

# FORCED REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA



THE SPP REPORTS VOL 5

THE TRANSVAAL

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# THE TRANSVAAL

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## Abbreviations

<u>BI</u>	<u>Bophuthatswana at independence</u> (Benso, 1977)
BIC	Bantu Investment Corporation
BNDC	Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation
BNDF	Bophuthatswana National Defence Force
BNP	Bophuthatswana National Party
CED	Corporation for Economic Development (formerly BIC)
<u>FM</u>	<u>Financial Mail</u> supplement on Bophuthatswana
GDP	Gross domestic product
<u>GER</u>	<u>Gazankulu Economic Revue</u>
GNI	Gross national income
<u>HAD</u>	<u>House of Assembly Debates</u>
KEDC	Kangwane Economic Development Corporation
LLA	Lebowa legislative assembly
LPP	Lebowa People's Party
Nafcoc	National Federation of Chambers of Commerce
PQ	Parliamentary question
PWV	Pretoria - Witwatersrand - Vereeniging

contd

## ABBREVIATIONS contd

<u>RDM</u>	<u>Rand Daily Mail</u>
SABA	South African Black Alliance
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SADF	South African Defence Force
SADT	South African Development Trust
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
S/TDC	Shangaan/Tsonga Development Corporation
VDC	Venda Development Corporation
VIPP	Venda Independence People's Party
VNP	Venda National Party
<u>WIP</u>	<u>Work in Progress</u>

## Glossary

### CATEGORIES OF RELOCATION

Relocation Removals Resettlement	All three terms are commonly used to describe both the overall policy and the processes involved in the massive, State-sponsored removals of people (almost all of them black) from one area to another that have characterised the apartheid system. SPP has favoured using either 'relocation' or the more descriptive 'removal' (or 'forced removal') in preference to 'resettlement' since 'resettlement' implies some accrual of benefit to the people who are moved and disguises the coerced nature of these population movements.
Consolidation	This is the official term used to describe the policy developed by the central government in the 1970s to reduce the number of separate, isolated pieces of land making up each of the bantustans (see below); it is part of the process of turning these areas into independent 'national states'.
Betterment planning	This refers to the schemes introduced by the central government in the african reserves since the 1930s and 1940s in an attempt to control land usage and thus improve and rationalise reserve agriculture. Under betterment, tribal areas are divided into residential and agricultural land and the people living on the land moved into rural villages.
Black spot	See below.
Influx control	This refers to the network of legislation and regulations which controls african access to the urban-industrial centres situated in what is claimed to be white South Africa; it severely limits the numbers of african people allowed to live and work there to those deemed to qualify in terms of Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act of 1923, as amended.

contd

## CATEGORIES OF RELOCATION contd

**Urban relocation** This refers to the deproclamation of african townships falling within prescribed urban areas (see below), and their removal to newly created townships within the boundaries of the bantustans. Physical removal does not always occur, as the boundaries of the bantustan can also be redrawn in order to encompass already existent townships within its boundaries.

## CATEGORIES OF RURAL LAND

**Reserve** These are the terms that have been officially applied to the african areas by the central government at various stages of recent South African history. 'Reserve' dates from the pre-apartheid period; the last three terms represent stages in the evolution of the policy of apartheid and refer to the various ethnic political constructions that have been created on the basis of the former reserves: Transkei, Ciskei, KwaZulu, Qwaqwa, Bophuthatswana, KwaNdebele, Kangwane, Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda. 'National state' is the most recent term to have been coined. SPP has chosen not to use either 'homeland' or 'national state' because of their unacceptable ideological bias. They present an image of these territories as economically viable, politically separate entities that are the only true and traditional 'homes' of the african people of South Africa, themselves divided along ethnic lines, and thus serve to justify the apartheid policy. Where possible we have referred to the various territories by name directly (e.g. KwaZulu, Ciskei etc.); otherwise, depending on the context, we have used 'reserve' or 'bantustan'.

**Scheduled land** Land set aside in terms of the Natives Land Act of 1913 for occupation and ownership by africans. The schedule to the Act was based on the existing african reserves and locations and amounted to about 8,98 million ha.

**Released land** Additional land set aside for african occupation and ownership to be added to the scheduled areas, in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. The total amount to be released in South Africa in 1936 amounted to about 6,2 million ha. Some of this was land that was already occupied or owned by africans; the balance had still to be acquired by the South African Native Trust (SANT, later SBT, then SADT) which was established at this time.

**Quota land** The total amount of land to be added to the scheduled areas in terms of the 1936 land legislation was apportioned between the four provinces on a quota basis; that amount represented the maximum area that could be occupied or owned by africans in each province. The total area of african land (scheduled and released) was thus fixed at a little below 13% of the total area in South Africa.

**Trust land** Land purchased by the State in terms of the 1936 land legislation and administered by the SANT/SADT.

**Black spot** This is an official term that is generally used to refer to african freehold land which was acquired before the 1913 Land Act and which lies outside the scheduled or released areas. It is one of the categories of land threatened with removal because it falls within what is considered the white area. In the SPP report we have used this term

contd

## CATEGORIES OF RURAL LAND contd

**Black spot, contd** to refer to all african freehold land that is under threat of removal, including land falling within scheduled or released areas that are to be moved in terms of the consolidation policy.

**Badly situated areas** This is a term used by the authorities to describe scheduled or released areas (tribal and, in some instances, freehold) that are to be moved because of the consolidation policy. Officials often use this term and 'black spot' interchangeably and SPP has tried to avoid using the term altogether.

**Excised land** Land which has been or is to be excised from the bantustans in terms of the consolidation policy of the government.

**Added land** Land which has been or is to be added to the various bantustans, in compensation for the areas to be excised in terms of the consolidation proposals of the government, so as to keep the quota of land set in 1936 constant.

## CATEGORIES OF URBAN/RESIDENTIAL AREAS

**Group areas** These are areas that have been proclaimed solely for occupation by members of a particular race group, either white, coloured or indian, in terms of the Group Areas Act of 1950. The Act also affects trading rights and interracial property transactions.

**Prescribed areas** Prescribed areas are proclaimed or deproclaimed by means of a notice appearing in the Government Gazette; they take in all the white urban areas and the presence of africans in them is governed by influx control regulations.

**Townships** Residential areas set aside for african, indian or coloured occupation, usually situated adjacent to or within commuting distance of a white urban area on which they are economically dependent. Conditions in these areas vary, but generally formal housing is provided for rent, and sometimes for sale. These areas are generally better off with regard to services and facilities than are the closer settlements described below.

**Deproclamation (of a township)** The process by which the legal procedure for establishing an authorised african township is reversed. This is a necessary preliminary step before such a township can be relocated.

**Informal settlements** Areas of settlement which are not planned or approved by the local authorities or the State. Housing is erected by the occupants of the land themselves, generally out of unorthodox building materials. The areas are often densely populated and generally poorly serviced.

**Closer settlement** The official term used to describe a type of settlement established for african people on reserve or Trust land that is for residential purposes only - no agricultural land is attached - and far more rudimentary in the type of facilities it has than a township. People who are removed off black spots and white farms are generally relocated to these settlements. They are provided with temporary accommodation and are expected to build their own permanent houses. Facilities vary but generally (not always) include pit latrines and a communal water supply point/s.

contd

black  
african  
indian  
coloured

In terms of the Population Registration Act of 1950, everybody in South Africa was classified according to their 'race' as defined by the Act; the four major classifications being established as 'White', 'Native' (subsequently Bantu, subsequently Black), 'Coloured' and 'Indian'. This is another example of language being manipulated by the government to promote the ideology of apartheid. In this report the term 'black' is used to include all those who are disenfranchised and are not classified as white; it thus includes all the people who are officially classified as Bantu/Black, Coloured or Indian. However, since the apartheid legislation affects these different sections of the black population differently in certain important respects, it is often necessary to distinguish between people along the official lines and in those instances we have used the terms 'african', 'indian' or 'coloured'. We have deliberately not capitalised the first letter in 'african' or 'indian' because we do not wish to legitimise the ideology of ethnic divisions and racism implicit in their usage.

Labour tenants

These are african families living on white-owned farms who supply their labour to the landowner for part of the year (3-9 months) as a form of rent, in return for the use of some of the land for themselves. Historically the most widespread form of farm labour in the northern parts of the country, the labour tenant system was finally abolished entirely by the government in 1979.

Rent/cash tenants

The term 'rent' or 'cash tenants' has been used in the report to refer specifically to those african families living on white-owned farming land who have commonly been referred to as 'squatters', because they are not labour tenants or full-time farm workers but pay a cash rental for the land. The term has been used to distinguish them from labour tenants. The government has over the years acted to eliminate this class of people.

Squatters

This is another ideologically loaded term. It is used in the report to refer to people living illegally on land without the permission of the landowner. The official use of the term is far broader and looser, and may describe any black person whose presence on a particular piece of land is not approved of by the authorities, regardless of the nature of the agreement between the occupant and the landowner. It has been used to describe people living on white-owned land, on black-owned land, both within and without the bantustans, on tribal land, and on State land.

Commuters

The term has been used in the report to refer to workers who work outside their place of residence but who are able to travel to and from work on a daily or weekly basis, i.e. as distinct from migrant workers (who only return home monthly or annually) or people working in the place where they live. We have not restricted the use of the term to workers travelling between bantustan settlements and non-bantustan centres of employment only, which is the official usage.

## General preface to the SPP report

Within days of announcing a reprieve for the Crossroads community outside Cape Town in April 1979, the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr P G J Koornhof, confirmed that 656 african families would be removed off tribal and african freehold land in the Tugela Basin in Natal, to make way for the building of the Woodstock Dam. The latter removal received an obscure report in the press and was forgotten in the wave of euphoria which marked the Crossroads Settlement. In April 1979 Total Strategy (against the Total Onslaught) was at its peak and ad hoc decisions appeared from a number of Departments serving, in this case, to highlight contradictions in the apartheid system.

While Crossroads had been the focus of national and international attention from the churches, liberal organisations and those in opposition generally, it was by no means the only community under threat of removal. Factors which helped Crossroads into the limelight included firstly, the fierce resistance of the people to be moved; secondly, its proximity to a metropolitan area (and therefore press, concerned public, welfare organisations and university resources); and thirdly, the recent demolition of all other squatter communities in Cape Town.

The idea of establishing the Surplus People Project, as a national research project on relocation, took root at this time in response to these events. Some people who had been involved in the Crossroads support group were unconvinced of the desirability of the Koornhof deal there and felt the need to focus on forced removals throughout the country, particularly in the rural areas where access was difficult, resulting in relocation unknown to outsiders. It was felt that an update of The discarded people by Cosmas Desmond was due, looking particularly at what had happened during the 1970s since the publication of Desmond's study. At the same time Gerhard Maré was compiling African population relocation in South Africa, for the South African Institute of Race Relations; this raised the general issue of relocation and suggested further areas of work.

After consultation with various community workers and academics, it was decided to hold a seminar of interested people to see if a national project on investigating relocation and raising the issues in public could be launched. The first meeting was held in February 1980. It was attended by 23 participants, most of whom became the core of the project which adopted the name Surplus People Project (SPP).

The objects of the project were established then as follows:

- 1 To co-ordinate and initiate research projects into population relocation in South Africa, and anything which has a bearing on such relocation
- 2 To work in conjunction with other groups and individuals who are engaged in similar work
- 3 To publish the results of the research in any manner that is decided by the management committee
- 4 To engage in any activity which is deemed by the management committee to be necessary to the adequate fulfilment of the above objects.

Initially the project was intended to last one year, but this became clearly inadequate and while funds were raised for that period, they were stretched to cover three years. Sincere thanks are expressed to the Interchurch Co-ordination Committee for Development Projects in the Netherlands for its financial and moral support.

The Surplus People Project derives its name from obvious sources. As a result of increased capitalisation of industry, agriculture and mining, relatively fewer unskilled workers are demanded by the economy. The changing nature of capitalist development in South Africa has

resulted in an increased demand for skilled workers, hence an attempt on the part of the ruling class to consolidate an urban black population with a stake in the system, and the determination to rid white South Africa of the unproductive, unemployed, disabled and youth. From surveys and field work, it has become clear that there are thousands of people who will never gain access to employment in urban areas and unless they are prepared to work for R1,00 per day on white-owned farms, where there may still be some work, they have been made redundant permanently. These surplus people will never enter the wage labour market under the present economic system.

However, during the course of the project, it has also become clearer to those involved in it that relocation has not been used only against those surplus to the economy's needs. Large numbers of skilled workers and employed people generally have been relocated under the group areas and urban relocation policies, for instance, while the removals linked to the consolidation planning of the 1970s have had a major political component to them. The original conceptualisation of what the project was investigating, as reflected in its name, has been broadened as a result.

The Surplus People Project was created as a voluntary group with a part-time national co-ordinator and a small steering or management committee for administrative matters. The strengths and weaknesses of a voluntary group were continually present. The experience from so varied a membership, based in Cape Town, Grahamstown, Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Johannesburg but with participants from the length and breadth of the country, was very valuable. There was a healthy mixture of theoreticians and practitioners with each learning from the other. For the first time many of the academics were involved in field work while community workers, priests and health workers were introduced to theoretical material which helped explain what they had observed for years. But the difficulties of voluntary work lie in the coordination of work and the responsibility of members to the group when it comes to working to deadlines. Some dropped out of the group and others joined. Those left to the end have had the major task of collating and writing up the masses of material collected.

The State intervened at various stages: Guy Berger, an early participant, was jailed (under the Terrorism Act) for other activity; Cedric de Beer and Aurret van Heerden were detained for over ten months and released without being charged. A number of other participants were detained for shorter periods in connection with other alleged activities. Field workers were harassed at various times.

It became clear that while a national understanding was essential, the whole country could not be covered in the same detail. Some areas were more accessible, both in terms of proximity to metropolitan areas and the level of political repression, e.g. KwaZulu; other areas exhibited less relocation on a mass basis, e.g. Transkei. In the case of the Transkei it was decided that the Eastern Cape group could not deal in depth with more than the Ciskei where mass removals have taken place on a very large scale and some of the worst conditions in the country occur. Relocation in the Transkei is therefore dealt with only as a chapter in the regional report. The national 5-volume report attempts to be comprehensive but it cannot claim to be uniformly reliable. It is, however, the most up to date and the most comprehensive account yet published.

While it is difficult to offer the right proportion of thanks to organisations and individuals, two organisations deserve special mention: AFRA (Association for Rural Advancement) in Pietermaritzburg for making the services of Cherryl Walker available at all times for research and field work (which accounts for the Natal volume being so much more detailed than the others). Co-operation has been particularly close with Saldru (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit) at the University of Cape Town. It gave generously of research officer and research assistant time and facilities for computer processing and for printing. The University of Natal and Lovedale Press have also been helpful in printing matters. The churches, particularly the Church of the Province of South Africa, the Roman Catholic Church,

the Lutheran Church and the South African Council of Churches, co-operated warmly. Without their network and contacts this project would not have been possible.

Sincere thanks also go to the Black Sash, the South African Institute of Race Relations, PACSA (the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness and Action), Diakonia and the Community Research Unit, both in Durban, the Legal Resources Centres in Johannesburg and Durban, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, journalists and many people from universities and institutions too numerous to mention.

#### SPP participants include:

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Helen Bradford	Marian Lacey	Thabe Shange
Debbie Budlender	Ben MacLennan	Janet Shapiro
Jeanne Chunnett	Mondi Makiwane	Judith Shier
Jacklyn Cock	Augustin Marapong	Charles Simkins
Josette Cole	Gerhard Maré	Janet Stanford
Carole Cooper	Pat McCartan	Pauline Stanford
Cedric de Beer	Rob Meintjes	Farouk Stemmet
Saul Dubow	Sheila Meintjes	Claire Stewart
Ross Duncan Brown	Raphael Mothe	Barry Streek
Tony Duncan Brown	Ray Moyikwa	Aurret van Heerden
Jeremy Grest	Vuyani Mqingwana	Cherryl Walker
Jenny Grice	Colin Murray	Nick Wellington
Priscilla Hall	Jean Ngubane	Joanne Yawitch
Ron Hall	Jeff Peires	Helen Zille
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Much of the production and co-ordination was done by Laurine Platzky (national co-ordinator), Cherryl Walker (Natal) and Priscilla Hall (Eastern Cape).


Cape Town, January 1983

# PART 1

## Introduction and Background



Driefontein, black spot under threat - this established community is fighting to stay where they have lived since the turn of the century  
(September 1982)



## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

This report is the last in the series of regional assessments on relocation produced by the Surplus People Project. The Transvaal report has three main parts:

First the introduction and background looking at the six bantustans in the Transvaal in terms of ethnic division and control. This is a broad area covering political and economic developments in the bantustans. It is general but necessary background to give an understanding of why relocation has taken the form it has in the Transvaal, as well as to explain how nearly one million people could be moved in the last 20 years and over half a million still be under threat of removal in the Transvaal alone, all in terms of State policy.

The second part summarises relocation in the Transvaal, being mainly a description by sub-region and bantustan of what is happening and has been happening. In many cases the material is sketchy and inadequate because so little has been published on the subject. It is hard to discover just where some of the places are, where people have come from or been moved to. Maps often bear no resemblance to names on the ground. But information has been gathered from fieldwork (trying to cover the whole province on limited resources) and secondary reports which have been checked wherever possible. The lists of places cleared and under threat have been compiled in an attempt to document removals. In many cases information is missing, so this report should be seen as an introduction to an area which needs detailed fieldwork and documentation.

The third part covers the detailed case studies. Five household surveys were carried out, four in relocation areas, one in an area under threat of removal. The plan was to cover each of the six bantustans but resources and time did not permit this, so Lebowa, KwaNdebele, Kangwane and Bophuthatswana were the ones sampled. Two further areas, Winterveld and the Sekgosese reserve, were analysed in detail as examples of ethnic division and resistance respectively. Unfortunately time has not permitted a comparative analysis of areas surveyed.

This report, like all SPP work, has been a joint and co-operative effort. At times there may be some repetition, but it should be read as a series of papers on relocation and the different bantustans.

The Transvaal has seen two main waves of relocation - the first moving africans into reserves and the second sorting them into ethnic bantustans. Many people have been moved a number of times as policy has developed and local conditions have changed. The most complex and unique aspect of the process of relocation in the Transvaal is the fact that it involves six different bantustans. Borders are continually being disputed, making it almost impossible for the researcher to make unqualified statements. Much is left in the air pending the Van der Walt Commission Report which should settle boundaries and probably mean that many more people will have to be moved to fulfil policy adapting to a changing economic and political scenario. Now that the decentralisation proposals, the plan for a 'constellation of States' and the handing over of Kangwane to Swaziland are being discussed, it is becoming increasingly clear that strategically the South African State intends abrogating its responsibility for as many rural blacks as possible while raising standards of living for the relatively few urban blacks who are necessary to the changing needs of a more sophisticated and technologically advanced economy.

The policy of relocating surplus people has therefore not changed in principle from the 1950s when people were endorsed and kept out of urban areas. Now not ALL blacks are to be excluded, only those who are not employed or who do not have standardised housing, which effectively limits access to the more skilled and stabilised urban black population. Resources are to be concentrated on them to improve education and housing while they are made foreigners - which in turn means they COULD be removed to a bantustan at any point. In terms of the new Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, the Minister may order any black person to be removed to an area he deems as their place of origin. Blacks therefore no longer have any form of security in urban areas once this Bill is passed.

The political justification has been created in terms of ethnic units. No-one pretends they are viable economic units anymore (hence the new decentralisation proposals). There has been much talk of interdependence, and increasing action against those from rural areas not conforming (migrants who strike, for example) so that it would seem that the talked-of 'reforms' mean increased control together with a recognition that urban blacks are part of the central economy. The strategy is: simply keep employed urban blacks materially satisfied, try to buy off puppet leaders to give them a show of political participation in the bantustans, evict and deport those who become politically active, or who grow too old or disabled to work in urban areas. Lastly, lower the costs of social infrastructure by getting rid of the rural unemployed, disabled and old multitudes to neighbouring States, and create buffer zones to ward off the guerilla army which finds fertile hearts and minds in the bantustans.

## 1.2 ETHNICITY & DISORGANISATION

### An aspect of population relocation in South Africa

The main concern in the Transvaal region of the SPP has been to examine a particular aspect of the State's policy of economic, political and ideological fragmentation of black people in South Africa.

Organisation of the dominant classes and disorganisation of the dominated classes are essential aspects of the general role of the State in capitalist social formations (societies). Organisation of the dominant classes is necessary to ensure that the collective interests of individually competing capitalists are catered for. Disorganisation of the dominated classes (especially of the working class) is essential to the maintenance of class exploitation (the reproduction of society). The strategy of disorganisation is general, even though it may take different forms in different social formations and at different times.

In South Africa the State's disorganisation strategies have been extreme, vicious and direct, and are still so. One only has to look at the most recent detentions of trade unionists and the State's role in breaking strikes to see examples of this. However, our concern is with another aspect of the strategy, viz. the bantustan policy.

While our focus has been on the african population of the Transvaal, this does not in any way mean that we do not perceive this to be a strategy aimed at all black groups (and ultimately at whites as well). A wide range of legislation and administrative actions extends the policy to coloured and indian people and to africans elsewhere in South Africa beyond the borders.

The aspect of policy under examination is the 'politicisation of tribal differences' (see Saul, 1979, p 348), and the effect this has on the relocation of africans into ethnic reserves (the bantustans, 'homelands', 'national States'). In other words we are looking at the extent and effectiveness (or failure) of indirect pressure/force that is brought to bear on africans to stay in, or move to, areas set aside for their exclusive occupation.

Fundamental to the policy of relocation is the virtual monopoly of power and force that the

State has - force that need not only take the obvious form of police interventions and/or military ones. The State's power extends to ideological and economic pressure as well, and it can mobilise great resources in all spheres. It is, however, not all-powerful. A range of factors set limits to the power of the State, and they account for its strength and weakness at different times. These factors include the organisational strength of the oppressed, the degree of legitimacy which the State has in the political sphere, how far the relations of control and exploitation are accepted in the workplace, the strength of ideas antagonistic to those other ideas that maintain society.

Let us briefly examine how disorganisation is achieved, or attempted (for it does not always succeed and there are definite limits to the power of the State). In South Africa the policy of disorganisation has involved the political form of a 'plurality of minorities' with political structure for each 'minority', preferably with separate and distinct areas set aside (see, for example, the regular resurrection of the idea of a 'homeland for the Coloureds'). At the same time this specific strategy demands the attempted destruction of political organisations and the removal of individuals who demand a common political future and a different economic structure. Examples of such disorganisation by the State can be found in the action taken against many individuals and the outlawing of organisations such as the ANC, the PAC, and the black consciousness organisations.

Economic disorganisation is directed at the class that bears the brunt of exploitation, the working class, and consists in putting obstacles in the way of working class organisation. The obstacles that concern us here are those that arise out of the system of migrant labour, such as insecurity, the control that is maintained through hostel and compound accommodation, time pressures on commuters, the distances between place of employment and place of residence, etc. This specific form of disorganisation and control of the working class both creates the conditions for and the maintenance of low wages, and offers justification for low wages (the myth of the 'single' worker lives on).

Ideologically one form that disorganisation takes is that of breaking the common bonds between the dominated classes and instead appealing to 'ethnic' identities, to 'homelands', to 'national awakenings' etc. In other words appealing to individuals to live their lives as members of fragmented ethnic units with claims circumscribed by this unit, the area it occupies, and the political apparatuses that govern it. This appeal of fragmentation would be set against counter appeals asking people to live their lives as 'blacks', as 'the oppressed', as 'the workers', as 'africans' etc. These appeals are antagonistic to 'ethnic' appeals because they call on a wider constituency that could counter the power of the central State and the dominant classes.

To repeat, this project is examining the relationship between these processes of disorganisation, and subsequent reorganisation of the oppressed/dominated classes into structures (also of ideas) which are not fundamentally antagonistic to ruling class interests. The specific focus is on the policy of the location and relocation of africans within ethnically divided bantustans, and the effectiveness and nature of the 'ethnic' justification offered for this division of people.

In Part 1 we will provide a framework for analysis, using disorganisation and reorganisation as the linking threads. It also deals rather briefly with the policy of separate areas in a historical perspective and contains a series of 'profiles' of the six bantustans in the Transvaal, illustrating the policy of ethnic fragmentation. Part 2 gives a regional overview of relocation. Part 3 surveys five relocation sites within the Transvaal. Part 4 is the conclusion.

The Transvaal region of the SPP has decided to focus on ethnicity and the origins of ethnic disorganisation of african people, and to provide some information on the ethnic relocation areas within the Transvaal because these areas (the 'black national States' as they are now known) have since the late '50s provided the political and ideological 'justification' for the relocation of people from one area to another. Without the 'rights and privileges', without

the 'realisation of a national striving' that is supposed to occur and be granted within these regions, the crudity of economic and political control mechanisms and the repression that is the reality of the bantustans would be too clear, both nationally and internationally.

## FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

As we have said, the State's role of disorganisation takes different paths, in part arising out of the different paths of capitalist development followed in the specific social formations. In South Africa the policy has to a large extent been determined by the way in which workers were first (partially) separated from access to their own means of production (land) and forced to work in industry, agriculture and on the mines. This is where the system of migrant labour has its origins, a system that allowed for labour-intensive extraction of poor-quality gold ore because labour was relatively cheap. The low wages paid were 'allowed' and justified by the coexistence with capitalism of a non-capitalist, 'traditional' and largely subsistence economy. In other words, it was possible to set the level of wages at the level of the needs of the individual worker with the argument that the families 'looked after themselves' in the reserves (see the bibliography in Moss, 1978, for the debate on the issue of 'cheap labour').

To maintain what increasingly became the myth of 'rural subsistence', it was necessary to maintain areas of separate land occupation and agricultural production - the reserves, set aside in law through the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts.

These geographically segregated areas increasingly came to be given a degree of institutional political identity, especially during the period that concerns us here, viz. the apartheid period. With the process of destruction of peasant and even subsistence production, the need for another justification for separation, division and disorganisation grew. Instead of the 'dual economy' thesis (of which precious little is heard today) we have a focus on political separatism, and a path that would lead to political 'independence'.

In other words, within the role of disorganisation lies the need for reorganisation by the State. Reorganisation has, in the last 20 years, taken the form of ethnic nationalism, at least as far as State intention has gone, that seeks to divide not only the working class but all dominated (black) classes.

The policy is apparently indiscriminate in that all africans are meant to find their political, if not residential, homes and have their aspirations met within the spatially separate bantustans. On the other hand, the policy is only apparently indiscriminate, in that it actually affects different classes in very different ways (see the discussion in the 'profiles' below). Let us draw attention to a few at this point: administrators and politicians are directly benefiting from the fragmentation of political responsibility, if not of authority, and limited financial control in the bantustans. They benefit not only through the salaries that are paid but also through the opportunities for corruption that are opened up (examples of corruption in the bantustans are many, as evidenced by reports of court cases and investigations in the Transkei and KwaZulu, while the salaries of the various 'cabinets' crudely reflect the aspirations and values of those who occupy the positions). The traditional petit bourgeoisie (traders and small-scale producers using mainly family labour) are benefiting through preferential treatment on an ethnic basis and through artificial protection from the ravages of much of the competition from monopoly capital. Capitalist farmers and peasants (few though they may be) receive financial and technical aid beyond what would have been the case had they been in direct competition with white capitalist agriculture.

At the same time the ethnic political structures are given a certain degree of 'legitimacy' through the trappings of political power. For example, control over the allocation of certain funds rests with the various ethnic legislative assemblies; certain repressive apparatuses

(police and military) are created on an ethnic basis; the symbols of political power are provided (a R7-million building has been erected for the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that rejects, in effect, only the final stage of ethnic reorganisation, viz. 'independence'); etc.

But, of course, this 'legitimacy' can backfire against the structures that have immediate responsibility for aspects of control, 'welfare' and 'development'. With responsibility for various services vested in the bantustan institutions comes an expectation from the regional populations that these will be met, and with the 'legitimacy' of controlling the apparatuses of repression comes the 'responsibility' of using them against the regional constituency (the best-known examples have come from the Transkei and the Ciskei, while in KwaZulu the Inkatha movement has played a similar role).

The economic rationality of the spatial disorganisation of the dominated classes (and specifically of the working class) by the South African State relates primarily to the system of migrant and increasingly commuter labour. The policy has succeeded beyond providing a rationale for low wages - it also made organisation of the working class most difficult through the extreme separation of place of work and place of residence (a separation that is inherent in capitalist factory production), the insecurity that goes with migration and contract labour where the termination of the contract means relocation to a region of control, and through the dual nature of industrial work and access to land (albeit inadequate in most cases even for subsistence production). It also places ethnic divisions on the working class at the place of work (extends the divisions that exist at the place of residence), and therefore acts against the socialisation effect that comes about through industrial production.

Increasingly commuter labour is replacing migrant labour, but this does not fundamentally alter the points made above.

The fact that ethnic separation affects one class very differently from another is most pertinent when we consider the effects of economic disorganisation on the working class. While 'ethnic preference areas' (the bantustans) may well benefit the individual activities of the petit bourgeoisie, and of small and large capitalist producers, this protection does not extend to the working class. Ethnic preference may mean conflict with other sectors of the working class. Such conflict cancels the strength of the working class that arises from unity and organisation.

Inextricably linked with attempts by the State at disorganisation in the political and economic spheres are assaults on the dominated classes in the sphere of ideology. Ideology, in the sense that it will be used here, does not refer to any specific content (for example, not in the sense of 'false consciousness'):

Rather it will refer to that aspect of the human condition under which human beings live their lives as conscious actors in a world that makes sense to them to varying degrees. Ideology is the medium through which consciousness and meaningfulness operate.  
(Therborn, 1980, p 2)

In other words, it refers to the many apparent 'self'-definitions according to which we act and interpret, but that are in fact imposed definitions (definitions implanted through the medium of ideology). Ideology (or elements of an ideology) does this to subjects (each one of us) 'by telling them (the subjects), relating them to, and making them recognize:

1. what exists ...
2. what is good ...
3. what is possible and impossible.' (Ibid, p 18)

It is especially the first and the last of these 'recognitions' that will concern us here - what exists and what is possible.

To put it crudely, in class societies the ruling class, those who control production, will also

attempt to control ideas, and the way that people see and interpret themselves and the world around them. It will attempt to get people to recognise as valid, to accept, a specific set of ideas as to what exists, what is good, and what is possible. Such a set of ideas is called an ideological discourse. In capitalist societies most of the ideological work is done for the ruling class by the State (through the media, legislation etc), by a range of apparatuses (the family, religious organisations, political parties, etc) and through various practices (speeches; films; books; and censorship of material, public speeches etc).

If the State hopes to achieve ideological hegemony or control (the ideological mobilisation of most of the citizens behind the ideas of the ruling class), it must have as many as possible of the elements in its ideological discourse accepted by the majority of the people. These must be accepted as the ideas ('self'-definitions) according to which they (we) recognise what exists, what is good and what is possible. And/or the State has to adopt and incorporate non-threatening (to the relations of exploitation and political domination) elements in the ideological discourses of other (dominated) classes (see Laclau, 1977; Mouffe, 1979).

An example is called for at this stage. In South Africa the State initially tried to adopt the black consciousness element into the discourse of the ruling section within the dominant classes. Black consciousness is an element within the discourse of antagonism of the dominated classes (as expressed largely by intellectuals and the petit bourgeoisie) that called on individuals to see themselves as black, to see this blackness as something positive and good, and that within this recognition lay the possibility of transformation of self and of society. The State tried adoption of this element, as expressed by SASO at the time, as being in line with its policy of separatism. This attempt very rapidly failed because black consciousness was a call to cohesion, and not fragmentation into ethnic or racial groups. Furthermore, the State attempted, and still attempts, to express this fragmentation in a non-antagonistic (to white interests) form of cultural variety and ethnic 'nationalism', rather than of conflicting interests and of a nationalism of the oppressed (blacks).

The ideological sphere is an area of struggle over whether society is to continue in a certain direction, as demanded by the ruling class, or whether it is to change in certain ways, as demanded by a section of the dominant class or by the oppressed people. The State does, of course, always have recourse to the power of its police and army if its ideological grip is loosened and its attempts at hegemony are rejected by the dominated classes. Ideology and repression cannot be separated. One only has to look at the brutal repression by the State when that very important institution for ideological control, the educational system, failed in its task during 1976 and since.

Wright has put it this way:

The fundamental interest of the capitalist class at the political and ideological level is to prevent the working class from acquiring state power and ideological hegemony.  
(1978, p 95)

One way in which this is being done, or attempted, in South Africa is the fragmentation (politically, economically and ideologically) of the african population into ethnic units (the bantustan policy/separate development/apartheid). In other words attempts are being made to disorganise appeals made to the working class, or to the oppressed people, or to both, and instead to try getting africans (and all other groups in South Africa) to live their political lives in separate ethnic groups.

But before we start saying something about South Africa, let us examine this element of 'ethnicity'. The first thing to note is that it can function both as an element in the disorganisation of people and as an element in the mobilisation of people towards change. The former is the most common though.

What is the nature of an appeal to 'ethnicity'; what are the conditions that make such appeals

available or unavailable, in specific situations and to different classes and organisations; and what sets the limits to availability? We will be drawing quite heavily on John Saul's article (1979), 'The dialectic of class and tribe'.

Saul wishes to discard the concept 'tribe' because it refers too directly and precisely to an 'entity pre-dating capitalism and colonialism, pre-dating "the beginning of (that) long transitional period in which their members were in varying degrees becoming incorporated into wider systems yet continued to retain strong elements of their former state"'. This 'tribal entity' can only be '(relatively) self-contained and autonomous' during this pre-capitalist period and not beyond it.

In the transitional and contemporary period Saul wishes to make use of the concept of ethnicity. Ethnicity would refer to 'attributes ... of commonality' like those of tribalism, e.g. 'language, territory, political unit and common cultural values or symbols'. However, the difference lies in the contingent and situational nature of ethnicity, the 'saliency of such features, the precise blend of them which becomes politically relevant' (ibid, p 349). In pre-capitalist social formations these 'attributes' would have formed a necessary and 'organic' whole. The same attributes now appear in the different situation of capitalism, torn from their previous relationship to production and distribution of products in a pre-capitalist (tribal) situation.

This is, however, a very loose formulation and the next point that needs to be raised is that of the 'availability of those elements which can coalesce, "situationally", into an expression of political ethnicity, some explanation, too, of the availability of significant numbers of the population to rally to such identifications' (ibid, p 352).

Saul argues that the availability of an appeal to, and mobilisation through, the features of ethnicity, comes from imperialist penetration in Africa, and the penetration of 'certain aspects of the pre-capitalist modes' (of producing and distributing products). Here he makes direct reference to the simultaneous destruction and maintenance of certain aspects of pre-capitalist economies and systems of political interaction, but now in the service of creating a specific kind of mining and industrial labour force. This is the process that we have referred to above as having occurred in the South African social formation and debated as the creation of a supply of 'cheap labour'.

This is the policy of maintaining territorial and political separation, and the continuation of a limited degree of subsistence production to allow and/or justify low wages in the capitalist sector. This policy, says Saul, in its historical development, has 'a clear tendency to strengthen ethnicity'. This is predominantly the case with the peasantry and with those who have been 'semi-proletarianised' (migrant workers with access to land) - in other words, people who are much more directly in contact with the pre-capitalist structures that have been maintained in a situation where capitalism dominates (structures such as those of chiefs and their authority). In South Africa this situation is much exaggerated, primarily because of the institutionalised nature of migrant and commuter labour, and because of territorial and political separation of a large section of the african population (placing them under the control of these maintained pre-capitalist authority structures).

Ethnicity can feature within the ideological mobilising appeals of the dominant classes, or of the dominated classes, or both (see Saul, 1979, pp 361-371). Examples of the latter can be found in the political and ideological practices of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and of FRELIMO in Mozambique during their struggles against Portuguese colonialism (but then it was to stress the richness of diversity within a common struggle). The example of the former type of attempt at mobilising ('top-down') that concerns us here is that of contemporary South Africa and the bantustan policy.

On a very broad level, the dominant element in the State's attempt to neutralise antagonism or conflict within South Africa is the strategy of transforming 'all antagonism into simple difference'

(Laclau, 1977, p 173, emphasis added). In other words, calling on people to define themselves in racial or ethnic terms, rather than in the terms of class that are demanded by the development of capitalism in South Africa. Racial divisions, as against class contradictions, are 'simple differences' in the sense that the racial definition of the situation allows for non-fundamental changes in the structures and institutions of the social formation, without in any way altering the basic relations of class exploitation. The terrain of the 'problem' (and of the solutions offered and discussed) is shifted to that of a 'fair' dispensation (in many fields, such as housing, education, political representation, welfare) between the races and between ethnic groupings. In this terrain progress is measured in quantitative terms (shares of the cake), while qualitative change in relations of exploitation and in the balance of power between classes is ruled out of bounds.

This does not mean to say that we are arguing that changes in 'race relations' do not have an influence on the expression and perception of relations of exploitation, but we are saying that the former is being used to cloud the latter.

The policy of bantustans has introduced further disorganisation, through ethnic fragmentation, into the racial definitions that were imposed during the segregation and early apartheid period. What success this has had against the immediately available and counteracting definition of 'black/african=exploited/discriminated against' or of 'worker', is difficult to assess. It can be expected that the most vigorous defenders of, and participants in, ethnic identification would be those who gain benefit from the material reality of political and economic positions and opportunities for enrichment (legal and extra-legal) that arise out of the existence of the bantustans.

We conclude, then, that there is a material reality to ethnicity, or to some of the features of ethnicity, that can be manipulated in the political and ideological mobilisation and control of the dominated classes. Those features arise out of the processes (referred to above) of the interaction between capitalism and non-capitalist economic and political structures and relations, and the subsequent destruction-maintenance of aspects of pre/non-capitalism.

The features of ethnicity are situationally mobilised and given a new reality in this different context of capitalism and capitalist domination (politically, economically, and ideologically).

In South Africa the State is attempting to mobilise ethnic nationalisms within the territorial units of the bantustans, based on the only regions left to the conquered tribes of southern Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Information argues it in this way:

... it is a verifiable fact that the Black peoples cannot by any criterion lay claim to all or even most of South Africa, and that the land surface of the country was 'divided' not by the Government but by history.

... By the end of the 19th century the patterns of settlement by Black and White had been legally stabilised. The vast majority of Black tribesmen were living in their traditional settlements where their chiefs and their councils held sway on matters of immediate concern to them. (Dynamic change in South Africa. For a fuller, different and less selective account, see the AFRA Factsheet, 'Who got here first - blacks in South Africa'.)

According to this account the bantustan policy is a smooth continuation of this pre-capitalist past.

Part of the fragmentation into bantustans involves direct and indirect pressures to separate people ethnically and thereby give credibility to the 'States'. This will be examined in some detail below.

This ethnic fragmentation benefits certain classes, and individuals drawn from these classes

are used as agents of the central State to fill the positions of control and mobilisation within the bantustan regions.

(See also Historical perspective section in Volume 1, and 'An outline of african land tenure in the Transvaal to 1936' in Part 4 below.)

#### NOTE

From this introduction certain questions and directions for investigation would seem to arise:

- to what extent have political control institutions been based (or been presented as having been based) on pre-capitalist structures (here reference is made to the institutions of indirect rule, african authorities, powers of chiefs in the legislative assemblies)?
- is there still an economic rationale for the political power of maintained pre-capitalist positions and institutions (e.g. allocation of land, or some contemporary equivalent such as bureaucratic intercession)?
- what are the material benefits offered to different classes in exchange for acceptance and propagation of an ethnic nationalism?
- what are the 'punishments' to force individuals and groups into ethnic territories?
- what are the symbols of ethnic nationalism used by classes mobilising on an ethnic basis?
- are any of these symbols making use of a 'centre-periphery' contradiction within the South African social formation (e.g. mobilising subjects on an anti-South Africa, or 'more land' appeal, phrased in ethnic terms)?
- what are the structures of ethnic political and ideological mobilisation (e.g. parties)?
- what factors militate against an ethnic interpellation - make it unavailable (e.g. industrialisation, national oppression and the organisation arising out of that oppression, class based organisations such as trade unions, etc)?
- how many people depend directly on ethnic apparatuses and institutions for their livelihood?
- to what extent are economic conflicts expressed in ethnic terms, and to what extent are the petit bourgeoisie mobilising ethnically in their own interests (economic and political)?
- is a progressive ethnic interpellation and mobilisation possible in South Africa?

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## 1.3 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALS

Proposals for decentralised industrial development in the Transvaal as proposed on 1 April 1982 were divided into three categories of incentive. The regions comprising the Transvaal are Region F (Eastern Transvaal, Kangwane, parts of Lebowa and Gazankulu), Region G (Northern Transvaal, Venda, parts of Lebowa and Gazankulu), Region H (the Pretoria - Witwatersrand - Vereeniging (PWV) area) and part of Region B (Northern Cape and Bophuthatswana). Relative development needs were ordered in terms of criteria outlined under discussion of the proposals in SPP Volume 3 for the Western and Northern Cape. The order of relative needs was set as Regions G (8), F and B (6), and H (4).

Deconcentration points related to the PWV metropolitan area were all in Region H - Brits, Bronkhorstspuit/Ekangala, a point in KwaNdebele in the vicinity of Bronkhorstspuit, Babelegi and Garankuwa in Bophuthatswana.

Industrial development points were isolated as Nelspruit/White River, Mkhuhlu (Gazankulu) and a point in Kangwane in Region F; Louis Trichardt, Pietersburg, Potgietersrus, Tzaneen, Thohoyandou (Venda), Seshego, Lebowakgomo and a point in the Steelpoort Valley (all Lebowa), Giyani and Nkowakowa (Gazankulu) in Region G; a point in KwaNdebele in Region H; and Heystekrand and Mafikeng in Bophuthatswana in the area under consideration in Region B.

A short description of the places isolated for incentives might be helpful. Heystekrand in the Pilanesberg near Sun City was designated capital of Bophuthatswana. Plans were changed, and the capital Mmabatho was built next to Mafikeng. Mkhuhlu is on the edge of the Kruger National Park between Hazyview and the Paul Kruger gate. The points in Kangwane and KwaNdebele had not been chosen by 1 April presumably because negotiations were in the pipeline concerning the futures of both areas - Kangwane is planned to be incorporated into Swaziland and KwaNdebele is to take 'independence' which is likely to mean a strategically important point would be chosen for industrial development, probably the capital Siyabuswa. Pietersburg, Louis Trichardt, Potgietersrus and Tzaneen are all strategically located within commuting distance of one or more bantustan towns: Seshego/Sebayeng/Mankweng near Pietersburg,

Table 1 INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POINTS

	Rail rebate (%)	% of total wage bill	Max amt per worker - R per month	Training grant	Rental & interest subsidy, 10 years (%)	Housing subsidy (% of interest rate)	Relocation allowance	Price preference on tenders (%)
<u>Region B</u>								
Heystekrand, Mafikeng	40	80	80	yes	45	40	yes	10
<u>Region F</u>								
Nelspruit/White River	40	80	70	yes	40	40	yes	5
Gazankulu: Mkhuhlu	40	95	110	yes	70	40	yes	10
Kangwane: a point still to be determined								
<u>Region G</u>								
Pietersburg, Louis Trichardt, Potgietersrus, Tzaneen	50	80	90	yes	50	50	yes	5
Venda: Thohoyandou	50	95	110	yes	70	50	yes	10
Lebowa: Lebowakgomo, point in Steelpoort, Seshego	50	95	100	yes	60	50	yes	10
Gazankulu: Giyani, Nkowakowa	50	95	110	yes	70	50	yes	10
<u>Region H</u>								
KwaNdebele: a point still to be determined								

Vleifontein is being built 30 km east of Louis Trichardt, Mahwelereng near Potgietersrus, and Nkowakowa and Lenyenye near Tzaneen. Thohoyandou, Giyani and Seshego are the capitals of Venda, Gazankulu and Lebowa respectively, while Lebowakgomo was originally designated the capital of Lebowa. The Steelpoort Valley is heavily populated with people moved into Lebowa in the past 10 years from black spots, towns and off farms.

It would seem that in white areas already established towns have been chosen. This takes advantage of existing infrastructure, unlike the past plans which proposed building in undeveloped areas. It may also be intended to stem the flow of whites with skills to the PWV and attract some to the small towns for strategic reasons. The places designated in the bantustans fall into three broad categories:

- capitals and places needing development for prestige and credibility,
- desperate unemployment (only the Steelpoort Valley falls into this category, despite the crying need throughout the bantustans) which may include places yet to be designated in Kangwane and KwaNdebele, and

Mkhuhlu, a place unknown except for its location described above.

This short generalised section serves as background to the profiles and more detailed material on relocation presented in Part 2.

## 1.4 PROFILES OF SIX TRANSVAAL BANTUSTANS

We now describe the six Transvaal bantustans in terms of their demography, economy, political developments, land tenure, relationship with the rest of South Africa, attitudes to relocation, categories of relocation, and so on. While not wishing to legitimate the ethnic delimitations of bantustans for those forced to live there, their material conditions have to be examined. (Part 2 will study the Transvaal in a geographical framework, for a more integrated picture.)

### 1.4.1 Venda

It has been proved that the Venda people and government are developed. It is time for Venda to take over the running of her own affairs. (Chief Minister Mphephu, quoted in RDM, 30.03.78. He went on to say that Venda expected to receive assistance from South Africa as long as Venda 'acted responsibly'.)

The tremendous enthusiasm and interest which prevailed during the recent elections ... make it abundantly clear that the Venda people believe in democratic processes of government by the people for the people. (Commissioner-General Otto, opening the Venda legislative assembly at Sibasa on 13.09.78)

This paper looks at Venda. Through this case study the myth of ethnic democracy and the impossibility of this 'independent State' providing anything like an adequate living for its 'citizens' are highlighted. The true role of the 'homelands' lies revealed as being the containment of sections of the working class, the establishment of puppet governments which exercise tyrannical control over sections of the oppressed classes (particularly the unemployed and others who are not required in the industrial centres), and the disorganisation of the oppressed classes through the imposition of ethnic divisions. It is in this context that the paper will finally look briefly at the available information on the process of population relocation as it

has affected those unfortunate enough to have been decreed 'citizens of Venda'.

Venda is two small dots of 6 060 sq km total in the Northern Transvaal. The two parts are separated at present by a finger of land belonging to Gazankulu, but they are to be joined according to proposals released on 8.07.82 (*Cape Times*). The same report says that Sinthumule - Kutama west of Louis Trichardt which was to have been excised will remain part of Venda.

At the time of 'independence' about one third of its citizens lived outside the 'country', which had to import about half of its staple foods. There was one tarred road in this 'new State', 13 km of railway line crossed it (although there was no station or siding to give this geographical accident any significance), and various reports claimed that 80-90% of the people depended on a subsistence agriculture for their survival. (In 1980 the de jure population was 522 000, and de facto 328 000.) In the year of independence Venda's budget was R35,5 million, of which R30 million came from the South African government. The Venda government offices were apparently served by only one telephone line.

Thus we see just how undeveloped Venda was and how necessary it remains for the Mphephu team to 'act responsibly' in order to ensure continued assistance from South Africa.

First we will look at the road to independence which belies the notion of Venda's commitment to democracy so vaunted by Commissioner-General Otto.

Venda's story begins with the 1913 Land Act which designated certain areas of land for occupation by africans only. The 1936 Land Act allocated some extra land. In 1962 the Venda Territorial Authority was created, and in 1969 some greater executive powers were granted to this body. In 1973 Venda was declared a self-governing 'homeland' with its own legislative assembly.

The 1973 legislative assembly was constituted in a strange way for a representative and democratic body. There were to be elections for 18 seats in the assembly. Another 42 seats were to be filled with chiefs simply by virtue of the fact that they were chiefs.

At the time of the election Chief Mphephu, drawing whatever support he had from the chiefs, was head of the Territorial Authority. The 18 seats were contested between his power bloc (later to form itself into the Venda National Party (VNP)) and Baldwin Mudau's Venda Independence People's Party (VIPP).

The VIPP won 13 of the 18 seats. It did them little good though, as Mphephu had the power to nominate the other 42, leaving his faction with a substantial majority. Mphephu left nothing to chance. Shortly before the opening of the assembly he took 40 chiefs on an all-expenses-paid trip to a private game reserve. There they were feted, given new suits as presents, and urged to support Mphephu. They were returned to the legislative assembly five minutes before the opening session and, not surprisingly, Mphephu was voted in to head the assembly.

Later, however, a number of chiefs defected to the VIPP. With little deference to the 'democratic process' Mphephu suspended the session of the assembly, which only resumed business once Mphephu had invoked powers to suspend and appoint chiefs in order to ensure loyal support from the chiefs whose status rested entirely in his hands.

If the 1973 elections were a farce, the 1978 ones were a tragedy, at least for the VIPP.

On 29.03.78 Mphephu tabled a motion in the assembly proposing that Venda become independent. Pre-independence elections for an enlarged legislative assembly were held on 22.07.78. The 42 nominated seats were retained, but the number of elected seats was increased to 42 as well. In these elections the VIPP won 31 of the 42 elected seats with Mphephu's VNP winning the

other 11. All 11 VNP candidates were elected in Mphephu's home territory, and the VIPP brought a court action contesting the validity of these elections, alleging there had been electoral irregularities.

Unmoved by the large display of popular opposition to his rule, Mphephu filled the nominated seats with his own supporters, many of them being defeated candidates in the election.

Even this was not enough to convince him that he had the situation under control. Within two months of the election, at least 55 VIPP members or supporters were detained, including 13 elected members of the legislative assembly. Two were magistrates who had been election officers in areas where the VIPP had won all the seats. The detentions were in terms of Proclamation R276 of 1977. (This was an emergency proclamation made after massive student demonstrations that year against Bantu Education which had led to 357 schools being closed, affecting 114 800 pupils.)

The legislative assembly opened on 12 September 1978. This was the occasion when Commissioner-General Otto talked about Venda's commitment to democracy. All but one member of the VIPP boycotted the opening. Then the run-up to independence began. A year later, on 13 September 1979, Venda became the third in the line of confidence tricks played on the people of South Africa, when half a million people were declared to be Venda citizens and were stripped of their right to claim a just stake in South Africa as a whole.

Before examining the rhetoric and the reality of this ethnic division, we shall look briefly at the ambiguous and vacillating role of the VIPP.

## THE ROLE OF THE VIPP

The VIPP's history is closely linked with that of Baldwin Mudau who headed the party from its inception. Earlier Mudau had been a social worker in Johannesburg, a lecturer at the University of the North, a research assistant at the University of the Witwatersrand, and had worked in the public relations section of a soap company. When the Venda Territorial Authority was proclaimed, Mudau was approached to work amongst Venda-speaking people in the urban areas.

Under the umbrella of the Venda Territorial Authority, he established a number of boards in the Transvaal townships, aimed at improving education, employment, housing, business rights and other services. His plans brought him continually into conflict with the ideological and bureaucratic structures of apartheid.

Mudau and some Venda-speaking businessmen tried forming a company that would operate businesses in the bantustan. Their licence to work was blocked by the BIC which controlled all business development in Venda.

Ensuing protests from Mudau and his board members led directly to them losing their jobs. The board members joined together to form the VIPP to fight the forthcoming elections, with Mudau at their head. Thus the VIPP grew directly from the frustration of petit bourgeois aspirations in the Venda bantustan, and has vacillated in almost classical petit bourgeois style since then.

The old advisory boards were turned into local VIPP branches in the urban areas to work amongst migrant workers. Candidates put forward by the VIPP were largely traders in the bantustan. With the resources at their disposal, the VIPP had no difficulty in mobilising widespread opposition to the undoubtedly unpopular cabal of chiefs presided over by Mphephu. Their rhetoric (and no doubt their belief) was one of strong opposition to independence and a commitment to social justice in South Africa. Dison quotes Mudau as saying,

I was brought up and educated to believe in a common South Africa and that is what I am fighting for. (Dison, 1978, p 286)

The extent of the VIPP's victory is an indication that the party was able to extend its appeal beyond the petit bourgeoisie into migrants and ordinary residents of the bantustan.

By 1978, when Mphephu committed Venda to independence, the position taken by the VIPP was much less clear. The RDM (30.03.78) reports that Mr G Legege, a VIPP MP, stated that his party was not opposed to independence but that they wanted to see the territory properly consolidated first. Mudau's position is reported to have been that he was neutral on the question but felt that a referendum ought to be held to determine the wishes of the Venda people. Thus we see that those who enter into ethnic, 'homeland' politics, even from an oppositional point of view, get trapped within the logic of ethnic separation, and the battles they engage in are over how such separation should take place (and who should benefit). From this time on, Mudau's statements are couched in specifically ethnic language.

The VIPP, with some of its members in detention and many others scared to set foot in the territory, boycotted the opening of the legislative assembly. However, by March 1979 they agreed to participate in the new session, after the intervention of Dr Koornhof, whom Mudau said he 'trusted'.

But one of Mphephu's first acts was to propose that VIPP MPs should not receive their salaries for the past few months because of their boycott of the legislative assembly. As a consequence the VIPP walked out, vowing never to return (Star, 23.03.79). Two newspapers quoted Mudau as saying the following:

We sit here as a solid group representing the people of Venda (Post, 22.03.79)  
and

We are capable of articulating the woes and aspirations of the depressed and defenceless Venda people.

Unfortunately their greed overcame their principles, and after the salary question had been resolved the VIPP returned to the assembly. By April the VIPP was collaborating in the drafting of a constitution which defined as a Venda citizen anyone born inside or outside Venda whose parents were citizens of Venda at the time of the birth.

In March 1980 Mudau called for a merging of the VIPP and the VNP. He said that the VIPP had the intellectuals necessary to run the country and called for the sacking of the whole cabinet (Post, 25.03.80). Presumably the idea was that the cabinet would be replaced by the VIPP 'intellectuals'.

Despite popular support, the VIPP had been unable to seize power via the ballot box in order to further their own economic interests (which had been stifled by the BIC). As a result Mudau and the VIPP turned to stealth and tried to put themselves in power through a palace revolt in which they tried simply to take the place of the 'uneducated' chiefs. Their aim could only have been to further their own interests, as is rather baldly shown by their behaviour over the threat to suspend their salaries.

The change in the position of the VIPP leadership is not that surprising. The South African government has always offered substantial rewards for those who are prepared to collaborate in the fragmentation of the country and has tried to buy support for the bantustans amongst a small elite through the development programmes initiated in the 'black states'.

## THE REWARDS OF INDEPENDENCE

The Venda budget for the year 1979/80 was increased by 40% to R36 million. All but R6 million was contributed by the Pretoria government one way or another. The following year the budget grew by another 92% to R70 million, of which only R15 million came from local sources. The ability to allocate and control these expanding resources obviously provides opportunities for self-enrichment. In addition to the above sums of money, the South African government allocated R18 million for twelve independence projects. These included R5 million for government buildings, R500 000 for a presidential palace, and R1 million for a new prison. Houses for Venda cabinet ministers were built at a cost of R88 000 each.

On 6.12.80 the RDM reported that the Venda parliament had voted themselves pay increases. According to the new scale, Chief Mphephu would earn R36 000 a year, cabinet ministers R27 000 and members of parliament R7 000. The attractions of high office are clearly substantial in a 'country' where the average annual income was R171 in 1978 (according to Dr Andries Treurnicht, quoted in RDM, 17.03.78).

In addition to the direct perks of office, influence with the Venda Development Corporation (VDC), which together with the Corporation for Economic Development (CED) dominates the development of industrial, commercial and agricultural projects, is of no small interest to those whose main concern is their own self-advancement.

There is a lot of money involved in the VDC/CED projects. The Tshivhase tea estates are a joint VDC/CED enterprise. The intention is to expand tea production by offering tribal authorities shares in return for making tribal land available for farming. Frasers, a major trading company in all the bantustans, dominates trade in Venda, and the VDC has a 50% share in Frasers Venda. In addition to Frasers, the VDC has joint venture agreements with LTA construction and NTK Roller Mills. It has provided more than R700 000 worth of loan capital to local businessmen and, together with the CED, VDC has developed an industrial area at Thohoyandou and two factory training centres. According to the RAU/Benso report the VDC plays an important role in stimulating trade and services. For example, in 1978/9 R361 000 was budgeted for this purpose. The main projects were: extensions to the Thohoyandou hotel, improvements made to one beerhall and one bottlestore, and the construction of four new bottlestores. Various other industrial, agricultural and food-processing projects were launched under the auspices of the VDC. Given the overall backwardness of the area, it is not surprising that Venda politicians have been drawn by the riches which participation could offer.

What of the ordinary Venda-speaking people who have been assigned citizenship? Where do they live, and how do they live?

The de jure population of Venda is thought to number about half a million people. Various estimates put the de facto population at two-thirds of this, or about 350 000 people. The RDM (13.09.79) says that at least 80% of the workforce is employed in agriculture. Given that the population density is about 55 per sq km, it is not surprising that Venda agriculture does not live up to its full potential. This paper will look at agriculture later.

The extraordinarily low level of economic development in Venda is demonstrated by the low-keyed urbanisation within the territory. In 1977 only 4 300 people (or slightly over 1% of the de facto population) lived in the four proclaimed towns.

In 1978 (according to the annual agricultural census quoted in the RAU/Benso report of 1979) 58 000 people who had been unable to obtain any land for farming were living in closer settlements - densely populated rural slums, with no land at all available for agriculture.

## EMPLOYMENT

How do the 20% who are not engaged in subsistence agriculture live? Proportions of national income are given in Table 1. below.

Table 1 NET NATIONAL INCOME 1971 & 1975 (%)

	Permanent	Commuters	Migrants	Total
1971	18,9	4,5	76,6	100
1975	21,5	4,4	74,1	100

from Department of Statistics (09-17-03)

## MIGRANT LABOUR

According to Venda government statistics, in 1979 there were 47 916 workseekers registered with the four district labour bureaux which have attached to them a total of 26 tribal labour bureaux. According to the same statistics, the total number of migrants recruited through these bureaux and private agencies such as TEBA totalled 20 239 or 42% of workseekers. Bearing in mind the large number of people who no longer bother to register as workseekers, the level of unemployment is reputedly up to 50%. At the same time, however, RAU/Benso report claims that there were in fact a total of 62 300 migrants earning a total of R100 million. (They do not explain how they come to this figure.) If it is accurate, it would mean that two thirds of all migrants were getting their jobs through unofficial channels. Moody states that 39% of the total de facto population is male, an imbalance most pronounced for the 20 - 24 age group where only 2,9% are men and 97,1% women.

## COMMUTERS

The RAU/Benso report states that in 1976 there were 3 700 commuters, and in 1978 the figure had risen to 5 300, earning a total of R7,5 million. Of the total number of commuters, 3 400 travelled daily to Louis Trichardt while they were employed on neighbouring white farms. The total number of commuters will presumably rise when the Louis Trichardt township is moved inside the borders of Venda.

## LOCAL EMPLOYMENT

According to undated statistics from the Department of Internal Affairs, there were 380 registered employers engaging a total of 3 104 employees at an estimated average wage of R28,50 a month. However, there was also a total of 646 unregistered employers, with an unknown number of employees. These figures do not cover the total range of employers, dealing as they do with petty traders and businessmen such as bakers, bottlestore owners, undertakers, etc.

In addition there are a number of larger commercial, farming and industrial enterprises, largely sponsored by VDC / CED in conjunction with capitalist enterprises from the rest of South Africa.

Table 2 PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

	1971	1975
MARKET PRODUCTION		
Agriculture	6,0	3,8
Mining	1,1	1,7
Manufacturing	1,8	3,1
Construction	2,9	1,9
Wholesale & retail	7,9	4,3
Transport	2,3	1,1
Finance	0,6	0,5
Govt: Public admin	12,4	13,9
Education	15,2	19,8
Health	7,7	6,3
Other	1,4	0,8
SUB-TOTAL	59,3	57,2
NON-MARKET PRODUCTION		
Agriculture	18,2	30,3
Manufacturing	14,1	8,2
Construction	3,8	1,9
Home ownership	4,6	2,4
SUB-TOTAL	40,7	42,8
TOTAL	100,0	100,0

from Department of Statistics (09-17-03)

Tshivhase Tea estates were reported by RAU/Benso (1979) to be employing 820 local people. Post (26.03.80) reported that these workers were earning about R1,00 per day.

There were 9 sisal projects employing a total of 423 people.

In 1979 the forestry projects were employing 617 people and Pumlanga saw mills 245.

There are two small irrigation schemes at Mutale and Senare. The intention is that all the land will be handed over to local farmers, according to RAU/Benso. Meanwhile, if these schemes are anything like similar projects elsewhere, these 'local farmers' are effectively being employed as wage labourers on the farms.

There are two citrus projects and some pineapple estates employing an unknown number of workers, and the CED is involved in a coffee project at Phaswane on a 200 ha estate. It is planned to involve 40-80 small farmers and to assist them with management, planting and marketing, RAU/Benso reports.

In 1978 there were four mines in production, employing 233 local people. The VDC has

established a canning factory to produce achar from mangoes, and a sorghum beer factory with unknown numbers of employees. The CED has established an industrial site at Thohoyandou, and the VDC has set up two factory training centres which have provided jobs for about 270 workers, 200 of them involved in cottage industries.

Finally, there is the government - 'by far the largest employer of wage labour' according to RAU/Benso.

According to this publication, at the end of 1977 the permanent government labour force was 1 500 excluding teachers, and temporary government posts employed another 1 750. Apparently there were 2 800 teachers in 1978.

It is not clear whether workers in the health sector are included in the above figures. Black homelands in South Africa published by the Africa Institute states in one place that there are 13 doctors and 352 nurses, and in another that there are 23 doctors, 649 nurses and 648 other, totalling 1 330. RAU/Benso gives a total of 428 for 1979 for nurses, assistant nurses and various categories of trainee nurses. In 1979 there were also six social workers.

Post (5.02.80) notes a Venda National Force (combining the functions of army, police, traffic control and firefighting) which totalled 450 members.

RAU/Benso reports that in 1979 there were 60 agricultural officers in government employment.

A casino opened in May 1981 and greyhound racing is planned. Apparently an arms factory is envisaged. These will provide some local jobs.

In 1978/79 a total of 19 162 people received pensions.

There is no point in trying to add up the total number of jobs involved or what was paid out. It is clear that locally generated income and jobs cannot even begin to cater for a population of 350 000 or more people.

We now look at agriculture in Venda and its contribution to the livelihood of the people.

## AGRICULTURE

The RAU/Benso report says that

though Venda has a fairly high agricultural potential, it is not so high that an adequate standard of living can be provided for the majority of the population, which implies that alternative sources of income and employment should be developed as a priority.

The Sunday Times (27.05.79) reports there are 50 000 'farmers' in Venda, and the RDM says (13.09.79) that

agriculture absorbs at least 80% of the work force. Most agriculture is still for subsistence rather than marketing.

The 1979 Volkskas Review gives the population density as 55 people per sq km.

These facts together give the following picture. 80% of the workforce is trying to subsist through agriculture, in an area with a population density of 55 per sq km (and very little urbanisation), off land which 'cannot produce an adequate living for the majority of the population'.

In fact these 50 000 farmers are not farmers at all. They are families who have been allocated some land (usually one or two morgen) by their chief or headman. Most of the work on the land is done by women who, having a vast range of domestic duties, can by no means be considered full-time farmers. There is also a serious shortage of adequate draught power for ploughing, and capital for other necessary inputs. As a consequence, yields from the land do not provide subsistence for even a portion of the year. With the population density as it is, not everyone has access to land. Interviews for an as yet unpublished survey show clearly that many people do not have access to any agricultural land at all. (In some areas less than 50% had any land.)

In 1978, RAU/Benso states, 24 closer settlements had been established with a population of 58 000.

They came into being in response to overpopulation on the land and were planned and laid out by the Department of Agriculture in conjunction with the local chief. Persons without agricultural rights were settled in these areas....

These would not be the only landless people. About 75% of Venda's agricultural land has been 'planned' into betterment schemes intended to rationalise arable, grazing and residential areas. Elsewhere in the country such schemes hide huge reservoirs of landless people (see Yawitch, Betterment, SAIRR, 1982). According to Moody, 80% of Vendas live on the land - about 217 500 in 1970 - while 11 471 in 1978 had no land rights.

Thus, of the 80% of the population that allegedly live off the land, many actually have no land at all, and of those who do, very very few gain anything like subsistence.

How do they live? The short answer is: with a great deal of difficulty. The (slightly) longer answer is that they live off income from migrant workers. This is quite clear from the fact that earnings from migrant workers totalled 70% of gross national income in 1976 (see RAU/Benso, p 111).

RAU/Benso 1979 quotes figures (pp 121-3) showing that Venda's agriculture has a potential for generating a net income of R34,5 million, and that 92% of this depends on the development of fruit, tea, vegetables and other cash crops on the 5% of the land suitable for farming of this sort. Venda had net imports of more than R3,5 million in staple foods in 1973/4 (Moody, p 26), though, which reinforces the impression that subsistence farming is simply not a viable means of livelihood for most of the population. It is also clear from the RAU/Benso report that the major sector of agricultural development will be cash cropping. This will pave the way for the future penetration of capitalist agriculture, which has already begun under the auspices of the VDC. This will not benefit the majority of people who live on (if not off) the land. It will also open further scope for exploitation (cf. wages on the tea estates quoted above) and landlessness as tribal authorities surrender land for commercial farming purposes.

For a detailed discussion on agriculture, the reader is referred to Moody.

## CONCLUSION

There seems little truth in either of the two statements quoted at the beginning of this paper: the 'democracy' that maintains the politicians in power, and Mphephu's statement about the level of development of the Venda people and government. By far the major part of Venda's budget comes from the central government. Even with this subsidy, the territory has no way of providing either employment or services to its 'citizens'. They live on land much too small to provide even subsistence for the population, and the job opportunities are limited and largely poorly paid. More than half of those employed work as migrants or commuters in

'white' South Africa. Even among that group, very few work in nearby towns (Louis Trichardt 2,8%, Pietersburg 0,4%, Messina 0,7%) while 56% are employed on the Witwatersrand and 6,8% in Pretoria, according to Moody.

The territory's function is clear. It is a labour reserve which also serves to house and discipline a part of South Africa's surplus population. What jobs there are, and the few small industrial and commercial ventures that exist, are for the elite. Their jobs, their loan capital and their permits to trade clearly come from 'our government', 'our health service' or 'our development corporation'.

So the educated elite, including the tribal chiefs, get locked by a system of patronage and dependency into the ethnic reality of the Venda bantustan. In time, many may come to see themselves as citizens of Venda.

It is this reality that led the VIPP from a position of opposing independence to one of acquiescence, and then collaboration, and finally to pleading to be accepted as part of the ruling group.

This is the reality which is helping to create a balkanised South Africa, in which real conflicts between the bantustans come to exist and where ethnic conflict over land and access to scarce resources is created. Unity is being destroyed among the oppressed people of South Africa.

Mudau and the VIPP were drawn by the imposed logic of apartheid and by their class position into accepting ethnic politics. Chief Mphephu and his colleagues, on the other hand, never had any doubts, nor did the officials of the South African government which installed them and keeps them in power because they 'act responsibly'.

Mphephu is quoted in the RDM (31.01.79) as saying that there was much work to be done before independence -

However, we will be helping in the building of a nation, and this will be a unique event.

Later on that year he says,

Both the Venda government and the people, irrespective of their place of residence, regard Venda citizenship as a most important and precious possession. (RDM, 7.06.79)

In August 1979, one month before independence, the South African government conferred paramount chief status on Mphephu. Ignoring the massive popular rejection of the man in the 1973 and 1978 elections, Minister Fanie Botha said at the ceremony that the

Venda people would now have one leader as a symbol of unity. In addition to having one language, one history and one culture, the people would now have one leader recognised by all.

The extent to which Mphephu sees Venda-speaking people as a group whose interests are different from, or even in conflict with, other oppressed people in South Africa is indicated by a statement he made at the time of independence. Apparently referring to territory which is in dispute between Gazankulu and Venda, he said:

We are aware of the problems confronting South African attempts to satisfy all black states, but the owner of the house and the tenant who has been allowed to hire a room cannot receive equal treatment.

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## 1.4.2 Gazankulu

Gazankulu has been designated the 'homeland' for all Shangaan/Tsonga people in the Transvaal, the common language being Tsonga. It is one of the smaller and even poorer bantustans, and has not had the publicity that some of the more flamboyant bantustan officials have been able to attract to the regions they administer.

However, this region, like the others, serves to fragment the population of South Africa, to create antagonisms where none existed, and to give what little legitimacy the central State claims for forcing people into these regional group areas called 'homelands'.

It is particularly ethnic conflict that will be examined in this brief section on the Gazankulu bantustan. We include some of the inadequate and often conflicting statistics and information on relocation in, and into, the bantustan. Some of the statistical absurdities have been left out, but it is still necessary to warn the reader against accepting the figures at face value. Benbo has a monopoly of published information and often there is no other research material available, so it is hard to corroborate its glossy publications.

## POPULATION

The table below shows the usual confusion on statistics. In 1970 there were said to be 34 140 'other blacks' in the Gazankulu bantustan, while 158 100 Shangaan/Tsonga people were said to be residing in other bantustans (73 580 in Lebowa; 55 540 in Bophuthatswana; 17 680 in Venda; and 10 280 in what is now Kangwane). A further 261 140 Shangaan/Tsonga were said to be in areas outside any of the bantustans.

In other words, in 1970, according to Benbo, 40,8% of Shangaan/Tsonga lived in Gazankulu. This percentage remained until 1976 (40,98%) and 1977 (41,2%) according to Benbo projections. These figures indicate that enormous numbers of people could still be moved for the sake of ethnic homogeneity.

The large numbers of Shangaan/Tsonga living in Lebowa, Venda, Bophuthatswana and (to a lesser extent) Kangwane regions of South Africa indicate the impossibility of separating people out except at the cost of great hardship. The mixed populations also mean there are areas where 'ethnic' conflict can be manipulated (see below).

Table 3 GAZANKULU POPULATION, DE FACTO & DE JURE, 1970-1977

	De facto	De jure	Source
1970	265 642	650 300	GER*1976, p 22. For 1970 Malan & Hattingh (eds), 1976, p 145 give a higher figure, but both sources quote the 1970 census.
1971	392 000	736 000	SAIRR Survey 1971, p 36, quoting Professor Ntsanwisi
1975	265 100	744 400	GER 1976, p 11
1976	333 600	814 000	SAIRR Survey 1977, p 311, quoting Benbo projections
1977	344 500	836 000	SAIRR Survey 1978

\* Gazankulu Economic Revue

The population of Gazankulu is mainly rural, with very little urbanisation having taken place. The South African Bantu Trust (SABT) first started establishing houses in Nkowakowa in 1961. Workers living in this town (population 1 830 in 1975) and also in Letsitele (population 627 in 1975) are mainly employed at the Letaba citrus estate, while the former also supplies the little labour that is needed at 'industries' in Letaba and Tzaneen. The capital of Gazankulu is at Giyani.

#### Urban population in Gazankulu:

1960	-	
1970	4 516	
1975	8 758	(Malan & Hattingh (eds), 1976, p 153)
	9 385	(Benbo, Black development in South Africa, 1976)
1976	10 537	(GER)
1979	12 305	(Smit & Booysen, 1981, appendix II)

While the urban population in 1960 was nil, the 1970 figure had doubled by 1975. Yet this still meant that only 3,5% of the de facto population of Gazankulu lived in towns.

It is not clear how many people living in town are there because of relocation from white areas and from other bantustans. This population movement is envisaged by Benbo in terms of a housing shortage problem (GER 1976, p 29):

A housing shortage is expected in future since more and more people are leaving the agricultural sector for towns and cities and efforts are being made to resettle Shangaan/Tsonga from the White area. (emphasis added)

The report points out that the bantustan annually budgets for a 'population resettlement programme'. The amount includes the costs of

removal and resettlement of Shangaan/Tsonga from the White area to Gazankulu. In the three year period 1970 to 1973 1 000 people were so relocated.

Professor Ntsanwisi, the Chief Minister, commented on this 'ethnic consolidation':

I do not see how we can possibly resettle these people now. They should stay where they are. We welcome back those who can start businesses, but we know we have nothing spectacular to offer at present. (Quoted in Horrell, 1973, p 28.)

Smit & Booysen (1981, appendix II) point out that the bantustans closer to major development centres have a much larger percentage of their population urbanised. It is possible to generalise and say that migrants largely come from bantustan rural areas, while commuters live in urban settlements within bantustan borders.

Only Venda, of all the bantustans, had a lower percentage of its de facto population resident in town. Benbo does point out that 'inhabitants of rural settlements and squatter areas were not included' in their calculations on urbanisation. However, it could be expected that squatter areas in Gazankulu would not be very large, as these areas develop close to industrial employment opportunities.

#### EDUCATION & HEALTH

In 1975 there were 245 primary schools and sections of schools for 97 181 pupils; 30 secondary schools for 7 140 pupils; and two teacher-training institutions (Malan & Hattingh (eds), 1976, p 153).

There were four hospitals with 1 317 beds, 39 clinics served by 49 nurses, and 20 full-time personnel and 536 nurses in the bantustan (Ibid, p 154). In 1973 there had been 29 clinics, four hospitals (but apparently 200 more beds were in use then), 13 medical, 13 paramedical and 402 nursing staff.

#### LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT

Ironically the Benbo publication on Gazankulu states (1976, p 11) that

because there is such a large percentage of migrant workers and commuters, the GNI per capita of Gazankulu is among the highest of the homelands. (viz. R191 in 1973/4)

People have to migrate because, apart from government employment, there is very little going in Gazankulu.

#### AGRICULTURE

Agriculturally 100% of irrigable available land (1973) was being used. It amounts to 0,2% of the area of Gazankulu of 675 000 ha - planned to be 741 000 ha and three rather than four pieces of land after the 1975 consolidation proposals (Black development in South Africa 1976, table B9.2).

The same report claims that 90% of Gazankulu's surface area had been planned by 1974 in 'phase I' planning ('the initial settlement and stabilization planning'). In other words, large numbers of people would, of necessity, have had to be relocated, since 62,2% of economically active Shangaan/Tsonga in Gazankulu have been 'employed in agriculture' (GER 1976, p 26).

Agriculture in 'white' South Africa is also the largest employer of the Shangaan/Tsonga people living outside the bantustan (36,3% of them) (GER 1976, p 26).

It was reported in the SAIRR Survey 1980 (p 435) that the Gazankulu Agricultural Company was formed by the Shangaan/Tsonga Development Corporation (S/TDC) and the CED to run large-scale projects and establish individual farmers on them:

- the Marivan irrigation project (providing employment for about 600) - the land on the Great Letaba River was being rented from the Bankuna Tribal Authority,
- seven poultry farms,
- the New Forest Irrigation scheme (employing 120),
- irrigation projects established by the CED at Mhinga, Belasting and Nondweni.

The Star (29.05.81) reported that the Belfast farm in the Mhala district was being developed at an estimated cost of R3,2 million. It will eventually settle 85 black farmers and provide them with small units....

The S/TDC had also lent the Gazankulu Agricultural Corporation R925 000 during the year ended March 1981 for four other projects (some of those mentioned above).

The CED has estimated that ultimately 28 600 ha could be irrigated (if the necessary dams were to be built), where 8 500 farmers could be settled, each earning R2 500 a year. (At 85 new farmers a year, it would take a long time for the full potential to be realised.)

#### MIGRANT WORKERS

It has already been noted that a large number of the de facto population of Gazankulu are migrant workers.

In 1975, for example, 10 961 male and 85 female labour contracts were attested, while 6 750 call-in cards were used (SAIRR Survey 1976, p 254). The SAIRR Survey 1977 records that the 75 200 migrant workers' incomes amounted to 77,5% of the GNI of Gazankulu (which stood at R225 per capita in 1975) (p 367).

It was said that in 1975 the GDP was R17 695 000 (or R55,00 per capita), while commuter incomes amounted to R13 760 000, and migrant labour incomes to R76 488 000. It would be an understatement to say that Gazankulu is a poverty-stricken labour reserve.

In 1975 the 72 500 migrant workers made up 22,4% of the de facto population, the highest figure for any of the bantustans. The dependency burden was also the highest. Gazankulu was reported as having only four district labour bureaux in 1977 (as against 126 tribal, 13 district and one regional bureau in Lebowa). Is this related to the necessity to migrate obviating the need to recruit workers? Benbo euphemistically puts it like this:

Of all the homelands Gazankulu has the highest male absenteeism coefficient and therefore (sic) the weakest retention ability, in other words, the homeland is subject to population pressure and a shortage of employment opportunities. Gazankulu's isolation from the PWV area, as well as the shortage of adequate industrial growth points in the surrounding area, are factors to which the low commuting\* figure and the high migrant worker figure can be ascribed.

\* The various figures given for the number of commuters from Gazankulu that are supplied in the publications consulted differ so much, they are impossible to interpret. The lowest figures range around 5 000.

#### INTERNAL INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT

Like the other bantustans only more so, Gazankulu provides very little internal industrial employment. Of Shangaan/Tsonga in all bantustans only 19,5% are defined as economically active by Benbo (GER 1976, p 25), while two and a half times as many are economically active in 'white' areas.

The only two areas listed by the GER as being 'border industrial areas' are a farm called Letaba (employing 78 africans in 1975) and the town of Tzaneen (where about 3844 africans are said to have been employed in 1975). By the same year BIC (now CED) enterprises had provided employment for 128 africans (97 in 1974).

In Black development in South Africa 1976 (table B9.18) it was estimated that 730 jobs were being created within Gazankulu every year, and an additional 856 jobs for commuters from Gazankulu. Quite a number of these must have been government jobs within the bantustan, as 6 887 africans were employed by the Gazankulu authorities in 1975 (up by 809 from 1973).

In terms of the agency system 301 jobs for africans had been created by 1974. Four years later this figure was 703. The S/TDC created jobs for 1 059 by 1978, a figure that had risen to 1 608 by 1980.

The number of operating mines in Gazankulu decreased from five in 1977 to four in 1979, and employment in this sector in this region apparently declined from 379 to 225 (the figures for sectorial employment within Gazankulu are from various SAIRR Surveys and the Benbo publications).

By 1976 there were 479 'trade and services enterprises', more than half being general dealers, and not one transport firm. During the same year there were eight 'manufacturing enterprises', half of them being dressmakers (GER 1976, p 45).

By 1977/8 there were seven 'specialised repair' and nine 'light manufacturing' concerns, and along with 637 trade, services, catering and accommodation concerns this completed the picture as far as capitalist entrepreneurial activity (other than agriculture) was concerned.

Three tripartite agreements entered into offered employment for 90 of the inhabitants of the Gazankulu region in 1979.

The local Development Corporation, the S/TDC, seems to have understated the case in finding that

development of large secondary industries in Gazankulu was not feasible because Gazankulu was unfavourably located in relation to the main consumer areas in South Africa (SAIRR Survey 1980, p 443).

By March 1979 the Gazankulu government was by far the largest single employer, with 6 887 jobs for africans (Black development in South Africa 1976, p 119). In this case, however, as with so many of the figures readily available on the bantustan, it is impossible to square Deputy Minister Hartzenberg's 1978 figure of 2 200 government posts, 4% of them held by white officials (SAIRR Survey 1978, p 290) with those provided by Benbo.

Clearly Gazankulu is as poverty-stricken as any of the bantustans, and probably more so than most. If it had not been for the large number of migrants, the situation would have been even more critical. If any large-scale relocation of the hundreds of thousands of Shangaan/Tsonga living outside the bantustan were to occur in the name of 'ethnic nationalism', the region would become a large rural slum, unable to provide employment for any but a tiny fraction of its population - in other words, the existing situation but worse.

## POLITICAL

It is in this area that the ethnic fragmentation takes place, with party politics, self-government, inter-state conflict, etc.

In Black development in South Africa 1976 (p ix) Benbo neatly gives the State's policy towards the african population of South Africa:

Due to the number and diversity of its peoples, South Africa has chosen (sic) the path of separate development.... This policy is based on the basic principle that each nation has a sovereign right to self-government according to its own system of values, abilities and needs; to retain that which it regards as valuable; and to pursue objectives which it formulates for itself. The prevailing principle, therefore, is one of nationalism, on the strength of which the government of every nation should act in the interest of that nation.

- all of it so much hot air when weighed against the reality of the origins of the policy of apartheid, the arbitrariness of 'nationalisms' decided upon, the farce of 'independence' in any sense, and the cruelty, misery and death that the policy has brought about.

This same publication indirectly acknowledges (p 22) the point of origin of these 'nationalisms' being created - there are now ten of them - with even more being demanded by the few who seem to benefit from this method of fragmentation:

With the publication of the White Paper (on the Tomlinson Report in the 1950s) there was a meaningful shift in emphasis from the purely 'spatial separation' concept of the 1913 and 1936 legislation, towards a multinational approach, where the spatial demarcation of territory was linked to ethnic considerations.

The pre-capitalist origins of the Tsonga-speaking Shangaan/Tsonga of the north-eastern Transvaal region seemed to have integrated these people very much into other groups in the area (for the official version of these origins, see GER 1976, pp 13-14; Malan & Hattingh, p 148; also see Mbata, 1960, pp 2-3). The migrations that ultimately led to the occupation of the north-eastern Transvaal by the Tsonga and Shangaans have their origins in Shaka's conquests in Zululand which sent waves of people up into Mozambique (Gaza province, hence the name 'large Gaza' - Gazankulu).

There were 'stages of political development' after the National Party came to power in 1948. The Tomlinson Commission had divided the 'Northern Areas' (as this region was rather indiscriminately known) into eight geographic regions. It was only with the implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act (69 of 1951) late in the 1950s and 1960s that ethnic differentiation was enforced and in turn had a fragmenting effect on the way some of the people perceived themselves.

Mbata's report to the SAIRR in 1960 dealt with conflict that was developing between Tsonga and Venda. As Mbata puts it,

with the introduction of the Bantu Authorities they (Tsonga) seem to have awoken to a realisation of themselves as a separate group and it is from them that objections have come.

Mbata quotes Van Warmelo, a government 'ethnologist', to the effect that no strong chieftaincies existed amongst the Tsonga after they had entered the region from Mozambique, but that slowly a 'new aristocracy' might arise, 'probably based on material wealth'. Says Mbata:

The Tsonga contend that, whatever the means by which these men became heads of various tribal groups, they were acceptable to them, and the government should have taken full cognisance of this fact in making appointments under the Bantu Authorities system. (p 3)

When asked why they had accepted the Bantu Authorities system in the first place, the answer was that 'the people were left with no choice'. A spokesman said at the time that they were willing to go on to Territorial Authority status, but then as a Shangaan/Tsonga group. Mbata summarises as follows, and it is worth quoting at length:

From discussions with various individuals and groups it has been possible to build up a picture of the situation and the reasons behind the Tsonga demand:

- 1) The Tsonga argue that they did not ask for Bantu Authorities, but since the Government has thrust the system on the people and since, by its own submission, the Government believes in separation on ethnic lines, they ask for no more and no less than the logical pursuit of this policy;
- 2) They contend that in the past they have shown themselves to be an enterprising and versatile people who found it easy to merge with any other group of people. As a result many Tsonga have crossed over to other tribes thus reducing the number of Tsonga-speaking people.... Now that the emphasis is everywhere on ethnic affiliations, they would like to strengthen themselves as a group and to re-establish their identity;
- 3) (Tsonga chiefs among the Sotho) have found it consistently difficult to secure adequate attention to Shangaan matters;
- 4) ... They accuse the Government of ignoring this (geographical) distribution of the respective groups and appointing Venda chiefs in predominantly Shangaan areas....
- 5) The Tsonga admit that until the Bantu Authorities system was imposed, they had lived peacefully, and successfully, together with both Venda and Sotho people. There was even intermarriage on a large scale. They contend, however, that no one in the past sought to impose his authority or way of life on the others. They also point out that one important factor has been missed by investigators and authorities alike, namely that a Shangaan always felt free to refer his affairs to the nearest Tsonga chief or headman, even though he himself might be living in an area nominally ruled by a Venda or Sotho chief. The principle also applied where Venda or Sotho lived in areas of Tsonga influence.

The Shangaan argue that the Bantu Authorities system has upset this delicate balance of co-existence, to the disadvantage of the Tsonga people.... (pp 4-5)

The Sotho and Venda opinion canvassed by Mbata in his study was strongly against such fragmentation -

They contend that they have lived peacefully together with the Shangaan for almost a century and have intermarried with them. They gave the Shangaan refuge when they fled from Portuguese East Africa.

The conflict was already, at the beginning of the 1960s, finding expression in such issues as boundaries, political authority and education.

At that stage, then, four regional authorities had been created for the Venda, Tsonga-Shangaan and Sotho speakers of Northern Transvaal. The Tsonga chiefs were in the minority on three of these authorities.

The government's next move was to pass the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (46 of 1959) as follow-up to the Bantu Authorities Act which had dictated the developments we have discussed. What the new Act did was to recognise eight 'national units', one of them being the Tsonga, with ten authorities to be appointed for each. (See SAIRR Survey 1958/9, pp 52-66, for a summary of this legislation.)

However, with the ethnically heterogeneous population in the Northern Areas, boundaries

could not be clearly drawn and had not yet 'been finalised anywhere' by 1976 (GER 1976, p 14), nor had they been decided on in 1981. The rather arbitrary approach to ethnic geographical consolidation was admitted by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development in 1959 when he was pressed to define the boundaries of these 'national units', and he replied that

even the Tomlinson Commission had not been prepared to do this. The basic policy was to take the recognized heartlands of the Bantu areas, and gradually to embroider on them. (SAIRR Survey 1958/9, p 64)

The unclear situation about the regional boundaries, along with re-ethnification of the regional populations, could not but lead to conflict and a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In 1962 a Mashangana Territorial Authority was established (Proclamation R1863 of November 1962). Only in 1972 did this bantustan come to be known as Gazankulu. The members of the Territorial Authority were drawn from regional authorities. In other words, every step in the 'constitutional development' of Gazankulu was built on the imposed - and here especially, artificially created - Bantu Authorities structure.

The ethnic fragmentation also meant the relocation (separation) of people:

An important cause for initial delay in applying the system (of authorities) was the fact that the inhabitants belong to a variety of tribes who live interspersed with one another. In places such as the Bushbuckridge area (see map) large numbers of Africans have been moved to facilitate the establishment of tribal authorities. (SAIRR Survey 1962, p 90)

This continued into the 1970s, with an article in Bantu (August 1972) stating that:

Though a large percentage of the Machangana people still reside and work in urban areas and in other Bantu homelands, their eventual resettlement in their homeland is one of the main priorities which have received attention during the past two years. In the corresponding period more than 700 families, of whom the majority previously resided in Vendlan, have been resettled in Gazankulu.

However, despite this 'ethnic sorting out' of people, friction continued, arising directly out of the fragmentation policy of the National Party. In 1967 Tsonga people (for example the Baloyi tribe) had been moved to make way for Vendas. Vendas had been appointed chiefs over Tsonga majorities, and Vendas were being used in some areas to teach Tsonga-speaking children. (This latter tactic is still being used frequently to separate people 'voluntarily', as in the Winterveld case discussed elsewhere in this report. See also SAIRR Survey 1967, pp 144 and 152.)

Relocation due to ethnic consolidation continued in both the 1960s and 1970s, as mentioned above. For example, during May and June 1968, about 1 000 Tsonga people were moved under atrocious conditions from a mainly Venda area. During the same year, it was said by government officials that Venda and Tsonga in the Sibasa district 'would prefer to separate'. A Tsonga chief denied this and said that there had been intermarriage in the district (SAIRR Survey 1968, p 137).

In 1969 the Territorial Authority was 're-organised' and took over functions and assets of the (five) regional authorities. Three of the six executive council members had to be chiefs. Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi was appointed Chief Executive Councillor.

In 1971, in terms of that year's Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, a legislative assembly was created for Gazankulu. In 1973 the region was declared a 'self-governing territory within South Africa'. Elections were held for 26 members of the Gazankulu legislative assembly, and 42 were appointed (18 chiefs and 24 members designated by the regional authorities). Professor Ntwanwisi (a nominated member) was unanimously elected Chief Minister (GER 1976,

p 16). Malan & Hattingh point out that, unlike Venda and Bophuthatswana, for example, the Gazankulu Chief Minister need not be a chief.

From 1971 on, Chief Minister Ntsanwisi has regularly called for economic development to precede political 'independence'. In 1971 he said that

Nation-building does not consist of drawing arbitrary lines on a map and calling that the birth of a new nation. (SAIRR Survey 1971, p 36)

And yet inter-'national' conflict continued. A 'land dispute' was said to exist between Lebowa and Gazankulu, with the former claiming some land in the Bushbuckridge area that had been allocated to Gazankulu. Conflict also existed over land between Gazankulu and Venda, and Professor Ntsanwisi announced that a Shangaan-occupied finger of land east of Louis Trichardt plus the farms on which the Elim Mission and Lewana College were situated would go to Gazankulu. (SAIRR Survey 1973, p 153)

A 1974 meeting on the Lebowa-Gazankulu border dispute was followed by a statement that a request for a merger of the two bantustans might be made (Star, 6.12.74). Nothing came of this, and in 1976 M C Botha had appointed a Commission of Enquiry into the dispute. In 1978 the Report of the Uys Commission was tabled in the Lebowa legislative assembly, but it was discussed only the following year, when it was slammed and said to favour Gazankulu. Uys was said to have been biased and to have been involved in drawing up the first boundaries for this area. Said one member:

I am aware that the central Government is afraid of the Shangaans. They fear that they may go red and appeal for help from Mozambique's President Samora Machel. (RDM, 16.03.79)

Reports of claims of harassment of Lebowa 'citizens' continued (see Post, 3.08.79). In 1981 Professor Ntsanwisi replied to some of these when he said that

Those who relinquish Lebowa citizenship and take out my homeland's did so at will. My Government was forced to move some Lebowa citizens who were squatting at our grazing areas. (See Star, 10.04.81; Sowetan, 10.04.81; Lebowa Times, 21.08.81.)

The Lebowa Times (21.08.81) said that two months earlier Lebowa 'citizens' on the farms Rooiwater, Sedan and Bonn were arrested by the Gazankulu police. 'More than a thousand of them' were charged with 'squatting'. Those found guilty were fined or imprisoned. The Lebowa government was said to have paid out some R4 000 in fines for some of those convicted. Harassment continued with huts reportedly being burnt down. Kgoshigadi Maake, whose subjects some of the people are, said:

I lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Central Government. We have been occupying the land for many years and suddenly it is handed over to Gazankulu without our being consulted.

Lebowa vehicles were said to be involved in moving some of the people, while others were said to have been moved to the Bakgaga Tribal Farm by the Gazankulu authorities 'until a more permanent place was found for them'.

Kgoshigadi Maake said that about 2 000 families had been affected, and added that 'retaliation' would follow if the people were to be moved again from the Bakgaga farm, as is being threatened.

In 1978 it was reported that

two Shangaan chiefs whose territory lies in KaNgwane ... declared their intention of joining Gazankulu following a meeting with Professor Ntsanwisi and his cabinet. (SAIRR Survey 1978, p 290)

There seems to be only one political party operating in Gazankulu, but this does not mean that there has not been political conflict. For example, in 1975 the popular Christopher Mageza resigned his post as 'Minister of the Interior', saying that the 'country (sic) was being badly administered, and that the Cabinet was making decisions without reference to the Legislative Assembly'. Dison (1978, p 283) comments on the 'unique' formation of the Shangaan/Tsonga area, in that

traditional authorities did not act as collaborators in the setting up of the institutional framework. Instead, its formation was mediated through a group of Shangaan intellectuals, teachers, businessmen, etc....

Because of this, 'party formation in the classic homeland mould did not occur' (i.e. with a 'traditionalist' party forming the government, and the opposition being drawn from the petit bourgeoisie).

In 1979 Professor Ntsanwisi repeated his regular rejection of 'independence' while being economically dependent (he also came out in support of foreign investment in South Africa). However, he had become aware of budgetary discrimination against his bantustan and in favour of Venda (smaller in size with about the same population). The Venda budget for 1980/1 was R104 million against Gazankulu's R49 million (courtesy of the South African government). Professor Ntsanwisi felt that the only feasible explanation was Mphephu's acceptance of 'independence'.

## CONCLUSIONS

What is immediately apparent about the Gazankulu bantustan is that here there is even less pretence at separate 'development' than in many of the other ethnic regions. Gazankulu is too far from the infrastructural development that has allowed a degree of decentralised industrialisation in, for example, Hammarsdale, Rosslyn and Babelegi. All that can be done is to plead for the inclusion of Tzaneen and Phalaborwa within the borders of the bantustan.

Consequently a very large proportion of the population is dependent on migrant labour income, while relatively few people commute and even fewer find employment within the Gazankulu region itself.

However, apartheid, in its spatial expression, is largely a policy of political fragmentation, while maintaining a flow of labour to white-owned agriculture and industry. This fragmentation counters unified expression of opposition either to exploitation of the working class, or to domination of black people.

Several factors serve to reinforce fragmentation (this is not to deny that there are counter pressures that aid african or black unity, such as urbanisation and industrialisation outside the bantustan. An indication of the rejection of the policy was given during the 1975 by-election for two vacancies in the Gazankulu legislative assembly when only 18 people voted in Johannesburg while nobody turned up in Pretoria. It was said that 60 000 Tsonga, mainly migrants, lived in the Johannesburg area (Star, 6.11.75).) These factors are:

- the existence of an ethnic area set aside for the Shangaan/Tsonga of the Northern Transvaal, co-existing and having to compete with other such ethnic areas for land, resources, labour, markets, etc.;
- ethnic authority and responsibility over the local population and for such matters as education, police, welfare and health;
- an educational system that is geared to reinforce the ethnic identification of the scholars and at the same time serve to fragment the african population even more;

- there is in existence a radio transmission specifically for the Shangaan/Tsonga;
- political issues are forced to be defined in terms of the regional politics of the Gazankulu authority, whether the political leaders may have aspirations that strive for national goals or not;
- conflict with other 'ethnic' groups serves to strengthen the local identification and the existing fragmentation, and makes National Party policy look prophetically correct instead of causative;
- the factors listed above do not exhaust the reinforcing tactics. At the same time it must be remembered that there is a 'tribal historical reality' that provides elements that can be manipulated to advance fragmentation - issues such as a language, elements of the pre-capitalist authority structure, a common history, and many cultural factors. These factors are revived in a distorted form, not to add to the rich diversity of the population of South Africa, however, but to divide, redefine, fragment, and set one group in conflict with another. These elements are revived in a situation where many are of no relevance at all.

In the introduction to this section we mentioned some of the factors that militate against the State's policy of ethnic division, the main one being a common experience of industrial exploitation in capitalist South Africa. There is no reason to believe this is any different in Gazankulu, and the voting pattern mentioned above adds strength to such an interpretation. Yet this is not to deny that ethnic fragmentation has a real effect on the way people respond to the world around them, and how the world materially affects them - and, in our case, the way in which they are relocated and controlled within a specific region.

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### 1.4.3 Lebowa

Lebowa, the largest of the four bantustans in the Northern Transvaal, has been designated the 'home'/'nation state' of all Northern Sotho-speaking people (Pedi in particular) by the central South African State and those classes of people within Lebowa who benefit from such a delimitation. This is despite the fact that the history of these people is totally intertwined with that of Ndebele and Swazi groups, and even recently, with the clearance of so-called 'black spots' around Lebowa, large communities of these people were dumped in Lebowa. Their subsequent fate will be discussed in more detail below.

How did Lebowa become a political entity? What material basis does it have to get the people to think that they are Lebowan rather than South African citizens? Who benefits from this system? What role does 'ethnicity' play? These are some of the questions broached in this paper.

In 1936 Hertzog had proposed that 7½ million morgen be 'released' and added to the existing reserves in order to make segregation more viable. By the 1950s, even by 1975, much of this land had still not been transferred. In 1955 the Tomlinson Report stressed the need for physical consolidation and 'development' of the scattered bantustans into 'single' viable units. The Commission was also convinced

of the need for a policy which will pursue the consolidation of these areas based on the historico-logical homelands of the most important ethnic groups.

It therefore recommended that the bantustans be consolidated into seven blocks 'around the seven historico-logical nuclei or heartlands': the Tswana block with Botswana as nucleus, a Pedi block centred on Sekhukhuneland, etc.

The Promotion of Self-Government Act (46 of 1959), according to the government publication Bantu,

gave the Bantu peoples of South Africa a categorical assurance that the South African government had irrevocably set a course on a road that would lead the homelands to meaningful self-government. (January 1972)

It established a number of white commissioners-general to act as agents of the central government in the bantustans, and set up eight Bantu Authorities (discussed below). It also completed the process of removing africans' civil rights by eliminating the white Native Representatives from the Senate and House of Assembly. The Lebowa Territorial Authority, with representatives from the various regional authorities, was set up in 1962.

In 1968 came the Promotion of Bantu Homelands Act (40 of 1968). This consolidated the legislation governing

- the financing of development in the bantustans, and
- the function of the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) and other like bodies.

In debate it was made clear that no links with 'alien interests' would be tolerated by the central government.

The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (26 of 1970) provides for all africans in South Africa to be given citizenship in one of the bantustans. In debate the Minister of Bantu Affairs said,

all so-called rights which could lead to equality with the Whites in South Africa on a basis of integration will in due course be removed by us. (HAD, 28, col 2011)

The Bantu Homelands Constitution Act (21 of 1971) provides for legislative assemblies to be set up without reference to parliament, by proclamation of the State President of South Africa. He can also proclaim a 'self-governing territory', giving it the theoretical right to legislate for any of its 'citizens' resident in the rest of South Africa. The Act also provided for Bantu Affairs Administration Boards to supervise the affairs of africans outside the bantustans, with the help of 'homeland representatives' resident in the big urban townships. In 1971 Lebowa got its own legislative assembly.

The Bantu Laws Amendment Act (76 of 1973) was designed to speed up planning for partial consolidation of the bantustans avoiding the various provisions for consultation contained in the 1927 Native Administration Act whereby, in the face of resistance to removals, it could not have been enforced without a resolution adopted by both houses of parliament. Africans therefore lost that minimal protection. The 1973 Act removed this means of resistance to enforced removals: before issuing a removal order, the Minister of Bantu Affairs and Development (BA & D) was meant to consult the bantustan government, but their agreement/consent was not necessary for the order to be implemented. The Act also provided for the 'reservation'/'release' of land in an urban area, usually a township, if it adjoined a bantustan area, although these 'bantustan townships' could also be completely separate from a bantustan. These dormitories clearly serve merely as a base for african workers in 'white' urban centres.

There were some other pertinent laws, including the Bantu Laws Amendment Act 70 of 1974 which provided for the delegation of existing powers over the bantustans, vested in the State President, to lower authorities within the central South African government. This Act gave the Minister of BA & D and minor officials an absolute power in many areas over the nominal chiefs who formed the 'governments' of the bantustans, when they were supposedly becoming autonomous.

The second Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1974 allowed bantustan chiefs and legislative assemblies to ban individuals, organisations and publications. This was the first police power given them, helping them to entrench their position, but still always subject to the approval of the Minister of BA & D. In effect the South African government still has almost full control of day-to-day administration and affairs.

### CONSOLIDATION

The 1973 Bantu Laws Amendment Act accelerated the mass removals by cutting away all legal grounds for resistance. In the 1973 Amendment to the Bantu Trust and Land Act, broad plans for consolidating the bantustans were put before parliament. Some plans were approved by majority vote in 1973, and the rest were adopted in 1975 when the Department of BA & D announced the final solution, in terms of the 1936 Land Act, of the 'land problem' in South Africa. It was hoped this would also solve the 'race problem'. As the years have shown, though, there are no firm deadlines for consolidation.

Lebowa became a 'self-governing territory' within the Republic of South Africa on 2 October 1972, with Seshego as the 'seat of government'. What did this mean in practice? Lebowa

became a territory with its own flag and national anthem, and with legislative powers in the following matters:

- 1 the administration and control of government departments such as education; welfare services; the establishment, maintenance and control of clinics; control and licensing of businesses; the planning, financing and co-ordination of undertakings approved by the Minister of Co-operation and Development (formerly BA & D);
- 2 agriculture: conservation, irrigation, planning, etc.;
- 3 public works;
- 4 births, marriages, etc.;
- 5 the division and amalgamation of 'tribes' after consultation;
- 6 the establishment, maintenance and administration of townships, collection of revenues and income tax;
- 7 the administration of the police force, etc.

According to the final consolidation plans of 1975, Lebowa was to be reduced from 14 geographical units to six, and the surface area increased by 270 449 ha to 2 518 000 ha. Lebowa rulers claimed a large part of the Northern Transvaal which was not included in the plans, including Pietersburg and 11 other 'white' towns. The proposals for Lebowa's consolidation and these subsequent claims have aroused controversy in Nationalist circles. The chairman of the BIC, Dr Viljoen, said:

You cannot have a viable homeland that consists of isolated bits ... homeland boundaries should make the homelands historically relevant, politically significant, and economically viable whereas in fact they have simply been drawn to exclude as many whites as possible. (SAIRR Survey 1975)

By March 1980 Phatudi's government was still calling for the inclusion of 'white' towns of the Northern Transvaal, among them Pietersburg, Tzaneen, Naboomspruit, Soekmekaar, Groblersdal and Duiwelskloof (SAIRR Survey 1980, p 318). They claimed that these islands surrounded by Lebowa should logically fall within its boundaries.

Phatudi - like other Chief Ministers - made the land question one of his government's first priorities. As in other bantustans, conflicts emerged between the legislative assembly (and the executive in particular) on the one hand, and the chiefs on the other, as the latter were constantly feeling that not enough was being done for their people and that their power was being eroded by those heading the government.

In fact, the various legislative assemblies have received little legislative or administrative power. As M C Botha, Minister of BA & D, told the Lebowa legislative assembly at the official opening in 1975:

Politicians should therefore bear in mind that they should not try to take part in the administration of their territory. (RDM, 25.03.75)

Many of the leadership disputes which have erupted and characterised Lebowa's internal politics arise out of the contradictory situation in which its 'stooges' find themselves on day-to-day issues as well as on broader political decisions such as whether or not to opt for 'independence'.

The first Lebowa elections were held in April 1973. No political parties had been formed, but there was an unofficial 'ticket' of over 20 candidates who supported the former Chief Minister, Chief Matlala (who was ousted by Phatudi). Of these only three were elected, and only two of the cabinet members were returned: this represented a strong rejection of the 'uneducated' chiefs who had been in charge, which also happened in the Ciskei. In the election of a

non-chief, Phatudi, as Chief Minister, however, the support of a bloc of chiefs from Sekhukhuneland was crucial. In June 1973 Chief Matlala announced the formation of a Lebowa National Party as the official opposition, and Phatudi followed by forming the Lebowa People's Party. A vote of no confidence was put by Matlala, at which Phatudi moved for him to be removed as opposition leader. A few days later, the remaining members of Matlala's party disbanded it and joined the LPP.

The members of the assembly then agreed to divide it into an upper house, for chiefs only, and a lower house similar to the current assembly. A committee was appointed to redraft the constitution. This aimed to remove the power of the chiefs in the legislative assembly. It was vetoed outright by the South African government. As one politician put it:

The chiefs have the whip hand all the time - and the South African government controls the chiefs.

This is true, particularly with more power being placed in the hands of petty officials, commissioners, magistrates and so on, in terms of the 1974 Bantu Laws Amendment Act. Such people control the day-to-day issues affecting people's lives directly or through the chiefs who still hold a lot of power and authority in matters including the administration of marriages, succession, townships and settlements, pensions and social services, and land allocation on a local level.

Conflicts between Chief Ministers and their former supporters and deputies take on an intensely personal and vindictive nature. In Lebowa, Phatudi expelled the popular Minister of the Interior and Economic Affairs, Collins Ramusi, without consulting his party. The repressive powers are often used in these instances to stifle/crush opposition. In particular it was felt that Phatudi was undermining the system of chieftainship, and he has often been opposed for doing so, and has retaliated in turn.

Phatudi, along with his legislative assembly, has rejected 'independence' for Lebowa, at least until the land question is settled. In a speech in Soweto on 21 March 1976 he said:

But in any case, South Africa is our homeland. Who wants to be independent from a country to which he has contributed so much? (Star, 22.03.76)

In November 1976 Phatudi said Lebowa might accept independence if the land question were settled. Just before this, the establishment of a Lebowa Development Corporation had been gazetted. Despite speculation, Phatudi still rejected independence during 1977. In London he said that a federation of multiracial states with complete control over internal affairs and full South African citizenship would solve South Africa's political problems. At the same time he said that

consolidation was a priority of the Lebowa government, which favoured the inclusion of white farming areas and a multiracial homeland.

According to opposition elements in Lebowa, it was only the opposition that stopped Phatudi from opting for independence.

Even since, though, Phatudi has always been publicly critical of independence, of the new citizenship of legal inhabitants of the Transkei and Bophuthatswana, of the fact that the central State gives them more backing and so pressurises the other bantustans towards 'going independent', and of the fact that independence could be accepted in a bantustan by its leaders when they could not provide their own jobs.

## BOUNDARIES

The setting of boundaries of the individual 'nation-states' has led to numerous conflicts between people inhabiting these areas, who had lived together in peace before. The Lebowa land commission laid claim to about a third of the Transvaal including some areas which, according to the South African State's consolidation plans, were to become part of Gazankulu or Bophuthatswana and what later became KwaNdebele. The commission 'invited' all people in those parts to become citizens of Lebowa, and suggested that no-one should be forced to move.

## BOPHUTHATSWANA

There were conflicting claims to the Garankuwa-Mabopane complex by Bophuthatswana and Lebowa. Bophuthatswana rejected Phatudi's claim that it was an 'international' area and insisted on its incorporation into Bophuthatswana (Star, 30.04.74). It was then that Phatudi suggested an amalgamation/federation of bantustans to control the area in which 'people of various ethnic origins lived'.

## GAZANKULU

A similar conflict emerged over the areas around Bushbuckridge, Tzaneen and Phalaborwa in the Eastern Transvaal, between Lebowa and Gazankulu. There were eight large farms in the Bushbuckridge area being vied for: while they were under the jurisdiction of a Sotho chief, the chief first opted to join Gazankulu but later decided on Lebowa. The Department of BA & D suggested the area should be divided between the two governments, which would involve removals of many people of both groups. There have since been many conflicts in this area.

## KWANDEBELE & THE NDEBELE PEOPLE

A further complication which caused immense conflict and suffering for the people was the position of Ndebele people inside Lebowa. Most of these people live in the Zebediela area, in parts of Bophuthatswana west of Groblersdal, and in various parts of Lebowa, particularly in the Nebo district. Four Ndebele tribal authorities (regional authorities) existed under Lebowa or Bophuthatswana governments. Once the South African government started proposing a separate Ndebele bantustan, various Ndebele chiefs started campaigning for a Territorial Authority and a bantustan of their own. They urged other Ndebele chiefs to secede from their respective administrations and received open opposition from the Lebowa and Bophuthatswana governments.

During the 1960s and early 1970s many aspects of the South African social formation developed rapidly. Accompanying this was the intensification of strategies to control and disorganise the african working class in the cities, on white-owned farms and in the bantustans. Influx and efflux control measures were stepped up and sophisticated; numerous freehold areas were declared 'black spots'; and with intensified agricultural production, hundreds of thousands of labour tenants and 'squatters' were removed from white-owned farms. The ruling-class strategy of 'ethnic' divide-and-rule was refined, along with attempts to deprive as many africans as possible of their South African citizenship and remove 'unwanted' africans from industrial centres. (See Maré, 1980, for categories of population removals.)

Within bantustans, on the other hand, consolidation plans were being implemented from the early 1970s and intensified betterment planning took place, both of which were attempts to rationalise methods of production and survival of the inhabitants. This was inseparable from other deliberate political and ideological strategies of the South African State and its bantustan agents aimed at building an 'ethnic consciousness' within sections of the african people.

Some material realities create a basis for this emerging consciousness, such as consolidation and removals, the fact that only Lebowa citizens have access to certain resources, the social services, infrastructural facilities (loans, licences, etc.). Yet it should be clear from what follows that there are many other realities that contradict this process.

#### REMOVAL OF PEOPLE TO AND WITHIN LEBOWA

Removals into, from and within Lebowa intensified after 1970. Of the many instances, we choose two of the more significant ones to illustrate:

- that many removals involved a process of proletarianisation, in robbing the majority of the people of their access to land;
- that the removals tended to be accompanied by the creation of a small, relatively wealthy, land-owning class, often members of the Tribal Authority and/or members of the legislative assembly;
- that most people were forced to become migrant workers, or to work for slave wages on the land of the wealthier class in their community;
- that the 'land question' and struggles over land between different 'ethnic' groups, although fought out in the name of 'the people', have often primarily concerned and benefited these privileged classes.

We can therefore say that (inside the bantustans) 'ethnicity' has been encouraged by and ultimately benefited these groups; it is probably not a very strong sentiment amongst the general people unless constantly reinforced. On the other hand, chiefs, no matter how well-meaning, are caught in a structural position which binds them to the State - at whose mercy they are.

#### REMOVAL OF PEDI- AND NDEBELE-SPEAKING FAMILIES FROM DOORKOP TO BOTHASHOEK (SEKHUKHUNELAND) AND HLOGOTLOU (NEBO)

In 1964 the farm Doornkop near Middelburg was declared a 'black spot'. The people (primarily Pedi-speaking, but increasingly mixed Pedi-, Ndebele- and some Swazi-speaking people) were offered land further north, in Lebowa. Under Chieftainess Miriam Ramaube the people of Doornkop resisted until 1970. Then she and her son Seth were forced to move to the 'planned' farm Bothashoek on the Steelpoort River (the southern border of Lebowa). She was followed by what is today described by Seth as seven 'loyal' families (interview, June 1981). Only about a year later, and again in 1974, when the State President signed an eviction order, about 200 more families moved to Bothashoek. Other families moved to a nearby farm called Praktiseer, and other mixed Pedi- and Ndebele-speaking families moved to Hlogotlou township on the farm Monsterlus in the Nebo district, which fell under the jurisdiction of an Ndebele chief, Mahlangu.

## Bothashoek

Bothashoek is a rocky thornbush area. Small township plots were made available for sale, but there was very little arable land for people to cultivate. This land was allocated to those families who came first and to the 'better farmers' - including the chief's family who got the biggest plot of the best arable land. The majority of the people were given no arable land, only sites for houses, despite the theory of betterment planning. They were also not allowed to move any livestock there and were forced to sell at low prices on official auctions (SAIRR Survey 1974, pp 200-2).

Subsequently the best land on the Steelpoort River has been taken over by the BIC in collaboration with Chief Seth Ramaube. The first families coming to Bothashoek received a quarter-morgen residential plot and 1 morgen of arable land. Only 160 morgen of dry land was provided. The 160 morgen set aside for irrigation is the portion taken over by the BIC (Yawitch, 1982). The shortage of land clearly cut many families out but it is most probable that certain families were favoured with continued access to land and aid. Today these farmers also share in the wealth of the BIC where they are being trained to farm on a more capital-intensive basis. Most people in this rural slum work in the nearby mines, on white farms or on the BIC scheme (particularly women in the latter case, who are paid +/- 70c a day (interview, Yawitch)).

Unemployment in Bothashoek, as in most areas, is very high despite the possibility of work on one of the 20 mines in Lebowa. There are approximately 3 600 families in Bothashoek, with others constantly moving in. Even residential plots are being subdivided to accommodate them. The people in Bothashoek live in extreme poverty and usually it is only the migrant workers who are relatively well off. From here and many other 'betterment areas' in Lebowa, women and children have been forced to work on white-owned farms on a daily basis - up to the point where they have once again established squatter camps on the farms today to avoid the trouble of travelling.

## Hlogotlou (Monsterlus Farm, Nebo District)

Pedi and Ndebele families were moved into Hlogotlou township on old Trust land called Monsterlus. The area was inhabited by people under the Mahlangu (Ndebele) chieftainship from 1938 - people from all over South Africa. Once again the older inhabitants have had the privileged access to land, even after it was 'planned' in 1966. When families from Doornkop were moved in in 1974 there was no land for them. Most people were forced to work in nearby towns or in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) triangle.

The result has been an endless chain of killings between Ndebele and Sotho-(Pedi-)speaking people in the area over access to land and other resources (HAD 1977, Part I, p 45). This is happening throughout Lebowa, which partly explains the recent 'secessionist moves' by North Ndebele chiefs to leave Lebowa and try their luck in KwaNdebele or Bophuthatswana.

Chief Mahlangu of Nebo has for the past six years been involved in a battle with the central State and Chief Mapoch, who has occupied 11 farms south of Nebo which Mahlangu claimed belong to 'his people' and which were promised to him by the South African government. There were long debates about this issue in the legislative assembly in 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980. While most people were aware that the South African government was playing a double game (it also promised Mapoch the area), it was also clear that South Africa would not permit Mapoch's inclusion into Lebowa and that South Africa wanted to cause 'tribal clashes' between the South Ndebele (Mapoch) and the North Ndebele (Mahlangu). Mahlangu recognised that

Mapoch cannot be expected to give way with his fat cattle to the dying people of Nebo

but continued to believe that the land belonged historically to the North Ndebele who were under Lebowan administration. The South African government threatened to remove Mahlangu and install another Ndebele chief in Nebo, as a result of his constant attacks and criticisms about the conditions of people in the area, particularly in Hlogotlou township where no housing or sewerage facilities had been laid on by the State. The South African State shifted the entire responsibility to the Lebowa government. In time, people in the Monsterlus area became discontented with the Lebowa government's performance over the land issue and many others. During 1980 a group broke away to join KwaNdebele, feeling that they had been discriminated against as Ndebele in Lebowa.

Other cases of removal and 'betterment planning' have had similar results. They cannot be discussed in detail here, but the reader is referred to Yawitch, 1982, for a study of them in Lebowa.

## A PROFILE OF THE CONDITIONS IN LEBOWA

### POPULATION

In the census the de jure population of Lebowa is given as the total of Lebowan citizens, irrespective of where they are/live on the census day. The basis of citizenship is the language, Pedi. Ndebele and Shangaan people live throughout Lebowa but are still not regarded as citizens (to the surprise of even the economic researchers at BEPA - Buro van Ekonomiese Politiek Analise - at Pretoria University).

In 1970 the de jure population of Lebowa was 1 777 940. 839 760 (47,2%) were male, and 39,6% of them lived and worked in 'white areas'. 53,3% of these men lived in Lebowa (though commuting to work in white South Africa), while 7,1% (125 700) lived in other bantustans. In 1970 the de facto population of Lebowa was 1 087 178, of whom some 137 000 africans were not 'citizens' (Ndebele, Shangaan etc.) In 1978, out of a de facto population of 1 470 800, 242 600 africans were 'non-citizens'. Furthermore, in 1970 39 400 Pedis were known to live in other bantustans; by 1978 this had gone up to 49 000 (Lebowa Economic Revue 1976 and Benbo statistical update 1979). In the same period the number of Pedi residing in white South Africa rose from 638 600 to 756 600 (more than 100 000). Only 58% of the 2 066 000 Pedi in the whole of the Republic actually lived in Lebowa, which suggests that many more removals can be expected in the name of 'ethnic consolidation'.

### URBANISATION WITHIN LEBOWA

In Lebowa, as in other bantustans, the great rural slums/'resettlement camps' are not regarded as urban areas, as this justifies to some extent in official terms the lack of infrastructure and facilities in these areas. This is a problem for the 'verligte' political economists (including Koornhof's son) who have been given the task of drawing up a development plan for Lebowa. However, between 1962 and 1976, 18 towns were built in Lebowa. By 1975 there were 18 500 houses and 154 000 inhabitants in Lebowan towns (BEPA publication, Benbo 1976 & 1979). Benbo recognises that the influx of people into towns is a result of the 'lack of employment opportunities in the agricultural sector' (1976, p 24). Many of the inhabitants have been removed off white farms, excised areas (e.g. Batlokwa people in the north), and others come to look for work from the impoverished rural areas.

The consequent 'problems' for the Lebowa government are :

- the fact that most towns 'cannot be expected to have viability because of a poor economic base for the creation and provision of employment opportunities ... the small towns will only provide housing' (Benbo 1976, p 24);
- the housing shortage, emphasised by the concentration of squatters close to the larger towns, especially those nearer white areas. As a result the government has tried to control the influx of people into town.

#### COMMUTING

The largest towns (Seshego, Lebowakgomo, Namakgale and Mahlewelereng) are situated near 'white areas' where people commute to work daily in South Africa. The number of commuters from Lebowa has increased rapidly, illustrating

- the growing number of people forced to be commuters through removals into Lebowa;
- the lack of jobs in Lebowa to justify this process:

1970	26 000
1974	49 193
1975	52 100

#### MIGRANT LABOUR

Many of the de facto Lebowans are migrant workers on a yearly contract basis. In 1976 there were 13 district, 126 tribal and one regional labour bureaux in Lebowa. The number of known migrant workers increased as follows:

1970	158 300	13,8% of the de facto population
1975	190 300	14,2% "
1976	196 900	14,2% "

#### EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

By 1976 only 5,5% of the economically active population worked in industry in and around Lebowa. The Benbo report clearly states:

If an attempt is to be made to establish a flow of Lebowan citizens back to their homeland, more employment opportunities will have to be created in Lebowa.

The economically active Lebowan population was expected to almost double between 1970 and 1980, which meant that for instance in 1976, 15 230 employment opportunities had to be created in or near Lebowa, and 17 000 annually. If not, people would be forced to look for work in the PWV triangle. The 1976 Benso report and the update also show clearly that a small fraction of these goals was realised. The movement of workers to industrial centres where they form links with other workers flatly contradicts the State's whole strategy of creating ethnic divisions within the working class.

### 1.4.4 KwaNdebele

KwaNdebele, the official 'home' of the South Ndebele, is the tenth and presumably the last of the South African 'homelands'. It is situated to the north-east of Pretoria between Groblersdal and Bronkhorstspuit. It is one of the least viable bantustans, even in official circles, with little development having taken place and the vast majority of people living in poverty-stricken conditions in overcrowded relocation areas.

The commissioner-general of KwaNdebele, Mr J A van Tonder, put it simply by saying that although the territory did not possess material wealth, rich mines or thriving industries, the population need not worry unnecessarily about it.

Your most important wealth at this stage lies locked up in the quality of the citizens of KwaNdebele.

Certainly the wealth, when it is unlocked, will not accrue to the citizen of KwaNdebele.

An important aspect of the development of KwaNdebele is the political activity centred around the various attempts to form a separate Ndebele ethnic entity. These activities illustrate three important aspects of the State strategy of separate development. Firstly, they show up the fact that ethnicity is an important factor in the reality of separate development and is much more than just the acceptance of 'ruling class ideology', from the researcher's view-point. Secondly, they illustrate the important role played by the ethnic states in carrying out state strategy, by ensuring the removal of ethnic groups other than their own. Thirdly, they reveal the contradictions which emerge with the implementation of separate development policy. The first part of this paper therefore focuses on Ndebele politics, played out largely in Bophuthatswana, Lebowa and the white areas and minimally in the future KwaNdebele. Finally some detail is given about politics in KwaNdebele itself, followed by an outline of conditions in KwaNdebele, giving an idea of population composition, health, education, consolidation, agriculture, employment and the CED's role in KwaNdebele affairs.

It must be stressed that details on KwaNdebele are limited. A Benbo official reasoned that the lack of research is due to the failure of any university to 'adopt' the new bantustan and to undertake research. What information is available from newspaper reports is often misleading, making it difficult to set out a coherent chronology of events.

#### NDEBELE POLITICS

During the sixties a number of tribal authorities were set up for the Ndebele, the majority of these being in Lebowa and Bophuthatswana. The first mention of an Ndebele 'homeland' was in the late sixties, when Chief David Maphogo was speaking at the installation of Chief William Mahlangu as the Ndebele representative in Springs. He said:

The Government has at last recognised the Ndebeles as a unit.... The establishment of an Ndebele Territorial Authority is the remarkable turning point in the history of the Ndebele. For us it is the beginning of a great marathon, a great march to a destiny which is not in sight. (RDM, 29.05.69)

The following year, Mr K J Mahlangu, chairman of the Ndebele National Unit, said that the South African government had agreed to the formation of an Ndebele Territorial Authority, subject to certain provisions (RDM, 4.06.70). The main provision was that the Ndebele should all move to Zebediela. The problems which the government suggested as to why the Ndebele should not be in a separate unit were their dispersed nature and their assimilation by other groups, and the resultant numerous Ndebele dialects spoken. However, Mr Mahlangu pointed

out that the language problem had been tackled and that a book on the Ndebele language was being written. Commenting on the South African government's reticence in granting the go-ahead for a separate Ndebele 'homeland', he said that the condition that the Ndebele move to Zebediela was unfair:

But this is a condition that applies only to Ndebeles. This does not apply to other groups. The Government has shown no love and sincerity towards us. (RDM, 7.12.71)

In March 1972 the leaders of the various Ndebele tribes met representatives of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development to discuss the formation of an Ndebele 'homeland' (RDM, 18.03.72). Later on in the year, the Minister released draft plans, drawn up by a committee appointed by the Department, outlining the consolidation of the Lebowa, Venda and Gazankulu bantustans and the creation of a bantustan for the South Ndebele group (SAIRR Survey 1972, p 173). The Bantu Affairs Commission was to hold public meetings for representation by interested parties, the possible areas considered for the Ndebele bantustan being to the east or west of Groblersdal.

In July 1973 it was reported that three chiefs from the Groblersdal district had met to discuss the formation of a regional authority. The chiefs were Paramount Chief David Maphogo of Weltevrede, Chief Willie Mabena of Allemansdrift and Chief Lazarus Mahlangu of Kalkfontein (RDM, 18.07.73).

In September 1973, Chief David Maphogo called a meeting of all South Ndebele at the Royal Kraal to discuss the establishment of a South Ndebele 'homeland'. On 19 July the following year, the Ndzundza tribal authority under Chief David Maphogo acquired the duties and functions of a regional authority and the development of the South Ndebele bantustan was under way. Mr Simon Skosana, the chairman of the new regional authority, was later to become the Chief Minister of KwaNdebele.

Trying to get the general sense from disparate facts concerning the various Ndebele groups, this paper discusses them according to the three aspects of separate development which they highlight:

- the importance of ethnicity
- the role of Lebowa and Bophuthatswana in pressurising Ndebele groups
- the contradictions which emerge in the implementation of separate development.

The three aspects are not mutually exclusive by any means but link the various facts together into a coherent framework.

It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which various Ndebele groups identified with a common Ndebele bantustan and as a result attempted to secede from either Lebowa or Bophuthatswana. Other factors playing an important part in this process have been the harassment and discrimination experienced in the bantustans and the possible alleviation of that in an Ndebele bantustan.

Another problem is the manner of reporting: the chief is quoted more often than the people. He was happy to secede as he did not face the hardships his people faced. The reasons given by the Ndebele chiefs for secession were couched in 'identification with a common Ndebele culture', while the people themselves were far more concerned with the prospect of having to rebuild their homes than being able to identify with a common culture. Bearing this in mind, though, it would still appear that 'identification with a common Ndebele culture' played a part in bringing the Ndebele people together.

According to a report in the RDM (4.05.74) a meeting was to be held at Zebediela on 11.05.74, with both South and North Ndebele chiefs and people attending and people were to be asked to

unite and leave other bantustans. A spokesman said:

At the meeting, the chiefs will get a mandate from the Ndebele to ask the Government to expedite Ndebele self-rule and negotiate with those homelands which have Ndebeles to allow them to join us. (RDM, 4.05.74)

A meeting was also held in Soweto, the day before the scheduled meeting at Zebediela, when a report was given on the North and South Ndebele 'summit' to be held in Zebediela the next day. Mr Isaac Mahlangu and Mr Kenneth Kekana, the South and North Ndebele representatives respectively, gave progress reports. No further report deals with the Zebediela meeting.

Chief Johannes Kekana, an Ndebele chief in the Zebediela district, seems to have made persistent efforts to get Ndebele people in Lebowa to secede, all the while calling for the inclusion of the North Ndebele in the proposed Ndebele bantustan. He accused the South African government of stalling on the issue of a joint Ndebele bantustan and said that the signatures demanded by the South African government, of all the Ndebele chiefs, were for the first time being proposed as a prerequisite for a bantustan. He said the government must set up an Ndebele bantustan before Bophuthatswana and Lebowa became independent. He was also against the Department of Bantu Administration and Development using divisive terms such as 'North Ndebele' and 'South Ndebele' (RDM, 24.12.75).

Chief Kekana was again involved in a secession bid in 1978 when he demanded the unification of the North and South Ndebele. He said that if the government was going to go ahead with the separate development policy, then it should be prepared to 'unscramble the egg':

It is not the fault of the Ndebele to be scattered throughout South Africa and until Government policy was implemented the black people lived happily together to the extent that inter-marriage took place on a large scale. (RDM, 25.03.78)

It is a pity that with his perception of what effects government policy has had, he should seek to aid the government in 'unscrambling the egg'.

In 1978, an organisation calling itself the Ndebele National Organisation threatened to take legal action against the Lebowa government if it did not accede to the secession requests which had been made. Mr V Molomo, their spokesman, said that the Department of Bantu Administration and Development had advised the Lebowa government to accede to their request. Mr Molomo added that the Ndebele did not want to follow other people's culture (Post, 1.08.78). The following year, during the lead-up to the granting of self-government to KwaNdebele, a memorandum drawn up by ten North and South Ndebeles calling for the creation of a united Ndebele 'homeland' was submitted to the government. This would appear to be the Ndebele National Organisation grouping as Mr W Molomo was their spokesman. He said that language and culture presented no problems. Once there was a common area, the tribal authorities would band together to make the unification of the two language groups a success (SAIRR Survey 1979, p 320).

In March 1977 three Ndebele tribes near Hammanskraal who had been split over whether to secede to the new bantustan or not, met officials of the Department of Bantu Administration and they were granted permission to secede. The three tribes were under Chief Alfred Mabena, Chief Lazarus Mahlangu and Chief Isaac Mahlangu of Allemansdrift, Witlaagte and Kalkfontein respectively.

The various examples above, although fragmented and superficial, give some idea of the ethnic element attached to the development of KwaNdebele.

This identification has facilitated the formation of KwaNdebele and has led to the movement of many thousands of Ndebele people. However, to argue that 'Ndebele nationalism' has played a part in the movement of people to that bantustan does not imply that there is a

possibility of 'Ndebele nationalism' developing in KwaNdebele. People there are in most ways worse off than they were before leaving Lebowa and Bophuthatswana, and there is little chance of getting people to identify with their 'homeland' as Ndebeles.

However, not all the Ndebele tribes in Lebowa and Bophuthatswana wanted to secede: many realised the hardships involved and saw through the illusion that things could be better there. The Mapela, an Ndebele tribe in Lebowa, when told by a representative of their chief, Chief Cyra Langa, of the decision not to secede, gave him overwhelming support (RDM, 29.10.78).

Leading on from a consideration of various ethnic responses to the formation of an Ndebele bantustan, it is necessary to consider examples of pressure placed on Ndebele people in Lebowa and Bophuthatswana, forcing them to make the choice between being discriminated against in the bantustans or moving to KwaNdebele.

In the case of Bophuthatswana, the harassment of various Ndebele groups started in the mid-seventies, as far as may be gathered from newspaper reports. An example of ongoing conflict was between Chieftainess Esther Kekana of the amaNdebele-a-Moetlane tribe near Hammanskraal and the Bophuthatswanan government. In 1976 the circuit inspector of schools forced them to use Tswana in their schools. The tribe subsequently withdrew their representative from the Bophuthatswana legislative assembly. Chieftainess Kekana, after much dispute leading eventually to a Supreme Court action, was removed from her position as chieftainess. She commented that the South African government was helping Bophuthatswana to dethrone her and said,

I am rocking the separate development boat. (RDM, 22.12.76)

Before being deposed, Chieftainess Kekana intimated that the tribe was hoping to secede. They subsequently approached Lebowa to be resettled there (RDM, 9.02.77). A nice twist emerges with Chieftainess Kekana taking the policy of separate development literally and thereby appealing for help from the South African government:

When we joined the Tswana we did so with the full understanding that we would forever maintain our identity - culture, customs and language - and we are appealing to the Government to help us because the separation of ethnic groups is their official policy. (RDM, 19.11.76)

The tribe did not secede and the conflict remained as the new chief, Chief Nathaniel Kekana, took the same stand as his predecessor. There seems to have been constant talk of secession, with nothing coming of it. The Bophuthatswanan government in 1978 was pressurising them to take out Bophuthatswanan citizenship, which they refused to do. In December 1978 they were given an ultimatum: either they leave by February or they take out Bophuthatswanan citizenship (SAIRR Survey 1978, p 296). They eventually gave in and people started applying for citizenship after President Mangope threatened to stop payment of teachers' salaries and pensions and to prevent Ndebele people from being employed in Babelegi. Although the response of the amaNdebele-a-Moetlane tribe was to secede to Lebowa if they seceded, the entire episode is indicative of the various kinds of pressure being brought to bear on Ndebeles in a bantustan other than their own.

Another example of pressure being applied on Ndebele people is the case of Winterveld, also in Bophuthatswana. The Bophuthatswanan government carried out police raids against all non-Tswanas in Winterveld, a large number of them being Ndebele. There was a large exodus of people from Winterveld, mainly to KwaNdebele, and of those going to KwaNdebele the majority were Ndebele people. However, there still remained in Winterveld a massive number of non-Tswana people, whom the Bophuthatswanan government sought to force out by refusing to give them work permits. Over the next year, there was a continual flow of people to KwaNdebele from Winterveld. Parents wanted their children to be able to go to school and to be able to get work permits themselves.

The above is indicative of the sort of imperative which forces Bophuthatswana to try to rid itself of all non-Tswana. The huge non-Tswanan element would act as a drain on their resources if they were to accept them and provide some services for them. This would hinder their attempt to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the Tswana by reducing the amount of wealth available for distribution, however meagre. By definition, the Bophuthatswanan government is also forced to try to legitimise its role as representatives of the Tswana people; the existence of almost as many non-Tswanas as Tswanas in Bophuthatswana serves only to underline the fraudulence of separate development and the idea of ethnic states and their role in it.

In Lebowa, there was an ongoing feud for most of the 1970s between two different factions of a South Ndebele tribe. In 1972 Mr Solly Mahlangu brought an application against Mr Jack Mahlangu to prevent him organising a meeting of Ndebele people at Derdeplaas to decide whether they were to remain in Lebowa or not. According to Mr Solly Mahlangu, Mr Jack Mahlangu was acting on behalf of the Lebowan government. The people had apparently been told in September that they had to pay taxes.

The application was upheld and the meeting was not held. In 1975 a group under Mr Solly Mahlangu again brought an action against Mr Jack Mahlangu and his headman, Mr Andries Mahlangu. According to Mr Solly Mahlangu the Ndebeles were not satisfied in Lebowa and resented having to pay tax - and yet if they didn't, they claimed they were molested (RDM, 10.09.75). The same group later in the year reportedly refused to take out Lebowan citizenship. Another point of contention was that they did not want the tribe's circumcision rites to be held under Pedi custom. There were also suggestions that there were problems with pension payments and schools. The dissenting groups recognised Chief David Maphogo as their paramount chief.

In 1979 the central government expropriated nine farms in the Nebo district of Lebowa, which apparently formed part of Chief Andries Mahlangu's land, for inclusion into KwaNdebele. Feelings have run very high and fighting has broken out between the two factions of the Mahlangu tribe. This fighting reached a head in 1981 when Chief Andries Mahlangu, head of the faction that did not want to secede, was assassinated. Nothing further has appeared with regard to the above.

These examples seem to show the varying degrees of pressure which have made people decide to move to KwaNdebele in preference to remaining in Lebowa or Bophuthatswana and experiencing the concomitant harassment.

The final aspect of the separate development policy which Ndebele politics highlights is the contradictions which emerge with its implementation, shown up clearly by the fact that the central government did not plan for an Ndebele bantustan. As Dr Ferdie Hartzenberg, Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development (formerly Bantu Administration) stated in 1979, the government had expected the Ndebele people to be incorporated into the surrounding reserves of Lebowa and Bophuthatswana. He added that the South Ndebele had rejected this in favour of recognition as a separate and distinct ethnic group (SAIRR Survey 1979, p 320). It is quite apparent that this was not the case. There was a big move to try to unify the North and South Ndebele, which the government could not meet, except by accepting massive resettlement. Instead it opted for the feasible option, that of granting the South Ndebele a separate bantustan and leaving the North Ndebele in Lebowa.

What emerges from the above is a policy of separate development, imposed by the central government, which has to be adapted and changed to cope with emerging circumstances. So it was with the Ndebele. The government had to allow for the development of an Ndebele bantustan because of persistent requests from various Ndebele groups. However, it could not allow for a unified bantustan as that would have posed problems with Lebowa.

Separate development, then, is not an attempt to create pure ethnic units at all cost, but is rather an expedient to give a material base to ethnic groups, within the confines of the policy, who will serve to control and confine people to those areas, all the while claiming legitimacy by being representatives of a particular ethnic group. This is particularly clear in the case of KwaNdebele. It would appear that to the extent the bantustan concerned wants to try to legitimise its existence as leaders of particular ethnic groups, so it will be either more or less concerned with the 'purity' of its population. In the case of KwaNdebele, there appears to be little attempt at legitimising its existence as a developing country; so too it is not concerned with the influx of Zulus, Pedis and Tsongas from Winterveld and other areas. Bophuthatswana, more concerned to project an image of a developing ethnic State, is therefore more concerned to portray a facade of purity, resulting in attempts to rid itself of other ethnic groups.

Having considered the various aspects of Ndebele politics outside KwaNdebele, we must give some chronology of the formal political developments in KwaNdebele itself. As mentioned earlier, the first Ndebele regional authority, the Ndzundza regional authority, was established on 19 July 1974. On the 7 October 1977 the second regional authority, the Mnyamana regional authority, was established. It was made up of the three chiefs who seceded from Bophuthatswana: Chief Alfred Mabena of Allemansdrift, Chief Lazarus Mahlangu of Witlaagte, and Chief Isaac Mahlangu of Kalkfontein. It was reported that within the future bantustan there were four tribal authorities: the Ndzundza, Mamanala, Katubane and Letho tribal authorities (RDM, 11.03.77). From the lack of reports it is impossible to work out the relationship between the tribal authorities and the two regional authorities.

On 24 November 1977 the Ndebele Territorial Authority was installed. At its installation, Minister M C Botha congratulated the two regional authorities on their work in the formation of the Territorial Authority and gave the executive committee R5 000 for 'its enterprising spirit'. The Territorial Authority comprised the chairmen of the Mnyamana and the Ndzundza regional authorities and 28 other members, 14 designated by each authority (SAIRR Survey 1977, p 357).

On 1 October 1979 KwaNdebele received its Chapter 1 rights in terms of the Homelands Constitution Act of 1971. The number of members in what now became the legislative assembly increased from 30 to 46, made up of four chiefs and 42 nominated members. The six departments established were: Departments of Authority Affairs, Community Affairs, Education and Culture, Works and Agriculture. The executive council was made up of a chief executive councillor and five executive members.

Mr Skosana, the Chief Minister, said on the occasion marking the opening of the legislative assembly that the Ndebele people who had always been oppressed by both black and white people were now receiving their freedom.

It was not long before the Ndebele people moved further down the 'road to freedom', when KwaNdebele received Chapter II rights as a self-governing State on 1 April 1981. Mr Skosana appealed to his people on this occasion to stand united and to work together towards their ultimate goal (Informa, September 1981). President Viljoen, when opening the third session of the first legislative assembly of KwaNdebele at Siyabuswa, to celebrate the occasion, made some remarkable comments. Initially referring to the allegations that South Africa's dispensation was a policy of divide and rule, he asserted innocently:

To my mind this allegation takes no account of the realities of Africa. Since the Second World War the flame of nationalism has burned strongly in Africa and this is as it should be. In all the people and in all the nations there is a natural urge to bring together that which belongs together.... Must the Black nations of Southern Africa be denied the realisation of their national aspirations merely because the enemies of the Republic choose to proclaim loudly that a dispensation that seeks to bring together that which belongs together is wrong...? Through the large scale

migration of your people to their own country, the Ndebele nation is bringing together that which belongs together. (Informa, September 1981)

How flimsy the KwaNdebele administration is, is apparent even in the formal educational qualifications of those in the executive council. Mr K Skosana, the Chief Minister, has a Standard 4 pass. The best school attainment in the cabinet is the Junior Certificate of the Minister of Agriculture, Mr Z Mnguni. The Minister of Education and Culture, Prince N Mahlangu, only has a Standard 7 pass (Drum, September 1981).

The central government has indeed scraped the bottom of the barrel in looking to such men to pose as 'responsible leaders of the Ndebele nation'. Yet in a way they are the right men for the job, men who will be able to carry out the coercion necessary to maintain, initially at least, the cohesion of the 'Ndebele nation'.

## THE CORPORATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (CED)

A local CED office was opened in January 1977 at Groblersdal. The committee that was set up comprised three senior members of the corporation and two local co-opted Ndebeles (Informa, February 1980, p 20). According to the CED's local manager in KwaNdebele, Mr C E Venter, lack of infrastructure has prevented large-scale industrial development being considered. The activities of the CED have thus been limited to commercial development, the establishment of small service industries, and housing loans.

Up to September 1980 business loans totalling R765 679 had been granted, the average being R17 400. One of the major projects undertaken by the CED at Siyabuswa was a R200 000 shopping centre, and another one for R160 000 was to be completed by the end of 1980. Two beerhalls had been built, one at Siyabuswa and one at Kwaggafontein. A set of factory flats had been erected to provide premises for five 'industrialists' - a welder, an upholsterer, a tailor making uniforms and protective clothing, a manufacturer of women's clothing, and a cabinet maker. They employ 15 people in all and have a turnover of R5 500 a month. The CED also gave housing loans totalling R69 543. They also had 15 houses built in Siyabuswa and Kwaggafontein for R94 000 (Growth, September 1980).

Certain areas of KwaNdebele are served by the Putco, SAR and Bothlabo bus services. A possible Ndebele bus service was being investigated.

In glancing through activities undertaken by the CED and then considering the activities of the members of the KwaNdebele cabinet and other officials, there seems to be a very close link. Ntuli's Supermarket in the Siyabuswa complex is owned by Mr Ntuli, the Minister of the Interior. When a Drum reporter spoke to a helper in the supermarket, she said:

This belongs to Mr Ntuli. He also has another bigger supermarket over there. (Drum, September 1981, p 15)

In the same Drum report there was mention of a set of modern houses being erected which, according to a woman there, were sold for between R6 000 and R9 000 each. The building construction was undertaken by Mr Solly Mahlangu, the Speaker of the House (Drum, September 1981, p 15). One can only surmise that the loans made by the CED were helping him. Other new buildings in evidence to the Drum reporter were being put up by Sakhe Construction, owned by Prince Mahlangu, the Minister of Education and Culture. He also owns numerous shops and butcheries in the bantustan. Mr Skosana, the Chief Minister, owns a bottlestore and other business interests.

The loans made to prospective traders etc. hinge on whether they are granted a trading licence, and these have to be agreed to by the government. It is quite apparent that the Ntulis, Mahlangus and Skosanas would brook no competition. Added to this is the very limited wealth of the CED and government, and it is certain that only a very few at the top will be allowed to benefit from the perks accruing to this self-governing bantustan in particular.

## SCHOOLS

It appears that KwaNdebele, as in many other areas, has a dual educational system. There are some facilities provided by the KwaNdebele government but the majority of the schools are provided by the people themselves with whatever meagre resources are available.

According to the Chief Minister, Mr Simon Skosana, there are 17 schools in KwaNdebele. However, the KwaNdebele government recognises private schools, so it is difficult to know whether the 17 are schools that have been built by the central State and the KwaNdebele government, or whether the 17 include all the schools, both government and private. Mr Skosana also said there was a high school and a technical school being built, and a teachers' training college is being erected in Siyabuswa (Drum, September 1981, p 15).

The 1981 KwaNdebele education budget allocates R3 million for the erection of 300 classrooms and administrative buildings. R2,6 million has been set aside for the erection of secondary school buildings and R1,2 million for the teachers' training college (RDM, 13.12.81).

Reports in the newspapers have indicated the poverty of the education received by children in the relocation camps. It is impossible to know the number of children not at school, but one can assume it is very great. However, one report highlights the starkness of the private schools in the relocation camps.

2 050 children attend a private school called Somtshongweni School in the Kwaggafontein relocation area. There are 11 classrooms made primarily of zinc. The school is run in two sessions for lack of space. From 8-10.30 a.m. 1 400 children attend classes. The second session is from 10.30-2.00 p.m. There are 35 teachers at the school, of whom two have a Standard 8 qualification and most of the rest have a Standard 6 or 7 pass. According to one of the teachers it is not uncommon for children to faint in the heat, and when it rains everyone goes home because the roof leaks. The teacher added,

The Government (KwaNdebele) is always making promises but it cannot keep them. They just ignore us because they cannot help us. (Star, 15.04.81)

## POPULATION

The official population figures for KwaNdebele show that there was a more than three-fold increase in population from 1975 to 1980:

1975	50 779	
1979	120 000	
1980	166 477	(HAD 1980, 3, col 117-20)

Unofficial population estimates are far higher, ranging up to half a million people. It was estimated that 35% of the Ndebele population are in KwaNdebele and that 20% of the KwaNdebele population is made up of Zulus, North Sothos and Tswanas (Die Vaderland, 26.05.81).

Assuming that the figures were based on the population statistics for both North and South Ndebele, which stand at 530 000 for 1978, then a figure of approximately 230 000 can be arrived at for the KwaNdebele population. This would remain one of the more conservative estimates. The population estimates for the North and South Ndebele in 1978 were:

Table 4 NORTH AND SOUTH NDEBELE POPULATION, 1978

	Bophuthatswana	Lebowa	Rest of SA*	Total
North Ndebele	28 900	62 200	139 970	230 800
South Ndebele	35 800	34 200	228 000	298 000

from Statistical Survey 1979

\* including the other bantustans

## HEALTH

The Department of Health in KwaNdebele falls under the Secretary of Health and Social Welfare of the Lebowa government. The bantustan does not have a hospital as it appears that the Philadelphia Hospital in Dennilton is not included in the bantustan (RDM, 19.09.81). It does, however, serve people from the bantustan. It has six doctors and is reputedly understaffed and overcrowded with the facilities having deteriorated since the hospital, formerly a mission hospital, came under the State. According to Dr Koornhof, there are 15 clinics; he also said there were no doctors in the bantustan (RDM, 19.09.81). According to the Chief Minister, Mr Skosana, though, there are two indian doctors and one african doctor in private practice in the bantustan (Drum, September 1981).

Setting out how many clinics there are does not indicate the level of services rendered. The 15 clinics may well be understaffed, and there is probably a limited supply of drugs. Coupled with that, reports indicate that malnutrition is rife. Church feeding schemes help a small proportion of those closest to starvation. There is very little water available. Together with malnutrition, this is one of the main contributory factors for disease. According to a report, 50 test boreholes had been sunk for water with no positive results, so the Department of Water Affairs started a crash dam-building programme (Star, 8.12.80).

## LAND

KwaNdebele's origins are obscure. There is very little information on its size and the process of consolidation. It seems that Paramount Chief David Maphogo lived on a 'black spot' in the Groblersdal area and this was chosen as the basis for the bantustan.

In 1974 there was a core area of 51 000 ha, and in the 1975 consolidation plans provision was made for the addition of another 99 000 ha. During the last six years this amount appears to have been added and KwaNdebele reputedly now has a total of 150 000 ha - an area four times the size of Johannesburg, for close on 300 000 people, if not more! (Sunday Express, 31.05.81) According to an article in Growth (September 1980) the Commission of Enquiry in the Consolidation of the National States is looking into the 'problem of insufficient land'.

Most of the additions to KwaNdebele appear to be white farm land. However, a large area of Lebowa, the Moutse area (RDM, 27.10.80), was excised and was to be given to KwaNdebele. This area was occupied by close on 90 000 Bantwana people who were originally from the Botswana area. However, the area has not as yet been given to KwaNdebele. The reason for this appears to be that large asbestos deposits have been found in this region and the

Anglo American Corporation are interested in mining these; presently the land remains under central government control.

KwaNdebele is made up of two areas, the bigger by far being the area between Groblersdal and Bronkhorstspuit. The smaller area is to the north, in the Nebo district in Lebowa. This area is made up of nine farms and has been the reason for much controversy in Lebowa government circles. Mr Andries Mahlangu, a South Ndebele chief who opted to remain in Lebowa, stated in the Lebowa legislative assembly that his people had been appealing to him to approach the Lebowa government about the nine farms the central government had taken from them:

The central Government has been gyrating little by little, taking our land and giving it to the Maphogo. It is incumbent on Lebowa to see to it that our nine farms are brought back to us. (RDM, 16.03.79)

This issue was part of a large dispute amongst South Ndebele people in his area, with some wanting to secede and others not. This issue has been dealt with more fully in the section on Ndebele politics.

## EMPLOYMENT

There are very few employment opportunities in KwaNdebele. The bantustan has no industry and as a result few people are involved in productive activity. According to Dr Koornhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development, there are 2 640 people employed in KwaNdebele besides those who are self-employed (HAD 1980, 3, col 117-9). This figure must also include all civil servants, police, nurses, teachers, etc. and those few who are employed in CED projects.

The vast majority of people employed in KwaNdebele are commuters and migrants, who travel to the surrounding towns and farms, as far afield as Pretoria. Figures quoted from the same source above put the number of people employed outside the bantustan at 35 500. Figures given for Ndebele employment as a whole set the total figure at 73 440, with agriculture and services being the two main employers, engaging 32 452 and 17 601 people respectively (Statistical Survey 1979). One can assume then that those two categories are important for KwaNdebele commuter and migrant employment as well, with agriculture being less prominent. There have been reports of people in KwaNdebele saying there are very few jobs on white farms and it would seem that those Ndebeles employed in agriculture actually live on white farms. According to a Star report (8.12.80) 150 buses ferry workers to work every day, the fares varying from R1,20 to R4,00 per day. Those who work in Pretoria travel up to 270 km per day. In 1979/80 the number of commuters increased by 719% and the divisional manager of Putco in KwaNdebele said of this increase:

This clearly shows how keen the people are to stay at home!

## RELOCATION

There are only scattered references to relocation occurrences concerning the Ndebele. As mentioned earlier, the core of KwaNdebele was the existing 'black spot' where Chief David Maphogo lived. However, with the expansion of the future bantustan, the Tswanas who lived on a stretch of Bophuthatswana had to be moved in 1973 and 1974. Two Bophuthatswana cabinet ministers told a gathering that their government did not know they were to be resettled to make room for the South Ndebele of Chief David Maphogo; Mr M C Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, had told a delegation of South Ndebele that Skilpadfontein was to be allotted to them. It is not known how many Tswanas were resettled.

In 1975, 1 500 families were moved from black spots at Kromkrans and Doornkop, near Middelburg, to Valschfontein. The people, numbering about 10 500, were nearly all Ndebele. The first phase of the removal had been the relocation of Pedi people to Lebowa. At that stage it appeared that Kromkrans was to become a Swazi area. Valschfontein was an existing community, with two primary schools, a clinic and tap water. The main complaint of the relocated people was the fact that they would lose their jobs if they were moved (RDM, 22.09.75). The above example bears out the idea that the initial core of KwaNdebele was made up of black spots, which were consolidated together, as Valschfontein was a black spot. In the same RDM report it is mentioned that 1 400 families had been moved the previous year, which would mean almost the same number of people.

There was a very recent example of a black spot removal. In May 1981, 65 families under Geel Boy Jewel Mahlangu were moved from farms in Syplaats and Bankfontein; white farmers there said the people were too close. On arriving in KwaNdebele, they were given tents. Although there are few references to other black spot removals, it is safe to assume that there were many more than the two just mentioned.

Although it is difficult to find evidence for farm evictions, they definitely did take place. Such relocation, which is of the old or unemployed people, goes unnoticed, especially as they are not big groups but instead just one or two families being forced to leave each farm. It is also difficult to indicate the extent of the movement of people from towns. People from surrounding towns such as Middelburg, Groblersdal and Bronkhorstspuit and from further afield, from places such as Pretoria, were forced to move to KwaNdebele.

Numerically the most important relocation category is that of the movement of Ndebele people from other bantustans to KwaNdebele. Many people moved from Bophuthatswana to KwaNdebele, some willingly as in the case of three Ndebele tribes from near Hammanskraal, under Chief Alfred Mabena, Chief Lazarus Mahlangu and Chief Isaac Mahlangu (RDM, 2.09.77). However, thousands of people left Winterveld and surrounding areas after harassment with police raids and inability to get work permits, etc. In 1979 the Department of Co-operation and Development reported that 10 000 families had been relocated in KwaNdebele from Winterveld. In 1980 a spokesman for the department, Mr J Eyssen, said that they did not want the Ndebele to move to KwaNdebele, but the Ndebele 'swamped us'. He added that those relocated by South Africa were well cared for. He was referring not only to Winterveld but to general Ndebele movement. The government made no attempt to prevent the movement of people from Winterveld, for instance.

As mentioned earlier, people were more unsure about the attraction of KwaNdebele than were their leaders. Uncertainty among tribal members is reflected in a report that at meetings of Ndebele tribes discussing secession to KwaNdebele, fears of hardship were raised which the chiefs brushed aside (Star, 8.12.80). In the Citizen (12.12.80) it was reported that people spoken to in KwaNdebele were bitter because they had been promised better conditions.

Resources made available for relocated people in KwaNdebele included the relocation budget of the KwaNdebele government, which rose from R461 000 in 1974/5 to R1 333 000 for 1978/9: a pitiful amount considering the thousands of people moving particularly in 1978/9 during the Winterveld exodus. The conservative official population estimate indicates the population increase over the same period as 50 779 in 1975 rising to 120 000 in 1979 (Statistical Survey 1979).

The Minister of Co-operation and Development gave the number of relocation areas in KwaNdebele as 11 with a total population of about 80 000 people (see Table 5 below). The bantustans are not generally seen as relocation areas, the phenomenon being confined to the idea of relocation or 'resettlement' camps - but KwaNdebele illustrates graphically that all the settlements in the bantustan, even the capital Siyabuswa, are relocation camps.

Table 5 KWANDEBELE 'RESETTLEMENT AREAS', 1980  
(CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT FIGURES)

Area	Estim. pop.
Vlaklaagte	18 426
Gemsbokspruit	2 898
Tweefontein	1 105
Vaalbank	6 000
Vrisgewacht	925
Boekenhout	5 724
Kwaggafontein	25 000
Leeufontein	205
Pieterskraal	2 938
Siyabuswa	14 000
Goederede	2 200

from HAD 1980, 3, col 117 - 9

## CONCLUSION

The future of the vast majority of people in KwaNdebele is very bleak. Unemployment, poverty and starvation are the lot of many in the sprawling relocation areas. Even though Ndebele nationalism may have contributed to the formation of KwaNdebele, only force will now keep people there. Many of those who went to KwaNdebele from Winterveld have returned to Winterveld rather than face the starkness of KwaNdebele, and Winterveld is no paradise. There are tribal policemen everywhere in the relocation camps, wary of anything that threatens the 'nation'.

KwaNdebele is the culmination of the separate development policy: some people having moved there because of a response to 'Ndebele nationalism', and many others because of pressure exerted on them by other bantustan governments concerned about their ethnic states. The rest of the population is made up of those evicted from ground in 'white' areas which they had owned for many years, or from white farms where they had been 'squatting'. Others came from the surrounding towns, where they had become 'undesirables'. The facade erected over KwaNdebele is paper thin. It is in fact a rural ghetto where the unemployed and old are forced to live, many in dire poverty. For those who find jobs as commuters, life is lived on buses and in factories with little respite from either.

An insight into the one who will possibly head an independent KwaNdebele, when it chooses that path within the next year or so: Mr S Skosana said,

Whites are very clever. They listen to our people make all the noises but if they do not have any money, what can they do? Whites know they have the power because they have the money. (Drum, September 1981)

The clever whites have now given a small share of power to Mr Skosana and his colleagues, and while it lasts it will allow them to grow rich. The GDP for KwaNdebele in 1980 amounted to R13 900 000 - a per capita income of R338 for those in the area. Even in theory that is a starvation income. In fact a large slice of that income goes to the small favoured group who

will certainly work to keep their advantages. The mass of other people are living on the merest scrap in comparison, small wages earned with immense effort.

The development of KwaNdebele has caused numerous conflicts between the Ndebele and other ethnic groups and also amongst the Ndebele themselves. This has served to divide people. However, with the development of KwaNdebele, the population has taken on a certain diversity: the bantustan has become a dumping ground for people from Winterveld, comprising North and South Ndebele, Zulu, Tsonga, Pedi and Venda people. Coupled with the extreme poverty of the area, this would act against the formation of any 'Ndebele nationalism'. The people in KwaNdebele have been spatially divided from the rest of the oppressed people. Even if there is little possibility of ideological control and ethnic consciousness being engendered in people, the creation of KwaNdebele facilitates the physical coercion that can be exercised over the Ndebele people, and this will in fact be the only way the KwaNdebele government and the central government will maintain its 'national unity'.

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## 1.4.5 Kangwane

Kangwane, a dumping ground allocated to South Africa's Swazis, consists of two blocks of land. The first, the Nsikazi reserve, is a finger of land stretching along the western boundary of the Kruger National Park, and has been under black occupation for over half a century. The second block hugs the western and northern boundaries of Swaziland, and consists of the Nkomazi and Mswati/Mlondozi reserves released under the 1935 Land Act, and the 'new area' added to Kangwane during the 1970s. The bantustan covered some 290 000 ha in 1971, 304 000 ha at the start of 1975, and 370 000 ha at the end of 1976. The total after consolidation was given as 391 000 ha. Much of this land is technically unsuited to agricultural or pastoral production, and Kangwane is far from the major industrial centres of South Africa.

## POPULATION

According to the 1970 census, the de facto population of Kangwane was 117 890. 117 600 were africans, and of this group 81 200 were Swazis. Some 21 000 Zulus lived in Kangwane, while Shangaans accounted for another 11 000 of the 'other' africans (Benso, p 20). The de jure population then was 471 000 Swazi: 29 160 Swazis lived in bantustans other than Kangwane (10 740 in Lebowa, 8 940 in Bophuthatswana) and 361 440 lived in 'white' South Africa - an indication of the massive task awaiting the ethnic consolidators of the 1970s. The State policy of unscrambling the ethnic egg certainly contributed to a number of secessionist moves in and out of Kangwane in this decade. In 1978, for example, the amaHlubi 'king' Langalibalele II declared that he wished to secede from KwaZulu to Kangwane; and in the same year two Shangaan chiefs in Kangwane said they intended to join Gazankulu (SAIRR Survey 1979, p 324, and 1978, p 290).

In 1976 the estimated de facto african population was 208 000 (SAIRR Survey 1977) and by 1977 this had risen to 213 600 (Benso, p 20). De jure populations for the same years were 590 000 and 606 000. Of the latter, 166 800 Swazis were estimated to live in Kangwane, 36 800 in other bantustans, and 402 400 in the rest of South Africa (Benso, p 21).

## POPULATION DENSITY

In 1977 this was estimated at 57,5 people (de facto) per sq km (Benso, p 22).

## AGE BREAKDOWN

In 1970, 45,6% of the de jure population and 52,7% of the de facto population were less than 15 years old. 51,4% of the de jure population and 43,4% of the de facto group were between 15 and 64 years of age, while 3,0% and 3,8% of the de jure and de facto populations were 65 and older (Benso, p 22). The adult male dependency rate in this year was 316,3 per 100 men in Kangwane: that is, for each 100 men in the 15-64 age group there, there were 316,3 people younger than 15 or older than 64 (Benso, p 25).

## URBANISATION

In 1970, 4,4% of the de facto population was urbanised; by 1977 this had increased to an estimated 19,3% (Benso, pp 20 and 28). The first town, Kabokweni, was established in 1967. By March 1974 there were four towns, all created to house africans relocated from 'white' areas. Population increases in the proclaimed towns were dramatic: Kabokweni's population rose from 3 310 in 1970 to 7 917 in 1977; Ekulindeni's from nil in 1975 to 4 307 in 1977; Kanyamazane's from nil in 1972 to 17 050 in 1977; and Matsulu's from 1 426 in 1970 to 9 323 in 1977 (Benso, p 27). By 1977 other relocation centres included Mayflower, Dundonald, Fernie, Zwalluwnest, Diepdal, Eerstehoek, Glenmore, Kamaqhekeza and Kamhlushwa.

## LABOUR

In 1970, 32,3% of the de jure population was classified as economically active, but only 22,1% of the Swazi population in the bantustans was so categorised (Benso, p 23). 41,3% of the economically active de jure citizens of Kangwane were farm and forestry workers;

28,7% were production and transport workers; 23,7% were service workers; and 3,7% were professional, clerks and other related workers (Benso, p 23). In the bantustans themselves, 58,3% of the economically active Swazis were farm and forestry workers; 25,5% were production and transport workers; 9,4% were service workers; and 4,4% were professional, clerks and related workers (Benso, p 23).

Benso estimated that from 1977 to 1980, 1 930 jobs would have to be created yearly to prevent new entrants to the labour market in Kangwane from becoming unemployed or migrant workers. It estimated that in the rest of South Africa a further 6 100 Swazis would have to be provided with jobs each year (Benso, p 24). It was estimated that by 1980 the Swazi labour force outside Kangwane would be 206 100 as against 46 100 Swazi and 20 600 'other' labourers based in Kangwane (Benso, p 25).

Benso's figures do NOT, however, make provision for relocation.

Between 1970 and 1975 there was a significant shift in the importance of commuter and migrant labour to Kangwane's 'permanent inhabitants':

Table 6 KANGWANE PER CAPITA INCOME, 1970 AND 1975 (R's)

	1970	1975	Average annual increase 1970 - 1975 (%)
GDP (africans)	22	49	16,5
GDP (africans) + commuters	33	133	33,2
GDP (africans) + commuters + migrant workers = GNI (africans)	72	169	19,3
GNI (africans and non-africans)	75	172	18,7

from Benso, p 31

Between 1970 and 1975, commuter income in fact increased by an average of 70,3% a year, while migrant income increased by an average of only 7,9% (Benso, p 31). In 1970 at least 11,9% of the men were absent from Kangwane as migrant workers; in the 20-44 age group this figure reached 37,4% (Benso, p 25). Despite the decrease in relative importance of migrant work, Benso noted in 1978 that

The newcomers to the newly-added areas and new entrants to the labour market are apparently even more dependent on migrant work, so it may be expected that the number of migrant workers has since 1970 increased sharply and is continuing to increase. (p 47)

The estimated number of commuters in 1970 was 3 000. By 1977 this had increased to 28 240 (Benso, p 43). Towns accommodating the largest number of commuters were Kanyamazane, Kabokweni, Matsulu and Kamaqhekeza, while Nelspruit, White River and rural areas adjoining Kangwane were the major destinations. Commuter income made up 47,2% of the GNI in 1975 (Benso, p 44), and in 1977 83% of the commuters travelled to work by bus.

In 1971 there were 13 tribal labour bureaux and 2 district bureaux; by 1977 there were three district labour bureaux, at 'Mango's place' in the Nsikazi area, at Tonga, and at Ekulindeni in the 'new area'. The Tonga bureau placed 1 132 workers in employment in 1976, and 1 728 in the first ten months of 1977. The Nsikazi bureau placed 2 189 workers in the 1976/7 financial year. The Ekulindeni bureau was only established in 1977 with the influx of people into the new area.

The estimated african labour force in Kangwane in these years was 58 900 in 1976 (26 700 male Swazis, 14 100 female Swazis, 12 000 male 'other' africans, and 6 100 female 'others') and 60 900 in 1977 (Benso, p 25). (These figures are a considerable underestimate insofar as they take no account of relocation.)

#### KANGWANE'S ECONOMIC BASE

Even Benso coyly admits that Kangwane is 'still a backward area' compared to other bantustans, and that the small economic base is almost entirely confined to the Nsikazi area. By 1978 Kangwane had no recognised growth point, although Eerstehoeck and Kamhlushwa were potential candidates. By March 1977, there were only two 'industries' established in Kangwane on the agency system: that is, non-local private industrialists had established two undertakings in Kangwane through the mediation of the CED. The one makes roof trusses, employing 10 workers, and the other is a brickworks employing 118 people (Benso, p 39). The CED itself was by this time responsible for 'six beer wholesalers, a wholesaler in Black art, a retail concern, a liquor store and a savings bank' (Benso, p 42), and there were no tripartite companies involving the CED/an external industrialist/local Swazi shareholders. There were only 214 applications for trade and services licences in 1977/78: general dealers, cafes, restaurants, fresh produce dealers and dealers in wood and coal represented 78% of these applications (Benso, pp 41-2). The 'only noteworthy Black manufacturer' by 1978 ran 3 brickworks employing about 100 people (Benso, p 39).

There are four industrial areas bordering on Kangwane: Hazyview, Malelane, Nelspruit and White River. By June 1977 border industries employed 938 africans from Kangwane (Benso, p 40). From 1973 to 1975 no employment was created in Kangwane's primary sector; 55 new jobs were created annually in the secondary sector; and 1 389 in the tertiary sector, 1 026 of them being in government service (Benso, pp 45-6). In 1974 the South African Development Trust (SADT) contributed R2,9 million of the R3 million gross fixed investment in Kangwane. Since then, the Kangwane government has taken over most of the SADT's functions (Benso, p 32). Locally generated employment in the primary sector did occur in the second half of the 1970s, and by 1980 there were two irrigation schemes, three agricultural co-operatives, and a very limited amount of employment in mining and in commercial agriculture.

Thus locally generated employment is totally meaningless as regards the physical survival of the vast majority of Kangwane's inhabitants. Nor does the sub-subsistence agriculture that characterises the bantustan allow for their survival. Population pressure, generalised poverty and unfavourable physical conditions force even Benso to recognise that

the agricultural potential of Kangwane is not large enough to provide the entire population with a satisfactory standard of living. (p 27)

Hence the critical importance of migrant and commuter labour, hence the fact that the migrant work system has become 'an integral part of the economic life of the Swazi' (Benso, p 48). Yet even for those households fortunate enough to have workers among their members, nutritious food is frequently a luxury, let alone access to health or education facilities.

#### HEALTH

In 1977 there were three hospitals with 683 beds. 15 doctors and 27 clinics served an estimated (de facto) african population of 213 600 (Benso, pp 52-3). The most prevalent diseases 'are venereal disease, bilharzia, tuberculosis, malaria, other infectious and parasitical diseases and typhoid fever' (Benso, p 52).

#### EDUCATION

In 1978 there were 103 primary schools and 62 269 primary pupils, and 16 secondary schools with 9 446 pupils (Benso, p 49). Children in the newly added area had by this time to go to schools in Kangwane despite the fact that there was and is 'a considerable shortage of educational facilities in Kangwane', an acute shortage of teachers, and 'numerous double sessions' (Benso, p 50).

#### PENSIONS

5 530 old age pensions were paid out in 1976/7 (Benso, p 53), averaging R360 p.a.

#### INFRASTRUCTURE

Until at least 1977, water for human consumption was obtained mainly from boreholes, rivers and dams - a fact which was significant in the cholera outbreaks of 1980. By 1978 Kangwane had one post office, and two towns were served with electricity. Rail and road networks were largely those which connected towns in 'white' South Africa, although efforts have been made to improve the transport links used by commuters.

#### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BRIEF

The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 recognised the Swazi as an ethnic unit, and the first tribal authorities were established in the Nkomazi region in 1959. By 1975 there were 14 tribal authorities and four regional authorities (Nsikazi, Nkomazi, Mlondozi and Mswati). The Territorial Authority was established in 1976, under chief executive officer Chief Dhlamini. Dhlamini was deposed in mid-1977 and his place taken by Mr E Mabuza. In October 1977 the Territorial Authority was converted into a legislative assembly of 36 members, at least 12 of whom had to be chiefs. Both Dhlamini and Mabuza formed political parties in 1978: Inyandza Yemaswati and Inyandza National Movement respectively. There were 21 chiefs in the legislative assembly in 1980, at which time a request was made to the central State that the legislative assembly be expanded to 45 members.

As will be indicated in the next section on relocation, political conflicts between a chiefly faction and that of the petit bourgeoisie have been fierce in Kangwane. Details also follow on the fact that Kangwane is to be incorporated into Swaziland rather than given 'independence'.

#### RELOCATION AND ETHNICITY IN KANGWANE

'The Swazi people, who are clearly experiencing a national awakening, are still flocking to the territory in their thousands', claimed the Deputy Minister of Plural Relations and Development in mid-1979, as he opened the session of the Kangwane legislative assembly. Even he did not see this 'national awakening' as an unqualified blessing. 'Although one has great appreciation of the fact that people want to come and settle in their national home', he continued, 'it is necessary to sound a warning that the chiefs should not allow settlement to take place in an unregulated way.' (RDM, 16.05.79) By mid-1980 the chief executive councillor of Kangwane, Mr Enos Mabuza, was even more concerned about the political effects of relocation. Noting that some 150 000 people had been moved from black spots and white

rural areas to Kangwane over the past few years, he stated that:

As far as we are concerned, resettlement is a political bomb ... some resettlement areas have no amenities whatsoever, no running water, no sewerage system, no schools and no clinics. Many of the people have no jobs. Some people have to drink dirty water. They think we are responsible. There is no message we can get across to them until their problems have been attended to. (RDM, 29.07.80)

Relocation to Kangwane is not a new phenomenon. It has been an ongoing process for many years, although only on a large and increasing scale from the late 1960s. Linked as it is to the growth of african unemployment in South Africa since the 1960s, and to the need to control the african dominated classes through bantustan structures, relocation into Kangwane has been the fate of hundreds of thousands of people over the last decade or so. In 1970 the de facto african population of Kangwane was given as 117 600 people, of whom 81 200 were Swazis. By 1977 the estimated de facto african population, taking population growth and resettlement into account, was 213 600 africans, 166 800 of whom were Swazis (KaNgwane *Economic Revue* 1978, pp 20 and 10). The Benso government report laconically notes that

These figures indicate large-scale resettlement in KaNgwane since 1970 (p 21)

and gives the official figures for Swazis relocated in Kangwane from July 1970 to June 1976 as some 58 696 people (p 26). The african population in the Swazi bantustan had in fact increased by some 82% from 1970 to 1977, while the Swazi population increased by some 105%. The massive influx continued from 1977 to 1981, apparently increasing both absolutely and in terms of the annual rate of relocation. By mid-1981 the Swazi population of Kangwane alone was estimated as some 350 000 people, which is 430% of the 1970 figure. (1)

Relocation 'refers to economic forces and political policies that, in their interaction, uproot, relocate, and contain and control enormous numbers of South Africans within 'group areas'' (Maré, 1981, p 2). In reality these various processes are integrated. Nonetheless, we shall discuss separately the processes of removal and the processes of relocation in Kangwane. Removal will be analysed in terms of various categories: eviction of people from 'badly sited Black areas' in order to consolidate the Swazi bantustan; transference of urban Swazis from a township in 'white' South Africa to a township in Kangwane; removal of 'surplus' people resident on farms; and movement of people already resident in the bantustan. Similarly, relocation will be examined in terms of the various sites to which people have been moved: planned townships, squatter towns, and agricultural and 'closer' settlements. Despite this artificial analytical distinction between removal and relocation, an attempt will be made throughout to indicate that these processes are integrally connected to one another, as well as to the containment and control of the african dominated classes. The fostering of ethnicity is one such method of control, and certain aspects of ethnicity will be a particular focus in the subsequent discussion.

#### 'HOMELAND CONSOLIDATION'

Kangwane has always been one of the smallest of South Africa's clutch of bantustans. In 1973 it consisted of three separate chunks of land in the vicinity of Swaziland, and about ten black spots in the surrounding districts. (2) The first of the three major land areas was the Nsikazi reserve, a bushveld region of 70 850 ha which stretched between the Sabie and Crocodile Rivers, and lay to the east of Nelspruit and White River, and to the west of the Kruger National Park. The second region was the Nkomazi reserve, bordering on Swaziland in the south and the Lomati River in the north. The third was a block of some 68 200 ha in the south, between the Pongola River and Swaziland.

In 1973 consolidation proposals were made to excise all the above land from the Swazi bantustan, with the exception of the Nkomazi reserve on the northern border of Swaziland, and

three rapidly developing dormitory towns in the Nsikazi reserve. The Swazi population in the excised area was to be relocated in the 'new area' still to be granted: some 170 750 ha in the highveld, on the western border of Swaziland (SAIRR Survey 1973, pp 154-5). (The Mlondozi and Mswati regional authorities are now located here, but like Benso we shall continue to refer to this as the new area.) This proposed region was at the time owned by the central State and by white farmers, and consisted of a block of land unsuited to agricultural or pastoral production, bitterly cold in winter, and remote from employment centres (SAIRR Survey 1972, p 174, and 1973, p 155). Swazi bantustan structures were so undeveloped at the time that these plans were made without consulting the ethnic administrators. Members of the Nsikazi regional authority received the news from a press report, and subsequently protested vigorously about the threatened loss of their reserve, 'the most developed of all the Swazi homelands' (Star, 22.02.73; SAIRR Survey 1973, p 154).

Between 1973 and 1975 some 100 000 ha of land was apparently made available in the Barberton, Carolina and Ermelo districts, as part of the area offered in exchange for the land to be excised. (3) After farms started being bought in the new area, 'the resettlement of Swazi in KaNgwane ... started in earnest' (Benso, p 26). By mid-1976 thousands, probably tens of thousands, had been relocated in this region. By mid-1977 the total population in the new area was conservatively estimated as 31 800 (Ibid). Many of these people appear to have been moved as part of the process of consolidation. According to the Minister of Bantu Affairs in late 1975, the new area would enable the establishment of a Territorial Authority, insofar as the land was to be used

for the settlement of a number of senior chiefs and their followers who were still resident in the White areas and could consequently not participate in a Swazi Territorial Authority. (4)

The Territorial Authority, that elaboration of the administrative machinery needed to control the bantustan population, was in fact established in 1976. Chief Johannes Dhlamini, a 'traditionalist' member of the Swazi royal family, became chief executive officer. That year he was approached by the commissioner-general of the Swazi to consent to a land consolidation proposal which involved 'the removal of Chief Dhlamini's Nsikazi tribe from their traditional lands' (Sunday Times, 3.02.78). It was at this point that the limited autonomy of the bantustan state from the central State emerged, as did the fact that ethnic political structures do not inevitably function in support of the dominant classes. Dhlamini called a meeting in Barberton in May 1977 at which it was unanimously decided that he should withhold his consent. In June 1977 he called a special meeting of the Territorial Authority and reported back in those terms. Members of the Authority promptly passed a motion of no confidence in Dhlamini, and (illegally) deposed him. Mabuza, an ex-school inspector with two Union degrees, who drew his support mainly from Kangwane's petit bourgeoisie rather than from the chiefs, was immediately elected to replace Dhlamini. (5)

The subsequent conflicts over leadership within Kangwane's political structures, themselves integrally connected to issues such as the relation between the Swazi State adjunct and the central State, have been described as a 'game of musical chairs' with the 'Government apparently calling the tune' (Star, 30.06.78). Mabuza, supported by the central State, effectively retained his position throughout, but the traditionalist chiefs did not concede victory to their educated petit bourgeois opponents without a struggle. One aspect of the mobilisation of internal support by the chiefs was the formation of Dhlamini's political party, Inyandza Yemaswati ('Swazi Nation Togetherness') in January 1978. This had an overtly ethnic orientation: its aims included the promotion of Swazi customs and culture, the fostering of unity amongst all Swazis in South Africa, and opposing anything antagonistic to the interests of Swazis (RDM, 25.01.78; Sunday Tribune, 26.02.78). The ingredients for this 'politicization of tribal distinctions' (6) lay partly in pre-capitalist Swazi society (in language, popular traditions, kinship ties, traditional lands and chiefdoms, etc.) and partly in the particular form in which pre-capitalist and capitalist social relations have been articulated

in South Africa, epitomised in the effects of segregation and apartheid. However, the deliberate fostering of ethnicity at this time by many of the Swazi chiefs must be related to their need to rally support for their positions within State structures, and to prevent land expropriations and population relocations which would erode their political bases.

The relation between these ethnic interpellations and the land question in Kangwane is an interesting one. On the one hand, demands and practices which were to some degree progressive, emerged from tribalists working within ethnic structures. Chief Dhlamini, for instance, apparently attached more importance to the demands of his tribe than to those of the central State. He also continued to act as a symbol of resistance to relocation into Kangwane from traditional land. (By mid-1980, when he was the local chief of the relocation camp Eerstehoek, he was refusing to move within the bantustan borders, as he claimed he lived on territory 'which belonged to the Swazi people by history and blood' (RDM, 29.07.80).) Similarly, the Inyandza Yemaswati took an aggressive line on land claims for Swazis, and aimed to unite all Swazis so that

we will ... be able to press the South African Government for a fair deal insofar as the allocation of land for Swazis is concerned. (RDM, 25.01.78)

On the other hand, the fostering of ethnicity in the context of national oppression is ultimately reactionary, and serves to disorganise and divide the dominated classes. This is clearly demonstrated in the representations made in June 1978 to the central State by ten Kangwane chiefs, eight of whom were members of the legislative assembly. Led by Dhlamini, the ten effectively requested more relocation, by 'demanding a Swazis only territory'. Remaining entirely within the dominant ideological discourse, they argued that Kangwane was meant to be a Swazi 'homeland', but that it unfortunately included Shangaans and other tribes as well (RDM, 6.06.78). Non-Swazis in Kangwane (mainly Zulus and Shangaans) formed 31% of the african population in 1970, and are concentrated in the Nsikazi reserve (Benso, pp 24-5), precisely the area under dispute at this time.

There were almost certainly other factors besides this internal resistance which led to the August 1978 announcement that the Nsikazi reserve with the exception of 750 ha bordering on the Sabie River was to remain part of Kangwane. (Such factors probably included the problems anticipated in moving some 60 000 Swazis out of the 'most developed' area of Kangwane, and the desire to pre-empt land speculation by white farmers and prominent white politicians.) As a result of this concession, Kangwane was to receive 70 000 ha less of the new area than originally promised (Benso, p 9). None of the other areas marked for excision in 1973 were reprieved, and relocation of Swazis from these areas appears to have begun in earnest from the mid-1970s.

As far as relocation as an aspect of bantustan consolidation is concerned, this resettlement into the new area involved a number of different groups of people. Removals appear to have occurred from the block of Kangwane south of Swaziland in the period from 1975 to 1977, although we have been able to obtain only indirect confirmation of this. (7) By 1978, removals of Swazis from 'badly situated Black areas or other Black states' (8) had either occurred or were imminent. (In 1970 some 29 000 Swazis lived in other bantustans, mainly in Lebowa and in Bophuthatswana.) 'Black spot' removals were also threatened in the late 1970s. A press report in early 1977 stated that:

About 20 000 Swazi families scattered over the Eastern Transvaal are to be resettled inside the newly established Swazi homeland.... Most of the people to be resettled come from Kromkrans, Driefontein, Amersfoort and Vlakplaas. Some are 160 km away in Nelspruit and Lydenburg. (RDM, 9.03.77)

Daggakraal and Kafferlokasie were two more 'black spots' noted by the Department of Plural Relations in its 1977/8 report as due for excision and the relocation of their inhabitants to the new area. (9) Waite, writing in 1977, also stated that the proposed consolidation of Kangwane meant that ten 'black spots' would be removed in the Barberton, White River and Nelspruit

areas, and seven in the districts of Volksrust, Carolina, Ermelo, Wakkerstroom and Amersfoort (Waite's map).

These 'black spot' removals appear to have begun on a significant scale from about 1978. In that year relocation involved Swazis mainly from Kromkrans, near Cullinan (Benso, p 26). 22 of the 35 Swazi chiefs in South Africa were by then resident in Kangwane and, according to the 1978 Benso report, 'resettlement of the tribes is still continuing' (Ibid, p 12). In 1979, 4 739 people were removed from a 'black spot' in the Carolina district. (10) By mid-1980, as already noted, Mabuza was claiming that some 150 000 people had been moved into Kangwane from white farms and 'black spots' over the past few years. Relocation from these black-owned freehold farms was still continuing in 1980 (SAIRR Survey 1980, p 395).

Such farms were not necessarily owned by Swazis. Doornkop, for instance, was a farm near Middelburg owned by some Pedis. Concerted Pedi resistance to removal occurred throughout the 1960s, delaying their actual eviction. By 1974, when the remaining 420 Pedi families were ultimately forcibly removed to Lebowa, there still remained some 18 000 people. They were largely Swazis and South Ndebeles who had moved onto the land and had been paying rent to the Pedi landowners from about 1970. These 'illegal squatters' worked as migrants in various towns or on neighbouring farms, but a high proportion of them were unemployed (SAIRR Survey 1974, p 200). By 1980 many of these Doornkop Swazis had been moved to the relocation camp of Eerstehoek in Kangwane (RDM, 29.07.80).

The next stage in this process of relocating South Africans in order to 'consolidate the homelands' is likely to occur after the Van der Walt recommendations have been made known. It is rumoured that Barberton and its environs will be incorporated into Kangwane if the Commission's proposals are implemented. Mabuza has certainly claimed areas adjoining Kangwane which, according to him, 'to any reasonable person should be logically inside' (Star, 30.06.81). It is debatable whether the people facing relocation as a result of this latest 'final solution' to bantustan consolidation - which may even result in a relocation of people out of Kangwane to labour dormitories near regional development axes (Population removals, pp 7-8) - accept the Commission to the same extent as does Mabuza.

## URBAN RELOCATION

Urban relocation to Kangwane involves the removal of african residents from townships bordering on this bantustan to Kangwane itself. It is thus one aspect of the process of making ethnic citizens of South African africans, of transforming workers living near their place of work to commuters, and of seeing that

no stone is ... left unturned to achieve the settlement in the homelands of non-productive Bantu at present residing in the European areas. (11)

Many of those relocated from townships have been dumped in the Nsikazi reserve in the north, which has throughout the 1970s been the area where a large section of Kangwane's economically active population lived, and there a large percentage of Kangwane's commuters.

The process of urban relocation to the Swazi bantustan began in the late 1960s with the removal of about 3 700 Swazis from the White River township to Kabokweni, 20 km east of White River in the Nsikazi reserve (Malan & Hattingh). Kabokweni was established in 1967 and had some 3 300 residents by 1970 (Benso, p 27), many of whom commuted daily to work in White River. Then in 1972, 2 000 'squatters' were moved from the outskirts of Komatipoort to Naas, later known as Kamaqhekeza, in the Nkomazi reserve. Instead of being able to walk to work, those who had jobs in Komatipoort had to pay R3,30 a month bus fare in 1972 (SAIRR Survey 1972, p 176; RDM, 14.08.72). By 1975, 2 300 Swazis had also been moved from Malelane to Kama-quekeza (Malan & Hattingh).

7 300 Swazis were moved from the township in Nelspruit in 1973. They were relocated in Lekazi, later known as Kanyamazane, a township 23 km east of Nelspruit (Ibid). The houses in Nelspruit township were converted into hostels for men, and Kanyamazane became a dormitory town for commuters working in Nelspruit. Matsulu in the Nsikazi reserve also developed into a dormitory town, this time serving Kaapmuiden. 6 300 Swazis living in Kaapmuiden's township had been moved here by 1975 (Ibid), the bulk of them being moved in the 1973-74 period. The process of urban relocation into Kangwane almost certainly went on after this and affected other townships in 'white' South Africa as well. Swazi residents in Barberton had for instance been moved to Kangwane by 1981 (*Star*, 30.06.81), and Piet Retief's Swazi inhabitants had been threatened with removal by 1977 (see Waite's map).

By 1975 the above-mentioned townships of Kabokweni, Kamaqhekeza, Kanyamazane and Matsulu were the only proclaimed towns in Kangwane, and were all the product of urban relocation. A feature common to all of them was a burgeoning population, as 'urban relocatees' were joined by those moving into the townships for other reasons. Urban population in Kangwane thus soared, from 5 200 people in 1970 (4,4% of Kangwane's de facto population) to an estimated 41 300 people in 1977 (19,3% of the total population) (Benso, p 20). Kanyamazane's residents, for instance, numbered zero in 1972, 9 780 in 1975, and 17 080 in 1977 (Ibid, p 27). These urban population figures do not even include those in the swelling squatter camps on the outskirts of all Kangwane's towns. By 1976 large squatter settlements had developed around the urban centres, as people unable to obtain land, housing or employment moved to where the chances of survival were greatest. Many of those initially relocated in other areas of the Swazi bantustan thus later moved to squatter settlements such as Pienaar near Kanyamazane, where some 14 000 people lived by the end of 1980 (*Afrika*, November 1980). Relocation into Kangwane's urban areas was thus by no means over once residents had been evicted from townships in 'white' South Africa. Glossing over the causes of this relocation and re-relocation into squatter settlements, the Benso report acknowledges this fact, by stating:

it should be pointed out that spontaneous urban settlement outside towns, as at Dundonald and other dense settlements, often occurs in Kangwane.... (Benso, p 28)

#### REMOVALS FROM WHITE-OWNED FARMS

Eviction of labour tenants, 'squatters' and 'non-productive Bantu' from farms in the Eastern Transvaal, due partly to the consolidation of capitalist relations of production on these farms, has been an ongoing process throughout the twentieth century.(12) The fostering of this process by the State has also long been a feature of the development of capitalist agriculture in South Africa. No new 'squatter' contracts could be made in the Transvaal after 1913, and by 1970 new labour tenant contracts had been prohibited in most if not all Transvaal districts. After August 1980 labour tenancy as a form of farm labour was made illegal throughout South Africa.

Legislation does not necessarily reflect practice, and illegal labour tenancy and 'squatting' have been prevalent in many districts at various periods. Nonetheless, for various reasons including the growth of structural unemployment in South Africa, many farmers have since the 1960s been only too willing to evict labour tenants, 'squatters' and other surplus people from their farms, replacing them with a smaller number of wage workers. In the context of influx control and the bantustan policy, this large and 'continuously increasing number of Bantu who live on white farms without contributing anything to agricultural productivity'(13) has tended to be forced into the bantustans.

It is difficult to obtain any idea of the geographical aspects or of the relative importance of this form of relocation into Kangwane. It is however clear that many of those in squatter settlements in the bantustan are ex-labour tenants evicted from white-owned farms in



Driefontein - well maintained family housing (September 1982)

Mathopestad (Mathopestat) near Boons, Western Transvaal (1981)





Mathopestad - homes under threat of removal (July 1981)

Mathopestad, where people may keep cattle and have access to fields (July 1981)



Mogopa, Western Transvaal - a black spot near Ventersdorp under threat of removal (July 1981)

Motlatla, another Western Transvaal black spot under threat of removal (July 1981)






Motlatla - boreholes and dams supply the whole community (July 1981)

Motlatla - surplus grain is processed on the farm and sold to the co-op at Lichtenburg (July 1981)



Motlatla - numbered houses indicate the threat of removal  
removal this Western Transvaal black spot faces (July 1981)

Motlatla - cattle in good condition now - but after the move? (July 1981)





Motlatla - schools have been numbered by officials in preparation for the move (July 1981)

Tsetse, a relocation area near Ramatlabama (July 1981)



Tsetse - grandmother cares for baby while the mother seeks work illegally in the city  
(July 1981)



Gannalaagte - relocation area for people evicted from farms (July 1981)

Atamaleng - relocation area for people evicted from towns (July 1981)



adjacent areas.(14) By 1980, for instance, there were

at least 11 000 squatters near Matsulu township, some of them having been recently moved off white-owned farms throughout the Eastern Transvaal. (WIP 16, p 26)

African farm residents are notoriously powerless, landless and poverty-stricken, and it is likely that on their eviction they would be forced into the least congenial of Kangwane's settlement areas - the squatter and denser settlements.

As regards the relative importance of relocation from 'white' rural areas, the SPP sample for Kangwane indicated that 19% of those interviewed had moved with their families from white farms to the bantustan. This percentage is probably not representative of Kangwane's population at large, 64% of those interviewed for SPP purposes having arrived in Kangwane in or before 1970, while the major thrust of relocation from 'white' rural areas appears to have been after 1970. According to Benso, 'large-scale and mostly voluntary resettlement' occurred in the new area between 1973 and 1978 (p 26). People from surrounding farms almost certainly made up the majority of those moving 'voluntarily' to Kangwane in this period. Furthermore, Mabuza saw removal from white rural areas as one of the two major forms of relocation into his bantustan from the late 1970s. Thus the figure of 19% is probably too low to reflect adequately the extent of removal from white-owned land to Kangwane over the 1970s.

#### RELOCATION DUE TO THE INSTITUTION OF BETTERMENT SCHEMES AND THE CREATION OF A PEASANTRY AND CAPITALIST ESTATES

The creation of betterment schemes centres around the demarcation of land into residential, agricultural and grazing land; the allocation of 'economic units' of farming land to the minority who are supposed to develop into a 'permanent farming class', and the complete or partial removal of the majority from access to land and stock. By 1974, 75% of Kangwane's surface area had been demarcated into the various areas, but by 1976 the second stage of detailed planning and actual movement of people had affected only 0,1% of the land.(15) The April 1981 edition of Informa indicates that little progress has been made with the implementation of betterment schemes since 1976:

Farming rights are allotted in an arbitrary fashion by chiefs on a non-selective basis. Therefore subsistence farming is mostly practised in KaNgwane. The department plans to establish more people on an economic basis. (p 14)

There are many obstacles to the institution of betterment schemes and the associated relocation of people. A prime one is the political implications of depriving tens of thousands of people of the limited amount of land and stock to which they have managed to cling. Furthermore, much of the land in Kangwane is technically unsuited to agricultural and/or pastoral production, and is in any case so densely populated that residential sites already occupy much of the land surface. In the Nsikazi reserve, for instance, dryland crop production 'is severely restricted by population pressure' (Benso, p 33), and consequently less attention has been given to betterment schemes here than in the rest of Kangwane (Ibid, p 19). The Benso report refers blandly to the population pressure on the existing agricultural land, and states that the estimated population in Kangwane in 1977 - 57,5 people per sq km - 'is indeed high for a predominantly rural population' (p 20).

Capitalist farming has however developed on a very limited scale in Kangwane. There are for example two irrigation schemes at Lomati and Tonga, and there is also a sisal project at the latter place. Commercial forestry plantations, run by the State, are of increasing importance in the new area. In 1978, 7 500 ha of commercial plantations around Lochiel were still to be added to Kangwane as part of the consolidation land. By 1980 the plantations in the bantustan covered 12 000 ha, and according to Koornhof this area could be expanded by 30%.(16)

It is useful at this point to analyse in greater detail some of the attempts to establish a peasantry and/or capitalist farming, and the associated relocation of people within Kangwane. The Lomati sugar project was established in 1966, and by 1981 it covered 219 ha. When the project was started,

The land was ploughed without the consent of the existing 'owners' and caused much resentment. (WIP 16, p 38)

The original intention was to convert the land use from (sub-)subsistence farming to sugar farms run by small farmers. However, the project rapidly evolved into a farm controlled by the South African - and later the Kangwane - State, on which wage labour was employed.

The sisal scheme at Tonga, on 1 600 ha in 1981, is also run as an estate employing largely female labour. From September 1980 it was owned jointly by Measured Farming Ltd, a Pietermaritzburg-based company, and various State development corporations including the KaNgwane Economic Development Corporation. By 1981 there were plans to expand sisal production, which involved utilising about 2 000 ha on the Swaziland border.

This is a particularly sensitive topic as it involves moving the people to accommodate the scheme.... According to the KaNgwane Agricultural Department this scheme and removals would only be undertaken with the consent of the people concerned. ('The people' usually refers to the chief, and presumably he can be persuaded to consent.... What would probably happen is that the state would initiate the new scheme - clear ground, move people, etc - and then hand over to MF who would make money on the venture). (Ibid, pp 36-7)

The cotton scheme, on 200 ha near Figtree in 1981, is one of the few agricultural projects where the intention to foster small rural capitalists via the scheme still exists. It is envisaged that in 1989 the scheme will be transferred to individual farmers, each receiving 20 ha. By early 1981 there were also seven 'progressive farmers' on 20 ha plots on land adjoining the cotton project lands. Each had been given massive loans by the KEDC - the only farmer who actually grew any cotton in 1980 received a R21 000 loan. These individual farmers were tightly controlled by the KEDC, and effectively served as managers for the corporation rather than as petty capitalists (Ibid, pp 37-8).

The agricultural projects discussed above typify the few which have been established in Kangwane, and indicate that Koornhof's desideratum for this bantustan -

die ontwikkeling van 'n suksesvolle en tevrede boeregemeenskap (speech on 2.05.80) - has hardly been realised. Indeed, the projects have tended to have precisely the opposite effect. Land subject to 'agricultural development' is being utilised not by peasants and petty capitalist farmers, but by large/State capital employing wage labourers. As a result, people have lost, or are in imminent danger of losing, their patches of land, and are being converted into rural workers and surplus people by capitalist development within Kangwane itself.

Thus, the conditions that have created structural unemployment in white-owned agriculture with the abolition of the labour tenant system, are being repeated in the rural areas of the bantustans themselves. Structural unemployment had made areas of control (the bantustans) necessary, areas where the unemployed could be 'kept' away from the urban areas. Now the slim chance of that control succeeding through the creation of a stable class of subsistence and peasant farmers, is being eroded. (WIP 16, p 35)

The central State and its bantustan adjunct clearly intend to press ahead with this agricultural programme, with its concomitant implications for relocation and class formation. Expenditure on agricultural planning and conservation rose from R21 000 in 1973/4 to R118 000 in 1976/7. By 1980 various schemes fostering the development of a peasantry and/or capitalist farmers had been initiated, including training courses for agricultural demonstrators, agricultural

co-operatives, and the utilisation of skilled national servicemen of the SADF in various agricultural programmes.(17) Koornhof has praised all these schemes, and has noted that the Kangwane government, like the South African government, must give high priority to agricultural development. The ominous implications of such development are noted in part by the Benso report, which emphasises the importance of urban development in Kangwane

to accommodate the surplus population from the rural areas, since the agricultural potential of KaNgwane is not large enough to provide the entire population with a satisfactory standard of living. (p 27)

In all, then, relocation of people through the implementation of betterment schemes and the fostering of peasant/capitalist farming, does not seem to have reached large proportions in Kangwane as yet. Nonetheless, provided the resistance of the people can be overcome, there is a strong probability that this form of relocation will increase in the future. There are also strong indications that 'agricultural development' will take the form of farming by State and/or medium and large capital, rather than by peasants and petty Swazi capitalists. The development of the latter type of farming, in the context of massive relocation on a grossly inadequate land area, of land which needs considerable cash outlays to make it suitable for commercial farming, and of the underdevelopment of Kangwane, is a very problematical process. Moreover the policy of creating petty rural capitalists, even if successful, would benefit only a miniscule percentage of Kangwane's population. As a representative of Kangwane's Department of Agriculture noted in 1981:

The department plans to establish more farmers on an economic basis. If the country's resources are fully exploited and the net income per farmer is R3 600 per year, it will be possible to establish 2 630 farmers on an economic basis. (Informa, April 1981, pp 14-5, our emphasis)

Thus even if a class of Swazi peasants and/or petty rural capitalists is established, the immediate economic effect on the vast bulk of Kangwane's rural population will be the same as that following the penetration of State capital into the rural areas: relocation, full proletarianisation, and marginalisation.

## RELOCATION IN KANGWANE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONDITIONS

People who have been relocated into Kangwane have landed up in a number of different types of settlement. One of these is a planned 'modern' township, to some extent comparable with the municipal township from which many of the people resident in such settlements have been moved. Housing and services, on a significant but grossly inadequate scale, are provided in part by State corporations such as the SADT.

Bantu are also permitted to erect their own dwellings with their own funds according to previously approved plans ... the occupants are entitled, provided they belong to the ethnic group in whose area the township is situated, to purchase the properties with or without dwellings.... (18)

'Self-built houses' (and 'self-bou dorpe') are in fact being promoted by the central State, as a result of its inability to cope with the housing shortage.(19)

Most of these townships, built to accommodate people removed from municipal townships and those working in the four border industrial areas surrounding Kangwane, are in the north of the bantustan. The main ones are Kabokweni, Kanyamazane and Matsulu, all in the Nsikazi reserve. Kamaqhekeza and Kamhlushwa (or Vlakbult) in the Nkomazi reserve are also townships, although they seem to fall into the more disadvantaged category of towns 'deeper into the homelands' with only 'rudimentary services and housing'.(20) People were for example moved to Kamaqhekeza (then Naas) before any houses or services had been provided.

Families moved in this urban relocation then had to live in one-roomed corrugated iron huts, unbearably hot in the bushveld summer (SAIRR Survey 1972, p 176). By 1977 there were however 631 SADT houses here, and 10 self-built ones, for an official population of 2 471 people (Benso, pp 27-8).

These townships housing commuter workers receive the bulk of State expenditure on urban areas. (21) A considerable boost has in fact been given by relocation to the development of Swazi capitalists, as construction work is given out as far as possible to Swazi contractors. Relocation into the bantustan was, for example, the precondition for the development of Kangwane's 'only noteworthy Black manufacturer' by 1978, the proud owner of three brickworks (Benso, pp 39-40). Very few if any of the seven million bricks supplied by him to the Department of Works in 1977/8 could have been used in the squatter settlements. These had already burgeoned around the dormitory townships, and the flow of people into them had shown no signs of diminishing by 1981. (22) As the Benso report notes:

If provision is made, especially at Kabokweni, for the surrounding squatter towns, which decrease in population density the further they are situated from White River, it becomes clear how important jobs in adjoining White towns are to the existence of towns in Kangwane. (p 26)

By 1977 people who commuted from Kangwane on a daily basis to work in 'white' South Africa were largely drawn from Kanyamazane (6 500), Pienaar, its neighbouring squatter settlement (5 000), Kabokweni (3 300) and Kamaqhekeza (1 700) (Benso, p 43). There were in that year no people commuting on a daily basis from the newly added area (Ibid, p 44).

Relocation towns in the north of Kangwane can thus be distinguished from those in the south visually, in terms of the extent and nature of State-financed infrastructural development in their centres. This in turn is related to their different class compositions: a significant proportion of people in the northern settlements are commuter workers or members of the petit bourgeoisie, and the proportion of migrant workers and surplus people is correspondingly less than in the south. The policy of urban relocation has in fact substantially altered the importance of migrant workers vis-a-vis commuter workers in Kangwane. In 1970 commuters' income formed 13,5% of Kangwane's GNI (Black), while migrants' income formed 58,5%. By 1975 commuters were earning 48,0% of the GNI (Black), and migrants only 24,1% (Ibid, p 31). (The number of migrant workers in Kangwane has probably increased sharply since 1970 (Ibid, p 47), but their relative importance has declined.) Fostering commuter workers at the expense of migrant workers is of course State policy, as it facilitates social control, encourages the development of a stabilised semi-skilled work force, and improves the chances of capitalist development within the bantustans by providing a home market (see e.g. Ibid, p 43).

By 1977 there were an estimated 28 200 commuters travelling daily between Kangwane and work - an increase of some 25 000 on the 1970 figure. Most worked in Nelspruit (12 500), White River (3 300), Komatipoort (1 400) and Malelane (1 000) (Ibid, pp 43-4). Over 80% of them used buses to get to and from work, and transporting labour units between Kangwane and 'white' South Africa seems to be another way in which capital accumulation amongst the Swazi petit bourgeoisie is fostered (Ibid, p 44). Over 9 000 commuters worked in neighbouring rural areas, mainly on farms, especially those near White River (4 000), Malelane (2 000), Nelspruit (1 600) and Komatipoort (1 500) (Ibid, p 44). Kangwane residents also commuted to nearby plantations and sawmills, and many women commuted seasonally as farm workers. Infrastructural development to facilitate this movement of labour has been more rapid than that to improve living conditions within the bantustan. In 1978, for example, a tarred road to Kabokweni was being completed.

There are three other types of settlement areas to be found in varying forms in Kangwane. The first is the 'closer' or 'denser' settlement, where agricultural activities are insignificant and where people are settled in 'more densely populated residential areas' than those described above for the townships. State-provided services are far more perfunctory than in the townships, and according to the government circular describing them,

(t)hese settlements offer a refuge for squatters from European farms, black spots and missionary farms. (23)

The second type of settlement is on Trust land, 'in accordance with a system of controlled squatting'. Agricultural activities occur here, and those who owned over 20 morgen of land before being moved to the bantustan are supposed to be transferred to this type of settlement. The third type is the betterment scheme, already described above. According to Government Circular 25/67, the first two forms of settlement 'are ancillary and complementary' to the third form, the betterment scheme. Furthermore, those settled in terms of the second system, that of controlled squatting, can if necessary be moved to townships or to closer settlements.

The interconnection between these various types of settlement makes it very difficult to distinguish them from one another in Kangwane. It is clear that betterment schemes are in their initial phases all over Kangwane. It also appears that the 'controlled squatting' type of settlement on Trust land exists in Kangwane. The Minister of Plural Relations and Development announced in mid-1978 that land acquired by the SABS was under the jurisdiction of the Kangwane government, but would continue to be owned for the time being by the Trust, so that the planning and orderly settlement of people on the land would be ensured (SAIRR Survey 1978, p 291). People who had been moved from rural areas also clearly preferred to attempt to subsist in areas where they could farm, rather than in denser settlements. The bulk of Kangwane's land is in fact divided into tribal areas, under the control of some 20 chiefs who still seem to have a significant degree of control over the allocation of farming land. The Benso report states that

the majority of those resettling prefer to settle in chiefs' towns with their tribal heads ... old inhabitants and newcomers almost without exception live on land allocated to the various tribes. Each member of the tribe is entitled to specific agricultural rights. (p 26)

Nonetheless, it appears that few people relocated in Kangwane have managed to obtain farming land, although doubtless the chiefs and their henchmen have been more fortunate than most. The SPP questionnaires indicated that 7% of the sampled families had obtained agricultural land, and 9% had obtained grazing land. As the Benso report notes ungrammatically:

The dense settlements which has arisen since 1975 in the newly-added areas is also urban in nature, with few of the people earning a livelihood in agriculture. (p 20)

'Dense settlement' is in fact the term generally used to describe relocation centres in Kangwane, apart from the townships discussed above. These centres, the archetypical dumping grounds, litter the new area. By 1980 they included Eerstehoek or Nhlazatshe, Ekulindeni, Dundonald, Lochiel, Zwalluwnest, Tsjakastad and Fernie. The settlements accommodate people evicted inter alia from land owned or rented in 'white' South Africa, from farms, from urban areas, and from land within Kangwane.

Relocation centres in the new area, together with their squatter environs and the squatter settlements adjoining the townships, are doubtless the major ones to which Mabuza referred when he claimed that some resettlement areas had no amenities whatsoever, and high unemployment rates. Primitive conditions and a desperate struggle for survival are characteristics of these centres. Eerstehoek, for example, consists of three settlement zones, occupied one after the other during 1978/9. By October 1979, when the third wave began, there were 12 000 people there. By July 1980, Eerstehoek had precisely five taps, and a small stream was effectively the only source of water. There was no sewerage system beyond the pit latrines built by the residents through a tribal levy. As in other relocation centres in the new area, stock is not allowed, and agricultural activities are precluded for most or all people through lack of land. As in the rest of Kangwane, surviving by providing a service or by trading is illegal in Eerstehoek, unless the individual concerned is moneyed and acceptable to the authorities. Surviving by obtaining work in 'white' South Africa is frequently also illegal and/or impossible - yet the settlement is primarily one of women and children, which indicates a large male migrant sector. And as the final touch, a seconded South African State

official wanted people to be shuffled around within Eerstehoek itself. This was because a 'neutral zone' of 500 metres had not been left between the border with South Africa - a road - and the settlement (RDM, 29.07.80).

One of the settlements in the new area, Mayflower, appears to have been established partly to accommodate a rising petit bourgeoisie and/or politically influential Swazis. The farm was given to the Swazi National Royal Club by the South African government in 1978 as an area where its members could obtain freehold rights. It was immediately divided into two townships, with stands measured

to suit the economic standards of the Swazis who will live there. The one for members of the "middle class" has 279 stands. The other one for the lower income groups has 893 stands. (Post, 3.07.78)

The Club has members in Soweto, and it is interesting that Koornhof noted in 1980 that there were a number of Swazi families on the Witwatersrand who wished to establish their own houses in Mayflower. 'Hulle mooi voorbeeld moet aangemoedig word', he added. (24)

Yet despite the existence of class differences within and between centres of relocation in Kangwane, almost all residents in the urban settlements face common problems. These include a chronic housing shortage, lack of school facilities, inadequate health services, the difficulty of obtaining purified water, lack of employment, disease, and generalised poverty. Matsulu has for instance been described as 'a "disaster", with houses containing 10 to 15 people in each, packed closely together' (WIP 16, p 26). It was here that cholera, prevalent in a number of areas of Kangwane in 1980, was particularly severe, due partly to the inadequacies of the water supply and sewerage disposal systems. Koornhof in mid-1980 stressed the inability of the central State to cope with the shortages of housing and educational facilities in Kangwane. The relocation towns of Ekulindeni and Eerstehoek, as recognised by even the Benso report, 'could not nearly keep pace with resettlement' (p 26). The meaning of this inability to keep pace was indicated in part by the Deputy Minister of Plural Relations in 1979. He stressed that

(b)ecause it had not been possible to foresee that people would move to the territory in such numbers, services became inadequate and the highest degree of administrative skill was needed to prevent a collapse. (RDM, 16.05.79)

Increasingly frantic statements by State officials from 1979 about unplanned settlement bear witness to the advanced state of the collapse by the late 1970s, as does the 1980 cholera outbreak.

Unemployment is rife throughout Kangwane, even in the (relatively) privileged dormitory towns in the north, and has been for a considerable period of time. The Benso report remarks coyly that the position is 'not favourable' as regards the provision of employment to Kangwane residents, and states that commuter traffic has not risen very rapidly despite a considerable increase in those seeking work (p 10). It thus claims that more and more Swazis have had to resort to migrant labour, a feature particularly pronounced among those relocated in the new area and new entrants to the labour market (p 47). The report does not however reveal that in the context of rising unemployment and the policy of discriminating against migrant workers in favour of resident workers, the migrant labourer has found it increasingly difficult to obtain work. Labour relocation, not labour allocation, is now the order of the day, and the bantustans have become dumping grounds for the unemployed. The Tonga labour bureau was, for instance, recruiting about twice a week in 1980.

Most times people gather at the bureau only to be told that no-one is recruiting. (WIP 16, p 38)

By September 1980 only about 500 people had been recruited, although by then 1 968 had been registered as workseekers since the start of the year.

On each recruiting day there are crowds of at least 500 people hoping to get jobs. (Ibid)

Responses to SPP questionnaires have indicated how strongly people in Kangwane's relocation sites feel about their appalling living conditions. Leaders in the bantustan State structures have become concerned about the political implications of their dissatisfaction. Mabuza complained in mid-1980 about people in Kangwane who discredited their leaders by exploiting the sufferings of 'our people' (Star, 9.05.80), and stated that no message would be accepted by those in relocation areas until their problems have been resolved. As Laurence notes in an article on Kangwane, the policy of relocation is

not only inductive to tribal rivalries between the different ethnic states but also to divisions between their political rulers and the "resettled" people. (RDM, 29.07.80)

Repressive forces are of course readily available to the central State and its bantustan adjunct to prevent this division exploding into open confrontation. Another countermeasure, much utilised in Kangwane as in other bantustans, is an emphasis on the unity of the Swazi nation. This displacement of class contradictions onto ethnic divisions has taken various forms in Kangwane. The exclusive appeal to Swazis by various chiefs, led by Chief Johannes Dhlamini, has already been outlined; Mabuza and his petit bourgeois supporters have taken a more flexible line. Supported by the central State, they have indeed continued to emphasise ethnicity. This is done both in their ideological discourses (phrases such as 'our people', 'our task of nation building', 'the development of the Swazi', etc. abound in their speeches) (25) and in their material practices, particularly in the cultural and educational spheres. The latter include the establishment of a SiSwati Language Board, the holding of national Swazi festivals, the introduction of SiSwati as the medium in primary schools in 1978, and the forcing of children in Kangwane to go to schools in Kangwane rather than in 'white' South Africa. (26) (This last measure was probably introduced by the central State rather than its adjunct, as part of the policy of cultivating good ethnic citizens.) On occasion, the practices descend to the ridiculous, as in the State's utilisation of the services of an 'organiser of culture' and of one 'Mother Culture'. (27)

Unification with Swaziland is also periodically mooted (RDM, 5.10.78), and constant references are made to Kangwane's close cultural and traditional ties with Swaziland. Nor are Swazis still resident in 'white' South Africa neglected in these ethnic appeals. Various organisations and State bodies, such as Kangwane's political parties and the Swazi urban board, have at various times attempted to foster an identification by urban Swazis of their 'Swaziness'. The central State, with considerably more power at its disposal, also forces an at least nominal identification in a whole variety of ways. As the Minister of Plural Relations told the Kangwane urban representative:

It is of the utmost importance that you should be successful in creating and maintaining strong ties between Kwa-Ngwane citizens in the urban areas and their country of origin. (Post, 15.09.78)

It is interesting to note that various prominent individuals in South African townships have in the past identified closely with their Swazi bantustan. (28)

Mabuza and leading members in his Inyandza National Movement, a political party formed in 1978, do not however emphasise ethnicity alone in attempting to unify and rally Kangwane residents in their support. In part, this is due to the very success of the bantustan policy in focusing the consciousness of the dominated classes on the State adjuncts rather than on the central State, and the counterproductiveness of this for the bantustan authorities. Mabuza, for instance, claimed bitterly that relocated people 'think we are responsible' (our emphasis). Thus a strong element in their ideological discourses, and to some extent in other practices, is a nationalistic appeal to 'blacks' as well as a somewhat contradictory emphasis on 'non-racialism'. In the late 1970s, Mabuza's statements were studded with rejections of the division of South Africa into ethnic units, rejections of exclusive bantustan

governments, refusals to consider amalgamation with Swaziland on the grounds that this contradicted his belief in an undivided South Africa, and with references to his 'Zulu, Xhosa and Tswana brothers'.(29) The Inyandza National Movement belongs to Buthelezi's South African Black Alliance, and as a top aide of Mabuza noted proudly of the Movement's constitution:

You will have to look very hard and very long before you find the word Swazi.  
(RDM, 11.10.79)

The political party is in fact open to all who accept its objectives, which include fostering a spirit of unity among the people of Kangwane and between them and 'all their African brothers in South Africa'; keeping Kangwane part of South Africa forever, and abolishing all forms of discrimination 'based on tribe, clan, sex, colour or creed' (Ibid). As yet, the Kangwane State does not seem to have discriminated against non-Swazis in those areas over which it has jurisdiction, although the central State has apparently done so (e.g. home and land ownership in the relocation areas seem to be restricted to Swazis only).(30)

There are, of course, numerous pressures which the central State can bring to bear to force greater ethnic identification among all classes in Kangwane, and a greater conformity by the Swazi state to the grand bantustan policy.(31) A swing towards this identification and conformity among Kangwane's administrators and politicians is perhaps indicated in the political infighting of early 1981, revolving around Mabuza's official visit in January 1981 to the Swazi Battalion. This was deplored by Lukhele, a cabinet minister who has on occasion been described as a 'strong critic of apartheid' (Star, 23.04.75). Lukhele rejected recognition of the Battalion, stating that he would not agree to blacks serving on the border until they had the same rights as whites. He also criticised Inkatha for allegedly forcing boycotting students back to school, and argued that if this were true he wanted the National Movement's affiliation to SABA reviewed.

Mabuza mobilised support against Lukhele amongst his henchmen by appealing to ethnicity. He claimed that he was the Chief Minister of all the Swazis in the Republic, including those of different views, such as the Swazis in the Battalion. Furthermore, Lukhele was 'a Swazi Cabinet Minister in a Swazi Government in a Swazi homeland', so he had no right to disown the Swazi Battalion. Chief Buthelezi also leapt into the fray, and emphasised that Lukhele was as capable of exploiting ethnic divisions as the best of them. Lukhele, he stated, was one of the 'chief mischief makers behind the moves to get the people of the Ingwavuma district to secede from KwaZulu'.(32) The net result was the expulsion of Lukhele from the cabinet, and his replacement by Chief Johannes Dhlamini - almost the reverse of the 1977 purge of Dhlamini and entrance of Lukhele. According to a press report, this was a sign of the imminent merger between 'Swazi Nation Togetherness' and the National Movement, in order to strengthen Mabuza's and Dhlamini's positions against Lukhele and his proposed opposition party.(33)

The above indication of a rapprochement between the chiefs and leading members of the petit bourgeoisie, and between the Kangwane State adjunct and the central State, is not the only one.(34)

## GRAND RELOCATION: THE DEAL WITH SWAZILAND

Question What sort of contact do you have with Swaziland?

Mabuza On a cultural and traditional level, the contact is very good. Any further contact will be entirely an evolutionary process.  
(Growth, May 1981)

Evolution, in the South African context, had a very different meaning when in the middle of 1982 - just a year after the interview quoted above - the South African government announced a deal with the Swazi King to merge Kangwane and Swaziland and to transfer Ingwavuma on the Mozambique-Natal border to the autocratic kingdom.

Mabuza and the Kangwane legislative assembly, which was dissolved by Pretoria by notice in the Government Gazette, bitterly opposed the move, but, as always, negotiation has never been a feature of relocation.

The Swaziland deal was seen in Pretoria as a major coup for Grand Apartheid: in the words of Dr Koornhof, this was a historic opportunity to adjust South Africa's borders and to reunite the Swazis. King Sobhuza, who died before the deal was finalised, had requested the unification on behalf of his people and, according to Dr Koornhof, the proposed incorporation promised greater political and economic development for the entire area.(35)

The reality was somewhat different. It had all the traditional features of relocation: forced removal of citizenship, lack of consent - even from the government-created legislative assembly in Kangwane - and Grand Apartheid above everything else.

For years, apartheid ideologues had argued the case for more far-reaching separation, linking Swazi-speaking South Africans with Swaziland, Tswana-speaking South Africans with Botswana, and Sotho-speaking South Africans with Lesotho. The merger of Ciskei and Transkei was also seen in this context. In this way, there would be effective consolidation within internationally recognised countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS - the ex-protectorates). Grand Apartheid could be legitimised, it was implied. The proposed constellation would in this way gain a foothold in the Organisation for African Unity and thereby gain recognition.

In August 1981 these dreams suddenly burst into public life after a meeting in Pretoria between the South African and Swaziland Foreign Ministers.

The official policy before had been the ridiculous one of grooming Kangwane for independence. In 1978 Dr Connie Mulder, then Minister of Plural Relations, had urged the Kangwane legislative assembly to motivate 'their people' to take out certificates of citizenship (Argus, 2.06.78). A year later, Mabuza said Pretoria was plaguing the bantustan to opt for independence:

We had hardly got used to the fact that we had been granted legislative authority status when we were being pestered about opting for independence. How can we ask for independence when we do not have the land on which to exercise our independence? (Post, 20.05.79)

In any event, he added, the retention of South African nationality was a non-negotiable prerequisite for most black people.

In 1981, apparently unaware of the new grand design, Mabuza was even praising the Prime Minister for his initiative in encouraging the development of the whole of South Africa (Citizen, 12.08.81). In fact David Lukhele, the cabinet minister Mabuza had helped to oust, was more in touch with both Pretoria and Mbabane.

The idea evidently was that Pretoria would try to persuade Mabuza and his allies to support Kangwane joining Swaziland. Their co-operation would make it easier to do. But if the persuasion failed, Pretoria would go ahead anyway. In the first hint of the plan, Patrick Laurence wrote:

South Africa and Swaziland have held high-level talks on boundary adjustments aimed at drawing Swaziland into Pretoria's 'constellation of states' - possibly in return for an outlet to the Indian Ocean. (RDM, 19.08.81)

Although largely ignored at the time, his story reflected some of the motivation behind the deal.

By the end of 1981, Pretoria had refused to grant self-governing authority to Kangwane - 'one of those decisions that ring the death knell of moderate black leadership in South Africa', Mabuza said at the time (Star, 3.12.81) - and the SABA had protested against the refusal (RDM, 29.12.81).

Koornhof had told the Kangwane executive council that 'preference had to be given to the possible unification of Kangwane with Swaziland' and in stating the South African government's sympathy with the king's request, as he put it, for 'border adjustments', Koornhof said:

His Majesty was guided by aspirations of Swazi unity and the interests and ideals of a unified Swazi people. (Ibid)

He did not mention Pretoria's interests in the 'unification', which had little to do with the Swazis or Kangwane, but plenty with the desire to turn Swaziland into a compliant bantustan which would not only be part of the constellation but, more significantly, would also act as a buffer between Mozambique and ANC guerillas, and South Africa.

Meetings between Koornhof and Mabuza failed to persuade the Kangwane leadership to back the deal (Cape Times, 10.02.82). The commissioner-general, George Botha, a former Nationalist MP, resigned his post and left the party because

this plan to hand South African territory over to Swaziland is totally unrealistic, like building grandiose castles in the air. (Argus, 10.02.82)

In parliament, the cabinet was doing its best to conceal those grandiose castles. In May 1982 Mr Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, denied there had been 'horse trading' in 'dark corners' over the Swaziland land deals. He added:

No square inch of South Africa can be ceded without the explicit approval of Parliament.

He also promised to 'consult' KwaZulu and Kangwane authorities, a meaningless assurance in view of their total opposition (as reported in the Cape Times, 7.05.82). In reply to questions, he and Dr Koornhof were both vague. Botha said discussions with the Swaziland government on border adjustments had taken place but

to what extent any future agreement on border adjustment will affect Kangwane cannot be indicated

and Koornhof said in March that no indication could be given 'of future agreement on border adjustment' although the government of Kangwane was involved in discussions.(36)

In fact, as the Laurence story had indicated the year before, the horse-trading was over, the deal had been struck. If the South African government could have gained support from the bantustan authorities it would have appeared as if consensus had been reached, at least within its own framework. When that support failed to emerge, Pretoria could fall back on its traditional policies after 'consultation': unilateral decision-making.

As soon as parliament had gone into recess, Koornhof went to Ulundi and announced the deal. Although he had the indignity of being pelted with tomatoes (Sunday Times, 20.06.82), was told by Gatsha Buthelezi that he would never be trusted again, and was accused of leaving his senses by the PFP (Cape Times, 15.06.82), Koornhof as always was standing in a position of strength.

The reactions came from many quarters. White farmers in the Eastern Transvaal lowveld said they had been sold down the river by the government (Sunday Times, 20.06.82). Mabuza, for the Kangwane leadership, was equally vehement:

I shall never lead the South African Swazis to an inevitable gas chamber. We shall never accept Swaziland citizenship, nor carry Swaziland identity documents.... The overwhelming majority of South African-born Swazis are fully aware that through their incorporation into Swaziland they will be in a position where they shall no longer strive for political accommodation within the central constitutional framework of this country, nor have access to the wealth and prosperity they have helped to achieve, in exchange for poverty and misery. (Argus, 16.06.82)

In the welter of statements, accusations and counter-accusations that followed, the South African government relied heavily on the SABC to promote its view, and that of the Swaziland government, to the exclusion of those in opposition. Pretoria even claimed that Swazi chiefs in Kangwane who had signed a petition against incorporation had done so out of fear (Rapport, 20.06.82).

While Prime Minister Botha was saying in Namibia that the Swaziland plan was not finalised, Koornhof was telling Mabuza and others in his delegation that the Kangwane legislative assembly was to be dissolved and its powers transferred to Pretoria.(37) Mabuza's reaction was perceptive:

Swaziland will look like a bantustan. (Cape Times, 18.06.82)

The South African government stated its position in a document (reproduced on pp 80-81 below) issued by the Department of Co-operation and Development:

The process of the adjustment of the border between RSA and Swaziland is the fulfilment of a long-cherished ideal of the Swazi people for so long deprived of Swazi citizenship by an accident of history, to be united as one nation under one King in one country. Both governments approach the question of border adjustment in the traditional spirit of goodwill and long-existing friendly relations between the two States and their peoples.(38)

It was an interpretation the South African government refused to put to any kind of popular test. Mabuza has persistently called for a referendum. Instead, as the document states, Pretoria has relied on the usual assurances, which have proved valueless in those areas defined as Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei:

One of the primary conditions set by the South African government throughout the preliminary negotiations has been to ensure that the Swazi in the Republic of South Africa who shall become citizens of the Kingdom of Swaziland shall retain all rights, privileges and benefits they presently enjoy.

The conditions of service of civil servants and teachers would remain unchanged, so the text goes, and tribal and regional authorities would function as before. Only the top control of the administration would change hands, from Lebowa to South Africa.

Both countries recognised and encouraged private ownership of property, and the kingdom of Swaziland

has undertaken to respect all existing property rights and investments existing in the area affected by the border adjustment.

No-one need fear economic disruption and consequent hardship, because

the fact is that the South African government will make arrangements to provide the retention of the right to remain or to find new employment in the RSA and to ensure that those who have obtained Section 10 qualifications will not forfeit them.

Pensions and other services would be retained.

This direct appeal to the economic interests of the petit bourgeoisie had little effect inside Kangwane. The Public Servants Association refused to accept the decision to dissolve the

## Annexure 1

### ADJUSTMENT OF BORDER BETWEEN SWAZILAND AND RSA

The process of the adjustment of the border between RSA and Swaziland is the fulfillment of a long-cherished ideal of the Swazi people for so long deprived of Swazi citizenship by an accident of history, to be united as one nation under one King in one country.

Both governments approach the question of border adjustment in the traditional spirit of goodwill and long-existing friendly relations between the two States and their peoples.

One of the primary conditions set by the South African government throughout the preliminary negotiations has been to ensure that the Swazi in the Republic of South Africa, who shall become citizens of the Kingdom of Swaziland shall retain all rights, privileges and benefits which they presently enjoy.

In order to finalise the border adjustments it will be necessary to dissolve the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly and the KaNgwane Executive Council. To ensure the continued administration of KaNgwane, existing services, such as justice, health, welfare, education etc. will continue as before and all conditions of service of civil servants and teachers will remain unaffected. The Tribal Authorities and the Regional Authorities will also continue to function as before. The only change that will take place in the administration, is that the powers formerly vested in the Legislative Assembly and Executive Council, will now be transferred to the Minister and the Department of Co-operation and Development.

Rumours have led the peoples of KaNgwane and elsewhere to believe that they will have to sacrifice certain existing rights and privileges upon the conclusion of border adjustments.

BUT: both South Africa and Swaziland recognise and encourage private ownership of property and private investments and the Kingdom of Swaziland has undertaken to respect all existing property rights and investments existing in the area affected by the border adjustment. Nobody need to

-2-

fear that his property will be confiscated and that he will forfeit any claim to property or investment registered in his name.

Border adjustment in itself will not result in the resettlement of people living within the present borders of KaNgwane.

It is true that people affected by the proposed adjustment of borders and all the Swazis in the Republic of South Africa will become citizens of the Kingdom of Swaziland. These people need, however, not fear economic disruption and consequent hardship.

The fact is that the South African government will make arrangements to provide for the retention of the right to remain or to find new employment in the RSA and to ensure that those who have obtained Section 10 qualifications, will not forfeit them.

The retention of all other existing rights, privileges or benefits referred to earlier on, also confirms the fact that teachers, nurses, other civil servants and recipients of social pension will continue to receive their salaries, pensions and other benefits. Similarly hospital services, education, industrial development, mining and many other subjects are being dealt with in formal agreements to be entered into between the two respective Governments. Both Governments have one purpose in mind and that is to avoid any disruption and hardship.

ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

legislative assembly. In a resolution, it said:

We refuse to abandon our South African Citizenship which God Almighty has bestowed unto us. We wish to make it clear that we are not South Africans by accident of history like those who came running away from their evils from the North of Africa. South Africa is our mother-and-father land and we refuse to be foreigners in our land of birth.  
(Undated copy of resolution)

A petition was also circulated:

We the undersigned Swazis of the RSA are against the incorporation of Kangwane into Swaziland with the subsequent loss of our RSA citizenship.

Mabuza challenged the proclamation dissolving the legislative assembly, taking the case to the Pretoria Supreme Court.

Just how little the Department of Co-operation and Development cared about the views of the people was underlined by their leaflet which advised the people of Kangwane and Ingwavuma to

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CONSULT YOUR CHIEF

(Notice, undated, issued by the Department of  
Co-operation and Development)

In a futile protest Mabuza tried to rally support, speaking at large meetings in the urban areas and in KwaZulu, and also to a gathering in the Johannesburg City Hall organised by Inkatha and the PFP.

Koornhof made a statement which, while piously undertaking that

the government will satisfy itself regarding the true feelings of the people concerned, made it clear that the government's decision was final. He even pointed to the government's record 'with the implementation of the consolidation programme for the national states until now' as proof, extraordinarily, of how it satisfied itself about the feelings of the people (Argus, 24.06.82). In a sense he was correct in pointing to that record: grand relocation has always been imposed by Pretoria, the government has never negotiated, let alone consulted, with the people affected by relocation and consolidation, and Kangwane and Ingwavuma were not to be an exception.

In case Mabuza had not understood this, he was visited by two security policemen who told him they were investigating an alleged offence - that he had addressed an open air meeting at Elukwatini near Eerstehoek on 23 May, which was before the deal was announced and while he was still officially Chief Minister of Kangwane (Daily Dispatch, 29.06.82).

Even the ANC was invoked to suggest a spirit of negotiation in the plan. The Sunday Times suddenly published a story on 18 July that the ANC - 'in a major reversal of its original stance' - had decided not to oppose the plan for 'Greater Swaziland', quoting 'sources close to the ANC leadership'. Such sources are not generally a feature of the Sunday Times, and they were not very good ones either because a week later and without any explanation for the earlier story, the newspaper reported that Swaziland was going to press ahead with its land claims 'despite strong opposition from the banned African National Congress'. The second story then quoted from an ANC memorandum stating that it was politically and morally incorrect for Swaziland to enter into agreements with the illegitimate South African government. The memorandum also warned that Swaziland would become an ally of apartheid by being drawn into the proposed constellation (Sunday Times, 25.07.82).

## Annexure 2

# NOTICE

## KANGWANE AND INGWAVUMA TO BECOME PART OF THE KINGDOM OF SWAZILAND

The Government of the RSA and the Kingdom of Swaziland have agreed to adjust the borders between them.

This means that KANGWANE and the district of INGWAVUMA will become part of the Kingdom of Swaziland.

All Swazi-people outside Swaziland will become citizens of a progressive modern African state.

No resettlement of people living within the present borders of KANGWANE and INGWA-VUMA will be caused by this border adjustment.

All existing privileges and benefits will be retained. These include:

- ☐ Retention of SOCIAL PENSIONS
- ☐ SECTION 10 privileges will be honoured
- ☐ Recognition of PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY
- ☐ Children will attend the same SCHOOLS as they do now
- ☐ JOB OPPORTUNITIES in the RSA will not be affected
- ☐ Teachers, nurses and other civil servants will continue to receive their SALARIES, PENSIONS AND OTHER BENEFITS

LISTEN TO THE RADIO

WATCH TV

CONSULT YOUR CHIEF

Issued by the Department of Co-operation and Development

The original claim that the ANC backed the deal came from Mbabane after the Swaziland government had tried to get support from Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania, but the story backfired - the effort to legitimise the plan ended with no backing internationally.

Why were the South African and Swaziland governments so determined for the scheme to go through? The story both governments wanted everyone to believe was that Swaziland had legitimate historical claims to the territory and that South Africa magnanimously wanted to correct the wrongs of history. Grand Apartheid ideologues could argue that this was the logical extension of government policies and that it would boost the proposed constellation of states. But as Aggrey Klaaste wrote in *The Sowetan* (21.06.82), this was 'the biggest piece of humbug since Marie Antoinette told the peasants to have cake'. He argued that

the government has admitted the homelands do not make economic and political sense. If you shunt thousands of unhappy people into non-viable strips of land and hope you have sort of swept the problem under the national carpet, you need to have your head examined. Inevitably these people trickle back into the mainland, among other impossible headaches. So send these troublesome blacks to another country and rid yourself of a lot of headaches.

The big bonus for South Africa if it pushes the plan through is that about a million Swazi-speaking South Africans would become Swazi citizens (see *Star*, 15.06.82).

There was also talk about 'punishing' Chief Buthelezi for his refusal to co-operate with Pretoria and opt for independence (*Sowetan*, 21.06.82). There was certainly some truth in the argument that 'the Zulus are being divided, consistent with the old principle of divide and rule'. (39)

For Pretoria, though, the main underlying purpose in the scheme was security, as Klaaste said:

South Africa has to close these irritating borders by setting up buffer states. That's easy. Too many interesting explosions have been going off in that part of the country lately. These guys, it is presumed, sneak from Mozambique through this no-man's land into S.A. Our country needs total protection through total onslaught, total fraud and duplicity. (*Sowetan*, 21.06.82)

The head of research at the South African Foundation, a body well known for whitewashing apartheid, put this basic motivation into context (40): ever since P W Botha became Prime Minister, the military view had predominated in the South African government. The army believed that the primary military threat was not from the policies of apartheid but from external communist aggression. The total onslaught was defined and a response, the total strategy, developed.


Everything the government has done since then, especially in the constitutional field, has been predicated on primary assumptions of total strategy. The Swaziland issue is merely a way-station on the track of this policy. The primary assumption of total strategy is that South Africa's human, technological, spiritual and economic, etc, resource 'power bases' must be mobilised and harnessed to meet the total onslaught.

From a regional perspective, the states of Southern Africa had to be cobbled together around the hub of South Africa -

a goal which can logically best be achieved through military and economic alliances forged between states in the regions which share common assumptions about the nature of the 'total onslaught'.

Swaziland would have to assume responsibility that it was not used as a route for ANC insurgents from Mozambique. But the Swazi defence force was clearly not equipped to patrol such a large chunk of bush effectively. Therefore, in return for the land, one million impoverished people and an increased power base, fulfilling the dictatorial Swazi monarchy's

### Annexure 3



*Sunday Times*, 20.06.82

dreams,

Swaziland may become the first independent African country to sign a military non-aggression pact with South Africa, and allow South African security forces if necessary to patrol the area. This is the old defence-in-depth concept still much favoured in Voortrekkerhoogte.

The military significance of the Swaziland land deal was also confirmed in the pro-Nationalist newspaper Die Vaderland which reported that

a military agreement between South Africa and Swaziland would be part of the agreement, but indicated that it might not be openly acknowledged.  
(as quoted in the New York Times, 17.07.82)

When the Swaziland government took the bait formally in August 1981 (although two years previously Chief Buthelezi claimed that the two governments had already 'concluded a deal' on the land (Daily News, 17.09.79)), it seemed that nothing would stand in the way of Pretoria. Grand relocation for the 700 000 people officially regarded as citizens of Kangwane was merely one of the side-effects, a disruption the community would have to bear.

## CONCLUSION

It is difficult to say to what extent members of the dominated classes perceive themselves as Swazis either about to be nationalised into Swaziland or set in a homeland about to attain its independence; or as oppressed and exploited blacks. Certainly the ethnic identification is likely to be fostered by the central and bantustan States, as relocation into Kangwane continues on its present massive scale. The fostering of such identification faces considerable problems, however. As a man relocated from a Barberton farm to Pienaar in Kangwane stated:

Broer, nothing grows here. There simply can be no improvement here.... You see, when we came here we were led to believe that this is a free country. We honestly believed that things would be free very soon. That is ten years ago. There is simply no change. I pray everyday that those black power boys from Soweto could come and blow the whole place up....

## FOOTNOTES

- 1 Star, 21.05.81. The population figures given by Benso are hopelessly inadequate: the 1980 estimate is over 50 000 less than the 1977 estimate. Census figures for 1980 should be examined here.
- 2 See the map by B Waite, 'A land divided against itself'. Note that from 1971 to 1972, the official area of the Swazi 'homeland' declined from 290 060 ha to 211 807 ha (SAIRR Survey 1971 and 1972).
- 3 Star, 26.11.75; Population removals, DSG/SARS information publication 3, p 4; and Malan, T and Hattingh, P, Black homelands in South Africa.
- 4 Probably Star, 26.11.75. The clipping is in the SAIRR clippings on Kangwane, labelled R26/11/75.

5 For example, see SAIRR Survey 1977, pp 352-3; Sunday Times, 3.02.78; RDM, 25.01.78; RDM, 1.02.78.

6 Saul, J, 'The dialectic of tribe and class' in Race and Class XX, 4, p 348

7 Considerable confusion arises from the various accounts of the consolidation of Kangwane. The SAIRR Survey 1975 states that the Swazi bantustan was made up of three stretches, of which two were to be excised. Malan and Hattingh (published in 1975) claim on the other hand that the bantustan was made up of two units, excluding black spots. By 1977, the SAIRR Survey was noting that Kangwane was in two pieces, but Waite still indicates the southern area as threatened with excision on her 1977 map. She also indicates removals both into this area from 'white' South Africa and out of it to the part of Kangwane on the north-western border of Swaziland. By 1978 this block of land was no longer considered part of Kangwane by Benso.

8 Benso, p 26. 'Badly situated Black areas' is sometimes doubletalk for de facto but not de jure 'black spots'. It is however unclear if this was the sense intended by the Benso report.

9 Report of the Department of Plural Relations and Development, 1/4/77 - 31/3/78, pp 19-20

10 Information relayed from Sheena Duncan

11 General Circular No 25, 1967, reprinted in Maré, G, African population relocation in South Africa, 1980, p 85

12 For example, see Morris, M, 'The development of capitalism in South African agriculture: class struggle in the countryside' in Economy and Society 6,3, 1976.

13 Minister of Agriculture, 1974, quoted in Maré, 1980, p 11

14 WIP 16, p 25; Afrika, November 1980

15 SAIRR Survey 1977, p 361; Benso, p 19

16 Speech by Koornhof to the Kangwane legislative assembly, 2.05.80, issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

17 For example, see Informa, April 1981, and Koornhof's speech, 2.05.80.

18 General Circular No 25, 1967, quoted in Maré, 1980, p 76

19 Speech by Koornhof, 2.05.80

20 General Circular No 25, 1967, quoted in Maré, 1980, p 76

21 Most of the R21,3 million spent by the SADT from April 1971 to March 1980 on urban development in Kangwane was devoted to Kanyamazane.

22 For example, see Informa, April 1981, p 18.

23 General Circular No 25, 1967, quoted in Maré, 1980, p 77

24 Koornhof's speech, 2.05.80

- 25 For example, see Star, 9.05.80, and Mabuza's foreword to the Benso report.
- 26 Informa, April 1981, pp 5 and 12; Benso, p 50
- 27 Informa, April 1981, pp 5 and 12-3. 'Mother Culture', allegedly held in high esteem, advises the Kangwane government on traditional Swazi customs to be used at national festivals, and imparts her exceptional knowledge to both adults and schoolchildren.
- 28 These include Mr J Madi, chairman in 1975 of the Witwatersrand Taxi Association, who was a leading light in the Mpisikazi Swazi Council. This was a political party with significant urban backing, which fought for Chief Nhlapo to be elected head of the Kangwane state, and for the establishment of education, medical facilities and industries in the bantustan (Star, 26.11.75). The 'Mayor' of Atteridgeville, the Rev E Sibanyoni, was another such: he was an ex-Swazi National Treasurer in 1978, who advocated 'progressive Swazi nationalism' (Post, 13.03.78).
- 29 For example Post, 20.05.79; RDM, 11.10.79; Star, 30.06.81
- 30 This is a murky area in which we have been able to find almost no information. Work must still be done in establishing whether, for example, medical facilities, licences, KEDC loans, school entrance, etc. are restricted to Swazis.
- 31 It is interesting to note that Mabuza complained in 1980 about security police questioning people who went to public meetings about the speeches (Star, 9.05.80).
- 32 Does this refer to the move in 1978 by 'king' Langalibalele II to secede from KwaZulu to Kangwane? By July 1979 this idea had been dropped. (See SAIRR Survey 1979, p 324.) The quote is given in Star, 15.01.81.
- 33 For the above story see RDM, 14.01.81; RDM, 13.01.81; RDM, 6.02.81; Star, 15.01.81.
- 34 In 1980, for example, the Kangwane legislative assembly requested that its members be increased from 36 to 45 so that each tribe could be represented by its chief. The request was gleefully received and gladly granted by the central State.
- 35 Sunday Times, 20.06.82 and Rapport, 20.06.82
- 36 Questions 34 of 17.02.82 and 32 of 5.03.82
- 37 Argus, 17.06.82; Burger, 18.06.82; Cape Times, 18.06.82
- 38 Dated 15.06.82, reference number D/13/1/2/49
- 39 Mpiyakhe Khumalo in Golden City Press, 4.07.82
- 40 David Willers in Sunday Tribune, 4.07.82

## 1.4.6 Bophuthatswana

### INTRODUCTION

Bophuthatswana, the 'homeland' for the Tswana ethnic group, is spread over 19 pieces of land in the Western Transvaal, the Orange Free State and the Northern Cape. (The 1975 proposals are designed to reduce the number of fragments to six.) It celebrated its fourth year of independence in December 1981. As a unit, it differs from other bantustans in a number of ways.

It lies near the Pretoria-Witwatersrand industrial area and other smaller industrial areas in the Western Transvaal, and as a result many people from the bantustan are either employed as commuters in the areas or as migrants. Bophuthatswana has a relatively large amount of invested capital in the factories inside the bantustan: in Babelegi (north of Pretoria) and in other areas. In fact it has more industrial development than all the other bantustans put together. It also has a large number of mineral deposits, with a value of over R300 million in 1974. It has some areas of viable agriculture, particularly maize-producing areas alongside the South African maize belt. Having set out some of the differences, we must stress that they are not qualitative, making Bophuthatswana a viable 'nation state' unlike the other bantustans. The differences are merely quantitative, yet they are important as they give Bophuthatswana some aura of legitimacy and do provide a relatively large amount of wealth which can be used to try to develop an ethnic nationalism, mainly by buying off the support of various elements in Bophuthatswana.

As we shall see, Bophuthatswana has made a concerted effort to portray itself as a nonracial third world country sincerely concerned to find ways to develop its potential. This has been manifested in numerous ways, varying from rejecting the 'first world' university image and adopting an educational system more suited to a 'third world' country, to the adoption of a Bill of Rights and the rejection of many of South Africa's racial laws. However, in the eyes of the majority of Tswana people, whatever Bophuthatswana does to gain legitimacy, it will remain merely a dependent Tswana colony, serving to consolidate the position of the central State. It will increasingly be forced to play a directly repressive role against the majority of its citizens who, like nearly all other oppressed people in South Africa, do not want more or less successful ethnic states, but demand the abolition of the very system of which Bophuthatswana forms an integral part.

### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

On 21 April 1961 a Tswana Territorial Authority was established by South Africa consisting of eight regional authorities and close on 70 tribal authorities. These authorities had been set up under the Bantu Authorities Act No 68 of 1951. The Territorial Authority was headed by Chief Tidimane Pilane and his deputy was Chief Lucas Mangope. The Authority had very little power; it set up a school for the sons of chiefs, a teachers' training college and an agricultural college. On 19 October 1968 the Territorial Authority received expanded powers and Chief Lucas Mangope became the Chief Councillor. The new powers appear to have been similar to the powers vested in the normal self-governing bantustan, the departments under their control being Authority Affairs and Finance, Community Affairs, Works, Education and Culture, Agriculture, and Justice.

To digress slightly from the development of the Tswana Territorial Authority specifically to general separate development, some of the important legislation should be considered. Early in the 1970s the separate development policy was streamlined, provision being made for the setting up and development of new bantustans without the necessity of having to return to parliament each time.

As a result, parliament passed the Bantu Homelands' Citizenship Act of 1970 and the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act No 21 of 1971. The first piece of legislation linked all black africans with their respective bantustans and ensured that when each bantustan became independent, the people would lose their South African citizenship. The second piece of legislation gave the State President the power to establish the various authorities and confer self-rule on the Territorial Authorities, when advised by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.

The Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971 makes a distinction, as does the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, between the different echelons of the bantustan administrative structure. The tribal authorities, essentially local authorities, are made up of traditional elements, the chief heading the authority. This arrangement maintains the traditional structure while draining it of all content, as the chiefs became paid State officials in 1951, and remain so. The higher authorities such as the regional and Territorial Authority are only obliged to maintain a traditional component insofar as chiefs and headmen participate and the vernacular is used (Rotberg, p 37). That appears innocuous enough; however, the inclusion of chiefs on the legislative body has profound implications for the bantustan politics of today. It is usual that the person who heads the bantustan government is backed by the traditional element, who are either in the majority or evenly split with the elected members of the legislatures. An indication of the importance the central State places on the continued participation of the chiefs in the legislative assemblies is shown by its refusal to allow an amendment to the Lebowa constitution which would have created a house of chiefs and an elected legislature (Rotberg, p 38).

Under the new regulations governing bantustan development, the Tswana Territorial Authority achieved Stage 1 of development in 1971. A legislative assembly and an executive council were set up. 13 regional authorities, later reduced to 12, were brought under the Tswana legislative assembly. Later on in the year, a recess committee of 17 was appointed and empowered to draw up a constitution and suggest a name and a flag for the territory. The name chosen, 'Bophuthatswana', means 'That which binds the Tswana together'. In 1972, according to Proclamation R130, Bophuthatswana became a self-governing bantustan, having reached Stage 2 in the process of bantustan development.

The new legislative assembly was made up of 48 designated members from the regional and tribal authorities, and 24 elected members, two from each regional authority. The cabinet, headed by the Chief Minister, consisted of six ministers.

With the establishment of the revised legislative assembly, with a proportion of members being elected, came the setting up of political parties. The political parties centred on Chief Tidimane Pilane, the original head of the Tswana Territorial Authority, and Chief Lucas Mangope, the prevailing head. It is in these political parties and their respective programmes that one sees the differing emphases of ethnicity, as each party tried to locate a support group within and without the Tswana bantustan. The programmes, although differing, are defined in terms of separate development and the conflicts hinge on the implementation of the policy.

Chief Pilane had differed with Chief Mangope in 1968 over self-determination for the Tswana, with Chief Pilane believing that faster constitutional change and the creation of a 'united Black multi-homeland state' were desirable (Rotberg, p 52).

In July 1972 Chief Pilane formed the Seoposengwe (Unity) Party which attempted to provide some alternative to Chief Mangope, all the while remaining within the framework of 'ethnic development' to which Chief Pilane was committed. The Seoposengwe Party was a Tswana organisation which aimed to unite Tswanas, all the while believing that there should be co-operation between the bantustans and that there should be co-operation and equality between different ethnic groups within Bophuthatswana. The government, according to its

manifesto, should be elected by the people. Separate development was accepted for the implied promises of handing back the land which the Tswana forefathers had owned and for the ultimate granting of sovereign independence. Chief Pilane urged that there should be an elected legislative assembly with no nominated members (Rotberg, p 52). After the formation of the Seoposengwe Party, Chief Mangope announced the formation of the Bophuthatswana National Party in 1972. The orientation of Chief Mangope's party was more strongly 'ethnic' in a separate development sense. Proposals such as 'citizens only' should have trading rights in the bantustans, were included in the manifesto. Related to the stress on ethnicity was the emphasis on the traditions, with Chief Mangope defending the continued involvement of chiefs in political life by saying:

We have been severely criticised for the large number of designated members in the assembly, but we believe we must lead our people from what they know, to what they do not know - for the concept of a general election is unknown in our traditional administration. (Rotberg, p 53)

Chief Mangope was also responsible for a stipulation in the constitution that only a chief could be Chief Minister. Chief Mangope, in commenting on the possibility of a Black Federation, made a revealing statement to the effect that he was opposed to it because the Tswana might be swamped by the numerically superior Zulu and Xhosa; not only that, but they might also be forced to share their mineral wealth (SAIRR Survey 1972, p 38). He seems to prefer a situation where even the Tswana do not have a share of their mineral wealth, let alone the Zulu and Xhosa.

With Chief Mangope's emphasis on and support for the traditional elements in Bophuthatswana, he received overwhelming support from the chiefs, giving the Bophuthatswana National Party the backing of 44 out of 48 designated members. The BNP also won three-quarters of the contested votes and was not opposed in four regions, receiving 70% of the votes in an election where 50% of the people eligible to vote did so. The vast majority of those who voted came from the rural areas. An indication of the support for the 'ethnic event' in the 'white' areas amongst urban people is given by the fact that only 4 661 out of a possible total of 50 000 voters voted. The Seoposengwe Party received more support in the urban areas than the BNP did.

An insight into the new Bophuthatswana legislative assembly is gained from a quote in the Star (2.11.72) to describe its opening:

It has all the trappings of a real parliament, including robes, procession and more. The huge majority of the Chief Minister's party sit crammed in one side - many fidgeting, some sleeping. Eight opposition members on the other side. Rather a comic opera effect. Speakers look from time to time towards the six White secretaries in mute appeal for instructions. The secretaries themselves, with expressions of slightly bemused anxiety on their faces, remind one of parents whose children are performing in a school play. You can almost read their thoughts: 'I hope he doesn't fluff it'. Sometimes one of the secretaries scrawls a note to be carried to the rostrum or to a speaker. The two messengers (in blue uniforms with silver buttons), run themselves silly.

Although the speakers have learnt to be more confident and the secretaries have become behind-the-scene advisers, the situation has not changed fundamentally: almost comic, if it did not obscure the human tragedy being played out behind it.

After the elections, with the BNP having an overwhelming majority in the legislative assembly, things did not go smoothly for them. A conflict emerged in the party, initially involving Chief Herman Maseloane, the Minister of the Interior, and Chief Mangope. Chief Mangope felt that Chief Maseloane was attempting to usurp power and he set about getting rid of the potential threat. Chief Maseloane was supported by the Minister of Agriculture, Chief James

Yoto. Chief Mangope was unable to resolve the dispute in his favour, so he appealed to the central government to remove Chief Maseloane. After an attempted reconciliation by the central government, Chief Mangope left the BNP and formed the Bophuthatswana Democratic Party. He was still unable to remove the two dissenters until April 1975, however, when by the passing of Proclamation 84/1975 in parliament Chief Mangope received the power of dismissal. Within four days the two dissenters had been removed from the cabinet.

This incident and the stipulation that only chiefs could become Chief Minister in Bophuthatswana give some indication of how people are able to entrench themselves in bantustan structures and remove anyone who is a potential threat. What remained of the BNP and the Seoposengwe Party formed a coalition in December 1975. A number of its members crossed the floor to the Democratic Party, weakening the already small new party. The new party became the National Seoposengwe Party, with Chief Pilane remaining outside it and forming the Independent Seoposengwe Party.

On 4 November 1975 Chief Mangope called a special meeting of all Tswana chiefs, headmen and their representatives, with no agenda being made known. When a motion was proposed opting for independence for the bantustan, it was passed by 155 votes to 5 (SAIRR Survey 1975, p 135).

On 9 November 1975 a Democratic Party majority gave Chief Mangope a mandate to seek independence for Bophuthatswana without even the requisite consolidation. Later on in November, the legislative assembly agreed to the start of negotiations for independence (SAIRR Survey 1975, p 135). This again illustrates the manoeuvring which goes on behind the 'democratic' two-party facade in Bophuthatswana.

The build-up to independence was one of conflict, with Chief Mangope insisting that until the issue of land consolidation and citizenship rights were resolved Bophuthatswana would not take its independence. Mysteriously, however, he changed his mind and accepted independence and said the Bophuthatswanan government would use its independence as a negotiating tool for more land. Chief Mangope understandably did not elaborate on the use of this 'tool' which came with independence. Not only did he succumb to the central government on the land issue, but he accepted a change in the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 which was no change at all, only serving to highlight the contempt with which Pretoria deals with its own bantustan leaders. After Bophuthatswana became independent, all Tswana people would automatically become its citizens. However, Tswanas wanting to retain their citizenship could reapply, but could only become a citizen of another bantustan, not of South Africa (RDM, 30.06.77).

The National Seoposengwe Party was opposed to independence and maintained that Chief Mangope could not accept independence without a referendum. They also petitioned the South African parliament, stating that Bophuthatswana could never be independent as Pretoria provided more than 50% of the budget (SAIRR Survey 1977, p 331).

Prior to independence a general election was held from 22-24 August 1977. 48 members were to be elected (as opposed to 24 in 1972) to the legislative assembly which, with independence, became the national assembly. The Democratic Party of Chief Mangope won 43 of the 48 elected seats and gained the support of 47 of the 48 designated seats, resulting in an overwhelming majority. After independence the constitution gave the President the right to co-opt six members onto the national assembly. Those co-opted did not have to be Bophuthatswana citizens.

It is interesting to compare the numbers of voters in the 1972 and 1977 elections:

	Inside Bophuthatswana	Outside Bophuthatswana
1972	268 407	156 586
1977	126 100	37 041

(Statistical Survey 1980, table 4)

If one were to use the figures as a rough guide to the support the Bophuthatswana government has amongst the Tswana, then that support was halved in Bophuthatswana. In the urban areas, support dropped to less than a quarter of the 1972 figure. This drastic decline could indicate a general increase in awareness, in the urban areas especially with the events of 1976.

Bophuthatswana duly became independent on 6 December 1977. At the celebration marking the occasion, Chief Mangope spoke of greater independence and not sovereignty. He said the reason for choosing independence was because of an abhorrence of racial discrimination and he pledged Bophuthatswana to creating a nonracial state (Star, 6.12.77).

In the Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution Act (18 of 1977), provision is made for a president who is head of state. He leads an executive council which initially consisted of nine ministers but has since been expanded to include three more. The departments they represent are:

Transport	Works and Housing	Dept of the President
Defence	Agriculture and Forestry	Health and Social Welfare
Interior	Foreign Affairs	Urban Affairs and Land Tenure
Finance	Economic Affairs	Justice, Police and Prisons
Education	Communications	

There are important similarities between the echelons of government before and after independence. As noted earlier, the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971 allows for the retention of traditional structures in the local echelons of government, like the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. The Bophuthatswana constitution allows tribal customs and controls to be kept in independent Bophuthatswana. The tribal structure remained unaltered, with the members of the tribal authority

recognised in accordance with the customs and laws of that tribe, appointed by the chief or headman for five years. (Bophuthatswana at independence, p 35)

The duties of tribal authorities include management of tribal affairs and advising the Bophuthatswana government on local affairs. Tribal authorities may also levy taxes, and the chief can have people arrested and pass sentence for certain offences. The chiefs must report any unlawful activity and can prohibit any unlawful gathering for a period of 14 days and anything they feel may endanger the law and order of the state (Ibid). It is clear that the chiefs have considerable power in their hands. As they did before independence, they still serve for local control over resources and over people.

The upper echelons of government have also not changed much. The chiefs participate in the national assembly and have a prominent role in the executive council.

There has been little focus on political events in Bophuthatswana since independence. The opposition National Seoposengwe Party has been quiet and has supported the 'positive' aspects of Bophuthatswana independence. It attacks the Bophuthatswana government's policy of harassing non-Tswanas but does not come into real conflict. The opposition has never appeared to represent the emerging petit bourgeoisie, though, as has happened in other bantustans. It has always been very small and relatively insignificant. Chief Mangope's

ruling Democratic Party representing the traditional element has captured most of the elected seats. The opposition has lent the national assembly an air of legitimacy, however, pandering to those who believe that the essence of democracy is to have two political parties in a national assembly.

In conclusion, the popularity of politicians in Bophuthatswana is perhaps gauged by a survey carried out in Bophuthatswana in 1974 by Markinor. The results may not be very reliable but cannot be wrong by an order of magnitude - and they indicate that Chief Mangope was admired by only 1% of the Tswanas interviewed (RDM, 2.12.74).

## POPULATION

The 1970 census gives the total Bophuthatswana population as 937 400, the ethnic breakdown of which is shown below in Table 7. There were 634 000 Tswanas in Bophuthatswana, about 36% of the then total Tswana population which was set at 1 782 000.

Table 7 BOPHUTHATSWANA DE FACTO POPULATION, 1970 & 1980

	1970	1980
Tswana	634 000	866 506
Shangaan	59 100	86 257
North Sotho	70 800	80 656
South Sotho	25 600	47 354
Zulu	28 200	45 099
Xhosa (Transkei)	22 700	40 360
Ndebele	52 000	61 685
TOTAL	892 400	1 227 917

Official categories of foreigners, Xhosa (Ciskei) and Venda have been left out: they constitute a very small fraction of the total.

from Statistical Survey 1980, drawn from tables 8 & 9

The 1980 census gives the total Bophuthatswana population as 1 285 675, giving an increase of 37% over the decade. The number of Tswanas living in Bophuthatswana is given as 866 506, an increase of 37% over the decade too.

The 37% Tswana increase has two components: natural population increase and population relocation. The Tswana group increased by 17% between 1970 and 1980 - well below the average increase for the black population, which is 27%. The Tswana increase in South Africa is 5,9% (from 1 147 000 in 1970 to 1 215 000 in 1980). Yet there is this increase in Bophuthatswana of 37%. If one subtracts the actual population total in 'white' South Africa from the projected total resulting from natural Tswana population increase, one gets a figure of 126 000. This figure would represent the number of people resettled, and this would account for the high Tswana population rise in Bophuthatswana.

Of the 1 215 732 Tswanas living outside Bophuthatswana in 1980, the vast majority were in 'white' South Africa, with only 19 535 living in other bantustans. This figure is the lowest for any ethnic group in South Africa, and is the result of the historical situation of the Tswana and of reserve and bantustan development. The Tswana have lived almost exclusively in the Western Transvaal, Northern Cape and in parts of the Orange Free State, and compared with other Transvaal bantustans there has been very little relocation to try 'separating out' the

different ethnic groups. Other bantustans have seen large-scale integration and, more recently, concerted attempts to 'unscramble the egg'.

The number of non-Tswana people in Bophuthatswana, set at 288 000 in 1970, rose to 361 000 in 1980, an increase of 39%. While the figures for the Tswana population may be reasonably accurate, those for the non-Tswanas are most certainly way below the real figures. The vast majority of the non-Tswana population live to the north-west of Pretoria in a wide arc from Hammanskraal in the north to Brits in the west. This part of Bophuthatswana is covered in squatter settlements of varying density. It is estimated that as many as one million people may live in the region, the majority being non-Tswanas. In the most concentrated area, Winterveld, an estimated 600 000 people live. A large proportion of the population in the region are simply ignored by the Bophuthatswana authorities, as they are non-Tswana and taint the image of ethnic purity the Bophuthatswana government would like to present. Taking the above estimates into account, we would suggest the figure of two million as more likely for Bophuthatswana in 1980 than the official figure of 1 285 675.

Accepting the area of Bophuthatswana to be 40 000 sq km, the population density based on the official 1980 population figures is 32/sq km. This is the lowest for any South African bantustan - but here one should remember that the population figure itself is suspect, and also that much of Bophuthatswana is semi-arid to arid country.

There are 15 proclaimed townships in the bantustan with a total population of 333 620 for 1980. This is a 164% increase from the 126 095 people who were urbanised in 1970. However, the figures ignore many settlements which differ from the proclaimed townships only in that they have not been proclaimed. The most important settlement ignored by the official statistics is Winterveld. The number of housing units in 1980 was 34 444, an increase from 18 866 in 1970. The most heavily populated urban centres mentioned are Garankuwa and Mabopane, the two proclaimed townships closest to Pretoria, with populations in 1980 of 85 000 and 88 180 respectively.

In conclusion, some broad trends may be mentioned. There has been a big increase in the Bophuthatswana population, much greater than the natural increase, and this can be attributed to the central government's relocation programme. There has also been an influx of non-Tswanas into Bophuthatswana, the official statistics seeming to underestimate grossly the extent of the increase. There has been a very big increase in the population in proclaimed townships in Bophuthatswana, due no doubt to natural increase, relocation and movement off the land in Bophuthatswana itself.

## HEALTH

The Department of Health was handed over to the Bophuthatswana government in 1975 by the South African authorities. The department has since been taking over the mission hospitals. In the 1979 Statistical Survey (table 81) it was recorded that there were 2 private, 4 mission and 5 government hospitals; and in the 1980 Statistical Survey (table 100), 9 government hospitals and 1 private hospital were recorded, with no mission hospitals mentioned. There are 4,55 beds/1 000, calculated on the assumption that there were 1 300 000 people in Bophuthatswana, slightly above the 1980 population census figure. There are 128 clinics with a distribution of very nearly 1/10 000 inhabitants (Statistical Survey 1980, table 100).

Often these institutions are short of staff and medicines. As a result, figures which look good may not reflect the real situation. There is also the point that hospitals and clinics do not solve health problems, although they contribute to their solution. Bophuthatswana has a lot of unemployment and lack of basic hygiene facilities, with many areas lacking any clean water. This, on personal observation, is definitely the case in the settlements close to

Pretoria as well as in many relocation areas. The health standard of the people would thus be very similar to that in other bantustan areas, namely poor to very poor. The figures quoted above do not reflect the distribution of the clinics. Winterveld, an area with over half a million people, has no clinic, and people there are forced to use the clinics in Mabopane and Garankuwa; this reflects the Winterveld people's 'unwanted' status and also reflects the ethnic, Tswana bias prevalent in Bophuthatswana. Only those who are accepted by the Bophuthatswana government get clinics.

The Bophuthatswana government paid out a total of R5 686 300 in all types of pensions in 1975/6 to 43 172 people. These figures increased to R14 480 000 paid out to 67 485 people in 1979/80 (Statistical Survey 1980, table 103). As with the clinics, so with the pensions: many non-Tswana pensioners in Winterveld are unable to get pensions.

## EDUCATION

It is in this sphere that the Bophuthatswana government is making a concerted effort to 'win the hearts and minds' so that children identify with the 'Tswana nation'. Obviously not everything in Bophuthatswana education is designed purely to instil a Tswana nationalism (which would be some kind of conspiracy theory) but some measures do have that ultimate effect.

Schools in Bophuthatswana increased from 834 in 1975 to 976 in 1979; classrooms increased from 5 785 to 7 363 over the same period. The number of pupils rose from 360 019 to 423 922 in that 1975-1979 period, and teachers from 6 403 to 8 714. The ratio of pupils to teachers dropped from 56,2 to 48,6 (Statistical Survey 1980, tables 85 and 86). Of the schoolgoing children in 1975, 88% were in primary school; in 1979, 80% of the children were in primary school. Secondary school attendance increased from 37 341 in 1975 to 78 645 in 1979 (Statistical Survey 1980, table 88).

The number of students from Bophuthatswana attending the black universities, colloquially called 'bush colleges', rose from 244 in 1975 to 495 in 1980 (Statistical Survey 1980, table 95).

Expenditure on education by the Bophuthatswana government rose from R17 208 000 in 1976/7 to a budgeted figure of R35 368 000 for 1980/1 (Statistical Survey 1980, table 99).

The new Bophuthatswana University (Unibo) was opened on 15 April 1980. Its emphasis will apparently be on community-oriented study, with the courses designed for 'students in a third world, developing country'. Degree courses will be very similar to the diploma courses except that they will be longer. The 'third world' image implies that Bophuthatswana is different from South Africa, a developed country, and must make her own way. In these indirect ways Tswana nationalism will be imparted to the students.

There is parity in teachers' salaries in Bophuthatswana, with men and women on the same scale - a good thing in itself, although it is also seen as a ploy to buy the loyalty of that large group of teachers. The Bophuthatswana authorities want that support and also want to propagate 'Tswana nationalism' in the classroom.

A Bophuthatswana Teachers' Association has been started to try to bring all the teachers into the 'fold'. At school many of the functions such as sports events take place within the framework of, for example, Bophuthatswana championships. (According to a local source, groups of teachers are often feted at Sun City by the Bophuthatswana government.)

In conclusion, there is much evidence to suggest that in the area of education the Bophuthat-

swana government will do all it can to gain legitimacy, both internally and externally, and to instil a 'Tswana nationalism' in its future 'citizens'. Apparently the main effort will be to win the support of the teachers, both as influential people and also as those who will instil a sense of nationalism in the children. As the teachers have already participated in the Bantu Education system, the education of the oppressed, perhaps they will be amenable to teaching a more sophisticated variant of the same thing. Enforcing the use of Tswana as a language medium in schools also promotes Tswana nationalism. Finally, as with health, so with education: the non-Tswanas in Winterveld have no government schools for their children - and if they had, the education would be in Tswana.

## GOVERNMENT

The Bophuthatswana government has seen a rapid increase in its funds. In 1977/8 the total available to it was R97 million, and this rose rapidly to R338 million in 1980/1. The 1979/80 budget figures indicate the spread of expenditure, some of the main items being

Economic Affairs	R10 million
Finance	20
Education	26
Works and Housing	42
Agriculture and Forestry	10
Health and Social Welfare	30

There is a shortage of skilled personnel in the public services and the Bophuthatswana government has tried in various ways to resolve it. One such attempt has been to encourage school leavers to enter the public service. In 1980 it was reported that there was insufficient staff to implement the R100 million budget for development, which represented a third of the Bophuthatswana government budget (Star, 3.07.80).

Two elements of the Bophuthatswana 'state' serve to develop support for Tswana nationalism, which is the rationale behind much of the 'state's' activity. The first is the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, and the second is the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation.

## THE BOPHUTHATSWANA NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

The Bophuthatswana National Defence Force (BNDF) was started in early 1977 to create a core of soldiers to participate in the independence celebrations. The initial intake consisted of 271 Tswanas who were trained by soldiers from the 'parent force', North-West Command of the SADF.

The creation of the BNDF was solemnly described thus by Benso:

The Tswana National Guard incorporates the development and expansion of a Tswana military culture. Tswana ethnologists were asked to integrate Tswana customs into a modern Defence Force. The results show some unique features, such as an own (sic) routine including a late breakfast, a light lunch and a large evening meal. Consideration is being given to the introduction of certain elements of the initiation school into the training course of the National Guard.

(Bophuthatswana at independence, p 40)

The Star (21.11.80) reported that 600 soldiers of the BNDF took part in manoeuvres near the

Botswana border. The force has greatly increased since its first days of marching at independence. The Star article also noted that the emphasis in training was on counter-insurgency tactics. The Bophuthatswana Defence Minister, who started out as the military adviser seconded from North-West Command, is quoted as saying that the BNDF should have an airforce component added (RDM, 25.04.81). The same article noted that a second army base was being constructed at Heystekrand, the first one being at Mmabatho.

The Defence budget increased enormously from R1,5 million in 1979 to R3,8 million in 1980 (RDM, 10.07.80). The SADF has also helped with extra kit, perhaps to improve appearances. The 'independent' defence force in Bophuthatswana acts anyway as an extension of the SADF, like the other ethnic battalions. It has already shown its mettle in aiding the SADF in counter-insurgency operations. With so sensitive a portfolio, small wonder that the Bophuthatswana Minister of Defence is a former SADF officer. As well as the relationship between the two defence forces, there has been an attempt to inculcate a Tswana nationalism into what is essentially an SADF army battalion.

#### THE BOPHUTHATSWANA POLICE FORCE

Not much information is available on the police force in Bophuthatswana. In 1977 control of the force was handed over to the Bophuthatswana government by Pretoria. It then consisted of 700 Tswana policemen and six seconded white South Africans (Bophuthatswana at independence (B.I), p 40). Eleven police stations were taken over by the new authorities and four district headquarters established. The police college at Temba in the Moretele district continued as a training centre for both Bophuthatswana and South African police after independence, according to an agreement.

#### THE BOPHUTHATSWANA NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

The Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation (BNDC) was established in 1975 as a public corporation for industrial, commercial, financial and mining development. It took over the activities of the CED in Bophuthatswana. The total assets of the BNDC increased from R9,6 million in 1976 to R74,2 million in 1979. The rapid increase is due to the transfer of assets from the CED to the BNDC at the time of independence.

Although much of the money spent has gone on infrastructure and buildings for large-scale industrial enterprises in Babelegi, one can see that a fair amount has also gone on setting up small businesses. These small concerns have been increasing: in 1978, 2 190 trade and business licences had been issued in Bophuthatswana (Statistical Survey 1980, table 83). The authorities can exercise a very important 'ethnic' discretion here, in deciding who shall receive trade licences and trade loans. In Winterveld, for example, the large non-Tswana element experienced harassment and discrimination.

#### LEGISLATION IN INDEPENDENT BOPHUTHATSWANA

A great deal of publicity has been given to the enlightened constitution and legislation of independent Bophuthatswana. The Sunday Times (15.06.80) reported that the Law Revision Committee was 'tossing out laws' that did not meet the Bophuthatswana Bill of Rights. Before independence all laws passed by the Bophuthatswana legislative assembly had to be presented to the South African State President for assent before being promulgated in the Bophuthatswana Gazette. After independence the situation changed, and Bophuthatswana could enact any laws

it liked. There has been great emphasis on the new enlightened nonracialism; but the Bophuthatswana government, while getting rid of much of the racist discrimination of the Republic, has left things as before in important areas such as 'national security', nor has it, in certain circumstances, done away with racist legislation where it was deemed expedient.

The constitution contains a Bill of Rights and is, according to the Chief Justice of Bophuthatswana, one of the most enlightened in Africa (Star, 19.04.78). Among other things it proclaims

- equality before the law
- the right to freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading punishment
- the right to freedom and liberty.

It also

guarantees respect for private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and assembly and protection of property.

(SAIRR Survey 1977, p 328)

The practice of the law is somewhat different and 'freedom and liberty' applies only to those fortunate enough to be Tswana people or who have managed to become Bophuthatswana citizens.

According to the Sunday Times (15.06.80), safeguards have been included in the Bophuthatswana security legislation. These include minimum periods of detention without trial, the right of access to judicial officials, the requirement that reasons be furnished for the detention, and a review process. The Internal Security Act (22 of 1978) gives the Minister the power to declare any organisation undesirable or a threat to State security, and hence illegal (SAIRR Survey 1978, p 265). The Riotous Assemblies Act of 1978 extends the power to prohibit or approve gatherings from magistrates to chiefs and headmen as well. This serves to extend a perfectly arbitrary measure to a local level and allows it to be used in ways that protect not only Bophuthatswana interests but local ones.

Some of the Acts scrapped by the Law Revision Committee were the Security Act of 1950, the Public Safety Act of 1953, the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956, Section 21 of the General Law Amendment Act of 1967, and the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1978 (Bophuthatswana) (Sunday Times, 15.06.80). The Bophuthatswana government finally rid itself of the Immorality Act in 1981 (RDM, 3.07.81).

While some of these moves supposedly set Bophuthatswana ahead of most bantustans, two factors should be noted about practices in the territory. There is the handling of non-Tswana residents at Winterveld and in other areas (see OFS report in SPP Volume III). They have been treated with scant regard for any Bill of Rights. The recent factor is the detention of a school principal in the Thaba'Nchu area. He was detained in early June 1981 with no charges being laid against him and held incommunicado. On 9 July when the Bophuthatswana commissioner of police was contacted in connection with the detention, the commissioner said that Mr Pule, the school principal, had been detained 'as from today' (RDM, 9.07.81). The arbitrary and selective application of the security legislation and much of the other legislation does not match the rhetoric contained in their 'enlightened' wording. Arbitrariness in applying the laws will only increase as the challenge from the oppressed people grows.

#### INDUSTRY

A relatively large amount has been invested in industry in Bophuthatswana, unlike other bantustans. It has purportedly more industrial investment than all the others put together. In 1977 the capital invested in industry was reported to be R66 million (Sunday Times, 2.12.77)

and by March 1981 it had risen to R200 million.

The main industrial area is Babelegi north of Pretoria, established in the late 1960s. By 1974 it was said there were 57 industries there with private investments worth R30 million. In 1976 the total investment in Babelegi amounted to R66,7 million. This includes capital investment in the infrastructure and the facilities made available by the CED to try to attract industrialists to the area. Another perk offered was the absence of minimum wage stipulations. As a result the average wage in 1976 was R81 per month. In 1979 the Citizen reported that the average wage was R17,49 per week, with workers receiving subsidies on bus fares, insurance and feeding schemes. Wages over that period do not seem to have risen very much. Some of the foreign companies with investments in Babelegi are AEG-Telefunken, Weston Hay, General Electric, Peugeot Cycles, Selab and Woolf Tools (FM, p 20).

The other industrial areas in Bophuthatswana are at Garankuwa, Montshiwa (near Mafikeng) and Seloshesha in the Thaba 'Nchu area. Investments used to be made in terms of a system whereby the company contracted out after a time. Now there is a new system whereby investing companies may stay permanently in the bantustan. The policy nowadays is to have a tripartite agreement whereby the company concerned and the BNDC work together to set up the business and then the BNDC makes 10% of the shares available to local Tswana businessmen (FM, p 20). Premier Milling has established an R8 million feed mill at Seloshesha on this basis (FM, p 15). Two of the most recent investments have been by AECI and South African Breweries at R31 and R25 million respectively, their factories to be at Garankuwa (Star, 26.03.81). It will be interesting to see if any of the 10% of shares available to local Tswanas are even taken up.

The expedient interest of capital occasionally gets a veneer of politesse towards the bantustans it uses:

'Congratulations to Southern Africa's youngest nation from South Africa's oldest bank' (a Standard Bank advertisement in the Financial Mail supplement)

'Bayer serves the farmers of Africa's newest nation'

'Impala Platinum congratulates the Government and the people of Bophuthatswana on their forthcoming independence'.

A paper on 'Small-scale industry in Bophuthatswana' (Müller, 1981) states that small-scale industry, broadly defined as

establishments with less than, or equal to, 50 workers and with a capital investment (land and buildings excluded) of less than, or equal to, R60 000 (p 1)

produced 13,9% of the industrial output in 1980. Large-scale industry produced R23,1 million or 86,1% of the total industrial output, it added. The paper considered manufacturing, construction, and mechanical, electrical and footwear repairs. A total of 447 firms were located constituting 87,5% of the industrial establishments. These 447 small-scale concerns had an average of 5,1 employees each (p 6). The authorities aim to boost this sector, apparently to try to create a class of small businessmen who rely on the government for various facilities and loans and who would therefore support it.

Bophuthatswana has been positively developed compared with some other bantustans where barely a factory has been erected, but industrialisation has not necessarily done the locals much good. Most of the employees work for a pittance. Many of the industrialists, in Babelegi for example, could buy labour-saving machinery because of the good terms on which they invested, and have thus provided far fewer jobs than predicted.

A special relationship seems to exist between the Bophuthatswana government and the Standard Bank, belying President Mangope's repeated assertion that he is committed to free enterprise. A government agreement allowed the Standard Bank a special position so that it could prevent

other banks from opening new branches or expanding old ones in the bantustan (RDM, 5.2.81). The Bophuthatswana government's only 'international' loan (of R15 million) was made from the Standard Merchant Bank.

A Bophuthatswana building society has also been established (RDM, 5.2.81).

There has been an ongoing feud between the government and the Bophuthatswana Chamber of Commerce. The chamber is an affiliate of the National Federation of Chambers of Commerce (Nafcoc) and the dispute arose because the local body refused to break ties with the national one. Early in 1980 a rival body, the Bophuthatswana Federated Chamber of Commerce, was formed, and affiliated itself to the ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party. President Mangope threatened to instruct local traders to join the new body if the other refused to break with Nafcoc (SAIRR Survey 1980, p 410). Clearly the government is trying to break all outside links and reconstitute them if necessary as 'international' links, to emphasise Bophuthatswana as an independent country. Firms must use a 'Made in Bophuthatswana' label.

Bophuthatswana is trying to look like a developing country with a vibrant economy. Allowing for differences between the bantustans, Bophuthatswana is still an underdeveloped region which is prostituting itself to get any investment. The industries give some people jobs, but most of the workers are not benefiting much - they are being heavily exploited. As in all the other bantustans, there are thousands of old and unemployed people. The latter keep the wages low in Bophuthatswana, and cannot leave the bantustan in search of work elsewhere. They are actually prevented from doing so.

## MINING

Mining's contribution to the GDP of Bophuthatswana has been heavily publicised. The main mineral mined is platinum; others are chrome, copper, nickel, palladium, gold and silver. Estimates of the value of mineral mined vary substantially, but one set of figures puts it at R384 million in 1977 rising to R572 million in 1980 (RDM, 28.07.81).

There were 22 mines in 1979, a drop from 39 in 1977; no reasons were given for the decline (Statistical Survey 1980, table 66). We should note that one of the two platinum mines, Rustenburg Platinum Mine, has only about one third of its lease area in Bophuthatswana.

It is difficult to know how much revenue is derived from the mining sector. Part of the royalties go to the tribal authority where the mine is situated. Impala Platinum has paid R15 million in royalties to the Baphokeng tribal authority, for instance. With all that money pouring in, a library (with no books) has been built at Baphokeng, and a huge civic centre which is used for the occasional tribal meeting (Sunday Times, 18.01.81). There are no figures for what the government gets in taxes; but suggestions in government circles that the mining is 'robbery' could mean the tax level is low compared with the profits.

## AGRICULTURE

Bophuthatswana lies mostly in the Western Transvaal, and its rainfall varies from 300-400 mm in the west to 500-600 mm in the east. The climate is generally suitable for cattle farming and some crop farming but there are areas in the west that do not suit any kind of agriculture. Rotberg describes the potential thus:

Bophuthatswana nonetheless is for the most part flat, dry and unsuited for mixed homestead farming. Most of the homeland lies in a zone of deficient soils, low and unreliable rainfall (300-500mm/year) and high temperatures. (pp 13-14)

Up to the 1970s much betterment planning had taken place with 47% of the land planned by 1972. The schemes went on being planned and applied in the 1970s, making the already existing landlessness still worse.

During the 1970s there was a change from traditional land use (or what remained of it) in a strong drive to create a middle class of farmers with access to land and capital. Agricultural divisions were established in the BICs in all the bantustans in 1973 to aid the transition from 'traditional to modern'.

In 1976 the BNDC started extending credit to individual farmers, and in 1978 the Bophuthatswana Agricultural Corporation was formed.

Development of a middle class of farmers has meant consolidating land into viable farming units, allocating land to potentially 'viable' farmers, and providing credit and other facilities. The scheme will bring great deprivation to many people if it is fully applied. There are some 142 000 families at present on land in Bophuthatswana which can support only 26 000 viable farming units (B.I, p 57).

Maize is the main crop. Apparently 120 000 tons were grown in 1980, 10% more than Bophuthatswana consumed. The bantustan was one of the few countries in Africa which could export food. Although crop production has greatly increased, the area under cultivation would not exceed 100 000 ha (update of figures in the BNDC annual report for 1977/8). The same report gives the feasible area for cultivation as 410 000 ha.

There are nearly 500 000 head of cattle. 27 000 were sold for slaughter in 1975/6 (B.I, p 79). This is another agricultural sector that land will be allocated for. The Bonantsha Kgomo feedlot has been set up at Taung where cattle are fattened for farmers and then sold for slaughter.

Some examples of the various agricultural schemes are given below (see also the Northern Cape report in SPP Volume 3). The Taung irrigation scheme is the most important of its kind in Bophuthatswana. It has 3 600 ha of arable land with up to 1 300 farmers settled and working the area. Lots are farmed communally by groups of 3-8 farmers. Income for each lot has reached R1 600 per annum. The above figures are for 1976. The Ditsobotla pilot development project has 3 500 ha of land and some 180 farmers. 60 000 bags of maize were expected in 1976, and two other projects were to be undertaken elsewhere along similar lines.

The two first schemes, developed early on, give some indication of the trends in agriculture. Under this present policy many people will be forced off the land and into the sprawling shanty towns that hug the major industrial and commuter townships.

## EMPLOYMENT

Most of the employed population commutes to South Africa. Commuters increased from 84 000 in 1970 to 104 000 in 1974 (Benbo, p 119) reaching 161 900 in 1980 (Statistical Survey 1980, table 16). Table 8 below gives the main residential and employment centres. The residential areas of Moretele I and Odi I are very densely populated, consisting of the proclaimed towns of Mabopane and Garankuwa and the area of Winterveld and its surrounds, the unproclaimed squatter camps. A large proportion of the 109 900 commuters reported to be from Moretele I, Odi I and Odi II are certainly non-Tswanas, and the figure should actually be much higher to include the large 'squatter' group in Winterveld.

Elsewhere, most of the commuters are Tswana people, the non-Tswanas having already been concentrated in the east of Bophuthatswana where many were originally relocated. The rapid

Table 8 MAIN EMPLOYMENT & RESIDENTIAL CENTRES FOR BOPHUTHATSWANA COMMUTERS, 1980

Employment centre	No. employed	Place of residence
Pretoria	80 800	Moretele I, Odi I
Rosslyn	19 700	Odi I
Brits	9 400	Odi I, Odi II
Rustenburg	14 200	Bafokeng, Mankwe
Lichtenburg, Delareyville	6 400	Ditsobotla
Bloemfontein	4 600	Selosesha
Thaba 'Nchu	900	Selosesha
Other urban areas	12 500	Other
Rural areas	13 400	Unspecified

from Statistical Survey 1980, table 16

increase in the commuter population is in large part due to the relocation of large numbers into Bophuthatswana during the 1970s.

Provision has been made for more commuters in the Moretele I and Odi I districts with the development of new rail facilities running from near Mabopane to Pretoria. This line is planned to carry 40 000 - 60 000 commuters daily. Phase 1 of the project was due for completion in December 1980 (B.I, p 74). Construction is under way with the development of a Rosslyn II alongside the original Rosslyn industrial township. This area will also draw its labour from the Moretele I and Odi I districts, increasing the number of commuters.

168 000 workers in 1980 were migrants, according to the Statistical Survey. That was 14% of the de facto population. A similar figure, 167 000, is given in Bophuthatswana at independence but with the rider that the total includes those working two contracts a year (p 51). According to this source, there had been 62 631 migrant workers in 1970 which dropped to 48 000 in 1976 - it seems these figures may well be wrong, for there was massive forced relocation into Bophuthatswana between 1970 and 1976 and the number of migrants should therefore have increased, not decreased.

TEBA is the only recruiting agency allowed, this same source says. In 1976 it had 12 offices and recruited 33 161 mine workers (as opposed to 6 392 in 1970). The growing intake is largely due to TEBA's emphasis now on bantustan labour instead of trying to recruit further afield. Their policy may slightly reduce the vast unemployment that has been building up in the bantustans.

The public sector is one of the main employers in Bophuthatswana, taking on 15 555 workers in 1975 and 22 375 in 1979 (Statistical Survey 1980, table 105). Teachers made up 40% of the 1975 intake; their proportion decreased slightly as more people were employed and the various services expanded. Other government employees are officials, professional people, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. We do not know their salaries, but some of the top officials evidently get very well paid. The post of 'Secretary of the Bophuthatswana Water Corporation', advertised recently, had a starting salary of R24 000 a year with the use of a car and other fringe benefits.

Industry is another important employer. In Babelegi, where most of the industrial development has occurred, 9 769 africans were employed at the end of March 1979 (Statistical Survey 1980, table 80). Total employment in Bophuthatswana in all industries created under the agency

system (with CED aid, and BNDC after independence) was 10 886 by March 1978 (Statistical Survey 1980, table 77). The intake in 1980 for all industry was 13 212: 10 937 in large-scale industry (enterprises with over 50 workers) and 2 275 in the small-scale group (Müller, p 5). Employment figures will be increasing, with the investment by AECI and South African Breweries announced in 1980.

Black employment in undertakings run solely by the BNDC was 1 634 in 1979, and the white intake was 67 (Statistical Survey, table 74). Transport companies are not included in these figures although they were started by the BNDC; they employed 2 250 black and 198 white workers (Statistical Survey 1980, table 64).

It is very difficult to know the numbers for agriculture. The Financial Mail supplement on Bophuthatswana, which came out just before independence in 1977, puts the number of resident, economically active people involved in agriculture at 56% of the total (p 17). The figure includes those who eke a little from the soil but who cannot be termed 'economically active' in the sense that they derive a living from the soil. The real figure for those economically active in agriculture must be much lower.

Graaff calculated that agriculture as a percentage of source of income had dropped from 24,7% in 1977 to 9,7% in 1981, and wages as a source had increased from 36,3% to 55,4%, while 'contributions received' had increased from 12,8% to 23,4% for rural people between 1977 and 1981. 45,4% of rural people are not economically active or unemployed, according to Graaf (table 4).

Very roughly, employment for all the categories mentioned above would total approximately 39 500.

Mining has been left out of the calculations as it was not possible to get a figure for the number of Bophuthatswana workers involved. Bophuthatswana at independence gives black and white mine workers together at 63 000 (p 83). In the early 1970s a very small proportion of the workforce was Tswana, but this has increased with recruitment following a policy line of the Bophuthatswana government. With a conservative estimate of at least 10 000 Tswanas employed in the mines now, the total employment for all sectors except agriculture would be about 50 000.

There have been more and more strikes in the Rosslyn area where many commuters from Moretele I and Odi I work. It seems workers involved in the disputes will increasingly reject the notion of ethnic development and the Bophuthatswana authorities' attempts to encourage an ethnic mentality. Other commuter centres and industrial areas can be expected to follow suit, and reject ethnicity too.

Bophuthatswana workers are paid a pittance, even compared with those in some sectors in South Africa elsewhere. The skilled workers and managerial staff are mostly white, and apparently there will not be a large materially well-off Tswana group to which the authorities could look for support. It seems that workers in Bophuthatswana are starting to organise: for instance, there was a strike at Batswana Transport when 200 workers came out in sympathy with a victimised fellow worker (RDM, 8.11.79).

The situation is different in the public sector. While many Ndebele people are employed in the industrial area of Babelegi, for instance, one can assume that the government employs only Tswana people - or if there are any non-Tswanas, that they have taken out Bophuthatswana citizenship. The government service offers far greater social mobility, and so its workers can be relied on for far more support.

Tswanas employed on the mines both inside and outside Bophuthatswana have ethnic divisions thrust at them in various ways. The mines have hostels for the various ethnic groups, for

instance, and the recruiting office shows films of the workers' homes to keep miners 'in touch' with those 'back home' (B.I). (Great deprivation 'back home' and hardships on the mines are hardly likely to encourage a positive ethnic spirit.)

The mines have very limited job advancement for black workers although Bophuthatswana is supposed to be free of racism. There has been talk in government circles of repealing the Mines and Works Act which prevents black job advancement (Sunday Times, 11.2.79). This has brought a rather heated response from the South African Mine Workers Union and their spokesman, Mr Arrie Paulus. The management of the big platinum mines had to ask the Bophuthatswana government to shelve the plans while they negotiated with the Mine Workers Union. Nothing seems to have emerged yet. It is clear that any powerful group - and not just the South African government - can dictate to the Bophuthatswana authorities.

It seems that the various groups in Bophuthatswana will respond differently to the institutions and laws that seek to control them. More detailed research is needed to give an idea of these developing responses.

## MEDIA AND CULTURE

The Bophuthatswana government has various means for assaulting the 'hearts and minds' of Tswana people.

Radio Bophuthatswana started soon after independence, and its services now cover all the areas (Sunday Times, 6.08.78). All news items are couched in nationalist jargon. Programmes deal with many local issues such as agriculture, development projects and 'Tswana culture'. A TV station has also been mooted.

After independence the Mmabatho News was launched as a small-circulation daily paper. J McGoff (of Washington Post and Citizen fame) helped to start it. It was not an official government mouthpiece but the editorial policy was compliant (Sunday Times, 10.09.78). When Mafeking was ceded to Bophuthatswana, the Mafeking Mail and Botswana Guardian changed its name to the Mafikeng Mail and Botswana Guardian, and the contents appear to be pro-government.

The information service of the Bophuthatswana government runs a monthly magazine called Tswelelopele with a (hand-out) circulation of 73 000, which we assume is distributed free. The BNDC publishes a newsletter Impetus to cover its developments. Finally the Bureau of Tswana Language and Culture, which comes under the Department of Education, has a journal Boswa with a circulation of 5 000 (B.I, pp 27-8). Other government bodies presumably have their own publications too. All serve to try generating nationalism.

Ethnic symbols seem to be highly valued in efforts to promote nationalism:

In recent years there has been a cultural revival through the reactivation of the Tswana authority and as a reaction against the influx of non-Tswana into Odi (east), Moretele and Thaba Nchu, which caused anxiety about the retention of the Tswana cultural heritage. The Bophuthatswana Government promotes this cultural revival by the emphasis it places upon culture in public utterances and Legislative Assembly debates and more concretely, through practical steps to encourage the survival of what is dear to the Tswana, and to protect the Tswana language and cultural heritage from foreign influences. (B.I, p 27)

## TOURISM

Part of local development has been by way of promoting tourism. The Mmabatho Sun Hotel was built at the site of the planned capital Mmabatho in 1976/7. It does not compare, though, with the Sun City complex of a few years later, also built by Southern Sun Hotels, and promoted internationally as an extravaganza. Sol Kerzner, managing director of the company, puts the share capital of the enterprise at R32 million, and without indicating the proportions he says this is divided between the company and BNDC. Taxes on the hotel profits are 35% (compared with 42% in South Africa). 1 000 blacks are employed in the hotel, casino and related complexes, Kerzner said in 1980, and other benefits to the bantustan were that meat would be bought locally and a laundry would be set up nearby. The minimum wage then was R95 a month with two meals a day for those on duty (RDM, 11.07.80).

During 1981 the findings of an HSRC report were made known, on the social implications of Sun City for the surrounding population. There was an increase in crime, truancy, alcohol abuse, family disintegration, prostitution and venereal disease in the area. The Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Dr Patrick Mokgobo, rejected the HSRC report as unscientific. The Bophuthatswana authorities set up a committee, briefed by Dr Mokgobo to 'critically examine' the findings. Of the ten members, two were from the Sun City management (Sunday Times, 14.06.81).

Another prestige project was the creation of a large game park in the Pilanesberg area. This necessitated the removal of 100 families of the Bakgotla tribe. They were moved from Welgeval in June 1980 to Sandfontein. No tents were provided at their new 'home'. The Bophuthatswana government has instead promoted its own image in the matter of game conservation.

## RELOCATION AND CONSOLIDATION

The Western Transvaal is characterised by relatively little historical 'mixing' of the ethnic groups. Elsewhere in the Transvaal there has been much relocation to try to isolate the various groups. Mixing has occurred in two main parts of Bophuthatswana (Odi and Moretele) but this is a recent phenomenon, and it is only in the last few years that the Bophuthatswana government has tried relocating the non-Tswana people.

The first documented move was that of a community at Holpan, 34 km north-west of Kimberley, to a place named Mammutla in the bantustan in 1964/5. 500 people were moved (SAIRR Survey 1966, p 144). The same report mentions Tswana people moved from a black spot to Koedoesrand (Seloriestad) in 1964.

Relocation has occurred every year from the mid-1960s. Most of the documented moves were those of relatively small communities and mainly from black spots. It appears that numerically the chief relocation period has been in the early and late seventies, with the implementation of the 1973 consolidation and the 1975 consolidation proposals.

100 000 people were moved from white farms and townships into Bophuthatswana in 1968-1975, according to Prof Smit of Pretoria University. These removals would fall under categories 2, 3 and 4 as set out by Maré (1980). The figures Prof Smit gives for the movement of people from black spots, mission stations and 'poorly situated land' in the same period total 24 000, and these would come under Maré's categories 1 and 8 (RDM, 20.04.79).

Some groups have been moved because of infrastructural development. One was a whole tribe of Tswanas, 2 000 people, who were moved from Mayen reserve near Taung to Vaalboschhoek. The reason the authorities gave was the building of the Spitskop dam. The tribe believed they were being moved not because they would have been flooded but because the dam would have

cut them off from the bantustan (Sunday Times, 16.02.75). Another move in the name of infrastructure was that of the Bakgotla tribe from Welgeval in the Pilanesberg to Sandfontein. 100 families were moved in June 1980 to make way for a game reserve for the Sun City holiday and gambling complex. The tribe had previously lived on a communal farm. When they arrived at the new place they were not even provided with tents, as already noted above (Sunday Times, 29.06.80).

The last type of relocation to be discussed here is that of moves made as resistance. These are important at a time when ethnic units are being worked up, with separate development at the local level. Winterveld and Thaba 'Nchu are two vast examples. In both cases the Bophuthatswana government put great pressure on the inhabitants either to leave or to take out citizenship. In Thaba 'Nchu most of the South Sotho people involved in the conflict left the area. In the case of Winterveld, many thousands of families left but most of the non-Tswana population stayed. (See the Winterveld section in Part 3 below, and SPP Volume 3, the OFS report.)

Here follows a brief chronology of the consolidation plans which have been carried out. In 1970 the Tswana Territorial Authority had six large blocks of land and 13 small areas, about 3 754 000 ha in all (SAIRR Survey 1972, p 168). Semi-final consolidation proposals were published in 1973 which were rejected by the Bophuthatswana authorities. Their own plan entailed consolidating the bantustan into one single area and doubling the land size (SAIRR Survey 1973, p 155). The final South African consolidation proposals published in 1975 allowed for the consolidation of Bophuthatswana into six areas, adding 605 000 ha and excising 352 000. This plan, which has been systematically applied, required the relocation of some 120 000 Tswanas. The final bantustan area would total 4 043 000 ha (SAIRR Survey 1976, p 220).

Early leaks of the Van der Walt report suggested that Bophuthatswana would be completely consolidated. There would be a gain of 200 000 ha in all; and large areas would be surrendered around Taung and Thaba 'Nchu. These proposals were rejected by President Mangope because of the massive relocation that would have resulted (SAIRR Survey 1979, p 302). The political effects of relocation must have been weighed in this decision.

In September 1980 Mafeking was incorporated into Bophuthatswana with much fanfare. The Bophuthatswana government had long demanded it. The town's name was changed to Mafikeng. Whites who stayed there were guaranteed the value of their property. Schools and various other facilities stayed segregated. These measures were to keep the whites from a mass exodus. Those who have stayed now live exactly as before, in a 'nonracial' bantustan.

The most recent announcement on consolidation was that of the transfer of 100 000 ha in the Northern Cape near Vryburg, added to the bantustan. The land is not occupied by whites. It is less than a third of the 360 000 ha due to the bantustan under agreements already signed (RDM, 26.11.81).

In general, nearly all the 1975 consolidation proposals have been met except for clearing a few black spots. In the process, many Tswana people who lived on their own land and were relatively free of bureaucratic control are now subject to the various constraints of bantustan life. Relocation has not been a smooth matter. Those who were determined not to move may not have had the necessary skills to resist successfully, but many are still resisting even after removal.

We would rather die here than accept any crumbs in compensation for our fertile land wrenched from us by the Whites.

(Chief Mokate of the relocated people from Machaviestad, when threatened with removal to Rooigrond)

## CONCLUSION

The Bophuthatswana government would like to portray itself as heading an autonomous and independent State, yet it is subject to a number of external means of control. The central State has a direct sanction against the government as it provides much of the finance. The South African State also makes the final decision on what land the bantustan will receive. Many whites are seconded from the South African civil service to aid the 'developing country' and this group forms a means of control over the direction the 'country' takes. A clear example is the case of Brigadier Riekert, once head of the North-West Command in the SADF, who became Bophuthatswana's military adviser and is now its Minister of Defence. He is unlikely to counter any of the wishes of the SADF.

Bophuthatswana is being vaunted as a nonracial democracy, an inaccurate image as the Politics section has indicated. Nonracialism is not practised towards all non-Tswanas. The Bill of Rights applies to all individuals in Bophuthatswana only if they are citizens, otherwise any harassment is justified. It is a curious paradox that the bantustan which is the product of a racist discriminatory system should flaunt nonracialism, but this is a way of emphasising independence. Yet its discrimination against non-Tswanas in Bophuthatswana is also an attempt to achieve a pure Tswana land which again is a necessary prerequisite for its legitimate existence.

Now that this adjunct of the South African State exists, the citizens of Bophuthatswana may find there is even greater control over them than before independence. Various groups in the bantustan are materially dependent on the local State and so must support it.

The Bophuthatswana government has also tried to instil a Tswana nationalism through various channels such as the media and the education system.

Bophuthatswana is perhaps the most successful example of the central State's attempt to disorganise the majority of the oppressed people and reorganise them into ethnic institutions. This and all the other bantustans in effect help the central State to maintain its vast discrepancies in wealth and privilege. Bophuthatswana mirrors those discrepancies and will never be able to resolve the contradictions engendered.

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## STOP PRESS

Mr Saul Mkhize, community leader in Driefontein and a champion of resistance to removal, was shot on 2 April 1983.

Press reports overleaf.

# Mkhize shooting highlights forced removals protest

The police shooting of Driefontein community leader Mr Saul Mkhize is likely to have international repercussions. Political staff writer JOHN BATTERSBY reports.

THE plight of the 5000 Driefontein villagers has received considerable international publicity during the past two months and the shooting of their leader, Mr Saul Mkhize, is likely to create a new outcry over the government's policy of forced removals.

Since about mid-1981 the black landowners, who acquired their land in 1912 before the Natives Land Act of 1913 was passed, have been waging a war of words with Pretoria to prevent their forced removal.

Driefontein has been declared a black spot by the government and is apparently the site of a dam project on the Assegai River.

In a report on March 6 this year the influential New York Times highlighted the plight of the Driefontein farmers in a substantial report in which Mr Mkhize was quoted.

## Angry backlash

When government officials painted white numbers on gravestones in the Driefontein cemetery last year, in preparation for reburials elsewhere, there was such an angry backlash from the villagers that Pretoria ordered the numbers to be removed.

Mr Mkhize told the New York Times: "When we bury our dead we expect them, as all other people do, to rest in peace."

"We paid for our land and we wish to keep it. We will not own the new land to which we are supposed to move. We will merely be squatters, and who knows when someone else will decide to move us again? Why should we move? Because the government wants our land for their own purposes? For the minerals be-



Mr Saul Mkhize... "We paid for our land and we wish to keep it."

leader told Mr Prinsloo that his message from the government that the people of Driefontein were to be moved was "unacceptable" because there had been no negotiation on the matter.

Mr Prinsloo told Driefontein villagers on that day that he was speaking in his capacity as Commissioner for the Wakkerstroom district and had a message from the Chief Commissioner at Pietersburg — a Mr Van Niekerk — who said his words came directly from the government.

Mr Prinsloo told the villagers that the Department of Co-operation and Development intended sending officials to the area "as soon as possible" to determine how many "squatters" were living in the area and to make arrangements for the compensation of the landowners' land.

Mr Mkhize told the magistrate that he was not adopting the government's resettlement plans.

neath the ground? Would they move white people in this way — by buses to barren land with no roads, no water, no schools, no shops, nothing?"

The New York Times wrote: "Driefontein is a village under a death sentence. Pretoria has decreed that the people in it and all other black communities must be trucked to 'homelands', the 14 percent of South Africa set aside for black occupation. Half a million blacks have already been swept off such 'black spots'..."

"Driefontein is not a wealthy village. But on a continent fast losing the race to feed itself, it is self-sufficient and more."

"There are about 300 individual landowners, some of whom lease out part of their small acreage to tenants with whom they practise share-cropping. They have dug wells and built homes, stores, schools and churches."

## "Are proud"

"The peasants raise cattle, goats and chickens. They grow corn, pumpkins, potatoes and peach trees... The residents are proud of what they have created. They elected a community board to keep out trespassers and petty criminals, and the sale of liquor is strictly controlled..."

Since November last year Mr Geoff Budlender, a lawyer from the Legal Resources Centre, has been acting on Mr Mkhize's behalf and has on record a detailed account of all the correspondence between the Driefontein villagers and the government.

On March 19 this year a commissioner of Dr Koornhof's department who is also magistrate of the Wakkerstroom district, Mr M J Prinsloo, conveyed a message from the government to the Driefontein villagers stating that the government was not prepared to negotiate further on the removals.

Mr Mkhize last week drafted a petition protesting against the government's plans to resettle black landowners and other residents in the Kwazulu and Kangwane homelands.

According to a transcript of the March 19 meeting the community

"The correct procedure would be to negotiate with the community," Mr Mkhize said.

Mr Prinsloo replied: "The government has already decided about the removal of Driefontein. They are not going to negotiate any further on the matter. It is finished."

Mr Mkhize replied: "That means that the government is now forcing us to be removed from this place. If the government is not accepting any negotiation with us... then we don't accept. The community is not accepting it. Thank you."

## Koornhof's reply

On December 18, 1981, the then chairman of the defunct Driefontein Community Board, which was spearheading resistance to forced removals at the time, received a reply from Dr Koornhof to an inquiry in which he had reminded Dr Koornhof of his undertaking that he was opposed to forced removals and that the government would not forcibly resettle anyone.

Dr Koornhof replied: "The position regarding the future of Driefontein 388 is as follows: (a) The dam in the Assegai River will, on completion, flood some of the Driefontein properties; and (b) it is a decision of Parliament that the people of Driefontein must be settled elsewhere. Therefore only the terms under which the move will take place are negotiable."

## Mkhize death findings

090483 CAPE TIMES

Own Correspondent  
JOHANNESBURG. — The post-mortem on Driefontein community leader Mr Saul Mkhize yesterday showed that his death was caused by shotgun wounds in the chest.

The post-mortem was conducted at the Diepkloof mortuary, lawyers for the Mkhize family said.

State pathologist Professor G Scheepers found the cause of death was shotgun wounds in the lungs, aorta and atrium.

Mr Mkhize was shot dead by a policeman last Saturday at a meeting against the forced removal of his community by the government.

## PART 2

## Regional Overview



Dundonald, Kangwane - stretching over hills, thousands of shacks with few facilities for people evicted from farms and towns since 1975 (September 1982)

## 2.1 SUMMARY OF RELOCATION IN THE TRANSVAAL

Historically relocation may be divided into two main periods in the Transvaal. The first was the removal of africans into the reserves set aside in terms of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts. The attempt was to clear the Transvaal of africans, to have them living in the reserves and emerging only to sell their labour on the mines, on white farms, and later in industry.

The second phase began in the late 1950s and early 1960s when the reserve policy had developed into bantustan policy. This time africans were to be sorted into ethnic groups, and the reserves were allocated to the various groups. Thus many thousands of people have been moved many times, some from white urban or rural areas to reserves and then later into their 'ethnic' units. This process is still going on. People who have lived peacefully together for 150 years, people who have intermarried and who speak many languages, are being forcibly driven apart particularly in the Northern, Eastern and Central Transvaal.

This summary does not pretend to begin to be comprehensive. The intention is to show some of what has been happening throughout the province. The reports are based on fieldwork, interviews, secondary material such as press reports and government statements and examination of maps. Accuracy has been a major priority. In many cases, however, it has not been possible to visit areas to check information gleaned from secondary sources. Where this information has been checked, it has sometimes been found inaccurate. So once more it is stressed that far more work needs to be done in the area of forced removals, particularly in the Transvaal which is so complicated with six bantustans, long distances, high population density and complex urban/rural relationships within a fast developing economy.

Part 2 includes a section for lists of relocated areas and areas under threat of removal, with maps. It has not always been possible to map all the areas at the scale chosen, and in some cases it is not clear exactly where the places mentioned are situated. Once again, without detailed fieldwork this is not possible.

For convenience the summary has been divided into the six bantustans. It is stressed that SPP examined the area on a regional basis, not accepting the ideological framework of

separate ethnic states. However, people are moved into bantustans, and so it is easier to summarise areas within each bantustan and within magisterial districts within that. Where possible information has been collected on areas under threat of removal, but it must be remembered that until the Van der Walt Commission reports on the consolidation of bantustans many areas may be reported as under threat of removal and may not be moved, and vice versa, areas presently not under threat may be moved.

A note on the names of places: it is not always clear whether places mentioned are in one area or another, whether places spelt one way may not be spelt another (this is particularly relevant when examining the topo-cadastral 1:250 000 maps). The names of farms appear over and over again in different regions, and it is not always clear whether the Doornkop/Doringkop in this district was the one from which the Minister reported people moved in 1969 in another district when a farm of that name does not appear on the map in the district he mentioned! In each case the places mentioned have been located on maps and where possible reproduced in this report. There are bound to be inaccuracies in so complex a field.

Frequently numbers of people moved and dates of removal as well as dates of establishment of the new place are confusing. Once again, having sifted through the available information, an informed guess has been taken in some cases. The most common problem is that numbers of families are confused with numbers of people. These figures have been converted from numbers of families to numbers of people using between five and six members to one family, depending on the general comments about the place on population characteristics.

Time and again fieldworkers reported that the clear lines dividing one bantustan from another on the map simply do not exist in the field. Often maps show the consolidated proposals rather than the existing confusion. Maps of different vintages show different information and in many cases the large-print place names of newly independent bantustans simply do not exist on maps printed three or four years ago.

This Part 2, being mainly descriptive, sets out to document removals over the last 10 to 15 years. The main trends to note are, chronologically, the removal of labour tenants (740 000 by 1976) and 'squatters' (656 000 by 1976) from white farms to the reserves - the families of those who had worked on farms or tenants of farmers; and the removal of former residents to closer settlements and embryo townships in bantustans. These are probably the largest categories of removal until the mid-1970s. Landowners and tenants from black spots account for 258 632 removals prior to 1976, while 317 000 were moved from black spots and 250 861 from 'badly situated areas' between 1970 and 1980 according to a report by the Department of Co-operation and Development (RDM, 14.04.81). However, in a reply to a parliamentary question by Horace van Rensburg MP, Dr Koornhof said that 141 219 blacks had been moved in the Transvaal between 1970 and 1979 (Argus, 23.04.80). In 1980 alone Co-operation and Development reported that they had moved 74 276 people in the Transvaal (RDM, 14.04.81). From the Pretoria area 3 350 people (1 033 families) were moved to KwaNdebele and Kangwane mainly, and from the Witwatersrand 2 381 (389 families) were removed (SAIRR Survey 1981, p 273).

Table 1 FAMILIES AND PEOPLE MOVED IN THE TRANSVAAL, 1977-1980

	Tvl to Kangwane		to Bophuthatswana		to Lebowa	
	Families	People	Families	People	Families	People
1.04.77 - 31.03.78	50	357	996	6 641		
1.04.78 - 31.03.79	53	378	1 453	10 809		
1.04.79 - 31.03.80				315		8 074

from SAIRR Survey 1978, 1979, 1980

From rough calculations from the lists of places which follow (many without figures for the numbers of people moved or under threat, in which case they have usually been underestimated) it would seem that about 1 153 000 people have been moved in the Transvaal in the last 20 years and that a further 585 000 are under threat of removal, which does not include areas said to have been reprieved such as Sekgosese. Both these figures are underestimates.

Table 2 PEOPLE RELOCATED AND UNDER THREAT OF RELOCATION IN THE TRANSVAAL, 1960-1982

	Relocated	Under threat
Venda	13 000	60 000
Gazankulu	105 000	10 000
Lebowa	290 000	335 000
Bophuthatswana	247 000	95 000
Kangwane	381 000	85 000
KwaNdebele	117 000	
TOTAL	1 153 000	585 000

These figures are very rough and represent the minimum numbers of relocations and people under threat of removal. KwaNdebele has nearer 250 000 people removed, and Kangwane has nearer 100 000 under threat to be moved there. Where areas are reported to have been reprieved (e.g. Sekgosese) the people have not been counted as under threat of removal, but where it is rumoured they have been reprieved (e.g. Mokerong I) they have been included. It is certain that nearly 1,3 million removals have taken place in the Transvaal alone.

Table 3 RELOCATIONS AND PEOPLE UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL IN THE TRANSVAAL, BY CATEGORY, 1960-1982

	Relocated	Under threat
Farm evictions	400 000	?
Urban relocation	350 000	12 000
Black spots	280 000	120 000
Consolidation	120 000	450 000
Infrastructural and strategic	5 000	2 500
SUBTOTAL	1 155 000	584 500 + ?
Group areas (since 1948)	140 400	?
TOTAL	1 295 400	584 500 + ??

Once more these figures are an estimate of those relocations which have taken place and those under threat of removal. It will be noted that farm evictions are the biggest single category and it is impossible to predict how many more will occur. Urban relocation in the Transvaal is a major category and has almost been completed in terms of published plans.

Black spot removals are about two-thirds complete and according to plan. For them and for consolidation, predictions have been made on the basis of the plans with areas reprieved not counted. Consolidation is in its early stages with the major relocation being the planned move of the Pedis living in what is to be KwaNdebele. Not much information has been collected on infrastructural and strategic removals, which may account for the low numbers involved (but they are not thought to be high). NOTE: These figures do not include removals through betterment, informal settlement or influx control.

Before summarising the actual areas, it is necessary to take a short look at the categories of removals operating in the Transvaal. For convenience the Mare categories are used.

### 2.1.1 Clearance of black spots

According to a 1961 departmental circular there were

approximately 55 farms or portions of farms in European rural areas which are owned by Bantu. These 'black spots' comprise a total area of approximately 55 000 morgen. Of these 55 'black spots' the following 16 have been cleared up:

- and then followed the names listed below as cleared by 1961. There are two other sources of names of black spots, one including 'badly situated areas' meaning areas owned communally which are either scheduled or released land and which have been excised from the reserves. These two sources are replies to parliamentary questions in 1969 and 1980. Together the three sources provide the basis for the black spot table. According to Dr Koornhof, between 1970 and 1979, 140 120 people were moved off Transvaal black spots (SAIRR Survey 1980, p 451).

Table 4 TRANSVAAL BLACK SPOTS CLEARED

Farm	District (near town)	Date removed	No of people	Comments
Snymansdrift (portion 413)	Brits (Brits)	by 1961	-	412 morgen
Vogelfontein (portion 191)	Brits (Atlanta)	by 1961	-	82 morgen
Elandsfontein 440	Brits (Brits)	part by 1969 1972	- 250	
Twefontein (491, 541 or 413)	Bronkhorstspuit (Bronkhorstspuit)	by 1961		375 morgen
Klipspruit (199 Delmas?)	Bronkhorstspuit (Bronkhorstspuit)	part by 1969 1972	- 55	
Ellissen; Steynsburg; Onverwacht 509	Bronkhorstspuit (Bronkhorstspuit)	1969 1970-1973	360 300	PQ, col 315, 1969 PQ 537, 1980
Van Dykspruit (214 Witbank?)	Bronkhorstspuit (Kendal)	by 1969	-	
Kromkrans 208	Carolina (Carolina)	1976-1979 1979	2 863 4 739	

TRANSVAAL BLACK SPOTS CLEARED contd

Farm	District (near town)	Date removed	No of people	Comment
Spitskop 276	Ermelo (Ermelo)	1972-1978	675	
Gruysbank 5JS	Groblersdal (Marble Hall)	by 1969	-	
Tambootielaahte 733	Groblersdal (Marble Hall)	by 1969	-	
Wildebeestpan 442	Klerksdorp (Stilfontein)	by 1961	-	516 morgen
Booyskraal 20	Koster (Boons)	1972	488	
Elandsfontein 21 (Molotestad)	Koster (Boons)	1977	18	
Kafferskraal 493 (Makgokwane)	Koster (Koster)	1977-1978	1 302	
Syferfontein 496; Rietfontein 464	Koster (Koster)	1977-1978	760	
Kranskop 417	Letaba (Duiwelskloof)	by 1969	-	
Rietkuil 53	Lichtenburg (Lichtenburg)	1970 1977-1978	721 706	
(no name)	Lichtenburg (Lichtenburg)	1974	1 064	
Biesiesvallei 149	Lichtenburg (Lichtenburg)	1975	282	
Geluk 235	Lichtenburg (Lichtenburg)	1975	160	
Rooijantjiesfontein (Moloka); Koppiesfontein 87; Renosterdoorns 88	Lichtenburg (Gerdau)	1976 1977	3 815 3 815	Quote from Dr Koornhof's reply to PQ 537, 1980
Sterkfontein 155	Lichtenburg, but according to topo-cadastral map 2626	1977 1978-1979 1977	4 214 451 35	
Wildfontein 201	all in Coligny (Coligny)	1977-1979	1 211	
Vogelstruisknoop 65		1977	4 417	
Putfontein 62		1978-1979	4 471	
Omega 156		1978-1979	521	
Sinthumule; Kutama	Louis Trichardt	1979	6 446	'badly situated'

TRANSVAAL BLACK SPOTS CLEARED contd

Farm	District (near town)	Date removed	No of people	Comment
Boomplaats 24 & 29	Lydenburg (Lydenburg)	by 1961	-	2 210 morgen
Koppieskraal (portion 73)	Marico (Zeerust)	by 1961	-	543 morgen
Leeufontein (portion 61)	Marico (Zeerust)	by 1961	-	2 787 morgen
Braklaagte 90	Marico (Zeerust)	by 1969	-	
Groenfontein 266	Middelburg (Middelburg)	by 1961	-	700 morgen
Doornkop 506	Middelburg (Middelburg)	by 1969 1970-1977	- 12 420	{ No Doornkop 506 on topo-cadastral map 2528, only 246
Kalkbank 182	Pietersburg (Pietersburg)	1970	1 039	
Roodewal 808	Pietersburg (Pietersburg)	1970-1974	3 000	
Matoks 491	Pietersburg (Pietersburg/ Louis Trichardt)	1977	3 915	{ 'Badly situated' part excised, the rest reprieved
Makgato (Klip- plaatdrift 508)	Pietersburg (Pietersburg/ Louis Trichardt)	1979	1 584	{ 'Badly situated', next to Matoks
Rooipan 539	Potgietersrus (Naboomspruit)	by 1961	-	789 morgen
Boekenhoutkloof 315	Pretoria (Pretoria)	by 1969	-	
Walmansthal 278	Pretoria (according to topo-cadastral map 2528, in Wonderboom near Hammanskraal)	1970-1977	65 000	
Vaalkop; Middelkraal 466	Rustenburg (Rustenburg)	by 1961	-	1 564 morgen 31 morgen
Rooikoppies 297	Rustenburg (Rustenburg)	by 1961	-	40 morgen
Kafferskraal 342	Rustenburg (Rustenburg)	by 1969	-	
Schilpadnest 385	Rustenburg (now in Thabazimbi) (Thabazimbi)	by 1969	-	

TRANSVAAL BLACK SPOTS CLEARED contd

Farm	District (near town)	Date removed	No of people	Comment
Haakdoornbult 542	Rustenburg (now in Thabazimbi) (Koedoeskop)	by 1969	-	
Bulhoek 398	Rustenburg (now Swartruggens)	by 1961 . Bulhoek mentioned twice with different land areas, so move in two parts?	-	1 176 morgen 1 177 morgen
Vlakfontein 385	Rustenburg (now in Koster) (Magaliesburg)	by 1969	-	
Klipgat 18	Ventersdorp (Carletonville)	1960	-	1 018 morgen
Goedgevonden 169	Ventersdorp (Ventersdorp)	1975-1978	3 483	
Hartbeeslaagte 146	Ventersdorp (Ventersdorp)	1976	186	
Doornkop 166	Ventersdorp (Goedgevonden)	1976-1978	5 650	
Boschhoek 144	Ventersdorp (Doornhoek)	1978	32	
Wayland 137; Thorn 143	Ventersdorp (Boschhoek)	1978	32	Not Wagland
De Hoop 525	Waterberg (Ellisras)	by 1969	-	
Kibi native reserve	Zoutpansberg	by 1961	-	1 992 morgen
Joppa	Zoutpansberg	by 1961	-	858 morgen
TOTAL			140 480	

NOTE 140 480 people were removed from 33 black spots and 'badly situated areas'. For 26 black spots no figures are given. In cases such as Kromkrans and Carolina, at least 20 000 people were removed. Figures listed are from official sources only.

In terms of the decision to include the Mafikeng area in the section on the Western Transvaal, the following black spots should be noted here instead of in the Northern Cape report:

Eastwood (portion)	Mafikeng	by 1961	-	611 morgen
Vaalbank (remainder)	Mafikeng	by 1961	-	289 morgen

In reply to parliamentary question 13 of 18 March 1969, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said there were 82 263 morgen 564 roods of small reserves and outlying parts of reserves, and 27 105 morgen 413 roods of other black spots to be eliminated in the Transvaal. Replying to question 11 of 7 February 1969, the same Minister said there were 59 739 morgen 456 roods of black spots in the Transvaal in 1948 (this time only land owned by africans was included in the figure). According to the Afrika Instituut (p 13, table 6) in 1972 only 33% of Transvaal black spots had been moved (22 487 ha) leaving 46 624 ha to be moved. In reply to parliamentary question 188 of 26 February 1981 the Minister of Co-operation and Development said there were NO further black spots to be removed in the Transvaal.

In summary, according to the 1961 circular there were 55 Transvaal black spots, of which 16 had been moved. In 1969, 29 were listed as moved. There should have been 10 left, but in 1980, 31 black spots were listed as having been moved in the last 10 years. The implication is that in some figures 'badly situated areas', not freehold areas, have been included, and that since 1961 further areas were declared white. From fieldwork it is clear that Dr Koornhof's reply in 1981 is untrue, unless he does not intend moving people from the Eastern and Western Transvaal, for example, where families on freehold land believe they are under threat of removal at Driefontein, KwaNgema, Daggakraal, Mathopestad, Mogopa and Motlatla.

## 2.1.2 Relocation due to the abolition of the Labour Tenant system & squatting on white-owned farms

For a full discussion of the system, see the Natal report (SPP Volume 4). Little primary work has been done on this category of relocation in the Transvaal. It would seem that the system of labour tenancy has been abolished in theory and practice throughout the Transvaal, although there may still be pockets in isolated areas where an agreement has been reached between the farm worker/tenant and the farmer.

Labour tenancy was enquired into from 1961 when the various farmers' associations were canvassed for their opinions. The Commission of Enquiry reported in 1964. Thereafter the 1936 Land Act was amended to make provision for the abolition or limitation of the system in certain areas. This was implemented as the local farmers put pressure on the State, e.g. labour tenancy was abolished in the Tzaneen and Middelburg (Transvaal) areas in 1967 under government notice 1335 in Gazette 1830. The same Gazette carried a prohibition on further labour tenancy contracts in the Potchefstroom area (notice 1358).<sup>\*</sup> By January 1969 labour tenancy had been abolished in 25 of the 85 districts in which it had been practised in the Transvaal (and in all districts of the OFS). Labour tenancy was abolished in the Northern Transvaal first, then in the Eastern Transvaal and finally in the Western, although in the last it was not such a popular form of labour contract. The limitation and later abolition caused thousands of people to leave the farms. Once the contract expired, people who had been living on the farms legally became 'squatters' and liable to eviction. In most cases they were evicted individually or in small groups and had to make their way to a bantustan seeking land. Thus many areas established for relocation of people from towns or black spots had to absorb ex-labour tenants. Many informal settlements grew up around the formal settlements, outside Mafikeng, Kabokweni, Seshego, and so on.

In the 1960s people evicted off the farms tried to find land in areas which had been set aside for grazing or ploughing in betterment schemes. Driving through Gazankulu one is confronted with continuous settlement where people have been forced to settle on land planned for

\* Labour tenancy was abolished in Delmas and Kempton Park in March 1968, Coligny in April 1968, and Vereeniging in May 1969.

agriculture. In some areas nearly all the people have no land at all (see sections on Lebowa and Bophuthatswana).

Between 1970 and 1979, 141 219 people were relocated as a result of the abolition of labour tenancy in the Transvaal - this same figure is given by Dr Koornhof for total removals in the Transvaal 1970-1979 (SAIRR Survey 1980, pp 394 and 452). The reasons for change in farm labour practices will be discussed under the Western Transvaal section.

## 2.1.3 Influx control

Since the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 was passed, well over four million people must have been arrested in terms of the Act. (Over 130 000 people were arrested in 1979. Multiplying this by 37 years gives 4 810 000, and this would be a conservative total because in 1969/70, for example, 643 860 people were sent to trial under the pass laws (SAIRR Survey 1972, p 161).) Figures are normally given only for metropolitan areas and not the smaller prescribed areas.

Figures for the last few years for the arrests in main centres of the Transvaal are given below. People may have been arrested more than once, so the totals are for arrests and not numbers arrested.

Table 5 ARRESTS FOR OFFENCES RELATED TO REFERENCE BOOKS AND INFLUX CONTROL, AFRICANS, 1978 - June 1981

	1978		1979		1980		Jan/June 1981	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<u>PRETORIA</u> SAP	43 291	3 005	35 269	4 901	13 273	848	4 951	335
Administration Board	-	-	3 391	1 313	174	30	27	4
<u>JOHANNESBURG</u> SAP	49 273	5 851	17 519	1 922	29 601	6 568	14 614	3 511
Administration Board	-	-	1 387	416	1 016	457	940	413
<u>SOWETO</u> SAP	679	78	397	11	142	37	21	-
Administration Board	-	-	23	30	23	1	-	-
<u>WEST RAND</u> SAP	14 261	4 535	4 902	1 398	2 935	957	1 027	399
Administration Board	-	-	3 870	2 942	5 660	3 178	3 741	2 402
<u>EAST RAND</u> SAP	20 500	5 865	6 753	2 104	4 648	1 164	2 680	362
Administration Board	-	-	12 309	4 458	6 196	3 065	7 052	2 218
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>128 004</b>	<b>19 334</b>	<b>85 820</b>	<b>19 495</b>	<b>63 668</b>	<b>16 305</b>	<b>35 053</b>	<b>9 644</b>

from SAIRR Survey 1980, p 302, and 1981, pp 234-5

While in some cases people would actually have been relocated out of the urban area, in many they are merely 'endorsed out' - that is, their passes are endorsed, but physically many try remaining in the urban area. For most people the risk is high, fines are high, and fewer employers are now prepared to risk high fines from their side. In order to survive, however, people have to risk staying illegally in urban areas. Dr Jan Lane of Unisa calculated that someone from Bophuthatswana spending three months of the year in prison and nine months

working illegally in Pretoria is 28,5% better off than staying at home. A person from Lebowa spending six months in prison and six months working illegally in Johannesburg would be 170% better materially than staying at home (*South Africa - a land divided*, p 10). With the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, the situation is likely to worsen considerably.

## 2.1.4 Urban relocation

A major category of relocation in the 1970s has been that of urban relocation as townships throughout the rural areas have been deproclaimed, the residents moved to their respective bantustans, and those lucky enough to still have jobs in the old town are now being ferried back on a daily or weekly basis as commuters. Thousands of people have been removed as a result of the deproclamation and abolition of townships.

People are usually told that 'this area is white' or 'the area has become a slum and must be cleared'. While most Transvaal townships attached to towns such as Pietersburg, Naboomspruit, Lichtenburg and Tzaneen have been deproclaimed and most of the inhabitants moved, not all the people have been moved. In most cases hostel accommodation for workers is provided, particularly if the nearest bantustan is further than about 50 km away, and families of workers are moved to the bantustans. Some people commute up to 100 km each day in each direction, as accommodation in township hostels is so scarce and many wish to live with their families despite high transport costs. In many places which have been deproclaimed there are still a number of families resident. They live in badly neglected housing, waiting for the removal trucks, sometimes for years. While it may well have been an economically and ideologically sound decision for the State to move the bulk of the population, cutting the social infrastructural costs and keeping the towns white, even in those terms it is not 100% desirable to have all families removed, particularly in the case of domestic labour. (An article in the *RDM* of 24.11.80 indicates clearly that the white residents of Vaalwater in the Northern Transvaal were most disturbed when all their labour was removed - it made life most inconvenient.)

Table 6 ABOLITION AND REDEFINITION OF AFRICAN RESIDENTIAL AREAS, TRANSVAAL

Gazette	Date	Abolition	Curtilment	Redefinition
1330	7.01.66	Tzaneen (established 29.11.57)		
2621	13.02.70	Meyerton		
2823	18.09.70	Groblersdal		
2810	11.10.70	Roodepoort		
3248	10.09.71	Naboomspruit (established 24.08.28)		
3299	29.10.71	Zeerust		
3309	19.11.71	Nylstroom (established 9.12.49)		
3466	14.04.72		Tokoza, Alberton	
3537	2.06.72	Bloemhof		
4052	19.10.73	Johannesburg		
4537	13.12.74			Fochville
4732	6.06.75	Thabazimbi		
5002	12.03.76	Marabestad, Pretoria		

ABOLITION AND REDEFINITION OF AFRICAN RESIDENTIAL AREA, TRANSVAAL contd

Gazette	Date	Abolition	Curtilment	Redefinition
5275	3.09.76	Groot Marico		
5323	29.10.76	Breyten		
5323	29.10.76	Kinross & Trichardt		
5367	31.12.76			Kagiso, Krugersdorp
5367	31.12.76			Valspan, Jan Kempdorp
5466	25.03.77	Ottosdal		
5837	23.12.77			Wesselton, Ermelo
6043	9.06.78	Graskop		
6205	10.11.78		Munseyville black village, Krugersdorp	
6235	8.12.78	Charl Cilliers		
6235	8.12.78	Ellisras emergency camp		
6235	8.12.78		Westonaria	
6459	25.05.79	Evander		
6466	1.06.79	Charlestown		
6764	7.12.79	Germiston		
6848	15.02.80	Randfontein		
6940	11.04.80	Nelspruit		
	1981	Springs (cf parliamentary question 733 of 1982)		

In reply to parliamentary question 733 of 1982, Dr Koornhof said that no towns had been deproclaimed in South Africa in 1977, 1978 or 1980. In the Transvaal two new townships outside the bantustans were proclaimed between 1977 and 1980: Leandra and Secunda. There were no new townships proclaimed in the Transvaal (or in the rest of South Africa) in 1981.

Another form of urban relocation, omitted from SPP research in the Transvaal, is that of squatter removal. Over the years, through group area removals and slum control as well as squatter control, many thousands of people have been relocated out of urban areas. Davenport & Hunt quote from evidence to the Fagan Commission where, in talking of Johannesburg, James Sofasonke Mpanza describes conditions and reasons for squatting (1974, pp 79-81). The 'natives' preferred living in Sophiatown, Martindale and Newclare to the control of the new municipal townships.

Organisation around housing issues is increasing. For example, 50 women marched to White City Jabavu administration board offices protesting against an instruction from the West Rand Administration Board to demolish squatter shacks in the yards of their houses. The 800 housing units promised to them, their families and tenants in Chiawelo Extension were not ready for occupation, yet people were to be left homeless (*RDM*, 11.05.82). 23 000 were left homeless as shacks were demolished (*Star*, 14.05.82). 300 shacks were demolished in the backyards of Duduza by the East Rand Administration Board, for the same reasons (*Star*, 24.02.82).

Issues round the 99-year-leasehold regulations were also sources of friction particularly in

the Transvaal where the scheme is being promoted. The Evaton Ratepayers Association protested that they wanted their area replanned under freehold title, not 99-year leasehold (Star, 11.05.82). At least part of Evaton has been expropriated and the people are to be moved to Bophuthatswana (Sowetan, 24.08.82).

When areas are replanned the authorities have an excellent opportunity to weed out illegal people. Only those legally in the urban areas with work would be eligible for the new housing and there is frequently a long time between new housing being provided and the old housing being condemned, if not demolished. Shack dwellers not qualifying to be in Benoni, for example, would have to move when the Holfontein site and service scheme takes off (Star, 10.03.82).

Over the years the old and disabled have been relocated from the urban areas where they are no longer economically useful. For example, Katlehong pensioners were moved from the 'transit camp' near Germiston to Ncala and Maphanga (Star, 18.03.82).

## 2.1.5 Betterment schemes

It is estimated that more than 400 000 people were relocated as a result of the abolition of labour tenancy throughout the country between 1971 and 1974. How many were moved in the Transvaal is not known, but at least half of them must have been in the Transvaal. Many of these people, desperate for land, moved into betterment schemes where there may have been some chance of gaining access to land rather than moving to closer settlements where they would only have a residential plot. Thus in recent years betterment schemes have become overcrowded and less viable with fewer people having access to any resources.

For an account of betterment planning, see Joanne Yawitch's recent publication with special reference to Lebowa. She analyses the policy, its historical development, resistance to it; and assesses its current value. Betterment planning disrupted and controlled the lives of millions of people in the reserves and those who have been moved in in the last 25 years. Many people have been moved many times - into the reserves, then into betterment schemes, then ethnically sorted, for example.

## 2.1.6 Relocation for strategic or infrastructural schemes

This category of removal is not important in terms of numbers moved in the Transvaal. People living on the borders of the country are particularly vulnerable, if not to relocation then to constant surveillance and control over their everyday lives. It has been shown that this is a major reason for the State's attempt to hand Kangwane to Swaziland - to create a buffer between Mozambique and South Africa.

It is not clear how many people have been moved from the north of Venda to create a South African controlled and owned buffer zone south of the Limpopo on the Zimbabwe border. 24 000 ha was excised from Venda and 50 000 ha given to Venda on its north-west border (Cape Times, 8.07.82).

Within bantustans there is some relocation of people for local planning and infrastructural development. An example of this is the removal of 100 families from Welgeval to Sandfontein in 1980 as the Bophuthatswana authorities wanted to create a game reserve for Sun City.

It was also reported that people were moved for the building of Loskop dam between Middelburg and Dennilton.

## 2.1.7 Relocation as resistance

This category refers to people who have been forced by circumstances to relocate themselves. It is impossible to estimate how many people find themselves in this position. There are those who are forced to find their ways to urban areas to set up illegal informal businesses, those who flee bantustan repression such as in Bophuthatswana, and those who seek agricultural land or any other means of survival. People in the bantustans speak of 'trekking' from one farm to another, not understanding that the law has been changed and that few white farmers would be prepared to take blacks in. Others 'trek' from rural areas within the bantustans trying to find a chief who will give them access to a field. As conditions become more insecure in urban areas, thousands of people build in the bantustans to ensure some place in the future.

The biggest example of this category of relocation in the Transvaal is the Winterveld complex where people settled in order to be close to urban areas and hence jobs and survival. Being non-Tswana citizens, they have had no end of harassment and many have 'chosen' to move to KwaNdebele, further from job opportunities, with no access to land, but at least a place to live in peace (for the foreseeable future). Winterveld will be examined in more detail in Part 3.

## 2.1.8 Consolidation

Until the Van der Walt Commission on consolidation reports, it is difficult to present a coherent picture of proposals. The 1973 proposals are well summarised in SAIRR Survey 1973 (from p 151) and the 1975 proposals are mentioned on p 120 of the SAIRR Survey 1975.

According to the 1975 proposals the 19 pieces of Bophuthatswana will be reduced to six, 12 pieces of Lebowa reduced to six, Venda would shrink from three to two parts, Gazankulu from five to four, Kangwane from three to one, and KwaNdebele from three to one. In the process 50 000 people in the Transvaal would have to be removed (officially). At that stage no white towns in the Transvaal were to be handed over to a bantustan, although later Mafeking was given to Bophuthatswana. 98 000 ha of african land in the Transvaal was to be excised and 22 800 ha kept in reserve for small adjustments and border changes. The table below attempts to summarise the often conflicting information available on the quota of land due to africans in the Transvaal.

Table 7 TRANSVAAL QUOTA POSITION (hectares)

Quota set in 1936	Fulfilled by		Purchased in		To be acquired
4 306 600	1974	3 649 600			657 000
	1977	4 034 475	1977	53 758	316 257
	1978	2 515 345	1978	35 248	274 235
	1979	2 561 840	1979	46 495	207 918
	1981	2 839 437	1981	161 091	-

It seems that when Bophuthatswana took independence its part of the quota was removed from the amount bought to 1977, but when Venda took independence no noticeable drop in the amount of land listed is shown. (Sources: SAIRR Survey 1978, p 271, 1979, p 306; 1980, p 393, parliamentary question 633 of 21 May 1982 in HAD, 15)

While 'leaks' from the Van der Walt Commission have appeared in the press over the past few years and policy statements have seemed confused at times, particularly in the more right-wing constituencies which have broken away from the Nationalists and joined the Conservatives, Mr A J Raubenheimer then Deputy Minister of Bantu Development in an interview with the RDM (7.11.75) made the last clear statement of policy:

You can't leave black squatters where they are. You have to move them in any case.... You will have to resettle them even if you have to move them 10 km instead of 100 km, you have to resettle them.

He was replying to the bantustan leaders' plea to redraw boundaries around black spots. On the question of 'squatters' he said:

Real landowners seem to be only 5% of the people we've moved. The others are squatters (i.e. not tenants).

He reacted to proposals that whites be allowed to stay and that the land simply be incorporated into the bantustans, saying:

Their (the blacks) need for land will still exist. It brings you nowhere. You'll have a clash of interest in no time.

He said the government was not redividing the land, but fulfilling the 1936 promise:

You can't say there is an unfair division of land because land was divided by history.... We've pegged it down and that's final.

Mr Raubenheimer estimated that a million people still had to be moved under his department's consolidation scheme.

The Minister of Co-operation and Development said in reply to a parliamentary question (109 of 25 February 1982) that R592 million had been paid out to property owners by the SADT since 1936 (to 31 January 1982).

The Borders of Particular States Extension Act of 1980 schedules land transferred from the SADT to Bophuthatswana and Venda. The lists refer to farms adjoining the bantustans which have been incorporated - mainly the farms on the north-western border and around the 'finger' of Venda, and all round Bophuthatswana. During 1979 there was a 'leak' from the Van der Walt report that it was proposed to excise the Taung and Thaba 'Nchu areas, 600 000 ha, for an extra 900 000 ha to consolidate the Western Transvaal to Northern Cape area around Mafikeng (not mentioning Tlhaping-Tlharo/Ganyesa). R240 million would be spent buying the land and R70 million on moving 100 000 people, and a further R66 million on finalising the 1975 consolidation proposals (Sunday Times, 23.09.79). No further comment was made on this rumour.

In summary, the 1975 proposals for VENDA were that three pieces be reduced to two by the excision of the Sinthumule/Kutama area west of Louis Trichardt and the clearance of a buffer zone (24 000 ha) to the Zimbabwe border. The 'finger' of Gazankulu sticking into Venda would be bought to hand to Venda to join the area to the main part of Venda, making one block as envisaged in the 1980 Act mentioned above. However, a 'leak' in 1982 indicated that Sinthumule/Kutama (20 000 ha) would remain part of Venda and would not be excised, making two parts again.

GAZANKULU was said to be consolidated from five areas to four in the 1975 proposals, but two of the areas are situated side by side (Giyani and Malamulele) and Ritavi 1 just touches the eastern border of Giyani, so that the three are contiguous. Ritavi 2 is separate, as is Mhala, but it does not seem that they are to be excised. It is thus not clear what is meant by reducing five areas to four. From Afrika Instituut and Benbo maps it does not seem as though Gazankulu is to lose land.

LEBOWA was to be consolidated from 12 to six pieces, losing two large reserves and a number

of black spots in the process. However it seems as though Sekgosese (Matoks and Batlokwa area) and Mokerong in the far west are to be reprieved. The future of Sekgops area is uncertain, having been included in the excised pieces in 1975. The Moutse area in the south has been taken away from Lebowa and given to KwaNdebele. The Leroro district near Acornhoek was to be excised, as was a part of Naphuno on the southern tip of Gazankulu (Giyani district) near the Kruger National Park. This would leave six pieces but it is not clear if any of the three small pieces (Sekgops, Naphuno and Leroro) could be reprieved at this stage. With KwaNdebele taking independence, Moutse will be cleansed of Sothos. Boundaries on the six remaining pieces will be rounded off, Lebowa losing and gaining land all round.

KWANDEBELE Since the 1975 proposals KwaNdebele has been created with land from Lebowa and Bophuthatswana plus white farms bought by the SADT. No land has been excised from KwaNdebele.

KANGWANE It was proposed that the three areas be cut down to one with the most developed region, Nsikazi, being excised. Part of the Swazi bantustan (Ndumana, also called Ntsiligwane) south of Piet Retief was also removed, to be given to KwaZulu (see SPP Volume 4). With the recent proposals to hand Kangwane to Swaziland no mention has been made of the southern part near Piet Retief, but the Nsikazi region has been included in the deal despite the fact that it shares no borders with Swaziland and is 20 km from the nearest point in Kangwane contiguous with Swaziland. It is rumoured that Ndumana (Ntsiligwane) may be given to Swaziland too.

BOPHUTHATSWANA It was proposed to reduce 19 sections to six pieces of land stretching from close to Pretoria in the north to Kuruman in the west to Thaba 'Nchu in the south. The six areas would be Thaba 'Nchu; Taung; Tlhaping-Tlharo/Ganyesa (with quite dramatic border changes); one contiguous piece including Molopo 1 and 2, Ditsobotla 1, 2 and 3, Lehurutshe 1 with white farms being incorporated around Ramatlabama and Mafikeng; Lehurutshe 2, Madikwe, Mankwe, Odi 2, Bafokeng forming the fifth; and the sixth being Odi 1 and Moretele 1. Moretele 2 was to be excised and most of it handed to KwaNdebele. To date the Ganyesa district has had many Trust farms added, the Ramatlabama area is crammed with relocated people, and the Trust farms are still administered by Co-operation and Development. Some of the black spots in the Western Transvaal have not yet been moved, and Moretele 2 is still administered by Bophuthatswana. At the time of writing it seems that Bophuthatswana comprises 12 areas.

According to the 1975 consolidation proposals, one million people will have to be moved (Black development in South Africa, Benbo 1976, p 23). What the Van der Walt Commission recommends and what the cabinet accepts is uncertain. There has been significant protest from farmers to the right of the Nationalist Party, which may mean that the cabinet will not accept any radical redrawing of boundaries. There has been some talk of co-operation and development of communities and peoples, not necessarily involving contiguous land areas. (After all, Greece operates as one state!)

## 2.1.9 Other

Under this broad heading Maré (1980) includes banishment - the relocation of political activists to remote rural areas. This was a popular form of punishment by the State in the 1950s and 1960s, but few people have been banished in the 1970s or 1980s and so this project has not researched it. For the purposes of this report, two further categories will be included: Deportation and Group area removals.

## DEPORTATION

Deportation is a relatively small new form of relocation on a mass basis. Until recently individuals were deported from South Africa if they were perceived as undesirable in broadly either political or criminal terms. The logical next step in the 'separate development' policy is that of making those who have been created foreigners by their bantustans taking 'independence' liable to deportation should they not 'behave' in South Africa. This is particularly easy now that the State and capital have a well controlled desperate potential labour force in any of the other areas to call on when cheap labour is required.

In mid-1980 the Johannesburg municipal workers went on strike. Instead of negotiating with them, the municipality had them deported in spite of the fact that some had legal rights to be in Johannesburg (see Johannesburg Advice Office report, February 1981 - January 1982). More than 1 000 workers at the Kloof Gold Mine near Westonaria were sent home on 7 July 1982 after unrest erupted following wage disputes. Scores boarded trains for home under heavy police guard. There were even police accompanying workers in two special coaches of the train (Cape Times, 8.07.82).

In the Western Cape deportation was used to relocate thousands of squatters from the Nyanga area in the second half of 1981. This strategy could be used all over South Africa if the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill becomes law, as it provides for the relocation of any black people anywhere at any time to a place that the Minister deems their home or place of origin.

A number of foreign-born blacks have been deported recently after having lived and worked in South Africa for 50 years or more. In Northern Natal people who have raised South African families have been summarily deported to Mozambique. In the Transvaal the same has happened to hundreds of Zimbabwean-born blacks. Repatriations have increased as tensions have grown between newly independent Zimbabwe and South Africa. In 1980 Zimbabwe halted the recruitment of migrant labour for South African mines, and the Department of Co-operation and Development countered that by introducing a regulation that a Zimbabwean must have either worked for one employer for 23 years or a number of employers for 28 years to be able to stay on contract in South Africa (Sunday Tribune, 6.12.81 and Johannesburg Advice Office report, February 1981 - January 1982). This contrasts with white Zimbabweans who enter South Africa in their hundreds sure of jobs, housing, free education for their children, and a continuation of the 'good life down south'.

## GROUP AREA REMOVALS

These have not been studied in depth as part of this project, which concentrated on rural areas and africans.

To 31 December 1981, 668 white families, 11 305 coloured families and 11 427 indian families (about 140 400 people) had been moved in the Transvaal since the commencement of the Group Areas Act in 1966. In terms of the Act, from commencement until 31 December 1981, 32 white, 81 coloured and 1 521 indian traders were relocated in the Transvaal, and 175 are due to be removed. (The position of 91 of the 175 traders is being reviewed.) (Parliamentary question 492 of 21.05.82) Each year the SAIRR Survey quotes the number of people moved in each province to date as well as a summary of Group areas removals (SAIRR Survey 1972, p 75; 1973, pp 117-20; 1974, pp 159-61; 1975, p 75; 1976, pp 160 and 167-71; 1977, pp 439-45; 1978, pp 384 and 386-90; 1979, pp 464 and 468-74; 1980, pp 349 and 353-7; 1981, pp 222-6). For a historical account of group areas in Johannesburg, see Davenport & Hunt (1974, pp 86-7).

Table 8 GROUP AREA PROCLAMATIONS AFFECTING SOME TRANSVAAL TOWNS

Gazette	Date	Area
-	February 1966	Schweizer-Reneke
-	February 1966	Venterstad
1330	7.01.66	Lichtenburg (Proclamation 3)
1650	10.02.67	Marble Hall
1650	10.02.67	Tzaneen
1650	10.02.67	Johannesburg and Benoni
-	March 1967	Klerksdorp
-	March 1967	Amsterdam, Ermelo
-	April 1967	Vaalwater
-	April 1967	Ellisras
-	April 1967	Thabazimbi
1785	7.07.67	Pretoria (Proclamation 156)
1830	August 1967	Witbank (Proclamation 189)
-	October 1967	Nelspruit
-	October 1967	White River
-	December 1967	Lydenburg
-	December 1967	Pilgrims Rest
-	December 1967	Piet Retief
-	March 1968	Johannesburg
2026	29.03.68	Lichtenburg
2026	29.03.68	Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark
-	April 1968	Middelburg, Transvaal
-	July 1968	Boksburg
-	July 1968	Messina
-	April 1969	Lydenburg
-	April 1969	Rustenburg
-	April 1969	Potgietersrus
2430	13.06.69	New Pietersburg (Proclamation 152)
2430	13.06.69	Eendrag, Nigel (Proclamation 154)
2559	14.11.69	Soekmekaar
-	January 1970	Ogies

A total of 351 indian traders were moved from Transvaal towns including Potchefstroom, Klerksdorp, Louis Trichardt, Bethal, Pietersburg, Vereeniging, Lichtenburg, Schweizer-Reneke, Piet Retief, Potgietersrus and Zeerust at a cost of R21 585 000 between 31.03.80 and

31.01.81 alone (SAIRR Survey 1980, p 351). In 1980 many shops were being vacated throughout the Transvaal. In some cases the local municipality, such as the one in Louis Trichardt, supported the policy of the move at the time and later found that as the indian shopkeepers were moved east of the Great North Road they became the first port of call for people now relocated to Venda, so that the centre of Louis Trichardt was dying. Pietersburg also has a number of empty shops but it was reported in 1981 that indians had sublet their shops illegally to whites who would manage the businesses for them. Furthermore, white shopkeepers were looking for indians to run their shops in the newly declared indian area (Sunday Times, 8.11.81). The R5 million new indian shopping complex on the edge of Pietersburg will house all the indian shops and for the first time in 90 years there will be no indian businesses in the centre of Pietersburg. Shopkeepers had been given until the end of June 1982 to move or have their licences revoked (Sunday Times, 13.06.82).

In Potgietersrus, however, it was reported that the town council had supported a plea from the local Indian Traders' Association and would make representations to the Minister of Community Development to redevelop the area now declared a slum into a free trading zone, and not to build a new shopping complex for indians (Argus, 8.12.80).

Over the last two years organised resistance to group area removals has increased and an organisation ACTSTOP was established to fight removals, and support people in areas under threat both morally and legally, particularly those coloured and indian families living in white areas of Johannesburg. A number of cases were taken to court and while they were being heard and appeals launched, families were allowed to remain. When cases were lost on appeal, however, evictions stepped up. Little has been reported of ACTSTOP activity in recent months. It would be interesting to analyse the extent of dependence on legal strategies of resistance and organisation among the families themselves.

Pageview was a major indian area close to the centre of Johannesburg where 11 000 families lived. It was declared a white area in 1956 and the first removals began in 1962. People were moved to Lenasia which is far from Johannesburg: it meant high transport costs, rents were higher (and in Section 11 walls of new houses were reported to be cracking), and there were no proper roads. With a waiting list of 500 indian families from Johannesburg, Lenasia and Fordsburg (the other main indian area) are very overcrowded. R18 million was spent on moving families from Pageview to Lenasia. Now Pageview is being rebuilt for whites. 450 families were left in Pageview in March 1981, almost all were moved by March 1982.

Group area removals continue. Indian traders were still being moved from Vereeniging in 1981, and in 1982 when the Johannesburg stock exchange wanted to expand they evicted 15 indian families. Under protest these families were given six months to find new residences, an almost impossible task in the PWV area today.

A residents' organisation was formed to resist removals from Protea on the southern tip of Soweto. 5 000 coloured people have lived in Protea for 30 years. Now it is planned to house 12 000 to 15 000 black families in a redeveloped Protea (RDM, 14.02.81 and 7.04.81).

Detailed analytical work on group areas in the Transvaal needs to be undertaken to assess the economic, political and spatial geographical effects on the urban areas and people.

## 2.2 SUMMARY OF RELOCATION AREAS

### 2.2.1 Northern Transvaal

#### VENDA

Area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>SIBASA</u>					
Sibasa	Thohoyandou	1960s	-	Surroundings	Betterment
		1968*	3 000 - 4 000	Mavambe	Ethnic (now Gazankulu)
		1970s	-	Ramaru people, Elim	Ethnic (now Gazankulu)
North of road near Shayandima		1979/80	Few thousand	South of road near Shayandima	Dispute
Sibasa district		1977	-	Buffer zone incl. Strategic Mabiligwa, Madimbo and Matshabatini	
<u>DZANANI</u>					
Kutama	Louis Trichardt	-	-	Bandelierkop white farms	Farm (Mpophu people)
Kutama & Sinthumule	Louis Trichardt	1960s-70s	Few thousand	Farms	Ex-labour tenant farm
Mara (Kutama)	Louis Trichardt	1970s	-	Kranspoort NGK mission farm	Black spot - squatters
Saamkorst (Sinthumule)	Louis Trichardt	Early 1960s	2 000	Gertrudsburg Lutheran mission /Ledig farm	Black spot
<u>VUWANI 1</u>					
Tshifulanani	Louis Trichardt	1971-3	3 000	Bophuthatswana & Gazankulu	Ethnic
Lwamondo	Louis Trichardt	1960s-70s	-	White farms	Ex-labour tenant farms
Tshakuma	Louis Trichardt	1960s-70s	-	White farms	Ex-labour tenant farms
<u>VUWANI 2</u>					
Molema	Elim Hospital	-	-	Kutama	Dispute

\* Dates below the main entry here and elsewhere refer to later developments.



Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
Ntlhavene area (excised from Kruger Park)	Punda Milia	1971	2 500	Sinthumule	Ethnic
		1971	27 500	From surroundings (now Venda)	Ethnic
Mphambo	Giyani	from 1968	16 000	Driefontein, Mtiti, Black spot Kurulen, Borchers, (now Vuwani) Schiel	
Mavambe (Mawambe)	Punda Milia	1968	1 500	7 villages surround- ing, people moved from what is now Venda	Ethnic
<u>GIYANI</u>					
Shirley/Elim on farms Styldrift & Waterval (& Malamulele)	Elim Hospital	-	1 000	Tshikota (Louis Trichardt), Valdesia and Kurulen	Urban Black spot Black spot
Helderwater	'Finger'	late 1960s	3 200	Buffelshoek, Groen- kloof, Grootplaats, Riverplaats, Kurulen	Ethnic (now Vuwani 2, Venda)
Rotterdam & Amsterdam	Mooiketsi	late 1960s	2 500	Kurulen, Avondale, Riverplaats, Groenvallei	Ethnic (now Vuwani 2, Venda)
Magoro (Groot- fontein) and Olifantshoek	Mooiketsi	late 1960s	4 000	Bushy Park, Noble- hof, Riversdale, Bellevue	Ethnic (now Vuwani 2, Venda)
Mashao	Elim Hospital	late 1960s	-	Part of Driefontein farm	? recently given to Venda
Malmesbury (Mtchetweni)	'Finger'	1968	3 500	Vaalkop, Kruisfontein	Ethnic (now Vuwani 1, Venda)
Giyani	-	-	3 000	-	Capital
Mbokoto, Cha- vani, Mashele, Ngwenya/Bung- weni, Majosi, Sundabi, Mofamade, DaVhana, Nkuri, Nqhalalume	Betterment areas between Elim Hospital and Giyani	-	-	-	-

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>GIYANI</u> contd					
Lulekani (Quagga)	Phalaborwa	1980	3 000	Namakgale & white farms	Ethnic & farm
<u>RITAVI 2</u>					
Nkowakowa/ Machaba	Tzaneen	1961	7 000	Tzaneen township; Lenyenye, Lebowa; Shiluvane, Lebowa	Urban Ethnic Ethnic
<u>MHALA</u>					
Thulamahashe	Acornhoek	1960	2 500	From Trust farms Acornhoek to Bush- buckridge; from white farms	Ethnic Farm
Tekamahala	Bushbuckridge	from 1963	c 15 000	Sabie, White River, Brooklands, Hendrik- stal, Maliveld	Urban & farm
Belfast	Bushbuckridge	-	-	Surroundings; white farms	Ethnic farm
Buffelshoek	Bushbuckridge/ Kruger National Park	1966	1 200	Blyderivierspoort, Steenveld, Diepkloof	Black spot & game reserve
<u>AREAS UNCONFIRMED</u>					
Gazankulu		1960s	4 000	Skuinshoogte; Schiel & Mtiti moved to Mphambo	Ethnic (now Venda)
Gazankulu Trust villages		1962	Hundreds	Mawoweni	Ethnic (now Venda)

## UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL

Area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	To be moved to	Category
Sinthumule/ Kutama	Louis Trichardt	-	-	Shirley/Elim	Ethnic & consolidation
Tshikota	Louis Trichardt	-	1 000	Shirley/Elim	Ethnic & urban
Valdesia/ Mambedi (Klipfontein)	Louis Trichardt	1875	3 300	Shirley/Elim	Black spot
Kurulen (Ongedacht)	Louis Trichardt	1880s	1 200	Shirley/Elim	72% Tsonga, black spot on land to be given to Venda

## LEBOWA

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>BOCHUM</u>					
Cumbrae	Bochum	-	-	-	-
Indermaak	Bochum	1979	800	Sinthumule/Kutama Tshikota (Louis Trichardt)	Ethnic Ethnic & urban
Kibi	Alldays	-	-	-	-
Kromhoek	Alldays	1979	1 000	Klipplaatdrift	Strategic/ consolidation
Normandy	Bochum	-	-	-	-
Koniggratz	Bochum	-	-	-	-
<u>SESHEGO</u>					
Magodi (Mahodi, New Manthata)	Dendron	1976/7	5 000	Mphakane	Tribal dispute
Naledi (Nanedi)	Pietersburg	1962	350	Palmietfontein & other white farms	Farm
Ramongwana	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-
Seshego to Moletse	Pietersburg	1967	40 000	Roodepoort mission; Pietersburg township White City	Black spot Urban
Moletse (Moletjie's) location	NW Pietersburg	1974	300	Bethesda NGK mission farm (maybe Kalk- bank (Makgodu))	(cf <u>Star</u> , 20.08.74)
Vlakfontein	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-
Vlaklaagte	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-
Vischkuil	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-
Perskebult	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-
Kalkspruit, Waschbank, Christiana	Pietersburg	-	250	Kalkspruit	Lebowa betterment planning
<u>MOKERONG 2</u>					
Mahwelereng	Potgietersrus	-	16 000	Potgietersrus	Urban

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>MOKERONG 2</u> contd					
Steilloop	Steilloopbrug	-	1 000	Nylstroom, Naboom- spruit, Vaalwater, Ellisras & white farms	Urban Farm
Vaaltyn	Potgietersrus	-	-	-	-
Magongwa- Tshamahanse	Potgietersrus	1965/6	5 000	Ethnic sort-out of Tsonga and Ndebele, moved from two villages which were split	
<u>SEKGOSESE</u>					
Matoks location	Bandellierkop	1979	3 000	Makgato	Fled from removal squad
<u>SEKGOSESE 2</u>					
Senwamokgope	Soekmekaar	1958	1 400	Soekmekaar, Grootfontein	Urban Black spot
Goudplaats	Soekmekaar	-	-	-	-
Lemondokop	Soekmekaar	-	-	-	-
Middelwater	Soekmekaar	-	-	-	-
Mosterdhoek	Soekmekaar	-	-	-	-
Mamaila	Soekmekaar	-	-	-	-
<u>THABAMOPO</u>					
Mankweng (GaMankoeng)	Pietersburg	-	5 000	Pietersburg	Urban
Makotopong (Nooigedacht)	Pietersburg	1967	2 000	Rodewal mission farm	Black spot
Sebayeng (Solomondale)	Pietersburg	1962	1 000	Palmietfontein	Farm
		1962	-	Dumasa	-
		1967	8 000	Rodewal Lutheran mission; Pieters- burg townships	Black spot & urban
Mothiba	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-
Mamabolo	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-
Molepo	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>THABAMOPOPO</u> contd					
Maja	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-
Chuene	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-
Lebowakgomo	Pietersburg	-	4 000	-	-
Mphahlele	Pietersburg	1981	150	Malebane	-
Mathabatha	Pietersburg	-	-	-	-
<u>BOLOBEDU</u>					
Bellevue	Duiwelskloof	-	-	-	-
Charlie Rangaan	Duiwelskloof	-	-	-	-
Modjadji	Duiwelskloof	-	-	-	-
Senobela	Duiwelskloof	-	-	-	-
Ga Kgapane	Duiwelskloof	1972	11 000	Duiwelskloof	Urban
<u>NAPHUNO</u>					
Naphuno (Siloane)	Phalaborwa	1981	8 200	Bonn, Sedan, Perry farms (Shiluvane Hospital)	Ethnic
Namakgale	Phalaborwa	1960s	24 000	Phalaborwa	Urban
Mashishimale	Phalaborwa	-	-	-	-
Maseke	Phalaborwa	-	-	-	-
<u>NAPHUNO 1</u>					
Lenyenye	Tzaneen	1962	8 000	Tzaneen	Urban & ethnic
New Phepeni	Tzaneen	1981	6 000	Phepeni (Mohlaba's) location	Urban & ethnic
<u>NAPHUNO 2</u>					
Moetladimo (Metz farm)	Tzaneen	1957 early 1970s	2 500 500	Tzaneen area Kratzenstein mission Mamathlola location	Black spot Black spot Black spot
Hlohlokwe (Bismarck)	Tzaneen	1962	-	-	-
Lorraine	Tzaneen	1962	2 000	Mamathlola location	Black spot

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>NAPHUNO 2</u> contd					
Marathong	Tzaneen	-	-	-	-
<u>SEKHUKHUNE</u>					
Penge	Burgersfort	-	3 000	-	-
Driekop	Burgersfort	-	-	-	-
Derdegelid	Burgersfort	-	-	-	-
Naboomkoppies (Ga-Motodi)	Burgersfort	{ 1964 1969	700 7 140	Lydenburg Lutheran mission (Boomplaats?) Sabie, Ohrigstad & Lydenburg farms	Black spot Farm
Alverton	Burgersfort	1965	4 831	Naboomkoppies	Tribal dispute
Tubatshe (Praktiseer)	Burgersfort	1974	2 500	Doornkop	Black spot
Bothashoek	Burgersfort	{ 1970 1974	- 3 000	Burgersfort Doornkop	Farms & urban Black spot
(Bothashoek 1982 population estimated at 16 000)					
				White farms	Farm
Eerstegeluk	Steelpoort	-	-	-	-
Boschkloof	Steelpoort	1977	1 500	Roosenekal, Lydenburg	Urban
Boschkloof	Steelpoort	-	-	Brakfontein (Mogase), Hlakudi (Groblersdal)	Black spot
Aapjesboom (Apiesboom)	Steelpoort	-	-	-	-
Duizend Annexe	Steelpoort	-	-	-	-
Mecklenburg	Burgersfort	-	-	-	-
Pasha (Paschas) Kraal	Burgersfort	{ - - -	- - -	Paradys (Mohlaetse) (Sekhukhune) Ex-labour tenants; people from tin mine location (Winterveld)	Accepted betterment

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>NEBO</u>					
Monsterlus (Hlogotlou)	Groblersdal	1974	6 000	Doornkop	Black spot
			(1982 estimated population 15 000)		
Gemsbokspruit	Groblersdal	-	-	-	-
Uitkyk	Groblersdal	-	-	-	-
Vergelegen	Groblersdal	-	-	-	-
Tafelkop	Groblersdal	1962	25 000	Maleoskop (5 000) etc	Black spot
Motetema	Groblersdal	1970	{ 4 000 800	Groblersdal; Botshabelo Lutheran mission (Middelburg)	Urban Black spot
Leeufontein (Moganyaka)	Marble Hall	1968	{ 500 4 000	Marble Hall	Urban
Brakfontein	Marble Hall	-	-	-	-
Mareolaneng	Marble Hall	-	-	-	-
Lukau area	Leeufontein	-	-	Labour tenants off Lydenburg, Groblersdal & Stoffelberg farms	Farm
<u>MOKERONG 3</u>					
Regae (Van der Merweskraal)	Marble Hall	-	300	-	-
Rietvallei	Marble Hall	-	-	-	-
Slypsteen	Potgietersrus	-	-	-	-
Zebediela	Potgietersrus	-	-	Kwarrielaagte; Elandsdoorn; Waterkloof; Kuilsriver	Excised for white farms
<u>LERORO</u>					
Dientje	Bourkes Luck	1960-8	600	Frankfort farm; Thanda Creek (Rotunda Creek) & Uitspan (crown land)	Black spot
Elandsfontein	Bourkes Luck	1968	-	Frankfort & farms	Farms

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>MAPULANENG</u>					
Acornhoek		-	-	-	-
Arthur's Seat (Motlamogatsane)	Acornhoek	1962	1 700	Ex-labour tenants from Sabie farms	Farm
Casteel	Acornhoek	-	-	-	-
Dingleydale	Acornhoek	-	-	-	-
Violet Bank	Acornhoek	-	-	-	-
London (Shatale)	Bushbuckridge	1966	7 000	Graskop	Urban
Thulamahashi	Bushbuckridge	-	-	-	-
Bushbuckridge/Maviljan		-	-	White farms but the Pedis will have to move again	Farm
Marite	Bushbuckridge	-	-		
Alexandria	Bushbuckridge	-	-		
Madras	Bushbuckridge	-	-		
Calcutta	Bushbuckridge	-	-		
Cunning Moor	Bushbuckridge	-	-		
<u>OTHER RELOCATION AREAS</u> (unsure which districts of Lebowa)					
Klipplaatdrift (Klipplaatdrift)	Dennilton	1962	200	White farms; and pensioners from Springs, Witbank, Johannesburg	Farm; Urban
Sephukubuyis	-	1958	5 000	White farms	Farm
Barothena	-	1958-67	5 000	White farms which SABS bought, people refused to be regrouped for betterment at first	Betterment & consolidation
Dalmin	10 km from Manthata or ? Matlatla	1977	-	From white farms; Venda	Farm Ethnic
Elsewhere in Lebowa		1978	-	Dalmin	Betterment

Relocation area	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>OTHER RELOCATION AREAS</u> contd				
'Baas Hans' farm'	Trust farms bought for Lebowa	-	-	Trust farms on which the same people lived and worked for white farmer, and ex-tenants from freehold areas
Lebowa	1979	6 446	Louis Trichardt area	Black spot

## UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL

Area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	To be moved to	Category
<u>URBAN</u>					
New Look	Pietersburg	1951	1 000	Seshego	Urban
Tshikota	Louis Trichardt	-	500	Indermaak	Urban
<u>CONSOLIDATION</u>					
Sekgosese (Matoks & Ramagoep)	Pietersburg	c 1900	-	-	-
Sekgosese (Sekgopo)	Pietersburg	-	10 000	Loma Dawn 50 km to the east	
Leroro	Bourkes Luck	-	2 500	-	? strategic
Area north of Acornhoek, bordering Blyderivierspoort nature reserve		-	-	-	-
Farms California and part of Nooitgedacht bordering Blyderivierspoort nature reserve & Sekhukhuneland (east)		-	-	-	-
Farms Bizaine, Finale, The Elms bordering Naphuno 2 (east)		-	-	-	-
Farms around Richmond, east of Graskop		-	-	-	-
Moutse 1 and 3 districts incl. Elandsdoring	Dennilton	-	300 000	Nebo district (Sunnysloot or Emmerpan)	To become KwaNdebele, excised on 1.11.80

Area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	To be moved to	Category
<u>CONSOLIDATION</u> contd					
Mokerong district	Close to Botswana border	-	18 000	Nebo	Said to be reprieved
Palmietfontein & part of Ramongwana	Pietersburg	-	-	-	To be excised under 1975 proposals
<u>BLACK SPOTS</u>					
Kratzenstein Lutheran mission	40 km east of Pietersburg	1880	500	-	Ethnic sorting, & black spot; some moved, rest refusing
Houtbosdorp Lutheran mission farm	Next to Kratzenstein	-	1 000 +	Molepo	Black spot
Mmasealama (Mamabolo area)	-	-	1 000 +	60 km east of Pietersburg	? village part of Lebowa now (15 km SE of Mankweng)

## 2.2.2 Eastern Transvaal

## KANGWANE

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>NSIKAZI</u>					
Kabokweni	White River	1967	12 000	White River	Urban influx
Ngodini (Nkomeni)	White River	1967	20 000	E Transvaal farms	Farm
Pienaar	White River	1978	45 000	E Transvaal farms: tenants from black spots	Farm
Maporo	White River	-	-	E Transvaal farms	Farm
Kanyamazane (Lekazi)	Nelspruit	1972/3	17 000	Nelspruit (Mbombela) township	Urban (deproclaimed 1980, 16 000 still to be moved)
(1982 estimated population 50 000)					



Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>MSWATI/MLONDOZI</u> contd					
Diepdal (Thousand Hills, Izinkulungwane)	Oshoek	1976/7	20 000 +	Black spots, farms around E Transvaal as far as Secunda	Black spot, farm
KaMnisi	Glenmore	Late 1970s	Few thousand	Eastern Transvaal	Black spot, farm
Vlakplaas	Oshoek & Steynsdorp	1981	{ 300 60	Mjindini people Goedehoop	? black spot Ex-labour tenants
Oshoek area to Lochiel	-	-	-	Driefontein, Kwa- Ngema, Badplaas, Amsterdam, Ermelo, Lothair, Carolina	Black spots, thinly spread (some moved) & urban
Mayflower	Lothair	1978	1 000	Swazi elite	Freehold
Tsjakastad	Badplaas	-	Few thousand	-	-
Dundonald	Oshoek	-	40 000	Ermelo, Kromkrans; The Brook (mission); E Transvaal farms & towns	Urban Black spot Farm Influx
Zwalluwnest (Shabalala)	Oshoek	1976/7	5 000	E Transvaal farms & towns	Farm Urban
Mzinti	-	-	-	-	-
Fernie	Lothair	1976/7	40 000	E Transvaal black spots, other farms and urban areas	Black spot & farm
Redhill	-	Late 1970s	Few families	The Brook (mission)	Black spot
<u>OTHER KANGWANE AREAS</u>					
Regions other than Mswati	Late 1970s	29 000	Winterveld, Garankuwa, Lebowa	Ethnic	

## UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL

BLACK SPOTS Those marked \* have definitely not been moved yet

Amersfoort 7 black spots to be moved

Threatened area	Nearest town	Est. pop.	To be moved to
<u>BLACK SPOTS</u> contd			
Volksrust	-	-	-
Wakkerstroom (area 36 & 37)	-	-	-
Barberton (area 34: farm Tenbosch 162/234 ?)	-	-	-
Nelspruit	-	-	-
White River	-	-	10 black spots to be moved
Driefontein 388*	Wakkerstroom	30 - 50 000	Oshoek/Lochiel
Daggakraal 161*	Wakkerstroom	15 - 20 000	-
Vlakplaats 344	Wakkerstroom	-	-
KwaNgema	Next to Driefontein 388	10 - 15 000	Oshoek
? Driepan	-	-	-
The Brook mission	Lothair	82	Oshoek
<u>CONSOLIDATION</u>			
Nsikazi region	-	-	Due for removal under 1975 consolidation proposals; but these are superseded by 1982 proposals to hand Kangwane to Swaziland

## 2.2.3 Central Transvaal

## KWANDEBELE

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
Siyabuswa (Valschfontein)	Dennilton	1975	{ 2 500 10 500	- Kromkrans & Doornkop	- Black spot
Vaalbank	Dennilton	1976/7	6 000	Delmas, Bronkhorst- spruit, Middelburg, Pretoria, Winterveld, Groblersdal, Witbank	All urban & farm
Vlaklaagte 1 & 2	Dennilton	1976/7	19 000		
Vrischgewaagd	Dennilton	1976/7	1 000		
Gemsbokspruit	Dennilton	1976/7	3 000		

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
TwEEfontein	Dennilton	1976/7	1 200	Delmas, Bronkhorstspuit, Middelburg, Pretoria, Winterveld, Groblersdal, Witbank	All urban & farm
Boekenhout (Boekenhoek, Boekenfontein)	Dennilton	1976/7	6 000		
Kwaggafontein A, B, C	Dennilton	1976/7	25 000		
Leeufontein	Dennilton	1976/7	200		
Pieterskraal	Dennilton	1964	3 000	Witbank, Middelburg & Stoffelberg farms; ex-black spot people; ex-labour tenants	Farm Black spot Labour tenants
Waterval	Dennilton	From 1964	6 000	Ex-labour tenants from Middelburg & Bronkhorstspuit farms	Labour tenants
<u>MOUTSE 3</u>					
Goederede	Dennilton	1976/7	2 200	-	-
Kwarrielaagte	Dennilton	-	20 000	Moved off black spots e.g. near Die Bron, now to be ethnically sorted into Ndebele & Pedi	Black spot, ethnic to follow
Waterkloof	Dennilton				
Kuilsrivier	Dennilton				
Elandsdoorn	Dennilton				
-	-	1965	5 000	Witbank, Nelspruit, Middelburg locations and farms	Urban & farm
<u>MOUTSE 1</u>					
Vlakplaats	40 km W of Marble Hall	From 1957	2 000	Naboomspruit & Nylstroom farms	Farm
Uitvlugt	40 km W of Marble Hall	1964	500	Naboomspruit & Nylstroom farms	Farm
KwaNdebele section of Moutse 1 (other influx)		1979	1 584	Pietersburg	Black spot
		1981	1 000	Syplaats(Zaaipplaats, Saaiplaas)	Black spot
			400	Bankfontein (next to Syplaats near Groblersdal)	Black spot

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>? IN KWANDEBELE, OTHERWISE LEBOWA OR BOPHUTHATSWANA</u>					
Maduma	Warmbaths	-	-	Nylstroom and Tuinplaas farms	Farm

## BOPHUTHATSWANA

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>ODI 1</u>					
Winterveld	Pretoria	From 1961	30 000	Lady Selbourne, The Highlands	Group areas
Garankuwa (Uitvalgrond No 584)	Pretoria	-	-	Despatch, Riverside, Eersterus, Eastwood, Walmans-thal (Wallmaansthall)	Black spot
Stinkwater		1968	2 000	Eersterus	Township land bought by private co.
Klipgat (Makanyaneng)		-	-	Walmansthal, Cullinan, Boekenhoutkloof	
Boekenhoutfontein (Mabopane)	Pretoria	1960 1969	- 15 000	White farms Lady Selbourne Walmansthal mission	Farm Group areas Black spot
<u>MORETELE 1</u>					
Temba	Hammanskraal	1965/6	-	Walmansthal & surrounding farms	Black spot
Syferkuil A	Warmbaths	1965	1 200	Middelfontein, Heidelberg & Walmansthal: 3 Lutheran missions	Black spot
Syferkuil B	Warmbaths	1965	500		
Syferkuil C	Warmbaths	1967	300		
Leboneng	Hammanskraal	1969	360	Ellison, Steynberg, Onverwacht, Walmansthal	Black spot
			100		
Boekenhoutkloof	Hammanskraal	-	-	Boekenhoutfontein (near Winterveld); Stinkwater (near Hammanskraal); Nooitgedacht (Tsebe)	May have been moved:

## CENTRAL TRANSVAAL: BOPHUTHATSWANA contd

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>MORETELE 1</u> contd					
Hammanskraal	-	-	14 000+	Lebowa (1978-80)	Ethnic
<u>MANKWE</u>					
-	-	1964	-	Haakdoornbult (Farm 542, Thabazimbi)	Black spot
-	-	-	-	Schilpadnest (Farm 385, Thabazimbi)	Black spot
<u>MDUTJANE</u>					
-	-	1979	30 000	-	Ethnic (non-Tswana)
<u>DISTRICT UNCERTAIN</u>					
Mogogokela	-	1965	-	-	-
-	-	1969	6 000	Boekenhoutkloof, Walmansthal, white farms	Black spot Farm
<u>BOPHUTHATSWANA IN GENERAL</u>					
		1968-75	124 000	White farms, black spots, townships (Prof Smit, Pretoria University: RDM, 20.04.79)	Farm, urban, black spot
		-	-	Atteridgeville, Saulsville, Mamelodi: no more housing	Influx control

## UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL

Threatened area	Nearest town	Est. pop.	To be removed to	Category
<u>MORETELE 1</u>				
Majaneng	Hammanskraal	12 000	KwaNdebele	Ethnic
Stinkwater	Hammanskraal	30 000	KwaNdebele	Ethnic
<u>TOWNSHIP IN WHITE AREA</u>				
Brakpan Old Location	Brakpan	6 000	Tsakane, near KwaThema Springs	Group areas

## CENTRAL TRANSVAAL: BOPHUTHATSWANA UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL contd

Threatened area	Nearest town	Est. pop.	To be removed to	Category
<u>ODI 1</u>				
Makanyaneng (Klipgat), Winterveld, Nooitgedacht (Tsebe)	Mabopane (Boekenhoutfontein)	30 000	KwaNdebele: Dennilton, Kameeldrift (Kameelpoort), Kwaggafontein, Boekenhoutfontein	Ethnic - their second move; first move had been for Group areas

## 2.2.4 Western Transvaal

## BOPHUTHATSWANA

This section includes information on a small part of the Northern Cape (Mafikeng area) which falls geographically to the Western Transvaal but historically to the Northern Cape. See SPP Volume 3 for background.

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
Rooigrond	Mafikeng	1971	320	Machaviestad (Matlwang (near Potchefstroom))	Black spot
<u>MOLOPO</u>					
Miga (Omega)	Mafikeng	1977	1 600	Putfontein (Botsabelo)	Black spot
600 (Botsabelo)	Mafikeng	1977	4 000		
200 (Ikopeleng)	Mafikeng	1977	1 200		
Tlhabang	Mafikeng	1977	-	Makgokgwane & Ventersdorp	Black spot
Makgokgwane (Mogokgoane, Kaffirskraal)	Mafikeng	1977	4 000		
Tsetse	Mafikeng	1977	4 000		
				Tsetse (Doornkop), Putfontein, Konopo (Vogelstruisknoop) and Ventersdorp (moved 1979/80)	Black spot
Rankhudu	-	-	-	-	-
Magetla & Seweding	Mafikeng	1970s	Thousands	OFS & Transvaal farms: Labour tenants & squatters off white farms, and moving as resistance	
Lonely Park	Mafikeng	1970s	2 500		



WESTERN TRANSVAAL: BOPHUTHATSWANA contd

Relocation area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	Moved from	Category
<u>LEHURUTSHE</u>					
Masedubule	Zeerust	1974	4 800	Goedgevonden, Welgevonden, Nagel (Ventersdorp)	Labour tenants & squatters on white farms; influx control; and urban
<u>MADIKWE</u>					
Madikwe (Morsgat)	Swartruggens	1969	6 000+	Groot Marico, Koster, Swart-ruggens, Derby & slate quarries: Chachalaza, Mazista, and Duradak	Urban
Mabaalstad	Swartruggens	1975	-	Rietfontein (Mabaalstad), Wolfontein	Black spot
Rietspruit	Swartruggens	1967	1 000	Marikana (Rooikoppies) (Rustenburg), Bleskop, Derryvale	Black spot
Uitkyk	Groot Marico	1960s	3 000	Jacksondrift (Baphogole people under Chief Mogagabe)	Black spot
Ledig	Rustenburg	1966	8 000	Mudiboon (Mudubung, Monakgotlastad, Molotestad)	Black spot
Sandfontein		1980	600	Welgeval (Sun City)	Game reserve

WESTERN TRANSVAAL AREAS UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL

Threatened area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	To be moved to	Category
<u>RELEASED AREAS</u>					
Motlatla (Kwag-gaslaagte 121)	Lichtenburg	Late 1800s	3 000	Ramatlabama and/or Uitkyk	Black spot
Mogopa (Swartkop, Zwartrand 145)	Ventersdorp	1906	3 000	(Community has rejected two proposals)	Black spot

WESTERN TRANSVAAL: UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL contd

Threatened area	Nearest town	Date estd	Est. pop.	To be moved to	Category
<u>RELEASED AREAS</u> contd					
Mathopestad (Elandsfontein 90)	Boons	1911	2 000	Onderstepoort	Black spot
Mokgola (Leeufontein 61)	Zeerust	-	3 500	1969 C Desmond reported resistance to removals plan; not known how many still to be moved, or where	Black spot
Lekubung (Braklaagte 90 (adjoins Leeufontein))	Zeerust	-	4 500	Some moved, not all; not known where	Black spot
Moboloka	Brits	1940s	20 000	South Sothos to be moved to Qwaqwa: resisting	Ethnic (non-Tswana)
Sannieshof location	Sannieshof	-	1 000	Gelukspan	Ethnic (town- ship abolished)
Paardevelei	Zeerust	-	-	'Further out' from these places in Bophuthatswana	Agricor wants land for vegetable and grain farms
Maramage					
Ikageleng					
<u>BLACK SPOTS MOVED IN WESTERN TRANSVAAL</u>					
This list has been compiled from replies to parliamentary questions. The information is not always complete or correct. Where other more reliable versions have been found, they are quoted. However, no responsibility is taken for general accuracy of answers.					

## 2.3 REGIONAL DESCRIPTION

The following four sections describe relocation in the Northern, Eastern, Central and Western Transvaal from field reports and secondary sources. While it is hoped that reports are accurate, there is no guarantee that some reports were not subjective, particularly when discussing ethnic disputes with various members of the communities affected. Fieldwork was begun in December 1980 and continued until September 1982. Much has happened in that time; and because the area is so vast, many places could not be revisited to update the information. This section is as comprehensive as possible under the circumstances. Further research and fieldwork is essential throughout the Transvaal - so, in a sense, this should be taken as an introduction.

### 2.3.1 Northern Transvaal

As indicated earlier, most of the towns throughout the Transvaal have been purged of their blacks, and most of the white farms have been cleared of all but the essential black labour. They are mainly on land owned by them for decades if not centuries, living together as a community. This section attempts to isolate the various community strategies and note their success or failure.

The towns of the Northern and North-Western Transvaal have suffered not only black depopulation (as a result of policy) but white emigration to the Reef where opportunities are far greater. In fact the small white business people in the towns and villages cannot survive without black consumers. Now that groups have been moved kilometres away, the small businesses are closing and only large national chain stores survive. Throughout the rural areas the pattern of trade is changing, with modern 'shopping centres' being established in the bantustans and CED loans being given to some locals (usually bantustan MPs and families) to set up bottle stores, general dealer and furniture shops, although the latter are usually owned by white national chains. Transport has become another major moneyspinner as people have to commute long distances to work or seek work or shop in cheaper areas where a wider

variety of goods is available. With group area controls, the towns have been divided into the indian area where most of the blacks from the nearest bantustan come to shop, and the white stagnating central business district which gives the whole town a ghostly atmosphere.

Particularly in the Northern Transvaal, depopulation has meant border area farms being deserted. Although farmers are supported financially and incentives to stay in border areas are significant, hundreds of farms were reported to be empty. In the Ellisras district, where 10 000 sq km of land had been either sold or deserted, 400 farmhouses were standing empty. The South African Agricultural Union estimated that only 25% of farmland was being used in certain border areas (Argus, 27.02.80).

PIETERSBURG has been the scene of major removals over the past 20 years, starting with black spots and mission farms. People were removed from Palmietfontein in 1962, Roodepoort mission in 1967, Bethesda NGK mission farm in 1974, Rodewal Lutheran mission in 1967, some from Kratzenstein (not many, others are still under threat of removal, and having set up a committee they are trying to resist being moved). About 1 000 people on the next-door Lutheran mission farm, Houtbosdorp, are also trying to resist being moved.

Urban removals have not been completed either. New Pietersburg was a freehold area, and then declared white. The black people there were given alternative sites in Seshego. Then in 1969 the area was declared a coloured township. Meanwhile a new coloured township was begun near the indian township - Westernberg, near a new industrial area. Compensation had been inadequate. Many people could not afford the terms on which the sites were granted: plots for R60 on which one had to build one's own house. They have remained in New Pietersburg. The famous Anglican school, Khaiso High, is now run by the Lebowa authorities as a day school, after the church had refused to hand the school over and had closed it down. The area is confused, with a few coloured and black families left, all expecting to be moved shortly, some only having lived there 10 or 12 years.

New Look, the municipal location, is also under threat of removal to Seshego, many people having moved already. White City opposite New Look is a former freehold area now deserted, the people having been moved to Seshego. The people in New Look have been living there since 1951 and do not want to move but feel they have no choice in the matter. They say that if the people opposite who owned their homes were moved, they as municipal tenants have little chance of staying. Transport from Seshego is costly, and people at New Look are within walking distance of Pietersburg. At the time of the visit (December 1980) the bus boycott was on with people in Seshego refusing to pay more than 25c fare. They were walking to catch 'Harris's bus' rather than use the more expensive Lebowa transport.

Facilities in New Look included an outside tap for each house. Water cost between R1 and R4 a month. In 1980 people paid R10,77 for a four-roomed house with no electricity. Water-borne sanitation was laid on. Busfare into Pietersburg was 15c but people walked. Busfare to Seshego was 50c. A Mr Harris who used to live in New Pietersburg and now in Westernberg owned the buses. Shops included one formal and one informal general dealer, a bottle store and cafes. Prices at the general dealer were: 21c a loaf of brown bread, 10c a candle, R2,50 a bag of coal, 50c a bundle of offcut firewood, 46c a litre of paraffin, and (in Pietersburg) R14 a bag of mielie meal.

There were three churches left (some had moved already), one school with primary and secondary classes, and a municipal clinic in Pietersburg. Seshego has a high school and vocational and teacher training colleges. Secondary school fees were R22 a year, and R1 for primary school. There were 350 children in the secondary school with 18 teachers. The children had to wear uniforms.

For fuel people used paraffin, coal and wood. Some wood could still be collected.

The municipality controlled the area along with the SAP. A few people could find work through the municipal labour bureau in Pietersburg. The most common types of work were domestic, industrial, mining, radio assembly and shop work. Some people sold things part-time, for example on a door-to-door basis. Jobs were not easy to come by but one would try the labour bureau and 'ask around'. On moving, the people would lose their Section 10 rights to work in urban areas.

Most people belonged to churches and burial societies. There were no major conflicts in the society, and problems were taken to the elected blockman. People felt they had little control over their impending move. They did not own their houses and had no organisational infrastructure to begin to rally any protest. No-one had opposed the move although people did not want to leave, mainly as they would have to travel further.

The next area under threat of removal visited was the piece of Sekgosese 50 km north of Pietersburg and 50 km south of Louis Trichardt, south of Bandelierkop and near Soekmekaar. There is a detailed history of the area with a map in Part 3 below, so it will not be discussed here.

The Sekgopo area east of Munnik is under threat of removal, under the 1975 proposals, but people are building.

In the LOUIS TRICHARDT area there are a number of places under threat of removal. Many people have already been moved. A number of black spots/mission farms went in the 1960s, for example Gertrudsborg Lutheran mission to Saamkoors in the Sinthumule reserve, which in turn was then under threat of removal in terms of the 1975 consolidation proposals but seems to have been reprieved (see press reports in July 1982, notably Cape Times, 3.07.82). The main category of removals in the 1970s and 1980s in this area is that of ethnic sorting - people being divided and sent off mostly to Lebowa, Venda and Gazankulu. Families who have lived together for over 100 years in peace are beginning to quarrel, as we gathered when two teachers in the township of Louis Trichardt said that everyone lived together peacefully and that there was no need to divide people, but added that the 'stupid Pedi' let themselves be removed to Lebowa with no resistance!

The ethnic and cultural differences, where they exist at all, would be acceptable, but not the politicisation of them. Throughout Gazankulu a common refrain was: 'Before separate development we have been living together with Sotho and Vendas and we have married with them. Since separate development they have become our enemies.'

The politicised ethnic consciousness has definitely material origins. People are mobilised along ethnic lines by the drawing of boundaries, loss of schools, hospitals and clinics. The class interests of chiefs, school teachers, businessmen and the bureaucracy are closely linked to the development of separate national units. Faced with the realities of losing mother-tongue education, job opportunities and resources such as land and hospitals, people inevitably start to think and act in ethnic terms.

The only way to counter the political and social fragmentation of mass removals, and the removals themselves, is by collective action. This is not easy in rural areas among very poor and unmobilised people. It is all the harder when migrancy has perverted the old forms of community organisation, and tribal structures have been warped into the civil administration, and the church has somewhat atomised society. Disorganisation often makes for apathy and stoic resignation which then complete a vicious circle.

The Swiss Mission Church has historically been the main source of health and educational facilities throughout the Gazankulu area. Yet all three of its farms scheduled for removal (cf pp 165-70 below) have a long tradition going back to the nineteenth century. They have been under threat of removal for a long time, all three lack an effective chief and are clearly

disorganised. The church seems to have been largely responsible for creating a power vacuum by neglecting political issues. A senior member of the Swiss Mission put it in quite self-critical terms: '... the Church is interested in the Kingdom of God. It neglects earthly matters.' Where the church has opposed mass removals, it has tried gaining better terms for removal rather than rejecting removals and bantustan policy altogether. In all cases the mission farms have tended to regard themselves as elite communities, somehow removed from the common problems of pagan neighbours. As an ex-school teacher said at Elim-Shirley, which is threatened with removal: 'People say now that we have been punished for accepting God.'

At least one observer has reported a mood of powerlessness and quiet desperation in the Gazankulu areas due to be moved or where people have been relocated. Many people just shrugged when asked how they would resist removal. There is fear of whites, of informers, of GG lorries. These things have sapped the morale of some communities that have been under threat for years. Then agricultural yields fall because people expect removal, houses degenerate, and people begin to leave to avoid the 'GG'.

The township of Tshikota near Louis Trichardt houses over 10 000 people and is under threat of removal. The Sotho/Pedi people are to be moved to Indermaak (and in fact they are being moved already), the Venda to Doringspruit/Vleifontein, and the Tsonga/Shangaan to Shirley. It would seem that the Trust farms involved are Doornspruit 41 and Vleifontein 316 adjoining the Venda district of Vuwani 2. Shirley/Elim are situated on the farms Waterval and Styldrift adjoining the 'finger' of Gazankulu.

Many people have been moved from Tshikota over the years, for example in 1973 when a number of Tsongas were moved to Malamulele on the border of the Kruger National Park, and many Sothos to Indermaak. In December 1980 a number of Sothos were told to move, Vendas having been told to go in 1979 when Venda 'took independence'. This was the second move for those living in the township: they had moved before, in 1964. Then the people had lived nearer Louis Trichardt on top of the hill at Masakeng, and were moved as it was said they were too close to the whites and could be seen from Louis Trichardt. Tshikota was therefore built round the corner down in the valley, further from town. The township superintendent gave people verbal notice to leave, saying municipal trucks would take them to their respective areas. Once Vleifontein had been built, 450 Venda families would be expected to move. No new people had been allowed to settle in Tshikota in the last 20 years and no new houses were built, nor was a waiting list kept.

Tshikota people paid R9,65 for a two-roomed house and R12,00 for a four-roomed house in 1980; and R13,65 for the latter in 1982. It seemed that only lodgers paid extra for water: R2,50 per person per month and R3 for a woman and her child. About ten houses shared a tap, people having to walk about 10 metres to get water. Lodgers' permits had to be obtained from the municipality. Bucket toilets were emptied once a week, which residents considered inadequate. There were complaints that when the buckets were emptied the contents often spilt in the yards and the streets, which could cause health problems. The nearest hospital was at Elim 25 km away, and another hospital at Vivo 70 km away.

There were regular bus and taxi services into Louis Trichardt, the bus costing 10c for a single trip and the taxi 20c. A R5 commuter ticket was available. Mr Machoko, a local resident, owned the buses.

There were about ten general dealers in the township, a butcher, no bottle store (this was the first thing to be built at Vleifontein), a bar and many shebeens. Prices at a general dealer's were: 21c a loaf of brown bread, R2,49 for 500 g powdered milk, R1,06 for 1 kg sugar, R15 for 40 kg mielie meal, 50c a litre of milk, 33c a cake of soap, 60c a packet of candles, R1,34 for 1 kg washing powder, R2,50 for a bag of coal, 10c per piece of firewood, and 20c for a carton of Jawala beer.

Facilities included 12 churches, a permanent clinic, three combined primary and secondary schools, and municipal offices. There were about 2 000 children and 40 teachers in the schools; children were not compelled to wear uniforms. School fees for sub-standards were 50c a year, and R1 for the others. The clinic charged 75c per visit per patient.

For fuel most people used wood, some paraffin, gas and coal.

Once again, as in New Look, when asked whether they paid tax, people immediately mentioned General Sales Tax, a tax resented by all those interviewed throughout the country.

The labour bureau in Louis Trichardt had been closed for the past five years. The superintendent at the municipal offices could be approached if one wanted to be registered for work but there was little to be found. The most common type of work was domestic, with some sales jobs and clerical work. Since the indians had been moved from town, they also worked in industries. It was best to walk around trying to find one's own job. Once again, people had Section 10 rights to work in urban areas, and these rights would be taken away from them on moving to a bantustan.

Organisations included burial societies and sports clubs. There is also a 'club' supposedly elected in the township but no elections are held. Instead certain people are appointed, and all they do is gather the people together to tell them news from the superintendent. For example, they gathered the Vendas to tell them to move. The Vendas had been shown where they were to be moved to; some said it was a good place, others said what could they do if they were told to go? Apparently two-roomed houses were being built which people could extend, but some wondered where they would get R1 500 for two rooms while earning R45 per month. It would be expensive and far from town, increasing transport costs, so not everybody wanted to move. However, there had been no attempt to resist the removal. People wanted to improve the Tshikota housing (which the municipality had let deteriorate as the people would be moved) and ask to stay on.

Tshikota people were concerned about the indians who had been moved out of Louis Trichardt to Alta Villas, east of the Great North Road. They were also concerned about many villages to be moved from Sinthumule and Kutama to Indermaak (Sothos) and land adjoining Vuwani 2 (Vendas). About 26 000 Vendas were under threat from about 20 villages which had been created through betterment planning in the 1960s. Once again people would be moved for the second time in 20 years, this time for consolidation of the bantustans and ethnic sorting.

A 1974 census revealed that Sinthumule ('Don't provoke me') held over 2 500 families, and Kutama some 2 200 families. It is said that this is an underestimate and that there are well over 30 000 Vendas living in the area. In the 1960s those families in betterment villages had access to a couple of acres of land, while those owning cattle shared a communal grazing area. Labour tenants evicted from surrounding white farms received no land. Taxes included R2 for land, R1 for head tax for males, R3,50 'development' of the bantustan tax, 25c per head of large stock and 5c per head of small stock. Few could live off the land only. Few had access to land. While a few people commuted to work in Louis Trichardt, most people were forced to migrate to the Reef for work. Local white farmers recruited labour on a daily basis, paying children 50c and women R1 per day. According to Chief Sinthumule, there are more people without than with jobs.

The future of Sinthumule and Kutama will remain uncertain until the Van der Walt Commission reports, but it would seem that rumours released in July 1982 (Cape Times, 8.07.82) that the area would remain part of Venda are likely to be true. Health, police affairs and local administration are all in Venda hands. The building of houses and schools continues, which seems to indicate some future for the area. To date 800 Sotho families have been removed to Indermaak, 150 km north-west of Pietersburg in Lebowa. At that stage (July 1979) there were no facilities in Indermaak (Sunday Post, 5.08.79).

With labour tenancy being abolished in the 1960s, many people were forced to leave the farms and seek refuge in the bantustans, including parts that were later under threat of removal such as Sinthumule and Kutama (where people from farms came in 1973/4). Many people made their way to Lwomondo location in Vuwani and to Tshakuma. Some families were retained on the farms but only a small number, just the more skilled and essential semi-skilled workers. The farmers' ownership of lorries may well have been the changing point in the abolition of labour tenancy, as they were then free to recruit labour as they needed it from surrounding reserves and did not have to depend on public transport and indian recruiters. Before, it was often easier to have the families live on the farms.

Rent-paying tenancy on white farms seems to have ended in the 1940s in this area, but large numbers of people continued living on mission farms such as Kranspoort, an NGK farm where hundreds of people lived with access to land for ploughing and grazing. In the early 1970s tension grew between an authoritarian missionary and the residents, and as a result a number of families were evicted with the assistance of the army. GG trucks dumped people at Mara in the Kutama area. They were forced to sell their livestock before moving.

The army also participated in the removal of 400 families from the Lutheran mission farm Gertrudsborg on the farm Ledig, 7 km from Louis Trichardt. The people were moved to Saamkorst, 30 km south-west of Louis Trichardt, in the Sinthumule area.

In reply to parliamentary question 187 (23.02.81), the Minister of Co-operation and Development said that three black spots had been cleared in 1979 in the Louis Trichardt, Pietersburg and Carolina areas, involving 12 769 people, with R679 493 in compensation (R53,21 each).


## VENDA

Vleifontein, 30 km east of Louis Trichardt, is being built as a commuter town for Vendas to serve Louis Trichardt. The 450 families from Tshikota and possibly the more than 26 000 people from Sinthumule/Kutama are to be relocated here. The first structure greeting one on entering the SADT township of Vleifontein is the beerhall. 1 500 units with running water, water-borne sewerage disposal, and 20 x 30 m plots will be available. About 300 units were occupied by early 1982. A two-roomed house with running water and flush toilet and bathroom inside cost R2 000. A clinic, primary school and four-roomed houses for teachers, nurses and government officials were complete. The secondary school was being built. Another high school is planned and shops are being built. According to Moody, 1 174 erven are being laid out and serviced for people from Tshikota, and the plan includes single quarters. (Vleifontein is also known as Ha-Tshikota.)


Two towns established in the 1960s have absorbed many people displaced from the surrounding areas. They are Makwarela and Shanyandima, close to Sibasa and the capital Thohoyandou (established 30.06.78). A further two towns have been set aside in the 1970s: Makhado and Vuwani town (or Schuinshoogte).

Relocation within Venda was mainly a result of betterment planning - about 75% of Venda has been 'bettered'. According to a 1976 Benso publication, 57 300 people live in 24 closer settlements as a result: 27 000 in Sibasa district; 17 000 in Vuwani; 9 000 in Mutale; and 4 300 in Dzanani (Venda Economic Review 1976).

Local disputes account for removals of groups of people, for example those living under the newly created chief Ntsianda who were moved from the south side of the road from Louis Trichardt to Thohoyandou, north of the road. A few thousand people were involved in this move in 1979/80 as the new chief did not want his followers living under Chief Mguhivi. Another case was that of the Mpophu people who had been living on white farms in the



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6

Bandelierkop area before they were evicted and moved to Kutama. They were moved once more to the Molema area.

In 1977 a 50 sq km buffer strip was cleared between Venda and the border with Zimbabwe. Small settlements such as Mabiligwa, Madimbo and Matshabatini were probably cleared in the process. The numbers moved are not known.

Many people are still to be relocated to Venda, including 40 000 Venda in Gazankulu, 9 000 in Bophuthatswana, and over 4 000 in Lebowa. According to the 1976 Venda Economic Revue, no mass removals took place between 1973 and 1976, but many thousands of people will have to be moved to fulfil consolidation proposals.

In 1980 the following farms were expropriated and added to the north-west part of Venda: Adelaide, Sizaan (Zisaan), Wendy and Cross in the Messina area. For the full list of farms added to Venda, see Schedule attached to the Borders of Particular States Extension Act of 1980.

## CONDITIONS IN VENDA

Until the introduction of tribal authorities, there had been no real friction arising from tribal consciousness and differences. This only began in 1969. 'Petty development' projects were introduced to bribe certain people, and this led to further divisions. From 1970 the authorities stressed that non-Vendas should move out of the area. This has not been absolutely enforced - some Shangaan and Sotho people still remain there - but in 1979 Sotho people were removed from Venda to beyond Vivo at Indermaak. Even they were not forced to move; but they did not wish to align themselves with Venda independence and therefore chose to move into Lebowa rather than lose their South African status. Conditions at Indermaak were very hard for them because the area was forested and there was no land to plough.

People in Venda are forced by circumstances to support the status quo there. Lack of employment has driven some into State apparatuses as government officials, members of the police force, and of the Venda national force. Venda itself is surrounded by a 'cordon sanitaire' of the South African Police, so the Venda national force has to deal only with internal affairs.

Until 1979 there was virtually free movement between Venda and Zimbabwe. Many Zimbabweans ran away from the 'protected' villages, alleging that whites were killing blacks on the issue of insufficient rations. In 1978 they were sent back. From that time, youngsters had to go to the local commissioner for a 'dompas' accompanied by their parents or their chief or headman. It seems likely that Venda national force service will become compulsory for all Vendas in the future.

People fight for their promotion, and this breeds large numbers of informers. Disciplinary powers are being used more often now, particularly after the unrest of 1977/78 when many people with opposition tendencies were detained. R276/9, equivalent to the Transkei R400, is used. Early in 1982 a detainee died in detention and others were seriously assaulted, it was alleged. The security threat cited by the authorities to justify detention is said to be 'from outside'.

## VENDA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (VDC)

Under the tribal authority structure, projects were introduced to draw certain groups into the system. Show pieces were set up, for example the cartoned beer scheme run by Patrick

Mphephu as chairman of the Thohoyandou authority. Chiefs were put in the forefront to exploit their traditional status. People were even persuaded in by fear - of losing their jobs, or even of finding themselves in detention.

VDC has been setting up business centres. Two were reported, one at Thohoyandou, the new capital where Mphephu and his ministers have their homes, and the other at the Makhado location near the Dzanani Dzata Ruits, where a shopping centre, post office and houses are being built. People are being pressed to register their businesses with the VDC.

The VDC was also trying to take over projects such as the Thathevondo irrigation scheme between Sibasa and Thathevondo plantation. A few villages and a saw mill may have to be moved as a result, for the dam to be built.

Tshakuma In Tshakuma the people are largely resettled from white farms and areas declared white. Many people are without jobs, and survival depends on buying bananas from farmers and engaging in petty trading. It was mostly the women who did this, fieldworkers were told, while men spent most of their time drinking.

The nearest labour bureau was at Vuwani to the east, on the road to Klein Letaba, but few jobs were available. People lived by the banana-selling and on what they could grow for themselves: groundnuts, beans and mielies. Most people had no fields. Apparently many people made money for schooling by producing and selling a dry gin known as tototo.

Because of unemployment, malnutrition is rife. Fresh fruit seemed abundant, yet there are many cases of pellagra.

Lack of land was attributed to the fact that the old system whereby indunas allocated land to subjects is now controlled by the new agricultural extension officers. The system is open to bribery.



In this complicated area east of Louis Trichardt where no-one is too sure whether they live in Gazankulu, Venda or South Africa (as it was) and who is responsible for them - the Northern Transvaal Administration Board, the municipality, the authorities of Venda or Gazankulu - and whether their land is owned by the SADT, one of the bantustans, the mission, themselves, etc., it is very difficult for the fieldworker spending a short time in the area to establish whom to believe. In December 1980 when residents of Shirley/Elim were handed numbers to paint on their houses they were delighted, thinking the authorities were about to upgrade their houses, for so long under threat of removal. On hearing that this might well be the final notice of removal, they were unsure what and whom to believe. Such cases of uncertainty can critically delay the responses of communities under threat.

The next section deals with areas under threat of removal east of Louis Trichardt and areas within Gazankulu to which people have been moved.

## SWISS MISSION FARMS UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL

### ELIM-SHIRLEY

Two adjoining farms, Elim and Shirley, are situated at the western extreme of the Gazankulu 'finger' (see map). Elim (Waterval) was established by the Swiss Mission in 1879 and is the



site of the wellknown Elim missionary hospital. Shirley (Styldrift) has long been occupied by rent-paying 'squatters' and was bought by the South African government from its owner Mr Phillips. Together the two farms make up the Elim hospital area.

Government pressure on Elim began in earnest in the 1960s. As a black spot, it was to be cleared for white occupation. With the emergence of Venda and Gazankulu, the fate of Elim-Shirley is uncertain once more with the two bantustans fighting for it.

The Swiss Mission Church agreed to sell Elim to the central government on condition that the land and hospital be given to Gazankulu. Prof Hudson Ntsanwisi, Chief Minister of Gazankulu from 1973, was Church moderator at the time, which could explain the arrangement. In 1973 the South African government announced that Elim would become part of Gazankulu. The land was bought in 1979 but still has not been formally attached. At present Gazankulu is responsible for running the Elim hospital and the schools. The commissioner in Louis Trichardt controls everything else and is considered something of a supremo. Elim has suffered from being in limbo: essential services such as water, electricity, school toilets, have been neglected both by Gazankulu and the commissioner.

People living on Elim and Shirley derive most of their income (one figure: 70%) from migrant earnings in Johannesburg and elsewhere in the Transvaal, and even from the Cape. Some workers also commute daily to Louis Trichardt, and others work at Elim hospital. Families cannot subsist off the land but mielies, beans, tropical fruit, and groundnuts are grown. With migrant labour and insecurity about the future, Elim has suffered. An ex-school teacher said that agriculture on Elim and Shirley began declining in the mid-1950s. A furrow used to supply the whole mission with water but has now fallen into disuse. Wheat and sugar cane used to be grown under irrigation. At one stage almost all the arable land was contoured by the farm manager. Twenty years ago almost everyone had a garden with vegetables including sweet potatoes. Mielies were sold to the 'indian shop' in exchange for groceries. Nowadays people produce only green mielies and have to buy wheat and bread from the shop. The Lemana Plain, previously under cultivation, is completely clogged with bush, and in some areas the monkeys and baboons make it impossible to keep gardens or orchards.

Most Venda-speakers, who had been living peacefully in Elim for many years, have already been removed. The Ramaru group were moved to Molema in the 1970s and a smaller group to Sibasa. Since 1969 it has been illegal to extend or alter buildings on Elim or Shirley without permission of the commissioner in Louis Trichardt. It seems that only those 'in with the government' and familiar with application procedures have been allowed to improve their properties. The general effect has been a deterioration in fixed property.

Early in 1981 the central government told the people on Elim and Shirley that they were squatters with no rights to the land. When next they paid their hut and livestock taxes to the commissioner, they were given numbers to paint on the doors of their houses. Some people thought the numbers meant a kind of recognition; others saw them as intimidation or a prelude to removals. In April 1981 officials from Louis Trichardt trespassed on Elim in an intimidating bout of counting people. This could be part of a State strategy of threatening people over a period of time until they move voluntarily. This kind of pressure has been used before to deter potential resisters. For example, the poorer families have traditionally cut grass in the veld for thatching. In 1981 a GG lorry arrived, and half of the thatching grass was demanded - with the rumour that the thatching will be used in relocation areas where there is no grass.

It seemed almost certain that a township would be built on Elim in February or March 1982. Informants said it was to have some 3 000 housing units built by the State, for Tsonga inhabitants of the present location in Louis Trichardt and from white farms in the area. Others feared the location would cater for the impending removals from Valdesia, Kurulen, Elim and Shirley.

The location will inevitably change people's way of life. They will not be allowed to keep poultry and livestock. The cost of living will rise as people have to pay for fuel, housing, housing, water and so on, which at present are free.

As with the other church farms, community organisation here is weak. In 1977 the South African government announced that chiefs on white farms would no longer be recognised. Chief Klaas Njaka-Njaka refused to move, and stayed on at Elim as the unofficial chief. Meanwhile the church had installed headman Mahange as chief, considering Njaka-Njaka as 'chief of the heathens'. Njaka-Njaka still holds customary courts, but because he does not have the power to distribute land many consider him 'just a name'. His supporters have recently asked the commissioner to re-establish his tribal authority. Others, mainly the schooled people, favour an elected leader. Generally, though, there is a power vacuum and a mixed mood of apathy and despondency. As one woman said, 'There is no community organisation - only silence.'

#### VALDESIA AND MAMBEDI

Valdesia (Valdezia) and Mambedi are on the farm Klipfontein (2 162 morgen). Valdesia is a Swiss Mission farm established in 1875. Valdesia-Mambedi is a black spot. To the north and east is the white Levubu River scheme; to the south the Sapekoe tea estates and Venda; and to the west a perfume farm. Valdesia holds 1 600 people, 92% of them Tsonga. 1 660 squatters live on Mambedi on land held in freehold by 27 black landlords. Mambedi was created when the church sold 100 morgen of the farm Klipfontein to private owners in 1923. The plots there vary from 25 to 37 morgen, and most are sublet to squatters who pay R20 in annual rent. They grow sweet potatoes, mielies and other vegetables, and tobacco. A few titleholders grow cash crops: one man recently reaped 70 bags of groundnuts at R10 a bag. Surplus produce is generally sold in Giyani or Louis Trichardt.

On Valdesia most tenants cultivate plots of about 3 morgen. The work is done by women, as 90% of all able-bodied men work as migrants in Johannesburg, Cape Town or Durban. Others work as teachers in Gazankulu. Most of these migrants work as clerks or artisans, a notable feature: the higher standard of mission education has ensured that there are few unskilled labourers. Rent on Valdesia is R3 yearly for unmarried men and R4,50 for married men, with polygamists paying an extra R4,50 for each wife. Those renting land pay R6,50 for a 3 morgen plot or R9 for two plots. Most grow vegetables and have fruit trees. The taxes mentioned also cover expenses for water and roads. Except for some sandy areas the land is generally fertile since it borders on the Levubu River.

As in Elim-Shirley, agriculture here has declined with migrant labour and the stress of impending removal. One man (Mr Mpapele) sells his produce to the Louis Trichardt market and hires out tractors in the ploughing season. Less than 20 people produce surpluses; most just aim at subsistence.

In 'the old days' people grew sugar cane, wheat and rice. This is no longer so because the furrows have been left to erode so that water has become scarce. Many ploughs are idle since there are very few cattle, partly because the boundary between Valdesia and the white farmers is not fenced and the cattle have been straying away. In 1972 most cattle were impounded by white farmers and the cost of reclamation exceeded their value. As with all the Swiss Mission farms, health is generally good and there are no chronic problems on Valdesia or Mambedi. Firewood is free and cheap poles are provided by the mission for huts and fencing. A secondary school was to be opened in 1982. A store with R20 000 worth of stock supplies most commodities for the community.

Since 1978 the Sapekoe tea estate and a perfume factory have been launched on farms around

Valdesia and Mambedi. Both these border industries, and the farmers of the Levubu River scheme, employ daily labour from Valdesia. The land where Sapekoe grows its tea is owned by the Venda government which gets royalties from sales. Sapekoe was said to pay monthly wages in 1981 of R40 for men and R25,30 for women. A breakfast of tea, a slice of bread and soup was included. Hours of work were from 6 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. Workers with a perfect attendance record were given two 2,5 kg bags of mielie meal monthly. The informant added, 'Don't think we don't know we are exploited.' There is much speculation that Klipfontein farm is sought either by Sapekoe or by the perfume farm (which is to expand its plant) but this is not confirmed.

On Valdesia there is a curious mixture of stability and apathy. Some families have been there over a century, and intermarriage in the community has increased the insularity. It was said that many individuals (with the support of the church) would refuse to move. The group are not effectively organised, though, and many people have either left already or are building houses in other parts of Gazankulu in anticipation of removal. There are the partially elected consistory, school and farm committees, but they tend to be conservative and dull. People doubt that they will get adequate compensation or similar housing if they are moved. The threat of removal is said to be the root cause of agricultural decline. A community gardening project was started recently but has little chance in the face of the low morale.

#### KURULEN

This, the third Mission farm under threat of removal, is situated on the farm Ongedacht. Despite its 72% Shangaan population, it is earmarked for Venda. As the map shows, Kurulen is surrounded by white land to the north and Gazankulu to the south. Its position, however, strategically splits two areas of Venda along the east-west axis, which is why it is to be consolidated into Venda. Its inclusion will also aid the plan that Venda should surround the Gazankulu 'finger'. Shangaan and Venda speakers have lived together peacefully for generations and have intermarried, but the plan to incorporate Kurulen into Venda has caused much tension of late.

Kurulen's population in 1979 was 1 176, of whom 824 were Tsonga. Tenants pay the same rents as on Valdesia, of R3, R4,50 etc according to marital status for a  $\frac{1}{4}$  acre residential plot. The agricultural plots, some way away, are mostly of 1 morgen, though there are some of 2 morgen for R9 rent a year. In all, Kurulen is 1 500 morgen. Cattle are kept on communal camps. Apparently there are about 370 cattle, 25 donkeys, 3-400 goats, and pigs and poultry.

Most of the men do migrant work on the Reef. Some work on the railways. They find work privately, by word of mouth, or else through the labour bureau at Giyani.

Health is generally satisfactory. Uncertainty about Kurulen's future, however, has led to its clinic being closed because neither Gazankulu nor the central government will fund it. A doctor from the Elim hospital visits the area. Pit latrines are being built but otherwise there is no sanitation. Water is scarce: there are two boreholes, but some people have to walk 1 km for water. Drums of water are sold informally for 75c each. There are no taps.

The Kurulen community was described as being 'more traditional' than Valdesia's. Problems of community organisation are similar to Valdesia's. Again, there is a consistory, school and a farm committee. The central government offered to buy Kurulen from the Swiss Mission in 1978 but has not done so yet. The residents will probably be moved to the location at Elim in the event of a removal.

#### GROUPS ALREADY RELOCATED

The first three groups discussed here - of Mphambo, Mtchetweni and Magoro - were all part of a far larger population movement. The areas north and south of the Gazankulu finger (see map), now part of Venda, were all solidly Shangaan prior to the mass removals. According to documentation supplied by Advocate H F Junod to the South African government in 1966, there were about 10 000 Shangaans north of the Levubu River and 40 000 south of it, all of them threatened with removal. In all these areas, now in Venda, the people were 70-90% Shangaan. Most of these 50 000 Shangaans have certainly been removed to Gazankulu.

In the late 1960s Chief Bokisi of the farms Avondale, Riverplaats and Groenvallei was moved to the farms Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Chief Ntushi of the farm Bushy Park and Chief Wayeni of the farms Noblehof, Riversdale and Bellevue have also been moved to the Magoro area. Chief Baloyi of the Ribongwane tribal authority was moved from the farms Buffelshoek, Groenkloof, Grootplaats and part of Riverplaats, to Helderwater. North of the 'finger' Chief Mtchetweni of Vaalkop and Kruisfontein was moved to Malmesbury in the Bungeni district. Hlomela of Skuinshoogte, Mphambo of Schiel, and Mtiti in the western section of the Knobnose location, were also moved in the late 1960s.

In 1966, prior to removal, apparently there were 2 328 Shangaans under Bokisi, 1 736 under Ntushi, 2 280 under Wayeni, and 3 116 in the Ribongwane tribal authority. North of the 'finger' it seems there were 2 221 Shangaans under Mtchetweni, 703 under Hlomela, 1 322 under Mphambo, and 2 158 under Mtiti. These figures were supplied to the SPP but should be used with caution because there are no corresponding numbers to show how many people were actually moved, or how many of those moved were following their chief or headman.

#### MPHAMBO

The so-called Knobnose location was given to Shangaan headmen in 1899 by Paul Kruger. In 1957 Headman Mphambo was elected chairman of the Knobnose location in accordance with the plan to form tribal authorities. In 1958, however, the only Venda headman in the location, Netshimbopfe, was nominated chairman by the commissioner Leibbrandt. Since then the headmen Mphambo, Hlumela, and possibly Shigamano and Nkuri too, have all been moved from Knobnose.

Mphambo now lives on the road north from Giyani, about two-thirds of the way to Malamulele. About 300 families accompanied him there in 1968. Others came from Borchers (near Valdesia) where they had been living as tenants on the Borchers brothers' farm. (This farm seems to be Driefontein, now the site of the Sapekoe tea estate.) In 1981 there were at least 2 500 stands at Mphambo. Most of the men there are migrant labourers who work in Johannesburg, but there also appears to be a high rate of unemployment. Maize and groundnuts are grown for domestic use. Water is drawn from the Shingwidzi River, purified and dispensed through taps. There are two primary schools and a secondary school (up to Standard 7) which was built in 1976. A health centre, opened in June 1980, serves the wider community.

#### MTCHETWENI

Chief Mtchetweni was allowed to settle on the Mashao Mountain east of Elim by Joao Albasini. Then after the Boer War he moved to the farm Kruisfontein close to the Mashao Mountain. In 1968, in order to make way for Vendas, 664 families were moved southwards to the farm Malmesbury. Mtchetweni resisted removal at first but was finally forced to go. The Shangaans

who stayed now live 'unhappily' under the Venda chief Mashao. It is said that these Shangaans suffer under Mashao because of the high taxes he exacts. Apparently he demanded R11 from each of his subjects recently towards a new BMW car. A community leader said that on Kruisfontein the Mtchetweni people had enough land for ploughing. Most people owned cattle.

On Malmesbury there is no land for ploughing, only the house plots, and virtually no land for cattle. People were forced to sell their cattle when they were moved. Each family must pay R3,50 tax a year to Gazankulu. Widows pay R1. Men work as migrants in Johannesburg, Boksburg and Germiston. White farmers fetch 46 women daily from the Levubu settlement for agricultural work. They are paid R1 per day and provided with one meal.

Bungeni has a primary and a secondary school. There is no clinic but a doctor visits weekly. There are only three taps of which one is unclean.

#### THE MAGORO AREA AND THE BALOYI

The Magoro area - and in particular the farms Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Olifantshoek and Grootfontein - has been a receiving area for many of the Tsonga removals north and south of the Elim 'finger'. The place is characterised by extreme heat and lack of water, which make it unpopular as a place to live in.

The chiefs Bokisi, Wayeni and Ntushi, among others, were all relocated here in the late 1960s. There are now six headmen vying for control of a huge and heterogeneous population.

This contrasts strikingly with the case of the Ribongwane tribal authority which resisted removal to the Magoro in the late 1960s. The group takes its name from the Shangaan headman Tingwana Ribongwane Baloyi who ruled over the farms Groenkloof, Grootplaats, Buffelshoek and Koedoespoort for over 40 years until his death in 1957. Despite a largely Shangaan population (3 116 Shangaans to 564 Vendas in 1966), a Venda chief called Ramabulana was installed in 1959. Round about 1961 the commissioner in Soekmekaar told the Baloyi people they were to be removed. They refused the idea of Magoro because 'the place is like an oven' and because of congestion there. For two years running the Baloyi people ploughed in defiance of the removal plan and some were imprisoned. In 1964 or 1965 the chief himself was jailed at the Soekmekaar police station for refusing to move. The Baloyi engaged Advocate H F Junod in 1965 and negotiated with De Wet Nel in Pretoria. After extensive consultation the Baloyi agreed in 1967 to move to the farm Helderwater, north-west of Magoro. There the South African government provided them with water, agricultural stands, schools and a clinic. Many of the Baloyi remained under the Venda chief Ntshabalala at Molema because they were still not prepared to move. Others who distrusted the move to Helderwater left for Mbokota, Tshabane, Bungeni, Mtchetweni and Elim in small groups. In 1974 there were apparently about 500 families in Helderwater.

Helderwater is considered one of the better parts of Gazankulu. Each family has a house plot and 3 morgen to plough. More than 20 families own between 20 and 30 cattle, and hire them out during the ploughing season. Water is drawn from a reservoir and a borehole. By January 1982 there were to be taps throughout the farm. Mielies, millet, groundnuts and sunflower seeds are grown for domestic use only. People produce adequate crops in good seasons. Most of the men work as migrant labourers in secondary industry throughout the Reef. Only a few work on the mines which are as unpopular here as they are elsewhere in Gazankulu. There is a clinic, a primary and a secondary school.

Families pay R3,50 tax a year to the Gazankulu government. Family heads also pay R3 for the agricultural plot, and 30c per head of cattle; and there is a school levy of R6 per



Mayflower, 'the hub of Kangwane' - proposed new capital (September 1982)

Bothashoek - home of a landowner removed from Doornkop (black spot near Middelburg) (1982)





Main highway through Nebo district, Lebowa (September 1982)

Commuters to Groblersdal from Lebowa (September 1982)



Naboomkoppies, Lebowa - people were relocated here from their Lutheran mission farm in the early 1960s (1981)




Naboomkoppies - children queue for water, with still only one tap per street after nearly 20 years

(September 1982)



Daggakraal, black spot under threat (September 1982)


Notice at the entrance to a group of SADT farms (September 1982)





Tubatse/Praktiseer, a well guarded settlement for commuters to the tiny white dorp of Burgersfort (September 1982)

On the road to Monsterlus, a woman sells a few tomatoes and peanuts, trying to earn a living (September 1982)



pupil.

The Baloyi's removal is particularly interesting on account of their resistance and their use of an advocate. Legal action can misfire, when lawyers abstract the struggle from the hands of the community, but here the Baloyi have seen their move to Helderwater as their own partial victory. In material terms at least, they are certainly better off than the people at Magoro.

#### NTLHAVENE

Ntlhavene district is a triangular area adjoining Mhinga and Shikundu, excised from the Kruger National Park in 1969. In the same year the Makuleke people living around Crook's Corner between the Levubu and Limpopo Rivers were forcibly removed to Ntlhavene. The move was a great shock for them, not least because they were taken from an area where fish was a staple food to a place of extreme dryness. The people were simply dumped on the dry veld of Ntlhavene without water, shelter, clinics or an infrastructure of any kind. There was mass starvation in the first year and many of the young and old simply died. The Swiss Church set up feeding schemes as a stopgap solution.

In 1968 some 5 000 Tsonga-speakers had been moved to Ntlhavene from Sibasa and Tshakuma in Venda. Without warning the commissioner announced the move, and a fleet of GG trucks transported the population to Malamulele. They were not even provided with tents, there was no water laid on. The people were just 'dumped'. Hyenas kept them awake at night - they could not sleep. It was July, and cold. A pregnant woman was so badly shocked that she gave birth prematurely, and the baby died.

The plan had been for a quick surprise removal, and so the people did not have time to prepare themselves for the new place. Conditions were appallingly harsh. As well as the physical hardships, people suffered a real though less tangible shock in moving from a highly productive area, where they had had employment in Levubu and had ready cash which they could spend in local shops, to the bushveld where they had nothing. The vegetation was quite different, so were agricultural conditions.

People from Tshakuma helped them establish themselves. Bark was stripped in Tshakuma, and sedge and grass collected for building homes. Wild vegetables were collected there, cooked and taken to Malamulele. Local farmers donated banana culls which were cooked and helped feed people for a month. Kupugani organised contributions from Johannesburg. Anglo-American contributed a 3 ton truck to transport the goods. An organisation called Hafint (Help Action for the Far Northern Transvaal) was started to cope with the mass of food flooding in. A major problem was sharing it out equitably. Hafint still existed in 1981, and its funds were also used to help relocated people at Kromhoek (Makgatho) and the people moved from Sinthumule to Bochum.

Outside aid lasted for a year. The bishop of the Swiss Mission helped in various ways, mediating between the people and the authorities on problems - for instance, the people were given land but lacked ploughs; seed allocated to the people rotted in the commissioner's office in Malamulele for lack of transport. The main spoken criticisms related to the lack of planning associated with the policy.

Schools, hospitals, shops and roads exist now, in 1981. The Presbyterian Church operates in the area. It took some time for the people to adapt to the change in liturgy, coming from a Lutheran area. Physically the place is transformed from the early days. Some good rains in the early 1970s gave good crops on the virgin soil. Water was first pumped from the Levubu

River in 1970, and a huge reticulation scheme linked to reservoirs has been built. Much of this was done by the South African government in response to pressure from the church and Gazankulu in its very early days.

Of the older removals, from Sibasa and Makuleke, it is alleged that the chiefs collaborated with the South African government. Other groups have been arriving since. A big one came in 1971: 400 Tsonga families removed from Sinthumule near Louis Trichardt. People are still being relocated to Ntlhavene from white towns and farms and from Lebowa and Venda.

The site is divided into 10 blocks (A - J) with some 600 families in each. Conditions are similar throughout. Each family has a house plot of  $\frac{1}{4}$  acre, and can grow mielies and other vegetables there. Many families (perhaps most) have a 2-morgen field further away where the main crops are mielies and groundnuts for domestic use. Of all the families in all 10 blocks, apparently only one man managed to 'make a lot of money' by selling cabbages and tomatoes to the market. Each block has communal grazing camps for the cattle. Families own as many as 10 - 12 head of cattle; but most people do not appear to have any. Cattle are hired out during the ploughing season to those without.

Migrant labour (to Johannesburg, Skukuza, Phalaborwa, Tzaneen and Louis Trichardt) is general. So is unemployment.

A shop owner who arrived in Ntlhavene from Sibasa said he had made application in Sibasa for a trading licence which he received in 1971. He was the first person to arrive in his block and built the shop himself. He now has a butchery and a 'restaurant' too, and therefore has a monopoly in his block.

One man said that each family pays a R3 tax to Gazankulu as well as R1 a year for the  $\frac{1}{4}$  acre house plot. (The R3 might be for the agricultural plots.) Sheep and goats are not taxed, but cattle are taxed at 45c a head a year. Another informant, a school teacher at Mhinga, gave a somewhat different account of taxation, saying that each family pays R10 a year to Gazankulu. Cattle are taxed at 35c a head, dogs at R1 each and bitches at R2. Most people pay R12 - 13 a year in taxes, he said, and no-one pays more than R15. The chief may also exact special levies for school-building. In one area this levy amounted to R6.

Community organisation in Ntlhavene is undeveloped. There are school and church committees but most power lies with the headman. In the two blocks housing those from Makuleke the headman is apparently well accepted. Blocks A, C and J, however, are a mixture of various communities all conflicting over leadership, so the headmanship rotates in these areas.

#### SHILUVANE HOSPITAL AND NEW PHEPENI

There has been conflict in the Shiluvane area, part of the greater conflict over boundaries between Lebowa and the Ritavi 2 section of Gazankulu. In this, the southern part of Gazankulu on the Tzaneen-Phalaborwa axis, the definition of boundaries seems particularly obscure.

The Douglas Smit hospital at Shiluvane is situated on the farm Sedan 18 about 30 km south-east of Tzaneen. The hospital was built after World War I by the Swiss Mission Church. Sedan 18 lies on the eastern side of Ritavi 2 (Gazankulu) and juts into Lebowa territory. Shiluvane is set between Chief Mohlaba (Shangaan) and Chief Maake (Pedi) who have traditionally lived together 'as brothers'. With the rise of separate development the church (under pressure) decided to split the farm between Lebowa and Gazankulu. The south-eastern side of the farm went to Lebowa, while the fertile part of the farm (with the hospital) went to Gazankulu. Prior to the pressures of separate development, the Shiluvane area was a model of inter-ethnic co-operation. As in many other areas, intermarriage and bilingualism were common. After

the decision to hand the hospital over to Gazankulu, however, Phatudi ordered the removal of all Sotho staff from the hospital. In addition the Sotho patients (including those on drips!) were removed by ambulance to the Metz and Masana hospitals. 1 400 families were forced to move from Bonn, Sedan and Perry to Naphuno in Lebowa. 600 more families had to move too, according to a press report (*Transvaler*, 16.09.81), and when land was transferred from Lebowa to Gazankulu, 4 000 families were reputedly thrown out and living in the bush (*SAIRR Survey 1981*, p 285). In other words, the case of the hospital was just a particularly gross example of the general situation whereby peaceful coexistence between people was turned into sharp conflict through the politicisation of ethnic differences. The extraordinarily complex attempt to create national boundaries in historically integrated areas has been the cause of a great deal of social dislocation.

Just a few kilometres north of Shiluvane hospital is Phepeni, part of Mohlaba's location. Mohlaba, a Shangaan, originally obtained the area from President Kruger. Through mutual agreement Sotho subjects of Chief Maake were given permission to live indefinitely in Mohlaba's location. Then when the boundaries were fixed in about 1979, some Sothos refused to accept Chief Mohlaba's jurisdiction. In October 1981 the Gazankulu government took action and removed about 1 000 families from Mohlaba's location to the Sotho area adjoining Shiluvane hospital. This relocation area has been called New Phepeni.

The leader of the community at New Phepeni said that in July 1981 the Gazankulu authorities jailed a number of Sotho dissidents in appalling conditions. Fines of between R60 and R90 were paid by the Sotho Chief Maake. After being released from jail, Sothos at Phepeni were given 60 days in which to demolish their houses. Six lorries were sent by Lebowa but other people had to hire transport. Some of the furniture was allegedly damaged in transit.

With the move to New Phepeni people had to sell their sheep and cattle. One man sold 8 head of cattle to the butcher for between R140 and R160. New Phepeni is hopelessly overcrowded. Apart from the small house plots there is no land to plough. There are no taps, and people defecate in the river they drink from. A doctor from Lebowa visits the area twice weekly but the Shiluvane hospital on the doorstep is for Shangaans only. The Lebowa authorities have recently built two primary schools out of corrugated iron. There is no secondary school. Taxes of R2 per year per family are paid to Lebowa. Work is scarce; those with jobs work in Tzaneen, Phalaborwa and the Witwatersrand.

#### LULEKANI

Lulekani was the last relocation area visited in Gazankulu. It was also the newest and visually at least, the grimmest. It lies on the farm Quagga about 5 km west of Phalaborwa, just north of the main road from Tzaneen. On the other side of the road is Namakgale, the existing township which serves Phalaborwa.

In August 1981 there were 2 265 people at Lulekani living in makeshift shelters of corrugated iron, cardboard and plastic. Another 722 people were in the 'dense settlement', a rapidly expanding part of Lulekani. The local shopkeeper at Lulekani said he was the first person to arrive in April 1980. The people come from Namakgale and its environs, and the territory of the Sotho chiefs Makushane, Maseke, Mushimale and Silwane. Others are from white farms.

Exactly why or how the people arrived in Lulekani remains a mystery. Some say they were discriminated against as Shangaans by Chief Makushane who taxed them heavily and confiscated their cattle. It also seems that the central and bantustan governments have had a lot to do with creating Lulekani, though their precise role remains obscure. Apparently Professor Hudson Ntsanwisi, Chief Minister of Gazankulu, visited the area in 1981 and promised schools, hospitals and so on.

The Van der Walt Commission will settle the fate of Lulekani and Namakgale. At present it seems likely that Lulekani will become part of Gazankulu while Namakgale will go over to Lebowa. If so, this plan will mirror the process east of Tzaneen where two black townships, Nkowkowa in Gazankulu and Lenyenye in Lebowa serve as dormitory towns for the white town. Whether in fact Lulekani or Namakgale will become de jure parts of Gazankulu and Lebowa is in doubt, though, because that vicinity is reportedly rich in minerals. At present many of the Nkowakowa people work on the Letaba citrus estates. Nkowakowa was declared an Industrial Development Point in 1982.

There are apparently going to be three types of settlement at Lulekani. A rural area will be surveyed for those people who have been moved from white farms or from Sotho chiefs. The 'dense settlement' will be extended (there are already rows and rows of corrugated iron toilets) where there will be residential stands but no facilities for the holding of livestock. Lastly, a location is to be built by the Tsonga Development Corporation. If this is indeed the case it seems likely that Lulekani will become a huge relocation area for Shangaans providing labour for the copper and phosphate mines in Phalaborwa.

At present the people at Lulekani are living in squalor waiting for stands to be surveyed. Those with cattle either keep them in the bush or have left them with relatives still living under the Sotho chiefs. The only water is from three centrally situated taps. The waterflow is very slow and women fight till late at night for access to the taps. There is a primary school at Lulekani and a secondary school is under construction. Doctors come once a week from the Letaba hospital in Tzaneen.

Those with jobs work for the Phalaborwa Mining Company, for the Foskor Mine, the TOC Mine and the Bosveld factory. Others work for three 'stone mines' in Gazankulu. It costs 70c return by bus to Phalaborwa. Workseekers have to produce a stand number in order to gain a certificate of registration. In order to gain a stand number, however, they have to join the 'dense settlement'. This seems to be just one of the coercive measures designed to force people into it.

These last sections on Gazankulu could well conclude with some impressions of the heavily populated countryside. Like the road from Elim to Sibasa, the road from Elim to Giyani goes through areas into which thousands of people have been moved in the last 20 years. People from all over the Transvaal have been brought in or have come seeking land.

At Mbokoto there had been a major regrouping of households 30 years ago and an influx of people in about 1965. Some recent immigrants were old people who had moved in 1972. All the villages on the road to Giyani seemed to be betterment villages. It was estimated that about 3 000 households were passed in a few kilometres beyond Chavani. Each household had three or four huts with garden plots. Very little stock was around and what was seen was rather thin. Women were seen collecting wood.

There were a number of CED shops and businesses recently completed but not yet occupied (December 1980). From Mashele it seemed women were walking further for water and the vegetation was less lush. The only regular facilities along the road were bottle stores and primary schools. For the next 30 km to Majosi, settlement was almost continuous along the ridge of the hill where the road ran, with villages visible to the right and left in the valleys. Nearer Sundabi there were more cattle, in better condition. The vegetation became more deciduous with thornbushes interspersed. Beyond Mofamade both men and women were seen hoeing and ploughing the fields.

At DaVhana the area became rocky and drier. There seemed to be greater distance between homesteads, with cultivated fields between them. For the first time homesteads were fenced and cattle were common. Settlement spread over 8 km. Beyond Nkuri and Nqhalalume there

were no settlements for about 10 km. After a further 10 km a tarred road was reached just before Giyani, capital of Gazankulu. Giyani consists of an old section of typical 1960s township houses and a new area with 200 houses being built by women, a government compound of luxury houses and administration buildings, a hotel, bank, small shopping centre and Nkensani hospital.

Employment opportunities seemed limited to a poultry farm, a few garages and shops, the new building operations (employing mainly women), the civil service and an agricultural school.

The drive from Giyani to the Eastern Transvaal takes one through pieces of Gazankulu and Lebowa at frequent intervals. At times signposts announce which 'country' one is in but generally the traveller realises from the density of settlement, condition of the cattle and fields, as well, of course, as the colour of the inhabitants, as few black people are seen in white farm areas today.

## 2.3.2 Eastern Transvaal

These regional descriptions are not strictly categorised into Northern, Eastern and Western Transvaal although there are three basic maps illustrating the area. Lebowa fits into Northern, Eastern and Central Transvaal, for example, and so these reports are presented more or less as the field trips were undertaken.

The southern part of Gazankulu around Bushbuckridge is closely interwoven with Lebowa and, a little further south, the Nsikazi section of Kangwane. There is large-scale relocation in the area. People have been moved to create nature reserves such as the Blyde River Canyon reserve; they have been moved for strategic reasons such as the community opposite the Bourkes Luck Potholes where there is an army base (a hospital was built there by Bantu Administration in the mid-1970s for the people of the area but it was never opened as the SADF declared it a military area); yet others have been moved in the deproclamation of townships such as Graskop which was deproclaimed in 1978 (although the move started long before in 1966 - according to Hansard (22.04.80) 2 000 people were moved from Graskop); and according to Cosmas Desmond people in black spots were moved to Dientje in the Leroro district of Lebowa which is itself under threat of removal in terms of the 1975 consolidation proposals.

Two other bits of Lebowa are also under threat in terms of the 1975 proposals: one adjoining the Blyde River Canyon reserve, as far as the J G Strydom tunnel; and the other north of that, east of the main road where Finale is situated. It seems there has been little talk of this excision in recent years. There has even been some new agricultural development around Phiring which might entail the Lebowa authorities moving people. Phiring and the area to Leboeng/Leroro were supposed to have been moved to clear a corridor from the Blyde River Canyon to Bourkes Luck.

There is much conflict in the Bushbuckridge area as land is disputed between Lebowa and Gazankulu. Bushbuckridge and Acornhoek are both just inside Lebowa but the area has been integrally mixed for years. People have intermarried, settled, been moved together, and now are having to sort out ethnic differences. The area is densely populated, badly serviced and poor. This was where cholera and polio epidemics have been worst.

Most of the people in the Bushbuckridge area are Shangaan speakers. They have been dumped in the area from white farms and plantations as well as from towns such as White River and Sabie.



An indication of conditions in the area is given in information from Tekmahala, a typical settlement on a Trust farm that people have been moved to:

People first started moving into the area from Brooklands from 1963. More came in 1965 from Sabie which had been declared a white area, with the blacks having to move into a newly built township where rents were high. Between 1968 and 1971 there was a further influx from Sabie compounds (Hendriksdal forestry, Brooklands and Maliveld). Small groups came from the compounds. They came by themselves as there was 'no more place in the compound' and the 'government' had told them to leave. This was probably the families of workers evicted from the compounds.

There is some agricultural land available for those who want to plough. It is allocated by the chief. One morgen per family is the norm, the rent being R2 per morgen. The agricultural officer seldom visits the area but stock are dipped and vaccinated. Numbers of sheep, goats and cattle are controlled. Few people keep chickens as Newcastle disease is rife and jackals also catch them. Most people keep pigs.

Residential land is allocated by the chief too. Most plots are between a quarter and half an acre, and the rent R1 per year. Water is not clean and should be boiled. There are no taps, and people have to walk more than a kilometre to get water. Few people have latrines, in some areas. The elders punish people who do not dig their own latrines. This is checked by the chief's guardsmen. There has been a great effort to get people to dig holes for latrines. Cholera is endemic in the rainy season.

Transport: there are buses to Mariti 4 km away (bus fare 40c, taxi 60c) and from Mariti to White River (about 60 km, bus fare R1,60 and taxi R2,10) and to Bushbuckridge (about 20 km, bus fare 50c and taxi 70c). There is a train from Mkhuhlu to Barberton Junction.

Before BIC and a Mr Ndlovu began to run the bus company, a Mr Brown who had owned the buses used to offer commuter discounts and had the fares deducted from wages. Now there are no special fares.

There are 10 general dealers in the area with two more shops and a bottle store planned. There are two butcheries. No other public facilities exist except a clinic and four schools. Prices at the shops are 21c a loaf of brown bread, R1,69 for 500 g powdered milk, R5,87 for 12,5 kg sugar, R14,50 for 25 kg mielie meal, 45c for a litre of paraffin, 30c a cake of soap, candles 10c each, R1,39 for 1 kg washing powder, and R10 for a ton of firewood. A visit to the clinic costs 80c. School fees are R10,50 a year with an extra R2 annually for school building funds since 1977 (and nothing had been built by December 1980). Children have to wear school uniform. There are 70 children on average in a class.

The chief is stationed at Oakley (one of the Trust farms in the settlement). Tax to the chief is R2 a year, and to the Lebowa administration R2 per field and R1 per residential stand. On payment of R3 the chief will send his police to investigate complaints and an indaba will settle disputes.

The nearest place of wage employment is Sabie. Labour offices in Sabie and White River offer very little - a very few people find jobs on contract for unskilled work. Most people work in the forestry compounds of Sabie and White River. People are no longer able to find work in Johannesburg. Only those who had some jobs there some years ago have managed to keep them.

Big firms occasionally go to the magistrate's office to offer contracts. While no farmers recruit in this area, it was reported that local white farmers do go into the Bushbuckridge area to pick up young males and females from 12 years old in the mornings and drop them back in the evenings.

Community organisations included burial societies and a women's league. It was felt that the chiefs were not the leaders but the people on the committees of these organisations. There were complaints that the chiefs taxed the people too heavily and that the people did not know how their money was being spent - for example, money was collected for water and no pipes were seen; R1 collected from each adult for schools, but no schools. The community had lodged a complaint in 1979 but nothing had been done about it. As a result people have not been working well together.

Areas used for relocation around Tekamahala are Calcutta, Madras, Cuning Moor, Mkhuhlu (a future industrial development point in terms of the April 1982 proposals), Mariti and Alexandria, according to information from interviews in December 1980.

Driving through the area from Acornhoek to White River, one's overwhelming impression is of continuous and continual settlement in bantustan areas, overcrowded with little easy access to water and very few latrines. Compared with the lush beauty of the white areas of Pilgrim's Rest, Hazyview, etc., the impact of generalised poverty is startling.



## KANGWANE

At the time of writing (1982) the future of Kangwane is uncertain. The South African authorities seem determined to hand it over to Swaziland. With the death of the Swazi king there has been little indication from Swaziland over whether the deal is still seen as desirable. The Kangwane legislative assembly was dissolved and the area is being tightly controlled by the Department of Co-operation and Development. People continue to stream into Kangwane off the farms, from towns, mine and forestry compounds, and black spots under threat of removal. Between field trips in December 1980 and September 1982 there has been a striking change: there are thousands more people in Kangwane now - for example, the area between Kabokweni and Kanyamazane was extensively settled, with about 45 000 people. In September 1982 that same stretch of about 40 km is almost continuously settled and the population has nearly doubled. The same can be said for the southern region between Lothair and Lochiel and the area south of the N4 towards the Swazi border.

The Nsikazi region east of White River was supposed to have been excised in terms of the 1975 proposals. In 1974 the Swazis protested strongly to Helen Suzman, MP, who raised the matter in parliament. In reply the Minister said the 59 000 Swazis living there would be compensated and would have to move south. Now the Nsikazi area is to be included in the Swazi deal. This, as has been said, is the most developed part of Kangwane, closest to job opportunities, where townships have been built (although they are surrounded by large tracts of informal settlement and the people have little access to township facilities such as water. A case in point was where the dam at Kabokweni was restricted for the use of the township people only and it was reported that people at Pienaar sometimes had to catch buses to fetch water.)

North of Kabokweni to Numbi Gate of the Kruger National Park are ten to fifteen villages housing thousands of relocated people. The villages include Pienaar, Zwelitsha, Tlautlau, Nkomeni, Nkohlakalo, Engodini, Maporo, Mbonisweni, Edwaleni, Mkokoto, Makoko, Mgan-duzweni, Jerusalem, Swalala, Phola, Magule, Mahushu (rumoured to be given to Gazankulu) and Majika, the last village 10 km from Hazyview. Most of these villages started off in the usual bantustan way as tribal villages but have been augmented by the stream of people off the farms.

Part 3 below includes the results of a survey carried out in Kabokweni and Pienaar which give more detail on conditions. One example of a household living in Game (from 'Game reserve') after eviction off a farm may highlight the plight of such people:



In 1969 the respondent was moved with about 20 other households off a white farm (Bonana) where they had lived for 18 years, at Rhenosterhoek. They were evicted by the Department of Forestry when the farm was sold to the State. Some households stayed on as they agreed to work for South African Forestry Investments. The people had kept cattle, goats and sheep. They had had grazing rights but had to sell their stock before moving to Kangwane. Two members of the household had worked on the farm fulltime for R30 per month and no wages in kind. The farmer had lived on the farm but the workers had no contract with him. The respondent worked as a tractor driver and looked after stock. Now he works on a construction site in Sabie as a labourer. His wife had been a domestic worker in Sabie until 1975 when she could no longer find work. Their 16-year-old daughter was in Standard 5 at school. The family could only afford to eat mielie meal and have tea with sugar on a daily basis. Every second day they ate bread and jam, and once a week potatoes/rice, milk, meat or fish. They ate greens, eggs, cheese and margarine less than once a month. Their major problems were that rents were high and food expensive. They would like to see improvements in the sanitary system (bucket latrines), schools, recreation, and old age homes. The Lutheran Church was cited as the only organisation, and 'the leaders' were identified just as the mayor, 'a puppet'.

Within the Nsikazi area are the townships of Kabokweni, Kanyamazane (which houses at least 50 - 60 000 people serving the town of Nelspruit 20 km away), Matsulu outside Kaapmuiden where people were moved from in 1972. They also came from Hendrina. About a quarter of Matsulu township is brick houses, the rest being shacks and mud houses very close together.

The townships of the Eastern Transvaal have been deproclaimed in most cases and the majority of people moved into Kangwane. Malelane, for example, has no township - the people commute from Matsulu or one of the relocation areas in the Nkomazi area such as Schoemansdal.

The Nkomazi district stretches from the Mozambique border, along the Swazi border, to west of Louieville, the official capital (which looks like a highly guarded road camp in the bush). Thousands of people in this area have also been relocated. On the flat dry wastes are found large closer settlements such as Naas (Kamaqhekeza) where at least 15 000 people live, having been moved there from 1972 onwards. The first people reported to be moved were about 2 000 'squatters' from the banks of the Crocodile River at Komatipoort (SAIRR Survey 1972, p 176). They were moved 35 km 'to a dusty place called Naas, where there is no natural water supply: water has to be transported there'. The people were given two one-roomed corrugated iron huts for R2,80 rent per month. The huts were stiflingly hot in summer. Instead of being able to walk to work and shops, they had to pay R3,30 a month each in bus fares. There are many smaller settlements over the area including Tongi Sidlamafa which has a section of four-roomed houses as well as huts, Mzinti village and Shongwe settlement. On the road to Jeppe's Reef are a number of relocation settlements including Driekoppies (10 - 15 000 people), Buffelspruit (15 - 20 000 people), Schoemansdal (3 - 5 000 people). There seemed to be quite a lot of stock around, but ploughed fields all belonged to white farmers (either using Trust or border farms).

The Mswati/Mlondozi area of Kangwane is probably the worst in terms of material conditions for thousands of people who have streamed in off the farms, out of the towns and off black spots since 1975. According to a report in the Rand Daily Mail (29.07.80) the de facto Swazi population rose from 85 200 in 1970 to 171 000 in 1978, an increase of more than 100%. By 1982 the area between Lothair and Lochiel alone accommodated about 140 000 who had been relocated into six settlements since 1976. The population of Kangwane in 1982 was estimated at 400 000.

The people, as in all relocation areas, have been well hidden from the public eye - for example, driving between Barberton and the Swazi border at Oshoek, even through Kangwane, one would be totally unaware of the hundreds of thousands of people hidden in settlements such as Eerstehoek (Nhlazatshe) or Tsjakastad hidden behind hills or way over in the distant

hills, well off the newly constructed road.

People can be seen carrying buckets for long distances, collecting water from springs in the rocks. Families have been dumped over the years without even latrines being provided. Many houses still have no latrines. There are no hospitals, the nearest being 100 km away at Ermelo. It is remarkable that there have been no major health problems in the area so far.

People came off the farms because the conditions were so bad. They felt insecure, with threats of eviction and low wages (R30 - 40 per month). They were promised land for ploughing and grazing, but these false promises never materialised. Others wanted to work on the mines where they could earn well - on Ermelo mines the starting salary is R190 - 200 a month, and at the moment, if they have jobs on the mines, they can get the correct stamp in their passes - but once Kangwane is handed to Swaziland, this will no longer be possible. Some people went to Kangwane to start businesses: 'everyone sells to everyone else here'. So, as in other areas, not everyone was forcibly removed. Many were promised a better life, others left for security. Those who were dumped were not given tents, latrines or even water, and now they are to become someone else's problem.

The women organised to get themselves the right to sell from stalls. Previously they needed licences and were not granted them as they would be in competition with shopkeepers. Now they have been recognised by the chiefs. They pay R10 a year and R1 a month which goes into a fund to build a proper market. Lorries bringing vegetables and fruit from Nelspruit and Barberton deliver to the women of Fernie. A lorry driver from Amsterdam competes to sell to the women.

The people started coming into Dundonald, known as Dundon, from Kromkrans (a black spot in the Carolina area). Schools had been built for the 20 000 people from Kromkrans and people in other areas began to demand schools. The government said that people were coming in faster than expected and they could not keep up the building. In many cases parents had to build schools (in Glenmore and Diepdal), in other cases the church helped (the Roman Catholic Church built five timber classrooms and the parents built five mud classrooms for 2 000 children in Fernie). In 1981 the parents built two other primary schools out of wattle and daub. Now the government is building a secondary school.

In Mayflower (Mpulusi), however, 'the hub of Kangwane' as it is advertised, a primary and secondary school were built in 1976 before people had even moved in. Mayflower is the proposed capital of Kangwane, built for the Swazi elite. Meanwhile relocation was going on all round the hills of Mayflower, and the schools were closed as there were only two families living in Mayflower itself. In September 1982 there were a few dozen families living in Mayflower, and the shopping centre (post office, etc.) which had been completed was not open. The houses built for teachers have been taken over by officials. There is room for banks, industries and all the infrastructure of a town, even electricity and a reservoir, but Eskom has not been connected and there are few people.

The relocation areas between Lothair and Lochiel may be summarised thus:

**FERNIE** Under Chief Tobias who lives at Diepdal, Fernie has a population of 40 000 or more and is divided into two sections by a (dry) stream. The clinic was built in 1978/9. There are no taps, so people collect water from the springs and stream. People came from 1975, mainly from the farms. There were no facilities. Roads were clearings with tree stumps in them (having been plantations). The older part of Fernie is slightly better now with a few trees. People have built some houses and their own toilets. There is no land for ploughing here or at Diepdal. Those lucky enough to have jobs commute to Ermelo daily (100 km each way).

**DIEPDAL** This settlement has more than 20 000 inhabitants. The parents built a primary

school, then the government built a primary school, so the parents' one was used as a secondary. Diepdal, also known as Izinkulungwane or Itinkulunowane ('Thousands of rocks') had a clinic built in 1981. The nearest telephone for the people of Diepdal and Fernie is 30 km away. The bus and taxi service to Lothair and Ermelo is not bad for the two areas, with buses leaving from 4 a.m. and returning from 2 p.m. to 9 p.m. at night, for commuters. There is no land for ploughing for the Diepdal people.

NORTHDENE is a Trust farm next to Diepdal which is presently being prepared for an influx of people.

Three Trust farms next to each other which are densely populated are Glenmore, Dundonald, and Zwalluwnest (Swallow's Nest, Shabalala). Dundonald and Glenmore are under Chief Nhlapho. They are settlements for people from black spots such as Kromkrans in the Carolina area. Others from farms and towns have joined the people but they do not all get land automatically. Should the chief be persuaded to give one land, one lives in the settlement and then the 'co-op' of the Kangwane Development Corporation ploughs, plants and fertilises one's land and later demands a proportion of the harvest in return. A similar scheme in Lebowa is described by Debra James in her work for the SAIRR (which will be touched on later in this section). Yields have risen and in 1981 there was a good harvest (in 1982 the drought affected it), but the people do not feel involved in farming. They see the scheme as a State one with little participation from them - 'the agric guys do it all'.

GLENMORE (Ekulindeni) township has about 30 000 inhabitants. There is a telephone. The people built their own primary school in 1981. A clinic was built in 1981 too. Many people have settled their families in Glenmore, then gone to the PWV triangle to seek work. The workers return from contracts as often as funds allow. It is said that people have settled in places like Glenmore and Dundon (Dundonald) as a result of intimidation from 'soldiers'. It was reported that in the early hours of the morning soldiers come to break people's houses down, then either take them or send them to Kangwane. This has been reported to have happened in 1981 and 1982 by people who had lived near Secunda, Leandra, Bethal and Louis Trichardt. It was reported that spots which are regarded as security risks are cleared in this way. In one case about 20 families had been brought in because they lived too near a railway line.

DUNDONALD (Dundon) spreads for several kilometres on rocky hills. It is also divided into two sections Dundonald 1 and 2 by a rocky stream. There are more than 40 000 people living at Dundonald in very poor conditions. It is difficult to say that one of these settlements is much better or worse than the last. The clinic was built in 1979 and there is a telephone, but as in the other places there is no ambulance service. There is an army doctor at Amsterdam with the Swazi regiment, and he visits every clinic once a week. He serves 120 000 people. He is training people in primary health care. Private doctors from Ermelo used to visit Dundon but there seems to have been a split between them about who should visit the area and they no longer serve there. A district surgeon from Bethal goes to Lothair and the people prefer visiting him as he charges less. In 1980 health conditions were very bad, there was no doctor in the area, and many children are reported to have died.

In Dundon 2 there are no taps and people have great difficulty getting water. In Dundon 1 there is one road through the area and there are a few taps along it.

SHABALALA (Zwalluwnest, Swallow's Nest) is a small place with about 5 000 people situated between Dundonald 2 and Glenmore. Chief Shabalala is in charge of the area. People draw their water from a protected spring.

KA-MNISI is a new township not far from Glenmore. It is a small place so far, but more people are expected.

MAYFLOWER (Mpulusi) - 'the hub of Kangwane' - has already been described in some detail.

It is an anomaly in the valley surrounded by thousands upon thousands of desperately poor people who were moved there or who came with little alternative but to 'squat' around the hills of the proposed elite settlement where schools, shops, a post office and houses were built long before there were inhabitants. Show houses costing R14 000, R16 000 and R20 000 were built to try to encourage development. In July 1982 a bakery opened at Mayflower. It has its own generator and makes good bread. There is also a wholesaler opening soon (September 1982).

Chief Mathieu who was not recognised by the government and who lived in this area before mass influx through relocation, gave the people permission to live around Mayflower. If and when Mayflower develops into the town it is proposed to be, presumably the people will be moved out of sight. The Kangwane ministers did not want to have Mayflower as their capital as they were all from the Lowveld and wanted to develop Louieville (which remains a highly guarded camp site). While the 'squatters' in the hills have been given ploughing and grazing rights by this chief, it is all highly insecure. Cattle are controlled through dipping and counting, as farmers in the area complain of stolen cattle being sent into Swaziland.

REDHILL is a Trust farm between Dundonald and the Kangwane border where the Anglican Church has bought a few stands for people evicted off their farm The Brook. There has been some controversy over this action as many people from The Brook did not want to move. The local priest took it upon himself to encourage them to move, bought some plots for them and helped them settle rather than see them suffer for resistance. Most of the people who lived at The Brook have moved, not as a community but as individuals, to various places, as most of them rejected the Church's purchase of land for them. Many feel insecure as they may be moved again but they are reluctant to return to The Brook after spending a lot on building their new homes. The Church feels they should retain land at The Brook for the people but it is too late. The local priest had little broader knowledge of relocation, the process and State strategies used. In encouraging them to move he made it impossible for them to be compensated as they would have no claim to Church land. Now it is too late. The wider community has been brought into the picture and it opposes relocation but the people have been scattered and the few left feel very vulnerable.

Moving north, across the main road to the Oshoek border post, a newly constructed road skirts Eerstehoek (Nhlazatshe) where the white magistrate of the area is based. The Swazi- and Zulu-speaking people from the black spot Doornkop were moved here in their thousands in 1974. Most of them were tenants of Pedi landlords, so they were moved into a closer settlement with no access to land. Today Eerstehoek is a township with a handful of industries and facilities. People who have been moved into the Mswati/Mlondozi area of Kangwane are supposed to apply for their pensions at Eerstehoek.

#### AREAS UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL

Areas under threat of removal to this part of Kangwane include the black spots Driefontein, KwaNgema and Daggakraal, and townships of small white towns such as Lothair and Amsterdam. It seems that the policy on deproclamation of townships in the south-eastern parts of the Transvaal is changing, partly as a result of escalating costs of building replacements in the bantustans and partly to suit employers in the area. For example, mines around Ermelo have built their staff solid attractive four-roomed houses and they pay their staff well, the people say.

The area around Kangwane is being bought up by large businesses. It is said they would not mind being incorporated into Swaziland as they would get trade preference. The South African government would pump money into the area. Large saw mills employ the people close by, and some provide reasonably good facilities such as schools and day care centres (in this

case the Natal firm HLH - Hunt Leuchars and Hepburn). Bruply saw mills own Lairmore, Lochleven, The Gem, Rothesay and Izivimba farms. They are supposed to be in Kangwane but Bruply put up a big fight to keep their plantations with a large saw mill in the middle so that it became too expensive for the South African government to buy them out for consolidation. Another farm Lotzababa is owned by General Mining.

Other commercial interests in the area include, as in all bantustans, furniture retailers. There are two collection points for Elleries serving the area, one at Lothair and one at Fernie, where people pay instalments and the collection of unpaid-for goods is organised. The collection point at Lothair is shared with a white doctor from Ermelo who uses it as a surgery.

LOTHAIR location was established in 1974 and 1975 as a temporary place for people who had been living at the saw mills on private land about 1 km away. They were told not to build proper houses as they would have to move by 1977. The people were given stands and built their own shacks. They are still there. Water, when it is running, is obtained from taps at intervals along the streets. The population of Lothair is 140 whites, 60 asians, 380 blacks, and that of Lothair township is 20 coloureds and 2 940 blacks, according to the 1980 census. The move seems to have been postponed after talk of moving the people to Mayflower. The people wanted to stay in Lothair as many work in the saw mills close by. No-one has officially been moved to the bantustan yet. There has been no recent talk of moving, but everyone is insecure. Even the Roman Catholic church is built of light wood.

AMSTERDAM location is being built further out. The old location was moved as a dam was being built, but it is thought this was an excuse to move the people. People have not been moved, it is said because there is a shortage of money. According to the 1980 census there were 2 580 blacks living in the location (660 whites and 80 blacks in the white area of Amsterdam).

The 1980 census figures for the Ermelo magisterial district give a total population of 119 900 (17 040 whites, 1 040 coloureds, 640 asians, 101 180 blacks). According to the 1980 list of black spots cleared, Spitskop outside Ermelo was depleted by 675 people between 1972 and 1975. There are three townships on Spitskop farm, with new buildings including the mine housing mentioned earlier, so people must have been moved to make way for the Spitskop mine. In 1980 there were 20 500 blacks and 40 coloureds living at Wesselton, according to census figures. Parts of the old Wesselton seem to have been demolished. People are putting a lot of time, energy and capital into their township houses, which seems to indicate a reinforcement from the authorities.

There were 4 960 whites, 840 coloureds, 100 asians and 61 320 blacks classed as rural in the Ermelo district (1980 census). In 1970 there were 58 233 blacks recorded in the rural Ermelo district. Taking population growth into account, there should have been 76 754 (compounded by 2,8% over 10 years). Net emigration is therefore estimated at 15 434, a conservative figure since some people were not counted as rural in 1970 but may have been included in 1980.

DRIEFONTEIN has a population of 30 - 50 000 people speaking Zulu and Seswati. Together with KwaNgema (also known as Kaffirlokasie) next to it and Daggakraal 45 km away, Driefontein is under threat of removal. The Swazis would be moved to Kangwane, the Zulus to the Babanango district of KwaZulu. The people's response to the idea was:

These Zulus don't want to go to Kangwane. The Zulus do not want to go to KwaZulu in Natal. They want to stay in KwaZulu in the Transvaal. In the school we are teaching Zulu. There are some who speak Xhosa and Sotho. At first they wanted to move everyone to Kangwane. That was the first decision. The second decision was that the Zulus must go to Babanango. The best place they say is in the Transvaal.

Some people have already moved out of the area voluntarily with the chief. Both tenants and

landowners were amongst the approximately 500 people who have moved.

We are still in some confusion whether we are going to be moved. The landowners just refuse to move. We think the government is just going to force us and take us to a particular place.

The landowners were reported to have their titled deeds. While the Legal Resources Centre in Johannesburg is in touch with at least one of the landowners, there is concern about divisions in the community and how representative the contact with the LRC is. A community board elected by the landowners meets in the school. It sees its task as communicating between the Development Trust and the people of Driefontein. The board refuses to take a stand on the removal - some want to leave the area, others want to stay. People wanting to leave use Sophiatown as an example of what happens if communities resist removal. Those wanting to resist use Alexandra and Crossroads as examples of communities being allowed to stay after they have resisted. An SACC field report claims that the community board was elected/appointed at the instigation of the Wakkerstroom magistrate and officials of the Department of Co-operation and Development.

Efforts to persuade the people of Driefontein to move have escalated in recent months. On 27 January 1982 the magistrate and various officials visited Driefontein to make arrangements for the move with the community board. They were met by a hostile crowd and the persistent questioning of at least one member of the community. They left in a hurry. Mr Msibi, the half-literate chairman of the board, was persuaded that he should first find out what the people thought about the move before entering into negotiations. When the officials returned to Driefontein on 9 August 1982 they told the people to go to the commissioner's office at Wakkerstroom 'to register'. The party included the commissioner from Pietersburg. These officials wanted to hold a meeting with those who wanted to move. It is not clear how many people 'want' to move. Various tactics are being tried by the State, including the idea of taking the people by bus to show them the site of their relocation at Lochiel. The people refused to go and said they did not want to move.

While those who attend meetings do not want to move, they are worried about how many have gone to sign what at Wakkerstroom.

The officials say that everyone who is not against the law of the government should go and sign.

At the meeting just before Easter 1982 the chairman of the board was told by the magistrate: 'If you are not against the law, just sign.' Everyone who signed was told by the magistrate: 'You were not called here.' They were told that they had gone voluntarily to Wakkerstroom to sign. Most people refuse to go to sign. Some want to negotiate terms of removal, others just want to stay.

In 1965 the people were first told they lived on a black spot and must leave. Then they were told their land would be inundated when the Heyshope dam was built on the Assegai River to the east of Driefontein. The dam will be finished in 1982 but it does not seem the water will cover much of Driefontein.

There has been no public debate about expropriation.

It was reported that the farm had been bought in 1912 by Dr Peter Seme and associates. The land was released, unlike KwaNgema which was scheduled.

Houses were numbered for the first time in 1970 and again in 1975.

Driefontein comprises an older and a newer area. The older area is well established with fine old trees, a lot of care and investment put into the stands with fencing everywhere, well

## Annexure 4

GPS (L)

DSO 117

Telegrafiese adres } "SAMEWERKING"  
Telegraphic address }

Posbus } 384  
P.O. Box }

NAVRAE/ENQUIRIES:

TEL. No.



REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA • REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DEPARTEMENT VAN SAMEWERKING  
EN ONTWIKKELING

DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATION  
AND DEVELOPMENT

PRETORIA

0001

18/19 May 1981

Dear Sir/Madam

### INFORMATION BROCHURE

1. At the meeting held the 3rd March 1981, the Department of Co-operation and Development provided the Community with an explanatory document outlining the details of the settlement of the Driefontein people. For the convenience of the community the information contained therein is repeated. It equally applies to the people of the Kaffirlokasie.
2. The aforementioned details are as follows:
  - 2.1 The new area will be planned by a planning committee which will be composed of representatives of the Central Government, the Kangwane Government and of the Driefontein Community.
  - 2.2 Compensatory land, provided by the South African Development Trust, will not be of lesser pastoral or agricultural value than that of the land occupied at present. In the case of land owners, they will again be granted title deeds in respect of their compensatory land.
  - 2.3 The time of these resettlement will be decided on in consultation with the Community.
  - 2.4 Facilities such as school, clinics, water, temporary houses, roads and sanitation will be provided at the compensatory land by the South African Development Trust.
  - 2.5 People will be adequately compensated for their improvements and will be allowed to take with them to the new area whatever reclaimable material they wish, e.g. doors, windowframes, corrugated iron, etc.

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Such material will be transported free of charge to the new area by the South African Development Trust.

- 2.6 The South African Development Trust will transport people by bus from their present abode to the new area, where they will be settled with the least possible inconvenience.
- 2.7 The South African Development Trust will pay compensation for damages caused to belongings during the settlement action.
- 2.8 During the moving period the South African Development Trust will provide rations free of charge for a period of three (3) days.
- 2.9 Tents or prefabricated houses, to be used as temporary housing, will - on request - be provided free of charge for a period after settlement by the South African Development Trust.
- 2.10 The people of the community will enjoy the same privileges in the new area as those which they enjoy at present. Furthermore as they will form a closer unity in the new area with the Kangwane Government they will be in an even better position to enjoy such privileges and facilities as their Government may offer.

Yours faithfully

DIRECTOR-GENERAL: DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

built houses, stock in good condition, many churches, a few telephones, three schools all built by the community. The lower primary school, Qalani, has about 2 000 pupils taught on a double-shift system. The Cabangani Higher Primary accommodates 800 pupils from Standard 3 to 5. The Qedelani Secondary serves 400 scholars from Form 1 to 3.

Driefontein is quite densely populated but has few shops. There seemed to be lots of activity although most of the younger people work outside the area, some on the surrounding farms (men, women and children), others in Johannesburg. Some people made a living working on the land alone. New tenants kept coming in, coming from various farms:

They have been chased away. They come here before they move somewhere else.

It seems that people from the farms feel they can get access to land in Kangwane if they move to Driefontein. The assumption is that when Driefontein is moved, everyone will be given compensatory land.

The amount of land given to tenants depended on the landowner. Most of the landowners have 10 morgen each. Some tenants wanted to move.

The labour tenant system used to apply in the district. It seems the practice still exists to some extent. Wages on the farms are very low.

They get a bag of mielie meal a month. If you have two boys who are working for life, you can have six cattle. They live there and the mielies come from the white farmers. If the sons moved to Johannesburg, the family must move.

In some cases the boys run away and the fathers have to take their place so that the family is not evicted.

They start working at about 12 years of age. Some feed the pigs, others tend to the cattle and ducks. If there are no ploughing fields, the small boys work taking off bark. The women also take off bark. Sometimes they get 50 kg of mielie meal, sometimes also two tins of fish and sometimes a packet of salt.

The people of Driefontein used to work on the coal mines but since people refused to move the males can no longer get jobs on the mines. Another tactic used for getting the people to move 'voluntarily' was:

The magistrate refused to use men from Driefontein on the dam because they refused to move.

If they went to the magistrate to try to find work it was difficult, so most left the district to seek work themselves. There is 'a lot' of unemployment. Previously people had worked in Piet Retief, Amersfoort, Wakkerstroom and Paulpietersburg. Relationships with local white farmers were reported as good until the mid-1960s when some white farmers complained of competition for farm labour. Driefontein farmers offered workers accommodation and a bit of land for ploughing. Later they complained their mielies were being stolen.

Apart from the community board, there is no organisation. There are no clubs other than the soccer clubs which play in leagues with Ermelo, Carolina and other places (but not Daggakraal). The Churches do not organise.

The community built a clinic but had a problem with water until a doctor from the University of the Witwatersrand helped with a windmill which should be operational soon. The problem is there is no nurse and no-one to pay for one. The doctor is hoping to raise funds for a nurse. If they are moved, he advised, they should get compensation for their clinic which was started in 1975. If there is no clinic, they should not move to the new place. The nearest operational clinic is at Piet Retief hospital, although private doctors do sometimes practise from the shop. There are no serious health problems in the community.

The people are very worried and confused about the move. They feel they are not strong enough to resist. They are not united, and the State is doing all in its power to keep things that way. They had been told that if they moved they would get tents for six months and in that time they should build their houses. But, they asked, why did the government not do the building, and put up houses before they arrived?

There are many old people who cannot build for themselves. They don't have sons and daughters to build for them. The people come back from Johannesburg when they are old.

It was felt that maybe the real reason for moving Driefontein was that there are coal mines nearby and that would be attractive to whites. They have not had the area tested for coal. There is abundant water and many boreholes which would make the farm very attractive.

The people felt they would be more successful in their resistance if from the start they had refused to move, as Daggakraal has done. STOP PRESS See p 110 above.

KWANGEMA (Kaffirlokasie) is a scheduled black area accommodating at least 15 000 people on the farm next to Driefontein. The people are in the same situation. Chief Ngema seems to be leading the resistance to the removal. A young man, he attended the Driefontein meeting with the magistrate on 27 January 1982 to 'take a few notes. They are coming to our village at 2 p.m.'

They have their own community board at KwaNgema.

DAGGAKRAAL is released land about 45 km from Driefontein, with about 20 000 people on three farms - Daggakraal 1, 2 and 3. Houses were first numbered in 1969 and since then, it seems, the people have 'flatly refused to move'.

We don't want to move, but the department says we must move. But the residents are refusing to move. The matter is on the table but it is not finalised yet. They were here on 10 August (1982). They had a meeting with the property owners. They were told that the people do not want to move. No one has moved yet.

Chief Moloi did not attend the meeting as he is not a property owner.

The people had heard nothing about the proposed move since 1976 until the officials arrived in 1982. They were told that the Zulus would go to Babanango, the Sothos to Qwaqwa, and the Swazis to near Nelspruit.

We are living together well. There is no trouble here. I am a Sotho. I married a Zulu.

The property owners still have their title deeds. Some own 20 morgen, others up to 90 morgen. Most people are tenants, and many new tenants are coming in to get plots from the property owners. People pay between R25 and R50 a year for land. They grow mielies and kaffircorn, and some have cattle.

The land looked very dry with severe erosion, few trees and not nearly as well established settlement as Driefontein. Settlement was more extensive. Fewer plots were fenced, and the place looked poorer than Driefontein.

Dr Peter Seme advised the people of Daggakraal to buy their farm from a Mr Potgieter. Dr Seme had lived at Struikfontein, halfway to Volksrust. The Zulus bought Daggakraal in 1911, and the Sothos came in 1912. People have therefore owned the land and lived together as a settled community for generations.

In recent years a community board was elected/appointed at Daggakraal in the presence of the magistrate. It is known as the 'Committee of 12' and has members from Daggakraal 1, 2

and 3. Mr Joshua Moloi was elected chairman. The community itself meets about once a month. It does not work with other communities under threat of removal and has no help from outside organisations.

The Driefontein people were very impressed at the strong stand Daggakraal had taken:

They refuse to move. They say the government must bring an agenda first. They do not want to talk to the South African Development Trust. They refuse to discuss the move.

Daggakraal people were reported to have said, 'If we see anyone taking or carrying a piece of that white man's paper, we'll kill them.' 'Do NOT sign anything without consulting us', they told their leaders.

The Daggakraal people have not been told why they must move. They think that perhaps whites want it for farming, 'some say the place is fertile'.

Most of the people work in Johannesburg, Standerton and Bethal. Very few work on the surrounding farms.

There are four schools at Daggakraal. There were 750 children at one lower and higher primary school combined. There is a secondary school. The parents built the schools. The department would not help. The parents want to extend the schools but are afraid their efforts will be wasted.

It seems that these three black spots - Driefontein, KwaNgema and Daggakraal - are the only ones left still to be cleared in the Eastern Transvaal. The removal of Kromkrans ('People were convinced by the government to move') and Doornkop caused the greatest upheaval and resistance in this region, and it could safely be predicted that the forced removal of Driefontein, KwaNgema and Daggakraal would cause similar, if not worse, unrest.

Some indications of feeling on the proposed inclusion of Kangwane into Swaziland were picked up on the field trip. It seems the vast majority of people see no advantage in being incorporated into Swaziland.

The Swazis come to work in South Africa. How will we be able to find work from outside?

The people say they are worried about the mines, factories and jobs not being incorporated, only the people will be incorporated. Swaziland will not only inherit hundreds of thousands of relocated poverty-stricken people, but more who are to be moved at a later stage from Driefontein, KwaNgema and Daggakraal.

Swaziland is considered traditional and tribal with its chiefs and royal family. There is no real loyalty to them and the attitude is 'They can rule that side.' In South Africa people have become more conscious of democratic rule, and for all the inadequacy of bantustan politics, there is some leeway and choice. The Kangwane legislative assembly members were never particularly active in the Lothair - Lochiel area but some were good speakers and had a fair following, especially among shopkeepers. The women did manage to organise a market system with the authorities. Mabuza is seen to be actively opposing the incorporation into Swaziland. Most of the people are Zulu and Swazi mixed, with some Sothos, but there has never been ethnic conflict. The greatest differences seem to be class differences between people off the farms, those from the towns, and the migrants who participate in urban politics. All these aspects go towards making the Kangwane legislative assembly, as it was before dissolution, an ally against the South African and Swazi governments.

The people regard themselves as closer to the Zulus than the Swazis. Some of the chiefs

work with Chief Buthulezi, particularly since the joint threat to Kangwane and Ingwavuma.

## DEPORTATION OF MOZAMBIQUANS

During 1982 (Sunday Tribune, 1.08.82) there was an outcry from farmers in the Lowveld about plans of the Department of Co-operation and Development to repatriate some 40 000 Mozambiquans working in the area. In the Komatipoort area alone there were 12 000 working with permits and 400 working illegally. Farmers complained that local labour was almost unobtainable as local blacks were attracted to the urban areas. The chairman of the Lebombo Farmers' Association, Mr Jan Lourens, said that

Even black entrepreneurs in Kangwane have applied to the commissioner for 'no objection' permits to recruit Mozambiquans because of the labour shortage.

Meanwhile thousands of Mozambiquans, forced by unemployment and hunger, enter the area illegally to try to find work. Farmer Tommy Thompson said that at reaping time he was forced to employ illegal labour as there was no local labour. Others preferred to employ the Mozambiquans at lower wages than the locals would accept. A legally employed worker who had been with the same employer for 26 years was still earning the minimum contract wage of R65 a month. Out of that he sends home money for his family in Mozambique.

It was announced that the plans to repatriate these workers would be dropped. The farmers argued that although there was a security risk in employing Mozambiquans, there would be greater risk if the farms on the border were deserted - and that could happen, as farmers would not be able to afford to pay locals to work on their farms.

## LEBOWA

A field trip was undertaken in the southern part of Lebowa, from Burgersfort (which may be included in Lebowa at some future date) through Sekhukhuneland to Nebo district to Groblersdal. Impressions were fleeting but contrasted remarkably with Kangwane.

Firstly, there are few closer settlements the sheer size of Kangwane relocation areas. There is far more extensive settlement in traditional patterns, mainly in the reserve areas of Sekhukhuneland, most of which land is released in that part of the world. Rogerson and Letsoalo say there are 16 closer settlements and 44 planned in Lebowa to contain about 200 000 people. The settlements vary from 500 to 16 000 in size, with a mean of 3 000. They say there is a strong relationship between the lack of closer settlements and strong resistance to betterment in Lebowa, using the Bochum area and Sekhukhuneland as examples.

Secondly, the part of Lebowa under consideration is closer to the metropolitan area of the PWV, making it easier for those endorsed out of urban areas and those feeling too insecure in urban areas, to build a family base in Lebowa and commute from there. There is a remarkable amount of building and trading visible from the road through Sekhukhuneland and Nebo. Even though the land is dry, eroded and dusty with very bad roads, conditions appear more stable and better established than in areas recently described.

The impact of the people from the black spot Doornkop (20 km north of Middelburg (Transvaal)) who were moved by force in 1974 is noticeable. Everywhere people talk about them and how they have affected the politics and economics of the area. Resistance to removals in the area has been an integral part of history for the last 30 years, and this continues with the resistance of the people in the Dennilton area either to coming under KwaNdebele or to being moved so that their land will revert to white control.

Although the place was not visited, it is worth recording a little of the story of the Mamathlola people who were evicted in 1958 from their scheduled land which they had bought near Tzaneen in 1907. They had been farming there for two centuries. They fought the removal order by appealing to parliament under a provision in the Native Administration Act, but the appeal was unsuccessful. (This example is referred to in describing Uitkyk in the Western Transvaal section below.) Only half the people got land at Metz, the rest were moved to the closer settlement of Moetladimo. Plots are small and are continually subdivided. Small crops of cashew nuts, pumpkins and other vegetables are grown as well as one bag of mielies per family per year. According to Letsoala who surveyed the area, 90% of the Metz residents - including the farmers - depend on bought provisions. A third of the families keep cattle.

In a settlement where 73% of the families are headed by women, one third of the families count on remittances from migrant workers for at least half their income. In the days when they farmed near Tzaneen, only 2% of the families depended on cheques from migrant workers.

The high dependence of the people of Metz on migratory labour becomes more disturbing in view of the fact that betterment planning was intended to reduce the rate of labour migration.

There are two buses a week run by the Lebowa Development Corporation, plying the route between Metz and Penge Mine. The SA Railway bus service, from Metz to the PWV, operates every weekend. Two private bus services travel daily from Metz to Phalaborwa/Tzaneen.

When Metz was first planned, there was provision for dryland farming as well as an area suitable for irrigation. But the village has grown and the closer settlement extended; and the dryland area has gone. An area set aside for irrigable land has been extended. Household water must be drawn from a canal, there are no sanitary facilities and only one school; but there is an agricultural training centre and a hospital not far away.

(RDM, 21.06.82)

The people of Metz have been punished for their resistance to removal. They were successfully used as an example to others who considered resisting. People say that the government has all the power to move them and it doesn't help to resist. You are only moved to a worse place in the end. This may have been the case in the 1950s and 1960s, but there are indications that resistance in the 1970s and 1980s is changing that response.

The Penge asbestos mine is reportedly not doing too well and not all the houses in the settlement for workers are full.

There are a number of relocation areas around Burgersfort including Bothashoek, Praktiseer (Tubatshe), Naboomkoppies (Ga-Motodi) (7 140 people), Alverton (4 831 people) and more along the road through the Steelpoort valley.

Table 1 NUMBERS IN VILLAGES AROUND BURGERSFORT

Village	Families	People
Naboomkoppies	1 020	7 140
Alverton	812	4 831
Zamenhoop	263	3 253
Kromellenborg	109	1 016
Rooiboklaagte	603	3 618

Holfontein	217	852
Annesley (Segorong)	529	1 308
Streatham (Mamogolo)	142	852
Onverwacht	249	1 174
Valleymines (Mahlashi)	374	2 213
Klipfontein (Makgwareng)	328	2 381
Rietfontein	1 152	11 209
Ardwick (Mokatung)	128	893
Sterkspruit, Trust farm	222	891
Sterkspruit, tribal farm	102	507
California (Leboweng)	713	3 820
Nooitgedacht (Leboweng)	722	3 862
Perkeo (Tswenyane)	114	414
Aanlaga (Strydom tunnel)	51	347
Chorhon	387	3 254
Koedoeskraal (Ga-Makofane)	993	5 958
Morgenson (Ga-Motaba)	56	587
Zonneschyn (Ga-Motshane)	208	1 158
TOTAL	9 494	61 538

from official figures obtained from local priest

There are a number of recently incorporated Trust farms round Burgersfort, including Thionville and Fau Ballagh. It seems land north of the railway line is being incorporated. People were moved from the settlement of Faugh-a-Ballagh (so spelt) when the SADT bought the land, to be used for commercial farming. A caretaker who keeps cattle was the only one living on Fau Ballagh farm in September 1982.

Burgersfort does not have a township. The people commute from the bantustan close by and there are a few squatters near the railway station. About 2 000 people live around the Monaps River (Aapiesdoorn area). The area seemed quite well established and there is talk that it will be allowed to remain, although it is understood not to be part of Lebowa. Some of the people farm there, others work in Burgersfort.

Farm removals have slowed down since 1973, and the stream of people off the farms into Lebowa seems to be easing. Most people in this district have already been moved off the farms. The Roman Catholic mission reported that they had to get rid of all the people who were not working at the mission. Families of weavers could stay on the farm but the commissioner investigates and others are removed.

Wages on the white farms are R1 per day plus food. Many children work on the farms, aged from 10 years old. The farmers are not keen to have many families on their farms and would rather go into Lebowa with their trucks to recruit women and children for harvest work. The ratio of men to women working on the farms in this area is about 1:3.

Winterveld, a farm outside Burgersfort, is being mined, and the people living there were moved off the land in 1978/9. They had lived in the villages of New Jerusalem and Jericho

where they had their own churches and made pots for sale.

In some places people still have land to plough although newcomers never get land. Chiefs allocate the land. There are chiefs in Monaps (with authority over Alverton), Bothashoek, Naboomkoppies, Rietfontein (Kgautswane) (which is an old village with seven others under the chief).

About 16 km west of Burgersfort lies the closer settlement of Bothashoek, established in 1970. At Bothashoek live people from the black spot of Doornkop, ex-labour tenants, and people evicted from various places. In 1972 people were moved in off farms from the Burgersfort area but the main influx came from Doornkop in 1974 when 600 families arrived with the chieftainess. Debra James has written the story of Doornkop/Bothashoek and Monsterlus in detail, and so what follows will only be a summary.

Doornkop was purchased in 1905 by about 200 people for about R7 000. The 856 ha farm 20 km north of Middelburg was owned by 598 landowners at the time of the relocation. Landowners were not compensated for their land because they had been offered alternative sites at Bothashoek. They were compensated R149 650 for housing, churches and shops (SAIRR Survey 1975, p 139). At the time of the move there were more than 20 000 people living there. In arguing that the Doornkop people should move, Mr Punt Janson said the place was a slum and that the population had increased dramatically from 2 408 in 1967 to 7 760 in 1970 and over 20 000 by 1973. He said the 285 Pedi landowners would be compensated (RDM, 7.05.74).

They had been under threat of removal since 1956 and had tried every means of resistance. In 1965 they fought a legal case and won, then they were expropriated and given until 25 June 1974 to move.

From all accounts Doornkop was a viable farm. The younger men would go to the cities and towns to work but if they were unemployed there would always be enough at home to fall back on. Families supplemented their harvest with cash wages until the 1950s when they began to supplement their cash earnings with what they could grow. Increasing numbers of tenants went to live at Doornkop. At the time of the move they were paying R20 a year in rent.

There was little conflict between landowners and tenants until early 1974 when the elders blamed the tenants for the forced move. They said the whites evicted the labour tenants who went to Doornkop, now whites argued that Doornkop had been turned into a slum and must be moved. If anyone should move, said the elders, it should be the tenants (RDM, 4.04.74).

However, there was a long fight to stay at Doornkop. The people, represented by the councillors and the then regent, Miriam Ramaube, refused to be moved to Bothashoek, the compensatory farm. The chieftainess was jailed for her lack of co-operation. In 1970, threatened with a third jail sentence, she agreed to move to Bothashoek with seven 'loyal' families. The State had managed to divide the community, but the remainder stayed until they were forcibly removed in 1974. They had elected a new chief, Albert Ramaube. The people were divided on whether or not the chieftainess had had any option - some believed she was duped.

Conditions at Bothashoek were bad. People were moved the 300 km from Doornkop at dawn with 20 police vehicles, 60 BAD trucks and an army helicopter. The tragic and violent story is reported in the Star (26.06.74) and RDM (27.06.74).

The land was not as arable and the people lived in tin huts for six months. Coming from an area where they had well built houses, three dams and a borehole, they were dumped into a betterment scheme with little control over what poor land they were given. The farm as originally surveyed was 1 385 morgen, but the people were not given the flat land below the road as it was to be farmed by the Lebowa Department of Agriculture, first to grow lucerne, then cotton. People from the area get some seasonal work on the Tswelopele cotton project

of the department.

The land above the road is officially the betterment scheme, planned before the Doornkop people moved in, but most of the land has been taken up by expansion of the settlement with people moving in. People get plots of only one-eighth of a morgen, paying between R40 and R60 to the chief for the plot.

Doornkop people have taps, but the rest have to fetch water from their area. It is free but not always clean. Sanitation is a problem. People are fined if they do not build their own latrines, but when the rains come then those built on clay are washed away. There are no major health problems.

There are three cafes in Bothashoek charging 24c for 250 g sugar, R20 a sack of mielie meal, 30c a carton of Jawala, 50c a litre of paraffin, 22c a cake of soap, 11c a candle, R1,68 for 1 kg washing powder, R2,90 a bag of coal (there are three coal yards; no wood is sold or to be collected in the area). There are special Lebowa police who arrest people collecting wood.

Facilities are few - just two schools. A lower and higher primary combined school has 300-400 children and 12 teachers, and a lower secondary has 130 pupils and five teachers. The pupils have to wear uniform. School fees are R3 a year. There are no churches here or at Praktiseer next door, so people worship in houses and schools.

People are subject to the chief and Lebowa authorities. They pay R2 a year in Lebowa tax. The chief was the only leader cited.

The nearest place of wage employment is Burgersfort but it is too small to provide jobs for everyone. Most men work on the mines at Winterveld and the chrome mines in the area. There is a labour bureau at Praktiseer but very few people find jobs through it. People wait for firms from the Reef to offer them jobs there. The white farmers fetch women and children every day by truck to work in the Burgersfort area. Most men work on the mines and some on the farms.

From a survey of 121 households in 1980, the average family size was found to be 6,5 (with up to 23 members per household). 47% had one worker regularly absent and working outside Bothashoek. On average each household had one migrant labourer employed earning R72 per month, with R40 as the mean. 13% had NO regular income. Local jobs included teaching, casual work on roads, seasonal work on white farms, and the Tswelopele cotton project.

14% of migrants were weekly migrants on the chrome mines in Sekhukuneland. Most people worked on the PWV, with the Eastern Transvaal (where they had worked before the move) coming next. There were no male migrants in agriculture. Most females were domestic workers. A very low income was reported from the informal sector because they are so far from centres where income is generated.

A fifth of the households are dependent on pensions. Without access to agriculture or local employment, people survive from migrant labour, informal sector and pensions (information from Letsoalo and RDM, 21.06.82). The population of Bothashoek is estimated at 16 000.

Next to Bothashoek is the township of Tubatshe (Thubatshe, Praktiseer) where some of the Doornkop 'dissidents' eventually moved. Further down the road is the older relocation area of Naboomkoppies (Ga-Motodi). There does not seem to have been much significant movement into the area since 1975. It is a well established area with a fair number of solid buildings, but water is a problem. It is very dry and rocky. People at Alverton across the river moved from Naboomkoppies after a dispute, according to Cosmas Desmond. People had been moved from the Lutheran Mission farm of Boomplaats in the 1960s. They were promised that they would not be put under a chief but this was changed, and rather than live under Chief Sekhukuni

many of them moved across the river to Alverton to live under Chief Manoko (Desmond, pp 137-9). The area has at least three schools, three churches, a shop, brickyards, and many cattle at Naboomkoppies. There is a large Lutheran church.

Driekoppies, an area on the road to Pietersburg, is proving very popular and has a lot of recent immigration. It is under Chief Maroga.

Travelling from Burgersfort along the Steelpoort valley (which has been declared an industrial development area), one passes a number of closer settlements on the Lebowa bank of the river. One of these settlements is Boschkloof (Mampuru) where a group of people from a black spot were relocated. Their chief resisted removal strongly. Finally in 1971/2 the authorities flew the resisting chief by helicopter to the new place and dumped him. They moved the people using tear gas. 'If you move we'll jail you', the people were told. The Lebowa Minister of Works lives in Phesha, the settlement next to Boschkloof.

Turning into Sekhukuneland, one is struck by the endless settlement and drought-stricken areas. Two villages were seen along the road that had been deserted. One, Mmela, near the Jane Furse hospital, was deserted as the people heard the road was going to cut a curve through their village. That was in 1979. The other village was deserted as a result of a dispute with the chief.

Between Glencowie and the Jane Furse hospital is a small place, another 'Doornkop', where some of the 'dissidents' found land.

Before discussing the next area, a few words on farm labour practices:

Many of the people in closer settlements are ex-labour tenants off farms in the surrounding white areas. By 1974 labour tenancy appears to have been abolished on most of the farms. Ex-tenants left the farms for Lebowa in the hope of educational opportunities for their children as well as to escape the exploitative conditions on the farms. Many others were evicted.

According to James the people became indentured on the farms after a war between the boers and Ndebele (Mapoch's war, c 1885). The Ndebele lost and were handed out to the boers as a kind of booty.

By 1974 some farmers in the Middelburg district were sending trucks to the Western Transvaal to pick up seasonal wage labourers and bring them to live in compounds on their farms. They complained bitterly that as soon as they had fetched these labourers, many of them would disappear into Doornkop and never be seen again. The workers would use Doornkop as a base for looking for work in the urban areas. Some farmers said they would be in favour of having labourers living on their farms again with their families, as happened in the days of labour tenancy. They gave humanitarian reasons for wanting this, but it was obviously related to the instability of the farm labour supply at the time. (This information is based on interviews with farmers conducted by Patrick Laurence for the RDM, June 1974).

In the Western Transvaal section below there is a description of the changing nature of farm labour and mechanisation. The story in the Eastern Transvaal is very different. It was often said in the Nebo district that farmers would come in with trucks to recruit mainly women and children to work on the farms, as far away as Brits. In one day someone counted 75 trucks taking people away, including young children between 10 and 12 years old. Wages are R22 a month plus food. There does not seem to be any direct compulsion involved, except the need for subsistence.

Land shortage is the main problem in the area. The eight farms between Bosele and Motetema,

which could not provide a living for the eight white families who owned them, are now home for over 100 000 people. In 1978 the rainfall was 18 cm. 1980 was an exceptional year with 37 cm rainfall but 1982 has been dry again.

Since 1962 the area around Lukau mission has been a relocation tract. Most of the people are forced to seek work as migrant workers in Pretoria, on the Reef, and in Witbank on the coal and power plants. Most jobs offered by the local labour bureaux are in the building industry or agriculture.

MONSTERLUS (HLOGOTLOU) is the other major closer settlement where people were moved from Doornkop. There must be about 15 000 people living in the various parts of the settlement, in relatively better conditions than Bothashoek, thanks apparently to the energies of the most popular MP in Lebowa, Andries Mahlangu (allegedly murdered in 1981). Mahlangu was the widely favoured Ndebele leader who refused to be included in KwaNdebele, preferring to stay under Lebowa.

The region is known as the Mahlangu Trust area or Spehaku. It was bought from white farmers by the SADT, except for four farms which were bought by blacks and have been incorporated into Lebowa.

The first blacks arrived here as labour tenants on the white farms. From 1950 to 1965 the farms were planned. Labour tenants moved in in the late 1960s, evicted from farms as the system was abolished, but the bulk of the population arrived after 1968. Debra James describes the area in some detail.

Most people in Monsterlus have to find work on the Reef although a few do commute an hour each way to work in Groblersdal.



People are still pouring into Monsterlus because it is known as a better place than most. Schools, a clinic, houses have been built. Mahlangu organised the building of a teacher training college, and the electricity and water supplies. Many professional and skilled people from Johannesburg come to build houses here in an attempt to get a secure base. They may not live in the houses themselves but see the place as somewhere to go in their old age.

Doornkop people who settled here rather than at Bothashoek have not, by and large, managed to get land, but they are probably marginally better off in a more 'developed' environment.

Doornkop black spot has become an army camp. People were reported to have tried to go back there and been evicted.

TAFELKOP is a large closer settlement of about 25 000 people not far from Monsterlus. Chief Rammuphudu, Minister of the Interior of Lebowa, was relocated here with his people from Maleoskop in the early 1960s. Maleoskop, between Middelburg and Loskop, is now the site of a South African police college. The people were dumped at Tafelkop in mid-winter with no water or shelter. They trekked back to their original settlement two or three times, and each time the police brought them back to Tafelkop. Their antipathy to the Bantu Affairs chief commissioner was so great that when he tried to address them through an interpreter he was mobbed and escaped with his life. The interpreter was killed.

Until recently when ethnic differences were emphasised there was no friction between Pedi and Ndebele living in the Nebo district or Moutse (described in the next section). It was proposed that the Ndebele in Nebo cede to KwaNdebele, but Mahlangu and the people there refuse. The Pedis in the Moutse area are similarly refusing to come under the authority of KwaNdebele. Lebowa has stated that it is not interested in 'independence' and hence



resources are being channelled to KwaNdebele whose semi-literate legislative assembly is about to adopt 'independence', much to the concern of the people - Ndebele, Pedi, Zulu and Swazi - living there.

### 2.3.3 Central Transvaal

#### KWANDEBELE (GROBLERSDAL TO PRETORIA)

From the lush green fields and hills around Groblersdal, one is shocked by the dry, dusty, overcrowded desert of KwaNdebele. The main part of KwaNdebele is a piece of land with three prongs. Two curve around a part of excised Lebowa, Moutse 3 (including part of Dennilton in the east); other parts of the border curve in the north around another piece of excised Lebowa, Moutse 1, and a bit of Bophuthatswana soon to be excised (Moretele 2); and the south-western border curves around white farms. It is proposed to create the soon-to-be-independent KwaNdebele from bits of Lebowa, Bophuthatswana and white farms. (Moutse 2 is a tiny wedge excised from Lebowa in the middle of the whole thing, bordering Moretele 2.)

Thus KwaNdebele comprises Moutse 1, 2 and 3 and Trust farms. These farms are Vlaklaagte, Gembokspruit, Tweefontein, Vaalbank, Vrischgewaagd, Boekenhout (according to Dr Koornhof's reply to parliamentary question 43 in 1981 - but there are two farms in the area (Boekenhoutfontein and Boekenhouthoek) so it is not clear which, or whether both, are included), Kwaggafontein, Leeufontein, Pieterskraal (which cannot be found on the map), Siyabuswa and Goederede. The 1975 proposals allowed for a land area of less than 75 000 ha although more than 200 000 people live there officially. Population increased by 136% between 1975 and 1979, by 39% between 1979 and 1980, by 50% between 1980 and 1981. From field trips it is estimated that there are at least 300 000 people living in KwaNdebele in 1982.

According to a special report on KwaNdebele (RDM, 15.06.82) there are 13 810 workers employed in factories, shops, domestic service and on farms in Pretoria, Bronkhorstspuit, Cullinan, on the Reef, in Middelburg, Witbank, Groblersdal, Marble Hall, Nylstroom and Warmbaths. Of commuters leaving KwaNdebele in the morning,

13%	go between 2 and 3 a.m.
24%	2.30 and 4 (sic)
21,4%	4 and 4.30
32,7%	4.30 and 5
8,4%	5 and 5.30

Yet many people have moved to KwaNdebele 'voluntarily' because they see it is the closest bantustan to the urban areas and this is their only chance to work in town, find a place to stay, and be 'legal'. People try to go somewhere where the household can stay together, but there have been cases reported of people having to leave their families further out because there was no-one to look after the children for long hours. So far the KwaNdebele authorities have welcomed everybody and not demanded ethnic purity, but the already repressive legislative assembly is likely to become more ethnic-minded - their resources are very stretched now and yet they are being forced to take more people off the farms, and the Pedi people in Moutse refuse to move or be administered by KwaNdebele.

KwaNdebele is administered at present by the Department of Co-operation and Development. Since the excision of Moutse, the Pedis have shown their resistance to being relocated. In October and November 1981, Dr Koornhof went to Dennilton to try to persuade Chief Mathebe and his 90 000 people to move, on the lines that the land being offered between Marble Hall and Roedtan was better than their present land or that he would make arrangements with

KwaNdebele to administer them. The chief said he had been to see the land, and it was worse than the land they presently occupied. They did not want to move, nor did they want to become part of KwaNdebele. Dr Koornhof promised to consider their reply but they have heard nothing for 10 months.

It is proposed that the land east of the road be returned to South Africa because there are mines there. The Elandsdoorn township would become the mine township, and the area towards Loskop where the magistrate is based now would become the white mine township.

The Pedi people are angry with Pretoria, not with the Ndebeles. They say they recognise who is behind the plans, but they have threatened civil war if they are forced to live under KwaNdebele. Meanwhile KwaNdebele is still claiming all the land from Monsterlus to the black spot area in the Groblersdal district. The people in the region have been moved at least twice, once off the white farms and black spots, and now for ethnic sorting. The chief at Monsterlus is a Ndebele and he and his people do not want to move or be administered by KwaNdebele. Mystery surrounds the death of Andries Mahlangu, the Ndebele MP in the Lebowa government, since he and his people wanted to remain and develop Monsterlus.

The conflict continues. The Chief Minister of KwaNdebele gave a speech in Dennilton saying the whole area belonged to him. The Pedis ignored him, and Co-operation and Development continue administering the area.

KwaNdebele claims all the land as far as and including Cullinan. The road to Cullinan is presently being tarred. Traffic is unbelievably heavy and the roads are in shocking condition, made worse by heavy vehicles carrying commuters.

Holiday Inns plan to build a casino and holiday complex at the hot spring resort at Die Bron near Verena. This would be the closest casino to Pretoria, a rival to the Southern Sun chain at Sun City.

A R35 million canal is being built from Loskop dam to provide water for KwaNdebele. 75% of the capital's water is supposed to be provided on site, while the rest of the areas are served by tanker lorries and water piped to street corner taps.

As has been said, KwaNdebele is seen as a refuge for various ethnic groups, as at Moretele where there are Pedis, Tswanas, Ndebeles and even Malawians. (There were a number of Malawians moved off the black spot Doornkop into a special part of Siyabuswa, known as Malawian Avenue.)

It was rumoured that if Pretoria gave Bophuthatswana Mafikeng, Bophuthatswana would give up Moretele 2 for KwaNdebele. No final proposals for Moretele have been announced.


An independent survey by the Human Sciences Research Council indicated that 55,4% of the people have come to KwaNdebele from white farms in the Delmas, Witbank, Middelburg area. Another 29% came from Bophuthatswana, with only 8,4% drawn from white urban areas.

Almost 36% of them gave "personal reasons" for moving. Mr Buys (KwaNdebele Secretary for the Interior) said this included a strongly expressed desire for their children to learn Ndebele rather than Tswana at school.


A third of the people interviewed in the sample said they moved because of pressure from the Bophuthatswana government. Other reasons given were financial circumstances (7,9%), better opportunities (8,9%) and having been given notice by the farmer (4,6%).

(RDM, 15.06.82)

With increasingly strict influx control keeping the rural poor out of the cities, KwaNdebele



source: Africa Institute ( )



source: Africa Institute ( )

will become more attractive as a gateway to the PWV, but once the bantustan takes independence in the next year or so the people will be squeezed between a repressive regime and influx control. In order to provide for the few who support them, the KwaNdebele authorities will have to limit access to resources and infrastructure. The only way will be to appeal to ethnic loyalty and once again force a removal by pressurising the others to leave.

#### BOPHUTHATSWANA

No SPP work has been done in the pieces of Bophuthatswana close to Pretoria except for a study of Winterveld reported in Part 3 below.

In August 1982 there were more reports of Bophuthatswana authorities harassing and victimising non-Tswana citizens of Ramagodi near Garankuwa. People claimed that daily raids left many homeless, both plot-owners and tenants. Raids enabled hooligans masquerading as police to attack residents and rob them of their belongings. Residents also said they had to pay up to R80 to the authorities to have their dead buried at the local cemetery. They claimed they had had their reference documents confiscated at the Odi magistrate's court. People are told to go to Brits to get documents (South African ones) or to go to KwaNdebele. The deputy chief magistrate denied that documents were confiscated unless they were out of date, in which case people had to apply for new ones, or they were false -

Identity document rackets are rife and some people are arrested for dealing with documents illegally. (Star, 13.08.82)

Meanwhile thousands of people stream to the Odi district in the hope of living close to the urban areas so that they might get jobs without the urban qualification. Many are employed illegally, others are commuters or contract workers who travel between the 'independent' country and the Pretoria area daily.

### 2.3.4 Western Transvaal

For the researcher the Western Transvaal is far less complex than the rest of the country for two main reasons: State policy is in the last stages of implementation and most people have already been moved; and there is only one bantustan, Bophuthatswana. For the people, conditions are among the worst in the country. They have been shunted into dry flat land on the Botswana border with not even the rolling green hills of Gazankulu or the lush vegetation of Venda to console them. The fertile grain belt is either still in white hands or those of the para-statal Agricor. Access to land that would produce anything is therefore extremely limited.

#### BOPHUTHATSWANA

Thousands of people have been shunted from the small towns and the black spots into the newly 'independent' Bophuthatswana. Thousands more have had to move off the white farms in the Transvaal and OFS because of oppressively poor working conditions. There is nowhere else for them to 'trek' to but Bophuthatswana. This is taken as a sign of the Tswana people 'flocking home' to share in the fruits of independence - independence has freed them from 'colonialism'. The rhetoric is frightening. The reality is that Bophuthatswana, like all the

other bantustans, is the dumping ground of the old, the infirm, the children and the unemployed. Commuters who are lucky enough to have jobs spend hours and rands travelling to 'minister to the needs of the white man' in white South Africa.

There are only three black spots still to be moved in terms of policy. There is likely to be a further clearing of townships next to small towns, because they have been deproclaimed but not everyone has been moved. The workers will remain in hostels or move with their families to the nearest piece of Bophuthatswana and then have to commute. In the early 1970s all the small towns were cleared of the pensioners, aged and unemployed. Families were moved next.

Although thousands have been moved against their will and conditions in the relocation areas are bad, people were reported as being very outspoken. There was a surprising amount of talk of 'going back'. Communities seemed to feel that forced removals were just a stage in the history of South Africa. The Rooigrond people regard themselves as temporarily removed although they have been there ten years; the Mabaalstad people (Rietfontein and Wolfontein) want to return to their farms; those in Mathopestad are fighting to stay. The general population may mouth independence rhetoric but seem well aware of who benefits and how short-term the stratagem is.

Very little has been recorded of the process of relocation in the Western Transvaal. The SAIRR Survey through the years gives something of an introduction:

In November 1961 the Department of Native Affairs expropriated a farm owned by the Ba Hurutshe tribe. It was 20 km from Zeerust, and they had lived there since 1894. They were given three months' notice and offered alternative land near the then Bechuanaland border. A few accepted the offer; at first 300 refused and had to appear in court.

It was reported in parliament in 1967 that in 1965 and 1966 the government had expropriated the farms Leeuwfontein and Braklaagte in the Marico district. The residents were refusing to move and they were now regarded as squatters. (1967, p 144)

In the 1968 Survey it was reported that the entire Bakubung tribe was ordered to leave Molotestad during 1965. Molotestad was 25 km from Rustenburg. They were to move to Ledig near Saulspoort. They were regarded as squatters on State land. When there was resistance, the school was demolished. By August 1966, 645 families had left, with 183 refusing to move. In November 1967, 88 members of the tribe were found guilty in the Bantu Affairs commissioner's court of occupying State land (1968, p 133). The group was convicted of the same offence a second time and they were meant to leave the land by the end of 1968 (1969, p 125).

It was reported in October 1968 that 2 500 members of the Bakwena Ba-Magopa tribe under Chief Simeon More were to be moved from the farm Swartkop, 22 km from Koster. They were to make way for white diamond diggers. The land they were on was 4 000 morgen in extent - they had bought it as Trust land round about 1912-1914. The group was to move to an area near Swartruggens. (1968, p 134) It was mentioned in the 1969 Survey that the group had still not been moved. This was still the case by July 1982.

Early in 1968 parliament approved the excision from the scheduled areas of the farm Mosete, west of Mafeking. The area, 4 720 morgen, had been occupied by a section of the Barolong tribe. There had been a split in the group over whether to move or not; eventually they did move to alternative land 90 km away. (1968, p 133 onwards. See also the North Cape report, SPP volume 3.)

The 1969 Survey noted that the relocation area of Morsgat (Madikwe), 45 km from Swartruggens, had had 300 families moved to it. The families had been endorsed out of various Western Transvaal towns. Totally inadequate preparations had been made for them. Madikwe is a township of about 6-7 000 people now in 1982, many of whom live in constant fear of eviction

as they cannot afford the rents (R17,80 for a four-roomed house in 1982). There is no work in the area. Rustenburg is the nearest town for work. The superintendent spoke of a crisis in the number of evictions. No squatting is allowed in the area - so where do the people move?

The 1974 Survey recorded (p 195) that the Banoneng tribe had been moved from their 300 morgen farm at Rietfontein 10 km from Lichtenburg to De Hoop 50 km west of Lichtenburg. They had bought their farm in 1909. 153 families were moved from there in June 1974 (RDM, 27.07.74).

It was also reported that 800 families from Goedgevonden, Welgevonden and Nagel near Ventersdorp had been moved to Masedubule in the north (RDM, 24.06.74 and 1, 18, 27.07.74).

The 1976 Survey notes (p 222) that 45 000 members of the Bakolobeng tribe living near Lichtenburg were to have been moved to Deelpan in the Delareyville area on 15 September 1976.

In the 1979 Survey (p 433) it appears that 250 non-Tswana residents of Rooigrond had been told to leave Bophuthatswana. They had been moved there from Machaviestad (Machaviestat) five years previously.

Interviews done in June 1981 yielded some information and impressions of the Mafikeng/Mmabatho/Montshiwa area. It seems that the Bophuthatswana government sees and plans for development in terms of large-scale projects, with foreign (mainly Israeli) capital and expertise, but that the benefit is not reaching those in the vast bulk of relocated people. Agricor, for example, is a para-statal enterprise set up by South Africa and Bophuthatswana to develop agriculture. They claim huge crops and improved conditions for black farmers. A study is being carried out to estimate the real benefit to small farmers in the Taung area where two kinds of irrigation are being used on the cotton project. Most projects grow maize, and vegetables are being promoted. The system is modelled on the Israeli moshavim (collective farms), but superficially at least it seems to resemble a new version of betterment, with some farmers earning a reasonable amount while the majority have had their land taken away. Production figures seem good but the distribution of benefits needs to be examined.

MADIKWE People were first moved into the Ledig area in the early 1960s from the farm Palmietkuil (Monnagutla's location) near Boons. The people had resisted the removal until their chief was detained and demoted. The State installed his wife as chieftainess, and she agreed to move. GG trucks then moved the people and dumped them at Ledig with no facilities. R340 000 belonging to the tribe was said to have disappeared as they got no compensation, title deeds or firm tenure. The people were made an example of, and others moved voluntarily as a result.

In the case of their close neighbours the Klipgat people, the example worked. On the recommendation of Dr Seme they had bought their farm in 1913. Here was a place of 1 018 morgen owned by 14 members of a syndicate. Undivided shares had been sold to the children of the original 14 members. There were no tenants.

Klipgat first came under threat in 1958. The people had seen how the Monnagutlas and the Mmamathlolas (south of Tzaneen, who fought for 40 years 'and lost') had been treated. They had seen Sophiatown's resistance broken. So they offered to move if they were given £15 per morgen and a farm of their choice  $1\frac{1}{2}$  times the area of Klipgat. In 1960 they moved to Uitkyk near Zeerust. While it is far from industrial areas, railways and telephones, the people feel the farm is better.

In 1967 they were told they could have their Uitkyk farm OR the money, not both. Rand Mining Company had wanted to try out Klipgat, and if they had found gold they would have bought the people another farm. The State said there was no gold and offered £500 for mineral rights. If ever gold is found on Klipgat, the Uitkyk people will lay claim to it. They have not given up their mineral rights.

In the 1920s the Klipgat people had white tenants who worked diamond diggings as the law prohibited blacks from dealing in diamonds. 35 claims were sold, or rather exchanged, for the farm Vlakpan near Lichtenburg in about 1929. They could hold the title deeds if they were under a chief or had five members of a syndicate. The land was released. There are still some families living there.

The people of Mathopestad are due to be moved north of Ledig, and the Uitkyk people feel they will be worse off, having resisted all this time. Meanwhile it has taken the Uitkyk people 20 years to organise setting up a co-op to demand land for subsistence farming for the nearby closer settlement, Uitkyk 2. (Uitkyk 1 is the compensatory farm for Klipgat. Uitkyk 2 houses people from farms and urban areas - they are on plots with shacks. Water is collected 3 km away.)

MANKWE With the development of Sun City, infrastructure has been laid on in the area for staff in industrial development at Heystekrand. R32 million has been allocated for development at Heystekrand in 1982. An impressive township is growing, with a shopping centre, schools and facilities. It was said that Rustenburg would be squeezed by the building of two bypass roads to Sun City on either side of Rustenburg. Another Winterveld could develop. Already about 1 000 people live in shacks on the outskirts of Heystekrand and many more would be attracted from farms and other parts of Bophuthatswana if jobs were to become available.

CONSOLIDATION On the western side of this piece of Bophuthatswana, Masedubule was to be surrounded by incorporated farms according to the 1975 proposals, but incorporation is slow. There are mines in the area and the land is fertile. While the farm Koppieskraal was cleared of blacks ostensibly because the Riekerts dam would affect the area, white farmers now hire the land from the SADT for grazing.

The SADT has bought the farms next to Koppieskraal (Pachasdraai and Haakdoornbult) for future relocation, possibly from Motlatla and Mogopa.

#### RELOCATED GROUPS

1 WELBEDACHT (LEHURUTSHE TOWNSHIP) Set in Bophuthatswana 18 km from Zeerust, Lehurutshe has grown out of the resettlement camp on Welbedacht Trust farm.

From 1969, firstly old people were moved in from white towns in the Groot Marico district, and from Zeerust location and even Pretoria and Johannesburg. Then people came from tribal villages around Rustenburg. Welbedacht was known as 'Pensionersdorp'. Other people were brought off the farms in the Ventersdorp area - for example the Tsetse people - some of whom went to Ramatlabama. Recently a few skilled labourers and professionals have come to take jobs previously done by whites in the newly independent Bophuthatswana. People are still coming in slowly.

More than 2 000 families live in Welbedacht, most in township houses, some in prefabricated and corrugated iron (fletcraft) huts.

Agricultural land surrounds the township. It is owned by Agricor, the para-statal agricultural corporation: no-one else may have access to it. The people may not own stock.

Residential land is owned by the government but people may buy it. Plots average 60 square metres, it was reported. The area is controlled by the township manager whose offices are

at the magistrate's court. Rent for a four-roomed house with flush toilet and bathroom is R32 monthly. Pensioners living in the 'tin cottages' do not pay rent. There are also four-roomed houses for R10,88 monthly and two-roomed ones for R5,88. They and the tin cottages have pit latrines.

Water comes from the Dinokana village fountain. Every house has a tap. The limey water is free at present but meters are being installed and it is said water will cost 14c a kilolitre.

Health problems arise mainly through malnutrition. Children whose parents are migrant workers are cared for by grandparents who cannot afford to feed them properly on what the parents send.

Transport exists, at a price. In peak hours regular buses run to Zeerust. The travelling time is about an hour but trips may take longer as people have to pass through two 'border posts', Dinokana and Willowpark, on the way to Zeerust. Bus fare is 50c single (workers have subsidised coupons), taxi fare is 80c during the week and R1,50 at weekends, or R1 if the passengers are in short supply. Buses are owned by Lehurutshe Transport (under B & DC). Bus fare from Zeerust to Johannesburg is about R6, and the train fare is about R4.

As for shops, there is one general dealer, one cafe and one beerhall. Prices were: 25c a loaf of brown bread, R2,69 for 500 g powdered milk, R1,59 for 2,5 kg sugar, R4,05 for 12,5 kg mielie meal, 23c a carton of Jawala beer, 50c for 1 litre of paraffin, R4,95 a bag of coal, 60c a pack of candles, 89c for 500 g washing powder, 42c for a cake of soap. Firewood was R1,55 a bundle (R1,20 in Zeerust) but there is some free wood in the district. (Electricity is being installed.)

Public facilities include two churches with others being planned, a permanent clinic, a creche, two primary schools, a secondary school and a recently opened post office. Clinic visits cost 40c each. Primary school fees are R4 per quarter and about R55 a year for secondary school. Each school has about 600 pupils and 20 teachers. The children have to wear school uniform.

People pay income tax to the Bophuthatswana government which controls the area. There are about 50 policemen in Welbedacht.

Some work is available in Zeerust, the nearest place for wage employment, but it is too small to offer many jobs. Most people have to work on the Rand. KwaTeba and Rustenburg Platinum Mines have recruiting offices and buses which take the people to work. It is said that many workers expect more remuneration than they get and so they break their contracts. Labour bureaux exist at the offices of the Zeerust commissioner and the Lehurutshe magistrate, but few people find work through them. The average wage around Zeerust is R20 per month with a monthly ticket home, so people try to get jobs on the Reef instead. The labour bureaux offer only labourers' jobs. Most men work in the mines or on the railways, most women do domestic jobs. Most jobs were found informally through the grapevine of friends and relatives, then people registered in the bantustan and at the commissioner's office near their place of work. Recruiters use chiefs in the villages to find workers.

In the area of organisation, there were clinic and creche committees, a committee for the Year of the Disabled, and branches of the Bophuthatswana Women's League in all regions. It seems it is difficult to involve people in these groups as they have little history of voluntary work. Leaders were said to be the clinic committee members (as a source of information), the township manager, the school principals and the recently elected township council (elected by secret ballot). It was said that people work well together and there have been no serious clashes. One senses that people are submissive, that there is no opposition and they keep quiet. Most people are illiterate. 'Maybe if they were more industrialised they would know their rights', one resident said.

The area is not yet densely populated and it is thought more people will come to settle. Some people from the towns have bought plots so that they will have somewhere to go when they retire. More pensioners are expected to be sent into the area.

Others may be moved by the Bophuthatswana government to make way for mielie and vegetable irrigation schemes. The areas under threat are Maramage, Paardevlei (vegetables) and Ikageleng.

**2 RAMATLABAMA DISTRICT** In the Ramatla area there are three main relocation areas with people mostly from Putfontein in the Lichtenburg magisterial district. The Putfontein people were sent to Miga (Omega), a place called 600 (Botsabelo) because there were originally said to be 600 families there, and Ikopeleng. There was not time to visit all three but apparently conditions are very similar in them. The tribal authority offices are at 600. Names of places must be clarified. Some have Tswana names and English/Afrikaans ones (mainly of farms), and where people are relocated the new place is often called by the same name as the old place they came from.

Putfontein was a black spot with about 2 000 people who were moved between late 1977 and 1979. There are few signs of settlement in the area now, except for green fields with long grass, plenty of lakes and dams (even in the dry June period) and trees. The people were moved by GG trucks. They did not want to go but their former chiefs seem to have made all the arrangements. One of the sub-chiefs interviewed said that they believed the government would stick to its promises. Now they regret not having resisted - 'We are not settled.' He did not know the details, but said the negotiations had taken place over a long time. Another informant said it was a touchy subject as the chief had made a deal over the move. The land they have now is not as good or as much as they had before. They were given R300 for houses worth about R1 600. They did not ask for compensation, but they did not argue on the amount either. They had asked for one and a half times the land they had, but this was refused. They said they were farmers and wanted land. What could they do with money but no land? There they had had freehold title. Promises were not fulfilled.

**MIGA** is next to the Ramatlabama border post with Botswana. It was deserted before the Putfontein people arrived. About 270 families were moved here. A handful have come recently from the surrounding farms and Montshiwa, the township of Mafikeng. The land is owned by the SADT. The people have the use of agricultural land but do not have title deeds. The GG officials allocated the area to the chiefs and they in turn allocated it to the people, giving priority to those who had owned land in the last place. Not everyone can have land because they are waiting for more land and there is not enough for everybody. The average field is about 3 acres. People do not pay rent for fields. There is no restriction on stock ownership. People brought stock with them and apparently did not have to sell because of removal. They have about 1 000 head of cattle, 900 sheep and goats, 15-20 horses, about 40 donkeys, 10-15 pigs, dogs and a lot of poultry.

Residential plots are about 20 metres square, also owned by SADT and allocated in the same way. People do not pay rent. Most people have built their own houses and some have established vegetable gardens (an SACC project encourages this). There are some trees. Water is clean and comes from a borehole. There are about 10 houses per tap, and all the taps work, so people walk perhaps 20 m or a bit more for water. The water is free. Each house has a pit latrine. No major health problems were recorded. Quite a few people appeared to be extending their houses, although a few still lived in the original fletcraft ones.

For transport, three buses run to and from Mafikeng every day. The single fare for the 20 km trip is 85c. The buses are owned by Bophuthatswana Transport Holdings.

Facilities include two general dealers, one church, one primary school, and there are many house churches. The nearest butcher is at 600, as is the nearest clinic and secondary school. There is a high school at Ikopeleng. The South African government built the schools but the Bophuthatswana government runs them. The primary school at Miga has 11 teachers and the school fees there are R3 a year. Fees at the high school are R16 a year. The children have to wear uniforms.

Local authority offices are being built for the tribal authority. South African police patrol the area and are based about 30 km away at Ottoshoop, towards Zeerust. People do not pay tax. The land has not yet been handed over to Bophuthatswana.

Wood is free. The people also use dung and coal (R5 per bag) for fuel.

Most workers are on contract in Johannesburg. More people would like to get jobs. There is no labour bureau - the chief puts his stamp in the passes and people try to find work by bush telegraph.

Organisations include the Bophuthatswana Women's League, the school committee and the kgotla. Some people are involved in a garden project with an annual competition.

The three Shole chiefs and the kgotla men would be regarded as leaders. People do not work well together but there have been no serious clashes.

IKOPELENG (200) Ikopeleng ('Ask for yourself') is also called 200 because 200 families were first settled here from Pitfontein, in 1977. Now (1981) it seems there are about 300 houses/plots, many people living in corrugated iron shanties. One very large and one smaller shop were seen. The high school with the motto 'Let there be light' was established in 1978. Some farm implements around and a kind of barn may have been vestiges of the old white farm days.

600 (BOTSABELO) was where 600 families were relocated from Putfontein in 1977, which explains the name. There are a few brick dwellings but most people are in shanties. Many churches were seen, a few shops, a clinic, and attempts to cultivate the dry land.

Between Ramatlabama's three relocation areas and Mafikeng are two others: Tsetse (Tsetseng) named after the place at Doringkop next to Putfontein where the people had been before; and Makgokgwane called after another black spot between Koster and Ventersdorp.

MAKGOKGWANE (MOGOKGOANE) started in 1977 with 4 000 people being moved from a black spot of the same name near Ventersdorp. They had bought their tribal land freehold from whites. They used to have land to plough, and now they have very little indeed. They were given some land and monetary compensation but had no choice offered them on the question of removal. They felt they had to go. The move took until 1979 and was done by GG trucks.

Many people still live in the fletcraft huts they were given. Some have built their own houses. They were given the fletcraft on 6 months' loan. If people had many goods they were loaned tents as well. They brought farm implements with them (some of which lie around rusting) and some stock. Some people sold their stock, others were brought by GG truck.

There are three schools built by South Africa, run by Bophuthatswana. The same goes for the

clinic (at 600 (Botsabelo)). There are shack shops, a brick-making area and a supply of borehole water.

During the interview a school teacher came to ask who the interviewers were. The informant then seemed less keen to answer questions.

TSETSE is 9 km off the main road between Mafikeng and Ramatlabama on a signposted side road. Most of the people had been in Putfontein under Chief Molefo. They were all brought here in GG trucks. About 3 500 people also came from Doornkop, about 160 km to the east.

It seems that at Tsetse one does not get a title deed but a receipt. There is no land for ploughing but there is grazing. A woman interviewed did not have stock. She had come in 1979 from a white farm. Her husband returns to that farm and others for seasonal work near Ventersdorp. She said that farmers used to come looking for workers, and the people refused as conditions were bad and they prefer local jobs (although there are too few of them). There are still people moving in off the farms, but no GG trucks now. People transport themselves.

These are difficult conditions more especially when your children can't work. There is no work.

Some people commute 140 km daily to jobs in Carletonville.

Tsetse is a large place with about 750 plots, water taps on the streets. It looks depressed - a few churches, schools, cattle grazing, a few horses, but deserted, dry, no trees, little growing. The school described in the report houses over 1 100 children in 10 brick and nine tin classrooms and has just 20 teachers. The clinic 6 km away treats mainly TB, malnutrition and skin infection cases. School children faint from hunger. 2 - 400 children are not in class as they cannot afford the R3 school fees per annum.

3 MAFIKENG/MMABATHO/MONTSHIWA Mafikeng was incorporated into Bophuthatswana in 1980, thereby augmenting the capital area of Mmabatho, about 6 km north-west of the old Mafeking (capital of Botswana until Gaborone was built). Montshiwa, the township of Mafikeng, was built in 1962/3 and now links Mafikeng and Mmabatho. It houses at least 25 000 people in two- and four-roomed box houses with few facilities. The fancy new Mmabatho, showpiece of the newly 'independent' capital, covers a wide area, the new buildings dotted around about a kilometre apart. New housing is being built for university staff, bureaucrats and the new elite. This scheme is slowly ousting the people who grew maize in the area - they move 'further out' as they find the bulldozers coming to flatten their fields.

Mmabatho boasts a legislative assembly, the Mmabatho Sun hotel, a civic centre where President Mangope holds huge rallies in plush surroundings, a block of civil service offices, an OK Bazaars, a stadium and the University of Bophuthatswana (Unibo).

Behind the hotel is some flat land where more and more people are coming to squat. One reason is said to be the promises the President makes about the great new capital - people come to participate in the development, to claim their share of the benefits of independence. Their hopes are not likely to be fulfilled. One engineer reported that once the building was done there would be no more jobs. No industry is attracted to the area. The only jobs are in the construction of civic facilities.

About a kilometre from the Mafikeng/Ramatlabama road up the old Zeerust road, the shacks begin, and stretch for at least a square kilometre on either side of the road. Going towards Zeerust on the right is Lonely Park, an area with at least 1 000 houses. People have lived

there for at least 50 years (one man said he had been there since 1926). The people who went to Montshiwa township came for jobs in Mafeking, but the people of Lonely Park did not need to do this because they had land to plough. Now much of it has been taken for building and they have been given some on the outskirts, near Signal Hill. They have been promised more land but it has not been given.

On the left of the road to Zeerust is Makgetla. People have been brought into this area in GG trucks, arriving between 1977 and 1979. Some came off white farms in the Transvaal and the OFS. (Some were taken to Lonely Park too.) Xhosa, Tswana, Zulu and Sotho people live on each side of the road. The Makgetla people are on land formerly ploughed by people from Lonely Park - it was not clear who had negotiated this, but it was done before the Makgetla people came. The future is uncertain. It was said at one stage that the Makgetla people would have to build brick houses; at another time (1980) their houses were numbered and they were told they would have to move. Then they were told the proposed area was too small - and that is the last they have heard.

Unlike Lonely Park, an old settlement filled in in recent years, Makgetla is laid out in closer settlement style with dirt roads about a kilometre long. It lies just off the tar road to Zeerust. There are about 600 shacks and quite a few empty plots. The Makgetla people have no land for ploughing, as mentioned earlier. Before they came, it was decided by the chief responsible for Lonely Park and his people that they should assimilate the newcomers. They were brought from Klerksdorp, Stilfontein, Potchefstroom and Orkney in the Transvaal; and Kroonstad and Viljoenskroon in the OFS. They arrived on GG trucks and were allocated plots. There was a cement dam they could draw water from. A fairly large school, built for the Lonely Park people, is used by all, and there is a shop.

If the Tswana government gives the word, the kgotla may tell them to move again at any time. People feel insecure. Many moved off the farms because conditions were so bad. They came individually from 1975 onwards. Some even came four weeks before the interviews were held in 1981. (At this point the interview was interrupted by a man wanting to know where the interviewers came from. He wanted to know the room number they had in the hotel, and claimed to work there.)

On the Mafikeng edge of Lonely Park, behind the university, four tents had recently been erected. People had been moved from Lokaleng a week before by the YB (Bophuthatswana authorities). The reason given was that a graveyard was to be made in their area. The people had chosen to go to Lonely Park and had been loaned the tents for six months. They planned building themselves houses. Eight families were moved, two of them to Lonely Park. They chose this place as it is close to a place that might offer work. The man interviewed worked as a carpenter for a firm based in Pretoria. He was working in Montshiwa at the time, but moved around.

SEWEDING is an area on the edge of Mafikeng, on the Vryburg road. It is very similar to relocation areas described already - a combination of people brought in by truck and others coming in off the farms, mainly from the OFS, augmenting the traditional settlement.

4 ITSOSENG (DE HOOP, MOOIDORPIE) About 90% of the 25 000 people living in the township of Itsoseng were evicted from towns in the Western Transvaal during the 1970s. Most people came from Lichtenburg, Klerksdorp, Potchefstroom, Carletonville, and a few from Ottosdal and Sannieshof. They are supposed to commute to work in Lichtenburg 30 km away. A few came off Vermaas farms. First the old people were brought in, then the families of those who worked on the mines. People are still arriving from Klerksdorp and a few families from Potchefstroom. The Western Transvaal Administration Board build the houses.

The Bophuthatswana administration owns the houses. People may buy them but 95% rent them. The township manager allocates the dwellings - 'even if they are not married or not Bophuthatswana citizens, they get houses.' Rent in 1981 was R2,11 for a two-roomed house in the older section and R5,70 for four-roomed houses. The newer houses are bigger but on the same size of plot as the older houses. Water was provided from taps on the street until very recently when it was piped to the houses. Water is clean and comes from the reservoir. Payment for water is included in the rent. The older two-roomed houses have pit toilets. The newer four-roomed houses have flush toilets which do not always work as there is a problem with water. There are no major health problems.

Transport by bus to Lichtenburg cost 75c each way in 1981. A monthly ticket cost R11,70. Busfare to Mafikeng was 85c single. Buses are owned by Bophuthatswana Holdings, and the service is frequent.

Most people shop in Itsoseng as they can walk to the shops and do not have to pay busfare, and there is no GST in Bophuthatswana. There are three general dealers, two bottle stores, a beer hall, many shebeens, two butcheries, two dry cleaners and two restaurants. Prices are comparable to those in Lichtenburg.

Public facilities include eight churches, a mobile clinic, 11 primary schools, two high and two secondary schools, a post office, a police station - but no community hall. A visit to the clinic costs 50c; school fees are R8 a year for post-primary, R2 for the sports fund, R2 for medical fee. There are many boarders from towns who attend school in Itsoseng. There are about 1 600 children in the secondary schools and 2 000 in the high schools, with about 200 teachers in all.

About 20% of the people use electricity, the rest use paraffin, gas and coal for fuel.

The nearest place of wage employment is Lichtenburg. A few people come from Randfontein and Klerksdorp to recruit workers from the magistrate's office but most recruiters are white farmers looking for seasonal workers during harvest time. The farmers also go to the villages for workers. Very few people are recruited. About 60% of the permanent working-age people commute into Lichtenburg - the women working mainly as domestics, the men as labourers at the two big cement firms, at the window and door and cheese factories, the railways, and for the bus company. The best way to find work is to go out and ask for it.

Various committees exist in Itsoseng - to run the school, for the teachers, the women's league, a branch of the Democratic Party (the ruling party of Bophuthatswana), and in 1981 there was a township council which was not elected by the people. There was 'supposed to be a mayor'. The township manager was a local man, a 'key man'. No serious clashes had occurred. Little evidence of organisation on any other level was forthcoming.

Next to Itsoseng is the settlement of Sheila with about 50 households working on the Agricor Sheila project. The settlement looked like any betterment village where the inhabitants were slightly better off (for example, some of the houses were fairly substantial). No real assessment could be made of the Agricor projects.

Bodibe is a mixture of informal and traditional settlement stretching from Itsoseng to Driefontein. Thousands of people live in this hot, dry dusty area in shacks, huts and some more substantial houses. The area is an old watering hole for Tswana tribespeople but over the years it has developed into a large unplanned settlement. The people of Rooigrond have been told to move here. In parts settlement is quite dense (particularly near the schools, bus stops and isolated stores), elsewhere it is scattered but extensive. Many wattle and daub houses have been built recently by people coming off the farms.

From Bodibe there are a number of settlements including Bethal, Makouspan, Thusong, Uitkyk,

Khunwana, Saleng and Skuinsvlakte where it would seem people had been relocated from black spots or else the places were betterment schemes. The settlements had between 1 000 and 2 000 people with some land nearby, and each settlement had a small depot equipped with new tractors, some fertiliser, tools and implements. These places appear to have been quite well stocked, perhaps by extension officers, to promote small-scale farming. Some of the farms had been Trust farms while others such as Khunwana were parts of the reserve (3 - 5 000 people scattered across a very dry area). It was reported that where chiefs co-operated with the administration their people were more likely to benefit materially, unlike the people of Gannalaagte whose chief resisted removal to the end.

5 GANNALAAGTE This is a fairly large relocation area near Deelpan. Thousands of people were moved off black spots where there were large villages such as Doornkop. They were the Bakolobeng tribe, under Chief Molete, and were moved about 1977 from Biesiesvlei and Rooijantjiesfontein (next to Gerdau), and also from Hartebeesfontein, a black spot near Klerksdorp. The people were allocated plots and given tents; some pit latrines had been prepared. The area is divided into three sections of about 200, 600 and 800 shacks spread over 3,5 km along the dust road and housing at least 8 000 people. The place is very flat, extremely dry, with no sign of agriculture. It has a church, a clinic and a school.

6 SPRINGBOKPAN is located between Itsoseng and Gannalaagte; a small closer settlement where people were brought in about 1976. The school has not been moved yet and is about 5 km away from the new area. It seems the people were shifted to make way for the Agricor project which meant moving from Rooijantjiesfontein black spot to Springbokpan.

7 GAMALOKA About 18 km from Gannalaagte is another closer settlement, Gamaloka, next to the dirt road in the middle of nowhere. 60 families with their own chief were moved here in 1977 from Rooijantjiesfontein. They had sent petitions to the South African government but had had no response. The Bophuthatswana administration may move them again.

8 ATAMALENG This is a slightly newer version of Itsoseng built in the late 1970s. People were moved from Schweizer-Reneke, Stella, Ottosdal, Delareyville, Migdol, mainly from towns in the surrounding area but some from the farms. (Delareyville was not deproclaimed by 1980 although 2 013 residents had been moved (HAD, 22.04.80).)

There are about 15 000 people in Atamaleng served by one primary and one secondary school; a high school, police station and permanent clinic are being built. There is a temporary clinic. As the township is still being put up, not many people were coming in in mid-1981. There is a shop and an enclosed sports 'field'. People with jobs in Delareyville commute daily. The busfare is 65c single, R2,20 for a five-day card, R2,60 for a six-day card, and R2,80 for a seven-day card.

In 1980, 150 people were moved to Atamaleng and Madibogo from Stella and Jan Kempdorp 60 and 180 km away. Most continued working at Stella but have had to pay an extra R10,15 monthly for transport and spend three hours every day on commuting.

SANNIESHOF township looks sadly depleted. Old, often neglected houses reflect the insecurity of the place. The few left living there have been told they will move to the Gelukspan area. At least a dozen churches remaining in the township, plus the large

beerhall and administration board offices, indicate what a large township it had been not so long ago.

The area is served by a good number of long-distance buses, such as the one marked for Carletonville leaving Itsoseng on a Monday morning. It seems that commuting - whether daily, weekly or monthly - is a way of life for those lucky enough to have jobs.

9 VRISGEWACHT is a closer settlement in the same area as Atamaleng, and a particularly bad place. People were moved here in 1978 from Goedgevonden and other black spots. Most people live in rusting shacks, a few in fletcraft and a few are building houses. Most households have latrines. Water is collected from street taps. A new school was being built in September 1982.

At Goedgevonden people had had land, implements and stock. Now they live in a dry, dusty closer settlement from where the younger men try to get jobs in Johannesburg. Some commute monthly to Klerksdorp.

There were some new fletcraft in 1982 and it was reported that people were still moving in. People expressed 'great bitterness'.

10 ROOIGROND The report of the household survey at Rooigrond appears in Part 3 below.

The people here came from Matlwang (also called Machaviestad) 12 miles from Potchefstroom, a black spot of 1 200 ha bought in the time of President Kruger, in 1885. The first notice of the State's intention to move them was served in 1948. They have been resisting ever since. From 1948 to 1 August 1971 they fought a long legal battle. Throughout they have maintained that Matlwang is their traditional land: they had bought it and it had been taken away.

Many methods were used to try to make them leave 'voluntarily'. They were harassed, chased from work, the chief was stopped from holding meetings, they had beasts impounded and had to pay R7 a head to get them back, schools were closed in 1949. On 11 May 1970 the State offered to show them the proposed new site at Noupoot. They agreed to examine it and were taken by bus. During the journey they were required to sign a list 'otherwise they would be charged for the fare'. This same list was later produced by the State as evidence to Chief Mangope that the people of Matlwang had agreed in writing to the move. The people have documented their history carefully and feel others could learn from the way they were treated.

The Potchefstroom town council appealed to some people to settle in the Potchefstroom township where there was a clinic and schools. People were promised enclosures for their livestock. This was seen as a way of dividing the resistance. Some people did move and were then told to get rid of their livestock. Others said they were farmers and wanted land, and refused to move.

People saw their cattle impounded and some destroyed; the legal battle was not successful; so they accepted Chief Kebalepile's offer to have them settle temporarily (for three months) on his land where they could take their remaining cattle. This was preferable to Noupoot. They have lived 'temporarily' at Camp 5, Rooigrond, for the past 10 years, refusing to give up the battle.

Many members of the Rooigrond community work in Potchefstroom. They co-operate closely in the revived attempt to retrieve their land. President Mangope has promised them land, but they want to 'settle with the Potchefstroom municipality' before accepting anything.

To return to the earlier story: on 3 August 1971 about 400 families were moved by GG trucks from Matlwang to Rooigrond. The Potchefstroom municipality had given orders for them to

be moved, claiming that the people's land belonged to the municipality and that it was a black spot that should be cleared especially as the people were no longer entitled to the land. Many people are said to have died because of the move to Rooigrond; others went to Potchefstroom township.

The Barolong chief who owned Rooigrond died in 1973. While the land is under Bophuthatswana jurisdiction the Rooigrond people refuse to pay tax there, claiming they are South Africans and liable for tax in Potchefstroom. The Bophuthatswana authorities therefore make life difficult when workseekers try to register. The people were promised they would retain their Section 10 rights if they moved, and this promise was not kept. Bophuthatswana has also hit back at the refusal to pay tax by making it harder to get children into school (although this kind of opposition has not been used in the last few years).

There is no land for ploughing. Everyone has access to limited grazing. People brought their farm equipment and vehicles, now rusting and decaying.

The community's lawyer had claimed R32 000 in compensation for the whole tribe in the 1960s. Most of the 400 families were paid R18 each in compensation, for 'provisions for the exodus'. Some received nothing. They were drawing up a list in 1981 of their claims from the past, believing it was not too late.

Stock held by the tribe in 1981 included 85 cattle (they had come with 250 head), 100 sheep and goats, 13 horses (came with 100), 4 donkeys, many dogs and poultry. Their pigs were left behind in the pound. Sheep were dwindling.

This place is not for grazing.

The Rooigrond land is tribally owned and allocated to people by the chief. The South African officials provided tents on a loan basis, and pit latrines, and the chief provided a windmill. Residential plots average 20 x 100 metres. No rent is paid. Water is free and clean although limey. It is pumped from a borehole into a small dam, and drawn from there. People walk about 500 metres to fetch it.

Buses pass on the main road between Mafikeng (18 km away) and Lichtenburg (50 km), Potchefstroom (190 km) and Klerksdorp (170 km). Every hour or so there is a bus to Mafikeng (45c single fare in 1981) and Lichtenburg (R1). A weekend bus goes to and from Potchefstroom (R3 single) and there is also the daily bus to Klerksdorp with a connection to Potchefstroom. The Greyhound Company owns the buses.

Nearest shops are 10 km away with the following prices (1981): 20c a loaf of brown bread, R1,25 for 500 g powdered milk (and their cattle also produce some milk), R1,80 for 1 kg sugar, R17 for 80 kg mielie meal, R1 for 750 ml paraffin, 50c a cake of soap, 57c a pack of candles, 95c a kg washing powder, R3,35 a bag of coal plus R1 transport from Mafikeng. Wood is impossible to buy. Most people use cow dung or steal wood. People cannot afford meat and 'it is not worth it to slaughter'.

There are no public facilities. People employ a woman to teach 85 children from Sub A to Standard 4. The school is in her house. The children do not have to wear uniforms. School fees are 45c per child per month. The older children walk or catch buses to school in Mafikeng (these scholars are the young commuters in the household survey figures). School starts at 7.30 a.m. so they have to start out hours before, with winter temperatures frequently below 0°C.

The nearest place of wage employment is Mafikeng. The labour bureau is there too, though very few people find work through it - contracts are for labourers, mainly in the construction industry, mainly in Potchefstroom. Some people work at the military base. Most find work through a Rooigrond man who has contacts.

The tribal authority controls the area with little interference from outside. The police who visit are from the bantustan.

The tribal council - the kgotla - administers the area and 'keeps the community together'. It is the 'cabinet' which has led the resistance. Since the days when the first chief bought the land Matlwang (now most popularly known as Machaviestad), the chieftainship has passed from Chief Kwaga to Boie Mokate, Lucas Rapulana, Daniel Mochubi, and Ben Lerefelo. The late chief's right-hand man, Mr Makodi, is next in line for the chieftainship. It seems the people want him, a man of 'calibre and experience'. The State favours one of the late chief's two sons, but the people say they are 'soft'. The sons wanted their late father to be buried at Rooigrond although the Potchefstroom municipality gave permission for him to be buried at Machaviestad. (1983: The people see Mr Makodi as the chief.)

People were said to work well together. They were thinking of holding a public meeting in Potchefstroom for their own resisting community and the authorities, inviting Bophuthatswana representatives, 'all the Presidents', churches and interested organisations.

It was felt that others under threat of removal should learn from the Rooigrond experience. They were in touch with other communities both under threat and those already moved.

**FRENCHDALE** This is a small place 140 km west of Mafikeng to which a number of people were banished during the 1960s and early 1970s. Many were from the Eastern Cape. It was reported that there are no longer banishees at Frenchdale.

## AREAS UNDER THREAT OF REMOVAL

It seems there are three main released areas under threat of removal in the Western Transvaal. They are all black spots, tribally owned land.

1 **MOTLATLA (KWAGGASTAD)** This is the farm Kwaggaslaagte 121 in the Lichtenburg magisterial district, 50 km from the town of Lichtenburg and 46 km from Ventersdorp. Driving from Lichtenburg towards Koster, at the Swartruggens/Ventersdorp intersection outside Grootpan one turns right towards Ventersdorp following the gravel road. At the Kwaggaslaagte intersection, one turns right on a bad road which meanders a long way to the village of Motlatla (Kwaggastad, Kwaggastat).

There are about 2 000 people at Motlatla. They have been given verbal notice of removal by the local commissioner who has visited them several times since 1978. They have been told they must move to Ramatlabama, to Biesiesvlei next to Tsetse, Makgokgwane and 600 (Botsabelo). In 1980 they were told they must move after reaping their harvest. The plan is to move them all by GG trucks.

They do not know why they should move. They like Motlatla and want to stay. No-one has moved so far (1981) but they thought it might happen soon as the Pretoria officials were coming to see them on Friday 26 June 1981 to say when they must move. The late chief was involved in the negotiations and the new chief feels helpless, not knowing what went on and how to represent his people who do not want to go. (The new man, Chief Solomon Serebatse, was installed in March 1981.) In 1983 they are all still waiting for the next official approach.

The land had been bought by the tribe in the late 1800s or early 1900s. A few extra people have come to live at Motlatla over the past few years, mainly those from towns who pay R24 for a plot, then build themselves a house for their retirement. These people have family and tribal ties with the area but have been working in town. Two or three families have come off white farms, either discharged or escaping from bad working conditions.

The tribe owns the agricultural and residential land. It is allocated by the tribal council which controls the area. Everyone has access to land, allocated to them 'as they need it'. Each household gets 9 morgen to plough and a residential plot about 40 x 60 paces. There are about 900 head of cattle, many sheep and goats, a good number of horses and donkeys, a few pigs, many dogs and poultry. A significant amount of produce is sold - mainly maize to the Lichtenburg Co-op. The tribe earns a lot from their farm, even hiring part of it to whites for over R1 000 in annual rent.

Water is clean, from a borehole. People do not have to walk far to fetch it. They pay R1 a year to the tribal office for water. Almost every house has a pit latrine and there are no problems in this regard.

A clinic was being built in 1981. A doctor from Koster will be visiting the area twice a week. There were no major health problems.

Buses go to Lichtenburg every day except Sunday. The single fare in 1981 was R1,50. Utility Transport, based in Lichtenburg, owns the buses.

There is a general dealer. Post comes through Ventersdorp. There are five churches; and one lower primary, one higher primary and one secondary school. The children have to wear uniform and pay school fees which vary according to class. There are 11 teachers and 'many children'.

People buy coal from merchants in the area but most families use wood, which they also have to buy.

The tribal council has offices at Motlatla. There are no police and the people do not pay tax any more. People are reported to get on well together. There are no community organisations.

The nearest places of wage employment are the white farms and some people have local jobs on them. Many work in Johannesburg, on the mines and some in Ventersdorp. To get a job one has to register with the tribal office, find a job and register the job. Not many jobs are offered, and most of them are labouring. People work full-time on the farm or find jobs outside the area.

The people have seen the place they are to be moved to. They were taken there during the life of the late chief, and say it is 'no good' for them. Nobody wants to move.

What will they do there? We only said yes because the government said they will move us.

What about the old women, the widows and the children?

There has been no attempt to resist removal. The people feel they need better built schools, a secondary school, a better road into the area, a clinic, a telephone - all this would help them to stay. The government has promised to move all their stock and farm equipment. The people were not aware of their right to compensation. They have heard that Mogopa and Mathopetad are also threatened with removal but have little contact with them. Buildings at Motlatla have been numbered.

2 MOGOPA (SWARTKOP) This settlement is on the farm Zwartrand 145 in the Ventersdorp magisterial district, the nearest town being Ventersdorp. It is a tribally owned black spot of 10 000 ha. The 2 - 3 000 people living there have been under threat of removal since 18 August 1964 when Pretoria officials accompanied the Ventersdorp commissioner to deliver verbal notice to a meeting of the whole community, under Chief More. The officials did not take minutes of the meeting, but the tribal secretary did.

Nothing more was heard until 1980 when officials came again with news of the removal. No date was given but two areas have been mentioned: one near Sun City in the Pilanesberg (Ledig) where there is a mine; the other near Swartruggens, no name given. All the people are to be moved, in GG trucks.

The people think they are to be moved because

We are sitting on gold here, diamonds (some say a scanty seam) and chrome. Whites will get it when we move.

The Rand Exploration Company and another company came to Mogopa in 1962 to prospect, having heard there was a good gold shelf in the area.

Originally the farm was bought in 1906 and the people moved there in 1913. A few newcomers have joined them in the 1970s, mainly people returning from town - ex-migrant workers and sons-in-law. The land is tribally owned and controlled. Each family is given about 10 morgen, and everyone has access to land. The average field is 9 ha. Two years ago the tribe did a stock vaccination of their 4 000 cattle, 1 000 sheep, 300 goats, 50 horses and 100 donkeys. They also have poultry. There is a significant amount of grain sold to the Ventersdorp Co-op. They sell as much as they can - about 200 tons a year.

The tribal council taxes residents to pay for improvements such as a new water supply, fences and schools. When asked if they paid other taxes, the people mentioned GST.

Each family is given a row of plots. Members of the family are then given plots for houses by the head of the family, and they do not pay rent or service levies. The plots were said to be a quarter to half a morgen each.

Water is healthy but not pure. There are three open reservoirs in the village and two in the veld. Water is free.

Each family is required to have a latrine. They dig their own pits.

There is no clinic. People visit private doctors in Koster or Ventersdorp. There are no major health problems.

Transport is difficult. People have to use private vehicles. They applied to Greyhound in Potchefstroom and Klerksdorp for a bus service. By 1981 they had received timetables but no buses.

Facilities include four general dealers. There used to be a butchery but the owner left. The village has one church and four congregations; and a lower primary and a secondary school. School fees are R4 a year from Sub A to Standard 2, R6 for Standards 3 to 5, and R8 for the secondary classes. The primary school is overcrowded and has two sessions a day. There are 11 primary and 12 secondary school teachers. Uniforms are compulsory for the children.

Wood is free. People also use coal for fuel.

Six tribal policemen patrol the area. They do not wear uniforms.

The nearest place of wage employment is Ventersdorp, and the nearest labour bureau is in Potchefstroom. Some people find jobs through the bureau or through the tribal authority, but most rely on relatives to find them work - mainly in Carletonville and Johannesburg. They get labouring jobs on the mines or in industry. People used to work part-time, but not now.

The only organisation is the tribal council whose members claim to be the leaders. People are said to work well together and there have not been any major clashes. They do not want to be moved. They have not been to see the proposed sites but they know they will not be able to survive there. They are resisting removal and arguing over conditions, but they don't know if their stand will be successful 'if they come with guns'. They want publicity. If the officials come again the people want outside support. They do not want to be dumped in tin houses. They saw how the people of Makgokgwane were tricked - their houses were valued at R10 000 and then they were compensated R2 500. The Mogopa people have investigated on compensation and conditions of removal. They have been told their stock and equipment will be taken for them, but they know their stock will not survive in the new place. Their buildings have not been numbered.

They know of areas that have been cleared: of Matau (Boshoeck) - the people from there were given a farm next to Vrisgewacht just half the size of their old farm. Also Tsetse (Doornkop), Botsabelo (Putfontein) and Vogelstruisknoop (Konopo) were moved, and people on the Trust lands at Goedgevonden and Welgevonden were moved to Vrisgewacht. They know too of areas under threat: of Motlatla people who have more or less agreed to be moved and it is just a matter of the date being set, and Mathopestad resisting removal.

3 MATHOPESTAD (MATUPESTAT) Mathopestad is 6 km off the main road just outside Boons on the way to Derby. (There is a sign on the left of the road.) The farm was bought in 1911, and the people moved there the same year. They have their title deeds. It is proposed that they move to a farm near Onderstepoort, an area with 'bush and mountains'.

How must 3 000 people live on a farm that one man lived on before?

A detailed account of the community is given in Part 3 below.

MOBOLOKA This area lies 50 km north-east of Mathopestad, near Brits in Bophuthatswana. It is occupied by a religious community of South Sotho people, members of an independent Zionist Church. They moved from Lesotho in the early 1920s and settled at Walmansthal, a mission farm near Pretoria. In the 1940s they bought land at Moboloka and handed it to Bophuthatswana on 'independence'. They had a chief.

The Church has divided into two groups, one which is happy to stay in Bophuthatswana and the other which refuses to take Bophuthatswana citizenship and does not want to be moved to Onverwacht (being South Sothos, they are supposed to move to Qwaqwa). Some people have moved, others say Mopeli (of Qwaqwa) can extend his administration to them at Moboloka. The whole population is more than 20 000, with about half in each group on this issue. They have been under threat since 1980, and no-one is sure what will happen to those who refuse to take Bophuthatswana citizenship. The first group is involved in Bophuthatswana and happy to be administered from Odi.

## AGRICULTURE & EMPLOYMENT IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL

Technological change in commercial agriculture has caused major changes in employment practices throughout South Africa. Based on research by Michael de Klerk, this section examines the implications for blacks living and working in the Western Transvaal.

According to De Klerk there have been three main areas of change:

- from hand harvesting to tractor-drawn and self-propelled combine harvesters
- from delivery in sacks to delivery in bulk
- from manual and technical methods of weed control to spraying.

Each of these operations traditionally employed large numbers of seasonal as well as permanent workers.

Changes began in earnest in about 1968, but most happened between 1974 and 1977. Between 1968 and 1981 the size of farming units doubled with the most rapid increase between 1973 and 1977 when the average unit increased from 750 to 1 250 ha.

Important effects of these changes on employment were bound to be felt. Seasonal and permanent employment both contracted. There is little seasonal employment related to delivery now which is almost 100% bulk (with no further need for males to carry heavy bags). Farmers do still use seasonal workers to glean and deal with weeds resistant to sprays. In 1968 about 50 seasonal workers were employed per farming unit. In 1981 this had dropped to 30. When the increase of farming unit size is taken into account, the fall is almost twice as great, with only 30 workers employed per 1 000 ha instead of 100. As for the permanent work force, in 1968 about 20 workers were employed per 1 000 ha, but with the increase in farm size only 10 were employed for the same area in 1981. Yet the proportion of machine operators to manual workers rose very little between 1968 and 1981, only from 55% to 60%. Workseekers with more skills are having to look to urban areas and mines for employment.

The age distribution moved downwards and the sex distribution towards women. In the 1968 sample, all except two teams of seasonal workers included men and only about 30% included women, whereas in 1981 only about 40% included men and 60-70% employed children. Less heavy physical work meant more women could replace men in seasonal teams.

There was a replacement of teams of workers from black rural areas, mainly Bophuthatswana and to a lesser extent Botswana and the Transkei, by teams from the families of permanent farm workers living on the white farms in the immediate vicinity. Table 2 shows the proportion of workers recruited from various areas and the changes over the years:

Table 2 GENERAL ORIGINS OF SEASONAL WORKERS (%)

For harvesting and delivery	1968	1981
Families of permanent workers on the farmer's own or neighbouring farms	9	48
Bophuthatswana	66	44
Botswana	6	-
Transkei	15	7
Black locations	3	1
Black spots	1	-

100

100

Table 2 contd

For weeding	1968	1981
Families of permanent workers on the farmer's own or neighbouring farms	63	72
Bophuthatswana	36	27
Black locations	1	1
	100	100

De Klerk, forthcoming thesis, 'Technological change and employment in South African agriculture: the case of maize harvesting in the Western Transvaal, 1968-1982'

Workers from black spots were employed until about 1979, but never made up more than 2% of the total, which does not suggest that these farmers would pressurise the State to remove people unless they wanted to use the land (which will be dealt with at a later stage in this report).

People living in black rural areas could count on more than 90 jobs per 1 000 ha in 1968, and less than 20 jobs in 1981. Given the tremendous increase in population as a result of relocation in the Western Transvaal, the rise in unemployment (particularly among the unskilled in the 1970s) and the fact that fewer women are able to enter urban areas, this contraction in the farm labour force must have caused large-scale hardship. Wages were never good; as Table 3 shows, they dropped in real terms over the period:

Table 3 COMPOSITE HOURLY CASUAL WAGE RATE (Cents per hour)

Year	Current prices	Constant prices (1970)
1969/70	13,9	13,9
1970/1	15,8	14,9
1971/2	23,3	20,7
1972/3	17,8	14,4
1973/4	24,3	17,7
1974/5	23,3	14,9
1975/6	18,9	10,9

De Klerk, op cit

Black spots referred to by farmers in De Klerk's survey included Doornkop, Rooijantjiesfontein, Kafferskraal and Putfontein. Relocated areas from which seasonal workers were recruited included Vrisgewacht, Gannalaagte, Ganyesa, Itsoseng (Polfontein), Lehurutshe, Madikwe, the Molopo district, Taung, and areas around Kuruman and Mafikeng.

Tables 4 and 5 below show the seasonal intake through the years 1968 to 1981 and where the workers came from.

Table 4 WORKERS RECRUITED FOR HARVESTING: ORIGINS

Bophuthatswana areas	1968	1973	1977	1981
Dinokana	91 (3)*	25 (1)	25 (1)	45 (2)
Vrisgewacht	-	-	-	8 (1)
Gannalaagte	-	-	20 (1)	20 (1)
Ganyesa	-	-	-	125 (1)
Itsoseng	-	15 (1)	15 (1)	15 (1)
Khunwana	21 (2)	41 (3)	39 (3)	53 (3)
Kopela	67 (4)	67 (4)	18 (2)	10 (1)
Kraaipan	-	20 (1)	20 (1)	88 (2)
Lehurutshe	-	-	-	8 (1)
Madibogo	57 (3)	84 (5)	35 (3)	7 (1)
Madikwe	30 (1)	-	-	-
Maretsane	10 (1)	14 (1)	-	-
Matlhase	-	-	-	7 (1)
Molopo	-	-	-	8 (1)
Morokwa	-	-	-	28 (1)
Morokweng	189 (2)	14 (1)	-	-
Polfontein	-	30 (1)	10 (1)	10 (1)
Setlagole	-	28 (1)	28 (1)	56 (2)
Taung	657 (15)	501 (16)	190 (4)	200 (3)
Unidentified	-	35 (1)	-	-
Kuruman area	33 (1)	33 (1)	-	-
Mafikeng area	23 (1)	58 (2)	113 (3)	-
TOTAL	1 178	961	513	688
Number (%) of farms drawing from				
Bophuthatswana	26 (72)	31 (74)	17 (35)	16 (26)
Average size of team	45	31	30	43

\* bracketed figure indicates the number of farms the workers went to.

The black spots from which the surveyed farmers drew their workers included:

**Doornkop (Tsetse)** One farm in the Koster area drew workers from this black spot in the Ventersdorp district to glean maize after the combine had gone through the fields. He employed about 40 people (men, women and children, mostly single people but also a few families) for 8-10 weeks a year between 1972 and 1977. In 1977 the people were moved to Gannalaagte and he continued employing them from there until 1979 when he replaced them with Transkeians. Previously he had employed people from Botswana. The reason he gave for not employing the Gannalaagte people was that they stole a lot, had no respect for their foreman, and were difficult to control. He said that it was through trouble over food

Table 5 WORKERS RECRUITED FOR WEEDING: ORIGINS

Bophuthatswana areas	1968	1973	1977	1981
Dinokana	28 (1)*	28 (1)	28 (1)	35 (2)
Vrisgewacht	-	-	-	8 (1)
Itsoseng	-	30 (1)	15 (1)	15 (1)
Khunwana	-	-	7 (1)	53 (3)
Kopela	-	-	6 (1)	-
Kraaipan	-	-	60 (1)	77 (2)
Lehurutshe	-	-	-	8 (1)
Madibogo	61 (2)	76 (2)	26 (2)	20 (1)
Matlhase	-	-	-	8 (1)
Molopo	-	-	-	8 (1)
Morokwa	-	-	-	16 (1)
Setlagole	28 (1)	28 (1)	28 (1)	45 (1)
Taung	175 (5)	175 (5)	6 (1)	-
Kuruman area	34 (1)	34 (1)	-	-
TOTAL	326	371	176	293
Number (%) of farms drawing from Bophuthatswana	10 (21)	10 (21)	6 (12)	10 (17)
Average size of team	32	37	29	29

\* bracketed figure indicates the number of farms these workers went to.

that he eventually decided to replace them. Distance, problems with black officials in Bophuthatswana and Botswana, and the difficulties of making arrangements by telephone and letter or having to make long trips personally - all these seem to have played a part in the farmer's decision to mechanise. There is no report of hiring this land after the removal.

Rooijantjiesfontein which was purchased by the Department of Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure for R2 302 500 and reported in the annual report of the Department for 1976/77 (RP 110/77: Pretoria, p 31), was not a source of labour for the surrounding farmers. The one exception was a farmer who had employed 22 men and women from the area in 1968 to harvest maize by hand and who no longer did so as he had mechanised. A farmer in the area reported that the people from Rooijantjiesfontein had always worked on the mines and in industry. There were no reports of the land being hired by the State after the removals.

Kafferskraal Two farmers in the survey lived close to Kafferskraal. One employed workers from Doornkop 15 - 20 km away but not from Kafferskraal. He said he had hired Kafferskraal land from the State between 1979 and 1981 when it was let for a nominal fee of R50 per hectare a year, but later when it was hired to the highest bidder he had not felt it was worth the money as the land was poor and shallow.

The other farmer had once employed one permanent farm worker and two or three seasonal harvest workers from Kafferskraal. He said that the young people went to look for work in the towns and that only the old people remained behind. He said the State had bought the land in

1978 and moved the people three or four kilometres the other side of Mafikeng on good agricultural land where they were 'doodgelukkig'. He had hired 700 ha of Kafferskraal at R8 500 a year (previously R3 400 a year).

These two farmers and three others in the survey live close to Mabaalstad, but none of them reported having employed workers from there although they had all been in the region at least 15 years.

Putfontein Three farmers very close to Putfontein were visited but none of them had employed people from this black spot (from which people were moved in 1979/80 to the Ramatlabama area). Most of the people had gone to Johannesburg for work. One of the farmers said he had employed workers from the Madikwe (Morsgat) area north-west of Swartruggens for about four weeks a year to hand-harvest before he mechanised in 1973. He had employed about 30 people, half of them men, half women, no children. He also said that most farmers in the area had recruited from the Molopo area near Mafikeng, not far from Putfontein.

Table 6 BLACK SPOT LAND PURCHASED IN THE WESTERN TRANSVAAL AND CONSEQUENT REMOVALS, 1964 - 1977

Year	Area bought (ha)	People relocated
Up to and incl 1963	34 062	11 677
1964	1 097	3 455
1965	652	4 060
1966	6 496	4 966
1967	6 096	4 110
1968	419	1 541
1969	3 802	10 720
1970	1 783	121
1971	13 068	6 272
1972/3	1 558	4 061
1973/4	389	2 877
1974/5	651	2 348
1975/6	1 178	6 114
1976/7	9 690	10 552
TOTAL	80 941	72 874

De Klerk, op cit, from official sources. These figures are an underestimate of actual numbers moved.

Other sources for recruitment of farm workers were locations of white towns including Schweizer-Reneke where two farmers got labour before the township was deproclaimed. The areas in Botswana where workers were drawn from included Ramotswa, Lobatse and Molepolole, although one farmer said that workers who gathered at the Swartkopfontein Gate (near Ramotswa) came from as far afield as Maun. By the early to mid-1970s Botswana seems to have stopped supplying workers. In the late 1960s workers came from the Sterkspruit/Herschel district in the Transkei, but in recent years they seem to have been replaced by people from Glen Grey

and adjoining districts into which people have moved in large numbers (see SPP volume 2).

Van der Merwe found that only about 1,7% of black people working in non-prescribed areas in the Western Transvaal were from white rural areas - that is, squatters or black spot people, other than those resident on and employed on white farms. This corroborates evidence collected by De Klerk.

According to Potgieter and Van Heerde the intercensal rates of population growth in the Ditsobotla, Molopo and Lehurutshe areas where most of the people were relocated are:

1946 - 51	0,83%
1951 - 60	3,35%
1960 - 70	5,03%

As a final indication of how dramatically the employment opportunities in the agricultural sector have contracted over the last 15 years, De Klerk analysed seasonal employment in weeding. Most people employed for weeding seem always to have come mainly from the white farms, but job opportunities per 1 000 ha weeded fell from about 60 in 1968 to between 20 and 25 in 1981 for all workseekers, and for those from Bophuthatswana from between 20 and 25 in 1968 to about 6 or 7 in 1981. This was after the introduction of chemical sprays. More than 65% of weeding teams included children in 1968, and by 1981 this had risen to between 75 and 80%.


The reasons the farmers gave for cutting down on their labour force were mixed. (For a detailed discussion see De Klerk's thesis, not completed at the time of this report.) It would seem that control of workers became increasingly difficult so that farmers preferred recruiting workers from further afield who 'could not run away' easily. Farming methods were streamlined with machinery and chemicals. It meant that a few more skilled workers were needed, plus a seasonal labour team for relatively light jobs. The farmers could then cope with a few families living on their farms, using seasonal labour from those families when needed. The increased size of Western Transvaal farms also made it less necessary for outside workers to be taken on. Wages are still dismally low on the farms and people claim they are no worse off unemployed and living in a closer settlement where at least they are not harassed by the farmer. There are still thousands of people living on white farms who will have to leave when they can no longer contribute a member of the family to the work force (or when the farmer evicts them). The continuous stream of people from the farms into the bantustans is evidence of this trend.

## PART 3

### Case Studies



Lonely Park - people evicted by the Bophuthatswana authorities from Mmabatho where a factory was to be built (July 1981)



## INTRODUCTION

This section deals with household surveys conducted in five Transvaal areas and two case studies presented particularly to highlight the problems in trying to resist relocation.

Part 3 comprises three distinct sections but they should be seen as case studies of a process of removal, showing some of the steps along the way. Mahodi in Lebowa is a settlement in the closer settlement mould - the people were moved from the Sekgosese area. Two areas next to each other were surveyed in Kangwane, Kabokweni which is the township serving White River, and Pienaar, the informal settlement which has grown in leaps and bounds on its periphery. Kwaggafontein in KwaNdebele is a recent closer settlement in a bantustan that is about to take independence. Rooigrond in Bophuthatswana is in a rather different category. It is the place people were forcibly moved to but not the chosen place of the South African or Bophuthatswana authorities. The people there are presently being told to move again. Their resistance is well documented.

Mathopestad is the last surveyed area. It is a black spot under threat of removal in the Western Transvaal. The community is trying to resist the relocation.

Sekgosese is a district in the Northern Transvaal reported to have been reprieved until the Van der Walt proposals are released. It was to have been cleared in terms of the 1975 proposals, and in fact many of the Makgato living in one of the villages were removed by force in 1979.

Winterveld is a well-known informal settlement in Bophuthatswana outside Pretoria where thousands of non-Tswanas have lived for some time in serious insecurity. The story of Winterveld illustrates yet again one of the main recurring themes in the Transvaal relocation process - ethnicity and how it has been used to divide and control the people.

The surveys were conducted in 1981 but written up in 1982 so that later reports have been incorporated where possible.

### 3.1 THE MAHODI SETTLEMENT (Lebowa)

#### INTRODUCTION

Mahodi Ha Manthata is a settlement of some 800 families in the bantustan of Lebowa. It lies 75 km north of Pietersburg. The nearest village is Dendron, 5 km away. The name of the settlement refers to Chief Stanford Manthata, under whose leadership most of the residents left a place called Mphakane to settle here in Mahodi. Mphakane is a village visible from the Great North Road 50 km north of Pietersburg in the Botlokwa area, in Sekgosese district (see map).

Others in the settlement were already in the area when Chief Manthata arrived, or came after being evicted from the Dendron location or from nearby farms.

Opinions differ on how the Manthata tribe originally came to Mahodi. The chief insists it was to escape conflict with another tribe, but some outsiders believe Chief Manthata 'collaborated with Pretoria' in the implementation of a removal plan.

A brief history from Chief Manthata traces the tribe's roots to Botswana. Then decades of migration took the people to Potchefstroom, back to Botswana and to six places in the Transvaal before settling at Mahodi. The dates of these moves were not established.

According to Chief Manthata, the tribe left Mphakane after serious conflict with the Machaka tribe under Chief Machaka. The two tribes had lived in harmony near each other until the Bantu Authorities Act which placed the two groups under a single tribal authority with Chief Machaka as chairman and Chief Manthata as assistant. Relationships deteriorated until the tribes 'had to use assegais for pillows'. The Lebowa administration tried and failed to mediate, and Chief Manthata and his followers decided to trek away from the area to settle at Mahodi.

The chief insisted he had not moved 'voluntarily' to suit the South African government with a

removals scheme, but that he and his people had decided they would rather leave Mphakane than live under Chief Machaka. He said the Lebowa authorities had contributed to the harassment of his tribe there (and particularly named Mr Collins Ramusi, the Lebowa Minister of the Interior, in this regard).

Yet Chief Manthata is accused of collaborating on the move. The chief himself referred to the South African Council of Churches 'pumping money into Machaka, who had lost nothing, and calling him a hero who refused to be resettled'. Further details on the issue of the removal are given below.

The land at Mahodi was bought but no details of the purchase were given for this report.

In 1981 a survey was conducted among 100 families in Mahodi. 99 questionnaires were completed and yielded the information that follows.

#### DEMOGRAPHY

29% of the sample households had 5 members, 24% had 6, and 29% more than 6.

Table 1 HOUSEHOLDS BY SIZE

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	Total
-	1	4	13	29	24	11	13	3	1	-	-	1	100
Median size 6					Modal size 5			Mean size 5,80					

90% of household heads were male, and 68% were male migrants on a monthly or yearly contract. Of the 10 female heads, 5 were permanent residents and 5 daily commuters.

Table 2 HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Status	Male	Female	Total
Permanent	6	5	11
Commuter	15	5	20
Migrant	67	-	67
TOTAL	88	10	98

(2 missing)

Most of the households (84%) arrived in 1977, 11% in 1978, 3% in 1979, and 2% in 1980. The majority of them (93%) had lived on Trust land at Botlokwa (Mphakane), 3% came from white farms, and 1% from freehold land.

66% came from settlements where they or their forebears had lived for more than 50 years. 4 had been there less than 4 years, 6 between 5 and 9 years, 23 between 10 and 20 years, and one between 21 and 40 years.

97% of households said they had moved voluntarily. Only 3% said they had been removed. These removals apparently happened from the Dendron municipal area after the township had been deproclaimed.

Before moving, 30% of those who were employed had worked in Johannesburg, 10% in Germiston, 6% in Springs, 5% in Pretoria and the same in Pietersburg, and 6% in Botlokwa.

A few had held jobs in Mahodi, Stilfontein, Kimberley, Bethal, Witbank, Potgietersrus, Geshego, Elandsfontein, Cullinan, Newcastle, Benoni, Boksburg, Grobler's Farm, Isando, German's Farm, Winburg, Middelburg, Ermelo, Zebediela, Dendron, Kempton Park, Modderfontein and Langlaagte.

427 people in the sample were permanent residents, 42 commuters and 110 migrants.

Table 3 POPULATION BY AGE, SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Age	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
0-14	127	128	255	-	-	-	-	-	-	127	128	255
15-24	31	46	77	3	5	8	20	5	25	54	57*	111
25-34	-	29	29	4	7	11	19	5	24	23	41	64
35-44	3	30	33	7	6	13	22	1	23	32	37	69
45-64	5	18	23	5	3	8	36	-	36	46	21	67
65+	3	5	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	5	8
Unknown	-	2	2	2	-	2	2	-	2	4	2	6
TOTAL	169	258	427	21	21	42	99	11	110	289	291	580

Permanent masculinity ratio	66
% migrancy in 15-64 range	35
% male migrancy, 15-64	63

\* 1 missing female

Children and women were in the majority. One of the most telling features is that there were no permanent male residents at all in the 25-34 range, and only 9% of the permanent residents aged 35-44 were male. 60% of all permanent residents were women.

The largest age group was 0-14, accounting for 60% of the permanent residents. The second largest (18%) was 15-24.

Permanent residents had decreased by 59% compared with the position before the sample population came to Mahodi.

50% of commuters and 90% of migrants were men.

## ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The next four tables show the economic status of the sample, the sector and occupation of those employed, and category of employer. Table 4 shows that 72% of those employed were migrants. The unemployment rate was 7%. Features of Table 5 are the 41% employed in services, 12% in agriculture and 10% in mining. 24% of jobs were in the public sector (Table 6). 53% of the men were in unskilled jobs, and 72% of the women were in services (Table 7).

Table 4 ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, BY SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Economic activity	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Not active	165	248	413	-	-	-	-	-	-	165	248	413
Employed	1	-	1	21	21	42	98	11	109	120	32	152
Unemployed	3	9	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	9	12
Missing	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	2*	3
TOTAL	169	258	427	21	21	42	99	11	110	289	291	580

\* 1 female missing

Table 5 SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT, BY SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Sector	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Agriculture	1	-	1	7	6	13	4	-	4	12	6	18
Mining	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	15	15	-	15
Manufacturing	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	8	8	-	8
Electricity etc	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	6	6	-	6
Construction	-	-	-	3	-	3	8	-	8	11	-	11
Trade	-	-	-	1	1	2	3	-	3	4	1	5
Transport	-	-	-	1	-	1	24	-	24	25	-	25
Finance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Services	-	-	-	9	14	23	28	11	39	37	25	62
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	2	-	2
TOTAL	1	-	1	21	21	42	98	11	109	120	32	152

Table 6 EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY, BY SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Employer	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Self	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	2
Private	1	-	1	15	13	28	73	10	83	89	23	112
Public	-	-	-	4	8	12	23	1	24	27	9	36
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	2	-	2
TOTAL	1	-	1	21	21	42	98	11	109	120	32	152

Table 7 OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE, BY SEX &amp; RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Occupation	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Professional	-	-	-	2	1	3	-	1	1	2	2	4
Business	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clerical	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	5	5	-	5
Sales	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	2	-	2
Service	-	-	-	3	13	16	35	10	45	38	23	61
Farm	1	-	1	4	5	9	2	-	2	7	5	12
Skilled	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Semiskilled	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1
Unskilled	-	-	-	11	2	13	52	-	52	63	2	65
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	2	-	2
TOTAL	1	-	1	21	21	42	98	11	109	120	32	152

Of the permanent residents there was only one person employed. 98% of the men and 96% of the women were not economically active. Informal economic activity consisted of selling fruit and vegetables or liquor, running an unlicensed taxi and selling table cloths and other handmade articles. Only 9 of the 99 households were involved in any kind of informal activity. Most of the migrants (73% of the men and 64% of the women) sent regular remittances home, and almost all the others sent irregular remittances.

There were five old age pensioners among the permanent residents.

Many of the male migrants (54%) were employed as labourers. The second largest group (36%) were in services. Five men had clerical jobs and one worked in sales.

79% of the female migrants were in services. There was one professional woman among the migrants.

Most of the commuters and migrants were in the private rather than the public sector. Most had found their jobs directly - only 16% were recruited through the labour bureau.

Table 8 RECRUITMENT

Job sources	Total
Labour bureau	14
Employer direct	64
Self	4
Recruiting agent	8

Of commuters, 38% were in services, there were 31% labourers and 21% farm workers. Three were professionals and one was in sales.

19% of the employed worked in Johannesburg, 17% in Mahodi, 4,5% in Pretoria and 4% each in Springs and Benoni. The others worked in Stilfontein, Kimberley, Cullinan, Krugersdorp, Newcastle, Delmas, Boksburg, Benoni, Kempton Park, Isando, Middelburg, Winburg, Ermelo, Zebediela, Tzaneen and Modderfontein.

## HOUSING

28 of the 100 families were still living in temporary homes, and the rest had permanent ones. On arrival, 95% of the people lived in tents.

Table 9 HOUSING ON ARRIVAL &amp; IN 1981

1981	On arrival		
	Shack	Tent	Temp house
Temporary home	-	27	1
Permanent house	1	67	3

## EDUCATION

The next table gives the level of schooling attained by all those of 7 years and older.

Table 10 LEVEL OF SCHOOLING, BY SEX &amp; RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Level	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
None	16	47	63	11	5	16	32	1	33	59	53	112
Lower primary	52	62	114	4	4	8	23	3	26	79	69	148
Higher primary	26	57	83	2	3	5	16	3	19	44	63	107
Lower secondary	20	36	56	2	9	11	26	4	30	48	49	97
Standard 9+ *	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
TOTAL	115	202	317	19	21	40	97	11	108	231	234	465

\* The questionnaire was miscast here: the matriculation course starts in Standard 8, not 9. Any numbers omitted are likely to have been very small.

Of the permanent residents, relatively few had no formal education (14% of males, 23% of females). The larger numbers in this permanent group are as one would expect, with all the under-7's and most of the older children at home. Most of the permanent residents had had a lower primary education. Of the women, 46% had had a higher primary one at least, and so had 41% of the men. 14% of them all had had some secondary education.

Few complained about the schooling. Some even praised it:

Here we have more schools compared to Botlokwa.

A high school has been built nearby.

Several said more schools were needed and that 'schools are far from us'. Some said a technical school was needed.

Overall, male commuters had had little schooling. 40% had no formal education (commuters, both sexes). Only 27% of the commuters had got beyond primary school, and none beyond Junior Certificate.

Among migrants, 64% of the women had at least higher primary and only 9% had no formal education. 45% of the men had higher primary and 32% had no formal education.

## NUTRITION

Most households (88%) ate twice a day, and very few (1%) ate only once a day. The staple diet appeared to be maize, bread, tea/coffee and sugar. Just under half had meat and eggs at least once a week, but fish and cheese were rarities and most households ate them less than once a month. 48% had milk every day but only 12% had daily greens. The table below gives more detail.

Table 11 EATING FREQUENCY OF HOUSEHOLDS

Item	Daily	Every 2nd day	Twice weekly	Weekly	Less than weekly	Less than monthly
Maize	99	1	-	-	-	-
Greens	12	21	23	24	18	2
Potatoes/rice	2	-	1	29	24	43
Milk	47	27	12	4	4	5
Tea/coffee	96	2	2	-	-	-
Sugar	94	1	2	-	1	2
Meat	3	7	6	48	22	14
Eggs	5	3	2	15	34	40
Fish	-	1	1	1	19	76
Cheese	-	1	-	1	12	86
Bread	90	8	2	-	-	-
Fat	55	12	1	19	9	4
Jam	31	24	6	5	2	32

Many people complained that there was not enough land, so crops and stock were very restricted. 92% said they had produced more in the old place. As one woman said:

We had sufficient land there. Here we can't even plant. As a result we have to buy everything. This has driven my husband to go to work.

Table 12 below gives an indication of agricultural production before the move.

Table 12 AGRICULTURAL DETAILS (OLD PLACE), BY HOUSEHOLDS

Assets		Production	
31 households had 1 field		Maize	by 34 households
7	2	Potatoes	2
1	3	Beans	6
1	4	Other crops	19
5	small fields	Meat	35
25	medium fields	Dairy produce	36
10	large fields	Hides	11
17 households sold some produce		Wool	1
		Eggs	16
		Other pastoral	1

## AMENITIES

Most households had water and latrines of some description on arrival (83% and 94% respectively). Everyone apart from the chief used pit toilets. The school latrines were not recorded.

There were a few schools in better condition than most in other locations. Many teachers had apparently come with the tribe from Mphakane, and the community valued schooling. Only 14% of respondents found schools on arrival.

There is a small clinic near the chief's residence. Mr Tom Manthata of SACC had to do with it being built, apparently, some time after the people arrived. It did not seem to be working well. It often ran out of medicines and closed until new supplies arrived. It is also rather far from some people who have to walk 5 km to visit it. It was staffed by one trained nurse in 1981. The community's health is probably below par, judging by the diet. The infant mortality rate in the 1981 survey was 31 deaths per 1 000 live births (survival rate for 0-4 years: 0,969).

There are few shops. Most of them are next to the main road which goes through the settlement. Further north the shops are more poorly stocked. In 1981 shops were under construction in this quite large area.

There was no fuel on arrival at Mahodi. Now one garage exists, though not always with fuel. The owner, Mr Masedi Manthata, attributes this to victimisation of 'white garage owners at Dendron'. He alleged these men were annoyed at the rivalry when he began repairing cars, and so they persuaded the petrol suppliers to deliver irregularly to his garage.

Buses and taxis do pass through Mahodi, but apparently not often. The researcher in 1981 saw a man 'rushing to town' one lunchtime who was still waiting at the roadside for a taxi three hours later.

None of the roads are tarred. They are in very bad condition, virtually impossible to use after rain.

## ORGANISATIONS

72 respondents said they did not belong to an organisation. There were no churches built.

Burial societies appear to be main type of organisation. Two people in the sample belonged to the women's burial society, and six others all belonged to different ones: the Ramakodi burial society, Manaka burial society, Mongalo burial society, Leboho burial society, and Selaka burial association.

Five people said they attended tribal meetings, one the tribal council meetings. Four belonged to the Manthata tribal authority, two to the Manthata women's society. Seven had forgotten the name, they said, of the organisation they belonged to.

## LEADERSHIP

87% of the sample regarded Chief Manthata as their leader. This need not imply that the others rejected him. Complaints are submitted to headmen rather than to the chief, and so respondents could have seen the headmen as their immediate leaders while still accepting the chief's overall leadership.

Only one respondent, a woman, implied outright rejection of Chief Manthata's leadership by saying 'I don't know' when asked if she saw Stanford Manthata as the leader. Presumably she could have expressed acceptance of him as leader quite freely if she had supported him.

The interviews suggested that Chief Manthata enjoyed 'overwhelming support' for leading most of the people out of 'Machaka's Egypt'. However, Mr Joe Manthata, a cousin and counsellor to the chief, was present at many of the interviews and may have inhibited them even though he walked out when people had to answer 'sensitive' questions.

Two complaints about the chief were: the unequal land allocation and the demand for money payments. They are recorded more fully below.

## PROBLEMS

70 people in the sample (70,7%) felt that conditions had improved since their arrival. This figure may be a little low: some of those interviewed had arrived in 1980, by which time most of the improvements had been completed, and the sample may have picked up a disproportion of these latecomers.

Improvements cited were the introduction of a transport system (buses and taxis), the building of a clinic, a garage, shops and schools (up to matric), the installation of water taps, the fact that people no longer lived in tents, the establishment of football clubs and other organisations such as burial societies, and increased concern in the events of the community such as deaths and marriages.

Respondents were asked to compare conditions before and after the move, and 67 felt there were differences. Some who had come from Mphakane with Chief Manthata preferred the old place where there was more land for crops and livestock.

At Botlokwa we could keep as much livestock as we wanted. Here you may keep only what you brought from Botlokwa. If it dies you cannot replace it.

Several said people had been forced to go out and work because they could not subsist off

the land at Mahodi.

The biggest problem here is that because we don't have land, we must buy everything, which is not always possible. Therefore we must do with much less food than was the case at Machaka.

We don't have money. We never really did but here we feel it more because we don't plant anything and we therefore have to buy things we never used to buy at Machaka.

Our plots here are much smaller than those at the mainstream. They say they had plots at Botlokwa ... they should have bigger plots here also. This is unfair because we pay the same amount although ours are smaller.

Others, also from Mphakane, took a different view. A typical answer was:

For us who never had any farms or livestock, there's no difference.

Others favoured Mahodi above Mphakane. They were no longer under Chief Machaka's 'unfair' rule. Peace had replaced friction. They were no longer subtenants. Mahodi was planned and better laid out than Machaka, and the streets were better.

Another, from the Dendron location, preferred Mahodi too:

We always had trouble with the police there and we hardly ever see a policeman here.

One respondent from Mphakane said: 'The only difference is the leaders.'

32 people saw no difference between Mahodi and their old place - though some of them had been in the Mahodi area before the Manthata tribe arrived.

Land allocation was clearly the main source of discontent in the community. Those who had had fields before could not continue farming. Unequal allocation of land also caused problems. Apparently the largest slices went to those who had been most loyal to the chief during the period of friction with Chief Machaka and the move to Mahodi. This favouritism led to discontent among the people.

Those who came with Chief Manthata were also granted easier terms for cash payments to the chief. They were given sites on payment of R65. If they could not afford this lump sum, they paid over a longer period. In addition some paid R1 a year for rent. But others told a different story, such as the woman who came to Mahodi after being evicted from the Dendron location:

On arrival we paid R10 - they said that was to salute the chief. Thereafter we paid R15 for schools. Then we paid R25 again for schools. We paid certain other monies, I don't know how much.

She then produced her receipts:

No.	Date	Amount (Rs)	Stated purpose
180	17.05.78	10	Tribal levy 1978
55	9.06.78	15	Tribal levy 1977
118	5.03.79	2	Installation
119	5.03.79	1	Private teacher
96	3.04.79	2	Moketi wa Kgosi (Chief's party)
37	13.05.79	10	Tribal levy

143	18.05.79	5	(illegible)
32	16.08.79	10	Tribal levy 1979
1052	20.05.80	15	Tribal levy 1980
2466	25.02.81	3	Tribal levy 1980
179	24.03.81	10	Compressor

An earlier receipt No 105 for R5, dated 19.11.77, had no purpose stated.

Other people may have paid similar sums. They did not mention them, which could mean they were satisfied with the situation.

People also complained that they lacked employment; that the dusty streets made it difficult to keep their homes clean; that they needed a church building.

37 said they had no problems.

#### IMPROVEMENTS WANTED

74 listed one or more of the following items they wanted: a technical school, a church, tarred roads, larger plots, a library, additional lower primary schools, a hospital, land for grazing cattle, recreational facilities, another clinic and increased efficiency and reliability in the existing one, street lighting, improved postal services, a reliable supply of petrol at the garage. One person said a police station should be built. Others wanted more jobs and permission to keep as much livestock as they chose.

9 respondents said they did not know what else they wanted, 15 said they didn't want any, and one said he was too old to think about them.

#### PROBLEM-SOLVING

Those who said they had problems were asked if they could do anything to solve them.

Some felt they could not do anything.

We can't do anything about it. Initially people were even talking about getting back to Machaka but nobody speaks like that today.... People get used to hardships.

Some said they did not know if they could do anything. On the church and the clinic, people generally felt the community should raise money itself to build them. But they felt the Manthata tribal authority should be responsible for the schools.

We are paying money every year towards the building of schools. Therefore I do not see why our children should have to walk such long distances.

Asked who they thought should solve their problems, people said: 'Chief Manthata should talk to Pretoria'; 'You educated people'; 'The chief'; 'God'; 'I don't know'. One evicted from Dendron location said: 'Those who brought us here in the first place, and those who rule us now that we are here should solve the problems.' Another said: 'I hope the government will understand our plight and make more land available.' One person seemed aware of how the buck was passed: 'I doubt if anyone knows. When the chief goes to the commissioner with our problems he is told that we are Lebowa's problem.'

## 3.2 KABOKWENI & PIENAAR (Kangwane)

The Pienaar complex is situated in the area immediately around Kabokweni township, 13 km from White River. It contains Edwaleni, Embonisweni, Ngodini, Nkohlakalo, Bhuga, Ermelo, Malekutu, Nkomeni, Tlautlau, Eluphisi, Zwelitsha, Choeni, Mganduzeni, Jerusalem, Swalala, Kiaat, Tsho-tsho-tsho, Kamajika, Mthimba, Gutshwa, Kamsogwaba and Kadantshi. (The last two are jointly referred to as Pienaar while Ngodini is also known as Kabokweni.) The structure of the area conforms to that of a location in an urban area. Settlements are named after those in jurisdiction over them: Chief Bokweni oversees ka-Bokweni, for example, and Chief Msogwaba ka-Msogwaba. Some of the chiefs see to several areas, like Chief Mbuyane who is in charge of Nkomeni, Tlautlau and Emanyeveni as well as ka-Mbuyane.

All the places are part of the Nsikazi section of Kangwane, the 'homeland' of Swazi-speaking South Africans.

#### HOW DID THE PIENAAR COMPLEX DEVELOP ?

The commissioner for Co-operation and Development could only confirm the 1967 removals from the old location of White River to Ngodini. Others offered more. The following story was told by a 70-year-old resident, Mr Mbuyane.

Several years ago, White River as it is known today did not exist. Black people lived in and around the White River of today and there was not one white man around. It was called Nyavaland then. How the name came about is not known.

A Mr Kilnerton came and bought the whole area from the government (it could not be established when this transaction took place, assuming there ever was one). Mr Kilnerton required black people to work for three months on his farm without pay. There was strong resistance to this, and Mr Kilnerton, through the agency of the State, evicted the people.

The people settled at places like Malekutu, Makoko, Mganduzeni, Embonisweni, Gutshwa and Skhukhuza. All these were very untamed during those days. Except for Embonisweni, all of them were within walking distance of the Kruger National Park. During those days the animals were not fenced off. These places were completely unsafe for human habitation, but the people had no option. They could have said, perhaps with more justice than Piet Retief, 'we are now quitting the fruitful land of our birth ... and are entering a wild and dangerous country; but we go with a firm reliance on an all-seeing, just and merciful Being'.

In the absence of anything else, the saga explains how Malekutu, Makoko, Mganduzeni, Embonisweni, Gutshwa, Skhukhuza and Emahushu grew.

Zwelitsha is the most recent settlement in the complex. The people were brought there in 1981 from the deproclaimed Matsulu township, between Komatipoort and Nelspruit. According to the commissioner they were removed because 'dit is nie hul plek nie'. These people had, however, lived there for years and years. Initially attempts were made to remove them 'amicably' but all those efforts failed. Then came the bulldozers and GG trucks. The drivers were simply beaten up by the people. Eventually they were moved in army trucks and dumped at 'Zwelitsha' at gunpoint. That is how the settlement began. Their leader was said to be still in detention in 1982 for having 'instigated' the people to resist being removed.

Another resident told how White River location was founded. This man, Mr M J Piitso, was born on 10 October 1899 at Hartbeesfontein in the Heidelberg district. He completed his teacher-training at Adams College in 1917. He taught at several places before finally being posted at White River in 1930, where he remains to this day.

The best-known farmer, back in the 1930s, was a Mr Webster. Although Mr Webster stayed in Cape Town, he had several massive farms around White River, and allocated 3 to 6 acres of land per family to 'his' people. Nostalgically Mr Piitso recalled the several herds of cattle and flocks of sheep and goats africans had in those days. According to him the whole area between White River and Nelspruit was simply grazing land.

Mr Piitso himself lived on a farm called Spitzkop belonging to a Mr Strijdom. He negotiated with Mr Strijdom that a school should be built for the children of the workers on that farm. When the school got built, it was called Spitzkop. On the hills overlooking the farm Mr Piitso found grinding stones customarily used by african women when they brew liquor. This suggested to him that several years ago this had been home for africans. In memory of those days he renamed the school Lwaleng which means 'Place of Home-brewed Liquor', and the school is still known by that name.

For some reason the white farmers - among them Lyn and Cannon Ross - met in 1932 and decided that africans should no longer be allowed to remain on the farms and that they should have a location. As a result, the old location was built in 1934. White River was then only a village.

Stands at the old location were sold at 25c each. The average wage of an african then was R5 per month. Although people had built their own houses on the farms, they had not found it to be costly as they used grass for roofing and wood and mud for walls. At the location they had to use corrugated iron for roofing. They bought used corrugated iron from whites at 30c a sheet. Those who had no money sold livestock to buy building material.

Some people did not like the idea of living in a location and they moved to places like Pienaar and Emanyeveni (another name for Malekutu).

At the location people had substantial gardens but they were considerably smaller than the fields they had had on the farms. They were paying 25c per month rent.

White River expanded. The people were told that they were too close to town and they would

have to move again. In 1968 they were moved to Ngodini (Kabokweni). They did not have to build their own houses there, but they had to pay R4,80 per month in rent. In 1981 they paid up to R14,50 rent monthly. Several people who could not afford the rent decided to go to Pienaar, Tlautlau, Emanyeveni and Edwaleni where they built their own shelters in informal settlements.

## REMOVALS AND LAND

Relocation means loss of land in most cases. The people living in and around Kabokweni have been moved three times as has been shown.

Nowadays most people have no land, not even a backyard garden. According to one resident, you must have livestock before you can be allocated a field. Another says you have to be a Mbuyane, a Nkosi or a Khumalo to be allocated a field. Both these requirements are beyond the reach of the vast majority in the complex. Most people move to the area because they have been unable to pay R4,80 rent. Very few people in these circumstances have cattle.

## REMOVALS AND LIVESTOCK

Each removal entails loss of livestock. The cattle die on relocation in many regions around the country. They cannot acclimatise to new, usually poorer, pasture. Several people have to sell some beasts in order to survive financially. Others are forced to sell cattle before moving. After a removal people are at times compelled to slaughter some of their beasts for food.

An additional hazard of the area is its proximity to the Kruger Game Reserve. According to Kruger officials, the animals were only fenced off in 1979. Despite this move, it is still easy for animals to jump over the fence (which is only about 2 metres high) and help themselves to the stock in Kangwane. People have also been attacked and killed by these animals from the park which forms the eastern border of the Nsikazi part of Kangwane. As for fields, the few people who have them complain about elephants which are very difficult to fence off in any case. Elephants simply destroy their crops.

Even if their stock do survive these dangers, inhabitants of the complex are not as a rule allowed to keep more than five cows. (Some well positioned individuals are able to bend the rules.)

## WORK OPPORTUNITIES

A labour bureau official claimed he did not know that there was a place called Pienaar. The Nsikazi section of Kangwane is the most densely populated in the bantustan with at least 60 000 people settled in the rocky hills between Kanyamazane and Kabokweni.

Inhabitants of the Pienaar complex complain that employers at Nelspruit and White River prefer workers from Kanyamazane and Kabokweni. According to the teaching staff at the Khumbula senior secondary school, over 80% of men and women of working age in the complex are unemployed. They seemed very sure of the fact, and a clerk at the Department of Works (Malekutu) agreed with them.

The labour bureau official said most people from the Pienaar complex with jobs would be employed as domestics, on the farms and in the timber industry. Confirming this, the Khumbula teaching staff added that a few people work in the mines too and at the power stations at Middelburg and Witbank, for Sasol.

Jobseekers in the complex must first go to their chief or headman who gives them a paper with his stamp. For this they must pay R2. Only then can they start looking for work.

Several people are barred from worthwhile jobs by lack of formal education. In the survey sample, 31,3% had no formal schooling and a further 24,5% had only four years of primary education. Employment on white-owned farms is available but the people are not keen to work for such low wages.

Employment on the mines and power stations is available to a few. According to the labour bureau man, the standard wages paid to domestics and workers in the timber industry and on white farms varies from R1,20 to R4,50 a day - with very few at the upper level.

## PRICES

Prices in the Pienaar complex do not always compare favourably with those at Kabokweni or Kanyamazane. The higher prices are defended by saying that it is costlier to transport the goods to Pienaar than to take them to Kabokweni or Kanyamazane. Within the complex, the further you go from the township, the higher the prices.

It does not pay people to go to shop in town unless they are buying several items, as travelling is too expensive. From several points in the complex the bus fare to White River is 80c single. Unless one were buying at least R30-worth of goods (which few in Pienaar could afford) it would be cheaper to buy in Pienaar itself. The buses are so congested anyway that there is hardly space for customers and their goods.

Some of the main items cost more in Pienaar, as this table shows:

Table 1 PRICES IN PIENAAR, COMPARED (1981)

	Cape Town	Kabokweni	Pienaar
Milk (500 ml)	32c	45c	48c
Brown bread	29	29	30
Paraffin (1 litre)	50	53	60
Cold drink (300 ml)	19	21	22
Mealie meal (2,5 kg)	90	R1,05	R1,10
Box of matches	2	2	3
	R2,22	R2,55	R2,73

People at Makoko pay up to 32c for brown bread and 23c for 300 ml of cold drink.

There is no post office in the complex. The local shopkeeper often acts as a substitute, at a price. People would have to pay 20c on a letter requiring a 5c stamp.

All residents must pay an annual tribal levy of R1, plus R3 for 'mazibuse' (self-government), and 25c for rain 'to make prayers for rain more effective', the headman was reported to say.

## SCHOOLS

According to the commissioner for Co-operation and Development, the whole Nsikazi area has 54 primary and 5 secondary schools. Understandably, most of them are at Kanyamazane and Kabokweni. A number are also spread over the hills. There is an effort to build 'proper' schools but some are simply far from adequate. Some students live far from their school, and must leave home at 6 a.m. to arrive by 9.

Until Khutshalani school started in 1979, Khumbula was the only secondary school for the areas visited. It caters for students from Form I to V - i.e. to matric - and has 18 classrooms. In 1981 the school had 913 students, and this was a considerable drop from the beginning of the year, a senior teacher said. Khumbula had 28 teachers including the principal. Students sat three to a dual desk. They were meant to pay an annual school fee of R11. Those taking Housecraft or Home Economics were to pay an extra R10 a year. The school had about 200 Home Economics students at the time of the visit.

It is not uncommon for students to fail to pay their fees. In that case, the senior teacher said, 'We send them home' - then added as an afterthought, 'We don't actually send them home any more. We send circulars to their parents.' There was no answer to the question: 'What if their parents ignore the circular?'

## WATER

Taps have been installed at Nkohlakalo, Malekutu, Ermelo, Enkomeni, Tlautlau, Kamsogwaba and Kadantshi. Every 2 km or so, one finds a tap in the street. At these places, huge tanks like reservoirs have been provided where taps could not be installed yet. Huge trucks carry water and fill these tanks. Water brought in this way has been purified. This has been done in response to the cholera epidemic. The taps started functioning on Monday, 5.07.82.

These taps are still a little too far away for many of the people they should serve. It is therefore not uncommon for people with vans or cars to deal in water. The standard price for a 25 litre container is 50c.

There are too few taps to serve all the people here. Queues wait their turn at every time of the day. Several people have found it more convenient to use the old sources, and many have died as a result. Even the dam is too far away. It was reported that that water was reserved for the township, not the people of Pienaar. Water merchants fetch water for Pienaar people, charging for their services.

The water supply is often suspended without notice. People start queuing for water at 5 a.m. and the supply is simply cut off, say at midday. The people cannot go back home if this happens as they will be at the end of the queue when the water starts dripping again. All they can do meanwhile is to get their water from the filthy dam.

No taps have been installed in other areas yet. Springs and rivers are still the sources of water. Serious shortages are experienced during droughts, with cholera spreading when it rains.

## HEALTH

### CLINICS

There are 10 clinics for the whole of the Nsikazi area with its population of about 60 000 (the tenth clinic had not yet started at the time of the visit in 1981).

One doctor, based at Themba Hospital, attends all 10 clinics. He is assisted by another doctor at the Kanyamazane clinic. Qualified nursing sisters work at all the clinics. Telephones and an intercom link all the clinics and the hospitals closest to them - notably Themba and Shongwe. The hospitals themselves have their own intercom.

The clinics charge R1 per consultation for patients of any age (except that pensioners do not pay). Often patients cannot pay the fees. Then they are treated and allowed to pay later.

The main problems treated are cholera, chicken pox, bilharzia, tape worms, roundworms, and whooping cough. The clinics open from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. Monday to Friday, and on Saturday to midday. If a patient is critically ill the clinic phones for an ambulance. There may be a delay of 20 minutes, or an ambulance may not be available at all. All 10 clinics depend on Themba Hospital which has only three ambulances. Every couple of months, a patient dies on admission, a hospital sister said.

The Malekutu clinic caters for people at Malekutu, Choeni, Gutshwa and Kiaat. The Kiaat people live up to 8 km from the clinic. Those at Gutshwa and Choeni are about 5 km away. Malekutu people are the closest - the furthest they have to walk is 2 km.

### HOSPITALS

Themba Hospital caters for the people in this complex. It has 15 doctors. Fees vary according to the patient's income, and work out roughly thus:

out-patient	R2
in-patient	4
maternity	10

Here again, people may not have the fee, and they are treated and sent an account afterwards. Most patients do pay their accounts, but some cannot.

A patient brought to the hospital by ambulance must pay R3 for the first 15 km and 20c per km thereafter. Anyone earning R6 000 or more a year must pay 62c per km after the first 15 km.

### COMMON DISEASES TREATED AT THEMBA

The infant ward has children up to the age of two. The three separate registers show the admissions for different levels of malnutrition. In the period January - December 1981, 58 infants were admitted with kwashiorkor, 27 with marasmus, and 2 with marasmic kwashiorkor.

The children's ward, with patients between 2 and 12 years, has one register for all its malnutrition cases. 49 children were admitted for malnutrition in 1981.

This does not reflect how serious malnutrition really is in the Pienaar complex, says the sister. A number of children with malnutrition do not even come to the hospital. More than 75% of the children admitted are suffering from gastro-enteritis, and malnutrition is the underlying cause. In fact malnutrition is getting worse.

The other common diseases all show clear socio-economic determinants. Typhoid and internal haemorrhoids are related to the lack of toilet facilities. Gastro-enteritis, in adults as well as children, spreads with poor nutrition and hygiene. TB, pneumonia, mitral incompetence, and the high incidence of still births, all betoken malnutrition and/or overcrowding. Diseases such as nephritis, tetanus and septicaemia arise when people only come to hospital once their illness reaches a serious stage and complications have set in. The vast range of venereal diseases stems from the disturbed social position at Pienaar and the fact that sexual relations are a lucrative career.

A fair number of people would rather go to traditional healers, of whom there are several in the area. There perhaps they receive a more sympathetic and less rushed consultation. But the minimum charge for a traditional consultation is R50 and probably few can afford this.

\* \* \* \*

The information in the first section of this report was gained from informal interviews, some on visits to Pienaar in 1981 and 1982. The second section summarises the results of 39 SPP questionnaires administered in Pienaar and 45 in Kabokweni.

Pienaar is an informal settlement near Kabokweni. Kabokweni (the newer spelling of ka-Bokweni) is the official new location for White River. When people in the old location were told they would be moved to Kabokweni, those who did not want to go started filtering out of the old location into Emanyeveni (Place of Thorns), immediately to the east of Kabokweni. Kabokweni itself is much like any other location in the urban areas of South Africa. It lies 13 km east of White River. About 1 000 households live in it, with most of the basic facilities provided.

## CONDITIONS AT THE RELOCATION AREAS

### DEMOGRAPHY

Of the 438 people in the sample, as Table 2 below shows, 267 were permanent residents, 105 commuters and 62 migrants. More than half the permanent residents were female (59%) and in the 0-14 age group (54%). The second largest age group was the 15-24 year olds (16%).

The largest number of commuters was in the 25-34 age group (29%), dwindling to 18% in the 45-64 bracket. There were more female than male commuters till the age of 35 when the situation was reversed, with 75% of the 45-64 age group being males.

The largest proportion of migrants and also of commuters was in the 25-34 age group. There were only 4 female migrants, all between 15 and 34 years old.

Two-thirds (57) of the 85 households had 5 or more members, as seen below in Table 3, while 76 (89%) had 4 or more members.

As in Table 4, relatively few of the male heads of household were permanent residents, most of them being either commuters or migrants. 14% of the households were headed by women, most of them permanent residents.

In Table 5, of the 26 people who had left their original household since arrival, 17 were male. In 20% of the households one infant had died since arrival. (The mortality rate to the age of 5 years was 143 per thousand.)

Table 2 AGE AND SEX BY RESIDENCE STATUS

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Missing			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	72	73	145	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	73	73	146
15-24	17	25	42	11	14	25	12	1	13	2	1	3	42	41	83
25-34	5	9	14	8	25	33	20	3	23	-	-	-	33	37	70
35-44	2	21	23	14	12	26	15	-	15	-	-	-	31	33	64
45-64	7	23	30	15	5	20	11	-	11	-	1	1	33	29	62
65+	7	6	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	6	13
Total	110	157	267	49	56	105	58	4	62	2	2	4	219	219	438

Table 3 HOUSEHOLDS BY SIZE

Size	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
Number	1	3	5	19	23	17	11	3	2	1	85

Modal size 5  
Median size 5  
Mean size 5,2

Table 4 HOUSEHOLDS' HEADS BY SEX &amp; RESIDENCE STATUS

	Permanent	Commuter	Migrant	Total
Male	12	34	27	73
Female	10	2	-	12
Total	22	36	27	85

Table 5 REASONS FOR LEAVING HOUSEHOLD SINCE MOVING

	Died	Married	Got own plot	Other	Total
Male	5	-	1	11	17
Female	2	1	1	5	9
Total	7	1	2	16	26

## ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND INCOME

Of the permanent residents, 96% were not economically active, 3% considered themselves unemployed, and only 1% were employed (3 out of 267 people).

Table 6 ECONOMIC STATUS BY SEX AND RESIDENCE STATUS

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Missing			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
NEA*	107	149	256	3	1	4	-	-	-	2	1	3	112	151	263
Employed	2	1	3	46	55	101	58	4	62	-	-	-	106	60	166
Unemployed	1	6	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6	7
Missing	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	2
Total	110	157	267	49	56	105	58	4	62	2	2	4	219	219	438

\* not economically active

The largest number of commuters was employed in the services sector (70%). The next highest figure (10%) was for transport. Other sectors that commuters worked in were trade, manufacture, construction, mining and electricity.

The migrants were mostly employed in electricity (28%), services (24%) and mining (18%). Three of the 4 female migrants were in services and one in manufacturing. Among both commuters and migrants, females were more concentrated in the services sector than men were. 33% of the men and 85% of the women were in services.

Table 7 SECTOR BY SEX AND RESIDENCE STATUS

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Agriculture	-	-	-	1	-	1	3	-	3	4	-	4
Mining	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	11	11	-	11
Manufacturing	-	-	-	3	2	5	4	1	5	7	3	10
Electricity etc	-	-	-	1	-	1	17	-	17	18	-	18
Construction	-	-	-	2	-	2	3	-	3	5	-	5
Commerce	-	-	-	4	1	5	2	-	2	6	1	7
Transport etc	-	-	-	9	2	11	3	-	3	12	2	14
Services	-	1	1	23	47	70	12	3	15	35	51	86
Missing	2	-	2	3	3	6	3	-	3	8	3	11
Total	2	1	3	46	55	101	58	4	62	106	60	166

Of employed males, over half were labourers (54%), the next highest group being semi-skilled (15%). 33% of males were employed in services, 17% in electricity, and the rest in decreasing numbers in transport, mining, manufacture, trade, construction and agriculture.

Of employed females, most were employed in a service capacity (62%), the next highest group being professionals (18%). 85% had jobs in the services sector, 8% in agriculture, and smaller numbers in manufacture, trade and transport.

28% of the employed worked in White River, most of them women. Some people worked in Nelspruit (15%), Kabokweni (12%), Sabie (12%) and Witbank (9%). A few people worked in various other areas including the PWV and towns in the Eastern Transvaal such as Middelburg, Graskop, Carolina, Lydenburg, Ermelo, Barberton.

Table 8 OCCUPATION BY SEX AND RESIDENCE STATUS

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Professional	1	1	2	4	10	14	1	-	1	6	11	17
Business	-	-	-	1	2	3	1	-	1	2	2	4
Clerical	-	-	-	4	1	5	3	-	3	7	1	8
Sales	-	-	-	2	2	4	2	-	2	4	2	6
Service	-	-	-	1	35	36	3	2	5	4	37	41
Farm	-	-	-	3	1	4	4	-	4	7	1	8
Skilled	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
Semi-skilled	-	-	-	11	1	12	5	-	5	16	1	17
Unskilled	-	-	-	20	-	20	37	2	39	57	2	59
Missing	1	-	1	-	2	2	2	-	2	3	2	5
Total	2	1	3	46	55	101	58	4	62	106	60	166

Table 9 EMPLOYER SECTOR

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Self	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1
Private	1	-	1	39	38	77	53	4	57	93	42	135
Public	1	1	2	6	16	22	3	-	3	10	17	27
Missing	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	2	2	1	3
Total	2	1	3	46	55	101	58	4	62	106	60	166

81% of the employed worked for private employers, 16% for the public service and only one male commuter was self-employed.

103 people found their jobs through the labour bureau, 29 from the employer direct, and two through a network of family and friends.

On the subject of incomes, only 19 of the 267 permanent residents gave information - most of them (13) lived off their old age pensions and 6 people received disability grants. Most salaried people remitted regularly to their families. 44 migrants remitted regularly, 17 (27%) did so irregularly, and one never. The households seemed to subsist mainly on this money as none produced agricultural goods of their own (gardens were too small and the ground hard and full of stones). Only 14 households (17%) were involved in informal economic activities (selling liquor and herbal medicines), and 3 households (4%) received gifts from outside. A number of residents said that in their previous areas they had had subtenants, but in the new place they no longer had that source of income.

## EDUCATION

A very large proportion of permanent residents (over 6 years of age) had no education (30%), and more again had reached lower primary level only (32%): over 60% had lower primary or less. Just 8 people had reached Standard 9+. As many as 14% of the commuters and 26% of migrants had no schooling. Very few had got to Standard 9+. In general, commuters had a higher level of education than migrants. The low level attained could partly be attributed to the fact that many of the residents arrived before there were schools in the area. Even now, only Khumbula seems to have a matric class. 28% of both sexes have secondary schooling.

Table 10 EDUCATION BY SEX AND RESIDENCE STATUS (7 years old plus)

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Missing			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
None	27	42	69	9	6	15	16	-	16	-	1	1	52	49	101
Lower primary	29	44	73	9	14	23	15	-	15	-	-	-	53	58	111
Higher primary	16	28	44	8	10	18	12	2	14	-	-	-	36	40	76
Lower secondary	12	25	37	20	24	44	13	2	15	-	1	1	45	52	97
Standard 9+	4	4	8	2	2	4	2	-	2	2	-	2	10	6	16
Total	88	143	231	48	56	104	58	4	62	2	2	4	196	205	401

## NUTRITION

The majority of households ate twice a day (69%). Two households ate only once a day. Most seem to subsist on maize, bread, tea/coffee and sugar. Protein in the form of cheese, eggs and fish was only eaten once a month by most households, but 66% had milk daily and 94% had meat at least once weekly. Greens did not seem to be eaten much: over a quarter of the households had them only once a month. Many people said that food was a problem as the shops charged very high prices and there was no land to grow vegetables on. Those living on farms had previously had assistance from their employers. The survey's findings are detailed in Table 11 below.

## HOUSING

While most of the households have permanent houses, many are still living in shacks (18%) and temporary houses (14%). This is an improvement on when the households first came, when 27% lived in shacks and 6% in tents. Most were unable to bring materials from their old houses. None of the households in Kabokweni had had to pay a lump sum for their land or houses on arrival, but the Pienaar people had had to pay R8 or R15 to the chiefs. For the types of housing, see Table 12 below.

Table 11 NUTRITION

	Daily	Every 2nd day	Twice weekly	Weekly	Less than weekly	Less than monthly
Maize	79*"	2	-	4	-	-
Greens	-	2	9	24	23"	25*
Potatoes	2	5	2	25	17"	34*
Milk	56*"	6	17	3	2	1
Tea/coffee	85*"	-	-	-	-	-
Sugar	84*"	1	-	-	-	-
Meat	7	6	16	51*"	4	1
Eggs	8	5	6	3	18	45*"
Fish	-	1	4	5	10	64*"
Cheese	2	-	1	1	7	74*"
Bread	71*"	6	5	3	-	-
Fat	14	2	6	20	23*"	20
Jam	23	3	1	-	11	47*"
Other	4	4	4	-	-	73*"

\* mode  
" median

Table 12 HOUSING

Now	When first arrived				Total now
	Shack	Tent	Temp house	Perm house	
Shack	12	-	2	1	15
Tent	-	-	-	-	-
Temp house	8	2	2	-	12
Perm house	3	3	8	42	56
Total then	23	5	12	43	

## ARRIVAL

Of the sample, the first household arrived in 1964. Others moved into the area after them, but most arrived later, between 1968 and 1970. Since 1971 a few households have come every year.

55 of the sample households were evicted and went to Kangwane, while 29 went 'of their own free will'. Table 13 shows dates of arrival, and Table 14 the number of years spent in the last place.

Most households said they lacked various services on arrival. As many as 46% did not have water or latrines, 45% found no schools, and 25% no shops. Services that have only recently been provided are clinics (67% lacked them on arrival), churches and fuel (94% did not have access to fuel on arrival). Further details are given in Table 15.

Table 13 DATE ARRIVED

2 before 1967
13 in 1968
22 in 1969
16 in 1970
18 in 1971-75
12 in 1976 and later

Table 14 YEARS IN LAST PLACE

Years	Households
0-5	18
6-10	10
11-20	20
21-50	8
Missing	29
Total	85

Table 15 FACILITIES FOUND ON ARRIVAL

Facility	Households
Water	45
Latrines	45
Roads	72
Buses	70
Taxis	59
Fuel	5
Shops	62
Schools	46
Clinics	27
Churches	39
Local authority	46
Other	34

## IMPROVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS

Responses from Kabokweni and Pienaar show large differences in the conditions in these two areas.

The problems in Pienaar are far more basic. While most Kabokweni residents felt that there had been improvements, many in Pienaar said they had had none.

The main problem in Pienaar is water. Residents complained that there are no taps and that they had to wait in long queues at the wells. They also said the water was dirty. Other problems were the lack of toilets, wood, schools, churches, decent roads, grazing land; the high cost of living; and the distance from the nearest town. Many said the area was overcrowded, dirty, noisy, and that there was a lot of theft. Most of the people said there was nothing they could do to improve conditions, that it was up to the government or chiefs to improve things, although one person stated that 'The chiefs live in luxury and have grown insensitive to our complaints.'

Improvements mentioned by Kabokweni residents were that the main road had been tarred, telephones installed, a hospital and post office built, and more shops, schools and churches provided. The houses all have flushing toilets and there are taps in all the yards. Many of the residents felt they were better off in Kabokweni than they had been before, as regards these things. The main problems mentioned were a scarcity of wood, no electricity, and that the water was sometimes cut off without warning, which meant problems with the indoor toilets. People also complained about the heat and mosquitoes.

## PLACE OF ORIGIN

Before the move, most people had lived either in towns (74%) or on white farms (19%). They moved mainly because they had been evicted, only 34% of the households having left of their own free will. The largest proportion had lived in their last place for 11-20 years. The majority had not been given compensation on leaving (74%). Those who had been compensated were paid R100 - R300.

The largest proportion of people had worked in White River. 16% had worked in Sabie, and 12% in Nelspruit. Most of the working people were normally resident in the areas they had worked in. Several areas were named, and others where 5 or more people had worked were Middelburg, Witbank, Lydenburg, Graskop and Barberton.

Of the households that had lived on agricultural land, 6 had had one field, mostly small in size. Crops grown were mainly mielies and sorghum. Stock kept was mostly cattle, goats and poultry. Produce included meat, dairy products and eggs, but no wool or hides. A large majority said they had produced more then than now.

16 households had been moved off white farms. All said they had worked for the farmer but had not had a written contract. Many of these households had had more than one member working for the farmer, generally helping with the planting and reaping of crops.

Of those moved off urban land, the majority had rented their houses (62%), in most cases paying their rent to private individuals. Over a third had owned their own houses.

#### REASONS FOR LEAVING

Of the evicted households, most had been told to go by the municipality or the farmer they had worked for. The municipalities' reasons were that the location was dirty, overcrowded and too close to town (White River location), that the location was to be only for 'coloureds' (Graskop), and that the area was to become an industrial one (Nelspruit). The townships were, in fact, deproclaimed.

Most of the people from white farms had had some sort of alleged dispute with the farmer and so had been fired. In one dispute the farmer wanted a child to be taken out of school to work on the farm. The parents refused and were then told to leave. Another farmer told the family to either sell him their livestock or leave. In some cases the employed member became ill or died and the family had been told to leave. A few households left when farms changed hands.

#### ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP

Once again there was a difference between Pienaar and Kabokweni residents, in the organisations they belonged to and the leaders mentioned. Only a few Pienaar people said they belonged to an organisation - besides the church, the only one mentioned was TUATA, the Transvaal United African Teachers' Association. Far more Kabokweni people had joined organisations, which included the churches, school committee, TUATA, Inyanza and the SANC (South African Nursing Council).

The only leaders mentioned by Pienaar residents were the chief and his indunas and a couple of people mentioned the Kangwane authorities. Leaders mentioned by Kabokweni residents were the chiefs, the mayor, the chairman of Inyandza, members of the community council and Kangwane government, and teachers (by a teacher!).

Table 16 LAST PLACE

White farm	16
Tribal land	1
Town	63
City	1
Other	4

#### CONCLUSION

The survey covered both Kabokweni (a proclaimed urban area in Kangwane) the commuter township for White River, and Pienaar, the informal settlement on the surrounding hills so typical of bantustan urbanisation. Two surveys should perhaps have been conducted as conditions and attitudes are so different, but the differences were highlighted.

Kabokweni houses a more privileged class - those who can afford the rent. A breakdown of those employed in different sectors would probably show the more skilled people working at the power stations of the Eastern Transvaal, the teachers and nurses to be living there. Kabokweni people are still isolated by having to commute (only 3 permanent residents in the sample were employed), and although housing conditions have improved since the move, access to facilities has not.

Pienaar households suffered all the evils typical of an informal settlement in a bantustan - no access to land or fuel; housing of poor quality, lack of water and latrines; long distances to overcrowded schools and clinics; expensive poorly located shops, high transport costs to the nearest white towns; authoritarianism and financial squeezing from chiefs and indunas.

Forced off the farms and out of compounds of forestry plantations, the people have poured into Pienaar and other parts of Kangwane 'voluntarily' with nowhere else to go. This trend in the 1970s continues into the 1980s turning the Nsikazi region of Kangwane into another 'city state' like Qwaqwa which the South African government would like to hand over to Swaziland. The people have expressed their opposition to being excluded from what little South African wealth they have and it seems as though there is a chance for a reversal of the decision.

January 1983

### 3.3 KWAGGAFONTEIN (KwaNdebele)

Kwaggafontein lies halfway between Pretoria and Groblersdal in an area designated to become an independent 'Ndebele' bantustan. The area is under the immediate jurisdiction of three indunas (headmen) Mahlangu, Shobangu and Ngoma, of whom Shobangu appears to be the most senior. Access to the area for visitors is only possible after obtaining a permit from the bantustan Minister, which must then be presented to the relevant induna. Even then access is not assured and is unlikely for journalists. Asked why newsmen were so unpopular in the area, Shobangu explained:

You see, young man, if you are a father and you have children you will know that children are difficult to satisfy. You could try everything to please them, but the chances are that when they see outsiders they will speak of things you don't know ... things they never told you about.

Kwaggafontein comprises three sections, A, B and C. The places appear to be named according to when people started living there, Section A being the oldest and C the most recent. As one drives towards Pretoria there are at least three other vast closer settlements. Kwaggafontein is likely to expand still further in a westerly direction as people are continuing to move out of Bophuthatswana for reasons to be discussed below. It is unlikely to develop to the east as the Machiding area is almost immediately on the border.

#### FACILITIES

Most people still live in shacks. The most serious problem is a lack of water, the only available taps having been placed opposite the gates of the headmen. Several people, because of the distance and queuing involved in using this source, choose to fetch their water from rivulets passing through the area. There are also water merchants who supply water at R1,50 a drum.

A building society based in Machiding, Vusani Investments, has put up a few proper houses in the area. These houses have flushing toilets, while most of the other households have pit toilets sheltered by corrugated iron.

There are schools, shops and one beerhall. There is also an understaffed clinic, which does not satisfy the needs of the people, as many still go to Machiding or Central Dennilton for medical treatment. People in the area still speak fondly of a nursing sister who ran a mobile clinic until three years ago.

Transport consists of buses running between Marble Hall/Groblersdal and Johannesburg/Pretoria. None of these actually enter Kwaggafontein.

#### THE PEOPLE

Most people in the area have come from the following areas near Pretoria: Stinkwater, Winterveld, Diloppe, Themba, Leboneng, Majaneng, Mabopane A (i.e. Boekenhoutfontein) and New Eersterus. Others came from Witbank, Dennilton (Ntwana), Tweefontein, Kameel River, Bronkhorstspuit and Delmas. Most people speak Ndebele.

Of the people who came from the Pretoria district, about 15% came from Majaneng. The reason for people leaving Majaneng indicates why they now find themselves at Kwaggafontein.

After her husband's death Esther Kekana became chieftainess of Majaneng. She was also a member of the Bophuthatswana legislative assembly. Because of this, Mangope protected her when critics tried to have her removed on the grounds that she had fallen pregnant by a 'commoner' to whom she was not married.

When Bophuthatswanan independence became an issue, Kekana attempted to repay Mangope for his assistance. She persuaded her subjects to stay in Bophuthatswana and take out citizenship as Mangope had promised that they would not be discriminated against for not being of Tswana extraction: they would still be able to teach in Northern Sotho in their schools and would continue to receive trading licences.

Those promises were not kept. Soon after independence Mangope issued a circular saying Tswana was to be the only vernacular language in all Bophuthatswana schools. Bureaucrats at the licensing offices were also not told not to discriminate against non-Tswanas. The owner of a prosperous cane furniture factory was forced to leave and take up residence in Pietersburg as he was of North Sotho origin.

Because of such experiences, people in this and other areas were no longer willing to take out citizenship. (Their main reason for it had been simply expediency.) Those who refuse citizenship must leave the areas, and one can thus expect continued expansion of Kwaggafontein. The move is not necessarily an improvement. Surveillance and control by the Kwaggafontein authorities appears as onerous as in the original areas. When a resident of Kwaggafontein was asked what the difference was between living there or in Themba where she had come from, she replied:

Look, I don't quite like that question. How can I be sure that you're not going to give those papers to the Chief? We who come from locations are watched suspiciously and if it is heard that I said anything bad, I am in for it. So please do not feel bad if I seem not to trust you but I don't want to answer that one.

\* \* \* \*

# THE SURVEY

The following information was taken from questionnaires administered to 98 Kwaggafontein households in 1981.

## DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Of the sample of 553, 387 people were permanent residents, 61 commuters and 105 migrants. 64% of the permanent residents were female. The largest category of permanent residents by age was the 0-14 age group, and next came 15-24.

Table 1 AGE AND SEX BY RESIDENCE STATUS

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	91	97	188	-	-	-	-	-	-	91	97	188
15-24	25	59	84	17	4	21	22	12	34	64	75	139
25-34	3	26	29	13	4	17	21	4	25	37	34	71
35-44	3	41	44	12	2	14	22	1	23	37	44	81
45-64	15	21	36	8	1	9	21	1	22	44	23	67
65+	3	2	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	5
Missing	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	2
Total	140	247	387	50	11	61	87	18	105	277	276	553

The majority of commuters were male (82%). Most were in the 15-24 age group and least in the 45-64 group (15%).

Of the migrants, most were males, although as many as 17% were female. Once again most were in the 15-24 age group (33%). This dwindled to 21% in the 45-64 group.

Household size ranged from 3 to 9 members. Almost a third (32%) had 5 members, then came those with 6 members (27%) and 7 members (21%). Most households consisted of a nuclear family (60%) or an extended family (29%).

Table 2 HOUSEHOLD SIZE

Size	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
Number	6	8	31	26	21	4	2	98

Modal size 5

Median size 6

Average size 5.6

Table 3 HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY SEX & RESIDENCE STATUS

	Permanent	Commuter	Migrant	Total
Male	11	28	50	89
Female	3	1	1	5

Of the male heads of household only 12% were permanent residents, the majority being migrants (56%).

Since moving to Kwaggafontein one male had died and two females left the household to get married. Four children under the age of 5 had died. (The infant mortality rate was 211 per 1 000 live births.)

## ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND INCOME

Only 4 of the permanent residents said they were employed. 94% were not economically active, but the unemployment rate was 23% of economically active permanent residents and commuters (10% of all the economically active).

Table 4 ECONOMIC STATUS BY SEX AND RESIDENCE STATUS

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
NEA*	133	233	366	-	-	-	1	-	1	134	233	367
Employed	-	2	2	50	11	61	86	18	104	136	31	167
Unemployed	7	12	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	12	19
Total	140	247	387	50	11	61	87	18	105	277	276	553

\* not economically active

Table 5 SECTOR BY SEX AND RESIDENCE STATUS

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mining	-	-	-	1	-	1	4	-	4	5	-	5
Manufacturing	-	-	-	4	-	4	2	1	3	6	1	7
Electricity etc	-	-	-	13	-	13	9	1	10	22	1	23
Construction	-	-	-	4	-	4	6	-	6	10	-	10
Commerce	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	2	2	1	3
Transport	-	-	-	14	-	14	22	-	22	36	-	36
Finance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Services	-	2	2	13	11	24	41	15	56	54	28	82
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1
Total	-	2	2	50	11	61	86	18	104	136	31	167

Commuters were employed most in services (39%), and then transport (23%) and electricity etc (21%). Others were in mining, manufacture, construction and trade. All the females were employed in services.

The majority of migrants were in services (54%) and then (like the commuters) in transport (21%) and electricity (10%). The rest were in the same sectors as the commuters. 83% of the females were in services, the rest in manufacturing, electricity and trade.

49% of all employment was in services, followed by transport and electricity.

Of the males, 50% were labourers and then 24% in service occupations and 15% semi-skilled. 84% of the females worked in service occupations, then 6% were labourers.

Table 6 OCCUPATION BY SEX AND RESIDENCE STATUS

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Professional	-	-	-	2	2	4	-	-	-	2	2	4
Business	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	1
Clerical	-	-	-	6	-	6	4	-	4	10	-	10
Sales	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1
Service	-	2	2	10	8	18	22	16	38	32	26	58
Farm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Skilled	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1
Semi-skilled	-	-	-	11	-	11	10	-	10	21	-	21
Unskilled	-	-	-	20	1	21	48	1	49	68	2	70
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1
Total	-	2	2	50	11	61	86	18	104	136	31	167

Most of those in jobs were employed privately. 15% of the commuters, 2% of the migrants and the 2 employed permanent residents worked in the public sector.

Table 7 EMPLOYERS

	Permanent		Commuter		Migrant	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
Self	-	-	-	-	-	1
Private	-	-	46	4	83	17
Public	-	2	2	7	2	0
Total	-	2	48	11	85	18

The largest group worked in Pretoria (45%) and others in Witbank (15%) and Johannesburg (11%). The rest worked in other towns in the Witwatersrand and Pretoria area and as far as Middelburg.

Of the 139 who answered the question on recruitment for their jobs, 117 (84%) had found their jobs through labour bureaux, 13 (9%) from the employer direct, 4 (3%) found their jobs themselves, 2 (1%) through recruiting agents, and 3 (2%) through a network of friends and family.

Only 7 of the permanent residents said they got any sort of income themselves, 2 through earnings, 3 from old age pensions and 2 from disability grants. 16% said they were involved in informal activities including selling liquor and various food products and selling things they had made, e.g. knitted goods and mats. Only 4% received gifts, and none produced

agricultural goods. Most of the employed sent regular remittances: 88% of the commuters and 74% of the migrants. The rest gave irregularly (26%), except for 1 migrant who never contributed.

## EDUCATION

21% of permanent residents over the age of 6 had no formal education, while 33% had only lower primary education. Only one permanent resident had reached Standard 9+.

Among commuters, 15% had no schooling. The largest group had higher primary (28%), and 8% (4 males, 1 female) had reached Standard 9+.

22% of the migrants had no schooling, the largest group had lower primary standard (37%), and nobody had Standard 9+.

Table 8 EDUCATION BY SEX AND RESIDENCE STATUS (aged 7 years plus)

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
None	21	47	68	8	1	9	20	2	22	49	50	99
Lower primary	43	62	105	12	2	14	34	5	39	89	69	158
Higher primary	23	63	86	13	4	17	20	7	27	56	74	130
Lower secondary	15	45	60	13	3	16	12	4	16	40	52	92
Standard 9+	1	-	1	4	1	5	-	-	-	5	1	6
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	103	217	320	50	11	61	86	18	104	239	246	485

## NUTRITION

The majority of households ate twice a day (64%), subsisting mainly on maize, bread, milk, tea/coffee and sugar. 5% ate greens daily but most had them weekly. Meat was eaten by 4% daily and 46% weekly. Eggs, fish and especially cheese were seldom if ever eaten. None had fields to grow their own vegetables in - even if they had, water would have been a major problem. Further details on diet appear in Table 9 below.

## HOUSING

Only 7% of households had permanent houses. 77% were still in shacks and 16% in temporary houses. This is not much of an improvement on when the people first came, when 92% were in shacks and 6% in tents. More than half said they had been unable to bring building materials with them from their old houses. All had had to pay a lump sum of R37,50 to the chiefs on arrival. 97% said they did not pay rent. Of the few who did, the complaint was that non-Ndebeles paid more rent than Ndebeles. Many residents complained about the

Table 9 NUTRITION

	Daily	Every 2nd day	Twice weekly	Weekly	Less than weekly	Less than monthly
Maize	94*"	2	2	-	-	-
Greens	5	4	11	28	33*"	17
Potatoes	-	2	2	22	22	50*"
Milk	52*"	13	28	2	1	2
Tea/coffee	92*"	4	2	-	-	-
Sugar	94*"	1	1	-	1	1
Meat	4	13	15	46*"	18	2
Eggs	9	1	8	8	22	50*"
Fish	-	-	-	-	17	81*"
Cheese	2	1	-	2	-	93*"
Bread	82*"	12	1	1	-	2
Fat	14	2	5	22	41	14
Jam	39	10	1	1	1	46*

\* mode      " median

Table 10 HOUSING

Now	On first arrival				Total now
	Shack	Tent	Temp house	Perm house	
Shack	71	4	-	-	75
Tent	-	-	-	-	-
Temp house	13	2	1	-	16
Perm house	6	-	-	1	7
Total then	90	6	1	1	98

housing situation, saying they wanted proper houses that were not made of zinc. Some also said their houses were overcrowded.

## ARRIVAL

Kwaggafontein is a recent relocation area. A few of the surveyed households arrived before and during 1977, with the majority coming in 1979 (29%) and 1980 (24%). See Table 11 below.

Facilities seem to have been very poor on arrival for most of the households. Over 90% did not have water, latrines, churches and local authority then. Over 60% had no shops, schools or clinics. 59% said no fuel was available when they came. The majority said that some buses, taxis and roads existed on their arrival. Table 12 below details the answers.

Table 11 ARRIVAL DATE

1977	13 households
1978	14
1979	28
1980	23
1981	20

Table 13 ORIGIN

White farm	3
Trust farm	76
Tribal farm	1
Town	18

Table 12 FACILITIES ON ARRIVAL

Water	3 households
Latrines	2
Roads	59
Buses	56
Taxis	54
Fuel	33
Shops	32
Schools	32
Clinics	28
Churches	2
Local authority	1

As for why people came: two households were evicted (for not paying rent to the municipality) and the other 96 came 'voluntarily', i.e. not relocated in official vehicles. Most people came from Trust land set aside for Tswanas, not other 'ethnic groups'. Some came from towns to get some kind of secure base for their households. (See Table 13.)

While only 32 households replied on how long they had lived in the last place, the response suggested that most had lived there a relatively short time (6-10 years for 8 of the households replying). This indicates the insecurity and mobility forced on people through ethnic exclusion - first from declared white group areas in and around Pretoria in the early 1960s, then to Winterveld and other Trust farms which were later incorporated into Bophuthatswana, when non-citizens were then excluded. 11 households reported living in the last place 11-20 years and only three 21-50 years.

Table 14 COMPARATIVE CONDITIONS BEFORE &amp; AFTER THE MOVE

Residence status	Before	After	Change
Permanent	36	19	- 17
Daily commuters	101	11	- 90
Weekly commuters	32	48	+ 16
Monthly commuters	16	108	+ 92
Yearly migrants	-	4	+ 4
Total	185	190	+ 5

Table 14 shows an increase of 5 workers after the move (probably children old enough to enter the job market). Since the move there has been a clear change in residence status from those who worked permanently where they lived or commuted daily to work, to weekly and monthly commuters. There had been no annual migrants before the move. Now there are four. The only people who stabilised their residence status were those who could not find employment. (This information was taken from Tables A and D in the questionnaire - see Vol 1 - i.e. those who worked at the time of the survey and/or who had worked before the move.)

Of the people who were permanently resident in the last place, one remained permanent, 10 became daily commuters, 12 weekly commuters, 17 monthly commuters and one a yearly migrant. (This includes 5 who entered employment.)

Of those who were originally daily commuters, one remained as such, 15 became permanently resident, 58 monthly commuters, 24 weekly commuters, and 3 yearly commuters. Of the 15

people who became permanently resident, 13 did so because they became jobless after moving. (This group includes one who entered employment.)

Those originally weekly commuters: 10 remained as such, one became permanently resident (by becoming jobless after removal), 21 became monthly commuters. Nobody in this group became a daily or yearly commuter.

Of those who were monthly commuters, 12 remained as such, two became permanently resident (by becoming jobless), and two became weekly commuters. Again, nobody became a daily or yearly commuter.

61% of those employed before the move had worked in Pretoria, 9% in Witbank and 12% in Johannesburg. A larger proportion had been resident in their job places than not. As with their present jobs, most had worked in the service sector. Some had worked in agriculture before removal, but none afterwards.

Of those moved off agricultural land, the largest proportion (38%) had had two fields, and 31% had had one. All but one household said their fields were small. The main crops grown were mielies and sorghum, and some households had grown potatoes and beans. Stock kept was mostly cattle and to a lesser extent poultry. Other kinds were goats, sheep, pigs and horses. All but one household had had grazing facilities. From the livestock families got mainly dairy produce and eggs. A few kept their stock for meat and wool. Only 8 households sold their produce. Most people said they had produced far more before removal, and none said they had produced less. The majority (69%) had been able to sell their stock before removal, and most of them said they had not received a fair price.

#### IMPROVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS

Most people felt there had been some improvement to Kwaggafontein since their arrival, mainly that schools, shops, roads and a clinic had been provided. Other new items noted were a water pump, beer hall, bottle store, toilets, churches, buses and taxis. Although some said there was no difference between Kwaggafontein and their last place, and some said it was better at Kwaggafontein, most felt they were worse off now. This was especially true in Kwaggafontein C, the newest part of the settlement. (At the time of the survey, people were still moving in there.)

The main problem is water. Residents complained they had to walk a few kilometres to the nearest tap and then often had to wait in long queues. The water is cut off without warning sometimes and not available all day. Then residents have to get it from the river, which is dirty. The whole area is very dry and dusty.

Other problems mentioned were that Kwaggafontein is far from any town and there was nothing to do there. There was a lack of shelters for latrine holes, of street lights, of enough schools. The mosquitoes were a problem.

One woman voiced a more basic feeling of insecurity:

Water is a big problem here, but (my husband) and I have another problem. We don't know how long we shall stay here, for it seems sooner or later KwaNdebele will opt for independence. We are thinking of building but there is no sense in it if we are going to move again.

91 households felt there was nothing they could do about the situation. One woman replied that

Whenever we make suggestions, they say we want to turn this place into a location.

A woman expressed her feelings thus:

I'm only a woman. Perhaps you should ask the men what they intend to do. In any case there's very little that can be done. People simply don't care here. They don't have time to think about these things. During the week they are away at work. During the weekend they are dead drunk.

Most people who did not think they could do anything thought the government (South Africa or KwaNdebele) or the whites should do something.

Speaking about the water situation one resident said:

I think that the government should lay taps here. I don't know why they think you (in the locations: addressed to the interviewer) get thirstier than us here.

Only two people thought they could do something. They felt men should form vigilance groups to combat crime.

#### DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KWAGGAFONTEIN AND LAST PLACE OF RESIDENCE

35 households reported no difference. Of the 62 who did report a difference, some patterns emerge:

##### Distance from towns and/or place of employment

In the short term there are no differences - both places are in tatters. In the long run I think Boekenhoutfontein is a better proposition. There we could go to town whenever we wanted to. I never missed (my husband) and here I see him during the weekends only. You must tell me if I sound silly, but what I am saying is true.

... If my child falls ill here, I must drive to Philadelphia and it is 20c from here.

Places of employment are far away.

Our nearest town is Groblersdal but you can't get much there. Therefore we still have to go to Pretoria for shopping.

I wish I could see my husband more.

For us (children) it is boring. We are used to location life and here we cannot even go to town, let alone movies.

##### Lack of facilities was mentioned:

The living conditions at Themba are much better. The streets are relatively well lit whereas there is not one street lamp here.... Of course I did not sell liquor at Themba.

##### Other people mentioned aspects which could be seen as improvements:

Here we are almost exclusively Ndebele. At Stinkwater we were tribally mixed. Although there are advantages in being mixed like that, I am happier like this.

At Majaneng we did not get on well with the Tswanas.

Here I don't have to work. I'm selling fruits and we survive. At Tweefontein we had to work even when we were ill.

### 'WHAT IMPROVEMENTS WOULD YOU LIKE?'

Two people said they would not like any improvements. 95 said they would, on the following items among others:

Almost every one of them feels the water situation should be corrected. Churches should be built. The government should build proper houses. There should be places of employment nearby. There should be fields for farming. There should be a police station. One said:

I would like to see these dusty streets tarred. I would like to see them electrified. I would like us to have water - I mean we are not at all far from the Loskop Dam and I therefore cannot see why we cannot have water like everyone else.

Another said:

I want water. I want a decent toilet. We had similar problems at Winterveld but that does not mean I should not ask for these things here. We did not choose to be in Winterveld any more than we chose to be here.

### ORGANISATIONS AND LEADERSHIP

88 people said they did not belong to any organisation. Six said they attended tribal meetings, two belonged to TUATA (Transvaal United African Teachers' Association), and two reported church membership.

The majority named as their leaders the chiefs and headmen including Mtsweni, Shobangu, Mokoana (MP), Mahlangu, Ngoma. One said members of the KwaNdebele government were their leaders, with 15 of the 98 who replied mentioning their names, i.e. only 16% felt KwaNdebele legislative assembly members were their leaders. One person said, 'Mtsweni assigned us here ... perhaps he is the leader.' Another said,

It depends on what you mean. Chief Ngoma is recognised by many as their leader, but decisions come from Valsfontein and there is a strong South African presence there.

### CONCLUSION

The recent relocation area of Kwaggafontein where 72% of surveyed residents arrived in the last three years is representative of the new trend in relocation. Only three households were evicted and went there. 97% were forced there through insecurity in another bantustan (being of a different ethnic group) or in urban areas. The promise that there would be no more forced removals referred to the trucking of people to areas similar to Kwaggafontein. Where only three households found water and two found latrines on arrival, the area resembles the worst established in the early 1960s.

People went to Kwaggafontein seeking some security, a place to build where they could base themselves, but many feel just as insecure as they were before. KwaNdebele is scheduled to take 'independence' and many know what that means - loss of citizenship and of access to the labour market.

Already 10% of all economically active people are unemployed, 23% of them if you exclude migrants. And this is only 75 km from Pretoria, an intended site for PWV expansion (planned to Bronkhorstspuit).

With poor education - only 33% of permanent residents over 6 years of age have lower primary education and 21% have no formal education - and poor diet - the vast majority live on maize, bread, tea/coffee and sugar daily with half having milk - still living in shacks with little access to facilities, the people who moved to Kwaggafontein obviously had no choice.

The structurally forced move has meant a change in life-style and finance for families. People previously returning home daily now find themselves weekly or monthly migrants. This means the family is dependent on migrant remittances rather than a weekly wage which the breadwinner is less likely to spend on himself or herself rather than the family.

Access to Kwaggafontein for the researcher or journalist is almost impossible and it is clear that there is nothing to be proud of in this new 'voluntary' move to an old-style 'resettlement camp'.

### 3.4 THE ROOIGROND SETTLEMENT (Bophuthatswana)

#### THE LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE DISPUTE

The people of Rooigrond came from Machaviestad (Matlwang) next to Potchefstroom. They believed then, and believe now, that they owned Machaviestad. Some people say they acquired it from Paul Kruger who gave them (the Barolong) the farm for their services during the first Anglo-Boer War in 1885. But they had lived in that place long before, then moved to Taung, and then back again to Machaviestad. Their return was approved by the executive council of the Transvaal which confirmed, by Volksraad Resolution Article 6 of 22 April 1853, that the ground was designated as belonging to the tribe. (A critical point here is that in those days africans in the Transvaal could not hold any title in their own name.) Some of the tribe moved to Polfontein later on, while the others stayed at Machaviestad.

Then in 1873 the Potchefstroom municipality wanted to extend its commonage to include part of this ground. The ZAR gave it title to Machaviestad in Grondbrief 964/1873. The tribe have never considered the farm as belonging to anyone but themselves. Nearly a century later, when their case went to the Supreme Court just before the removal to Rooigrond in 1971, they still did not realise they were being evicted as illegal squatters but thought they were defending their claim to Machaviestad. The whole background is being researched now (1983) and this may validate their claim.

To return to the early days: the Barolong helped the boers drive away Mzilikazi in 1837. They were already settled on the disputed land then. Nobody seriously thinks that the tribe did not occupy the land long before 1873. Simon Makodi, the leader of the people at Rooigrond, says that when they were removed from Machaviestad they heard white people say

They don't know where we came from. By this they meant to justify our removal, trying to make us look like intruders. When they say they don't know where we came from, I think they are right, albeit for a different reason. They found us there ... therefore how could they know where we came from?

When Burgers became president in 1872, the boers were still very unhappy about the last candidate, Marthinus Pretorius. They felt he had let them down badly, especially over the Keate Award area, and were anxious that their next president should be a clever man 'who

could competently argue their cases and defend their interests before any European council' (Molema, 1966, p 77). Burgers had to satisfy the boers that he was such a man.

Soon after taking office he researched the Barolong and found that the tribe comprised, in order of seniority, the following clans: Ratlou, Tshidi, Maksatla, Seleka and Rapulana. The chief of the most senior clan was Moshete. By some twist of fate, Moshete was working as a servant and shepherd for Field Cornet Schalk, a Dutch farmer. Burgers could not have been more fortunate. He released Moshete from his indenture and enthroned him.

One good turn deserves another. Burgers now urged Moshete, as paramount chief of the Barolong, to 'cede all Barolong territory to the ZAR' (Ibid, p 78). Moshete agreed. To make his plan airtight, Burgers tried to persuade the other 'minor' chiefs to follow Moshete's example, emphasising that they could neither rule nor expel the white people living in their land. He succeeded with all but one chief, Montshiwa, who did not agree to cede his land and saw Burgers' manoeuvres as a violation of the Keate Award. Molema abounds with letters written by Montshiwa to the British government in this regard.

This notwithstanding, on 11 March 1874 Thomas Burgers issued a proclamation that

all the territorial rights of the Barolong, are now by cession from the Paramount Chief Moshete the territorial rights of the South African Republic, and that, therefore, all Moshete's people, including Matlaba and his people, are now subjects of the South African Republic.

(The boers said 'Matjavie' for Matlaba. 'Matjaviestad' would have derived from Chief Matjavie, i.e. Chief Matlaba.)

Burgers had already signed the Potchefstroom contract, Grondbrief 964/1873, on 11 July 1873, eight months before the proclamation which purported to give him power over the land in question.

Although Chief Montshiwa had not ceded his land to the ZAR, on 4 April 1874 Burgers moved Matlaba's people into areas claimed and occupied by Montshiwa's people. When the latter protested, the ZAR commissioner and agent for Native Affairs, Samuel Melville, wrote:

The President has heard that Montshiwa's people are occupying farms belonging to the Boers and other subjects of the South African Republic. He lets Montshiwa know that as his government has full concessions from Moshete, Paramount Chief of the Barolong, of all his territorial rights, it cannot allow Montshiwa, a petty chief under Moshete, to infringe on such rights by acts of aggression. Montshiwa's people must therefore leave those farms before 9 am on Tuesday next. If not, then Montshiwa will be considered as wishing to provoke hostilities and his people will be forcibly driven from those places if still found on them after the expiration of the said time .... (Molema, p 84)

This was written on 16 August 1874.

Montshiwa and his people were, as promised, 'forcibly driven from those places'. They settled at Mafikeng. The fathers of the old people at Rooigrond actually helped Thomas Burgers drive them away - and 97 years later the families of those helpers were also 'forcibly driven (in GG trucks) from those places' by the town council of Potchefstroom.

One of the old Montshiwa's favourite sayings was: 'A wounded person should not be wilfully slain, else Jehovah will punish the offender. If we thus err, Jehovah will forsake our cause' (Ibid, p 214). Kebalepile Montshiwa allowed Israel Mokate, Makodi's predecessor, to settle on his farm Rooigrond in 1971 when the Potchefstroom town council 'wounded' him even though his father had been ousted by Mokate's people 97 years earlier.

A complication in the land dispute is that the tribe insist they have title to 'plot 557'. Even the deed number is the same as that of the Potchefstroom municipality's, 964. Worst of all, the leaders at Rooigrond say the document was handed to Mr Ngcobo, an attorney who once worked on their case but who has since died. In view of the fact that africans could not hold title in the early days, it is inevitable that no such deed could be found at the deeds office when the tribe's lawyers (Junod and Giblos) searched there. The only deed registered for Machaviestad is that of the Potchefstroom municipality. Yet the missing document that had been handed to Mr Ngcobo remains a mystery.

Multiple claims in the Transvaal were a commonplace because the boer governments were very inefficient about allocating land:

In theory, a burgher simply chose his farm, or farms, and gave a description of the selected land to the local landdrost, who noted the details in his aantekeningboek and gave the claimant a certified copy of this entry, called an uittreksel.... Given the obscurity of the descriptions registered by the landdrost, it is obvious that no-one, with the possible exception of the claimant himself, could have had the vaguest idea of the extent of his farm. If the aantekeningboek of the landdrost of Wakkerstroom is typical, there can be no wonder that some pieces of land were claimed many times over. (Cornwell, 1974, p 30)

Cornwell goes on to describe the procedure in such multiple claim cases:

Technically, when the question of a multiple claim arose, only the holder of the oldest uittreksel received satisfaction and any subsequent aantekening was declared uitgemeten. (Ibid)

While in the case of an african tribe there could not be a clash of uittreksels, the principle of the prior claim may turn out to be crucial in the Machaviestad dispute. This would help the tribe, since the Volksraad confirmed the land was theirs 20 years before Potchefstroom municipality were given title.

The extent of the land concerned is also a matter of dispute. Before they were moved to Rooigrond the people claim they were promised land as vast as Machaviestad. After that promise was made, Machaviestad was surveyed twice in order to determine its extent. Both surveys recorded Machaviestad as much smaller than the inhabitants had known it to be. Their title deed put Machaviestad at 28 064/6767 morgen.\* According to the J F I Curlewis survey, the area consisted of only 18 415 morgen. The authorities wanted to give the people of Machaviestad land commensurate with that last survey. The people demanded the amount as they knew it, not what the government said. They further declared:

But what we are happy about is that they (the government) have stuck a finger in their own eye by agreeing to give us land that is equal to our land - Machaviestad. We want it according to its boundaries - viz. 28 064/6867 morgen.\*

In time, though, it became clear that the authorities had never meant to keep the promise about providing equivalent land. They proposed De Hoop, in the vicinity of Lichtenburg, as an alternative - and it covered only 400 morgen!

The people agreed to move to De Hoop on condition they were paid R32 000 for Machaviestad instead of R2 400, the government offer. If the government didn't like this, the proposal went on, then each party could get a sworn evaluation on the land. An amount agreed upon by the two assessors would be acceptable to the Machaviestad people. If the government agreed to this, the people promised they would arrange their own new accommodation so that the authorities would not have that burden. But the Minister of Native Affairs gave the official view:

\* These figures evidently include two farm numbers 6767 and 6867, subdivided portions of the main farm. Our only other source of information, a survey in December 1934, put farm 6767 at 1 178 morgen and 6867 at 28 064 morgen - which partly contradicts the statements reported in the text here.

... dat vergoeding aan die naturelle van Machaviestad betaal moet word, nie op enige kontraktuele verpligtings wat daar mag bestaan, berus nie, maar wel op oorwegings van menslikheid.

The authorities agreed to increase the 'ex gratia' compensation of R2 400 to R40 per family (how many families there would have been is not known) provided payment was made after the move. Yet after the removal the people were paid only R18,20 per family and not the R40 promised.

From as early as 1904 there were plans to move the africans from Machaviestad. Considering they were finally removed in August 1971, the government had a very long struggle to dislodge them. The government's intention was common knowledge, as the records show: for example, in a letter dated 22 April 1965, F Epstein asked Israel Mokate to find the family of Charly Olin and 'ask them what was done to prevent the eviction of the tribe in 1937'. The land surveys were done by the government a long time ago (the second one was in 1934) but were nevertheless done in the context of a removals policy, which has made the Machaviestad people more suspicious still of their low figures.

By May 1967 it seemed (to the government at least) that the dispute was about to be solved. The government asked for a list of children in order to register a school on the farm De Hoop. Officials even arranged with the Potchefstroom municipality to assist in the exhumation of the dead at Machaviestad. On 5 May 1967 the Bantu Affairs commissioner wrote to Mr B A Dlamini, the people's attorney:

... it is my opinion that a tentative date for the removal should now be agreed upon as agitators have already started to sow the seeds of dissension.

(To that letter the commissioner attached a copy of minutes of an interview with Israel Mokate and two others in which it was said '... there can be no question of their having a claim to more land in the future despite the disparity in size of Machaviestad and De Hoop - there is no question of quid pro quo regarding the land'.) The commissioner also took pains to make it clear that the minister had given them the farm as a free gift - although the people had originally asked to be allowed to buy land with the compensation money to be paid them by the Potchefstroom municipality.

The people at Rooigrond stress they were promised that they would be settled there for two years only. To them, Rooigrond is temporary. They therefore reject any effort to improve the area, saying it would imply their acceptance of it as a permanent place. The authorities deny any promise that the people would be moved to a more suitable site. Advocate Junod found that it would be near impossible to prove that the authorities ever promised to settle the tribe elsewhere after stationing the people temporarily at Dihatshuane (Rooigrond) for two years, as the department is bound to deny any such undertaking. If any such undertaking were proved, he added, it would be difficult to prove that the authorities had an intention to create a binding contract 'in dealing with what they must have regarded to be squatting'.

Taking into account that the tribe was not moved amicably from Machaviestad, it becomes clearer still that it is very unlikely that a promise could have been made at that time to move the people to a more suitable place after two years.

A promise of this nature was made, but with specific reference to the Hammanskraal - Brits area. In a letter (signed by Advocate J Unterhalter on 6 March 1970) to Mr Collins Ramusi, the writer says the Bantu Affairs commissioner

had informed me that his department would be willing to make land available at once in the Hammanskraal - Brits district for the temporary accommodation of the tribe.... The tribe would have to remain there for two years and would then be removed to a homeland....

Whether this offer of a temporary place still held for anywhere other than the Hammanskraal -

Brits area is a matter of interpretation.

The government do not consider themselves bound (even morally) to fulfil the promise they apparently made and deny now. In any case, as Unterhalter's letter makes clear, the tribe was finally destined for removal to a bantustan - even if they had been moved somewhere outside a bantustan for two years, the plan was then to have them 'removed to a homeland'. The place they went to, Rooigrond, is in Bophuthatswana - and therefore in the government's eyes they need not (and possibly will not) be removed.

In April 1982 the Rooigrond community received a letter from the Bophuthatswana president, Lucas Mangope, addressed to Simon Makodi, their leader since the death of Chief Israel Mokate. The letter boiled down to saying that the people at Rooigrond were not 'a separate tribe' but part of the people of Chief Israel Matlaba, and that they would have to move once again (RDM, 19.07.82).

President Mangope's interpretation of Barolong-baModipoa history was rejected as totally false by Simon Makodi (RDM, 23.07.82). The community at Rooigrond repeated their demand for a return to Machaviestad, or an adequate and acceptable 'alternative land'. Simon Makodi stressed that the community did not want to become part of another Barolong tribe (and subjects of Chief Matlaba) at Bodibe, west of Lichtenburg (RDM, 19.07.82).

The meeting with the Bophuthatswana authorities, at which their refusal to move was conveyed, was also attended in 1981 by community members who had moved to Ikageng township outside Potchefstroom in 1971. Chief B L M Motsatsi, Bophuthatswana Minister of Works, addressed the community and said there was no land to compensate them - 'You can't fight forever', he told them.

The people at Rooigrond said that the land at Bodibe 'is dry and offers no solution to the present war with the authorities' (Star, 19.07.82). To them this is not a solution, and the authorities know they have rejected it. Efforts to demoralise and divide the community are being stepped up. At a meeting on 30 November 1982, President Mangope's secretary tried to defame Simon Makodi by alleging that he was in the pay of the press.

## THE MOVE TO ROOIGROND

The first notice of the State's intention to move the people of Machaviestad was served in 1948. From then on until 1971 the people fought a long legal battle to remain on what they regarded as their traditional land. During that time they were repeatedly harassed by the State: they were chased away from work, their meetings were stopped, their beasts were impounded (they had to pay R7 a head to have them released), and the school was closed, ostensibly for not being registered with the Department of Bantu Education. Bus transport to the area was cut off, their grazing fees were raised, and ploughing was prohibited. The harassment hit at the economic independence of the people, forcing them into a situation of complete dependence on wage income (as happens in the course of most removals).

On 11 May 1970, officials offered to show them a proposed new site at Noupoot. They agreed to examine the site and were taken there by bus. During the journey they were asked to sign a list 'otherwise they would be charged for the fare'. They signed the list and it was later produced by the State as evidence to Chief Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana that the people of Machaviestad had agreed in writing to move.

The Potchefstroom town council appealed to some people to move into the local township where there was a clinic and schools. They were promised enclosures for their livestock. This had the effect of dividing resistance to the move. Some moved, and were then told to

get rid of their livestock. Others refused to move into the township, saying they were farmers and wanted land.

On 3 August 1971 about 400 families were moved by GG trucks from Machaviestad to Rooigrond. The Potchefstroom municipality had ordered the move, claiming that Machaviestad was their land and that the people were squatting. They did not accept the idea that the place was a 'black spot' of african freehold land. Some of the people moved to Potchefstroom township. Of the others who went to Rooigrond, some were reported to have died.

An irony of the final move to Rooigrond was that while the South African Defence Force claimed to be 'winning the hearts and minds' of the oppressed people, apparently it was to take over the Machaviestad area from the Potchefstroom municipality: 'They wanted the fields for the soldiers', said a 61-year-old respondent.

Even when the people were finally moved to Rooigrond they continued regarding their presence there as temporary. They still do, even after 10 years at 'Camp 5'. Many of them work in Potchefstroom; and although President Mangope has promised them land, they want to 'settle with the Potchefstroom municipality' to retrieve their land.

At Rooigrond they were housed in tents. Building materials were brought there by the people themselves. No provision had been made for basic facilities such as roads, bus transport, taxis, fuel, shops, schools, clinics, churches or a police station. Ten years later none of these facilities had been provided by the authorities.

South African officials provided pit latrines and loaned the people tents. Chief Motshiwa provided a windmill. Residential plots average 20 x 100 metres. No rent is paid. Water is free and clean but limey: it comes from a borehole pumping into a dam, and people walk about 500 metres to fetch it.

The land at Rooigrond seems to fall under Bophuthatswana jurisdiction, but the people refuse to pay tax, claiming they are South Africans and liable for tax in Potchefstroom. The Bophuthatswana authorities therefore make life difficult when workseekers seek to register or when children wish to attend school (although there has been little opposition on schooling in recent years). Apparently the people were promised they would keep their Section 10 rights if they moved, and this promise has not been fulfilled, as Keke Jan Tshabadira's case shows:

On 3 November 1979 Mr Monaisa wrote a letter on behalf of the Bophuthatswana consulate to the local labour officer, Western Transvaal Administration Board. He said Tshabadira had been refused permission to work in Klerksdorp because he resided at Rooigrond, and argued that Rooigrond lay within the Board area in terms of Government Notice 1445 promulgated in the Government Gazette (3632 of 18.08.72). On the same letter the receiver simply scribbled:

GN 1445 excludes Bantu homelands. In terms of Govt Notice 801 published in Govt Gazette 5553 dated 25.5.77 page 7 Rooigrond is within the area of Bophuthatswana.

The land at Rooigrond is tribally owned and allocated to people by the chief. There is no land for ploughing but some limited grazing. It had also been made clear that the community was not to spread beyond the perimeter as defined by the authorities. This deprived people of the agricultural land they were used to having. Instead they were allocated small plots inadequate for subsistence farming. Farm equipment and vehicles brought from Machaviestad are now rusting and falling into disrepair.

Stock held by the tribe includes 85 head of cattle (they came with 250), 100 sheep and goats, 13 horses (they had 100), 4 donkeys, dogs and poultry. Their pigs were left behind in the pound. Their sheep are dwindling in numbers - 'This place is not for grazing.'

Buses owned by the Greyhound Company pass on the main road between Mafikeng (18 km away)

and Lichtenburg (50 km), Potchefstroom (190 km) and Klerksdorp (170 km). Every hour or so there is a bus to Mafikeng (45c single fare) and Lichtenburg (R1). Over weekends there is a bus to and from Potchefstroom (R3 single). One can take the daily bus to Klerksdorp and connect to Potchefstroom.

The nearest shops are 10 km away with the following prices: 20c a loaf of brown bread, R1,25 for 500 g powdered milk (and some milk is produced by their own cattle), R1,80 for 1 kg sugar, R17 per 80 kg mielie meal, R1 for 750 ml paraffin, 50c a cake of soap, 57c a pack of candles, 95c for 1 kg washing powder, R3,35 a bag of coal plus R1 transport from Mafikeng. Wood is impossible to buy. Most people burn cow dung or wood they have stolen. People cannot afford meat, and 'it is not worth it to slaughter'.

The people employ a woman to teach 85 children from Sub A to Standard 4. The school is in her house. The children do not have to wear uniforms. School fees are 45c a month for each child. The older children have to start out for school some hours before class with winter temperatures often below 0°C.

The nearest labour bureau is in Mafikeng. The few who find work through it are employed as contract labourers, mainly in the construction industry in Potchefstroom. Some people work at the military base. Most find jobs through a Rooigrond man who has contacts.

The tribal authority controls the area with little interference from outside. The tribal council - the kgotla - administers and 'keeps the community together'. It is the 'cabinet' which has led the resistance. The late chief's right-hand man, Mr Simon Makodi, is next in line for the chieftainship. It seems the people want him, a man of 'calibre and experience'. The State favours one of the late chief's two sons, but the people say they are 'soft'. The sons wanted their late father to be buried at Rooigrond even though the Potchefstroom municipality gave permission for him to be buried at Machaviestad.

It was reported that the people worked well together and that they were thinking of holding a public meeting in Potchefstroom for the Machaviestad people together with the authorities, Bophuthatswana representatives, 'all the presidents', churches and interested organisations.

It was felt that others under threat of removal should learn from the Rooigrond experience. The people were in touch with other communities both under threat and those already moved.

These conditions at Rooigrond (this outline has inevitably had to repeat much of the description given in section 2.3 above) were nothing like what the people had been led to expect. The place was to become the responsibility of the Bophuthatswana government, but after 10 years it is still undeveloped. The Bophuthatswana authorities appear reluctant to assist the people until they pledge allegiance to another chief in the area, which they have refused to do. The community already have their own hierarchy of elders from Machaviestad who moved with the others in 1971.

There is also insecurity - another possible reason for the lack of community and agricultural development. The people's legal position is uncertain. It seems that Bophuthatswana has the right to forcibly remove the people and return them to South Africa.

Besides, the people believed from the start that their move to Rooigrond was temporary and that they would leave again after two years. They felt that any purposeful development of the place on their part would automatically amount to acceptance of a permanent situation.

## THE SURVEY

In late 1981 questionnaires were completed by all 37 households at Rooigrond. Their total population of 323 people included absent members. The survey was an attempt to record facets of their life before and after removal.

### MACHAVIESTAD, BEFORE REMOVAL

36 households said they had lived on tribal land at Machaviestad (the one exception was a household off Trust land). At Machaviestad they had access to land for agricultural production to maintain themselves or at least supplement income from wage employment.

30 households had one field each (13 described as large and 15 medium). 7 had no fields. Nearly all those with fields grew maize, 18 also had crops not listed on the questionnaire, 3 grew beans.

29 had grazing for livestock. 21 produced meat, and 28 produced milk (some of this must have been goat's milk, as only 26 households had cattle). Very few households sold hides (4) or wool (7), but many had poultry, with eggs to sell or eat.

21 households (of 32 responses) sold at least some of their agricultural produce, while all 32 said they produced either more or 'much more' at Machaviestad.

In other words, both in terms of what they had at Machaviestad and how they saw their position there, most of the people reported Machaviestad as a place where they could at least have some produce or income to supplement wage income.

### ROOIGROND POPULATION PROFILE

The sample population of permanent residents, commuters and migrants gives an idea of the community 11 years after their forcible removal from Machaviestad.

Table 1 AGE AND SEX, BY RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Age	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
0 - 14	40	32	72	20	17	37	4	3	7	64	52	116
15 - 24	11	11	22	4	4	8	24	20	44	39	35	74
25 - 34	3	9	12	-	3	3	18	13	31	21	25	46
35 - 44	1	7	8	1	2	3	9	1	10	11	10	21
45 - 64	10	24	34	-	2	2	10	2	12	20	28	48
65 +	6	5	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	5	11
Missing	-	2	2	-	-	-	4	1	5	4	3	7
TOTAL	71	90	161	25	28	53	69	40	109	165	158	323

Masculinity ratio (permanent) = 79

% 15 - 64 who are migrants = 51

Of the 323 people in the sample, half were permanent (161), a third were migrants (109), and a sixth were commuters (53).

Of the permanent residents, over half were children up to 14 years and nearly half the rest were over 44 years. Only 8 were aged 35 - 44. The young had a fairly equal sexual distribution; the older groups had twice as many women as men. In the whole permanent group, females outnumbered males by 90 to 71. In other words this was a typical rural african community.

Most of the commuters (37 out of 53) were aged up to 14 years. Rooigrond has no school, so children must commute for their formal education (except for the small arrangement for 85 pupils already mentioned). Commuting to school probably also applies to some of the 15 - 24 age group. 7 of the 8 commuters between the ages of 25 and 64 were women in domestic jobs locally.

Most migrants (75 of 109) were aged 15 - 34, and most were male (69 of 109).

#### MARITAL STATUS

Most permanent residents (108 of 161) have never married, a majority divided equally between the sexes. 35 had married and 17 were widowed, and both these categories had twice as many women as men: 24 women and 11 men were married, 11 women and 6 men were widowed, and one woman was divorced.

Among commuters - who as we have seen are mostly schoolgoers - only 3 of the 53 had married, one of whom was widowed.

Most of the 109 migrants had not married either (51 male and 36 female unmarried). 20 were married (17 men and 3 women) of whom two had been widowed (1:1).

#### HEADSHIPS

Twice as many households were headed by men as by women (24:13). In a patrilineal society this was an unusual pattern, having so many women as heads, because even when male heads are migrants they usually keep their position. The survey illustrated that point: of 24 male heads, 12 were permanent, one commuted and 11 were migrants. Of the female heads 9 were permanent residents, 3 commuted and one was a migrant.

Table 2 HOUSEHOLD HEADS, BY SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Status	Male	Female	Total
Permanent	12	9	21
Commuter	1	3	4
Migrant	11	1	12
TOTAL	24	13	37

Table 3 HOUSEHOLDS, BY SIZE

No of members	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	14	15
Households	1	1	3	2	2	4	2	3	5	3	6	1	2

Average size 8,7

Median size 8

Table 4 THOSE LEAVING HOUSEHOLD SINCE MOVE, BY AGE & SEX

Age	Male	Female
0 - 14	-	-
15 - 24	-	-
25 - 34	-	1
35 - 44	-	1
45 - 64	6	2
65 +	2	-
Missing	2	1
TOTAL	10	5

All died.

#### INFANT MORTALITY

Of babies born between the years 1976 and 1980, 43 are still alive and one has died. The survival rate inferred from this is 977 per 1 000 live births, to the age of five - which is good by rural african standards. The sample was small, however, and possibly some deaths at an early age have not been reported.

#### ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Of the permanent residents nearly all were not economically active (NEA) - 66 males and 88 females. Two were employed (one male and one female) and four were unemployed (all male).

Commuters had 41 NEA (22 male, 19 female) which is to be expected with the many pupils involved, and only 12 employed of whom 11 were in service jobs.

34 migrants were NEA (16 male, 18 female). 75 were employed (53 male, 22 female).

Of permanent residents, four males in the 15 - 24 age group were unemployed, and in the 25 - 44 group two people were employed. 18 in the latter group were NEA, and 34 in the 45 - 64 group (10 male, 24 female).

Table 5 ECONOMIC STATUS, BY SEX &amp; RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Status	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
NEA	66	88	154	22	19	41	16	18	34	104	125	229
Employed	1	1	2	3	9	12	53	22	75	57	32	89
Unemployed	4	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	4
Missing	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
TOTAL	71	90	161	25	28	53	69	40	109	165	158	323

Unemployment 4%

% employed as migrants = 84

Table 6 SECTOR, BY SEX &amp; RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Sector	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mining	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	6	6	-	6
Manufacturing	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1
Electricity etc	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1
Construction	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	2	1	1	2
Commerce	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	1
Transport	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	1	13	12	1	13
Finance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Services	1	1	2	2	9	11	31	19	50	34	29	63
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1
TOTAL	1	1	2	3	9	12	53	22	75	57	32	89

% of females in services = 91

% of males in services = 60

The weak economic status of permanent residents is also reflected in the sources of income cited: only two people mentioned earnings, while 16 received old age pensions and two got disability grants. In other words, only 20 of these 161 people had some source of income.

12 of the commuters were employed. All except for one male construction worker were in services (9 female, 2 male); 7 were in private employment, 5 in public (see table below).

75 were migrants, and again the service sector accounted for the majority of jobs. Nearly all were in private employment.

Most migrants (41) were in the 25-44 age group. 66 migrants were said to remit money regularly, 8 irregularly, and one never.

Services predominated in both male and female employment. There were 34 males in these

Table 7 OCCUPATION, BY SEX &amp; RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Occupation	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Professional	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Business	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clerical	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	3	-	3
Sales	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Service	1	1	2	1	9	10	22	22	44	24	32	56
Farm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Skilled	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Semiskilled	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unskilled	-	-	-	2	-	2	28	-	28	30	-	30
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	1	1	2	3	9	12	53	22	75	57	32	89

% of females in service 100 % of males in service 42 % of males in unskilled 53

Table 8 EMPLOYER, BY SEX &amp; RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Employer	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Private	1	1	2	1	6	7	45	17	62	47	24	71
Public	-	-	-	2	3	5	8	5	13	10	8	18
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	1	1	2	3	9	12	53	22	75	57	32	89

% in private employment 80

Table 9 MIGRANT REMITTANCES

	M	F	Total
Regular	46	20	66
Irregular	7	1	8
Never	-	1	1
TOTAL	53	22	75

## OLD AGE PENSIONS &amp; DISABILITY GRANTS

16 old age pensions and 2 disability grants were reported, all to permanent residents.

jobs, 24 of them labourers; and 29 females. Altogether 29 of the 57 employed males worked as labourers, only 3 of them on the mines; and 3 other males did clerical work on the mines.

65 of the employed had found their jobs through a labour bureau, one directly, one through a network, and 9 through other means. (The other 13 employed did not answer this question.)

## EDUCATION

Of the permanent residents, 43 over the age of 6 had no formal education - in other words, over a third of this group. This is a poor rating especially as the group includes so many children. About a quarter (30) had lower primary levels, fewer (21) higher primary, and only 10 lower secondary.

Commuters had only one (male) without any education, but also had an abrupt decline after lower primary levels (31 out of 53) to higher primary (14) and lower secondary (7).

Migrants had 14 out of 104 without education, then a rise through lower and higher primary (both 22) to 46 at lower secondary level, perhaps indicating that those with more schooling got more migrant contracts. Twice as many men as women (31:16) had got to lower secondary, and nobody in the whole sample had got further.

Table 10 EDUCATION, BY SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS (aged 7 and over)

Level	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
None	17	26	43	1	-	1	11	3	14	29	29	58
Lower primary	13	17	30	16	15	31	13	9	22	42	41	83
Higher primary	8	13	21	5	9	14	10	12	22	23	34	57
Lower secondary	7	9	16	3	4	7	31	15	46	41	28	69
Standard 9+ *	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	45	65	110	25	28	53	65	39	104	135	132	267

\* Miscast, this group should have started from Standard 8. None were even at that level.

## DIET

32 households ate twice a day, the other 5 three times a day.

They all had maize, tea or coffee, and sugar daily. Most had bread every day (23), and some had milk (10). 14 had meat weekly, and another 14 oftener than monthly.

Only 5 had greens once or twice a week, the rest less often or never. The same rarity affected potatoes, fat and jam. Only 2 households ever had eggs, and only one had cheese. Nobody had fish.

Further details appear in the table below.

## PROBLEMS & IMPROVEMENTS

As already noted, people are poorer in many ways since moving to Rooigrond. Leaving Machaviestad, where the whole sample had lived for over 50 years, they all went into tents at Rooigrond (now they are in shacks), and water was the only facility there on arrival. Their most serious problem was lack of land and livestock.

Table 11 NUTRITION : HOUSEHOLD DIETS

Item	Daily	Second day	Twice weekly	Weekly	Less than weekly	Less than monthly
Maize	37**	-	-	-	-	-
Greens	-	-	1	4	20**	12
Potatoes/rice	1	-	1	4	1	30**
Milk	10*	6	6"	3	7	5
Tea/coffee	37**	-	-	-	-	-
Sugar	37**	-	-	-	-	-
Meat	-	-	2	14*	14**	7
Eggs	-	-	-	-	2	35**
Fish	-	-	-	-	-	37**
Cheese	-	-	-	1	-	36**
Bread	23**	2	2	4	6	-
Fat	1	-	1	2	19**	14
Jam	5	-	-	-	-	32**

\* mode      " median

We had a few sheep and fowls there. I had to sell our stock when we left because I was told I couldn't bring it with. I brought a few fowls but had to eat them because we had financial problems.

Another much-quoted issue was the long distance to school. 16 respondents mentioned it. Apart from the 85 children in the local informal school, all pupils have to walk several kilometres to the nearest school. Lack of a church was mentioned by 15, and lack of transport to town by 11.

Having to live at Rooigrond at all was a basic topic, quoted by 17 who referred to impermanence, lack of development of any kind, and that the move was not acceptable in the first place.

Our problem is that they must take us back home.

Matlwang (Machaviestad) is the land of our forefathers, nothing short of returning us there will please us. We could do anything there, here we live at another man's place.

We were happy at Matlwang, this is not our land, we can still be moved - in fact we want to be moved. We cannot settle down until we have a piece of land that belongs to us.

We feel like sort of sub-tenants here.

This is simply uninhabitable - not even animals manage to live.

Although I couldn't say Machaviestad was urban, it was definitely not like this place. People had lived long there and had made improvements - buildings - on the land itself. This place is still untamed.

People also resented being forced into the cash economy. This had been a matter of choice

before, but now was permanently needed for survival. 5 households said they were starving because they could not produce enough to live on and did not have enough money for food. Subsistence was not just a matter of food either, but other facilities and necessities such as wood.

I paid R40 just the other day for allegedly stealing wood.

We don't have wood. We have turned, you know, into petty thieves - stealing wood.

After depending entirely on the land, people have had to turn to wage employment - and 3 respondents said jobs were scarce. It is not known if jobs are more difficult to find from Rooigrond than they were from Machaviestad. People complained that the move to Rooigrond had split the community. Two respondents said relatives and friends had moved into the township outside Potchefstroom and sought full-time employment rather than leave the area.

It was also said that nobody had proper houses and they all lived in shacks (10), that they had no proper streets (5), and it was far to the graveyard (3).

The improvements people said they wanted were better transport (8), a church of their own (10), better houses (2), shops (1) and of course a school (16). There was no consensus on these issues, though, which links directly with the fact that 14 out of the 37 respondents said emphatically that they did not want any improvements.

People must do nothing which might suggest acceptance of the status quo, for example people should not build proper houses.

We don't want any improvements here which might suggest that we have accepted our unfortunate situation. They once tried to build us a school, but we rejected it for the same reason.

We don't want this place improved, we want to go back.

Asked about any organisations within the community that might help deal with some problems, people showed a marked lack of response: 26 out of the 37 said they were doing nothing. One man suggested the government should look after the school and the people see to the church. The only organisation in the community, referred to by two respondents, was the 'KhuDu-Thamasa' which 'keeps the spirit of the people here in shall we say a fighting mood': it encourages people, apparently successfully, to do nothing that would imply acceptance of their situation.

The official leader of the community is Simon Makodi, whom the community see as their chief, although four people mentioned two other leaders besides.

The overwhelming majority (23) saw the government as being responsible for bringing about improvements they desired:

The South African government brought us here, we are their responsibility and they should solve the problem.

Five claimed it was the chief who should find a solution. Three said it was the responsibility of the men, two said they didn't know, another two said nobody should do anything, one man said he thought the SACC should find an answer.

## COMMUNITY DOCUMENTS

This list indicates the primary material that is available for the serious researcher. Copies of the original documents are held by the University of Bophuthatswana.

- Map showing location of Baralong & Bahurutshe tribes
- Extract from Grondbrief 964/1873 re Machaviestad 557
- 21.07.59 Letter from Acting Town Clerk
- 19.09.59 Eviction notice from Potchefstroom Town Council
- 22.05.61 Judgement from Appellate Division: Gorekwang v R
- 22.04.65 Letter from Epstein & Epstein
- 25.02.66 Letter from B A Dlamini
- 25.02.66 Letter from B A Dlamini to Town Clerk
- Summons for Mokate to appear, 4.03.66
- 7.03.66 Letter from B A Dlamini
- 12.04.66 Letter from Manager, Non-European Affairs
- 9.08.66 Letter from Bantu Commissioner
- 10.02.67 Letter from Commissioner offering De Hoop farm
- 10.04.67 Memo from Chief Commissioner re details of the move
- 5.05.67 Letter from Commissioner requiring people to move
- 1.05.67 Record of interview (Bantu Affairs and Israel Mokate)
- 12.02.68 Letter from Minty Nanabhay & Partners to Commissioner
- 2.04.68 Letter from Town Clerk to Minty Nanabhay & Partners
- 19.12.68 Letter from Town Clerk to Minty Nanabhay & Partners
- 7.05.69 Letter from Commissioner to Mokate re the move
- 13.05.69 Letter from Minty Nanabhay & Partners re the move
- 26.02.70 Sworn statement from Chief Mokate
- 6.03.70 Letter from J Unterhalter to Collins Ramusi
- 27.10.70 Letter from Town Clerk to Machaviestad residents
- 4.12.70 Letter from Town Clerk to Machaviestad residents
- 18.02.71 Eviction order from Town Council
- 6.08.71 Statement from Chief Mokate 'A beaten chief moves on'
- 21.01.73 Tswana statement
- 31.03.76 Letter from N Cape & W Transvaal Council of Churches to SACC
- 17.11.76 Letter from Bowens to SACC
- 10.11.76 Letter from Advocate H F Junod: opinion
- 28.03.77 Letter from Bowens to SACC
- 3.11.78 Letter from Bophuthatswana Consul, Potchefstroom, re permission to work in Klerksdorp
- 21.02.79 Letter from Bantu Commissioner to Minty Nanabhay re R32 000 claim
- 1982 Correspondence (details not known) between the community and Bophuthatswana

## 3.5 MATHOPESTAD

### An area under threat

#### INTRODUCTION

Mathopestad (Mathupestat) is set on fertile land in the Magaliesberg area. It has 200 well built houses for 1 500 - 2 000 people, mostly Tswana of the Bakubung tribe.

The settlement began in about 1910 (some say 1911) when 22 families bought 1 300 morgen from a white farmer in the area. They still have their title deeds including mineral rights. In 1949 a further 304 morgen was purchased. People in Mathopestad continued buying stands in the 1950s and early 1960s, but thereafter most people settling there were told by Chief Mathope that they would have to wait before they could have titles.

The people live off the land (stock and crop farming) and get remittances from labourers on nearby farms and the nearest village, Boons, or further afield in Johannesburg, Randfontein, Potchefstroom and other towns.

A stream runs through the area. There is enough water but apparently it is badly polluted, perhaps partly because of the pit toilets.

A primary school caters for 500 - 600 pupils who attend in shifts. There is also a secondary school with 184 pupils (in 1981) up to Junior Certificate level, and a third school attached to the church.

The people are largely Christian, most of them Anglicans.

This community is now threatened with removal to Onderstepoort about 80 km away near Sun City in Bophuthatswana.

A resettlement camp with tin latrines has already been constructed in the terrain of grass and bush. The camp, apparently intended for many more people than those from Mathopestad alone, is laid out in plots of a quarter to a third of an acre. This hot area would not suit the types of crop the Mathopestad people are used to growing - maize and other grain, sunflowers, fruit and vegetables. Requests for precise information on what land will be available for

farming and cattle have had evasive replies. Officials have just insisted that the place is fertile and suitable for growing vegetables that can be sold at Sun City. One official, a Mr Pretorius, is said to have told a meeting of Mathopestad representatives in March 1982 that the 'tribesmen can go and enjoy their money at Sun City'.

No date or detailed information has been given about the move. It was believed it would take place in 1982 but up to September it has not happened.

The people are somewhat confused on what is fact or merely rumour about the proposed relocation. A document compiled by the Black Sash and dated 28 January 1982 states that the commissioner has declared 'the removal must take place in terms of a decision of Parliament'. Another report by a member of the Legal Resources Centre says that during the March 1982 meeting Mr Pretorius told representatives of the tribe that the 'Government has decided that the people of Mathope cannot stay where they are now'. Yet Mr Dennis Boon, a local white farmer (whose family has been in the area since 1870), thinks the tribe will not be moved but that their land as well as his own will be included in Bophuthatswana.

People in Mathopestad strongly oppose the move but it is clear there is not complete unanimity among them. Some would agree to move for various reasons listed in some detail below.

An SACC report dated 1 April 1982 says the people are highly suspicious that their Chief Arthur Mathope might have 'betrayed' them and 'arbitrarily signed the surrender of Mathopestad without the approval of the tribe'. This fear has been aggravated 'by the fact that a house with all essential facilities such as running water is already available for the chief (at Onderstepoort)' including two other houses supposedly for the chief's mother and uncle.

This report suggested a higher level of trust in the deputy chief, Chief John Makgatho. The SPP questionnaire survey, conducted seven months earlier, recorded more support for the chief than the deputy.

Some organisations that have been or are involved in assisting the people of Mathopestad to resist removal and/or improve conditions in their present settlement are: the Legal Resources Centre; the Environmental Development Agency (EDA); the Black Sash; Wilgespruit; the Human Awareness programme; the SACC and other Church organisations.

So far, resistance to removal appears to have focused primarily on legal action by the Legal Resources Centre. The community has also tried to get all family heads to sign a declaration that they refuse to move. People have compiled a full inventory of the community's assets, personal and communal. A census has been taken of all members of the population including those dependent on the land at Mathopestad, the elderly and infirm, and scholars and children with handicaps. This information would be used to support medical evidence for a plea for clemency.

Other activity includes publicity in the local and foreign press; personal intervention by Mrs Helen Suzman, MP; the Human Awareness programme taking influential business leaders to the area.

One report claims that only the use of force, covert or overt, is likely to remove the tribe from Mathopestad. Yet it also says the people will need 'much moral and material support' if they are to withstand resettlement. It warns that anyone wishing to keep the confidence of the tribe 'should keep a cautious distance from the chief' and make contact instead with the deputy chief. It recommends that 'efforts be made to discourage factions from developing within the tribe for factions might weaken a united effort and a unity of purpose within the tribe'.

In September 1981, 98 households completed questionnaires with the following information:

# DEMOGRAPHY

The 98 households contained 561 people (290 male, 271 female). 78% were permanent residents, 19% migrants, 1% commuters, and 2% had not been assigned any residential status. Most of these households were nuclear (55%) or extended (35%), with a median size of 5. 26% of households were headed by women, all of them permanent residents.

Table 1 AGE, SEX & RESIDENTIAL COMPOSITION

Age	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Missing		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
0 - 14	102	103	205	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	4
15 - 24	41	44	85	-	1	1	11	13	24	1	2	3
25 - 34	9	27	36	-	1	1	30	18	48	2	2	4
35 - 44	13	26	39	1	-	1	15	6	21	-	1	1
45 - 64	14	32	46	1	-	1	14	-	14	1	2	3
65 +	12	9	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Missing	1	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	192	243	435	2	2	4	70	37	107	7	8	15

Age	Total		
	M	F	Total
0 - 14	105	104	209
15 - 24	53	60	103
25 - 34	41	48	89
35 - 44	29	33	62
45 - 64	30	34	64
65 +	12	9	21
Missing	1	2	3
TOTAL	271	290	561

Permanent masculinity ratio 79

Proportion of males who were migrants, 15 - 64 46%

Proportion of females who were migrants, 15 - 64 21%

Table 2 HOUSEHOLDS, BY SIZE

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15 +	Total
4	6	14	13	18	16	5	5	5	3	4	-	3	1	1	98

Average household size 5.7

Median household size 5

65% of the migrants were male, and 59% of these were between the ages of 15 and 34. Women just outnumbered men in the category 15 - 24, but thereafter they dwindled rapidly as migrants. 46% of the male migrants headed households, compared with only 20% of the permanent male residents; but overall, migrant workers headed only 32% of the households.

Table 3 HOUSEHOLD HEADS, BY SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS

MALE				FEMALE	
Permanent	39	Commuter	1	Migrant	32
				Missing	1
				Permanent	25
				Missing	1

## LANDOWNERSHIP & DWELLINGS

82% of the householders were landowners, and extremely proud and conscious of the fact. Buying a stand was one of the major reasons for moving to Mathopestad, just as retaining ownership of that plot was an important reason for staying there. As one middle-aged head of household said:

We are landowners here, and not prepared to go anywhere. We've got titles of this land; only if they take the titles from us can they own this land, but if we are still in possession of these titles then they won't take it, only over our dead bodies.

Another main attraction of Mathopestad was that none of the households there had to pay rent. In 1970, for example, an old man moved from Soweto to Mathopestad:

I wanted to buy land, I didn't want to stay in Soweto for the rest of my life because those houses belong to the municipality. I was no longer able to pay rent....

It was not, however, only landowners who paid no rent: even a household which moved there only in 1980 and could not get a land title claimed that rent-free existence was a central attraction of living in Mathopestad. (It is possible that non-landowners had to pay a fee to the chief. One household that moved there in 1951, for example, said they had to pay the chief R36 to settle in Mathopestad.)

60% of the sample lived in permanent houses, 39% in temporary dwellings, and 1% in tents. Landowners owned 89% of the permanent houses, while three-quarters of those without land titles lived in temporary houses. But temporary or permanent, houses were a key possession and a major investment. Numerous people with temporary houses did not want to leave Mathopestad because, for reasons such as age, disability, expense or lack of labour, they would not be able to rebuild. And there were owners of temporary as well as of permanent houses who spoke like this:

We've got beautiful buildings here, we are not prepared to demolish these houses of ours.

## ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

### PERMANENT RESIDENTS

The great majority (86%) of permanent residents were not economically active. 11% were employed and 3% considered themselves unemployed. Employment patterns varied considerably, however, between male and female permanent residents, although both were subject to the lack of jobs in the vicinity.

31% of the permanent male residents between the ages of 15 and 64 were employed. Most of them were 35 or older, and in fact over half the permanent male residents in each of the age categories 25 - 34, 35 - 44 and 45 - 64 were employed. The bulk (80%) of them were farm workers or labourers; 52% worked in agriculture and 36% in mining, construction or transport. The figure for agricultural employment is misleading, however, as is the appearance of a

Table 4 ECONOMIC STATUS, BY SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Status	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Missing			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Not econ active	165	207	372	-	-	-	3	2	5	4	5	9	172	214	386
Employed	25	23	48	2	2	4	66	35	101	2	3	5	95	63	158
Unemployed	2	13	15	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	4	13	17
TOTAL	192	243	435	2	2	4	70	37	107	7	8	15	271	290	561

Unemployment rate: Male 4%, Female 17%      % migrant employment: Male 69, Female 56  
 Dependency ratio =  $\frac{\text{Not economically active} + \text{Unemployed}}{\text{Employed}} = 2,55$

Table 5 SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT, BY SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Sector	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Missing			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Agriculture	13	1	14	-	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	-	16	1	17
Mining	2	-	2	-	-	-	23	-	23	-	-	-	25	-	25
Manufacturing	-	1	1	-	1	1	8	6	14	-	-	-	8	8	16
Electricity etc	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1
Construction	4	1	5	1	-	1	10	-	10	-	-	-	15	1	16
Transport etc	3	-	3	-	-	-	13	-	13	1	-	1	17	-	17
Finance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Services	3	20	23	1	1	2	3	27	30	1	2	3	8	50	58
Commerce	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	2
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	6	-	-	-	4	2	6
TOTAL	25	23	48	2	2	4	66	35	101	2	3	5	95	63	158


% in agriculture 11

% in mining (male) 26

% in services (female) 79

Local employment: 52% males in agriculture  
 87% females in services

relative abundance of wage labour opportunities for permanent male residents. 44% of all employed permanent male residents were actually self-employed and worked in agriculture in Mathopestad itself, usually for 12 months each year. (Most of these males were among the largest land and stock owners in Mathopestad, but a couple of them worked on the fields of others.) The availability of this agricultural work in Mathopestad, where over half the employed male residents worked, was of considerable importance. Although a handful of permanent males worked in Krugersdorp, Ventersdorp and Rustenburg, Boons was the only other place close enough to provide work to permanent residents, and indeed over a quarter of the employed male residents worked there.



Makgato, Sekgosese - ruins of houses destroyed by removal squad in 1979 (July 1981)




Makgato - rebuilding in defiance (July 1981)

Makgato - determination in resistance (July 1981)



Makgato - the community raised funds to repair the ruined school (July 1981)


Makgato - hessian and cardboard protect pupils from the elements until the community rebuilds the school (July 1981)





Rooigrond - the people display their history (September 1982)


Rooigrond - the people preserve records of their struggle (September 1982)



Biesiesvlei - for sale to white farmers (September 1982)

Biesiesvlei - all that is left of a large community - the others were moved to Bophuthatswana (September 1982)





Vrisgewacht - closer settlement for the aged ...  
(September 1982)



... and the unproductive  
(September 1982)



Vrisgewacht - this house is being built by a migrant labourer son working in Carletonville (September 1982)



By the roadside - sad comment on Bophuthatswana which boasts of exporting food (September 1982)

Table 6 OCCUPATION, BY SEX & RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Occupation	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Missing			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Professional	1	2	3	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	1	2	3	5
Business	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Clerical	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	2
Sales	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	2	2
Service	4	19	23	1	2	3	17	30	47	1	2	3	23	53	76
Farm	13	1	14	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	14	1	15
Skilled	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Semiskilled	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	3
Unskilled	7	1	8	1	-	1	39	-	39	-	1	1	47	2	49
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	6	-	-	-	4	2	6
TOTAL	25	23	48	2	2	4	66	35	101	2	3	5	95	63	158

% male unskilled 49

% females in service 84

Table 7 REMITTANCES

Frequency	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Missing			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Regular	24	23	47	2	2	4	48	26	74	1	2	3	75	53	128
Irregular	1	-	1	-	-	-	12	7	19	1	1	2	14	8	22
Never	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	8	-	-	-	6	2	8
Missing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	25	23	48	2	2	4	66	35	101	2	3	5	95	63	158

Boons also provided work to almost all the permanent female residents who were employed. Only 18% of the women aged 15 - 64 living permanently at Mathopestad had jobs; almost all of them in services, and almost all privately employed. All these women were 25 or older, and all gave regular remittances to their households. The Boons work was very badly paid, however, and some of the female workseekers who were unwilling to become commuters or migrants because of family commitments refused to 'work at Boons and be underpaid'. 10% of the women aged 15 - 64, mostly those between 15 and 34, actually defined themselves as unemployed, compared to only 3% of the permanently resident men. As a middle-aged woman complained, whose family of five depended entirely on the remittances of her migrant husband:

This place has got no working areas nearby. I'm still young, I won't be able to stay at home not working for the rest of my life.

## COMMUTERS

Only 3% of the employed were commuters. All gave regular remittances. They worked in Roodepoort, Potchefstroom, Randfontein and the West Rand; they were scattered amongst jobs in manufacturing, construction and services; and were equally divided between males and females.

## MIGRANTS

Almost all the male migrants were employed. 63% of them worked as labourers and 27% in service jobs, while 57% of them worked for private employers and 41% for the State. The major places of employment, in order of importance, were Johannesburg, Ventersdorp, Carletonville, Krugersdorp and Rustenburg. Mining absorbed 37% of these male migrants, and 21% worked in transport and 16% in construction. 73% made regular contributions to their households; 18% of male migrants contributed irregularly; and 9% contributed nothing.

As for female migrants, most (84%) were between 15 and 34 and almost all worked for private employers. 82% worked in service jobs and all the rest in manufacturing. Johannesburg was by far the most important place of work, followed by Krugersdorp and Rustenburg. None of these women were defined as unemployed, and only 1% of the male migrants were so defined. 74% of them contributed regularly to their households; 20% irregularly; and 6% never.

## OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPORT

Of the people sampled, 28% were defined as employed (64% as migrants), 7% drew old age pensions, and 1% received disability grants. 22% of them contributed regularly to their households; 4% irregularly; and 1% never. 4% of the households engaged in informal activities (such as liquor selling) and none received gifts. The only other source of support came from agricultural activities.

Respondents repeatedly pointed out that Mathopestad was in a fertile highveld region, that it was well watered, and that grazing was free. However, it was only a minority of households that enjoyed these advantages. Only 39% of the households produced any agricultural or pastoral products at all, and only 30% owned stock. 66% of the households did not have any fields (and the fields there were almost all medium or small in size), and 80% did not have garden plots.

Table 8 AGRICULTURAL ASSETS

FIELDS	1	2	3	4	5+	Total	SIZE				
							Small	Medium	Large	Missing	
Households	11	10	5	6	1	33	5	26	1	1	
PLOTS	1	2	Total	STOCK							GRAZING
				Cattle	Goats	Sheep	Pigs	Poultry	Horses/Donkeys		
Households	16	4	20	25	-	13	5	26	2		29
PRODUCE	Maize	Sorghum	Potatoes	Beans	Other crops	Meat	Milk	Wool/Hides	Eggs	Other pastoral	Cash sale
Households	24	-	6	13	6	12	15	-	16	-	1

For those households without fields or stock, the distance of Mathopestad from employment opportunities sometimes outweighed its other advantages. Some people were for the move, to reduce this distance from employment centres.

Others are satisfied because they've got fields.

We have no fields, we'd better leave, maybe where we are going to we will survive.

Yet despite their relatively privileged position within Mathopestad, the great majority of those with access to land and with stock could only use them to supplement other sources of income. Stock-owning households owned on average only 7,1 cattle and 19,9 hens. The households with fields averaged only 2,3 fields each, while those with garden plots had an average of 1,2 each. Given these fairly meagre possessions, almost all efforts were devoted to subsistence production, and in fact only 1% of all the households sold any of their products. Thus of the 29% of households that produced any crops, almost all grew maize, about half grew beans, about a fifth grew potatoes, and only about a fifth grew anything else (mainly tomatoes, grown by the households with the largest amounts of agricultural land). The types of stock were also fairly uniform: almost all stock-owning households had cattle and poultry, and about half had a few sheep. A full 31% of these stock-owners produced nothing from their stock; 41% obtained meat, while about a half produced milk and/or eggs.

Land and stock were, however, distributed fairly unevenly amongst those involved in agricultural or pastoral production, which allowed some households to depend very heavily on peasant production. For example, 16% of this group had 4 fields, although the median number was 1. In almost all the households with 4 fields, the male head worked full-time in his own fields and with his own stock. Moreover, about one-eighth of these households - about one-twentieth of the Mathopestad sample - were sufficiently small in size and sufficiently wealthy in stock and land, not only for the male head to devote himself full-time to his own agriculture, but for this in itself to support the entire household. A strong peasant consciousness was to be found amongst some of these households. For instance, one family of 4 was supported entirely by their 3 fields, 1 garden plot, 17 cattle, 36 poultry, 4 sheep and 3 pigs. The male head who devoted all his time to his agricultural activities in Mathopestad declared his desire to stay there:

I've got enough fields which are too fertile. The Government will have to give me reasonable compensation for my fields because I understand that where we are supposed to be removed is bushveld not suitable for agricultural purposes.

This man, like all those rich in land and stock, owned his land. (About a fifth of the households involved in husbandry did not own the land they used, but they were all small-scale producers on patches of land.) And he reflected this land-ownership when asked if he expected people to co-operate in resisting removal: 'Yes', he said, 'because we are land-owners.'

## NUTRITION

The great bulk (84%) of households ate twice daily, and almost all (95%) ate maize every day. On a daily basis about three-quarters of the households also had tea or coffee, three-quarters had sugar, about half had bread, and half had margarine or fat. But over half the households had milk and/or jam only once a week or at greater intervals of time; over half had potatoes/rice and/or eggs less frequently than once a week; and over half had meat, greens, fish and/or cheese less frequently than once a month.

Despite this scanty starchy diet, the very reverse of complaining occurred about the lack of food. People doubtless compared themselves favourably to many blacks outside Mathopestad: 'No problems in this land, there is a lot of comfort', said one elderly woman heading a

Table 9 NUTRITION: EATING FREQUENCY

Item	Daily	Second day	Twice weekly	Weekly	Less than weekly	Less than monthly
Maize	93**	3	1	-	-	1
Greens	2	1	1	19	17	58**
Potatoes/rice	1	-	4	31	18"	44*
Milk	23*	12	10	14"	19	20
Tea/coffee	71**	15	8	4	-	-
Sugar	70**	15	8	4	1	-
Meat	2	1	2	29	13	51**
Eggs	8	8	15	11	25"	31*
Fish	-	1	11	10	10	66**
Cheese	2	1	1	2	4	87**
Bread	53**	31	10	4	-	-
Fat	27	30**	16	13	5	7
Jam	2	14	24*	22"	13	23

\* mode

" median

household of 9, which lived on maize, bread, sugar and tea every day, fat every second day, and anything else only at intervals longer than once a week. The household did not have fields or stock. Another household which had two fields, 10 sheep and 6 hens still ate only maize, sugar and tea every day, bread every second day, eggs less than once a week, greens and meat less than once a month. Even so, the woman heading the household of 8 in the absence of her migrant husband declared that they would try to stay at Mathopestad because 'We eat as much as we want here.' Yet despite her enthusiasm, a chilling reflection of the generalised poverty in the area is given by the organisations which predominate, for there are at least seven different burial societies in this community and 41% of the households belong to one of them.

## EDUCATION

There was little difference between the levels of education of male and female permanent residents, although the women tended to be slightly more educated. As Table 10 shows, 20% of the permanent residents aged 7 or more had no education; 56% had higher primary schooling, 23% had lower secondary education, and 1% had a higher level.

The commuters' levels were much the same, but those of migrants were considerably higher. (Obviously this is partly due to the differing demographic composition of the groups.) Only 9% of the migrants had no education, 53% had primary, 35% had lower secondary, and 3% had a higher level.

Female migrants had significantly higher levels of education than males: for example, none of the women had no education, compared to 14% of the men; while 49% of the women and only 27% of the men had lower secondary schooling.

The presence of schools in the area was of vital importance to a number of households. Some

Table 10 EDUCATION, BY SEX &amp; RESIDENTIAL STATUS (all aged 7+)

Level	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant			Missing			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
None	31	38	69	1	-	1	10	-	10	-	1	1	42	39	81
Lower primary	44	57	101	-	2	2	9	7	16	1	-	1	54	66	120
Higher primary	45	52	97	1	-	1	30	11	41	2	2	4	78	65	143"
Lower secondary	31	51	82	-	-	-	19	18	37	3	4	7	53	73	126
Standard 9+ *	-	2	2	-	-	-	2	1	3	-	-	-	2	3	5
Missing	1	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	3
TOTAL	152	202	354	2	2	4	70	37	107	6	7	13	230	248	478

\* The questionnaire was miscast: the matriculation course starts in Standard 8, not 9, but any numbers omitted here are likely to have been very small.

" the mode and median

had moved to Mathopestad because schools were available nearby; others were dissatisfied and wanted to move away because there were 'not enough schools' and in particular no high schools.

## AMENITIES

One respondent, moved by the State in 1954 from Reismerriebend in Ventersdorp to Mathopestad, claimed that on arrival there had been no amenities in the area apart from roads. By 1981, however, the community had two schools (a primary and a secondary), two shops, and a borehole, while a doctor came once weekly. Despite some pride in these facilities, which the community apparently got for themselves, dissatisfaction still existed over the absence of water taps, a high school, transport, more shops and a clinic.

## SOCIAL LIFE & LEISURE; LEADERSHIP & PROBLEM-SOLVING

All agreed that people in Mathopestad related well to one another, and that 'there is harmony in this area'. 42% of the households belonged to an organisation, but in all but one case (where the respondent was a member of the school committee and the chief's council), the organisation was a burial society. These numerous organisations did not seem to play an important role in people's social lives: a number of people claimed to belong to a burial society, 'but I don't remember its name'.

There was considerable agreement about the leaders of the community. Four men - including John Mathope, and all probably members of the chief's council - were each named as leaders by over 20% of the community. Chief Arthur Mathope was given as a leader by 45% of the respondents, and 77% of the households said they expected Chief Mathope to help them with their problems. 13% said that 'your organisation' or 'educated people' should help them, 2% said that 'We, the tribe as we are, can solve the problem by uniting', and 1% saw the central government as their helping hand.

## ARRIVALS

Table 11 DATE OF ARRIVAL

Period	1900-45	1946-60	1961-65	1966-70	1971-75	1976-78	1979-81
Households	18	29	13	9	12	12	5

48% of the households had lived in Mathopestad before 1961, and 70% had lived there before 1971. Only a third of the households answered the question on where they had lived before and why they came to Mathopestad, and those who did were not restricted to 'tenants arriving in the last ten years'. But of those who answered, two-thirds had come from the adjoining Ventersdorp district, particularly from Klipgat and Reismerriebend, and from Ventersdorp itself, and they had come mainly in the 1950s and early 1960s. About a sixth had come from the Rustenburg district, at scattered times between 1912 and 1969. And about an eighth had come from Soweto, mainly during the 1950s.

As to the reasons for moving, over a quarter of these respondents simply stated that 'We felt like moving to a homeland'. More specific reasons were given in another quarter of the answers, insofar as households had moved off farms for various reasons, particularly because

A white farmer wanted to exploit my children by sending them to his farm to work instead of going to school.

About a seventh had found their previous places too expensive - paying rent was a particular problem - and about one-tenth had actually been removed from their previous places by the State during the 1950s and early 1960s.

Nearly half of these households had moved to Mathopestad in particular because they wanted to buy a stand. The fact that Mathopestad was nearby - 'the nearest place with our nation' or 'the nearest tribal land where we could buy a stand' - had influenced at least 40% of them. Nearly half simply stated that

We came here because it's a homeland.

Some referred to their independence and the cheapness of living on tribal land, others expressed pleasure in being a 'bona fide of this land'.

## THREAT OF REMOVAL

The first indication that people seem to have had of impending removal was when a 'strange white man' helped by Mathopestad councillors numbered the houses. Most agree that this occurred in 1967, although some refer to other years, especially to 1968. Many people were not there at the time, and others were afraid or 'not eager to know' the reason for the numbering. Hence considerable confusion exists about the meaning of this act, even amongst the 78% of households who say that their houses have been numbered.

Thus although over 40% of this latter group link the numbering to relocation, almost as high a percentage state that no reason was given or that they do not know why the houses were numbered. Moreover, even among those who believed the numbering was related to relocation, a variety of reasons were given for this deed. About a third of this group stated they were told at the time that they were to be moved to a better place:

They said this place has no clinics, no schools and no shops, so we are supposed to move to a better place.

About a sixth of this group state they were told they had to be moved because Mathopestad was not a black spot but a white farm. And about a tenth claim they were told the numbering was linked to compensation:

They said they wanted to know how many houses the Bakubung nation (Mathopestad) had, so that they could gauge how much the government is going to use for compensation.

Given the indifference of the authorities to informing the people, great confusion exists about the removal, and many 'don't believe this rumour'.

While 60% of households believed that others would be moved at the same time, 39% said they didn't know. And a full 84% of the respondents said they did not know whether they would be compensated. (The 4% who believed they would be, named figures between R400 and R550.)

The general rumour, supported by some who say they were told this by the authorities, was that the removal would be to 'Bophuthatswana, near Sun City'. But when asked the reason they were given for this, 77% made no reply. Of the 23% who answered, over half said they were told it was because 'this is a white farm and not a black spot'. A further third said they were told 'there is a better place for us somewhere'.

Partly because of beliefs such as this, 16% of the households said they wanted to leave Mathopestad. One of these households was particularly well off, and even with two fields, two plots, 16 head of cattle, meat every day, and two people employed out of three, they wanted to leave because 'the water around here is not sterile'. But excluding this household, those who wanted to leave were differentiated from the sample at large by having arrived later (53% of them arrived after 1965, compared to 39% in the entire sample); by being more involved in the migrant labour market (27% of them were migrants, compared to 19% in the sample); and by being less involved in agricultural activities (15% of them were stock-owners, and 20% had fields, compared to 30% and 34% in the sample).

Their reasons for wanting to leave reflected very clearly their considerable dependence on migrant labour, insofar as 53% of this group wanted to move because 'the place has got no working areas nearby'. Other reasons were also given, particularly the lack of amenities in Mathopestad (40%) and the hope that they were to be moved to a better place (50%). As was said by one elderly woman heading a family of 5 supported by two female migrants:

This place has got no transport to and from town. I'm made to understand that in the place where we are to be resettled there are shops nearby, and even Sun City is nearer, I mean for working purposes.

A full 84% of the households did however state that they did not want to move from Mathopestad, and about two-thirds of them gave their reasons. Over a third of these reasons centred on the social desirability of staying in Mathopestad:

I was born here, my children were born here, my husband died here. I'm not prepared to leave.

So said a woman whose family had settled there in 1919. Like her, many had a strong feeling about having grown up in the place, of living harmoniously with their neighbours in a community, of 'being a citizen of this land', and of not being prepared to leave graves of their relatives. Some however did indicate that although they wished to stay because they were 'used to this place', their decision was dependent on what the chief desired.

A further quarter of these reasons reflected satisfaction with the material aspects of life in Mathopestad. Frequent references were made to the agricultural productivity of the area, with respondents commenting on its fertility, its abundance of water, and the fact that they were allowed as much stock as they pleased. Being able to live rent-free was another merit

mentioned, and numerous people made statements such as:

We don't pay rent here, I don't see the reason why I should leave.

And for some, it was the existence of expensive, beautiful buildings and two schools which made them reluctant to leave the place.

It was precisely this agricultural productivity and rent-free homes that underlay another quarter of these reasons, where people specifically said they did not wish to move to a new place - particularly not one near Sun City - because they would be worse off. Over half of such responses related to being reluctant to move from the fertile, well watered highveld area to the unhealthy bushveld unsuited to agriculture that characterises Bophuthatswana near Sun City. Nearly 40% of these responses focused on the difficulty of rebuilding houses and of getting used to a strange place.

We've got no problems here. My mother is blind so she won't be able to go elsewhere. We have no father, my mother is blind, my elder brother is disabled, so I don't think we will be able to build another house where they say we are supposed to be resettled.

## RESISTANCE

People were considerably more divided on the question of resisting removal than they were on whether they wanted to stay in Mathopestad. Thus although only 16% of the households said they wanted to leave the area, 46% of them said they would not resist removal, and only 54% said they would try to stay. Nonetheless, a significant number of households, while not prepared to resist removal themselves, still had suggestions about how this resistance could be conducted - most of which revolved around other people confronting the authorities or taking the decision. 69% of the households actually hoped that successful resistance would occur.

About half these households assigned a leading role to the chief when asked how they proposed to resist removal. The most common proposal about the specific course of action that the chief should take was that he should go to the commissioner and produce land titles. Other suggestions included his negotiating generally with the commissioner or central government, or his telling the commissioner about 'the bad things in the new place'. Over 40% of this group allowed for some popular participation as well: for example, they said that people would try to persuade the chief to negotiate with the authorities, or that the people would resist if the chief told them to do so, or that the chief should call a meeting to unify the people. But a quarter of those who saw the chief as playing a leading role in resistance explicitly stated that the chief was the only person who could resist. Their typical response was:

I think the chief is the only person to resist removals. We are not in authority to do anything.

This view was particularly prevalent amongst the 13% of households who were not prepared to try staying but who hoped that resistance would be successful.

Seeing the chief as the only person who could oppose removal was a response frequently linked to personal fear of resistance. Over a quarter of the whole sample said they were afraid to refuse to move, or that they had no right to do so. 'I'm afraid to be locked up', or 'I'm afraid to be caught for being against the law', or 'We've got no right to resist', were common responses, and were very concrete fears for those whose relatives and friends had been imprisoned when resisting removal from Malote in the 1950s. Such replies were especially prevalent amongst the 27% of households who made no positive suggestions about opposing removals: 40% of this group actively wanted to leave Mathopestad, and 50% of

them were too afraid or felt themselves too rightless to resist.


One fifth of the suggestions about ways of resisting - and half of those made by households who were against removal, were prepared to resist and offered proposals - assigned an initiatory or even predominant role to the people themselves. Over half of these responses centred on persuading the chiefs to resist. Other ideas included reasoning with the authorities themselves (bringing up such points as the need to remain in Mathopestad to look after the graves), or going to the authorities with their land titles. (Possession of these titles certainly gave many the belief that their opposition would succeed, and a fifth of all the households saw the land titles as their trump card when they or the chief negotiated with the authorities.) But only some 3% of the entire sample stressed the importance of unity amongst the Mathopestad inhabitants, with suggestions such as:

If only Mathope, our chief, can legalise this rumour (about removals) and make it a real story, then we can combine and form one thing. If there is unity then no enemies can divide you.

Finally, about a tenth of the entire sample assigned a role to outsiders, to 'educated people', 'your organisation' or lawyers. The most common responses here were that educated people should negotiate with the central government, and that lawyers would fight to prove land ownership.

## POSTSCRIPT

In September 1982 Mrs Helen Suzman, MP, and Mrs Sheena Duncan, national president of the Black Sash, visited Mathopestad at the invitation of the tribal council. The chief reported their presence to the South African police, saying he did not know who these strange whites were. After some altercation with the Boons police, Mrs Suzman and party left. The next day, it was reported, the young chief died of a mysterious stomach complaint.



### 3.6 SEKGOSESE

The removals of the Batlokwa and Makgato people of the Pietersburg area involved more than 70 000 Batlokwa people and over 740 Makgato families. The events are interesting for several reasons. Firstly there were a variety of responses from the people - ranging from the Makgato chief and a few followers who agreed to removal, to those who resisted and fought the removals with legal weapons, to those, possibly politically more astute, who used a form of passive resistance. Secondly, the history is well documented and the documentation includes a number of very clear statements from the people concerned. Thirdly, the resistance has proved, at least up till now, to be successful: the majority of the people have been granted a reprieve and are not to be resettled. Lastly, the Batlokwa include both a group who were actually removed and others who spent a period of three years under threat of removal.

#### BACKGROUND

The Batlokwa and Makgato people live in the Sekgosese district of Lebowa, about 50 km north of Pietersburg, on the strategically important road to Zimbabwe. They live under the two tribal authorities of Chief Edward Machaka and Chief George Ramokgopa.

The land on which the Batlokwa people live is their own. Apart from tribal locations, there are collectively bought farms as well as tribal Trust farms granted to the people. Their right to the land, according to one of the tribal authorities, was 'granted to us by Paul Kruger'. It was on this land that they entrenched themselves. At the time of the proposed move there were 21 schools, four clinics, 15 churches, mills, dams, boreholes, shops, stores, garages, post offices, and beautifully cultivated gardens as well as an assortment of bungalows, traditional rondavels and a few double-storey houses. The land was rich and well cultivated with afrikander cattle, sheep and goats. Observers felt that with the modern farming techniques being introduced by agricultural officers, it would be possible for farming to develop beyond the subsistence level.

In about 1962 the Makgato tribe, who were 'squatters' on a white-owned farm at Munnik south-west of Soekmekaar, were moved to the Trust farm Klipplaatdrift (No 508) which adjoins the Matoks (Machaka) tribal area, apparently because of some unhappiness between the farmer and tribe. The father of the present Makgato chief is said to have complained at the time of the move that the land assigned to his tribe was too small. He hoped to get more land adjoining the farm or nearby.

The people were told, however, that this was the final resettlement and that they could make improvements. They did this at great expense. By 1979 there were mud huts in the Makgato village, but also a reasonable number of brick buildings. Different sized farms were established and there were plenty of cattle. There were three schools - two primary and one junior secondary, catering for about 1 000 students in all, as well as a new clinic, three shops and boreholes in the yards of the houses. The community was well established.

While the Batlokwa people have occupied their land since time immemorial, the recent attempts to move them have not been the first bureaucratic intervention in their lives. The betterment scheme system has already entailed much dispossession of cultivated lands and fields without compensation, while the new division of land restricted the amount of land available to families for ploughing. In 1954 the people from the more remote and scattered homesteads were brought nearer to the more densely populated areas and in 1959 the entire area was 'planned'.

1979 was the third time the Batlokwa people were to be moved, the previous moves having taken place in 1945 and 1958. After the last move they were promised that this would be the last one, and that they could make as many improvements as they wished. This they did.

## THE PRESENT MOVE

By Regulation R217 (Government Gazette 6139, of 25.08.78) the Batlokwa areas were excised from the jurisdiction of the legislative assembly of Lebowa, although the actual excision is said to have occurred already in 1977. The areas became 'black spots' within 'white South Africa'. However, the Lebowa administration remained responsible for education, for collecting taxes, stock counting etc. Thus the proclamation sought to dispossess the people of their land and South African birthright, while retaining the use of the bantustan government's services.

The reasons for the move are not entirely clear, although the strategic importance vis-a-vis the road to Zimbabwe has been cited. The move would also make available thousands of hectares of good farming land to white farms. State spokespeople justified the move in terms of consolidation of the 'homelands'. In the case of the Makgato, they also claimed that they were complying with the previous Makgato chief's request by moving them to a larger area.

## THE PROPOSED DESTINATION AREAS

The Makgato were to be moved from their land at Dwars River 50 km from Pietersburg, to Kromhoek, a distance of 128 km. The Batlokwa were to be moved to the Bochum/Vivo area, 62 km away.

Kromhoek was situated near the Soutpansberg. It was a village of tents, with a tap in each road providing the only water. A school with 12 classrooms and accommodation for about 100 children was provided. A bus driver reported that some of the white farmers who left the area

might have done so because lions were eating their livestock.

Vivo was described as an 'arid pebbly' area, 'not fit for human habitation'. Whereas there were two or three permanently flowing rivers at the original Batlokwa place of residence, at Vivo there was only underground water.

Bochum was far from tarred roads. It consisted of a police station, a few houses, a provisions store, a bottle store and a beerhall. The land was flat, stony scrubland, the heat was excessive, water in short supply and the rainfall scanty.

But there were other problems. The majority of the Batlokwa men were employed outside their area. 40% worked in Pietersburg, 20% were commuters, and 40% worked on the neighbouring white farms. Many of the women also worked on the farms. The move would deprive the people of all these opportunities. Those who decided, or felt forced by circumstance, to remain in their former employment would find home visits more difficult and less frequent. Daily commuting for those employed in Pietersburg would become virtually impossible. Before the move there was a regular bus service to take them to work. After the move busfares to the town would increase from 75c to R3,09 for a one-way trip. Even weekend trips home would be difficult with the petrol restrictions then in force. Few, if any, private cars would be able to hold sufficient petrol to permit a return trip home if garages were closed.

While compensation was to be offered to the people resettled, the amounts were patently inadequate, as seen below. Widows would be particularly hard hit without men to help with rebuilding. Compensation only covered the buildings. No compensation could pay for the loss many, especially the elderly, would feel in losing what was regarded by many as a sacred ancestral place where their dead were buried.

## REACTIONS TO THE PROCLAMATION

On 28 August 1978 the chiefs were informed by the chief commissioner that no farms had as yet been bought. The chiefs 'agreed with him that he should not buy them' because they intended to register a protest.

On 13 September 1978 the leaders of the tribe met Lebowa's Chief Minister, Dr Cedric Phatudi, at Seshego, the Lebowa capital. Phatudi made it clear that he was totally opposed to the removal of the Batlokwa. He informed them that he had already pleaded with the then Minister and Deputy Minister, Dr C Mulder and Dr F Hartzenberg, to let the tribe remain on their ancestral land.

A week later, on 20 September 1978, the two chiefs of the area, Machaka and Ramokgopa, were summoned by the chief commissioner for the northern areas, Mr J Pieterse, and officially informed that they were to be resettled. Pieterse was curt and unfriendly. 'It is futile to discuss the matter', he told them. His attitude was 'one of master talking to his servants'. The chiefs registered the determination of their people that they would not move. They tried to organise a meeting at which all their people, including migrants, could be present, to hear about the proposed removals. This would have had to be over the December/January period when most of the migrants were home from contracts. However, the government went ahead with a meeting for 15 November, when a meeting consisting mainly of women was addressed by the deputy secretary of the Department of Plural Relations, Serfontein. The meeting was a stormy one. The people protested against the move, stating that they would not move. Serfontein appeared to be sympathetic and promised to forward their memorandum to Koornhof. (Note: On 21 November 1978 Dr Koornhof visited Crossroads, Cape Town, for the first time and announced he would not bulldoze the settlement.)

Some months later Chief Ramokgopa was again summoned to a meeting in Pietersburg. The chief asked what was to be discussed. When this query was not answered, he refused to attend the meeting, only to be charged under the Bantu Administration Act with refusing to obey a lawful order. The charge was later withdrawn.

In the first half of 1979 the chiefs were summoned to a meeting by the chief commissioner. Ramokgopa and Machaka refused to attend because 'no agenda was provided', and possibly also because they feared they would be arrested. The meeting was, however, attended by Chief Makgato and by the Lebowa MP for the area, a shopkeeper named Kobe. It was decided that the resettlements would be discussed between the Lebowa legislative assembly (LLA) and Dr Koornhof at Seshego on 4 July. The Minister would outline the government plan for removals.

On the day of the discussions, 4 July, the Batlokwa addressed a memorandum to Koornhof requesting that the proclamation be withdrawn and a halt called to plans for removal. The people protested against the proclamation that

- There had been no consultation on the matter, contrary to the alleged policy of dialogue of the government
- It was felt that the intention of the proclamation was 'to isolate us, and to cause ill-feeling between the Batlokwa and the Lebowa government'
- The proclamation had caused confusion both in the legal sphere, where the areas of jurisdiction of Sekgosese and Pietersburg were unclear, and in social development in that the building programme 'had come to a standstill, in ... one time fast developing area'.

The memorandum went on to point out the physical disadvantages of the Vivo area as well as the more personal and social upheaval which such a move would entail. It ended with the plea that the 'Hon Minister' regard them 'as people'.

Koornhof replied that he would give the matter 'his deepest thought'.

The people then answered with a supplementary memorandum in which they corrected certain mistakes which Koornhof had made in his letter, and also added several further points of complaint. In particular this second memorandum complained about government officials having consulted with members of the tribe without having gone through the chief. This, it was said, alienated the chief, and would ultimately lead to violence. The memorandum ended by stating the removal would cause permanent hatred and mistrust for whites

and so we will never feel obliged to fight for this land. We want to feel we are together.

The third chief, Chief Solomon Mathipa Makgato, of the Makgato tribe, meanwhile lent credence to the government's claims that the people had something to gain from resettlement. After consulting with his tribal authority, he agreed to the move. However, none of the Makgato people were consulted. The villagers held a three-day indaba at which they tried to persuade him not to accept. When he still refused, the families petitioned the Minister of Co-operation and Development through the PFP spokesperson, Rupert Lorimer.

## THE MAKGATO REMOVALS

On 25 September the Co-operation and Development lorries and officials came to the Makgato village to take the people who had agreed to be removed. Lorimer was reported as saying:

Dr Koornhof did not make a promise to me personally that the tribe would not be moved, but my understanding is that the Minister had said that nobody would be removed against his will. (Post, 27.09.79)

The members of the Makgato tribe also understood this to be the truth, for the tribespeople who were refusing to move gladly and openly assisted the approximately 50 people who wanted to move with the chief.

However, at 6.30 a.m. on 1 October 1979 about 30 trucks arrived again at Klipplaatdrift. They were accompanied by about 11 police vans, one of them with two police dogs. Camouflaged police patrolled the area while others started demolishing houses and huts, using a chain attached to a truck. The property in the house was then loaded into a truck. The people in the vicinity were forced into the trucks 'voor die voet', under threat from the dogs and guns. All reporters were meanwhile banned from both the Dwars River and Kromhoek areas.

Three delegates from the village arranged an urgent meeting with Dr Phatudi for 2 o'clock that afternoon, to try 'to stop this barbaric and inhuman action immediately'. Phatudi felt that the Lebowa government was helpless, but asked for the information in writing. The delegates abandoned this avenue of appeal and went to the chief commissioner's office. There they saw a Mr C Liebenberg who referred them to the proclamation and said they had had 18 months to prepare for resettlement. The delegation dismissed themselves and returned to the village.

As soon as the vans and police arrived, the Makgato people had begun to flee from the village. Some locked the doors of their homes before leaving, in the hope that their belongings would be protected. The general exodus continued for the next few days.

Using bicycles, wheelbarrows, private cars, hired tractors and vans, the inhabitants, most of them women, moved in and out of the village, taking out their belongings - corrugated iron, pots, furniture, blankets and fowls.

Women, some carrying children and bundles of clothing, were seen scampering through the bush away from the village. Eight people ... have been arrested. Several others have been assaulted according to some fleeing tribesmen.

All day and night they streamed across the dusty road. A woman balanced a 40 gallon water drum on her head. Behind her came a young girl pushing a wheelbarrow filled with wooden struts, not far behind a young boy walking alongside his mother bore a kettle, pot and food in a large brown paper bag.

'We don't want to move', said a wrinkled elder tribesman, leaning on his stick, 'so we are making sure that when they come again to take us away we won't be here'. (Star, 8.10.79)

But the authorities were prepared to use force. They stated that they might 'have to detain them if they do not return to where their property is'. Besides the eight arrests, there were 14 detentions, including that of a local school principal. At least one child was bitten by a police dog. Later reports mentioned at least four deaths which could be attributed to the stress caused by the removals. When 14 people who had been resettled returned to their former homes, they too were arrested. The chief commissioner, on hearing that people were returning, said that this would not be allowed. He said,

You must expect some resistance (against the removals) but once they are settled they will be happy. (Afrika, 1, November 1980)

Police headquarters in Pretoria confirmed 14 arrests, stating four were for assault, one for malicious injury to property, and nine for trespassing.

78 of the total of 740 Makgato families had agreed to move. The possessions of a further 14

families were taken to Kromhoek while the families themselves fled into the bush.

By Friday 8 October the village was absolutely deserted. Approximately 600 families had been absorbed into the surrounding countryside. The church, clinic and schools were partially demolished. It was reported that the cattle of those Makgato who had refused to move had been driven into a camp and shot by officials of the Department of Co-operation & Development, or by the police. A 'squatter camp' arose not far from the original village. It consisted of tin shacks and thatched shelters and housed about 1 000 of the 2 000 people who had refused to move. The rest of the people had been absorbed by the neighbouring tribe, the Batlokwa, who offered this help and accommodation despite threats that their action was illegal, and despite their already fairly overcrowded conditions.

The Deputy Minister described the destination of the resettlement, Kromhoek, as a beautiful land and said that the removals would definitely continue. He also said that all families who were resettled had been provided with free transport, had been compensated for their homes, and were allowed to take windows, doors and corrugated iron. Those 'few families' who were resisting the removal were acting against their tribal authority 'in an undemocratic manner'.

... the area in which the tribe is being resettled offers the people more opportunity than they had in the area from which they are being removed. This is particularly true in respect of schooling, supply of water and rural resettlement of farmers.

Pieterse reported that he had been to Kromhoek himself and that those who had been moved had told him they were happy in their new surroundings.

Meanwhile those who returned reported that conditions were unbearable. The people were not allocated arable land in time to plant crops for that year's season. The amounts paid as compensation were totally inadequate. A good rondavel cost R700 - R800 to build. One family received R50 for an old rondavel. Another received R175 for three new rondavels. A third received R920 for two zinc rooms and four rondavels. Those who had been opposed to the move had been further discriminated against by Chief Makgato who had separated those who had moved voluntarily and those who were forcibly removed. The latter feared that this was a prelude to further discrimination in matters such as land distribution.

Chief Makgato felt that the government authorities had let him down. He told reporters,

I expected the government to protect the 78 families who wanted to be resettled with me here. But it has left most of them behind. They are now being beaten by those people who are opposed to the removal.

He was also bitter towards the other chiefs:

These chiefs have taken away my people. Because of their attitude the 536 families who do not support the removals will not join me. They have built homes among their tribes.

I am terribly disappointed but these chiefs did not support me by rejecting those of my people who don't want to follow me.

I have no people now.

At his request a meeting was held on 11 October between the three Batlokwa chiefs and the chief commissioner, but it ended in stalemate. Machaka and Ramokgopa rejected Chief Makgato's accusations. The two chiefs refused to surrender the families their people were harbouring. The Batlokwa claimed that the fleeing Makgato were refugees from a war which the government had declared on an unarmed and defenceless people. They compared themselves to 'Christian South Africa' which was so ready to give asylum to refugees fleeing from 'troublespots' abroad.

The Makgato chief was totally rejected by those who stayed behind and those who returned. They referred to him as 'the baas from Kromhoek'. In place they elected a committee of four to represent their views. Each day, in the late afternoon, a hooter would sound and the people would gather from the homes they were rebuilding down to the river banks for their daily meeting about the resettlement. After a meeting with the Pietersburg bantu commissioner in which he told them that they were trespassing and would have to move, eviction notices were handed out. The people gave them back saying, 'We can't read'. They were warned they faced fines of R150 or jail sentences of up to six months, and that they would still have to go to Kromhoek afterwards. They were warned that they were 'making life difficult for themselves' and would end up as squatters. Pieterse issued an additional warning that those who delayed in moving might lose their compensation. Despite the warnings the community made a firm decision to resist all attempts to move them.

## THE AFTERMATH

The returned families and those who had refused to move spent the next 12 months either squatting or living with the other tribespeople who had offered them accommodation. Conditions were bad. Various organisations such as the Catholic Mission and SACC provided the people with emergency relief in the form of blankets, mealie meal, powdered milk and soup. But the donors themselves realised that this was only

temporary relief. These people need a permanent home which we cannot offer and unless an acceptable lasting solution is found immediately real trouble with the possibility of violence lies ahead.

While friends, relatives and sympathisers continued to accommodate the people in their small dwellings, they could not be expected to share these indefinitely, and animosity was feared. Overcrowding was rife with families of 18 or more living in two rondavels.

Then, about a year after the removals took place, it was reported that 500 of the displaced people had returned to their former homes, claiming official authority to do so.

In March 1980 Koornhof had replied to a question in parliament and had said that all removals except of those agreeing to move had been delayed until the report of the commission on consolidation of the areas had reported.

On 4 August Koornhof, together with Horwood, attended an intertribal meeting in the area. Koornhof stated that he was not responsible for the proclamation, that it had taken place before his time, and said that the Van der Walt Commission (on consolidation) would be looking into the matter. He said he would not return to the area unless the commission decided that the people did indeed have to move. He said he did not expect to have to return. (Horwood's presence at the meeting, as Minister of Finance, was seen by some as an attempt to see if the government could 'pay them off'.)

However, when the people came back in October, the commissioner for the area, Mr W van Niekerk, would not comment on their return.

Within a few days, though, official reaction came, in the form of summonses on three of the families. The families were charged with 'wrongly and unlawfully occupation of SADT Klipbloeddrift without permission' (sic). The summonses were delivered by white officials, travelling in three cars, and accompanied by six policemen in a van. After delivering the summonses they called the villagers together and told them to move from the area. They also told them that their former Chief Solomon Makgato was waiting for them in the new area.

The people reacted angrily. They reiterated their refusal to move and asked to be left alone. As the officials were consulting among themselves about the matter, three residents' committee members arrived and told the people to disperse. The near 300 villagers complied. A committee member complained to newsmen about the officials' actions:

We cannot allow a situation where people just come and call our people together and address them.

He also expressed anger that only three families had been summonsed:

If they are guilty then we are all guilty. We are all going to that court on that date. We have suffered, my sons. Look at all this rubble. We want to make a new start and rebuild our homes. What we ask from the government is to be left alone in peace.

Despite the official intervention, more and more families returned to the 'ghost village' to rebuild their ruins. In the absence of the promised action by Koornhof and other high authorities, the people had taken a unilateral decision to reestablish themselves. They had had enough of being handled in a manner which one woman likened to that of 'a cook turning a steak on a frying pan'.

No further official developments were reported until April 1982. Then, after a battle of almost four years, Koornhof announced that for 'practical and financial' reasons the proposed removals had been shelved. The Batlokwa and Makgato had, temporarily at least, won the right to remain on their land.

## THE SCHOOLS ISSUE

At the time of the move, people reported to be in favour of moving were attacked by hundreds of children. But there was also an aspect which affected the children more specifically, and which initiated a series of incidents centred around the issue of school accommodation.

Towards the end of October 1979 the department had started to demolish the Makgato schools, despite the memorandum presented to Koornhof and his subsequent promise. The children of the 662 families who refused to move were thus without classroom accommodation. The leaders of the people then approached the Machaka tribal authority for help in providing accommodation, and he agreed that the matter be referred to the Lebowa Department of Education for official sanction.

The official response took a long time in coming. Meanwhile a large number of Batlokwa students refused to write exams until the Makgato children were accommodated.

On 9 October more than 900 students from Turfloop University and Hwiti High School held a protest march in solidarity with the villagers. Then on 15 October thousands of pupils marched through the Batlokwa area in protest against the removals. The march started at the Kgarahara High School with nearly 700 students. The crowds grew bigger as they went from school to school until nearly 7 000 students, a train of over 4 km, reached the circuit inspector's office. The principal of one of the primary schools described the pupils' march as follows:

Hordes of pupils went from school to school telling youngsters to join them in the demonstration. Some of our schools were completely empty in a flash.

The pupils, under the auspices of the Batlokwa African Youth Organisation (BAYO) presented the inspector with their five-point petition:

- that the Department of Education and Training had shown no interest in the plight of the Makgato students
- that the detained students should be released before Thursday
- that a staggering 740 students were out of school due to the forced removals
- that the Department should make arrangements for the Makgato students to write exams at the local schools
- that crucial steps should be taken on Thursday October 10 if the authorities did not respond positively to the demands.

The inspector signed the petition, but afterwards denied having told the students that the schools would be opened to the 740 Makgato pupils. He said that only senior department officials could make such a decision.

Just before the Std 5 exams were to be written, the Northern Transvaal Regional Council of Churches decided to send a deputation to interview the Lebowa Department of Education. After this delegation the Makgato pupils were accepted into the schools by the Under-Secretary Kobe and Minister Marishane. 635 of the 740 who were eligible were thus able to write their exams. Their teachers were, however, prohibited from attending these schools, which made it impossible for them to carry out their intention of covering the various syllabi and schemas of work and preparation which they had begun in Makgato. The teachers were also deprived of their salaries for a few months for having refused to move. Since that time many of the teachers have been reallocated to areas far away from their homes and families, despite sufficient vacancies in the Batlokwa schools.

## COMMUNITY ORGANISATION

The students were not the only ones to organise. Throughout there was participation by the ordinary people in the removals issue. This participation was particularly strong in the Matoks area, the land to the west of the national road. This area is that immediately adjoining the land of the Makgato, and it was these people also who provided most of the shelter after the removals.

As soon as they heard the first mention of the proposed removals the Batlokwa people formed an executive committee to deal with the removals. They formed this committee 'not from tribal authorities alone, but also people who were against the removal and people who could reason well, level-headed'. This committee then got the chief on their side. He was invited to a meeting where the people told him clearly how they felt and instructed him how to respond to the central authorities. They showed him around, and 'made him aware of the fact that he is the chief of all these people who will get nothing, and who are aware that he will get any car that he asks for from them.'

The Batlokwa realised the strong position of the chief in their community. They realised the bribes and pressures to which he and other tribal authorities could be subjected, that they could be offered 'more than they could refuse'. They also realised the strength which his support could lend them in their struggle. If they talked in the presence of the chief, they were 'covered'.

Further astuteness was shown in their negotiations with the authorities. When the chief commissioner's response did not satisfy them, they appealed to higher authority and were visited by Serfontein, the departmental secretary. At the visit they wrote down all that was said by both parties, afterwards presenting him with a copy of these 'minutes'. These, they

said, should be given to the Minister. Six months later, they requested a meeting at which both the Minister and Phatudi should be present.

At this meeting the people once again affirmed that they were peace-loving, and that all they wanted was to remain on their land. The visitors were driven around and shown the buildings and lands.

The Matoks community also undertook its own research. Using their own transport, they visited the proposed places of settlement. From this first-hand information they compiled their own 'good memorandum' comparing the two places, which they then presented to the authorities.

A further focus of community action was the shopkeepers. It was felt that the businessmen had been 'bought out' by the government by promises of new business complexes, licences and a flourishing trade. The people reacted by boycotting the shops of those who were felt to be cooperating with the authorities. Especially strong action was taken against M D Kobe, who besides being a shopkeeper was also a member of the LLA. The people felt that Kobe was ignoring and belittling their chiefs and the people who had elected him. In mid-1979 a boycott of over six weeks' duration caused his daily takings to drop from R400 to R2. Kobe blamed Chief Ramokgopa for the action, saying that he was being used by his advisory committee. The chief denied this, and added that the tribe had decided on a fine of a beast and a goat for anyone who defied the boycott. (Kobe then confirmed all suspicions by appealing to Pieterse for help.)

In many of these dealings the Batlokwa rejected outside professional help, preferring to do the surveys, petitions and memoranda themselves. Lawyers, they complained, were too ready to bow down to government regulations. Lawyers would try to obtain better compensation for them. The people were aware of their rights to compensation, but were not interested. As soon as one started discussing compensation, they said, the department started numbering the houses. They knew only one thing. They would not go. 'This is the main thing.'

Legal suspicion also directed their attitude towards officialdom. The leaders told the people not to answer questions put to them by officials.

You may think it is a good answer you are giving them, but you find out that it may have other implications. Tell him 'Give us time to think about these questions.' Discuss them. Try and find out what the implications of the questions are and then work out a reply.

This legal reticence was not displayed by all the Batlokwa however. The chiefs in particular had legal advice throughout and vast amounts of money were spent on legal fees for lawyers brought in from Johannesburg. Help was received from many sources, for example the SACC, Rand Daily Mail, overseas publications, as well as individual academics, professionals and others.

Throughout their struggle the Batlokwa as a whole displayed an awareness of unity that negated the government's ideology of division into tribes. A lot of bitterness was thereby avoided. Alfred Masipha, a Machaka school principal, and spokesman for the Batlokwa committee, put it this way:

Adversity has drawn us very close together. On the removal issue we act as one. We have resolved to oppose any attempts by the South African government to shift us from our ancestral homes.

A lot of bitterness was felt towards the Makgato chief both for having agreed to the removals and for having conducted separate negotiations with the government. An intertribal committee had been set up so as to have a united strategy towards the government, and it was felt that the actions of some of the Makgato had weakened their struggle. Further awareness of the

need for unity was evidenced in the importance attached to publicity. Publicity was felt to be important in that it helped to put different people from different tribes in the same threatened situation in touch with developments in other parts of the country. They could then become aware that theirs was not an isolated struggle.

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## 3.7 WINTERVELD

### INTRODUCTION

Winterfeld, a densely populated area in 'independent' Bophuthatswana, is situated 30 km north-west of Pretoria and is an example of the State's attempt to divide the oppressed people of South Africa along ethnic lines, attempting to force them into separate bantustans. Direct measures and more subtle forms of coercion have been used in Winterfeld to force non-Tswanas out of Bophuthatswana. Meanwhile hundreds of thousands of people are locked into a cycle of poverty and insecurity, their fate in the hands of the central State and its Bophuthatswana adjunct.

The first part, on relocation, gives the context for the Winterfeld story. This is followed by a historical background of the area; the various means used to force non-Tswanas out of it; and finally, recent changes that seem to be taking place.

### A NOTE ON RELOCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The term relocation is defined by Maré (1981:1) as 'in its most direct form, referring to economic forces and political policies that, in their interaction, uproot, relocate and contain and control enormous numbers of South Africans within "group areas"'.

In crude terms, relocation is a phenomenon engineered by the State which in various ways removes people who are unemployed or 'superfluous' from 'white' urban areas and 'white' agricultural land, usually to resettlement camps in the bantustans. The vast majority of those affected are blacks. Although the programmes are carried out by the State, they certainly benefit the private sector. The effect, if not the whole rationale, is to rid capital of the dependence of unemployed and unemployable people. These people are forced into the bantustans where they represent little cost to capital and pose little threat to political stability which is necessary for capital accumulation. They also form a manipulable and

cheap migrant labour force for particular sectors of the economy. Previously the system of reserves served to allocate and supply labour to the economy. Now it absorbs the people who, in productive terms, are superfluous. The reserves have been given increasing political autonomy and even independence to lend credence to the notion that blacks have political rights. On another level the State has passed increasing control to the bantustan authorities for them to apply to the impoverished people in their areas.

### BACKGROUND TO WINTERVELD

Now within the borders of Bophuthatswana as 'independent' territory, Winterfeld consists of 1 658 freehold plots bought by blacks in 1938 from a land speculation company. The land was originally designated for agricultural use, though this has since proved impossible on many of the 5 and 10 morgen plots.

The growth of Winterfeld and similar areas in the last 25 years has been one aspect of the general trend in the development of the economy, with the capitalisation and mechanisation of industry and agriculture and the concomitant removal of 'superfluous' people. In the case of Winterfeld there have been three main causes of relocation:

- The rationalisation and increasing mechanisation of the agricultural sector led to restrictions on labour tenancy and squatting. Many affected people from neighbouring farm areas move to Winterfeld.
- People have been evicted from group areas and black spots around Pretoria - from Lady Selbourne, Eastwood, Riverside and Eersterus. According to reports, these people were either dumped in Winterfeld by the central government authorities or the authorities told them that Winterfeld was a place to go to.
- Influx control has forced people into Winterfeld if they lacked accommodation or employment or their squatter camps were destroyed. This movement happened in the late 50s and the 60s. The population went on growing during the 1970s. No figures are available, but people from other bantustans certainly went there, hoping for work. As fewer jobs became available, people in the reserves far from urban centres found it increasingly difficult to get them. The labour bureaux were offering few contracts or none at all. People have been trying to move closer to job centres while staying perforce in the bantustans. Winterfeld was an obvious choice.

The delineation of Winterfeld is false in some ways, as there are few neat boundaries. Strictly speaking, Winterfeld is the freehold area with at least 600 000 people (Chief Mangope spoke of 750 000; a 1981 census reported 105 000). Loosely it describes a semi-circle of land from Brits in the west to Hammanskraal in the north, containing approximately one million people - 90% of them said to be non-Tswana. This whole area lies inside Bophuthatswana, an embarrassment to both the central and bantustan authorities.

This paper focuses on the smaller Winterfeld, the freehold area. The most densely populated part, called Stakaneng (Shanty Town), is the area closest to the official town of Mabopane. Further into Winterfeld the density lessens, but there are few plots without tenants. People have converged on Stakaneng as it is the closest area to Pretoria and Rosslyn, where most people work. The 5 morgen plots are in the Stakaneng area. Tenant farming has begun there. Taking in tenants increases the density again but is a difficult process to stop: tenant farming is more reliable than agriculture, particularly in that climate (WIP 10, 1979). The houses in Stakaneng are mostly zinc and mud. They get bigger and more permanent-looking as one goes further into Winterfeld.

Winterfeld has very little infrastructure. One main tar road passes through the centre, a

maze of dirt roads of varying quality link up the residential areas. Like so many relocation camps, it has an excellent bus service for transporting workers. A police station and a clinic exist in Mabopane, but none in Winterveld itself until recently: in 1981 the Roman Catholic Church started a clinic there. The Seventh Day Adventist Mission had built and furnished a small hospital in Winterveld in the late 1950s, but it has never been given permission to open. As with any very poor and deprived area, disease is rife, with malnutrition on top of the unsanitary conditions and lack of health care. After some cholera cases were reported in 1980, the Bophuthatswana authorities provided a few areas with clean water. Water is easily obtained here compared with some other areas. Some plot owners have sunk boreholes and sell water at 2 or 3c per 20 litres.

1 300 children attend 15 registered primary schools and 2 000 the one Tswana-medium secondary school. These are all government schools. There are about 10 private Zulu-medium schools teaching 6 000 children in particularly trying conditions. They are built mainly of zinc and are chronically overcrowded with few desks and other facilities available. All teachers are very poorly paid; in 1980 some received only the first few months' salary. Principals of the private schools have been generally harassed (fined and jailed) by the Bophuthatswana authorities.

As for the level of unemployment in the area, some say it is bad and getting worse, while others say it exists but the major problem is insecurity. Both views may be true. Non-Tswanas are not entitled to work permits or pensions (on pensions see Table 1 below).

Winterveld first became news in 1973 when the Pretoria News exposed the conditions there. A health survey was started. Various promises were made, for schools, hostel accommodation and housing in Mabopane East. The only promise kept was the building of a police station (WIP 10, 1979). Occasional press reports have indignantly noted the lack of human rights and a solution; but there has been little investigation of Winterveld as a whole.

In the name of ethnicity (discussed below), people in Winterveld are under pressure to move for the second time. Many had been relocated in the 1950s and 60s. As pointed out earlier, in terms of Maré's categories these removals had resulted from the abolition of labour tenancy and squatting on white farms; clearance of black spots; urban relocation; and group areas.

Since the early 1970s the non-Tswanas have been under pressure to move again. The 'autonomous' Bophuthatswana is obliged to try to justify and give credibility to its existence, and together with the central State it has tried solving the anomaly of the massive non-Tswana group in Winterveld. The only section of Winterveld to be served with eviction notices has been Klipgat, in December 1978. Otherwise the general tactic has been harassing people so that they are forced to move 'voluntarily'.

In summary, the two phases of removal have been:

- Relocation of people to Winterveld from the late 1950s to the early 70s. This was an attempt to rid the white areas of 'unproductive' blacks. It seems the choice of bantustan did not matter much then.
- The attempt to move people during the middle and late 1970s. To gain credibility the Bophuthatswana State has worked to become ethnically pure. It also needed to rid itself of the political threat posed by the non-Tswana element. These aims arose as the bantustan was given a material base and increasing autonomy.

## ETHNIC ISSUES

In 1972 the Lebowa cabinet appointed a commission headed by Chief Minister Phatudi to look into land issues. When meeting with the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, it was agreed that the Mabopane-Garankuwa-Winterveld complex would not fall under Bophuthatswana, because many North Sotho people lived there. The area would be administered by the central government, and people of all ethnic groups could own houses and businesses.

Although this never happened, there seems to have been a move, under pressure, towards a compromise. In 1974 the Bophuthatswana authorities, while trying to impose Tswana as a medium in all schools, met with such protest that they compromised and allowed mother-tongue instruction in Mabopane East. Eventually Mabopane East was called Soshanguve and reverted to the control of the central government, for a while coming under a committee representative of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development and the Bophuthatswana authorities. This story illustrates the quandary the central government was in, pushing ideological purity and 'separate development' in its own interests, yet having to cope with the logistics of relocation and disruption in the name of that purity and development.

As independence approached, Winterveld was again in the news. The Rand Daily Mail of 7.12.77 reported:

The South African and Bophuthatswana Governments are to co-operate in the resettlement of thousands of blacks ... among the key targets are the squatters in Winterveld and Thaba Nchu in the Orange Free State.

The South African government would resettle all those who wanted to move, and Bophuthatswana would let the rest stay there until provision was made for them (WIP 10, p 52). Disregarding the agreement, Chief Minister Mangope told the people that those who did not want to take out citizenship should leave. As some Winterveld people commented:

When independence came, they thought Mangope would welcome them, but he kept saying they must go away.

In the second half of 1978 attempts were made to apply direct pressure on people to move to their 'homelands'. Starting in August and culminating in December, raids were made against both tenants and plot owners, with people arrested and fined R30 or 30 days for not possessing permits and being illegal squatters. At the end of November 500 people were arrested in Mabopane and Winterveld and were found guilty of squatting. They had to leave the area or face sentence. According to WIP, eviction orders were served on thousands of Winterveld people, and many fled to SADT farms in the area. Large numbers also started moving to relocation camps in newly formed KwaNdebele, as many of the non-Tswanas were Ndebele.

It is said that the raids might have been illegal because legislation against squatting only exists for white areas, and the tenants were neither squatters nor illegal. However, it is not in the legislation but in the title deeds that the distinction is made. The title deeds state that the land is only to be used for agricultural purposes, and only the owner, his immediate family and bona fide farm helpers are allowed to live on the property. This gives the police scope for harassment.

With the population census in 1970, residential permits were issued to tenants. The practice continued until mid-1977. The permits legalised the tenants' position, and more importantly, they enabled tenants to get their work permits endorsed as well.

Prior to the main spate of raids in December 1978, Mangope had given his assurance (Post, 22.10.78) that he did not want to remove people from Winterveld as long as the landlords regularised the position of the tenants by getting permits for them. Yet the local community

authority said they would no longer issue permits.

The pressure on the non-Tswana Winterveld residents had some effect. On 21 February 1979 the Deputy Minister of Plural Relations, Dr Hartzenberg, told parliament that 'the government had resettled about 6 000 families from the Winterveld area of Bophuthatswana'.

In March 1979 President Mangope warned that land would be expropriated if overpopulated by squatters and accused the plot owners of robbing squatters by imposing rent. The seeds of a tenant/landlord conflict do exist and could be exploited by the Bophuthatswana authorities.

Tenants began to face increasing difficulties when applying for endorsements to their work permits. They were turned away from the Odi magistrate's court because 'the office no longer catered for squatters'. Mr G Nkai, the Bophuthatswana Secretary for Internal Affairs, stated that if tenants applied for citizenship they would receive work permits. However, any non-Tswana who wants to gain citizenship must have lived in the area for five years, which would be difficult for some tenants to prove.

A local priest says there were and still are varying attitudes towards the different groups of people. The non-Tswana plot owners are helped in Soshanguve in South Africa. They are mainly Pedi-speaking (of 1 604 plots, only 32 are owned by Tswanas). However, the plot owners' children are not helped there and are referred to their respective bantustans for reference books and work permits. The tenants were helped at Soshanguve at first, but then were referred to their bantustans for all their needs. The offices in Winterveld and Garankuwa issue no permits of any kind to non-Tswanas. This has been the case since 1979.

This inability to renew work permits puts people into grave uncertainty. It is a more subtle and, in the State's eyes, more effective way of forcing people out of Winterveld. People give two reasons for leaving:

- They must go to 'their' bantustan to renew their work permits.
- Their children cannot speak Tswana and therefore cannot go to school in Bophuthatswana. The private schools are overcrowded. Because people value education so highly, they leave Winterveld.

Yet the more subtle approach is not working either and it is reported that people who left for other bantustans are now returning. They are caught in a spiral with little chance of escape: although Winterveld is a place of insecurity and poverty, other relocation camps are no better and often, as in KwaNdebele, far worse. Instead of actually removing their belongings, people just return to the other bantustans long enough to renew work permits. The Black Sash report that families are fragmented - with parents in hostels and Winterveld, for example, and children in KwaNdebele.

Pensions are another major problem for non-Tswana residents. Control over pensions, insurance, health and unemployment benefits was passed to the Bophuthatswana authorities three years after independence. Some people have been without pensions for years. No replies to applications are received.

The Pension Act No 18 of 1978 states that:

Subject to the provisions of this Act, any person shall be entitled to the appropriate social pension if he satisfies the Secretary -

- a) that he is an aged, blind or disabled person or a war veteran; and
- b) that he is resident in Bophuthatswana at the time of his application for a social pension; and

c) (i) that he is a citizen of Bophuthatswana; or

(ii) that he has lawfully resided in the Republic of Bophuthatswana for the period of five years immediately preceding the date of such application.

In other words, the conditions are the same as for citizenship.

Table 1 PENSIONS IN WINTERVELD (Sash report, May 1982)

Of the 534 cases documented by the Pretoria Advice Office, an examination of a random sample of 45 cases shows that:

- 75,6% are females
- 24,4% are males
- 97,8% are non-Tswana
- 13,3% have applied for citizenship
- 100% have no income whatsoever
- 93,3% have never received a pension
- 40% have applied for a pension
- 60% have not applied\*
- 62,2% had worked in the RSA
- 24,4% were forcibly removed to Winterveld
- 66,7% have the Winterveld Community Authority Stamp in their reference books
- 15,6% applied for disability grants

The average age is 68,6 years.

The average time of living in the Winterveld area is 17,4 years.

\* The reasons given for not applying for pensions are usually: not knowing where to go; friends, relatives and neighbours have been shunted from pillar to post and have received nothing; to apply is regarded as hopeless in any case and some do not know that a pension is a right and due to them; non-Tswanas know that their application will not be accepted.

Another form of repression is Bophuthatswana's continual harassment of private schools and unregistered stores. There is only one registered school in Stakaneng, and only three trading stores with licences. Unregistered shops have sprung up to alleviate the acute shortage. People in Winterveld say these shops have been raided consistently. Raided principals and shop owners have to pay a fine at Mabopane police station - one principal has been fined three times. When shops are raided the goods are confiscated and not returned.

A feature of life implied here is the corruption which has inevitably developed as officials have total control over the people. The Bophuthatswana police gain from the raids. Winterveld people have also said that bribes of up to R200 are paid at the Winterveld community authority for permit endorsements. These two examples are symptomatic of the corruption that the people must live with since they have no rights and no recourse against those in charge.

(The Winterveld community authority, set up in 1967, has 13 members - though in 1981 it had only four active participants. Non-Tswana plot owners could be elected to the authority but

may not take the chair - in fact one was elected and not allowed to take it.)

Coupled with the raids on private schools and shops has been a concerted attempt to rid Winterveld of informal activity, particularly street vending. WIP 10 notes the RDM report of 15.08.79 about a blitz on street vendors, the officer in charge of the Mabopane police station saying 'there were four licensed grocers serving about 500 000 people in the Winterveld district and there were no licensed street vendors'.

Non-Tswanas may not apply for loans from the Bophuthatswana National Development Corporation. Only two non-Tswanas have received loans to build shops - and that was before the 'ethnic squeeze' began and they had become Bophuthatswana citizens.

Finally, on 'ethnic pressure', it is worth quoting from the minutes of the meeting held on 8.10.80 by the Winterveld Plot Owners Committee of 18. (The passage refers to plot owners but applies equally well to tenants.) Under 'Labour Contract and Work Permit' it is noted:

The majority of people are bitterly dissatisfied how this is being handled by the Magistrates Office at Odi and the local Winterveld Community Authority. They strongly appeal for the election of a New Winterveld Community Authority councillor at once.

As: 1. This councillor has never met the plot owners since he was elected in 1974. He never gives annual reports.

2. He does not attend to the cases of the plot owners sincerely and fairly.

- eg. a) Labour contracts  
b) Work permits  
c) Issuing of new reference books  
d) Pension applications, recommendations and approval  
e) Pension payments, receipts of money of pensioners  
f) Transport and distance of bus stops from most areas and for pensioners  
g) Road repair and maintenance in the whole township  
h) Clinics  
i) Social welfare activities  
j) Sports and recreation facilities  
k) Education for the mixed area

Discussions between Dr Koornhof and the present Intergovernmental Management Committee (IMC) proceed as the majority want to be within the Republic of South Africa. At issue is the position of all the non-Tswanas in Winterveld. They may be compensated to move to other bantustans. Their situation in Winterveld has not changed: non-Tswanas may not get permits for anything in the area. Their deadline for leaving Winterveld expired in May 1981, but then it was extended again by the Bophuthatswana authorities.

## RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Announcements since the beginning of 1980 indicate that the central government realises the permanency of the non-Tswana group in Winterveld. In January 1980 there was a joint press release by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of South Africa and Bophuthatswana, the main points being:

- lack of housing in Mabopane had caused the problem at Winterveld (with people moving there, attracted by the Johannesburg and Pretoria metropolitan areas)
- the IMC had been formed to investigate and plan a development strategy for the area

'all actions resulting from the investigation will be based on the involvement of all people resident in Winterveld'. All points of view would be considered.

At the request of the Bophuthatswana authority, a residents' committee was also set up on a short-term basis. Called the Committee of 18, it was made up of plot owners who were to investigate local needs and make any proposals. On completing a questionnaire, however, they carried on at Bophuthatswana's request to work with the IMC. Three of their members serve on it. A Tenants' Committee of 18 was nominated too, and three of their members sit on the IMC.

A working committee of the IMC with aid from the CSIR Building Research Institute is planning how to upgrade Winterveld. Their activities include a survey of the area, investigation into local economic activity, building industry and land use. The plot owners are sceptical of the surveying and fear their lands may be expropriated. They have reason for concern: in 1967 the central government expropriated part of the Winterveld area without notifying the land owners, a 'mistake' that the Bophuthatswana authorities apologised for.

The minutes of the IMC working committee give no real idea of future plans. A problem arose, of how far the committee could go with investigating and planning before deciding on the legality or illegality of the non-Tswanas. The committee has tried passing the buck on problems of work permits and pensions when tenants and residents raised them at meetings. People demand rights, not upgrading.

Potential conflict exists in Winterveld between the tenants and the plot owners. At a report-back meeting of the Residents' Committee of 18, people were asked, 'What have you to say about tenants as you are the plot owners?' They replied, 'Let the Government take the tenants away. We want to use our plots as agricultural plots.' Some plot owners say this is not quite as harsh as it sounds because they think first of all other areas should be found for the tenants.

## CONCLUSION

The present situation in Winterveld is one of poverty exacerbated by insecurity. Clearly the central government must either excise Winterveld from Bophuthatswana or force Bophuthatswana to accept the non-Tswanas. Either course will taint its ideological purity. The new Rosslyn II industrial site near Winterveld is tacit acknowledgement that the people are there to stay. Many workers would probably come from Winterveld. With more labour needed, the spate of strikes in 1981 at Rosslyn I may be a sign of growing consciousness and militancy among Winterveld residents. No progressive grassroots organisation has emerged yet to mobilise people there.

Whether the people are given the right to stay in Winterveld in Bophuthatswana or as an excised community in the Republic, their short-term future is bleak. Like those in other rural and urban ghettos, they have been isolated, politically and economically, from State power and control over their lives. Their long-term future can only lie in a restructured political economy for South Africa, where those who produce wealth can distribute it to the benefit of all. Only then can the deprivation, poverty and insecurity which plague our society be resolved.

### 3.8 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEYED AREAS

This section is intended to highlight some of the results of the surveys indicating broadly where conditions are worst, where poverty exists in its worst form, and what preconditions determine that position. In most cases only those areas to which people have been moved (Rooigrond, Mahodi, Kwaggafontein and Kangwane) are compared, although at times it is useful to compare them with the place under threat of removal which was surveyed, Mathopestad.

The economic indicators which have been chosen for the comparative analysis are: economic status (of permanent residents, as well as of all economically active members of the household), income type (whether people are earning or receiving transfer incomes such as pensions or grants), regularity of remittances of working members of the household, whether there are any informal economic activities, gifts received by members of the household from outside, and whether there is any agricultural land available, giving an indication of other forms of income. The number of transfer incomes per household received is measured with the number of earners. The number of migrants and local workers is compared with the households with no earners.

It has been mentioned elsewhere that the questionnaire did not ask what people earned. It has been the experience of members of the SPP that people seldom answer that question accurately, mainly because in rural areas the household head may be away or may only remit part of his migrant earnings occasionally, and pensions may not be received regularly, etc. - so that to measure a household's poverty strictly in monetary terms does not show all the nuances. The level of poverty was sought through indicators such as whether and how regularly remittances are coming in, whether there are local earners, income from informal sources, access to subsistence from the land. In the case studies the occupations and sectors in which the employed work give an indication of wages in the formal sector. Further than that it is clear from the results which areas are relatively worse off and this is the intention of the surveys. It would not be possible 'scientifically' to establish a measure of income.

Other indicators of poverty are frequency of eating, diet, housing, access to facilities at the

time of the move and at the time of the survey.

Some demographic factors will be compared as well.

#### EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Table 1 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%)

	Permanent residents	Total economically active population*
Rooigrond	66,7	0,04
Mahodi	92,3	7,3
Kwaggafontein	90,5	10,2
Kangwane	70,0	4,0
Mathopestad	23,8	9,7

\* includes permanent residents, commuters and migrants

In Rooigrond most of the people who are regarded as members of the household are migrants. As they are migrants, they have to be employed. For the other places it is clear that there are almost no work opportunities in and around the closer settlements. The Kangwane figure is slightly lower because some of the people from Kabokweni work locally in the handful of factories there.

#### RESIDENCE STATUS

Examining residence status will show that Mahodi and Kwaggafontein have the highest proportion of permanent residents while a third of Rooigrond people are migrants and nearly a quarter of Kangwane surveyed people would commute to White River and the surroundings.

Table 2 RESIDENCE STATUS (%)

	Permanent			Commuter			Migrant		
	Male	Female	Total	M	F	T	M	F	T
Rooigrond	21,99	27,88	49,87	7,74	8,67	16,41	21,37	12,38	33,75
Mahodi	29,14	44,47	73,61	3,61	3,62	7,23	17,07	1,89	18,96
Kwaggafontein	25,31	44,66	69,97	9,04	1,98	11,02	15,73	3,25	18,98
Kangwane	25,58	36,30	61,88	11,19	12,78	23,97	13,24	0,91	14,15

contd.

Table 2 RESIDENCE STATUS (%) contd

	Missing			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
Rooigrond	-	-	-	51,10	48,92	100
Mahodi	-	,17	,17	49,82	50,15	100
Kwaggafontein	-	-	-	50,08	49,89	100
Kangwane	-	-	-	50,01	49,99	100

## INCOME TYPE

Table 3 INCOME TYPE (%)

	Earnings	Old age pension	Disability grant	Missing	Total
Rooigrond	27,6	5,0	0,6	66,9	100,1
Mahodi	26,6	0,9	-	72,6	100,1
Kwaggafontein	30,3	0,5	0,4	68,7	99,9
Kangwane	37,7	3,0	0,5	58,9	100,1
Mathopestad	28,1	7,1	1,1	63,6	99,9

The highest proportion of earners were found in Kangwane and Kwaggafontein, with the other three places more or less in line. Rooigrond and Mathopestad showed a high proportion of pensioners which would bear out what members of the community said about not wanting to move. The old people have been left in Rooigrond while the younger members migrated to work but many no longer contribute to income coming into Rooigrond. The community is close and people have been helped to get old age pensions. Mathopestad people said that while members of the younger generation did not necessarily stay to work at their black spot, when they had worked all their lives in the towns they wanted a secure place as a home to retire to. This would account for the high proportion of old people and the doubly cruel proposal to relocate them.

(More than half the missing income types would be not economically active people under 15 years of age, the rest would be older not economically active people receiving no other means of income, and the unemployed. No-one reported receiving UIF benefits.)

## INCOME

A cross-tabulation was done for all the areas with variables being transfer incomes, incomes from local and migrant workers, and other forms of income such as from the informal sector. Everyone in Rooigrond had some form of 'other' income. Worst off were three households with no earners but two members receiving transfer incomes. The biggest group of households (16) had migrant workers only. Next were those (7) with local workers only.

In Mahodi there were 24 households with no 'other' income, one of them having no earners and no transfer income. Nine households had no other income than that from local earners, which would be very low in that area. The largest group (44) had a local earner, no transfer income but 'other' income.

Of those surveyed in Kwaggafontein two households had no earners, no transfer income and no 'other' income. The biggest group (35) had local earners and some sort of informal income, while 22 households had local and migrant workers and informal income, and 16 households had migrant workers and informal income.

In Kangwane the worst off were four households with no earners, no transfer income and no 'other' income. 25 households had migrant workers and 'other' income while 20 households had migrant and local workers and informal income.

In a detailed analysis of migrant and local earners, it was found that in Rooigrond the 16 households with migrant workers only had more than one migrant per household (5 had one, 6 had two, 4 had three, and 1 household had four migrant workers) headed by males; while of those headed by females 2 had two workers, 3 had three, and 1 had four migrant workers.

Most households in Mahodi (38) had one migrant worker and no local workers (one of these was headed by a female). 15 households had one migrant and one local worker while 14 households had one local and no migrants.

For Kwaggafontein the situation was similar with 32 male-headed households having one migrant and no local workers. The next largest category was 14 households, also male-headed, having no migrants and one local worker, and 12 households (one of which was headed by a female) with a migrant and a local worker each.

In Kangwane the situation was a little different as most workers are commuters. 18 households (two of them female-headed) had two local workers each but no migrants. 15 households had a migrant and a local worker each (two being female-headed).

The point about female-headed households is that they have generally less earning potential as society not only discriminates against women with respect to wages, but women usually have more domestic responsibilities and have less chance of leaving home to earn.

Table 4 REGULARITY OF REMITTANCES (% of households)

	Regular	Irregular	Never	Total
Rooigrond	88,2	10,5	1,3	100
Mahodi	73,9	25,2	0,9	100
Kwaggafontein	78,3	21,7	-	100
Kangwane	73,1	25,6	1,3	100
Mathopestad	81,0	13,9	5,0	99,9

Rooigrond and Mathopestad had the most regular and also the least regular remittances. These figures are taken from all workers, whether resident or not. It seems that Rooigrond and Mathopestad have the closest-knit community in terms of regularity of remittances, but fewer migrants form part of the Kwaggafontein community, indicating that those who return home more regularly might remit more regularly.

Table 5 EARNINGS

Households, by number of local workers		Households, by number of migrants									
		Male-headed					Female-headed				
		0	1	2	3	4	0	1	2	3	4
Rooigrond	0	2	5	6	4	1	1	0	2	3	1
	1	1	1	0	2	0	3	0	1	0	0
	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Mahodi	0	2	37	11	7	1	3	1	0	0	0
	1	12	14	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	0
	2	3	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Kwaggafontein	0	3	32	6	5	3	1	0	1	0	0
	1	14	11	6	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	2	6	3	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kangwane	0	3	10	1	2	0	4	0	1	0	0
	1	9	13	2	3	0	2	2	0	0	0
	2	16	5	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
	3	4	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 6 INCOME

Households, by number of transfer incomes		Households, by earners, & with/without 'other' incomes (Yes/No)							
		No earners		Local earners		Migrant earners		Local & migrant	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Rooigrond	0	0	0	7	0	16	0	3	0
	1	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	0
	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	1	0
Mahodi	0	3	1	44	9	14	4	11	8
	1	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	0
Kwaggafontein	0	2	2	35	8	16	7	22	1
	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Kangwane	0	0	4	12	1	25	2	20	6
	1	1	1	1	1	6	1	2	0
	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

As an indicator of survival techniques questions were asked on the extent of outside aid (gifts) to the household, if any informal economic activities were undertaken, and what access there was to agricultural land. Many people reported that they 'borrowed' food, that when pension money arrived or migrant remittances were sent, they repaid their benefactors. There was almost no access to agricultural land. Only 4% of households in Mahodi had access, the rest of those surveyed had none. A few Rooigrond people have cattle which graze illegally around the settlement. This happens to a greater or lesser extent around most closer settlements, depending on how strict the bantustan authorities are in the area.

Informal economic activities are not always reported to interviewers as they are often illegal. (The Ciskei authorities have banned home industries such as sewing as they are competitive with the small-scale shopkeepers having a vested interest in Ciskei politics.) Kangwane (16,5%) and Kwaggafontein (16,3%) reported informal economic activity while Rooigrond reported nothing and Mahodi reported 9% of households thus engaged. Mahodi reported the most gifts (15%) while Rooigrond reported none and Kwaggafontein (4,1%) and Kangwane (3,5%) a few.

Table 7 INFORMAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN HOUSEHOLD (%)

	Yes	No	Missing	Total
Rooigrond	-	97,30	2,70	100
Mahodi	9,00	91,00	-	100
Kwaggafontein	16,33	83,67	-	100
Kangwane	16,47	83,53	-	100

Table 8 GIFTS RECEIVED FROM PEOPLE OUTSIDE HOUSEHOLD (%)

	Yes	No	Missing	Total
Rooigrond	-	97,30	2,70	100
Mahodi	15,00	85,00	-	100
Kwaggafontein	4,08	95,92	-	100
Kangwane	3,52	95,29	1,18	100

Table 9 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (%)

	Yes	No	Missing	Total
Rooigrond	-	97,30	2,70	100
Mahodi	4,00	94,00	2,00	100
Kwaggafontein	-	100,00	-	100
Kangwane	-	98,82	1,18	100

To compare: in Mathopetad no households received gifts, 4% involved themselves in informal economic activities, and 38,8% produced agricultural goods including maize, beans, potatoes, meat, eggs, and milk products from cattle, sheep, pigs and poultry. Two households had horses and one household reported selling farm produce.

## DIET

In terms of frequency of eating it is clear that Kwaggafontein, followed by Kangwane, is better off than Mahodi and Rooigrond. Only 11% of the households eat three times daily in Mahodi while 13,5% eat three times a day in Rooigrond. The percentage for Kwaggafontein

and Kangwane was 33,7% and 28,2% respectively.

The staple diet is maize, tea or coffee with sugar, with bread on a daily basis in Mahodi (90%), Kwaggafontein (83,7%), Kangwane (83,5%) and Rooigrond (62,2%).

Eggs, fish and cheese are almost never eaten by surveyed households. Where people keep poultry, the incidence of eating eggs is higher. The diet of the people in Mahodi and Rooigrond is markedly worse than in Kwaggafontein and Kangwane where people eat meat more frequently (twice weekly: 5,4% Rooigrond, 6% Mahodi, 15,3% Kwaggafontein, 18,8% Kangwane; weekly: 37,8% Rooigrond, 48% Mahodi, 46,9% Kwaggafontein, 60% Kangwane). Another main indicator - milk on a daily basis: 27% Rooigrond, 47% Mahodi, 53% Kwaggafontein, 65,9% Kangwane.

The Mathopestad diet is better than that of Rooigrond and Mahodi, people eating more frequently than all relocated communities surveyed, in the way of eggs, fish, cheese and butter; whereas meat was eaten less frequently. This could be a reflection of the produce of Mathopestad, whereas in the relocated areas people would have to buy their food (both what is available and 'value for money' which may be perceived as meat rather than other foods).

Table 10 DIET COMPOSITION IN MATHOPESTAD (%)

	Daily	Every 2nd day	Twice weekly	Weekly	Less than weekly	Less than monthly
Maize	94,9	3,1	1,0	-	-	1,0
Greens	2,0	1,0	1,0	19,4	17,4	59,2
Potatoes	-	1,0	4,1	31,6	18,4	44,9
Milk	23,5	12,2	10,2	14,3	19,4	20,4
Tea/coffee	72,5	15,3	8,2	4,1	-	-
Sugar	71,4	15,3	8,2	4,1	-	1,0
Meat	2,0	1,0	2,0	29,6	13,3	52,0
Eggs	8,2	8,2	15,3	11,2	25,5	31,6
Fish	-	1,0	11,2	10,2	10,2	67,4
Cheese	2,1	1,0	1,0	2,1	4,1	89,7
Bread	54,1	31,6	10,2	4,1	-	-
Fat	27,6	30,6	16,3	13,3	5,1	7,1
Jam	2,0	14,3	24,5	22,5	13,3	23,5

Table 11 EATING FREQUENCY IN THE SURVEYED AREAS (%)

	Thrice daily	Twice daily	Once daily	Less than daily	Missing	Total
Rooigrond	13,51	86,49	-	-	-	100
Mahodi	11,00	86,00	1,00	-	2,00	100
Kwaggafontein	33,67	64,29	1,02	1,02	-	100
Kangwane	28,24	68,24	2,35	-	1,18	100
Mathopestad	11,20	83,70	5,10	-	-	100

Table 12 DIET COMPOSITION IN ROOIGROND (%)

	Daily	Every 2nd day	Twice weekly	Weekly	Less than weekly	Less than monthly
Maize	100,00	-	-	-	-	-
Greens	-	-	2,70	10,81	54,05	23,43
Potatoes	2,70	-	2,70	10,81	2,70	81,08
Milk	27,03	16,22	16,22	8,11	18,92	13,51
Tea/coffee	100,00	-	-	-	-	-
Sugar	100,00	-	-	-	-	-
Meat	-	-	5,41	37,84	37,84	18,92
Eggs	-	-	-	-	5,41	94,59
Fish	-	-	-	-	-	100,00
Cheese	-	-	-	2,70	-	97,30
Bread	62,16	5,41	5,41	10,81	16,22	-
Fat	2,70	-	2,70	5,41	51,35	37,84
Jam	13,51	-	-	-	-	86,49

Table 13 DIET COMPOSITION IN MAHODI (%)

	Daily	Every 2nd day	Twice weekly	Weekly	Less than weekly	Less than monthly	Missing
Maize	99,00	1,00	-	-	-	-	-
Greens	12,00	21,00	23,00	24,00	18,00	2,00	-
Potatoes	-	2,00	1,00	29,00	24,00	43,00	1,00
Milk	47,00	27,00	12,00	4,00	4,00	5,00	1,00
Tea/coffee	96,00	2,00	2,00	-	-	-	-
Sugar	94,00	1,00	2,00	-	1,00	2,00	-
Meat	3,00	7,00	6,00	48,00	22,00	14,00	-
Eggs	5,00	3,00	2,00	15,00	34,00	40,00	1,00
Fish	-	1,00	1,00	1,00	19,00	76,00	2,00
Cheese	-	-	1,00	1,00	12,00	86,00	-
Bread	90,00	8,00	2,00	-	-	-	-
Fat	55,00	12,00	1,00	19,00	9,00	4,00	-
Jam	31,00	24,00	6,00	5,00	2,00	32,00	-

Table 14 DIET COMPOSITION IN KWAGGAFONTEIN (%)

	Daily	Every 2nd day	Twice weekly	Weekly	Less than weekly	Less than monthly
Maize	95,92	2,04	2,04	-	-	-
Greens	5,10	4,08	11,22	28,57	33,67	17,35
Potatoes	-	2,04	2,04	22,45	22,45	51,02
Milk	53,06	13,27	28,57	2,04	1,02	2,04
Tea/coffee	93,88	4,08	-	-	2,04	-
Sugar	95,92	1,02	1,02	-	1,02	1,02
Meat	4,08	13,27	15,31	46,94	18,37	2,04
Eggs	9,18	1,02	8,16	8,16	22,45	51,02
Fish	-	-	-	-	17,35	82,65
Cheese	2,04	1,02	-	-	2,04	94,90
Bread	83,67	12,24	1,02	1,02	-	2,04
Fat	14,29	2,04	5,10	22,45	41,84	14,29
Jam	39,80	10,20	1,02	1,02	1,02	46,94

Table 15 DIET COMPOSITION IN KANGWANE (%)

	Daily	Every 2nd day	Twice weekly	Weekly	Less than weekly	Less than monthly	Missing
Maize	92,94	4,71	-	2,35	-	-	-
Greens	4,71	-	10,59	28,24	27,06	29,41	-
Potatoes	2,35	5,88	2,35	29,41	20,00	40,00	-
Milk	65,88	7,06	20,00	3,53	2,35	1,18	-
Tea/coffee	100,00	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sugar	98,82	1,18	-	-	-	-	-
Meat	8,24	7,06	18,82	60,00	4,71	1,18	-
Eggs	9,41	5,88	7,06	3,53	21,18	52,94	-
Fish	-	1,18	4,71	5,88	11,76	75,29	1,18
Cheese	2,35	-	1,18	1,18	8,24	87,06	-
Bread	83,53	7,06	5,88	3,53	-	-	-
Fat	16,47	2,35	7,06	23,53	27,06	23,53	-
Jam	27,06	3,53	1,18	-	12,94	52,94	2,35

## HOUSING AND FACILITIES

Housing is worst in Rooigrond. When the people were moved from permanent housing in 1971 they were given tents. They now live in shacks. All of them brought building material with them. They were loaned the land for three months, and 12 years later they are still there, not paying rent. They have residential plots averaging 20 x 100 m. The land was allocated to them by their chief.

Upon arrival in Mahodi 94% were given tents (4% temporary houses and 1% shacks), now 72% of households have permanent houses and 28% temporary ones. 56% brought building material with them. Regarding housing, Mahodi reported the best overall conditions.

91,8% of people moving into Kwaggafontein moved into shacks, 46,9% bringing building material with them. (6% were in tents and 1% each in permanent and temporary houses.) By 1981 it seems 76,5% live in shacks, 16,3% in temporary houses and 7,1% in permanent houses, which shows a slight improvement in living conditions. All of them paid lump sums for their plots or houses and only 3,1% pay rent.

Kangwane: It should be remembered that two areas were surveyed - the township of Kabokweni and the informal settlement of Pienaar - and so two groups of housing are involved. 50,6% were moved into permanent housing (the Kabokweni people) and 67,1% live in permanent housing now (1981). The same proportion live in temporary housing (14,1%) while the 7,1% who were in tents have moved into more permanent shelters. 98,8% pay rent while 41,2% paid lump sums for land and houses. The 24,7% who brought building materials with them probably moved into Pienaar.

The only facility provided at Rooigrond when the people moved there was water, provided by the chief, not the State. The people walk about 500 m to fetch water. Today they still have no facilities, arguing that they are there temporarily and so they do not want to provide anything themselves and are not being offered anything by the authorities. There is a local school housing over 80 primary school children in a shack where they are taught by a local woman. The rest of the children commute to Mafikeng. For all services, the people have to commute.

On arrival in Mahodi almost everyone had access to latrines and water but little else. Today everyone has a latrine, there is a clinic built with the help of the SACC, a few shops, a garage. None of the roads in the area are tarred. Transport is poor with an infrequent bus and taxi service. There were no churches built at the time of the survey, and fuel is still a major problem.

Table 16 LUMP SUM PAID FOR LAND OR HOUSE (%)

	Yes	No	Missing	Total
Rooigrond	-	97,30	2,70	100
Mahodi	84,00	12,00	4,00	100
Kwaggafontein	100,00	-	-	100
Kangwane	41,18	49,41	9,41	100

Upon arrival in Kwaggafontein only 3,1% of the people had water and 2% latrines. Roads, buses and taxis were not major problems - the authorities would have made sure that transport was reasonably adequate, as KwaNdebele is a commuter bantustan for the PWV area; but fuel, shops, schools and clinics are in short supply. There are almost no churches built in the area.

Table 17 BUILDING MATERIALS BROUGHT FROM LAST PLACE (%)

	Yes	No	Missing	Total
Rooigrond	100,00	-	-	100
Mahodi	56,00	40,00	4,00	100
Kwaggafontein	46,94	51,02	2,04	100
Kangwane	24,71	74,12	1,17	100

Table 18 CONDITIONS UPON ARRIVAL (%)

Housing in	Tent	Shack	Temporary house	Permanent house	Missing	Total
Rooigrond	97,30	-	-	-	2,70	100
Mahodi	94,00	1,00	4,00	-	1,00	100
Kwaggafontein	6,12	91,84	1,02	1,02	-	100
Kangwane	7,06	27,06	14,11	50,59	1,18	100

Table 19 CONDITIONS IN 1981 (%)

Housing in	Tent	Shack	Temporary house	Permanent house	Missing	Total
Rooigrond	-	97,30	-	-	2,70	100
Mahodi	-	-	28,00	72,00	-	100
Kwaggafontein	-	76,53	16,33	7,14	-	100
Kangwane	-	17,65	14,11	67,06	1,18	100

Table 20 RENT (%)

	Yes	No	Missing
Rooigrond	-	97,30	2,70
Mahodi	-	100,00	-
Kwaggafontein	3,09	96,91	-
Kangwane	98,82	1,18	-

As Kwaggafontein is such a recent settlement, conditions have changed little. The dust, lack of water, and poor roads make it an unbearable place to live in.

Upon arrival in Kangwane respondents from Kabokweni (about half those surveyed) found far better facilities than those moving into Pienaar. 52,9% had water and latrines, over 80% found roads and buses (to help workers commute into White River and beyond), a large proportion found shops (72,9%), taxis (69,4%), while 54,1% found schools and a local authority (Kabokweni people). 45,9% found churches and 31,8% clinics. The biggest problem was, and still is for everyone, fuel - only 5,9 found fuel on arrival. For those living in Pienaar, water is a still greater problem with people sometimes having to catch buses to find water.

Table 21 FACILITIES UPON ARRIVAL (%)

	ROOIGROND		MAHODI		
	None	Some	None	Some	Missing
Water	2,70	97,30	16,00	83,00	1,00
Latrines	100,00	-	5,00	94,00	1,00
Roads	100,00	-	33,00	66,00	1,00
Buses	100,00	-	71,00	28,00	1,00
Taxis	100,00	-	84,00	15,00	1,00
Fuel	100,00	-	96,00	3,00	1,00
Shops	100,00	-	88,00	11,00	1,00
Schools	100,00	-	85,00	14,00	1,00
Clinics	100,00	-	91,00	8,00	1,00
Churches	100,00	-	98,00	1,00	1,00
Local authority	100,00	-	99,00	-	1,00

	KWAGGAFONTEIN			KANGWANE		
	None	Some	Missing	None	Some	Missing
Water	75,59	3,06	17,35	44,71	52,94	2,35
Latrines	80,61	2,04	17,35	44,71	52,94	2,35
Roads	22,45	60,20	17,35	12,94	84,71	2,35
Buses	25,51	57,14	17,35	15,29	82,35	2,35
Taxis	27,55	55,10	17,35	28,24	69,41	2,35
Fuel	48,98	33,67	17,35	91,76	5,88	2,35
Shops	50,00	32,65	17,35	24,71	72,94	2,35
Schools	50,00	32,65	17,35	43,53	54,12	2,35
Clinics	54,08	28,57	17,35	65,88	31,76	2,35
Churches	80,61	2,04	17,35	51,76	45,88	2,35
Local authority	81,63	1,02	17,35	43,53	54,12	2,35

## DEMOGRAPHY

Comparing the populations by age in the surveyed areas with the 1980 bantustan average for non-'independent' bantustans is only partially useful. As has been explained, Rooigrond is a special case of a community which resisted for a long time and which is characterised by a high proportion of migrant workers and unemployed workseekers, whereas it is assumed that migrants are not counted in the 1980 census figures.

On further examination it is seen that in all areas, except perhaps for Mahodi (44%), that the 0-14 year olds are far below the 1980 figures (Rooigrond 35,9%, Kwaggafontein 34% and

Kangwane 33,3% compared with 49,8% in the 1980 census). This is because the 0-14 year olds form a smaller proportion of the surveyed communities, which include migrants, than the census which included permanent and commuting residents only.

Rooigrond has a relatively older population than Mahodi which has only 1,4% of its members over 65 years old (Rooigrond 3,4% over 65 years). Kwaggafontein is another predominantly young closer settlement with only 0,9% over 65 years, while Kangwane has 3% over 65. Kwaggafontein shows a profile closest to the bantustan census figures, with Kangwane not too different mainly because Kangwane has many commuters rather than migrants in the economically active age groups.

Table 22 POPULATIONS BY AGE (%)

	ROOIGROND			MAHODI		
	Male	Female	Total	M	F	T
0-14	19,81	16,10	35,91	21,90	22,07	43,97
15-24	12,08	10,84	22,92	9,31	9,82	19,13
25-34	6,50	7,73	14,23	3,97	7,07	11,04
35-44	3,41	3,10	6,51	5,51	6,37	11,88
45-64	6,20	8,67	14,87	7,93	3,62	11,55
65+	1,86	1,55	3,41	0,52	0,86	1,38
Missing	1,24	0,93	2,17	0,68	0,34	1,02
Total	51,10	48,92	100	49,82	50,15	100

	KWAGGAFONTEIN			KANGWANE		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	16,46	17,54	34,00	16,67	16,67	33,34
15-24	11,57	13,56	25,13	9,13	9,14	18,27
25-34	6,69	6,14	12,83	7,54	8,43	15,97
35-44	6,68	7,95	14,63	7,08	7,53	14,61
45-64	7,96	4,16	12,12	7,53	6,39	13,92
65+	0,54	0,36	0,90	1,60	1,37	2,97
Missing	0,18	0,18	0,36	-	-	-
Total	50,08	49,89	100	50,01	49,99	100

Table 23 below is taken from a forthcoming publication by Charles Simkins entitled The Distribution of the African Population of South Africa by Age, Sex and Region-type, 1950-1980 (p 21). Simkins adds a caution:

Another difficulty is occasioned by the lack of information on Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. The only published information gives estimated total populations in 1980 (BENSO, 1980 Statistical Survey of Black Development, Pretoria 1980, Table 8) in these three homelands. The 1980 distributions are, therefore, provisional and subject to revision as final reports on the geographical distribution of the population, ages, 'independent homelands' etc. are published.

Table 23 'HOMELANDS POPULATION 1980' (%)

Age	Male	Female	Total
0-14	25,32	24,49	49,81
15-24	8,64	10,52	19,16
25-34	3,94	6,64	10,58
35-44	2,85	4,68	7,53
45-64	3,59	5,81	9,40
65+	1,32	2,20	3,52
Total	45,66	54,34	100

Table 24 AGE AND SEX BY RESIDENCE STATUS (%)

ROOI-GROND	Permanent			Commuter		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	12,38	9,91	22,29	6,19	5,26	11,45
15-24	3,41	3,41	6,82	1,24	1,24	2,48
25-34	0,93	2,79	3,72	-	0,93	0,93
35-44	0,31	2,17	2,48	0,31	0,62	0,93
45-64	3,10	7,43	10,53	-	0,62	0,62
65+	1,86	1,55	3,41	-	-	-
Missing	-	0,62	0,62	-	-	-
Total	21,99	27,88	49,87	7,74	8,67	16,41

contd.	Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	1,24	0,93	2,17	19,81	16,10	35,91
15-24	7,43	6,19	13,62	12,08	10,84	22,92
25-34	5,57	4,02	9,59	6,50	7,73	14,23
35-44	2,79	0,31	3,10	3,41	3,10	6,51
45-64	3,10	0,62	3,72	6,20	8,67	14,87
65+	-	-	-	1,86	1,55	3,41
Missing	1,24	0,31	1,55	1,24	0,93	2,17
Total	21,37	12,38	33,75	51,10	48,92	100

Table 24 AGE &amp; SEX BY RESIDENCE STATUS (%) contd

MAHODI	Permanent			Commuter		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	21,90	22,07	43,97	-	-	-
15-24	5,34	7,93	13,72	0,52	0,86	4,31
25-34	-	5,00	5,00	0,69	1,21	1,90
35-44	0,52	5,17	5,69	1,20	1,03	2,23
45-64	0,86	3,10	3,96	0,86	0,52	1,68
65+	0,52	0,86	1,38	-	-	-
Missing	-	0,34	0,34	0,34	-	0,34
Total	29,14	44,47	73,61	3,61	3,62	7,23

contd.	Migrant			Missing			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	-	-	-	-	-	-	21,90	22,07	43,97
15-24	3,45	0,86	4,31	-	0,17	0,17	9,31	9,82	19,13
25-34	3,28	0,86	4,14	-	-	-	3,97	7,07	11,04
35-44	3,79	0,17	3,96	-	-	-	5,51	6,37	11,88
45-64	6,21	-	6,21	-	-	-	7,93	3,62	11,55
65+	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,52	0,86	1,38
Missing	0,34	-	0,34	-	-	-	0,68	0,34	1,02
Total	17,07	1,89	18,96	-	0,17	0,17	49,82	50,15	100

KWAGGA-FONTEIN	Permanent			Commuter		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	16,46	17,54	34,00	-	-	-
15-24	4,52	10,67	15,19	3,07	0,72	3,79
25-34	0,54	4,70	5,24	2,35	0,72	3,07
35-44	0,54	7,41	7,95	2,17	0,36	2,53
45-64	2,71	3,80	6,51	1,45	0,18	1,63
65+	0,54	0,36	0,90	-	-	-
Missing	-	0,18	0,18	-	-	-
Total	25,31	44,66	69,97	9,04	1,98	11,02

contd.

Table 24 AGE &amp; SEX BY RESIDENCE STATUS (%) contd

contd.	Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	-	-	-	16,46	17,54	34,00
15-24	3,98	2,17	6,15	11,57	13,56	25,13
25-34	3,80	0,72	4,52	6,69	6,14	12,83
35-44	3,97	0,18	4,15	6,68	7,95	14,63
45-64	3,80	0,18	3,98	7,96	4,16	12,12
65+	-	-	-	0,54	0,36	0,90
Missing	0,18	-	0,18	0,18	0,18	0,36
Total	15,73	3,25	18,98	50,08	49,89	100

KANG-WANE	Permanent			Commuter		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	16,44	16,67	33,11	0,23	-	0,23
15-24	4,34	5,94	10,28	2,51	3,20	5,71
25-34	1,14	2,05	3,19	1,83	5,70	7,53
35-44	0,46	4,79	5,25	3,20	2,74	5,94
45-64	1,60	5,48	7,08	3,42	1,14	4,56
65+	1,60	1,37	2,97	-	-	-
Total	25,58	36,30	61,88	11,19	12,78	23,97

contd.	Migrant			Total		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
0-14	-	-	-	16,67	16,67	33,34
15-24	2,74	0,23	2,97	9,13	9,14	18,27
25-34	4,57	0,68	5,25	7,54	8,43	15,97
35-44	3,42	-	3,42	7,08	7,53	14,61
45-64	2,51	-	2,51	7,53	6,39	13,92
65+	-	-	-	1,60	1,37	2,97
Total	13,24	0,91	14,15	50,01	49,99	100

# HOUSEHOLD SIZE

Rooigrond had the biggest households, the modal size being 9 while the modal size for the other surveyed communities was 5. The biggest Rooigrond household had 15 members while the biggest in the other settlements was nearer 9 (with 1% each over 9).

Table 25 HOUSEHOLD SIZE (%)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Rooigrond	2,70	2,70	8,11	5,41	5,41	10,81	5,41	8,11
Mahodi	-	1,00	4,00	13,00	29,00	24,00	11,00	13,00
Kwaggafontein	-	-	6,12	8,16	31,63	26,53	21,43	4,08
Kangwane	1,18	3,53	5,88	22,35	27,06	20,00	12,94	3,53

	9	10	11	13	14	15	Missing	Total
Rooigrond	13,51	8,11	16,22	-	2,70	5,41	5,41	100
Mahodi	3,00	1,00	-	1,00	-	-	-	100
Kwaggafontein	2,04	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Kangwane	2,35	1,18	-	-	-	-	-	100

# HOUSEHOLD HEADS

Once again Rooigrond showed signs of the older generation dominating with 62,2% of household heads being in the 45-64 age group, with a surprising 35% headed by women. At the other extreme Kwaggafontein and Kangwane each had 1% of households headed by 15-24 year olds with only 4,1% of Kwaggafontein households headed by women. This is probably due to the fact that so many Kwaggafontein residents commute, allowing more traditionally male-headed households. Nearly 80% of all households were headed by 35-64 year olds.

Table 26 HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY AGE AND SEX (%)

	ROOIGROND			MAHODI		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
15-24	-	-	-	-	-	-
25-34	5,41	-	5,41	11,00	-	11,00
35-44	10,81	8,11	18,92	30,00	4,00	34,00
45-64	37,84	24,32	62,16	47,00	2,00	49,00
Other	8,11	2,70	10,81	1,00	3,00	4,00
Missing	2,70	-	2,70	2,00	-	2,00
Total	64,87	35,13	100	91,00	9,00	100

contd.

Table 27 HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY AGE AND SEX (%) contd

	KWAGGAFONTEIN			KANGWANE		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
15-24	1,02	-	1,02	1,18	-	1,18
25-34	17,35	-	17,35	10,59	1,18	11,77
35-44	34,69	-	34,69	29,41	4,71	34,12
45-64	40,82	4,08	44,90	36,47	5,88	42,35
Other	1,02	-	1,02	-	-	-
Missing	1,02	-	1,02	9,41	1,18	10,59
Total	95,92	4,08	100	87,06	12,95	100

From this summary of conditions in surveyed areas it emerges that Rooigrond and Mahodi are the poorest. Rooigrond is in this position because it has been left in limbo all these years, dependent on migrant remittances and with no local facilities and little chance of improving itself. Mahodi is in poor condition because of its distance from white urban areas, making residents dependent on migrant labour, if and when possible. Conditions have improved over the years since the people were moved there but being so isolated keeps the population poverty-stricken.

Kwaggafontein being the newest of the areas surveyed and nearest to the PWV allows its residents more contact with the urban areas and the possibility of work, even on a commuter basis. Although facilities are poor, people have access to better earning potential. The same is true for those living in Kabokweni in proper housing, where they may find work to commute to in nearby white towns such as White River. The people surveyed in Pienaar (about half the sample) no doubt pull the Kangwane results down as they live in the informal settlement with very poor facilities and little chance of competing with their Kabokweni neighbours. In the cases where Mathopstad has been compared, it is shown as marginally better in some respects but hardly an idyllic rural life. Whatever happens the people will be moved to worse conditions further out, far from the urban areas with their potential for survival.

## PART 4

### Miscellaneous



Makgato, Sekgosese - pride in resistance (July 1981)

## CONCLUSION

What this report has attempted to show is that moving 1,29 million people is not only a major piece of social engineering, but part of a process of disorganisation and reorganisation for the perceived benefit of the State. It has also attempted to show that this is not an end in itself, either for the State which finds it difficult to force people to stay out of urban areas, or for the people who resist relocation and oppression on various levels. It is becoming clear that the State no longer has the finance to carry out its grandiose plan (if it is also to defend the borders of the country) or the personnel to administer it. At times the State still uses brute force to move people but the trend is away from forced removals at gunpoint. The new coercions that force people to move are more subtle - increased rents in urban areas, housing building programmes severely curtailed, increased influx control related to employment and housing. Thus has South Africa moved from the 'No more black South Africans' of Connie Mulder's era in government to 'No more forced removals' of Piet Koornhof's time.

Relocation follows similar patterns in the Transvaal to the other provinces but the process is so much more complex with six bantustans and the added mechanism of ethnicity. Part 1 showed the development of bantustan politics and control. Part 2 showed the deprivation and hardship resulting from the system of dispossession. The sheer numbers of people relocated into ethnic units gives some indication of scale, but travelling round closer settlement and rural township after closer settlement and rural township shows another side of the story. The areas are remote geographically, infrastructurally and psychologically. They are hidden behind mountains. They are collections of hundreds of thousands of people with little water, a few latrines, shacks, a few schools, a clinic if they are lucky, and a relatively efficient bus service to transport those few fortunate enough to have jobs in 'white South Africa'. The migrants and the commuters form part of the elite. The petit bourgeois shop keepers and bottle store owners are usually bantustan politicians with connections for licences, funds from the development corporation, and the rhetoric of 'independence'. Tribal and security networks are ever-present making people suspicious and difficult to approach, but once the connection had been made, people were surprisingly open about their problems and attitudes.

Bitter memories of treatment on white farms intensify people's fatalism and acceptance of the status quo. Time and again fieldworkers were told that it was better to suffer unemployment in the bantustan than R1 a day and the control of the white farmer.

Thousands of people have been moved more than once. They were moved into the reserves in the earlier part of this century, then they were sorted ethnically. The extent to which the Verwoerdian dream has been implemented in the Transvaal is remarkable - most towns have been deproclaimed and the people moved. Blacks in white rural areas are there by and large with white permission to work on the farms. Labour tenancy has been abolished and mechanisation calls for small seasonal labour pools which can be fetched from the nearest bantustan.

The intricate network of land allocation between one bantustan and another means that many people are not sure whether they are living in Lebowa or Gazankulu, for example. People have intermarried and have lived in peace for years. They find ethnic allegiances the only way to survive in an area governed by semi-literate autocratic puppets, as in the case of KwaNdebele. Even when the Pretoria administration has set up its structures in the bantustan, it may simply dispose of them when the incumbents are not compliant, as happened in Kangwane. Along with parts of KwaZulu, Kangwane is to be handed to Swaziland in the latest strategy to rid South Africa of its social and political responsibilities towards blacks.

With KwaNdebele becoming the next 'independent' bantustan, it is receiving the usual share of 'development': a tarred road, dams, housing for officials, a national stadium, shopping centres - and over 380 000 relocated people with no stake in the system, few facilities and the prospect of losing their South African citizenship rights to the wealth of South Africa. They will no longer be able to work in South Africa or claim a pension, or unemployment insurance, or anything else in the land in which they were born.

Of the 585 000 people under threat of removal in the Transvaal, 300 000 live in an area which has been excised from Lebowa to be given to KwaNdebele. Lebowa is not interested in 'independence', so it loses out. 450 000 people are under threat of removal throughout the Transvaal in fulfilment of the 1975 consolidation proposals. The Van der Walt Commission report (awaited, January 1983) is expected to change this, but it may not mean fewer people to be moved.

The interrelated means of control used - citizenship, relocation and influx control - are in their advanced stages in the Transvaal. On one level they are working to exclude the majority of people from wealth and political participation, on another they are showing signs of crumbling. Pressure is building up in the rural areas. As more and more migrants and urban workers are repatriated for taking part in labour organisation and industrial action, and more people are forced into the rural areas seeking some form of security of tenure, the rural areas become overcrowded repositories of landless hungry people, ripe for political action. While this should not be interpreted as an imminent peasant/rural uprising, it would be as well to note that there is a long history of rural resistance, to betterment, to black spot removals and to co-option of tribal structures. Examples of Sekhukuneland, the people of Doornkop and Driefontein, of Rooigrond and Sekgosese show that. The cases are not localised, but spread throughout the province, and the country. They are communities which have resisted, not the result of outside 'agitators'. Why else is the State spending so much time and money trying to win the hearts and minds of rural people and why else is so much attention given to border farmers in an attempt to persuade them to stay in their vulnerable positions?

While relocation should be seen as one strategy of controlling the majority, it should also be seen as a phase in South African history. While people may be suffering, starving and apathetic in the bantustans, human beings are amazingly resilient. How whole families survive on meagre pensions of grandmothers and irregular remittances from migrants, with little access to facilities taken for granted by urban people, both black and white, must be seen to be believed. On the other hand, once the country is governed by the majority, it will be difficult for people to shake off that period of oppression. They will need organisation.

The question is often asked by concerned outsiders - what can be done? While no single answer can be offered, from research and from field work the replies would be in terms of long and short term action. In the long term, unless all the people have access to central

and local government in an undivided South Africa, nothing, however well meant, can develop the country. The land needs to be relieved of the masses. Only those people who want to work the land should be on the farms. Therefore influx control must be lifted. There must be no more relocation and people should not be stripped of their South African citizenship. Many people would not choose to go to the cities, many are farmers who have had their land taken from them. Land should be redistributed so that both goals of rural development and feeding the urban population can be fulfilled. Relocation in itself may (probably will) have to be undertaken by a majority-elected government, but as long as the people participate in that decision, planned location need not be negative.

In the short term, it is essential for both black and white in the urban areas to be aware of rural conditions and their causes, since State policy intends co-opting urban dwellers and excluding rural people increasingly. People in rural areas need support for their organisation against relocation. They need access to resources such as lawyers (in some limited fields), health workers, education, and contact with other communities in similar positions, but above all they need to organise themselves for present development as well as for the future. Conditions under which people live vary enormously according to the repressive nature of the bantustan authorities, according to suitability for agriculture, proximity to urban areas, history of resistance. This volume has attempted to describe just those conditions with respect to relocation in the Transvaal. What has emerged is that there is regional variation within the national policy, and that is how the resistance to relocation should be moving - a national ongoing campaign against removals, as well as localised and regionalised organisation against being moved.

## ADDENDUM An outline of african land tenure in the Transvaal to 1936

The early movement of Voortrekkers into the Transvaal was not marked by extensive conflicts with the african population. Although the Ndebele were forcefully ejected from the Western Transvaal in 1837, the other major centres of white settlement, at Ohrigstad (founded near Lydenburg in the Eastern Transvaal in 1844) and Schoemansdal (settled in 1848 close to present-day Louis Trichardt), were established with the permission of local african chiefs. Boer farms were marked out on the edge of african chiefdoms and each male citizen had the right to one farm. Many of these farms were allocated together with the africans living on them, and as most Boers were hunters or pastoralists they often encouraged other africans to settle on their lands in return for rent paid in labour or produce. It was often beneficial for an african refugee to settle on a white farm where he had access to guns and ammunition, land and a modicum of protection against rapacious african chiefs, native commissioners and tax collectors.

When the three Boer republics north of the Vaal combined to form the South African Republic in 1858 - 60, all unsurveyed land was decreed 'government land' and the africans living on this land were proclaimed 'squatters'. As land was the major economic resource of the new Republic 'loan farms' were rented out to burgers in order to raise revenue for State administration. This led to the gradual accumulation of land into the hands of magistrates, veldkornets and other Boer notables who were responsible for the allocation of these loan farms. This concentration of land into the hands of these people, when combined with the rolling-back of the northern frontier after the fall of Schoemansdal in 1867 and mounting population pressure, resulted in a land shortage and the end of the traditional burger-right to a farm. An attempt was made at this time to alleviate the labour shortage on white farms by the initiation of a discriminatory form of taxation which penalised africans living on government-owned land while favouring those living and employed on white-owned land. But the inability of the Boers to implement this legislation or impose their will on the independent african chiefdoms was underlined by the failure of their expedition against the Pedi chief Sekukuni in 1876.

However, following the British occupation of the Transvaal (1877 - 81) the Republic entered into a number of wars of conquest which provided impoverished burgers with small 'occupation

farms'. But because of militant opposition from africans living on the land surveyed for these white occupation farms, the government was obliged to create reserves that would constrict and confine the military threat posed by the african chiefs and their followers. Reserves had first been mooted in 1853, legislated for in 1876 and then included in the conventions of 1881 and 1884 that guaranteed Transvaal independence. But due to the labour needs of white farmers only a few small and generally impoverished areas were set aside, largely in the 1890s, for african occupation. Consequently the great majority of africans lived outside these reserves.

One of the major areas of african settlement was on land bought by companies speculating in land and minerals. For these companies, which mushroomed after the gold discoveries of 1886, the most profitable short-term return on their speculative land investments accrued from the occupation of their estates by tenants who paid rents in cash. Anti-squatter legislation of 1887 and 1895 attempted to restrict the formation of these and other 'unauthorised reserves' and, in an attempt to reduce working costs by restricting competition for labourers, called for the equitable distribution of africans living outside the reserves amongst white farmers. This legislation was seldom enforced outside the central areas of the Republic as the State did not have the strength, nor its officials the inclination, to break up the concentrated african settlements on white-owned land.

Africans faced with removal or suffering under a disadvantageous tenancy could also move as rent-paying tenants to mission-owned farms or purchase their own land. The Republic's initial antipathy to african freehold land tenure was modified at an early date in order to permit the purchase of land by africans on condition that it was held 'in trust' for the african owner by a european. The inevitable litigation that arose out of this system caused african freehold land during the first British occupation to be held 'in trust' by the Secretary for Native Affairs and then, after 1881, by the Native Location Commission. Following the Anglo-Boer war this responsibility fell to the Commissioner for Native Affairs until a supreme court decision in 1905 lifted all restrictions on african freehold tenure in the Transvaal.

During the Anglo-Boer war many africans moved back onto the land from which they had been alienated during the previous two decades. The desire to drive africans off this land was accompanied by a change in the tenancy relations on white farms for, as the price of land and labour soared and new urban consumer markets emerged after the gold discoveries, profits from agriculture rocketed and land owners wished to rid themselves of those tenants occupying large parts of their farms. Rents were demanded from africans living on government land for the first time in 1903, and a Native Location Commission was established in order to define and allocate african reserves. The old Republican anti-squatter laws were enforced for the first time in 1908 when the newly Responsible government's attempt to move 300 000 'squatters' off company lands, through a proposed Native Occupation of Lands Bill, was blocked in the legislative assembly. But the implementation of the anti-squatter laws was only partially successful for, as large numbers of africans were forced from company and government lands, they chose to move to the overcrowded reserves rather than the white farms.

Much of the Native Occupation of Lands Bill was included in the Natives Land Act of 1913. This Act was essentially an alliance of mining and farming interests as it both extended the existing reserves as labour pools for the mines and provided farmers with labour by breaking up the african population concentrations on company lands. The increasing tendency for africans to own land individually or in partnership was restricted. Africans were prohibited from owning land outside areas 'scheduled' for their occupation and all land bought by a combination of more than six africans had to be purchased on a tribal basis and was held in trust for the tribe concerned by the Minister of Native Affairs. The Land Act also forced people off the land by encouraging labour tenancies of 90 days per annum. While the anti-squatter laws were not applied to labour tenants, a graduated tax, which was in effect an annually increasing fine, was levied on those land owners who permitted africans to live on their estates in return for rents in cash and produce.

After 20 years of debate further land was 'released' for african occupation in 1936. Although no ethnic separation was proposed, the Native Land and Trust Act of 1936 determined that all land 'scheduled' and 'released' for african occupation had thenceforth to be purchased on a tribal basis for which a special Trust Fund was established. Provision was made for native commissioners to control the number of labour tenants required by a farmer and there was a re-emphasis on the graduated taxation of farmers employing registered squatters. People living on land owned by africans outside the reserves ('black spots') were threatened with expropriation as government officials sought to consolidate and segregate what they began to define as african 'homelands'. But although the 1913 and 1936 Acts provided the legal basis for the massive removal of africans from white-owned land, this aspect of the Acts was not implemented in many parts of the Transvaal until the 1950s.

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