

FORCED REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA



THE SPP REPORTS VOL 4
NATAL

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CONTENTS

Contents	i
Tables	vi
Major summaries of places/information	viii
Maps	viii
Photographs	ix
Glossary	x
Abbreviations	xiii
General preface to the SPP report	xiv
Preface to the Natal report	xvii

PART ONE	INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND	
1.1	Natal/KwaZulu and relocation	1
	1. Introduction	1
	2. Economic features of KwaZulu	3
	3. Constitutional developments in KwaZulu	5
	4. KwaZulu's response to relocation	7
	Appendix 1. Extract, parliamentary debate 7.05.82	14
	Appendix 2. Press release, KwaZulu Minister of the Interior	15
1.2	Land tenure in Natal before Union	17
	1. The Natal reserves	17
	2. The Mission reserves	19
	3. The Zululand reserves	21
	4. African freehold land	24
	5. White and unalienated (State) land	27
1.3	Land tenure in Natal 1910 - 1960	29
	1. Land legislation 1910 - 1936	29
	2. African freehold land 1910 - 1936	33
	3. Developments between 1936 - 1960	37
	4. White-owned land	42
	Appendix 1. NAUNLU article, 11.03.55	48
PART TWO	RELOCATION IN NATAL : CATEGORIES AND REGIONS	
2.1	Introduction	51
	1. Categories and numbers	51
	2. Historical overview, 1960 - 1982	55
2.2	Relocation sites : a summary	59
	1. Relocation townships	59
	2. Relocation closer settlements	61
	3. Potential/proposed relocation sites	67
	4. Unofficial relocation sites	68

2.3 Farm evictions	70
1. Introduction	70
2. The abolition of labour tenancy	70
3. Farm evictions since 1976	78
Appendix 1. Statements by four evictees, 1979/80	83
Appendix 2. Papene Sibisi, case study of an eviction	85
Appendix 3. Case study of an eviction in the Vryheid district	88
Appendix 4. Natal Witness report, 2.05.82	90
2.4 Black spots	91
1. Problems of definition and calculation	91
2. Total number of black spots in Natal	94
3. Conditions	96
4. The removal of black spots, 1960 - 1982	99
5. African freehold black spots 1948 - 1982 : a summary	107
6. Mission black spots, 1948 - 1982 : a summary	128
Appendix 1. NAUNLU report, 8.06.62	133
Appendix 2. Memorandum from Lusitania, threatened black spot	135
Appendix 3. Memorandum from a former landowner	137
2.5 Consolidation	138
1. Numbers of people and areas affected	138
2. Summary of consolidation plans 1955 - 1975	139
3. The financial cost of consolidation	148
4. Opposition to consolidation	150
5. The van der Walt Commission and after	156
6. The Ingwavuma land deal	159
Appendix 1. Reserve areas to be excised, 1975	164
Appendix 2. Natal Mercury report, 18.05.82	165
Appendix 3. NAUNLU report, 2.02.62	166
Appendix 4. Notes on Groutville	168
2.6 Urban relocation	170
1. Background to urban relocation in Natal	170
2. Deproclamation and removal of townships	171
3. Location of townships inside KwaZulu	175
4. Urban relocation in Natal : a summary	176
Appendix 1. Towns in KwaZulu, 1968 - 1982	180
Appendix 2. Natal Witness report, 20.08.81	183
Appendix 3. Letter of appeal, Shakaville	184
2.7 Influx control	186
1. Introduction	186
2. Influx control in the Durban region	187
3. Repatriation	190
Appendix 1. The new influx control bill : a synopsis	191
2.8 Informal settlements	195
1. Introduction	195
2. Informal settlements in the Durban region	198
3. Malukazi	203
4. Richmond Farm	205
5. Informal settlements in Natal : a summary	209

Appendix 1. The housing backlog, Durban townships	212
Appendix 2. Notice of eviction, Malukazi	213
Appendix 3. Daily News report, 3.08.82	214
Appendix 4. Folweni : slum or exciting experiment?	215
Appendix 5. Richmond Farm undertaking	216
2.9 Group Areas removals	217
1. Introduction	217
2. Forerunners of the Group Areas Act in Natal	219
3. Group Areas removals in Durban	220
4. Group Areas removals in the rest of Natal	229
Appendix 1. Cato Manor	234
Appendix 2. The effects of the Group Areas Act in Pietermaritzburg	236
2.10 Infrastructural/development projects	238
1. Introduction	238
2. Industrial and township development	240
3. Agricultural and rural development projects	241
4. Conservation and forestry projects	243
5. Dams	251
6. Roads	254
Appendix 1. Clairwood	256
Appendix 2. Ndumu Game Reserve	258
2.11 Strategic removals	261
1. Introduction	261
2. Removals from the missile range	261
3. Clearing land on the north-eastern borders	267
2.12 Betterment	269
1. Introduction	269
2. Betterment in KwaZulu	271
Appendix 1. Ngwengweni - betterment village	275
2.13 Regional overview	279
1. North Eastern Natal	279
2. Northern Natal	283
3. North Western Natal	285
4. The North Coast	287
5. The Midlands	290
6. The Drakensberg	291
7. Lower Tugela	295
8. Greater Durban	297
9. Southern Natal	298
10. Griqualand East	303
PART THREE CASE STUDIES OF RELOCATION SITES	
3.1 Sahlumbe	308
1. Introduction	308
2. Origins and background	309
3. Conditions	312
4. Demographic features	314

5. Economic activity	316
6. Education	321
7. Organisation and attitudes	322
Appendix 1. Dombi Khumalo's story	325
Appendix 2. <u>Sunday Tribune</u> report, 11.03.79	329
Appendix 3. Notes on Msusamphi	331
3.2 Ezakheni	332
1. Introduction and background	332
2. The removal to Ezakheni	335
3. Demographic features	340
4. Economic activity	342
Appendix 1. <u>Natal Mercury</u> report, 12.06.82	346
Appendix 2. <u>NAUNLU</u> article, 15.02.74	347
Appendix 3. The removal of Roosboom : E. Mngadi	348
3.3 Mzimhlophe	354
1. Introduction	354
2. Removals to Mzimhlophe	355
3. Demographic features	360
4. Economic activity	362
5. Organisation and attitudes	365
Appendix 1. Report from Mzimhlophe, Qudeni	368
Appendix 2. Case study of a removal	371
3.4 Compensation	373
1. Introduction	373
2. Conditions before the removal	373
3. The removal to Compensation	376
4. Demographic features	380
5. Economic activity	382
6. Organisation and attitudes	387
3.5 Inanda Newtown	389
1. Introduction and background	389
2. The removals	393
3. Demographic features	397
4. Economic activity	398
5. Organisation and attitudes	401
6. Subsequent developments in RA 33	404
Appendix 1. The relocation and housing process	407
Appendix 2. <u>Natal Mercury</u> report, 1.07.82	414
Appendix 3. Landlord's eviction notice	415
Appendix 4. Letter from Magistrate, Verulam	416
3.6 Two other rural relocation sites	417
1. Emakhosini	417
2. Bilanyoni	419
3.7 Phoenix	423
1. Introduction and background	423
2. Demographic features	428
3. Economic activity	431
4. Organisation and attitudes	433
Appendix 1. Newlands East	435

PART FOUR CASE STUDIES OF THREATENED AREAS

4.1 Matiwane's Kop	441
1. Introduction	441
2. General conditions	442
3. Demographic features	447
4. Economic activity	450
5. The removal threat	453
Appendix 1. Memorandum : Proposed removal of the Matiwane's Kop tribe	458
4.2 St Wendolins	465
1. Introduction and background	465
2. General conditions	467
3. Removals at St Wendolins	470
4. Group Areas Board hearing, 1982	476
Appendix 1. Memorandum of the St Wendolins Welfare Committee	479
Appendix 2. St Wendolins community survey	485
4.3 Kwapitela	487
1. General conditions	487
2. The removal	491
4.4 Steincoalspruit	497
1. History of ownership	497
2. Developments in early 20th century	500
3. The removals threat	501
Appendix 1. Letter from Dr Hartzenberg, October 1977	506
Appendix 2. Letter, Secretary for Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure, 22.01.79	507
Appendix 3. Letter, Secretary of Steincoalspruit proprietors, 28.12.79	508
Appendix 4. Letter, Secretary for the Interior, KwaZulu, 24.07.80	509
4.5 Umbulwane	510
1. Background	510
2. Conditions	513
3. The removals threat	516
Appendix 1. Memorandum from the people of Umbulwane, 1980	522
Appendix 2. Reply, Dept of Cooperation and Development, 26.03.81	524
Appendix 3. Reply, Umbulwane Committee, 10.06.81	526
Appendix 4. Eviction/demolition notices	527
4.6 Reserve Four	529
1. Background	529
2. The descheduling of Reserve Four	535
3. Excision from KwaZulu, 1981	540
CONCLUSION	545
Bibliography	556
1. General	
2. Natal	
Index of place names	566

Tables

GENERAL

1. Natal Mission reserves	20
2. Black land ownership in Natal, 1860 - 1910	27
3. Distribution of freehold land among Mission churches, 1910	27
4. Land scheduled in Natal, 1913	30
5. Allocation of reserve land, Natal 1913 - 1936	32
6. Population density on various categories of african land, 1916	35
7. African freehold land and the creation of black spots, Natal, 1910 - 1959	37
8. Estimated numbers of removals, Natal 1948 - 1982	53
9. Total number of black spots in Natal, 1948 - 1982	94
10. Black spots removed, under threat, 1948 - 1982	95
11. Acquisition of quota and compensatory land (for black spots) in Natal, 1936 - 1980	101
12. Land purchases required to implement 1975 consolidation proposals for KwaZulu	148
13. Allocation of funds for purchase of land for consolidation purposes, South Africa, 1974/75 - 1980/81	149
14. Families moved in terms of the Group Areas Act by 1981, by province and race classification (excluding africans)	217
15. Traders affected by the Group Areas Act, by province and race classification	218
16. Summary of effects of Group Areas proclamations, Pietermaritzburg, 1961	230
17. Area under betterment planning in Natal reserves, 1954 - 1965	271
18. Compensation paid out for relocation as a result of betterment planning, KwaZulu, 1972 - 1979	273
19. Unemployment rates in five relocation areas, Natal	552
20. Comparison of economic activity and skill level of workers in areas surveyed by SPP, Natal	554

CASE STUDIES

3.1 Sahlumbe

1. Previous employment by industry, skill and residential status	311
2. Total population by sex and residential status	314
3. Distribution of permanent resident population of working age	315
4. Economic status of the total population, by residential status	317
5. Fulltime employment, by industry, sex and residential status	318
6. Skill level of workers by sex and residential status	318
7. Educational standards by sex and residential status	321

3.2 Ezakheni

1. Origins of households	335
2. Length of time at previous place	336
3. Manner of arrival of households	336
4. Employment of workers before removal	337
5. Total population by sex, age and residential status	340
6. Household type and household size	341
7. Household heads by age and sex	341
8. Education by sex and residential status	342
9. Education in the 7+ age group, by sex	342
10. Economic status and sex of the population	343

11. Residential status of the economically active population	343
12. Employment/unemployment in the economically active population, by residential status and sex	343
13. Employment by sex, industry and residential status	344
14. Occupation level by sex and residential status	344

3.3 Mzimhlophe

1. Length of time at previous place	356
2. Total population by sex and residential status	360
3. Masculinity rates among the permanent and commuter population of working age	360
4. Comparative distribution of children and adults in the permanent/commuter and total populations	361
5. Household heads by age and sex	361
6. Education of the population 7 years and older, by sex and residential status	362
7. Economic status of the population, by sex and residential status	362
8. Economic status of the permanent population, by sex and age	363
9. Employment, by industry, residential status and sex	364
10. Unemployment	364

3.4 Compensation

1. Population by sex and residential status	380
2. Masculinity rate in the permanent population of working age	381
3. Household type	382
4. Distribution of workers in male- and female-headed households	382
5. Economic activity	383
6. Not economically active population of working age, by sex and residential status	383
7. Distribution of workers according to sex and residential status	384
8. Employment by industry, sex and residential status	385
9. Education, by standard and age category	387
10. Education levels of commuters and migrants	387

3.5 Inanda Newtown

1. Length of time at previous place	395
2. Total population, by age, sex and residential status	397
3. Education in the 7+ age group, by sex and residential status	398
4. Economic activity by sex and residential status	399
5. Employment by sex, industry and residential status	400
6. Occupation level by sex and residential status	400

3.7 Phoenix

1. Length of time people lived at previous place	426
2. Population distribution by age, sex and residential status	429
3. Household heads, by age and sex	429
4. Education levels of the population 7 years and older, by sex and residential status	430
5. Employment by occupation, sex and residential status	432
6. Employment by industry, sex and residential status	432
7. Unemployment by residential status	432

4.1 Matiwane's Kop

1. Length of residence of households	444
2. Average diet at Matiwane's Kop, Sahlumbe, Mzimhlophe and Compensation	446
3. Distribution of population, by sex and residential status	448
4. Distribution of population by age, sex and residential status	449

5. Household type	449
6. Education by sex and residential status	450
7. Economic status of the total population, by sex and residential status	451
8. Unemployment rates	451
9. Occupation level of workers, by sex and residential status	452
10. Employment by industry, sex and residential status	452

Major summaries of places/information

1. Relocation townships	60
2. Relocation closer settlements	62
3. Potential/proposed relocation sites	67
4. Coal deposits on black spots in 8 districts of Northern Natal	104
5. African freehold black spots, 1948 - 1982	108
6. Mission black spots, 1948 - 1982	129
7. Reserve areas threatened with removal, 1975	164
8. Townships moved	176
9. Townships under threat	177
10. Townships where reprieve promised	179
11. Towns in KwaZulu, 1968 - 1982	180
12. Major informal settlements, Greater Durban	209
13. Major informal settlements, rest of Natal	210
14. The housing backlog, Durban townships, 1981	212
15. Group Areas proclamations, Durban	227
16. Group Areas proclamations, rest of Natal	232
17. Group Areas proclamations, Pietermaritzburg, 1960	236

Maps

1. Areas accessible to roads, railways, electricity, Natal	5
2. African reserves, colony of Natal and Zululand, 1904	22
3. Land ownership, colony of Natal, 1910	26
4. 'Die beswaring van die Platteland', Natal 1959	44
5. Consolidation proposals, Tomlinson Commission, 1955	140
6. The 1972 consolidation proposals for Natal	144
7. The 1975 consolidation proposals for Natal	146
8. Proposed land deal, Ingwavuma and Simdlagentsha	160
9. Informal settlements in the Durban area	200
10. Land occupation, Durban, 1950	222
11. Group Areas, Durban, 1982	226
12. Proposed conservation area, Thongaland	246
13. Past and threatened removals : Game reserves and dams, Natal	250
14. Clearing the missile range, 1968 - 1979	260
15. Sub-regions for the purposes of the Report	278
16. Removals in North Eastern Natal	280
17. Removals in Northern and North Western Natal	286
18. Removals on the North Coast	288
19. Removals in the Natal Midlands and Drakensberg	292
20. Removals in the Lower Tugela area	294
21. Removals in the Greater Durban area	296
22. Removals in Southern Natal	300
23. Removals in Griqualand East	304
24. SPP case studies, Natal : relocation sites	307

25. The Inanda area	390
26. SPP case studies, Natal : threatened areas	439
27. St Wendolins	464
28. African areas of Natal, 1965, showing black spots	At back
29. African areas of Natal, 1982, showing relocation sites	At back

Photographs

1. Farm evictees' goods, Nondweni 1981	Opp.	1
2. Farm evictees, Nondweni 1981		50
3. Toilet blocks for future relocation sites, near Ezakheni		58
4. Relocating Kwapitela households at Compensation, July 1981		58
5. Farm evictees, Nondweni 1981		82
6. Demolishing house, Kwapitela, July 1981		92
7. Partly demolished house, Kwapitela, July 1981		92
8. Old man, St Wendolins		127
9. Lusitania		134
10. Relocating Kwapitela households at Compensation, July 1981		163
11. Chesterville		179
12. Durban hostels		182
13. Section of Ntshaweni, Stanger		194
14. Etete, Stanger		194
15. Cato Manor		235
16. Relocating a Kwapitela household, Compensation, July 1981		255
17. Removal of Kwapitela to Compensation, July 1981		272
18. Bulwer Trust Farm		306
19. Former labour tenant, Sahlumbe		324
20. Mzimhlophe		367
21. Woman making beerstrainer, Sahlumbe		372
22. Compensation, July 1981		378
23. Removal of Kwapitela to Compensation, July 1981		378
24. Inanda Newtown		413
25. Nondweni		420
26. Phoenix		434
27. Steincoalspruit landowner in front of numbered front door		438
28. Mawane's Kop		440
29. Man in front of his house, St Wendolins		478
30. Kwapitela before its removal		488
31. Community meeting, Kwapitela, 1980		488
32. Family graveyard, Steincoalspruit, 1980		496
33. Demolished shop, Steincoalspruit, 1980		496
34. Community meeting, Umbulwane, 1981		523
35. Roadside stall, Reserve Four, 1981		543
36. Speaker at meeting, Umbulwane, 1981		544
37. Community meeting, Umbulwane, 1981		544

GLOSSARY

CATEGORIES OF RELOCATION

Relocation
Removals
Resettlement

All three terms are commonly used to describe both the overall policy and the processes involved in the massive, State-sponsored removals of people (almost all of them black) from one area to another that have characterised the apartheid system. SPP has favoured using either 'relocation' or the more descriptive 'removal' (or 'forced removal') in preference to 'resettlement' since 'resettlement' implies some accrual of benefit to the people who are moved and disguises the coerced nature of these population movements.

Consolidation

This is the official term used to describe the policy developed by the central government in the 1970s to reduce the number of separate, isolated pieces of land making up each of the bantustans (see below); it is part of the process of turning these areas into independent 'national states'.

Betterment planning

This refers to the schemes introduced by the central government in the african reserves since the 1930s and 1940s in an attempt to control land usage and thus improve and rationalise reserve agriculture. Under betterment, tribal areas are divided into residential and agricultural land and the people living on the land moved into rural villages.

Black spot

See below.

Influx control

This refers to the network of legislation and regulations which controls african access to the urban-industrial centres situated in what is claimed to be white South Africa; it severely limits the numbers of african people allowed to live and work there to those deemed to qualify in terms of Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act of 1923, as amended.

Urban relocation

This refers to the deproclamation of african townships falling within prescribed (see below) urban areas, and their removal to newly created townships within the boundaries of the bantustans. Physical removal does not always occur, as the boundaries of the bantustan can also be redrawn in order to encompass already existent townships within its boundaries.

CATEGORIES OF RURAL LAND

Reserve
Bantustan
Homeland
National state

These are the terms that have been officially applied to the african areas by the central government at various stages of recent South African history. 'Reserve' dates from the pre-apartheid period; the last three terms represent stages in the evolution of the policy of apartheid and refer to the various ethnic political constructions that have been created on the basis of the former reserves: Transkei, Ciskei, Kwa-Zulu, Qwa Qwa, Bophuthatswana, KwaNdebele, Kangwane, Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda. 'National state' is the most recent term to have been coined. SPP has chosen not to use either 'homeland' or 'national state' because of their unacceptable ideological bias. They present an image of these territories as economically viable, politically separate entities that are the only true and traditional 'homes' of the african people of South Africa, themselves divided along ethnic lines, and thus serve to justify the apartheid policy. Where possible we have referred to the various territories by name directly (e.g. KwaZulu, Ciskei etc.); otherwise, depending on the context, we have used 'reserve' or 'bantustan'.

Scheduled land

Land set aside in terms of the Natives Land Act of 1913 for occupation and ownership by africans. The schedule to the Act was based on the existing african reserves and locations and amounted to about 8,98 million ha.

Released land

Additional land set aside for african occupation and ownership, to be added to the scheduled areas, in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. The total amount to be released in South Africa in 1936 amounted to about 6,2 million ha. Some of this was land that was already occupied or owned by africans; the balance had still to be acquired by the South African Native Trust (SANT, later SABB, then SADT) which was established at this time.

Quota land

The total amount of land to be added to the scheduled areas in terms of the 1936 land legislation was apportioned between the four provinces on a quota basis; that amount represented the maximum area that could be occupied or owned by africans in each province. The total area of african land (scheduled and released) was thus fixed at a little below 13% of the total area in South Africa.

Trust land

Land purchased by the State in terms of the 1936 land legislation and administered by the SANT/SADT.

Black spot

This is an official term that is generally used to refer to african freehold land which was acquired before the 1913 Land Act and which lies outside the scheduled or released areas. It is one of the categories of land threatened with removal because it falls within what is considered the white area. In the SPP report we have used this term to refer to all african freehold land that is under threat of removal, including land falling within scheduled or released areas that are to be moved in terms of the consolidation policy.

Badly situated areas

This is a term used by the authorities to describe scheduled or released areas (tribal and, in some instances, freehold) that are to be moved because of the consolidation policy. Officials often use this term and 'black spot' interchangeably and SPP has tried to avoid using the term altogether.

Excised land

Land which has been or is to be excised from the bantustans in terms of the consolidation policy of the government.

Added land

Land which has been or is to be added to the various bantustans, in compensation for the areas to be excised in terms of the consolidation proposals of the government, so as to meet the quota of land set in 1936 constant.

CATEGORIES OF URBAN / RESIDENTIAL AREAS

Prescribed areas

Prescribed areas are proclaimed or deproclaimed by means of a notice appearing in the Government Gazette; they take in all the white urban areas and the presence of africans in them is governed by influx control regulations.

Townships

Residential areas set aside for african, indian or coloured occupation, usually situated adjacent to or within commuting distance of a white urban area on which they are economically dependent. Conditions in these areas vary, but generally formal housing is provided for rent, and sometimes for sale. These areas are generally better off with regard to services and facilities than are the closer settlements described below.

Group areas

These are areas that have been proclaimed solely for occupation by members of a particular race group, either white, coloured, indian, in terms of the Group Areas Act of 1950. The Act also affects trading rights and inter-racial property transactions.

Informal settlements

Areas of settlement which are not planned or approved by the local authorities or the State. Housing is erected by the occupants of the land themselves, generally out of unorthodox building materials. The areas are often densely populated and generally poorly serviced.

Deproclamation
(of a township)

The process by which the legal procedure for establishing an authorised african township is reversed. This is a necessary preliminary step before such a township can be relocated.

Closer settlement

The official term used to describe a type of settlement established for african people on reserve or Trust land that is for residential purposes only - no agricultural land is attached - and far more rudimentary in the type of facilities it has than a township. People who are removed off black spots and white farms are generally relocated to these settlements. They are provided with temporary accommodation and are expected to build their own permanent houses. Facilities vary but generally (not always) include pit latrines and a communal water supply point/s.

CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE

black
african
indian
coloured

In terms of the Population Registration Act of 1950, everybody in South Africa was classified according to their 'race' as defined by the Act; the four major classifications being established as 'White', 'Native' (subsequently Bantu, subsequently Black), 'Coloured' and 'Indian'. This is another example of language being manipulated by the government to promote the ideology of apartheid. In this report the term 'black' is used to include all those who are disenfranchised and are not classified as white; it thus includes all the people who are officially classified as Bantu/Black, Coloured or Indian. However since the apartheid legislation affects these different sections of the black population differently in certain important respects, it is often necessary to distinguish between people along the official lines and in those instances we have used the terms 'african', 'indian' or 'coloured'. We have deliberately not capitalised the first letter in 'african' or 'indian' because we do not wish to legitimise the ideology of ethnic divisions and racism implicit in their usage.

Labour tenants

These are african families living on white-owned farms who supply their labour to the landowner for part of the year (3 - 9 months) as a form of rent, in return for the use of some of the land for themselves. Historically the most widespread form of farm labour in the northern parts of the country, the labour tenant system was finally abolished by the government entirely in 1979.

Rent/cash tenants

The term 'rent' or 'cash tenants' has been used in the report to refer specifically to those african families living on white-owned farming land who have commonly been referred to as 'squatters', because they are not labour tenants or full-time farm workers, but who do pay a cash rental for the land. The term has been used to distinguish them from labour tenants. The government has over the years acted to eliminate this class of people.

Squatters

This is another ideologically loaded term. It is used in the report to refer to people living illegally on land without the permission of the landowner. The official use of the term is far broader and looser and it may be used to describe any black person whose presence on a particular piece of land is not approved of by the authorities, regardless of the nature of the agreement between the occupant and the landowner. It has been used to describe people living on white-owned land, on black-owned land, both within and without the bantustans, on tribal land and on State land.

Commuters

The term has been used in the report to refer to workers who work outside of their place of residence but who are able to travel to and from work on a daily or weekly basis, i.e. as distinct from migrant workers (who only return home monthly or annually) or people working in the place where they live. We have not restricted the use of the term to workers travelling between bantustan settlements and non-bantustan centres of employment only, which is the official usage.

ABBREVIATIONS

TEXT

AFRA	Association for Rural Advancement
ACAT	Africa Cooperative Action Trust
ANC	African National Congress
BAD	Bantu Administration and Development
BENBO/BENSO	Bureau for Economic Research, Cooperation and Development
BIC	Bantu Investment Corporation
CAD	Coloured Affairs Department
CED	Corporation for Economic Development
CKD	Case knocked down (refers to material used for shacks)
CMRA	Cato Manor Residents' Association
CRU	Community Research Unit
DAB	Drakensberg Administration Board
DCC	Durban City Council
DDHCC	Durban and District Housing Co-ordination Committee
DHAC	Durban Housing Action Committee
GG	Government
KDC	KwaZulu Development Corporation
NAU	Natal Agricultural Union
NCW	National Council of Women
NIC	Natal Indian Congress
NRP	New Republic Party
PFP	Progressive Federal Party
PNAB	Port Natal Administration Board
PUTCO	Public Utility Transport Corporation
PWC	Phoenix Working Committee
SAAU	South African Agricultural Union
SADT/SANT	South African Development Trust/South African Native Trust
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAIC	South African Indian Council
SAICCOR	South African Industrial Cellulose Corporation
SAIRR	South African Institute of Race Relations
SAP	South African Police
SASA	South African Sugar Association
SFP	Surplus Peoples Project

SUMMARIES

adj.	adjacent	incl.	including
app.	appears/apparently	km	kilometres
BAAB	Administration Board	KZ	KwaZulu
bs	black spot/s	maj.	majority
c.	circa	perm.	permanent
C & D	Cooperation and Development	pop.	population
comp.	compensatory	prim.	primary
deprocl.	deproclaimed	procl.	proclaimed
est.	estimated	sec.	secondary
establ.	established	sim.	similar
g.a.	Group Areas	temp.	temporary
GG	Government	wkly	weekly
hh	household/s		

GENERAL PREFACE TO THE S.P.P. REPORT

Within days of announcing a reprieve for the Crossroads community outside Cape Town, in April 1979, the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr P.G.J. Koornhof, confirmed that 656 african families would be removed off tribal and african freehold land in the Tugela Basin in Natal, to make way for the building of the Woodstock Dam. The latter removal received an obscure report in the press and was forgotten in the wave of euphoria which marked the Crossroads Settlement. In April 1979 Total Strategy (against the Total Onslaught) was at its peak and ad hoc decisions appeared from a number of Departments serving, in this case, to highlight contradictions in the apartheid system.

While Crossroads had been the focus of national and international attention from the churches, liberal organisations and those in opposition generally, it was by no means the only community under threat of removal. Factors which helped Crossroads into the limelight included firstly, the fierce resistance of the people to be moved; secondly, its proximity to a metropolitan area (and therefore press, concerned public, welfare organisations and university resources) and thirdly, the recent demolition of all other squatter communities in Cape Town.

The idea of establishing the Surplus People Project, as a national research project on relocation, took root at this time in response to these events. Some people who had been involved in the Crossroads support group were unconvinced of the desirability of the Koornhof deal there and felt the need to focus on forced removals throughout the country, particularly in the rural areas where access was difficult, resulting in relocation unknown to outsiders. It was felt that an update of The Discarded People by Cosmas Desmond was due, looking particularly at what had happened during the 1970s since the publication of Desmond's study. At the same time Gerhard Maré was compiling African Population Relocation in South Africa, for the South African Institute of Race Relations; this raised the general issue of relocation and suggested further areas of work. After consultation with various community workers and academics, it was decided to hold a seminar of interested people to see if a national project on investigating relocation and raising the issues in public could be launched. The first meeting was held in February 1980. It was attended by 23 participants, most of whom became the core of the project which adopted the name Surplus People Project (SPP).

The objects of the project were established then as follows :

1. To co-ordinate and initiate research projects into population relocation in South Africa, and anything which has a bearing on such relocation
2. To work in conjunction with other groups and individuals who are engaged in similar work
3. To publish the results of the research in any manner that is decided by the management committee
4. To engage in any activity which is deemed by the management committee to be necessary to the adequate fulfilment of the above objects.

Initially the project was intended to last one year, but this became clearly inadequate

and while funds were raised for that period, they were stretched to cover three years. Sincere thanks are expressed to the Interchurch Co-ordination Committee for Development Projects in the Netherlands for its financial and moral support.

The Surplus People Project derives its name from obvious sources. As a result of increased capitalisation of industry, agriculture and mining relatively fewer unskilled workers are demanded by the economy. The changing nature of capitalist development in South Africa has resulted in an increased demand for skilled workers, hence an attempt on the part of the ruling class to consolidate an urban black population with a stake in the system, and the determination to rid white South Africa of the unproductive, unemployed, disabled and youth. From surveys and field work it has become clear that there are thousands of people who will never gain access to employment in urban areas and unless they are prepared to work for R1,00 per day on white owned farms, where there may still be some work, they have been made redundant permanently. These surplus people will never enter the wage labour market under the present economic system.

However, during the course of the project, it has also become clearer to those involved in it that relocation has not been used only against those surplus to the economy's needs. Large numbers of skilled workers and employed people generally have been relocated under the group areas and urban relocation policies, for instance, while the removals linked to the consolidation planning of the 1970s have had a major political component to them. The original conceptualisation of what the project was investigating, as reflected in its name, has been broadened as a result.

The Surplus People Project was created as a voluntary group with a part-time national co-ordinator and a small steering or management committee for administrative matters. The strengths and weaknesses of a voluntary group were continually present. The experience from so varied a membership, based in Cape Town, Grahamstown, Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Johannesburg but with other participants from the length and breadth of the country, was very valuable. There was a healthy mixture of theoreticians and practitioners with each learning from the other. For the first time many of the academics were involved in field work while community workers, priests and health workers were introduced to theoretical material which helped explain what they had observed for years. But the difficulties of voluntary work lie in the co-ordination of work and the responsibility of members to the group when it comes to working to deadlines. Some dropped out of the group and others joined. Those left to the end have had the major task of collating and writing up the masses of material collected.

The State intervened at various stages : Guy Berger, an early participant, was jailed (under the Terrorism Act) for other activity; Cedric de Beer and Aurret van Heerden were detained for over ten months and released without being charged. A number of other participants were detained for shorter periods in connection with other alleged activities. Field workers were harassed at various times.

It became clear that while a national understanding was essential, the whole country could not be covered in the same detail. Some areas were more accessible, both in terms of proximity to metropolitan areas and the level of political repression e.g. KwaZulu, other areas exhibited less relocation on a mass basis e.g. Transkei. In the case of the Transkei it was decided that the Eastern Cape group could not deal in depth with more than the Ciskei where mass removals have taken place on a very large scale and some of the worst conditions in the country occur. Relocation in the Transkei is therefore dealt with only as a chapter in their regional report. The national 5-volume report attempts to be comprehensive but it cannot claim to be uniformly reliable. It is, however, the most up to date and the most comprehensive account yet published.

While it is always difficult to offer the right proportion of thanks to organisations and individuals, two organisations deserve special mention : AFRA (Association for Rural Advancement) in Pietermaritzburg for making the services of Cherryl Walker available at all times for research and fieldwork (which accounts for the Natal volume being so much

more detailed than the others) and SALDRU (South African Labour & Development Research Unit) at the University of Cape Town for giving so generously of staff time, and facilities for computer processing and printing. The churches, particularly the Church of the Province of South Africa, the Roman Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church and the South African Council of Churches cooperated warmly. Without their networks and contacts this project would not have been possible. Sincere thanks go also to the Black Sash, South African Institute of Race Relations, PACSA (Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness and Action), Diakonia and the Community Research Unit, both in Durban, the Legal Resources Centres in Johannesburg and Durban, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, journalists and many people from universities and institutions too numerous to mention.

SPP participants include :

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Seton Bailey	Sheila Meintjes
Guy Berger	Raphael Mothe
Helen Bradford	Ray Moyikwa
Debbie Budlender	Vuyani Mqingwana
Jeanne Chunnett	Colin Murray
Jacklyn Cock	Jean Ngubane
Josette Cole	Jeff Peires
Carole Cooper	Laurine Platzky (Co-ordinator)
Cedric de Beer	Andre Roux
Saul Dubow	Ina Roux
Ross Duncan Brown	Garth Seneque
Toni Duncan Brown	Thabe Shange
Jeremy Grest	Janet Shapiro
Jenny Grice	Judith Shier
Priscilla Hall	Charles Simkins
Ron Hall	Janet Stanford
Kirk Helliker	Pauline Stanford
Lindile Jela	Farouk Stemmet
Jenny Kirk	Clare Stewart
Marian Lacey	Barry Streek
Pat MacCartan	Auret van Heerden
Ben MacLennan	Cherryl Walker
Mondi Makiwane	Nick Wellington
Augustin Marapong	Joanne Yawitch
Gerhard Maré	Helen Zille

Much of the production and co-ordination has been done by Laurine Platzky (National co-ordinator of the project), Cherryl Walker (Natal) and Priscilla Hall (Eastern Cape).

Cape Town
January 1983

PREFACE TO THE NATAL REPORT

Volume Four of the SPP report deals with population removals in Natal. Although it is hoped that interested people will read the volume as a whole, it can be consulted as a reference work as well - the detailed contents pages, the major summaries of places and of information, which are listed on p. viii, and the index of place names can be used to guide readers to particular aspects of relocation in the province.

The report is divided into four parts. Part One is an introductory section. The first chapter, on KwaZulu, its development and relationship to Natal and its position on relocation, is integral to the main body of the report. The two subsequent chapters, on the history of land tenure in Natal, are background chapters that attempt to trace the historical development of the extremely fragmented, confused and confusing pattern of black land allocation and land occupation that had been established by 1960 when population removals began on a large scale.

The main body of the report starts with Part Two, which summarises all the information collected on relocation in Natal in the past twenty two years - numbers, places, categories, phases - and then devotes a chapter to each category. Part Two ends with a chapter in which the information contained in the previous chapters is summarised on a regional basis within Natal. It is hoped that this chapter will be used by people travelling in the province or wanting to investigate removals in particular areas.


Some categories are dealt with more comprehensively than others in Part Two. Categories where far more research and fieldwork is needed include those of group areas, influx control and betterment planning. Little information has been gathered on how the Group Areas Act and influx control have been applied in the smaller towns and what the actual impact of betterment planning on the distribution of the population and people's access to land in KwaZulu has been. The quality of the information, particularly that dealing with figures and statistics, varies as well - the inadequacies of the available figures and the reasons for that are discussed in some detail in the introductory chapter to Part Two and the chapter on black spot removals. A further problem in compiling this section relates to the time span in which it has been written : the cut-off date for the different chapters varies so while some record events as late as October 1982, others stop at June 1982 or even before. Some of the information presented here has been superseded by new developments as a result.

Parts Three and Four contain detailed case studies of communities affected by relocation - Part Three dealing with relocation areas and Part Four with communities threatened with removal. SPP undertook household surveys in seven areas in Natal - six of them relocation areas (Sahlumbe, Ezakheni, Mzimhlophe, Compensation, Inanda Newtown and Phoenix) and one of them an area threatened with removal (Matiwane's Kop). In addition Part Three contains brief descriptions of two other relocation areas while Part Four has detailed write-ups on five more threatened communities as well. These case studies indicate the range of conditions and issues prevailing in both relocated and threatened areas. The surveyed relocation areas range from a group areas township (Phoenix) through an Urban Foundation site and service scheme to one of the poorest and most depressed relocation areas surveyed in the country, the closer settlement of Sahlumbe. Each Part begins with a map on which the survey and other case study areas are located.

To pull all the strands of so large a study together has proved an extremely difficult task and the concluding chapter merely highlights the major issues that emerge in the course of the report. More work still needs to be done on comparing conditions in re-location areas with those prevailing in non-relocation areas, particularly rural areas, and in analysing the factors influencing the nature and degree of resistance to removals by threatened communities. Since so much relocation is still pending in Natal, this is not an academic issue and cannot be accommodated by academic research only. One of the strengths of the Natal region of SPP has been that, largely because of the involvement of AFRA, there has been on-going contact with a number of the communities discussed in the report and the information collected over the past three years has been disseminated quite widely through Natal/KwaZulu.

In producing this volume, the Natal region of SPP has been helped by a large number of individuals and institutions. In addition to the institutions mentioned in the 'General Preface to the SPP Report', the following individuals deserve special thanks : Audrey Tanner, for her skill, patience and support in typing both this volume and Volume One; John Aitchison and Robin Mackie for all their help with the printing; Ruth Edgecombe, Bill Guest, Christopher Merrett and Louise Torr for their contributions to Parts Three and Four; Martin Duma, Lindiwe Mngadi, Jotham Myaka and all those who helped with the Phoenix survey for their contribution as fieldworkers; Rose Doyle as well as all those students at the Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Natal, Durban, for their help in drawing the maps, and Johan Maree.

While this volume is the outcome of a collective effort on the part of the SPP participants in Natal, we would like to acknowledge the special contribution of Jenny Grice, Jenny Kirk, Judith Shier and Cherryl Walker in seeing it through to completion.



PART ONE INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1. NATAL/KWAZULU AND RELOCATION

1. Introduction

There are a number of features of Natal/KwaZulu which set it apart from the rest of South Africa and have ensured that the process of removals has been somewhat different here from what it has been in the other provinces. Despite the existence of important local variations within it, this region does form a readily distinguishable and separate entity within Southern Africa as a whole - geographically, economically, politically. In any economic or ecological analysis of the region it is impossible to separate out KwaZulu from the rest of Natal. It is totally merged into the regional economy, albeit in a periphery/metropole relationship. This region is one of the most densely populated areas in the country, containing approximately 20% of the total population but only 7% of the total land; KwaZulu on its own is even more densely populated having in 1970 a population density of 173 per square mile. (Horrell, 1973, 39) Relative to its size Natal/KwaZulu contains a large amount of high-potential agricultural land, and a higher percentage of the country's water resources (25% of the total runoff) than the other provinces, but its extremely broken topography acts as a constraint on agricultural production.

Politically the region differs in some crucial aspects from the other provinces. As far as relocation is concerned, the most significant feature is that in Natal, unlike the other provinces, there is only one bantustan to deal with and, as bantustans go, it is a relatively powerful one. KwaZulu is one of the largest of the bantustans; it is by far the most populous. It occupies some 38% of the land mass of Natal but contains over 55% of the total population in the region - 3 187 987 people out of a total for the region of 5 722 221 according to the 1980 census. (Buthelezi Commission, vol. 1, 69. The Commission also notes that these official figures probably underestimate the population by as much as 400 000, most of whom would be black.) The Zulu ethnic group, as defined by the central government, is the largest single grouping in South Africa; in Natal (including KwaZulu) over 77% of the total population is african and over 90% of all africans are Zulu speaking. (Buthelezi Commission, vol. 1, 70.) One

result of this Zulu-speaking preponderance in the region is that there has been very little scope for the kind of ethnic manipulation by the State that is found in the Transvaal - the Ingwavuma land deal being an outstanding exception. Here Pretoria has been assiduously cultivating a pro-Swazi nationalism among people it formerly had classified as Zulu, in order to justify its proposal to hand the district over to Swaziland. In most cases, however, outside of the workings of the Group Areas Act (which has affected mainly indians and is discussed below), the people being relocated in Natal are classified as Zulu citizens and moved into land that either is or is destined to become part of KwaZulu.

Sheer numbers alone, therefore, would make KwaZulu a significant force in the region. In addition, however, KwaZulu has presented Pretoria with the most recalcitrant line against consolidation and against 'independence' of all the bantustans. Although accepting the constructs of apartheid to the extent of becoming a 'self-governing national state', KwaZulu has publicly and repeatedly refused to accept full political independence on the Pretoria model; it has presented itself instead as an opposition movement - even a liberation movement - that is using the system to undermine the system. This brings a degree of ambiguity and fluidity to regional politics that is lacking in the other provinces and has had important repercussions on the nature of removals and especially resistance to removals in Natal/KwaZulu, as is discussed more fully in subsequent sections of this report. Although ultimately dependent on Pretoria and fully enmeshed in the administration of apartheid, the KwaZulu authority has achieved a certain degree of autonomy and is committed, for its own political credibility, to maintaining at least the appearance of that.

Pretoria faces other political problems in the Natal region as well. Despite recent inroads into the white electorate, the National Party does not command a majority following among the white population. Natal is the only province where the provincial council is controlled by an opposition party, in this case the conservative and, outside of Natal, very weak New Republic Party. In drawing up its consolidation plans for the region, Pretoria has run into considerable opposition from white interest groups, mainly farmers who are opposed to handing agricultural land over to KwaZulu. This has made implementation of these plans more difficult. At the same time, a potentially powerful alliance is being forged in Natal between KwaZulu and more liberal white groups, particularly in the sugar industry and the business world. These groups see in the Buthelezi administration their main hope for the continued security of themselves and the profitability of their investments. The sugar industry is the dominant industry in Natal and has been particularly influential in trying to draw up a regional political alternative to the present system, based on recognition of KwaZulu as a legitimate and key institution and committed to the maintenance of what is labelled 'the free enterprise system'. The most recent expression of this alliance between KwaZulu and liberal capital has been in the establishment of the Buthelezi Commission, whose report was published in early 1982.

Apart from these political considerations, there are other special features of the region which have had a bearing on the nature of removals. KwaZulu, as historically constructed, is the most fragmented of all the bantustans. In 1978 it consisted officially of 48 major pieces and 157 small pieces scattered throughout the province. (Thorington-Smith et al, 1978, vol. 1, 6. In fact, if all the african freehold properties had been included in this count, the de facto number of pieces of african land, if not of KwaZulu, would have been even higher, as the section on black spots in this report makes clear.) By comparison Bophuthatswana, the next most fragmented bantustan, consisted, before consolidation, of a mere 19 pieces. KwaZulu is a consolidationists nightmare, even on paper. The best that Nationalist planners have been able to suggest publicly thus far (we do not know yet what the van der Walt Commission has proposed) is that it be reduced to ten pieces; and in trying to work

towards that, Pretoria has encountered serious opposition from both whites and blacks in Natal.

At the same time, until very recently, a very large percentage of african people in Natal have had access to agricultural land outside the scheduled or released reserve land: either as labour tenants, rent tenants and squatters on State or private white land, or as landowners and their tenants on black freehold farms. These people, living contradictions of apartheid theory, have been a major target of State relocation drives, but eliminating them has proved logistically a very large and difficult task. We estimate that today, despite the massive relocation of people over the past twenty years, over half of all the african freehold areas have still not been eradicated, while the african population in what is supposedly the white farming areas still greatly exceeds the white population. In Natal, more than in any other province, the fact of an overwhelming african majority in the population is becoming increasingly difficult for the State both to deny and to control spatially. The goal of 'no more black South Africans', towards which much of the relocation policies of the past have been directed, is more elusive here than anywhere else in the country, with the single exception perhaps of the Witwatersrand.

There is another feature of Natal that has played an important part in shaping relocation policies: its strategic location. The region has a small but strategically very sensitive common border with Mocambique and Swaziland in the north, as well as a long and, from the military point of view, exposed coastline stretching south from Mocambique. These northern areas are populated entirely by africans and clearing these border areas of their potentially troublesome residents has been an important category of relocation over the last two decades. The Ingwavuma land deal with Swaziland has served to focus attention on this aspect recently; an awareness of the history of removals for military and strategic reasons in this part of the province is an essential part of the background to this.

Thus far one has written as if the only people affected by forced removals in Natal have been african and the only relocation sites located within KwaZulu. This of course is not the full picture of relocation in the region. Urban removals under the Group Areas Act have amounted to a major category of relocation in Natal as well. This Act has affected mainly the very substantial indian community in Natal; it is discussed in Part Two.

2. Economic features of Kwazulu

KwaZulu, despite its relatively more favourable irrigation and agricultural potential, reveals all the features of underdevelopment that characterise the black rural areas of South Africa in general: widespread, often grinding poverty; lack of infrastructural and industrial development; a high rate of male migrant labour; a high degree of landlessness among the supposedly subsistence sector; an overblown local bureaucracy; poor health and welfare services. It has no basis for independent economic development but is totally dependent on the metropolitan/industrial centres that are located beyond its boundaries.

It is not intended to go into these features here; they are well known and well-documented in numerous studies of the region. The statistics of underdevelopment have most recently been very comprehensively summarised in the report of the Buthelezi Commission. From the point of view of this study on relocation in the region, the following features of KwaZulu's economy are considered particularly pertinent:

1. The already existing demographic imbalance, which has been and will be further

exacerbated by relocation into the area. It is estimated that almost 50% of the population of KwaZulu is in the age group 0 - 14, and furthermore, because of the high level of dependency on migrant labour in the region, the *de facto* adult population approaches an average ratio of two females to every male. (Buthelezi Commission, vol. 1, 70) The degree of imbalance varies from region to region and also within different adult age groupings.


2. Lack of industrial potential: Apart from some coal-mining potential in the Nongoma district, the region as a whole has very little industrial or mining potential. There used to be a number of privately-owned african farms in the Newcastle/Dundee districts which had significant deposits of coal on them; there are still some in the Klip River district. Most of these have already been expropriated and their people removed and those remaining are under imminent threat. As is described in Part Two, the mineral wealth of these lands has been exploited by white-owned mining companies and not the original owners.

KwaZulu has an exceptionally rugged terrain and its topography alone - no accident of history - ensures that industrial and infrastructural development will be confined to certain corridors which remain under white control. (See map opposite.) The two major harbours in the Natal/KwaZulu region, Durban and Richards Bay, are in white Natal and Pretoria has made it clear that that is where control over them will remain. Industrial decentralisation in Natal/KwaZulu has not proved successful. It is estimated that at the few industrial growth points inside KwaZulu, over R182 million has been spent to establish 44 factories which, in 1981, employed a total of 6 122 people, 5 522 of them at Isithebe; a derisory amount compared to the number of people needing jobs in the region. (Some 30 000 new jobseekers come onto the labour market in KwaZulu every year. Figures supplied by Dr Lenta, Economics Dept, University of Natal.)

The most recent decentralisation concessions announced by Pretoria in April 1982 hold out no possibility of significant industrial development within KwaZulu and it is clear that KwaZulu will continue to be dependent on migrant labour for the foreseeable future.

3. The degree of dependence on outside employment: In 1976 56% of the economically active population of KwaZulu was employed outside its boundaries and nearly 78% of the Gross Domestic Product for the region came from the export of labour. It is estimated further that 80% of the earnings of all its economically active people (working both within and without the boundaries of KwaZulu) is spent outside KwaZulu. Migrant remittances to dependents left behind in KwaZulu amount to 138% of the rural output (of the region as a whole) and 155% of the subsistence output, which confirms the point already made, that the people living inside KwaZulu depend for their survival on remittances coming from outside. (Above statistics drawn from Buthelezi Commission, vol. 2, 155-162).

4. Rural landlessness and environmental degradation: The number of landless rural households in KwaZulu has been estimated at between 30 and 40% of the population. At the same time, the destruction of the environment as a result of overpopulation, overstocking, deforestation and lack of capital for development is proceeding at a terrifying rate and in some parts of KwaZulu, notably the Masinga and Nqutu districts, appears to be irreversible. In addition to a massive programme of rural reconstruction, the area needs to shed the enormous number of surplus people who are chained to it by government policies if it is ever to become more than a cheap labour reserve and a dumping ground for those who are surplus to the needs of the South African economy as presently structured.



3. Constitutional developments in Kwazulu

As the next chapter on the history of land tenure in the Natal region makes clear, KwaZulu is historically a very recent political creation and its boundaries bear little relationship to the pattern of african land ownership and occupation before the coming of the white settlers in the early 19th century. Its creation marks the most recent

phase in a long history of struggle between white and black over control of the land, its resources and the labour to work them.

The present structure of government in KwaZulu has its roots in the institutions created by the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. This provided for the establishment of ethnically based tribal, regional and territorial authorities, with limited powers of local government, in the various reserves in South Africa; this Act thereby coopted tribalism and traditional institutions of government, such as chieftainship, into the administration of apartheid. In 1959 eight 'national units', including that of the Zulu, were demarcated under the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, and the bantustan/homeland/independent national states era in South African politics was launched. In 1968 and 1969 new territorial authorities, with enlarged powers, were established in most of the bantustans. At first developments in the Zulu bantustan lagged behind the others because of initial opposition to the scheme. By 1970, however, Pretoria had successfully overcome this opposition and a territorial authority, with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi as Chief Executive Officer, was created. KwaZulu was thereby officially established and the concept of a separate Zulu region within both Natal and South Africa, the only official home of all the Zulu speaking people in South Africa, was thus imposed on Natal.

The next phase in the elevation of KwaZulu into a tool of apartheid administration came with the establishment of a Legislative Assembly in 1972. (Proclamation R69, 1972) As in the other bantustans, chiefs were given a dominant role in the new Assembly. This Assembly was constituted as follows:

1. A personal representative of the Paramount Chief (Goodwill Zwelithini);
2. Three chiefs appointed by each regional authority - 66 in total;
3. One chief from each tribal authority deemed to be a regional authority (i.e. where no regional authority yet existed);
4. 55 elected members.

In addition an Executive Council was established, made up of a Chief Executive Councillor, who had to be a chief (Chief Buthelezi), and five other members of the Assembly, at least two of whom had to be chiefs. The Departments under the control of the Executive Council were: Authority Affairs and Finance, Education and Culture, Community Affairs, Works, Agriculture, and Justice. (Horrell, 1973, 54)

Entry into the next phase of constitutional development, that of becoming a self-governing territory, was delayed in KwaZulu until 1977, mainly because of a dispute between Pretoria and the KwaZulu Executive Council over the means of identification of voters for the election, and also because of problems associated with the demarcation of electoral divisions: lack of progress with consolidation in the area meant that the boundaries of the territory were not yet finally fixed. The Executive Council was opposed to the use of reference books as a means of identifying voters, since it regarded these as a symbol of oppression. It was decided to use citizenship cards instead but the processing and allocation of these took some time.

In the meantime, the ruling group in the Assembly had launched a political party, Inkatha YaKwaZulu, in 1975, and used the delay to entrench Inkatha's position within the bantustan. In 1973 and again in 1975 there were several attempts to set up an opposition party within KwaZulu, but these failed to secure a power base for themselves. In 1974 Mr Jeffrey Mthethwa, later a Minister of Justice in the KwaZulu Cabinet, proposed a motion in the Legislative Assembly which asked the central government to empower the KwaZulu government to control or forbid the formation of political parties until after independence. Although not accepted by Pretoria, the motion was passed by the KwaZulu Assembly. Once Inkatha had been formally constituted it completely dominated the Assembly. It described itself as a 'national cultural liberation movement' and members were asked to refrain from making public criticisms of it; advancement within the KwaZulu civil service was also dependent on one's allegiance to the organisation.

Inkatha membership grew rapidly and by 1977 it claimed to have some 120 000 members. (SAIRR Survey, 1977, 36) Today it is virtually impossible to operate within KwaZulu - whether in the area of politics, community development, business, employment or even research - without coming into contact with Inkatha and being called upon to account for oneself to it.

On the 1st February 1977 KwaZulu was declared a self-governing territory and elections arranged for February 1978. At these elections Inkatha was the only party to put up candidates. About 50% of those who were entitled to vote had registered as voters by then and the overall percentage poll was 37,7%. There were some allegations about intimidatory tactics by Inkatha during the election but these were repudiated by Chief Buthelezi.

With the introduction of this next stage in the constitutional development of KwaZulu, the Executive Council was transformed into a Cabinet consisting of the Chief Minister (Chief Buthelezi) and six other ministers and most matters outside of the crucial areas of Defence and Foreign Affairs were, in theory, delegated to their departments. In practice Pretoria retains control both by the total dependence of KwaZulu on the central Treasury for its financing (some 75% of KwaZulu's revenue comes from Pretoria) and by the practice of seconding white civil servants from Pretoria to head the various ministerial departments at Ulundi (the capital of KwaZulu). Furthermore, all Acts of the Legislative Assembly require the signature of the South African State President who may return the proposed legislation to the Assembly for 'further consideration' if it is considered unsatisfactory by Pretoria.

Thus by 1982, although KwaZulu has stopped short of taking independence along the lines of the Transkei, Ciskei, Bophutatswana and Venda, it has acquired a measure of autonomy, both constitutional and political. As already described, KwaZulu's position within the bantustan system is an ambiguous one. Some of the ambiguity and complexities of its position is brought out in the next section which looks briefly at the response of the KwaZulu government to the relocation policies inflicted on this region by the central government.

4. Kwazulu's response to relocation

The question of relocation is politically a very delicate one for KwaZulu. KwaZulu spokesmen have consistently maintained a public image of resolute and principled opposition to removals in any form. They deny reports which suggest that a modus vivendi is being worked out on this question between them and the central government, with a vigour which points to the sensitivity of the issue and their fears of being regarded as collaborators in the apartheid system. At this level they have been prominent propagandists against removals. However, if one probes behind the rhetoric and tries to assess what steps KwaZulu has been taking to oppose or to mobilise opposition to removals on the ground, then a far more contradictory picture emerges.

PUBLIC ATTACKS ON REMOVALS

Public statements by KwaZulu representatives attacking relocation abound. In 1973, when Pretoria had outlined its then final consolidation plans for the bantustans, Chief Buthelezi commented: 'We have said before that we are not prepared to cooperate with the removal of people. We don't want to be a party to the misery of our people.' (Natal Mercury, 30.04.73) In the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in 1981 Pretoria's methods of removing people were likened to 'the cattle trucks of Nazi Germany.' (Natal Mercury, 7.05.81) Later that month Dr O. Dhlomo, Secretary-General of Inkatha,

pinpointed relocation as possibly the major issue causing resentment amongst blacks: 'Already some people are saying they would go into the bush rather than move. That means they will be prepared to take up arms to protect their land.' (Sunday Tribune, 24.05.81)

CLAIMS OF LACK OF CONSULTATION, POWERLESSNESS:

At the same time KwaZulu has also defended itself from the criticism that it has not effectively opposed forced removals, by arguing that a) it is not informed of what is going to take place by Pretoria and removals have proceeded without its prior knowledge, and b) it does not have jurisdiction over either the areas removed or the areas into which people are moved and hence is powerless to prevent removals: that people are moved out of areas set aside for white occupation and administered directly by the central government (black spots, farms) into relocation areas on land that is still administered by Pretoria, in the form of the SADT - Trust land. Thus in May 1981 in attacking the excision of the Sodwana Bay triangle from KwaZulu, Chief Buthelezi was reported as saying that he had had no knowledge of the excision. (Sunday Times, 17.05.81) In a paper presented to the annual conference of the SAIRR a month later, Dr Dhlomo argued that his government was neither consulted nor informed about removals in Natal and, furthermore, did not participate formally in receiving re-located people. He said too that a Select Committee appointed by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in 1978 to investigate the living conditions of displaced people in KwaZulu had found that no meaningful consultation had taken place between the people being relocated and the authorities supervising their removal. (Sunday Tribune, 26.06.81)

Both defences are in themselves revealing admissions on the very real constraints to effective opposition to Pretoria that bantustan leaders experience generally and, probably unintentionally, expose the relative powerlessness of KwaZulu in relation to the central government. As far as removals specifically are concerned, KwaZulu is partly right - Pretoria can and does bypass the bantustan leaders when it suits it and some (but certainly not all) removals do take place between areas over which KwaZulu has no formal jurisdiction. However, as the following brief case studies show, this is not always the case and KwaZulu has been more deeply embroiled in removals than it is willing to admit.

1) MILITARY REMOVALS IN NORTH EASTERN NATAL, 1974

The details of these removals are described more fully in Part Two. Here what is of relevance is that the KwaZulu administration was involved in the planning and implementation of the relocation of these people at the receiving end. While the actual removal of the 400 people who were living in the demarcated 'danger zone' of the proposed missile range was carried out by the army and the Department of Bantu Administration, the KwaZulu Departments of Community Affairs and of Agriculture were responsible for the allocation of sites and the provision of facilities for the re-located people. Furthermore, in this case the land into which the people were being moved was not Trust land but indisputably part of KwaZulu: Mbazwana, west of Sodwana Bay. It is not clear to what extent the KwaZulu Cabinet was actively involved in this; the available evidence suggests that it was largely the white civil servants, the permanent secretaries of departments seconded to Ulundi by Pretoria, who directed KwaZulu's participation. Nevertheless, unless it was prepared to admit that it did not or could not at least monitor, if not control, the activities of its own departments, the KwaZulu Cabinet must have known about what was happening and apparently acquiesced to the relocation of people into its sphere of administration. It does not appear that it protested publicly about what was happening, and these and subsequent removals by the military in the area passed largely unrecorded.

2) EXCISION OF AREAS FROM KWAZULU 1981/82

In January 1981 four areas were excised from KwaZulu by proclamation in the Government Gazette - a triangle of land west of Sodwana Bay; former released land to the east of Paulpietersburg; Reserve Four north of Richards Bay and the Driefontein block of farms in the Ladysmith district. The excisions were in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans for KwaZulu, the details are described in subsequent sections of this report. The proclamation passed unnoticed for some months. Then, in May 1981, the threat of removals in the Sodwana Bay area surfaced in the press. In the ensuing fuss, KwaZulu attacked the removals and claimed ignorance about Pretoria's intentions. The threat to Reserve Four received some press publicity in late 1981 as a result of questions being asked in Parliament, but nothing was heard about Driefontein or Paulpietersburg till 1982 when further questions were asked in Parliament and the fact that all four areas had been excised and that their people would be relocated at some stage was confirmed. (Hansard, PQ 465, 23.04.82)

In confirming the excision Dr Koornhof said it was a consequence of both a resolution in Parliament (referring to a parliamentary debate on the consolidation of KwaZulu in 1975) and 'an agreement reached in this regard between the Department of Cooperation and Development and the Government of KwaZulu.' He also said that after this agreement had been signed, representations were received 'that the areas concerned should not be excised.' (He did not explain where these representations had come from but certainly the Tribal Councils for Reserve Four had been protesting before their excision, in late 1978). KwaZulu immediately denied cooperation; such was their indignation that Dr Koornhof felt it necessary to issue a statement which partly but not entirely exonerated KwaZulu from complicity in the matter:

The impression might have been created that the Government of KwaZulu supports the excision of these areas ... and the resettlement of the Black communities involved and that the Government of KwaZulu agreed upon such steps. In view of the fact that Parliament ... adopted certain firm decisions in connection with the consolidation of KwaZulu, Chief Minister Buthelezi informed me that he had no alternative ... other than to sign this agreement ... because he felt he could not shirk responsibility for his people once the decision by Parliament in Cape Town had been taken.

Chief Minister Buthelezi and Dr Mdlaose in particular, are, as in the past strongly against any excisions from KwaZulu and the resettlement of communities.

Any conclusion that Chief Minister Buthelezi or his Government might be in favour of resettlement schemes is therefore not correct. (Statement, 6.05.82)

When questioned about his statement the following day in Parliament, Dr Koornhof said the agreements to which he referred had been signed in April and August 1979 - i.e. months before the areas were excised. He would not be drawn when Graham McIntosh, an opposition PFP Member of Parliament, stated that KwaZulu denied having signed an agreement, but appealed to Mr McIntosh to discuss the matter with him privately, 'to prevent a wedge being driven which could create serious problems in the future'. (Hansard, col. 781, 7.05.82. See Appendix 1)

In trying to make sense of this incident, one should note the following points:

1. Two agreements were signed, according to Dr Koornhof and KwaZulu has not in fact denied their existence - the one in April and the other in August 1979. There is further, unpublished evidence to show that Pretoria was discussing the excision of Reserve Four, at least, in very specific detail with Ulundi in 1978. Similarly, the excision of the Sodwana Bay area had been on Pretoria's agenda for several years before it was finally carried through. Despite this, KwaZulu still claimed

ignorance of Pretoria's intentions, and moreover, only responded to the excision publicly months after it had been gazetted and then only on a piecemeal basis as each of the areas involved was disclosed.

2. In this case Ulundi cannot claim that it had no jurisdiction over the territory at stake, since all four areas were indisputably part of KwaZulu, either as scheduled or released land. In terms of the National States Constitution Act of 1971 the central government cannot amend the boundaries of the 'national states' without consulting with the Executive Council of the area concerned and this was complied with in this case.

3. Despite their opposition to the proposed and then enacted excisions, KwaZulu did not try to mobilise effective opposition to what was happening within the affected areas; its protests were confined mainly to public statements which condemned what had happened and also defended its own role in it. It did express its opposition to Pretoria's plans in meetings between its Department of Interior and the Department of Cooperation and Development, in the course of 1981 (after the proclamation), but did not take steps to see that all the people in the affected areas even knew what was happening. The public exposure of Sodwana Bay and Reserve Four came from outside KwaZulu; the threat to Driefontein and the Paulpietersburg land remained obscure for over a year. The first that Driefontein knew about the excision was in February 1982 - 13 months later - when the local white Magistrate came to inform the Councillors that the area would no longer be administered from Ulundi, but from Pretoria, through him.

4. In protesting against the interpretation that he had supported the excision, Chief Buthelezi appealed to KwaZulu's powerlessness in the matter: he had had 'no alternative' but to agree, once the central government had made its decision. Nevertheless, Ulundi, through its MPs and through Inkatha, continues to encourage communities threatened with removal to make their representations against being moved through it. This has been true in the excised areas as well as other threatened places. At a number of meetings held on threatened black spots in the Ladysmith district in the course of 1980/81, for instance, spokesmen for Inkatha have urged that the 'proper channel' for protest is through Ulundi and through Inkatha. They actively encourage communities to send memoranda and delegations in that direction first. The emphasis seems to be to encourage centralisation of opposition in Ulundi rather than to promote strong local organisation and initiative. (Fieldwork in the course of 1981 and 1982)

5. In issuing his statement on the 6th May, 1982, explaining KwaZulu's position, Dr Koornhof was, in effect, protecting KwaZulu's credibility as an opposition force, by publicly acknowledging on its behalf that it had been forced into signing the various agreements. Then, when questioned on the statement the following day, he avoided taking a stand on whether KwaZulu had in fact denied making the agreement, as alleged by the PFP spokesman, or not. It is intriguing that he should have felt it necessary to shield KwaZulu in this way and, in so doing, make himself vulnerable to charges of coercion and deceit. It seems that having achieved what he wanted - the excisions - he was prepared to appease KwaZulu for reasons that are not at this stage apparent.

This incident exposes certain fundamental weaknesses in the opposition strategy adopted by KwaZulu. If one accepts that its opposition to removals goes beyond mere public posturing, then it was clearly out-manoeuvred, caught in the trap of its own admitted impotence in relation to Pretoria. But then, having failed to prevent the excisions through private negotiations, it also failed to speak out against them publicly until months after they had taken place, and then only once they had become public issues. More significant, it failed to mobilise popular opposition in the threatened areas.

In very marked contrast, however, has been the KwaZulu response to the Ingwavuma land deal that Pretoria has been negotiating with Swaziland. At the time of writing the

final outcome of this deal is not clear; the events and issues surrounding it are discussed in Part Two. What is of interest here is how vociferously and actively KwaZulu has opposed this threat to its territorial integrity. The entire Legislative Assembly has travelled to the area to hold mass rallies at which popular opposition to the excision of the area and its handing over to Swaziland has been mobilised. KwaZulu is even prepared to go to the Supreme Court to challenge the legitimacy of Pretoria's action in taking back administrative control over the area from Ulundi. (*Natal Witness*, 24.06.82) In this instance KwaZulu has displayed considerable enterprise in resisting Pretoria's plans.

3) BLACK SPOT REMOVALS AND STEERING COMMITTEES

While the excision issue in Sodwana Bay etc. was slowly unfolding in 1981, developments were also taking place on the issue of black spot removals and Ulundi's role in that. Black spot removals are particularly controversial in Natal. Here too KwaZulu's position has been ambiguous, at times riddled with contradiction: publicly strongly opposed to these removals, actively encouraging certain prominent black spot leaders to rely on it to take up their struggle against being moved and drawing support from these people for its stand, yet caught up in secret negotiations with Pretoria in which vital concessions are made which are detrimental to that struggle. Furthermore, only when these concessions have been exposed to the press and the public have the KwaZulu authorities come out strongly against them.

The idea of steering committees was accepted in principle at a meeting between the central government represented by the Deputy Minister of Cooperation and Development, (Wentzel), and KwaZulu, represented by the Minister of the Interior, Dr Mdalalose. (*Natal Mercury*, 5.06.81) The meeting had been occasioned by the fuss surrounding the excision of Sodwana Bay, which had just got into the press. KwaZulu used this opportunity to make representations on behalf of Sodwana Bay and Reserve Four, and also on behalf of the threatened black spots near Ladysmith, Matiwane's Kop and Jonono's Kop. Dr Mdalalose appealed that they should not be moved and their already expropriated title deeds returned to the landowners. Smoothly side-stepping the title deed issue, the Pretoria representatives proposed that steering committees be established to advise on problems associated with the relocation of black spots. These committees would consist of representatives of Pretoria, Ulundi and 'the people', this last group defined quite unambiguously as people working within the structure created by Pretoria - chiefs and their councillors, members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, local magistrates.

At the time KwaZulu delegates expressed fears that their involvement might be seen as acceptance of the idea of removals; they did not oppose the establishment of such committees, however, and their objections vacillated between opposition to removals on principle and opposition to the inadequate facilities provided to people once they had been moved. In September 1981 Pretoria's purpose in creating steering committees was publicly revealed when Dr Koornhof announced in Parliament that the KwaZulu authorities had agreed in principle to the formation of steering committees, 'to advise the two Governments on particular problems and implications concerning the resettlement of each of the particular Black spots'. (Hansard, Question 3, 2.09.81) In enlarging on this two days later and referring specifically to Reserve Four, he said these steering committees would be formed 'for the necessary arrangements, consultation and identification of problems in connection with, *inter alia*, the proposed resettlement of the residents of Reserve Four'. (Hansard, col. 286, 4.09.81) In other words, their function would be to administer relocation. In November Dr Koornhof told the Transvaal Congress of the National Party that KwaZulu had eased its former 'rigid opposition' to the removal of black spots in Natal. He was reported as saying that 'although there had been strong opposition in the past from

the named government (KwaZulu), certain procedures had been decided upon as a result of discussions (with KwaZulu) which would be followed in future with the removal of black spots in Natal.' (Daily News, 5.11.81)

Once this had been made public, KwaZulu was quick to distance itself from the steering committees. In a press release issued on the 24.11.81, the KwaZulu Cabinet stressed that it would have nothing to do with removals and that it would oppose all removals with all means at its disposal. (See Appendix 2) It accused Dr Koornhof of trying to sow distrust by falsely claiming that KwaZulu had agreed to a system of removals: 'It is admitted that discussions have taken place regarding removal of people but these discussions have always been on the basis that the people should not be removed.' (Press release, 3) Since then no more has been heard about steering committees; there have been no reports, however, that the idea has been abandoned.

Once again it seems that KwaZulu has been out-maneuvred and that here too its opposition to removals has been shaped more out of concern at protecting its public image as an opponent of the central government than out of an actual commitment to halt removals. The standing of Ulundi and Inkatha is still high among many locally powerful threatened landowners in the Ladysmith district; it is hoped that in the future this will promote, rather than confuse, the strongly felt but not always directed resistance to being moved that is widespread in these communities.

4) KWAZULU REMOVALS

Malukazi

Malukazi is the name of a huge informal settlement of over five thousand families which grew up on the edge of Umlazi township, outside Durban, on land that is part of KwaZulu. The history of the settlement and its removal, which started in 1981, are described more fully in Part Two. Here what is of relevance is that it is the KwaZulu authorities who have been responsible for the removals: because Malukazi is in the way of the planned expansion of Umlazi which is also under the authority of KwaZulu. Although KwaZulu has denied strenuously that the removals are in any way forced, and is at great pains to explain that there is no similarity between its removal of people, from Malukazi to the relocation site at Folweni, and removals carried out by the central government, the basis of its argument is not clear.

There are definite disadvantages to moving to Folweni for the people of Malukazi. It is further out from job opportunities in Durban than Malukazi, and people fear the factional violence that is found in the surrounding Umbumbulu district. Moreover, people are expected to build their own houses, at a cost of approximately R1 000 for a five-roomed house. For these reasons people at Malukazi have expressed an unwillingness to move. This reluctance does not correspond with KwaZulu's claims that nobody is being forced to move.

KwaZulu, like the central government, is unable to accommodate the proliferation of informal settlements in the greater Durban area within its own housing strategy. In administering this area it has been forced to accept problems created by the central government's housing policy for urban africans, which has been shaped by the policy of influx control. There is a basic lack of formal housing for africans in metropolitan Durban which KwaZulu is now obliged to deal with. Saddled with the responsibility for administering and controlling this part of greater Durban and faced with a critical shortage of formal housing, KwaZulu has chosen to deal with the problem - at least in Malukazi - by removing those in the way of Umlazi township development further out into the rural periphery, and obliging those moved to build their own houses. It has in this instance adopted similar methods of controlling access to the metropolitan centre as that used by the central government and its agents, the administration boards.

Faction fight removals

In May 1981 the Daily News carried a report in which the KwaZulu Minister of Justice was quoted as saying that KwaZulu had the power to remove people suspected of instigating faction fights and settle them elsewhere. (Daily News, 19.05.81) To what extent these powers have been used is not known but it appears that here too KwaZulu, as the local administration and responsible for maintaining 'law and order' in its territory, has been forced to adopt coercive strategies to control a major socio-economic crisis that has been caused, primarily, by its own position of dependence and underdevelopment within the political economy of South Africa. At the heart of much of the rural factional violence is competition over inadequate and shrinking resources. The social problems created by rural landlessness and overpopulation cannot be resolved by moving people from one impoverished and overpopulated area to another; all that that is likely to do is to transfer the problem to the relocation area.

CONCLUSION

The above is a very brief look at what is a complex and tangled issue: the relationship between KwaZulu, the most hostile to Pretoria and also the most powerful of the bantustans created by Pretoria, and the effect of this on relocation policies. It is apparent that within the bantustan system KwaZulu has achieved a certain degree of autonomy from Pretoria and that this has given it some bargaining power. It has used this position to oppose removals on occasion, and to embarrass the central government. Ultimately, however, as the case studies cited have shown, KwaZulu has not posed a serious threat to Pretoria's relocation plans; far more effective, as later case studies on Umbulwane, St Wendolin's and Reserve Four will show, have been strong local organisation coupled with pressure from outside support groups. Furthermore, as the Malukazi case study highlights, KwaZulu has been involved in administering certain removals as well.

KwaZulu's response points to the contradictory nature of its position, on relocation and in relation to Pretoria generally. It is in effect caught in the logic of participation in state structures whose final end is control of the population. As a participant it cannot escape from the responsibility of supporting that control; nor can it offer an adequate base from which to challenge it.

Appendix 1. Extract, parliamentary debate 7.05.82

781

FRIDAY, 7 MAY 1982

782

arising out of the hon. the Minister's reply, is he aware how many Cabinet Ministers were present here in the House last Friday to answer questions?

Mr. SPEAKER: Order!

†The PRIME MINISTER: Is Ken Andrew also a Cabinet Minister now? [Interjections.]

Mr. SPEAKER: Order!

KwaZulu: agreement

*11. Mr. G. B. D. McINTOSH asked the Minister of Co-operation and Development:

- (1) (a) What (i) was the nature and (ii) were the terms of, and (b) what areas of land were covered in, the agreement to which he referred in his reply to Question No. 465 on 23 April 1982;
- (2) (a) who signed the agreement on the behalf of (i) his Department and (ii) the Government of KwaZulu and (b) when was it signed?

†The MINISTER OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT:

- (1) to (2) The information furnished in reply to Question No. 465 has been discussed with the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and I have issued a statement in this regard and have therefor nothing more to add.

Mr. Speaker, I nevertheless want to say that we are dealing here with the same thing as in the previous question. I therefore ask the hon. member to come and discuss this matter with me, because I have here the agreement signed in April and August 1979. However, an attempt is being made here to make trouble, which will harm relations seriously. If the hon. member would take the trouble to come and get the particulars, I should very much like to make it available to him in order to prevent a wedge being driven in which could create serious problems in this country. I therefore want to ask the hon. member to come and discuss the matter with

me that I can inform him and show him what the position is.

Mr. B. R. BAMFORD: Mr. Speaker, on a point of order: Would you be prepared to give a ruling as to whether an hon. Minister is permitted to go beyond the giving of an answer to a question? [Interjections.]

Mr. SPEAKER: It is for the hon. Minister to decide whether he wishes to do so or not.

Mr. G. B. D. McINTOSH: Mr. Speaker, arising out of the hon. the Minister's reply, let me say that I am fully aware of the statement that was issued yesterday by the hon. the Minister. But may I ask him why he thinks that asking a question about such an agreement—it is something the KwaZulu Government says it has not agreed to, while the hon. the Minister says they have—is regarded as driving in a wedge?

Mr. SPEAKER: Order!

The MINISTER: Let the hon. member come and discuss the matter with me. Then I can give the hon. member the answer.

Mr. B. R. BAMFORD: What are you ashamed of?

The MINISTER: I am ashamed of nothing.

Mr. SPEAKER: Order!

Mr. B. R. BAMFORD: You look ashamed.

Mr. SPEAKER: Order!

†The MINISTER: We are still going to let you have it over this matter.

Oshakati: charge against driver of vehicle

*12. Mr. R. R. HULLEY asked the Minister of Defence:

- (1) Whether any (a) complaint has been lodged and (b) charge has been laid against the driver of vehicle No. R48716 as a result of an incident on the outskirts of Oshakati on 16 March 1982; if so, with what result;

Appendix 2. Press release, Kwazulu Minister of the Interior

The following press release was issued by the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior, Dr Mdlalose, in response to a statement by Dr Koornhof that certain procedures for the removal of black spots had been agreed upon with KwaZulu.

The Cabinet of KwaZulu has noted with grave concern the contents of the following item which appeared in the Natal Mercury on 5 November 1981:

"Removal 'procedures' with KwaZulu decided:

Certain procedures had been worked out with the KwaZulu Government about the removal of black spots in Natal, Dr Piet Koornhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development, said.

He held this up as an indication of the progress the Government was making with the homeland governments on the controversial issue of black spot removals.

Though he did not say so, it is known that the KwaZulu Government has virtually refused in the past even to discuss the issue.

Yesterday, Dr Koornhof said that there had been discussions at ministerial level with the KwaZulu Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr I.F. Mdlalose.

'Although there has been strong opposition in the past from the KwaZulu Government, a certain procedure has been decided on as a result of these discussions on future black spot removals,' he said.

The Cabinet, wishes to state that the information fed to the readers of the Natal Mercury is devoid of all truth and that the Cabinet can only conclude that it was a deliberate attempt to sow distrust and to bring the name of the KwaZulu Government into disrepute with its people. If the statement of Dr Koornhof is correct, it can only disturb the harmonious relations which at present exist between him and the KwaZulu Cabinet.

The factual position is and always has been that the KwaZulu Government is totally opposed to any removal of its people to areas determined by the Republican Government. The KwaZulu Government will oppose such removals with all the means at its disposal. It is admitted that discussions have taken place regarding removal of people but these discussions have always been on the basis that the people should not be removed.

The Minister of the Interior had discussions with the Deputy Minister of Development and Land Matters, Mr J.J.G. Wentzel, on 20 February and 27 May 1981 and at those discussions repeated requests were made that the people of *inter alia* Matiwane's Kop, Jonono's Kop, Driefontein Block and Reserve no. 4 should not be removed. After the discussion on 20 February 1981 the KwaZulu Cabinet agreed to the formation of a Steering Committee, on which senior officials of KwaZulu will serve, to investigate the development of the area in the Ladysmith district provided that such participation by the KwaZulu Government in no way is interpreted as acceptance of the removal of residents of Matiwaneskop and that the expropriation notices already issued be withdrawn.

It was further decided at the meeting with the Deputy Minister on 27 May 1981 that other steering committees would be established to include all other areas in KwaZulu

where similar problems exist.

Subsequent to this decision a proposal was submitted to the Cabinet by the Deputy Minister regarding removal of KwaZulu residents and the proposal was rejected by the Cabinet as it did not comply with the original decision of the Cabinet. How the Minister of Co-operation and Development can now state that "a certain procedure has been decided upon as a result of discussions on future Black spot removals" is beyond the comprehension of the Cabinet and is rejected.

(signed)

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

2. LAND TENURE IN NATAL BEFORE UNION

Outside of Group Areas removals, there have been two major thrusts of the relocation policies applied to Natal/KwaZulu over the last twenty years - 1) to locate as many africans as possible within the areas demarcated as 'KwaZulu' and 2) to reduce the number of those areas into a more coherent geopolitical whole, by eliminating black spots, consolidating the numerous scattered pieces and most recently, with the Ingwavuma proposals, actually handing a piece over to a foreign, neighbouring state (Swaziland). KwaZulu, as already mentioned, is itself a very recent political creation and its shape bears little relationship to the pattern of african land occupation in this region in the early 19th century. It consists of a core of land reserved for african occupation by the 19th century colonial and settler administrations in Natal to which other State and freehold (black and white) land has been added - and subtracted - during the course of the 20th century.

The following two chapters set out briefly the history of the various categories of land which have been drawn into or excluded from KwaZulu. They are intended to provide a background to the main body of this report. What they show very clearly is that current relocation policies as well as the policy of creating black areas as labour reserves and population holding grounds have their antecedents in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

This chapter looks at land tenure before 1910. The categories of land considered are:

- 1) the Natal reserves
- 2) the Mission reserves
- 3) the Zululand reserves
- 4) african freehold and mission station lands
- 5) State and white lands.

It is followed by a chapter looking at historical developments in these areas after Union, in the period before the main focus of this study, i.e. before about 1960.

1. The Natal reserves

When de facto British Control was assumed over the colony of Natal in 1845, one of the most urgent problems was the distribution of land. On the one hand there were at least 100 000 apparently 'refugee' africans, who had been dislocated by the Shakan wars and subsequent turmoil and who had now returned to their traditional lands, in addition to another perhaps 10 000 'aboriginal' blacks who had remained in Natal. On the other hand there was a land-hungry white population which included land speculators, restless Trekkers, and commercial farmers who were trying to produce for the local and export markets.

British Commissioner Henry Cloete had accepted the distinction between 'aboriginal' and 'refugee' africans in 1843, and reported:

... a distinction should be made between those in the country, who continued to occupy lands as their own and have thus a claim to those lands as their own, and such other Kafirs who are but late deserters from the Zulu country, and have fled into this colony within the last two or three years ... and who are now settled down on any spot which they happened to have found unoccupied.

(Quoted in Welsh, 1971, 3)

Cloete suggested the establishment of locations (or reserves) and this was acted upon by the 1846 /47 Commission for Locating the Natives. This Commission recommended the establishment of seven locations : Zwartkop, Umlazi, Umvoti, Inanda, Impofana, Umzin-yathi and 'one on the Tugela'.

Although the 1848 Lands Commission and the 1852 /3 Native Affairs Commission attempted to reduce the size of these reserves, a certain amount of land was in fact added to them so that by 1864, when the legal position of the reserves was finally defined, there were then in Natal 42 reserves totalling about 836 509 ha and a further 21 mission reserves totalling about 70 764 ha (Brookes and Webb, 1965, 60 On the mission reserves see below.)

Both the legal position and the permanence of these locations were not assured until 1864, when the Natal Native Trust was established and ownership of this land vested in that. In 1847 the Locations Commission, which was composed of officials and missionaries, had recommended that a trust be formed on a tribal basis, 'the Government reserving to itself the right to convert these lands or portions of them, into freehold grants for africans whose improved conditions of life rendered such action desirable.' (Brookes, 1974, 163) They regarded such a Trust as a legal approximation to the traditional african land tenure system, in which it was believed that the 'land was owned by a trust of which the chief-in-council was the sole member.' (Brookes, 1974, 161) Following the 1847 Commission, the original intention of officials (particularly those in the Native Affairs Department) was that each tribe should receive titles, vested in trustees, one of whom would be the chief, with the power to divide the land, even into units for individual land holding. This policy was implemented in the Umnini Trust established in May 1858 for the Thuli people who had been moved by the colonial administration from their original home on the Bluff, next to Durban, to the Umlazi area to the south - one of the earliest forced removals in Natal.

The official point of view can be readily comprehended. The idea of tribal titles supported and concurred with their native policy which was based on using traditional structures to govern the african population. Individual title would have undermined this. Also, it was argued, the locations were not suitable for 'minute sub-division' and individual tenure was alien to traditional african society.

The location system was, however, strongly criticised by many colonists. The colonists considered that the locations were too expensive, thus causing a labour shortage (because africans were able to subsist independently of wage labour), and also posed a security threat. When the question of tenure was raised, colonists, ironically, came out in opposition to the segregationist policy. In their opinion, the extensive locations and official native policy discouraged beneficial contact with 'civilised' people, and encouraged traditionalism and tribalism. Tribal titles would have the effect of entrenching this. They therefore adopted an assimilationist policy, but they 'did not really mean assimilation in the sense of eliminating cultural differences between white and black; rather, they wished to entrench a new difference : that between a class of masters and a class of servile labourers'. (Welsh, 1971, 40/1) Individual tenure was supported because it would open up the reserves for white purchase and facilitate the cheap labour supply. Tribal titles were unacceptable, not only because they lacked the obvious advantages of freehold and reinforced the political power of traditional authorities, but also because the Trustees would tend to be independent of legislative control and forestall governmental powers to re-allocate reserve land.

Thus, the segregation/integration issue, as manifested in the land tenure debate, should be seen as peripheral to the central issue - control over native policy. No party really wanted complete segregation and no party really wanted thorough-going assimilation; each wanted to satisfy their material interests. For one party - the colonists - this meant gaining access to and control over african productive capacity and labour-power. For

the other - the colonial administration - it meant establishing efficient and economical control on a tribal basis. To an extent these interests overlapped, but the distinctions were manifested in their different views on land tenure.

The outcome was in fact a compromise. In the Natal Native Trust (Letters Patent 27th April 1864) all the reserves were alienated to the Trust, which consisted of the Natal Executive Council sitting in the capacity of Trustees. Land tenure was on neither a tribal nor an individual basis. The Trustees were empowered to 'grant, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the same lands, in such wise as they shall deem fit, for the support, advantage or well-being of the said Natives, or for purposes connected therewith.' (Quoted in Welsh, 1971, 184) The Trust was thus able to control both the people and the land.

The jurisdiction of the Trust extended over an area of slightly more than two million acres. At the time that it was started, and subsequently, there was no mention of or action taken in alienating land to families, individuals or other groups, and communal tenure was enforced. Much of the allocated land was of inferior quality - generally very hilly and agriculturally less viable than the lands retained for the white colonists. Magistrate Peppercorne, in the early 1850s, described most of the land of the Impofana Location (present-day Msinga) as 'as worthless as the sands of Arabia.' (Quoted in Welsh, 1971, 177) At the same time, although the Trust was not restricted in acquiring more land, between 1846 and 1913 hardly any more land was added to these locations or the mission reserves.

These lands were the only areas where africans had any legal claim (apart from a small number of individually purchased farms, described below) and, trapped within fixed boundaries, their population grew rapidly. Added to the natural increase in the population was a continual influx of families evicted off private white and State lands as well as refugees moving in or returning from across the Tugela River. Already from the 1870s africans were complaining bitterly about the shortage of land; the degradation of the environment in the reserves due to overpopulation, and lack of development was clearly in evidence by the late 19th century. In 1906/7 the Natal Native Commission criticised the Trust, for 'beyond some tree-planting, fencing, and the construction of a few water-courses and roads, no attempt had been made to improve the vast estate controlled by the Trust in order to make it more habitable or carry a larger population...' (Brookes, 1974, 164)

In contrast to the overcrowding in the reserves, the white settlers in Natal held vast areas of land. In the 1870s there were some 8 000 whites living on just under 2,5 million hectares. Even in the first decade of the 20th century, the average size of white farms was 800 to 1 200 ha and 1 600 to 2 000 ha was common. (Marks, 1970, 120) In 1907, after the delimitation of the Zululand reserves, the ratio of the rural population to land acreage was 1 : 184 for whites and 1 : 8 for blacks. (Marks, 1970, 121)

2. The Mission reserves

In a slightly different category from the Natal reserves proper, were the Mission reserves. These were areas of african occupation that were set aside under the authority of various mission societies, of which there were a number. (19th century Natal has been described as one of the most heavily evangelised areas in Africa at the time.)

In these reserves about 500 acres would generally be alienated as 'glebes' for the specific use of the relevant missionary society (often the most productive land) and a further six to eight thousand acres set aside as the reserve. This land was held in trust by a board consisting of the Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary of the Mission and

the Secretary for Native Affairs. The land was to be used by the local african people and could, with the permission of the Lieutenant Governor, be alienated to individuals. (Welsh, 1971, 47) The first mission reserves were demarcated in 1856 and by 1864 there were 21 of them, totalling 70 764 ha. (Brookes and Webb, 1965, 60. Later boundary adjustments brought the total to 19) Generally within these areas a fairly prosperous *Kholwa*⁺ group emerged (see Etherington, 1978) taking advantage of the benefits that contact with a missionary offered. Missionaries, especially Americans, and their converts, tended to be strongly in favour of individual land tenure, and various experiments with it were attempted at Grootville. The advantages of individual land tenure were seen to be the incentive for agricultural improvement it held out, the security of tenure, and the diminution of chiefly control. (Marks, 1970, 61. For a list of the reserves see Table 1, below.)

Colonists and officials were particularly strongly opposed to mission reserves and attempted to get them placed within the Natal Native Trust. In the 1890s they put an end to individual land tenure in these areas and with the 1903 Mission Reserves Act, brought them under their direct control. By means of this Act the Trust took over the administration of these reserves although the mission stations were allowed to remain. Shula Marks (1970, 77/8) quotes the aims of the Act, as articulated by Leuchars, Minister for Native Affairs in Natal in 1903, as

to check and if possible stop a movement in this colony amongst the natives which was growing very quickly ... of throwing off white control and achieving for itself and its supporters independence and self-government.

Table 1 NATAL MISSION RESERVES
Source : SAIRR Factsheet, Nr. 25/1965; 2.03.65

RESERVE	DISTRICT	DENOMINATION	ACREAGE
1 Emmaus	Bergville	Lutheran	5 476
2 Table Mountain	Camperdown	American Board	5 632
3 St Michael's	Ixopo	Catholic	6 300
4 Grootville	Lower Tugela	American Board	9 086
5 Isidumbini	Mapumulo	American Board	5 500
6 Mapumulo	Mapumulo	American Board	8 196
7 Umpumulo	Mapumulo	Lutheran	12 000
8 Enhlizeni	Msinga	Lutheran	11 000
9 Inanda	Ndwedwe	American Board	11 500
10 Itafamazi	Ndwedwe	American Board	5 500
11 Umsunduzi	Ndwedwe	American Board	5 595
12 Amanzimtoti	Umlazi	American Board	8 077
13 Imfume	Umlazi	American Board	7 498
14 Umlazi	Umlazi	Anglican	7 521
15 Etembeni	Umvoti	Lutheran	5 939
16 Amahlongwa	Umzinto	American Board	6 965
17 Ifafa	Umzinto	American Board	6 209
18 Umtwalume	Umzinto	American Board	12 922
19 Ndaleneni	Richmond	Methodist	5 664

⁺ Amakholwa - literally 'the believers', i.e. Christian converts.

3. The Zululand reserves

Historically the area north of the Tugela River and south of Kosi Bay consisted of two separate, though interdependent political entities, Zululand proper and Thongaland.


ZULULAND

In the mid 19th century the region north of the Tugela and west of the Buffalo rivers was indisputably part of the Zulu kingdom. However, in the second half of the 19th century successive Zulu kings faced a growing problem of encroachment onto their land by white settler-farmers from the Transvaal (the South African Republic) who were marking out farms for themselves in the north-west, in the present-day Utrecht district. Finally, after the Transvaal had been annexed by Britain in 1877, the Natal Government agreed to appoint a Boundary Commission to investigate Zulu complaints and appeals for support in this matter. Acting on the Commission's report shortly before the outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu War - and thereby contributing to the rupture between the Zulus and the British - the British Governor upheld the Zulu claim to the territory but recommended that Boer ownership of land they already occupied should be recognised, albeit under Zulu sovereignty. It was a settlement that amounted to a *de facto*, if not *de jure*, alienation of Zulu land; an alienation which became formalised in 1887 when, the Zulu kingdom defeated and dismembered and the Transvaal once more independent, the district of Utrecht was incorporated into the South African Republic of the Transvaal Boers.

The encroachment of white settlers into Zululand did not stop at Utrecht. Political instability within the former Zulu kingdom, after its defeat at the hands of the British in 1879, gave the land-hungry Boers an opportunity to carve out more land for themselves to the south and east. In 1884 a group of about 100 Boers agreed to help Dinizulu, heir to the defeated Cetshwayo, in an attack on Zibhebhu, one of the Zulu chiefs whom the British had set up as an independent ruler (and thus rival to Dinizulu) within the former Zulu kingdom. The Boers duly took part in an attack on Zibhebhu and then demanded their fee - 800 farms, a vast tract of land measuring about 4 000 square miles in extent. Intervention by the British succeeded in scaling down their claim a little, but not much, and thus the area that today encompasses the districts of Mtonjaneni, Babanango, Vryheid and Ngotshe passed out of Zulu control and into white ownership. On this land the Boers set up the New Republic which, after a few years, was incorporated into the South African Republic in 1887, along with Utrecht.

These Northern Districts, as they were known, were subsequently returned to Natal in 1903, after the Anglo-Boer War, but were not restored to the Zulu people. They remained firmly in the hands of the descendants of the Boers. Today, this area, unlike the rest of Natal, is still dominated by Afrikaans-speaking whites, many of them holding extremely rightwing views and hostile to even moderate black aspirations for land and improved conditions of living. The Zulu people, whose land this once was, were not necessarily removed from these districts. Many continued to live on the white farms as labour tenants or rent-paying tenants, gradually brought under the increased control of both individual farmers and the State. Their status on their land had thus been fundamentally altered - their security of tenure now depended on the goodwill of their white landlord.

Because of the failure of the settlement imposed on the Zulu kingdom by the British after the war in 1879, Britain finally annexed this territory in 1887. From then on pressures mounted within Natal for settler control over the area so that they could exploit its resources. Sugar farmers wanted the fertile coastal lands. Cattle farmers wanted the rich grazing lands in certain parts of the interior (notably the Nqutu and



Nkandla districts). There was some gold at Nondweni and coal at Hlabisa. Some settlers wanted to expel all the 'surplus' african population in the colony to north of the Tugela - an idea dating back to Volksraad policy in Natal in the 1840s. Officials wanted Natal to gain prestige in the current partition of Africa and, more important, to be in control of the region before the Zulu king, Dinizulu, returned from his term of imprisonment on St Helena (1888 - 1897).

In 1897 Britain agreed to hand over control of Zululand to Natal, and from the start it seems to have been accepted by both Britain and Natal that Zululand would be opened to white settlement. The 1902/04 Delimitations Commission, appointed by the Natal government, set aside 1 573 019 hectares in 21 reserves, and the remaining 1 057 444 hectares was open to purchase. (Brookes and Webb, 1965, 186) The Natal government never implemented the Commission's proposal that anyone could buy in the purchase areas - which included almost all of the sugar-growing areas, and most of the good cattle grazing areas (32 000 ha at Nkandla, nearly 11 000 ha at Nqutu). (Marks, 1970, 128) Rather, they allowed only whites to buy land. After the land settlement in the 1913 Land Act and the passage of the 1920 Native Affairs Act, africans could only buy land outside the reserves with the permission of the Governor-General; this was only granted for 405 ha at Amatikhulu (the 'Amatikhulu lots'). (Brookes and Webb, 1965, 187)

Thus a considerable portion of historical Zululand was lost by the Zulu people in the 19th century, and in the 20th century only three fifths of what remained was reserved exclusively for africans. On the rest - some 1,05 million hectares - africans could only squat or become labour tenants. To a great extent, the desires of white farming merchants and prospecting interests had been fulfilled: 'to indiscriminately throw open the whole of the lands suitable for European occupation, irrespective of the interests of the Natives occupying these territories'. (Commissioners Saunders and Beachcroft, of the 1902/04 Delimitations Commission, quoted by Marks, 1970, 127)

THONGALAND

The northern reaches of present-day KwaZulu - in the Ingwavuma and Ubombo districts - were not, historically, part of the original kingdom of Zululand and this still has a bearing on political developments in the area today. The northern boundaries of the Zulu kingdom were not clearly demarcated in the 19th century; according to Jeff Guy 'to the north lay the Swazi kingdom and in the north east the direct authority of the Zulu king shaded into the tribute areas of the Thonga chiefdoms'. (Guy, 1979, 21) A cluster of small, independent tribes loosely grouped together as the Thonga, inhabited the region between the Lubombo mountains in the west and the sea; their territory included the southern reaches of present-day Mocambique as well. In the west the Thonga territory blurred into land controlled by the Swazis, in the south into land controlled by the Zulus.

Although the Thonga paid tribute to their powerful southern neighbour, they did not form part of the Zulu kingdom and were thus not defeated by the British in 1879. However, in 1887 when Britain annexed Zululand, it incorporated the southern reaches of Thonga territory into the area it was annexing and thus brought them under British administration. Subsequently the Thonga in the Kosi Bay area asked for British protection and in 1895 their lands were proclaimed a British protectorate. When Zululand was handed over to the Natal settler government in 1897, Thongaland was included with it. This whole area thus came under the control of the white settlers in Natal and was subjected to the determinations of the Zululand Delimitations Commission. In this way the boundaries of the present scheduled reserves in this area were established in 1904 and a vast corridor of land, loosely described as the Makhathini Flats and already settled by the indigenous african people, became designated as State land, its inhabitants as squatters.

This territory covers the present-day district of Ingwavuma, the area which the central

government is currently offering to Swaziland. It is justifying its action by referring to the non-Zulu origins of the people of this area (overlooking its own classification of them as Zulu a little while before). Its commitment to ethnicity is not only opportunistic, it is also historically false. Only the Ngoni people living in the Lubombo area, on the western border of Ingwavuma with Swaziland, have kinship and historical ties to Swaziland. The people in the north, in whose territory Kosi Bay falls, have never been part of a Swazi nation.

4. African freehold land

The origins of african freehold land date back to the mid 19th century when a small but vigorous and predominantly Christian peasantry was in the process of emerging in Natal and other parts of the country. This process has been described by Bundy (1979) and, for Natal in particular, Wright (nd), Etherington (1975, 1978) and Slater (1973, 1975). At this time, in response to expanding market opportunities in colonial Natal, under pressure to find cash to meet taxes and consumer needs and partially shielded from hostile white settlers by a colonial administration that was anxious not to jeopardise security in the colony, an increasing number of african households began producing an agricultural surplus for sale on the open market. For a brief couple of decades this group flourished and grew into a recognisable, frequently prosperous peasantry and it was from this new class of african farmers and entrepreneurs that the first african landowners came.

According to the available evidence, much of the agricultural activity of this group was based on non-tribal land - mission, white-owned or Crown (State) - which the producers either rented from the owners or simply occupied as squatters. However, by the 1860s some peasant producers, the richer ones, often with missionary backing or support, were beginning to enter the property market as well. According to Etherington (1975, 4), 'the first Kholwa purchases were motivated not by a desperate search for food, but by an opportunistic desire for good land held on secure tenure and located, if possible, near ready markets.' He does not pinpoint the exact date for the first purchase but describes this process as well under way by the early 1860s. Already in 1851 Edendale, just outside Pietermaritzburg, had been acquired by an ex-Methodist missionary on behalf of his mission community. This land was subsequently sub-divided and sold off to his followers. In 1861 a group of men from the Indaleni Mission Reserve (near present-day Richmond) approached their District Chairman for help in buying some land in the Upper Mzimkhulu river valley. (Unfortunately Etherington does not specify the name of the property.) They were followed by a group of 30 to 40 men from Edendale who banded together into a Trust to buy more land - first the farm Driefontein, outside Ladysmith, in 1867 and then the adjoining farms of Kleinfontein and Doornhoek: today the nucleus of the large Driefontein complex of farms and under imminent threat of removal.

By 1870 africans owned 12 357 acres in Natal, compared to 35 786 acres owned by various churches and 5 025 836 acres owned by whites (Christopher, 1969, 215) - a miniscule 0.24% of the total freehold land then allocated in the Natal colony, but the beginning of a radically different form of land tenure within african society and the base on which a tiny class of african landowners was emerging. As the african peasantry continued to grow in the next couple of decades, so too the amount of freehold land in african ownership increased. Between 1870 and 1880 the acreage increased five-fold, to 62 012 acres (1.14% of the total freehold in the colony) and by 1890 a total of 206 719 acres was in african ownership. (Christopher, 1969, 276)

Most of this land was inland, where land was cheaper than on the coast, and concentrated

mainly in the northern districts where very little land had been set aside as reserves. The 2 counties with the largest amount of african freehold were the Pietermaritzburg county (which took in the southern Drakensberg as well) and the Klip River county in the north. By 1890 there was a total of 84 189 acres of african freehold in the Pietermaritzburg county, much of it along the upper Umkomaas river valley (where a large number of released black spots still remain today), and a total of 83 482 acres in the Klip River county, grouped around three major blocks - to the south-east of Newcastle, the west of Wasbank (including Boschhoek, Meran, Steincoalspruit) and the north of Ladysmith (the Driefontein area). (Christopher, 1969, 253)


However, although the amount of land in african ownership continued to increase after 1890, to 395 113 acres by 1900 and 397 754 acres by 1910, from the 1890s the pace of purchases began to slacken and then fall off, with foreclosures on sales of african-owned lands to whites beginning to equal new purchases. This relative decline in african land ownership coincides with the decline in the fortunes of the african peasantry, of which it was a part. Bundy and others have described this process: a product of the political powerlessness of the peasantry in relation to the white settlers in Natal and of the voracious labour needs of the new mines. The opening of the gold and diamond mines in the last quarter of the 19th century gave an enormous boost to white commercial agriculture, previously stagnant, and unleashed a heavy demand for cheap labour by both the mines and farms of white South Africa. In response to these new opportunities, the various white colonial governments of Southern Africa began laying the foundations of the modern migrant labour system: restricting black access to land outside of the reserves, controlling mobility and forcing blacks into wage labour by a series of tax and land laws. The process of proletarianisation of the bulk of the african population was further speeded up by a series of natural disasters, including cattle disease, from which many african producers and subsistence farmers, lacking political leverage and access to capital, failed to recover. By 1910 the peasantry was, as a class, in a state of collapse.

In Natal the white settlers finally achieved responsible government in 1893 and immediately began to use their new political clout to restrict africans' access to land and channel them into labouring for them instead. In the 1890s the mission reserves were closed to individual ownership and in 1903 the Lands Department was instructed to refuse all african bids at sales of Crown land. By the time Natal joined the Union in 1910 african acquisition of freehold land had been checked and the economic basis of the peasantry smashed.

Nevertheless, a small but significant amount of land remained in african hands, land which continued to nurture an embattled but relatively powerful stratum of african society in Natal in the 20th century and into the era of bantustans and homeland governments. In 1905 there were 1 545 registered african landowners in Natal and 3 in Zululand, owning an average of about 250 acres each. In addition there were by 1910 134 450 acres of land owned by various churches and settled by african tenants. These mission stations were in a separate category from the mission reserves. They consisted of individual farms acquired by various mission societies - often with the financial help of their converts - parts or all of which were then leased back to individual members of the congregation.

Although little is known about the society that was emerging on these lands, it seems clear that this group formed something of an elite within the wider african society, linked to each other by a complex network of marriage alliances, a common, staunchly mission-Christian culture, often highly educated and independent of traditional tribal structures and institutions. A number of prominent Natal african nationalists of the 20th century were drawn from this group, including Selby Msimang, from Edendale/Driefontein and Chief Luthuli from Groutville.

LAND OWNERSHIP COLONY OF NATAL 1910



On the freehold lands a new kind of landlord/tenant relationship was developing within african society. It seems that already by the early 20th century african landowners were taking on rent-paying tenants in lieu of producing agricultural goods for an elusive market. There were two inter-related factors at work - the inability of black farmers to compete on the market as described above, and the growing pressure on land within the reserves which was driving more and more landless people to look for alternatives elsewhere. African freehold land was one of the last remaining areas where access to land was not mediated by government officials or appointees. This role of catchment for people dispossessed of land elsewhere, which is one of the most significant characteristics of contemporary black spots, had already started in the early 20th century. By 1916, when figures were available, probably about two thirds of the population on black freehold farms were tenants, and their families (see below). The extreme sub-division of land which characterises many black spots today was not yet a feature, however, and agriculture, for subsistence but also to a diminishing extent for sale, was likely to have been the main economic activity.

Table 2 BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP IN NATAL 1860 - 1910
Source : Christopher, 1969

	AFRICAN	INDIAN	CHURCH
1860	?	-	-
1870	12 357	-	35 786 ⁺
1880	62 012	193	66 629
1890	206 719	2 510	105 930
1900	395 113	18 426	129 992
1910	397 754	34 972 ⁺⁺	134 450

+ Church of Scotland, near Pietermaritzburg, i.e. Impolweni area.

++ Including 489 acres in the Klip River District.

Table 3 DISTRIBUTION OF FREEHOLD LAND AMONG MISSION CHURCHES, 1910
Source : Christopher, 1969

	ACRES
Hermansberg (Lutheran)	33 988
Marianhill (RCC)	32 195
Other RCC	10 011
Anglicans	14 688
Berlin M.S. (Lutheran)	11 144
Swedish M.S. (Lutheran)	8 110
Free Church of Scotland	6 057
Church of Scotland	5 890
Norwegian M.S. (Lutheran)	3 533
Others (includes American Methodist, American Mission Board and 6 smaller churches)	8 834

5. White and unalienated (state) land

By the 19th century many africans squatted on Crown or privately-owned lands. Squatting was then (as now) the official term used by whites to describe blacks who were living on white-owned land but not in the employ of the landowner. In fact although some of these people occupied the land without the agreement of the legal landowner, most of them were

cash-paying tenants of the landowner and not squatters at all. They were there out of necessity, because of the shortage of land in the reserves, but the white reaction to them was mixed. For absentee land speculators or farmers who were not using all of their lands, these tenants could provide a useful source of income. But for commercial farmers, who wanted to use all of their land or who wanted labour or who wanted to reduce competition from african farmers, the cash tenants were a threat to their interests. As white agricultural capitalistic interests became stronger in the Natal economy and in the legislature, from the 1860s, increasing pressures were put on the tenants, primarily legislative, to get them evicted. Often the justification used for eviction was the great increase in the number of african-owned cattle on the land, but in fact white-owned cattle herds were increasing more rapidly at this time. (De Kiewet, 1937, 193) These evictions caused considerable anger and bitterness amongst africans, and in 1875 Shepstone refused to support an anti-squatting bill in the legislature out of fear that it might precipitate a serious revolt. (De Kiewet, 1937, 191). Evictions of africans off white-owned land increased sharply after the Anglo-Boer war, when numbers of colonists settled in the Natal Midlands and engaged in dairy and wattle farming. In 1905, for example, about 2 500 africans were evicted from white-owned farms in Natal. (De Kiewet, 1937, 125)

Despite these evictions, substantial numbers of africans remained both on State and private white lands. There were in 1913 37 000 africans living on State lands alone, according to government statistics. (Marks, 1970, 125. Many of these would have been on the Makhathini Flats.) According to the chairman of the Beaumont Commission, reporting in 1916 in a dissenting minute to the main report of the Commission, over half of the total african population in Natal were then living on white-owned or State land - 440 000 altogether. (Report of the Beaumont Commission, 1916, 41) He noted

Large numbers reside on what are known as the 'thorn farms' - indicating the hotter areas where the Mimosa flourishes. These are not occupied by Europeans, or only partially so, but are used for winter grazing, and for obtaining a supply of labourers for farming purposes.

These thorn farms, mainly located in the Weenen/Greytown area, would be the scene of extensive evictions fifty years later.

Although there were advantages for this group of africans in squatting - chiefly, access to land outside the overcrowded reserves - there were disadvantages too. Rents were often high: £2 per hut per annum on State land in the early 20th century, as much as £7 per hut on privately-owned land. Such rents were often higher than the value of what the land could produce. (Marks, 1970, 122, 125) There was also no security of tenure.

Cash tenancy gradually diminished in Natal, with the spread of white settlement and of capitalist agriculture. Pressure was applied on africans living on white land to convert from cash to labour tenancy and thus provide white farmers with much-needed labour. Under the labour tenant system each household provided labour to the landowner for a period at first averaging three months a year, later stepped up to six months a year, in return for the right to use a portion of the land for its own agricultural production and subsistence. Although african cash tenancy on white land has continued in Natal right up until the present day, by the early 20th century labour tenancy had become the major form of african access to white land outside the reserves. It remained the major form of farm labour in Natal until the massive evictions of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

3. LAND TENURE IN NATAL 1910 - 1960

1. Land legislation 1910-1936

In 1910 Natal became part of the newly created Union of South Africa. In this section the major features of legislation affecting african access to land in Natal after Union are outlined; the information should be read against the background provided by the brief historical overview of the evolution of South Africa's reserve policy in Volume One.

THE NATIVES LAND ACT OF 1913

In terms of the Natives Land Act of 1913, about 10,5 million morgen (8,98 million ha) of land were scheduled as 'Native Reserves' throughout South Africa, with provision being made for the addition of more land, to be 'released' for this purpose in the future. Henceforth africans were no longer allowed to acquire land outside what had been scheduled and, as the 'separate but equal' pundits were quick to point out, whites could not acquire land within the scheduled areas. The main purpose behind this Act was to preserve a limited rural subsistence base for africans outside of the urban-industrial centres, which would then subsidise the migrant labour system without being able to support an economically independent black peasantry.

The schedule accompanying the Act was based on the existing reserves and locations established during the colonial period; it amounted to a mere 7% of the total land surface in South Africa. In Natal about 3 050 000 morgen (2 610 800 ha - 15% of the total area of the province) were scheduled in this way,⁺ somewhat less than the land set aside in the Cape but considerably more than what was made available in the Transvaal and Orange Free State (where little land had been set aside as reserves in the 19th century).

It appears from the available secondary material that most of the existing african freehold land was not included in the schedule for Natal. Some of it was. According to Tatz (1962, 22) the schedule consisted of 'the existing African reserves and locations in the Union as well as of land privately owned by Africans'; the extent of this last category of land is not, however, specified. Brookes and Hurwitz, writing in 1957, distinguish very definitely between 'Scheduled land'; 'Additional Scheduled land' (which included some 'Native individually-owned' and 'Native tribally-owned' land); 'Released land' (in terms of the 1936 Land Act), and 'Native-owned lands' (most of which was released as well).

The following Table gives a breakdown of the land scheduled as reserves in Natal in 1913.

⁺ Available figures do not tally exactly. The Beaumont Commission (1916) records 3 049 627 morgen of native reserves, locations, mission lands and reserves; Brookes and Hurwitz (1951) record 3 061 399 morgen of scheduled and 24 242 morgen of additional scheduled land; in 1970 the Minister of BAD said in Parliament there were 3 041 245 morgen of scheduled land in Natal.

Table 4 LAND SCHEDULED IN NATAL, 1913
Source: Brookes and Hurwitz (1957, 23) Hectares calculated
by Thorrrington-Smith et al. (1978, 6)

1. SCHEDULED LAND	ACRES	MORGEN
1. Natal locations	2 267 632	
2. Mission reserves	146 571	
3. Zululand reserves	3 887 000	
	6 301 203	3 061 399
		(2 615 366 hectares)
2. ADDITIONAL SCHEDULED LAND		
1. Crown forest lands		7 238
2. Native individually-owned		2 392
3. Native tribally-owned		871
4. Mission-owned		3 127
5. Trader-owned		2 429
6. Other		8 185
		24 242
		(21 151 hectares)

THE BEAUMONT COMMISSION AND LOCAL COMMITTEES

In order to meet its commitment to increase the area of the reserves as scheduled in 1913, the government appointed the Natives Land Commission (the Beaumont Commission, named after its Chairman) to investigate and make recommendations concerning the additional land that should be added to that core. Its recommendations, finally tabled in 1916, suggested an additional 8 365 774 morgen (approximately 7 211 874 ha) be added to what had already been scheduled. This was met with strong opposition from local white interest groups who, in a manner foreshadowing current consolidation squabbling, supported segregation but did not want to give up any of their own land to make it possible. As a result, the Commission's recommendations were shelved and five Local Committees appointed to review and make amendments to its proposals instead.

The recommendations of these committees scaled down the Beaumont recommendations to 7 521 273 morgen (approximately 6 483 813 hectares). First made available in 1918, these proposals were adopted in principle by the Smuts government in 1921. (Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 43) Although no legislation was passed to formalise the addition of these lands to the reserves until 1936, in practice these recommended areas were opened up to african acquisition (through purchase or lease), where they were not already so owned or occupied. 183 870 morgen (approximately 158 508 hectares) was reportedly acquired by africans in Natal in this way between 1913 and 1936, according to the Minister of Bantu Administration in 1969. (Quoted in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 46) It is not clear from this figure how much of this total represented new purchases, how much of it was made up of land already owned by africans but not scheduled in 1913, and how much was land that was not owned but was occupied by africans and subsequently recognised as released in 1936. Close scrutiny of the available figures for the period 1910 - 1959, none of which

correspond satisfactorily, suggests that the bulk of this land consisted of already established african freehold land. (See Table 7 below.)

THE 1936 NATIVE TRUST AND LAND ACT

The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, finally passed by Parliament in 1936, is one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the history of 20th century South Africa. It touched on the lives of all african people, giving added shape and content to the reserve policy and establishing new controls over africans living on white-owned land.

Drawing on the system of Trust tenure developed in colonial Natal, this Act created a legal body to be known as the South African Native Trust (SANT) (later the South African Bantu Trust and now the South African Development Trust) in which ownership of the african reserves in South African was vested. According to the Act, this Trust was to be administered 'for the settlement, support, benefit and material and moral welfare of the natives of the Union.' (Quoted in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 51) The various Trusts established in Natal before 1910, to administer the Natal and Zululand reserves were, with the exception of the Umini Trust, absorbed into this new body.

The 1936 Land Act also marked out the geographical dimensions of the reserves and created a new category of reserve land, that of released land - land released from the prohibition placed on african acquisition of land outside the scheduled reserves of 1913, i.e. land legally opened up for african occupation, either through the Trust or through individual or group purchase. In so doing the Act formally legalised the position of the new land bought by africans in the recommended areas since 1921 and recognised certain other areas already owned or occupied by africans for inclusion in the reserves. In an attached schedule to the Act, a list of 47 released lands was set out which, according to the Minister of Native Affairs at the time, corresponded 'substantially' to what had been proposed in 1918 by the Local Committees. (Quoted in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 45)

QUOTA LAND

In addition to adding more land to the scheduled reserves, the Act drew a severe limit to the amount of extra land that was to be made available. It put forward a total of 7,25 million morgen (6,2 million ha), apportioned between the four provinces on a quota basis, as the maximum amount of land that africans could acquire in South Africa over and above what had already been scheduled in 1913; the SANT was empowered to buy up whatever land was needed to add to the newly recognised released areas so as to meet that total. This figure was in fact a reduction on what the 1918 local committees had recommended. Since 1916 white pressure groups had successfully whittled down the various proposals for more land for the reserves from 8 365 774 morgen (Beaumont) to 7 521 273 morgen (1918 committees) to 7 250 000 morgen (1936 quota). Until 1979 successive governments in South African were adamant that the 1936 quota represented the final allocation of land for africans and that they would not go beyond it. When added to the 1913 schedule the new figure brought the total amount of land reserved for africans to only 13% of the land mass in South Africa.

Natal's share of the quota was set at 526 000 morgen, well below the 5 028 000 morgen and 1 616 000 morgen allocated to the Transvaal and Cape respectively. Once again the available figures do not correspond exactly, but according to the Chief Native Commissioner of Natal in 1955, 288 718 morgen (247 295 hectares - Thorrrington-Smith et al, 1978, 6) of this Natal quota was released in terms of the 1936 schedule; the remaining 237 282 morgen (203 239 hectares) had still to be identified and bought by the SANT. (NAUNLU, 11.03.55)

Although the released areas were all specified in the 1936 schedule, (drawing on

the 1918 recommendations), not all of these lands had been formally acquired by them. Again, the figures are conflicting. Brookes and Hurwitz, writing in 1957, refer to 33 066 morgen of released land that had yet to be bought, over and above the outstanding quota of land allocated to Natal. (1957, 23) Addressing the NAU Congress in 1959, the Chief Native Commissioner said 314 800 morgen out of the total quota of 526 000 morgen still remained to be acquired, i.e. 77 518 morgen more than the 237 282 morgen of quota land set in 1936. (NAUNLU, 2.10.59) Most of the released land that was acquired in Natal by 1936 consisted of land already owned or bought by africans since 1913. Again according to the Chief Commissioner of Natal in 1959, in 1936 africans owned 136 600 morgen of the 288 718 morgen of land that was released. (NAUNLU, 2.10.59) Once the outstanding amount of released land still to be acquired has been taken into account as well, these figures mean that only a relatively small amount of land could have been vested in the Trust itself in 1936 - some 47 000 morgen. (See Table 5.)

None of the figures correspond very well which makes them particularly difficult to grasp; the following table sets out the main features of the allocation of reserve land in Natal between 1913 and 1936.

Table 5. ALLOCATION OF RESERVE LAND, NATAL, 1913 - 1936

Note : 1 morgen = approximately 0,86 hectare

DATE	CATEGORY OF LAND	MORGEN	SOURCE
a) 1913	Scheduled reserves	1) 3 061 399 24 242 2) 3 041 245	Brookes & Hurwitz, 1957 Minister of BAD, 1969
b) 1936	'Acquired by africans' 1913 - 1936 - owned/bought by africans - occupied by africans in recommended areas	183 870 136 600 47 270	Minister of BAD, 1969 Chief Native Commissioner, 1959 Calculated from above
c) 1936	Released land - owned/bought by africans - occupied by africans/ vested in Trust - to be acquired by Trust/ africans	288 718 136 600 47 270 104 848	Chief Native Commissioner, 1955 Calculated from above
d) 1936	Outstanding quota	237 282	Chief Native Commissioner, 1955
TOTAL RESERVE AREA ALLOCATED : 1) 3 611 641 (a) + c) + d) 2) 3 567 245			
TOTAL LAND STILL TO - Released 104 848 BE ACQUIRED IN 1936 : - Quota + 237 282 342 130			

2. African freehold land 1910-1936

The information on african freehold land in Natal between 1910 and 1936 is sparse. Such secondary source material as there is is often contradictory and confusing and to unravel the important issue of what the attitude of white agriculture was to these properties, before the Second World War, would be a major study. The following section is thus incomplete. It looks briefly at the main features of the legislation that was shaping the future of this land during this period and includes, where possible, such data as to area and population as has been found.

During this time the role of the african reserves as reservoirs of cheap labour was being developed. Their basic outline was being slowly but systematically marked out, traditional tribal structures bent into more refined instruments of control. It was clear that private title to land among blacks ran counter to this general scheme of things and that a significant proportion of the existing 'Native-owned lands' did not fit inside the approved boundaries of the 'Native territories'. Yet while the status of their freehold areas became ambiguous and their long-term security more vulnerable, their continued existence was not seriously threatened during this period. The translation of land policy into legislative and administrative reality was a slow and cumbersome process, hampered by political differences within the white ruling group. At the same time, local Natal administrators were reluctant to tamper with the existing african freehold rights, partly because they feared that this would lead to unrest and partly because of the size of the population living on them which would have to be accommodated elsewhere if moved. Too small to constitute an urgent problem but too large to be easily eliminated, the african freehold farms were regarded by officials as an entrenched feature of Natal - an anomaly that could and should be controlled and limited but one that did not seriously weaken the system of reserves that had already been set up.

Thus, in a dissenting Minute attached to the Native Lands Commission Report of 1916, the Chairman of the Commission, W H Beaumont, argued:

The conditions in Natal ... are, and have been, totally different to those in the other Provinces ... In Natal, since it became a British possession, the Natives have always had, and largely exercised, the right to purchase land outside their defined locations, and they regard any infringement of this right as a breach of the terms of the Proclamation issued by Her late Majesty Queen Victoria at the time the country was annexed by Great Britain ... The Natives in Natal now privately own about 359 000 acres, on which are residing some 37 000 Natives. These lands are, in certain areas, so intermixed with lands owned by Europeans that any line of demarcation can only be arbitrarily made, and may result in serious hardship or injustice to both European and Native owners. (41 of the Report)

THE EFFECT OF THE 1913 NATIVES LAND ACT

The passage of the Natives Land Act in 1913 was a significant event in the history of african access to land in general and to freehold land in particular. Although the Act did not itself establish the concept of 'black spots' (this developing later), it did legislate the principle of territorial segregation with respect to white and african land ownership in South Africa and laid down the basis for the present grossly inequitable allocation of land between white and black. By providing that only certain strictly defined areas would henceforth be open to african ownership and

occupation, and by placing the power to determine and regulate these areas in the hands of the all-white Parliament, it put a stop to the previous very limited purchase of freehold land on the open market by africans and furthermore made isolated african properties that had already been bought, vulnerable to the charge that they were misplaced, in white territory.

Christopher, in his thesis on land settlement in colonial Natal, has argued that the 1913 Land Act actually protected african freehold land from further encroachment by whites: 'There can be little doubt that the passage of the 1913 Union Native Land Act which froze Native-owned lands saved many of them from steady encroachment by European purchasers'. (1969, 336-7) Because of the political and economic powerlessness of the peasantry in Natal, as elsewhere, the extent of freehold property among them had peaked by the beginning of the 20th century and was thereafter hovering on the edge of decline. But while in the short term the Land Act may have prevented further direct alienation of african-owned land to whites, it could not provide any long-term guarantee against indirect alienation of this land, at a later stage, through the intervention of the State - nor was it intended to do so.

As already mentioned, very little of the existing freehold land was scheduled in 1913. The figures compiled by Brookes and Hurwitz show a total of 3 263 morgen of freehold land as scheduled - somewhat less than 9 000 acres and only a tiny fraction of the 397 754 acres known to have been in african ownership in 1910. (Christopher, 1969, 336) After 1921 the block to african acquisition of land outside the scheduled areas was partly lifted, once the Beaumont Commission and then the Local Committees of 1918 had reported. However, few africans had the resources to buy more land by this time and most of the freehold land released in 1936 was, as already argued, land that had already been bought but not scheduled in 1913. Furthermore, the new lands that were acquired were all in clearly defined and strictly limited areas (bordering on previously scheduled land) and thus tied to the concept of segregated and controlled land for africans.

A further outcome of the 1913 Land Act and subsequent release of certain areas was that two classes of african freehold land were being created - those included in the reserves, with their prospects for security of tenure reasonably assured (but, in the light of the consolidation manoeuvring of the 1970s, not entrenched) and those not included, their status and future prospects unclear: future black spots. The Beaumont Commission in fact recommended that the 'existing rights' of both 'European-owned' land falling within a 'Native area' and 'Native-owned' land falling within a 'European' area should not be interfered with, but added the revealing qualifier 'until the Government desires to exercise its rights of expropriation or the owner desires to sell'. (6 of the Report)

From the Report of the Beaumont Commission a few details on conditions on the freehold areas emerge. According to its calculations, there were then 374 889 acres of 'Native-owned farms' in Natal, 359 708 of that total in Natal proper (the former colony of Natal) and the remaining 15 181 acres across the Tugela river in Zululand. (Most of this land was to be found in the Mtonjaneni district around Melmoth and takes in the farm Mfanifile). If these figures are accurate, then they indicate a decrease in the area owned by africans since 1910, when the total freehold land held by africans in Natal (excluding Zululand) stood at 397 754 acres. (Christopher, 1969, 336) This provides further evidence of the decline in african freehold after its peak at the end of the 19th century. However, since the figures supplied by the various sources consulted fluctuate so considerably in so many respects, the apparent decline may reflect discrepancies in the manner of calculation rather than an actual alienation of african land between 1910 and 1916.

The total population on the freehold lands in about 1916 was, according to the Report,

39 250 - 37 890 in Natal and 1 360 in Zululand. Assuming that there were by that time between 1 500 and 2 000 landowners in Natal (Christopher lists 1 545 landowners in 1905), with a further 9 000 to 10 000 dependents, then the bulk of the population - between three quarters and two thirds - must have been made up of tenants and their families. This indicates that little of the land could have been available for extensive cultivation and that sub-division of the land into small rented holdings was already well-advanced. However, it was still a considerably lower ratio of tenants to landowners than exists on many black spots today.

Other figures supplied by the Report reinforce the view that the pressure on the soil in the freehold properties, while not nearly as acute as it is today, was already strong. According to these figures, the freehold farms were more densely populated than the reserves, although not as crowded as the mission lands.

Table 6 POPULATION DENSITY ON VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF AFRICAN LAND, 1916
Source : Beaumont Commission Report, 5

	RESERVES	MISSION LANDS	NATIVE-OWNED	CROWN LAND	WHITE FARMS	
					UNOCCUPIED BY WHITE	OCCUPIED BY WHITE
Population per sq. mile	50,08	88,3	67,11	32,89	25,54	21,03
Morgen per unit occupied	6	3,4	4,5	9,1	11,8	

THE EFFECT OF THE 1936 NATIVE TRUST AND LAND ACT

The 1936 Act sharpened the division between the two classes of freehold property (those included within the reserve areas and those not) and hastened the advent of the category of black spots which would have to be removed. As already described, it formalised the existing position with regard to freehold areas recommended for addition to the reserves in 1918 by adopting a further schedule of land to be released. According to the Chief Native Commissioner for Natal in 1959, a total of 136 600 morgen of freehold land was released in 1936. (NAUNLU, 2.10.59) This would have included the Driefontein block of farms north of Ladysmith, some freehold farms to the east of Newcastle and many freehold farms in the Mpendle district.

In addition to recognising approved freehold lands as part of the african territories, the 1936 Act also allowed for some additional land to be bought by individuals within released areas after 1936. Individual tenure was not encouraged by the authorities, however, since it was regarded as destructive of the tribal system of local government on which reserve policy rested. Also, few africans had the capital with which to buy land by the mid 20th century. Compared to the scale of land purchase by africans in the 19th century in Natal, therefore, african purchase of land after 1936 was extremely limited: a total of only 15 552 morgen (13 312 hectares) by 1959 (Chief Commissioner for Natal, NAUNLU, 2.10.59), increasing very slightly during the 1960s to a total of 15 893 morgen (13 604 hectares) bought since 1936, by 1969. (Minister of BAD, quoted in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 46)

DEMARCATON OF BLACK SPOTS IN 1936

Although most of the existing freehold lands were thus incorporated into the reserves in 1936, a substantial amount of land was excluded, land that became known as black spots. Once again figures do not tally exactly but a comparison of them points to a figure of some 49 400 morgen (42 226 hectares) of privately owned land that was not released at that time. Brookes and Hurwitz refer to 49 400 morgen of land spread

over 22 magisterial districts as 'land owned by Natives outside released areas'; almost half this land, they said, was in 'the triangle of Natal proper North of the Tugela River, where locations were never laid out' (1957, 23), i.e. in the Klip River, Dundee and Newcastle districts. In 1959 the Chief Native Commissioner for Natal spoke of 48 390 morgen of freehold land that was not released in 1936 (NAUNLU, 2.10.59); in 1969 the Minister of BAD said there had been 49 218 morgen of black spots in Natal in 1948. (House of Assembly Debates, 1969, col. 324 - 326)⁺

The freehold land that was not released in 1936 was placed in an increasingly vulnerable position. Generally it was land that did not have a common border with other scheduled or released lands - isolated african holdings, surrounded by white farmers who were, for the most part, hostile to their african neighbours. The future status of these farms or african areas was no longer under investigation. They had not been legitimised in 1936 and henceforth, although removals would not start in earnest for another twenty-five years in Natal, their title deeds no longer offered these african landowners any guarantee of security of tenure. The 1936 Land Act in fact made provision for the expropriation of african land falling outside the boundaries of the reserves, by the Minister of Agriculture.

In this way the concept of black spots, already discernible in the 1913 legislation, hardened and acquired substance. However, the 1936 Land Act was not the final delimitation of what was and what was not a black spot, as later developments made clear. In the 1960s and 1970s, when the former reserves were being dressed up as homelands and then black national states, some released areas became earmarked for excision from the areas allocated for african ownership and occupation in terms of consolidation planning, and freehold farms within these areas reverted to the status of black spot once again. The official term for scheduled or released areas that were to be excised was 'a badly situated area' as opposed to a 'black spot' (which was applied to land which had never been scheduled or released), but in fact many government spokesmen were inconsistent in their use of terms or concepts and applied 'black spot' or 'badly situated area' indiscriminately. In this report, as is discussed in more detail in Part Two, the term 'black spot' is applied to any freehold area (whether scheduled, released or not) which is threatened with removal or has been removed.

As far as the threatened landowners and tenants are concerned, the distinction between 'black spot' and 'badly situated area' is not a material one. Whatever they are called, they are still threatened with expropriation, removal and dispossession of their land. Their continued existence on their land - those treasured title deeds - is sanctioned not by law but by the consent of a government that they can not participate in, a position first formalised by the Land Act of 1913 and entrenched in 1936.

The following table sets out information on the extent of african freehold land in Natal between 1910 and 1961. It shows how inconsistent the figures with which one is working, are. This raises serious questions about the reliability of current official claims to have 'met' the Natal quota or compensated adequately for land they have expropriated. The figures do not agree on whether there was an overall decrease in the *de facto* extent of african freehold between 1910 and about 1951 or not. According to the Brookes and Hurwitz figure there was a slight decrease of about 14 000 morgen (just under 12 000 hectares); according to the Chief Native Commissioner's figures, there was an actual increase between 1910 and 1936 and, if the figure for land purchased after 1936 is added to this, a further increase by 1959.

⁺ Note however that in 1964 the Minister of BAD said there was then a total of 62 185 morgen of black spot land in Natal - more than 12 000 morgen more than the other figures and at a time when several black spots had already been removed. His figures are clearly incorrect. (Senate Debates, col. 2267, 17.03.64)

All the figures however show a significant decrease in the *de jure*, or approved extent of african freehold (once black spots are excluded from the count). The greatest threat to the continued security of african freehold tenure in this time came clearly from the State.

Table 7 AFRICAN FREEHOLD LAND AND THE CREATION OF BLACK SPOTS, NATAL, 1910 - 1959
1 morgen = 0,86 hectare

DATE	CATEGORY OF LAND	MORGEN	SOURCE
1910	African freehold	185 618	Christopher, 1969
1913	Scheduled freehold	3 263	Brookes & Hurwitz, 1957
1916	Unscheduled freehold	174 948	Beaumont Commission, 1916
	TOTAL : Scheduled + unscheduled	178 211	
1936	Released land owned/bought by 1936	136 600	Chief Native Commissioner, 1959
	Freehold land not released in 1936	48 390	Ibid
		184 990	Ibid
	Scheduled freehold	3 263	
	TOTAL : Freehold	188 253	
1951	Scheduled freehold	3 263	Brookes + Hurwitz, 1957
	Released freehold	119 010	Ibid
	TOTAL : Scheduled + Released	122 273	
	Black spots	49 400	Ibid
	TOTAL : Freehold	171 673	
1959	Land bought by africans 1936 - 1959	15 552	Chief Native Commissioner, 1959

3. Developments between 1936-1960

During this time the National Party came to power (in 1948) and the role of the reserves as political units 'to house, control and administer the vast bulk of South Africa's workforce' (Lacey in Walt, 1982, 3) began to take shape. The first step in this process was the passage of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951; this was followed by the promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act in 1959 which introduced the concept of ethnic bantustans, to be based on the existing reserves.

ACQUISITION OF QUOTA LAND

The acquisition of quota land by the SANT proceeded very slowly in the two decades following on from the 1936 Land Act. In 1959 the Chief Native Commissioner for Natal reported that 314 800 morgen (2 694 688 hectares) of land had still to be acquired to meet the Natal quota of 526 000 morgen. (NAUNLU, 2.10.59) Since 1936 then, when 342 130 morgen of the quota was still outstanding, only 27 330 morgen (23 394 hectares) had been acquired, of which, according to the Commissioner, 15 552 morgen had been bought by individual africans, and not the SANT. It was only in the 1960s that the SANT began to acquire land on a larger scale. Since it has been State policy to relocate people onto Trust land, i.e. land controlled by it, through the SANT/SADT, the sluggishness of the land purchasing programme in the 1940s and 1950s prevented any large scale relocation being initiated in this time.

The acquisition of quota land also became entangled with the question of providing compensatory land for black spots that were now threatened with eventual removal. It appears that when the original quota of extra land for the reserves was set in 1936, the amount did not include compensatory land for any black spot that might be forced to move. The long-term policy with regard to the black spots was not clear. After 1948, however, the National Party was determined to eliminate these properties, because they contradicted its bantustan policy. In order to clear them, it had to find alternative sites on which to accommodate what was by then a considerable group of people. (One estimate, probably conservative, put the total black spot population in Natal in 1964 as 67 100; SAIRR, c 1964) In addition, the State was also responsible for providing land for land compensation for the larger african landowners (owning 20 morgen - 17 hectares - or more) upon expropriation.

Tomlinson, in his 1955 Report on the 'Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu areas', in which he analysed the amount of land that had been allocated to the reserves, pointed to the problem that the black spots posed. Noting that his total, which included scheduled, released, outstanding quota and black spot land, was larger 'than was generally assumed would be the case' when the quota for the reserves was first set in 1936, he reported:

The main reason for this is that land acquired by Natives before the passing of the Act of 1936, does not fall within the interpretation of quota land. In other words there is a misconception on the part of the general public as to what the eventual position will be. (UG 61/1955, 46)

He went on to say that it was not clear to him whether the legislators who had enacted the Native Trust and Land Act in 1936 had 'visualised what the eventual position would be' when approving the quota.

It appears that after Tomlinson the State accepted that compensatory land for expropriated black spots would have to come from outside the existing quotas. In 1961, in a memorandum submitted to the NAU, the Secretary for BAD reported:

When a "black spot" is cleared up and compensatory land is made available within a scheduled Native area, or released area, then this (the) quota is affected to the extent of the compensatory land which has been made available in such area. To restore the balance it is therefore still necessary in terms of section ten of the Native Trust and Land Act, 1936, to acquire land of the same extent adjoining these areas. (NAUNLU, 14.04.61)

This explains why figures supplied by officials during and after the 1950s about the extent of quota land acquired or still to be acquired add up to a higher total than the original 526 million morgen of quota land set in 1936.

Thus, in the 1950s, the search for compensatory land for threatened or expropriated black spots became absorbed into the SANT's search for quota land. The impression gained from contemporary documents and the pages of NAUNLU is that this search often overshadowed the SANT's original brief, which was to augment the area allocated to the reserves and, supposedly, to administer this land for the benefit of its inhabitants rather than to remove people.

OPPOSITION FROM WHITE FARMERS TO THE QUOTA

The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 provided an immediate check on attempts by the SANT to acquire quota land - the war diverted central government funds and attention away from the reserves. Once the war was over, the SANT then had to contend with strong opposition from organised white agriculture in Natal which was, as a body, vehemently against making any more land available for african occupation. The National Party, which came to power in 1948, drew much of its support from white farmers and their objections were treated sympathetically. By 1955 a 'gentlemen's agreement' had been reached between the SANT and the NAU whereby the SANT agreed not to buy up any further land without consulting with and obtaining the support of the local farmers' associations in the districts concerned. (Chief Native Commissioner, NAUNLU, 11.03.55)

The attitude of farmers in the 1950s was in many respects the same as that adopted by the early white settlers towards the colonial locations a hundred years before. In the 1940s and 1950s farmers were complaining bitterly about a labour shortage. They blamed this partly on unequal competition from the mines and secondary industry and partly on the reserve system which allowed africans a subsistence base that was independent of the white farms and beyond farmers' control - a subsistence base that benefited mining and industrial interests at their expense. Making more land available to the reserves, beyond that which had already been scheduled or released, would, they felt, only exacerbate their problems.

Farmers were also concerned about the deteriorating condition of the environment in the reserves. Oblivious to the history of successful economic experimentation by the african peasantry some seventy years before and overlooking the years of State neglect of the reserves, they blamed this entirely on poor farming techniques and innate inability amongst the reserve population. This position was summarised by the Chairman of the Elandslaagte Farmers' Association in 1954, speaking at a meeting called to protest against attempts by the SANT to buy up some farms in their district.

The Native is not a farmer and never will be a farmer. He would ruin every bit of land that was placed at his disposal, and it was the height of folly and irresponsibility to hand over the district to Natives. (NAUNLU, 5.11.54)

Farmers also attacked the continued existence of non-released african freehold farms and pressed for their removal. The evidence in the pages of NAUNLU during the 1950s (and later) indicates that most farmers saw no benefits for themselves in having black neighbours. Despite the labour shortage they were experiencing, they did not regard these freehold farms as providing a convenient labour pool. A few people, mainly women and children, did work on neighbouring white farms on a seasonal or casual, togt basis, but most of the residents on black spots then, as now, looked to the urban-industrial centres for wage employment. Their land provided them with sufficient independence to resist farmers' efforts to recruit them; in this way they were in an analogous position to the people living in the reserves proper.

However, although farmers were agitating for the removal of black spots, few were willing to make land on which they could be relocated, available. 'The huge squatter population which lives on the Native farms must be removed with all its belongings',

insisted the Elandslaagte Farmers' Association in 1954; it then went on to suggest where these people should be sent to:

A number could find an abode on European farms. The balance should be taken to townships created for Natives at a railhead, so that they could work in industries. Those who remained must be controlled, and if they could not succeed, they must quit. (NAUNLU, 5.11.54)

Another solution that was being put forward at this time was to send all the 'surplus' population that the SANT wanted to accommodate on Trust farms to reserve or State land in 'Zululand' (across the Tugela). The Makhathini Flats was mentioned on several occasions - then, as now, this large tract of State-controlled land was regarded as a convenient trade-off for any number of schemes to expropriate and reduce african-owned land.

NAUNLU carried several reports on farmers' protests about the activities of the SANT, for instance in the Elandslaagte/Klip River area in 1954/55 (see below) and the Mpendle area in 1958. (NAUNLU, 28.11.58) It also reprinted several memoranda and reports in which officials endeavoured to placate farmers' opposition and appealed for their cooperation - from the Chief Native Commissioner of Natal in 1955 (NAUNLU, 11.03.55, see Appendix 1) and 1959 (NAUNLU, 2.10.59), and from the Secretary for BAD in 1961. (NAUNLU, 14.04.61) This last memorandum, entitled 'Compensatory land Required to Clear Black Spots', was also reprinted in Bantu, the official journal of the Department of BAD, and circulated to local farmers' associations. In it the Secretary set out at some length the history of the quota allocated to the various provinces in 1936 and the question of black spot removals and urged:

It is here that the cooperation of the farmers' associations and unions is sought. "Black spots" cannot be cleared up if compensatory land is not offered.

Opposition in the Klip River district, 1954/55

These themes were well illustrated in a confrontation between the SANT and farmers in the Klip River and Elandslaagte districts in 1954/55. Earlier the SANT had, despite local white opposition, acquired a farm adjoining the Driefontein block of farms which it was intending to use as a relocation site for people from the black spot of Khumalosville, near Besters. In late 1955 it was announced that the SANT wanted to buy up a further 54 000 acres of white farmland in the eastern part of the Klip River district, in the direction of Helpmekaar. This announcement drew forth such an outcry from the three local farmers' associations (Elandslaagte, Besters and Ladysmith), supported by the Ladysmith Town Council, that the SANT eventually backed down. In October 1955 the MP for Newcastle reported to these groups that

as a result of the Native Affairs Commission's report, the Minister had decided that until such time as farmers in the area asked for the removal of "black spots" and provided compensatory ground, nothing would be done about acquiring further land for Native Settlement in this area. (NAUNLU, 21.10.55)

Earlier, when the Chief Commissioner for Natal had pointed out that in terms of the 1936 Land Act, there was an obligation to provide more land for the reserves, the Chairman of the Ladysmith Joint Bodies Association (which represented all the local Farmers' Associations plus the Town Council) replied: 'Zululand is their territory and it is no injustice to send them there'. (NAUNLU, 8.04.55)

As a result of the farmers' objections, no Trust land was acquired in this area until the 1960s and the relocation of black spots in the Ladysmith/Dundee area did not get under way till the late 1960s. The land finally bought up by the SANT was

in the same general area as had been proposed in the 1950s. Revealingly, in 1955 the Chairman of the Ladysmith Joint Bodies Association described this land as 'arid and totally unsuitable for closer settlement. Erosion will set in as fast as it is populated, as it is very vulnerable'. (NAUNLU, 8.04.55) This is the land where today several of the major relocation closer settlements in Natal are situated, including Ekuvukeni, Limehill and Uitval.

Opposition to the SANT's attempts to buy up more land meant that the population pressure in the already released and scheduled areas intensified. In 1957 Brookes and Hurwitz commented:

What is ... important, however, is that since 1881 (virtually since 1864) there has been no appreciable increase of land provision for Natives in Natal proper. It must be added that between 1936 and 1953 there has been considerable buying of Trust farms which are not included in the location and mission reserve figures, but apart from this recent and relatively not very extensive development the provision of land for Natives in Natal proper has been stationary for ninety years. If ever there were too much land for the population, that state of affairs must have ceased many decades ago, and today ... all these areas are overcrowded, and some grossly overcrowded. (1957, 10-11)

One official response to the environmental crisis that reserve policies over the previous hundred years had produced, was to try to control people's access to land and land usage within the reserve territories. Betterment planning began to be applied in the Natal reserves in the 1950s and by 1959 12,2% of the total reserve area had been planned. (See Table 17, p. 271) The inadequacy of betterment planning as a solution to the problems it was meant to address as well as the process of implementation of betterment planning in Natal are looked at in greater detail in Part Two.

Black spot removals

There was no serious programme of removal of black spots before the National Party came to power in 1948, although, according to the Deputy Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission in 1968 (Froneman), three black spots were cleared in South Africa under the United Party government. (Address, 30.05.68) He did not specify the names or location or the reasons for these removals.

After 1948 the National Party's intention was to eradicate all the black spots as soon as they could but they were hampered in the 1950s by the shortage of land on which to relocate this group of people. Not until the farmers' opposition to providing more land for the SANT had eased - which was not until the labour shortage they were experiencing started to ease in the 1960s - could the Government get on with large scale removals in Natal. During the 1950s however the Department of Bantu Affairs did embark on a major survey to investigate the extent of black spots in the province.⁺ In the SAIRR files in Durban there is an undated list of black spots which the SAIRR researcher obtained from undisclosed official sources in about 1954/55. This list is very detailed; it is divided according to magisterial districts and gives not only property names and numbers but also details about sub-divisions, the various land-owners and the areas of land they owned. It seems that this survey - and the list - was a preliminary step in planning a programme for the removal of these properties. According to the list there were 165 black spots spread over 22 magisterial districts. (This list has been used to compile the summary of african freehold properties in Natal contained in Part Two.)

⁺ Whether similar investigations were carried out in the other provinces is not known.

A few black spots were moved in the 1950s but details on these are sparse. The first black spot cleared in Natal appears to have been a farm called The Patch, in the Port Shepstone district, in or before 1953. Nothing is known of the history of this place or where its people were relocated. A start was also made with the removal of the community of Khumalosville, near Besters (outside Ladysmith) to the farm adjoining Driefontein that had been bought by the SANT in the early 1950s. These removals were very protracted. The people of Khumalosville put up a lengthy struggle (described in a Liberal Party publication, Black Spots, nd) and it was not till 1963 that all of them had been moved to a place called Vulandondo and Khumalosville eliminated. Twelve black spots were also moved in the Mt Currie and Matatiele districts in East Griqualand before 1961, but details on where to and how are not known. (Dept of BAD, memorandum, c 1961 and fieldwork)

4. White - owned land

LABOUR TENANCY IN NATAL IN THE 1950s

N. Hurwitz, writing in 1957 (Agriculture in Natal 1860 - 1950) distinguished three main agricultural regions in Natal, each of which had developed its own labour system by that time:

- a) The predominantly sugar-cane belt along the coastal areas north and south of Durban. Here farmers were relying increasingly on migrant, contract workers, many of them coming from outside Natal/KwaZulu (from Pondoland in the south and Mocambique in the north). Workers were housed in compounds for the duration of their contracts and sent home at the end of that period.
- b) A fairly intensively-cultivated arc of land in the southern half of Natal, stretching from Port Shepstone to the Natal Midlands, where farmers went in for wattle, timber and mixed farming and had, over the years, moved to a system of fulltime wage labour - although there were pockets of labour tenancy in some parts.
- c) The inland regions of central and northern Natal where farmers went in for extensive stock farming and cereal production and labour tenancy was deeply entrenched as the most common form of labour. It is this area that has witnessed the most profound changes in its labour system in the years since Hurwitz was writing and where farm evictions have taken place on a massive scale in the late 1960s and 1970s.

In addition to people living on white-owned land in some form of employee relationship to the landowner, there were still, by the late 1950s, substantial numbers of cash tenants on white-owned land in Natal, particularly in the northern labour tenant regions. It is difficult to give figures for this group since the official statistics do not generally distinguish between labour tenants and squatters but lump them all together. Squatter farming had been under attack in Natal since the 19th century - in 1960 the NAU described it as a system that 'cannot be condemned too much' (NAUNLU, 18.03.60) - and the numbers of rent-paying tenants had been reduced considerably by the mid 1950s. In 1962 the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal reported to NAUNLU that there were 250 000 'surplus' africans on white farms, about 100 000 of them in the northern part of the province, and that 'most' of them were labour (not cash) tenants. (NAUNLU, 16.02.62)

As described previously, the roots of the labour tenant system stretch back into the 19th century. Under this system, african families living on white-owned land supplied the landowner with their labour for part of the year, at a non-existent or nominal wage (commonly R2 per working month by the 1950s), in return for the right to graze some stock and cultivate some land on the owner's farm - labour serving as a form of land-rent. During the period when they were not working for the landowner, many tenants supplemented their meagre cash incomes by becoming short term migrant workers in industry or on the mines.

In Natal the system evolved over several generations into what was commonly known as the 'six-month system'. Whereas in the early 20th century in other parts of the country labour tenants generally spent only 3 months of the year working for the landowner, in Natal by the time of the 1932 Report of the Native Economic Commission six months was already the norm. (UG 22/1932, 51) There were, however, many regional variations to the general pattern. In some areas the whole family worked the same six-month period; in others their labour obligation was staggered throughout the year.


In the dry, thornveld country, particularly round Weenen and Muden, the companion institution of 'labour farms' had developed along with labour tenancy - small, private labour reserves: white-owned farms used solely by their owners to house and provide some agricultural land for their labour tenants who then spent six months of the year working away from their homes on the commercial farms of their landlords. As time went by these labour farms came under increasing attack from soil conservationists and more progressive farmers for being neglected, overpopulated and overstocked. In February 1960 NAUNLU carried an article reporting on the 'den of iniquity' in the Weenen district and the alarming condition of the thornveld farms. One farmer was quoted as saying this was the only area in Natal where the squatters and tenants controlled the farmers, instead of the other way round. (NAUNLU, 19.02.60)

The amount of land available to labour tenants for their own use varied considerably from district to district and farm to farm but generally each family would have at least one field of perhaps 2 acres to plough as well as access to common grazing land. During the 20th century landowners started putting restrictions on the number of animals tenants could keep but even in the late 1960s tenant herds of 50 cattle or more were not uncommon.

The labour tenant system was deeply entrenched in central and northern Natal until the late 1960s. It was a labour-exploitative system but in a situation where access to both land and the cities was severely restricted for african people, it offered certain advantages to which most labour tenants clung. Chief among these was the scope it offered them to keep cattle and to plough. In 1960, after legislation had been introduced by the central government to curb the numbers of labour tenants, there were 42 000 registered labour tenants in Natal. Assuming an average of 7 members per household, that would mean a total of a little under 300 000 people in a tenant relationship on white farms and since many labour tenant contracts were known not to be registered, the actual population would have been far more. (Dep. Minister, Hansard 1960, col. 2957)

STEPS TO CONTROL LABOUR TENANCY

Starting in the 1920s and 1930s, gathering momentum in the 1950s and 1960s, labour tenancy came under increasing attack, as the State, with the support of the South African Agricultural Union (but not with blanket support from all farmers nor with the unqualified support of the NAU), sought first to control and limit and then to eliminate labour tenancy on South African farms.



In 1956 the government amended the 1936 Trust and Land Act so as to tighten control on labour tenancy. The new legislation provided for the registration of all labour tenant contracts, established Native Labour Tenant Control Boards to administer this and prohibited farmers from taking on any more purely rent-paying tenants ('squatters') after the 31st August 1956. In 1959 the government appointed an Inter-Departmental Committee of Enquiry into the labour tenant system. This Committee, reporting in 1961, called for the abolition of labour tenancy within 7 years.

The main grounds for opposing labour tenancy were economic: that by the mid 20th century it was a wasteful, uneconomic and inefficient system which was no longer appropriate in a modern, capitalist economy. The increasing capitalisation and mechanisation of white agriculture during this time fuelled the arguments of the opponents of labour tenancy. In the late 1950s fears were also being voiced about the political and security risks of what the Du Toit Commission described in 1959 as 'die beswaring van die Platteland' (the blackening of the countryside). This Commission produced a Report which described how an exodus of whites from the countryside was being accompanied by a growth in the black population on white-owned farms.

Witnesses stated that many farms previously occupied by Whites were now managed by non-White foremen. The homesteads of the White farmers, managers and share-croppers are now either uninhabited, abandoned and neglected, or else are occupied by the non-White and his family. Evidence of this development is particularly strong in the southern and south-eastern parts of the Free State and certain parts of Natal. (Quoted in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 60)

The Report contained a map, reproduced on the opposite page, which highlighted this trend in the Weenen, Bergville and Klip River districts in Natal. (What the map failed to make clear, however, was that a fair proportion of the 'farms occupied by Natives' in the Bergville/Klip River area were in fact owned by them.)

The response of Natal Farmers

In the early 1950s, before the government had started imposing serious restrictions on labour tenancy, the NAU was unqualified in its support for the policy of changing over to a system of fulltime agricultural labour. In 1949 its Annual Congress passed the following resolution: 'This Congress subscribes to the principle of full-time employment with appropriate annual leave on full pay' (NAUNLU, 23.04.53); this position was endorsed in subsequent articles and editorials in NAUNLU in the early 1950s. However, as local farmers began to balk at the increasingly bureaucratic State controls being imposed on their employment of labour after 1956, the NAU retreated to a more ambivalent position. While still endorsing the principle of fulltime labour as an ideal, it began to appeal for what it termed an 'evolutionary' as opposed to a 'revolutionary' changeover.

Its main concern, reflecting the view of constituent Farmers' Associations, was that too abrupt a changeover would further disrupt an already insecure labour supply. In the late 1950s NAUNLU carried a number of reports on problems farmers were experiencing with restless workers. At issue were official attempts to register labour tenant contracts and impose reference books (the *dompas*) in the rural areas, both of which were resisted by rural africans. Labour tenants were reported to be leaving farms in numbers substantial enough to cause concern about the labour shortage; they were going either to the reserves or to the towns rather than submit to what they interpreted as an attempt to tie them to the particular farm on which they were living and to reduce their own agricultural activities. (See for instance NAUNLU, 11.07.57, 17.10.58, 14.11.58) A further concern of farmers was the cost to them individually in changing over to a fulltime wage-labour system. Many

farmers stated that they did not have the cash to pay their workers for twelve months of the year.

In a memorandum submitted to the Inter-Departmental Committee of Enquiry into labour tenancy, in 1960, the NAU outlined its position as follows:

- the NAU 'has repeatedly confirmed the desirability of a change to fulltime employment of Native labour, as an ideal' but 'there exists among the farmers in Natal a very decided difference of opinion' about what is the best labour system;
- any speedy change-over to a fulltime labour system would mean 'an immediate addition in cash expenditure and probably a reduction in the labour force' without necessarily making more land available for agriculture since most fulltime workers still retained access to land anyway;
- reducing the numbers living on white farms would mean that the redundant workers and their families would have to be accommodated elsewhere; a 'fair percentage' could probably be absorbed on other white farms but the rest would become the responsibility of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development.

Rather than introduce new legislation, the government should enforce the already existing legislation 'aimed at stabilisation of the labour force and division of labour between town and country.' (NAUNLU, 18.03.60)

FARM EVICTIONS IN THE 1950s

Although State attempts to control and reduce labour tenancy were opposed by many farmers and organised agriculture in Natal during this time, some individual farmers were evicting workers and/or tenants in sufficiently large numbers to prompt the State to establish several small relocation sites on which to accommodate them. Material on this is scant - then, as now, farm evictions were not an issue to be reported in the daily press. The Babanango district, however, was one such area which appears to have experienced an increased wave of farm evictions in the late 1950s (and early 1960s) since at least three relocation sites were established there for ex-farm-dwellers at about this time: Mpungamhlope, Hlungulwana and Emakhosini (all to be used as relocation camps in later years as well). (Fieldwork) Further fieldwork in other settlements on Trust land may uncover more that started as relocation points for evicted farmworkers or tenants during (or even before) this period.

The reasons for these evictions must, in the absence of more research, remain speculative. Individual farm evictions have a very long history in Natal, stretching back to the first days of white farming in the 19th century. African workers and residents on white farms have never enjoyed an assured security of tenure but have always been dependent on the goodwill of their employer/landlord. It is likely that some of those evicted in the Babanango district in the 1950s fell into the category of old/disabled/unsatisfactory workers who were no longer wanted or needed by the farmer and simply told to leave. Cash tenancy was also under attack and some of those evicted may have been what were officially classified as squatters, whose lands were wanted by the individual farmer for his own use. It is possible, too, that these evictions were part of an early phase in mechanisation and rationalisation of land-use and labour in the district, involving some of the more progressive farmers who were making the changeover to a fulltime and smaller labour force.

Compared to the later phase of farm removals, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the number of households officially relocated at this time was very small. Relocation guidelines were not developed beyond those already in operation in betterment planning, and the sites into which the people were moved appear to have been

modelled on betterment lines. Although other facilities were virtually non-existent, some grazing and arable land was made available for each household. Betterment-type controls were placed over the agricultural land - the sites were planned so as to divide residential from agricultural land, stock numbers were limited and stockowners charged a small grazing fee annually. In this respect the people who were relocated to these settlements in the 1950s were advantaged compared to the households who were moved in later, who were not allowed to bring stock and not allocated agricultural land. These advantages have, it appears, elevated these early evictees to something of an elite within the settlements today: land, as the preceding pages have made clear, is a precious and wasting asset in the african rural areas.

11th March, 1955

NAUNLU

LAND FOR NATIVE SETTLEMENT

FROM THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF NATIVE COMMISSIONER

ON November 5, 1954, NAUNLU reported a special general meeting of the Elands-laagte Farmers' Association. As a result of this meeting, the Joint Bodies Committee met at Ladysmith.

A report of the proceedings appeared in NAUNLU on December 3rd. The following is a quotation from the report:—

"The meeting passed a resolution protesting against the acquisition of any further land for settling Natives outside the Released Areas"

This resolution has caused the Department of Native Affairs considerable concern. If implemented, it would effectively wreck existing schemes for the rehabilitation of some 3,000,000 morgen of Native Reserve, and the elimination of "black spots." The Department therefore welcomes the opportunity it has been offered of placing before the farming community through the medium of NAUNLU, an overall picture of the situation regarding Native settlement in Natal.

The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 empowered the S.A. Native Trust to acquire land for Native settlement to the extent of 7½ million morgen, and each Province was given its own quota, which may not be exceeded. The quotas for the various Provinces are as follows:—

Province.	Quota
Natal	526,000 morgen
Transvaal	5,028,000 morgen
Cape	1,616,000 morgen
O.F.S.	80,000 morgen

In each Province are so-called Released areas, within which land may be bought by the S.A. Native Trust, or by a Native by direct negotiation with the owner, without consulting the adjoining owners and/or Farmers' Association concerned.

The full provincial quota is not, however, in all cases made up of released areas. The following are comparative figures for the various Provinces in respect of (1) Released areas in relation to quota land and (2) reserve in relation to quota land:—

(1) Cape	100%
O.F.S.	100%
Transvaal	95.5%
Natal	55%
(2) Cape	52%
C.F.S.	103%
Transvaal	408%
Natal	18%

The full extent of Released Areas in Natal is 288,718 morgen (i.e., 55% of the quota land) so that the Trust, to obtain the full quota, must acquire 237,282 morgen outside the released area. The Native Trust and Land Act also empowers the Trust to purchase land adjoining released areas as well as land adjoining land acquired next to a released area, but at present a gentleman's agreement exists whereunder the Trust will not buy land outside of a Released Area, but within the limit of the quota, without the consent of the adjoining owners and the Farmers' Associations concerned.

This is not the full story. Of the Released Areas 136,000 morgen or 47% are in private Native ownership. These lands as a whole are grossly over-populated and over-stocked.

47% of the Released Areas may, therefore, be written off as useless for the purpose for which they were intended.

Of the balance, a not inconsiderable number of the farms already bought consist either of heavily over-stocked and over-populated labour farms, or of extremely broken country with little arable land and, therefore, a low population potential.

So much for the resources at the disposal of the Trust, to solve the problems in over 3,000,000 morgen of Native-occupied land.

It is now necessary to examine the position within this land.

Including temporary absentees, the population is about 1½ millions, or 227,500 families of six. Density is 101 per square mile. Excluding the districts of Ingwavuma and Ubombo, which for various reasons are thinly populated, the density is 118 per square mile.

Readers' comments on the N.A.D.'s views are invited. Let NAUNLU be the forum of rural public opinion.

There are 1,450,900 stock units, or an average of 6.4 per family.

Estimating the safe carrying capacity at 3½ morgen per stock unit, the figure of 1,006,500 units is arrived at, or an average of 4.4 per family. 444,400 units must, therefore, be disposed of. A significant figure is that of absentee taxpayers, i.e., the able-bodied males. It goes as high as 77%, with an overall average of about 66%.

This figure is obtained from tax-collection registers, and is unchallengeable.

Up to a point, it refutes the common allegation that the Native male spends most of his time loafing at his kraal and it is indicative of the poverty within the reserves, due to sub-economic holdings, arising from over-population.

For the same reason, large areas entirely unsuitable for cultivation, have been put under the plough; lands on slopes of 1 in 1½ have been found. The erosion that is taking place can be imagined.

Arising from the summary of conditions in the reserves, the argument might be advanced that the whole quota would in any case be quite inadequate for relief of congestion, and that the idea of further purchases of land might as well be abandoned.

If it was the intention to provide every Native with arable land and grazing rights, this argument might be valid. There is no such intention.

The policy of creating Native townships, advocated at the Elands-laagte meeting, quoted earlier, is in fact Governmental policy. Contour surveys of the first two townships in Natal are completed, and the laying out of one, on the banks of the Umkomas, is in progress. The unspectacular progress that is being made is due solely to lack of staff, and is a matter of concern, for the absorption into one or other form of closer settlement, whether large towns or small rural villages, of a large proportion of the people now working land and owning stock in the reserves, is vital to the long-term plans for their stabilisation and rehabilitation.

These long-term plans can be summed up very briefly. They are, to put in train a sequence of moves that will eventually result in all arable and grazing rights being in the hands of that number of persons only that can make a full-time living out of them. The creation of closer settlements is one move. The issue of Certificates of Occupation to land-holders is another. There is little purpose in making academic appeals to these people, such as that they must guard the soil for the sake of their children. The Certificates, which are issued to tenants on Trust farms, give a reason which they can understand, for looking after their land. They lose it, if they fail to do so.

Before dealing with the matter of the Native's potential as a farmer, it is apt to quote from the report of the Elands-laagte Asso-

(Continued on page 8).

Continuation

LAND FOR NATIVE SETTLEMENT

(Continued from Page 7)

ciation meeting referred to earlier:—

"It (the Association) felt that the Native is not a farmer, and never will be a farmer. He would ruin every bit of land placed at his disposal, and it was the height of folly and irresponsibility to hand over the district to Natives."

It is hoped that the facts which now follow will prove that this expression of opinion is a generalisation, which is not well-founded.

On the Trust farm Olivia, in the Bergville district, are 42 tenants, each with six acres arable land and the right to run 10 head of cattle. These tenants were not specially selected. None has much education; some are illiterate; they are, in fact a typical cross-section of the labourer class and reserve dwellers.

A milk scheme is now in its fourth year, whereunder raw milk is sold to a condensery, until a market can be developed among their own people, e.g. in closer settlements still to come into being.

The farming year July, 1953-June, 1954, was a bad one in that there was a severe outbreak of contagious abortion, during which over 50% of pregnant cows aborted.

Nevertheless, eight men made from £60 to £183 from the sale of milk alone.

During this period they produced the following feed: Veld hay, 117 tons; cowpea hay, 84

tons; silage, 169 tons; maize stover, 20 tons.

They also bought 93 bags of concentrates, and several produced 10 bags of mealies per acre.

In the six months, July-December, 1954, one man was paid out £170 for milk, after deduction of 1½d. per gallon for transport.

Five men have sold their oxen and bought a Ferguson tractor, with plough and hammermill.

Two have recently sought permission to fence in an acre each to establish grass-cloved pasture for cows in milk.

Four have so far built 20-ton concrete-block silos. Seventeen have built thatched hay barns-cum-compost-kraals.

Visitors from other districts have been taken to the farm, and let loose to talk to the tenants. As a result, ten other schemes are in operation; equipment is on order for two others (the cost of this being repayable by participants); several others are due to start next spring; a neighbouring Chief has started a demonstration 30 acre holding; another has allowed a commoner to fence off a 12 acre trial holding; three other Chiefs have just announced their intention of starting similar holdings.

These facts, it is submitted, justify study by all who subscribe to the opinion that "the Native is not a farmer, and will never be a farmer."

It is, of course, equally untrue that all Natives are fit to work land.

Of the 42 tenants in Bergville, only 11, or 26%, can be classified

as reasonably good to good farmers. It is felt that this is a satisfactory proportion. On the one hand, the tax collection figures quoted earlier show that the labour market now requires 66% of able-bodied males from the reserves, and industry is expanding. On the other hand, the Olivia figure indicates sufficient good farmers will be found eventually to occupy all farming land in the reserves, provided they can be identified.

The balance of the Trust quota is thus urgently required, not only to relieve congestion but to afford centres under full control where the correct land usage for the various ecological areas can be demonstrated. As their influence spreads into adjoining areas, the process of identifying those Natives who should stay on the land (and, ipso facto, those who should get off) will be greatly expedited.

Another point must be made: the general opinion seems to be that the sale of land to the Trust amounts to throwing good land after bad. This is quite unfounded.

It is admitted that there are still farms, relatively few in number, not under full control. In some cases, this is because it has just not yet been possible for the local staff to get round to them. In the others, they were so grossly overpopulated and overstocked at the time of purchase that a solution to the problem has yet to be found.

Otherwise, no farm is now in worse condition than at the time of purchase.

Many are in better condition: the Trust is a good neighbour.

Finally, the Native is well aware that "black spots" are being expropriated, on the one hand, and that the purchase of European-owned land promised to him is proceeding very slowly, on the other hand. He is observing events with an increasing vigilance. The good faith of the white man no longer remains unquestioned.



PART TWO: RELOCATION IN NATAL: CATEGORIES AND REGIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

The era of massive forced removals in Natal opened in the early 1960s; during the past two decades the State has relocated forcibly - the coercion taking both direct and indirect forms - well over a million people in this province, if all the categories of removal (both overt and hidden) are considered. Part Two examines this process - its overall dimensions and its constituent parts. This introductory chapter sets out the main categories of relocation in the province and the estimated figures for the total number of people affected, and provides a brief historical overview of the process of removals in Natal since 1960. The following chapter summarises the information SPP has collected on relocation areas and subsequent chapters examine each of the various categories of relocation in more detail. Part Two ends with a regional overview in which the main features of relocation in each of ten geographical sub-regions in the province are summarised.

1. Categories and numbers

MAJOR CATEGORIES OF RELOCATION

The major categories of relocation in Natal, in the order in which they are discussed in the ensuing chapters, have been:

- 1) Eviction of farm workers and tenants from farms in the white countryside,
- 2) The removal of black spots, both african freehold and missionary properties,
- 3) Removals relating to the consolidation of the reserve areas,
- 4) Urban relocation,

- 5) Influx control and repatriation,
- 6) The destruction of informal settlements,
- 7) Group Areas removals,
- 8) Removals relating to infrastructural, other development and conservation schemes,
- 9) Removals for strategic reasons,
- 10) Removals caused by the implementation of betterment planning within KwaZulu.

Although these categories are discussed separately, they should not be seen as isolated and discrete phenomena. While some removals have had a more overtly political and ideological purpose - for instance those relating to consolidation - and others a more overtly economic rationale - for instance those stemming from the abolition of labour tenancy - they nevertheless all intersect as supports in the structure of the apartheid state. The massive population removals in Natal (and the other provinces) and the acute suffering and dislocation to people's lives that they have necessitated, have been integral to the overall strategy adopted by the white ruling class to retain and enhance its ultimate political domination and economic control. Forced removals have formed part of a process of systematic dispossession of the black majority - dispossession not only of their land and access to the wealth of the country, but of their citizenship too. The various categories of removals listed have facilitated this process by the following means:

1. The expulsion of 'non-productive' and 'superfluous' africans from the urban, and white rural areas into the rural periphery, through the enforcement of influx control, the elimination and control of informal settlements, the location of african townships inside the boundaries of KwaZulu, the repatriation of foreigners, the removal of black spots and the abolition of labour tenancy and squatting in the white farming areas.
2. Increased control over the distribution of the labour force and the bargaining powers of workers by the maintenance of the migrant labour system and, where possible, the transformation of those african workers living in the urban areas into commuters living inside KwaZulu. This has been achieved by relocating or incorporating urban african townships into KwaZulu and ensuring that all new township development takes place inside KwaZulu as well.
3. The legitimisation of the ethnically based bantustan/homeland/national state of KwaZulu by the consolidation of the scattered reserves of Natal into a more coherent geo-political entity, the elimination of black spots and 'badly situated' reserve areas and the enforced imposition of Zulu citizenship on the african residents of Natal.
4. The promotion of a limited degree of development in border regions and, more recently, within KwaZulu, to create the economic basis for a small governing class, and, through betterment planning, enable as many people as possible to be accommodated within the limited boundaries of KwaZulu.
5. The division of the working class along ethnic and racial lines, through the manipulation of citizenship, the enforcement of group areas legislation and the development of racially stratified, highly controlled townships for the different sections of the black population.
6. Increased population control in strategically sensitive areas through the establishment of conservation, forestry and military areas.

As the pressures on the State have mounted over the past two decades, particularly those coming from the opposition forces ranged against it, it has been forced to refine and rework its tactics; the programme of population removals has gone through different phases as a result. However, while the evidence suggests a slowing down in the pace of removals in Natal in recent years, there are no indications that the State has abandoned its long-term intentions to force as much of the african population as possible into KwaZulu, from which only those needed by the dominant economy will be allowed temporary escape.

TOTAL NUMBERS OF PEOPLE AFFECTED

Estimates for the total numbers of people removed in Natal since 1948 or threatened with removal in terms of current policy are set out for several of the categories listed above in Table 8. The detailed information from which these figures have been calculated is contained in the chapters dealing with each of the various categories. These figures show something of the magnitude of the social engineering that has taken place in the past and threatens in the future, although by themselves they say little about the enormous costs - financial, political and social - to our society.

Table 8. ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF REMOVALS, NATAL 1948 - 1982

	MOVED		UNDER THREAT	
FARM EVICTIONS	300 000	Abolition labour tenancy; mechanisation.	?	Creation of Farm Tenement Boards may see renewed State Action
BLACK SPOTS	105 000	109 african freehold; 14 missions	245 000	189 african freehold; 13 missions
CONSOLIDATION	10 000	Reserve 6; part of Reserve 4.	300 000	Reduction of 48 scheduled and released reserve areas to 10.
URBAN RELOCATION ⁺	17 000	Dannhauser, Estcourt, Umlazi Glebe (Dbn), Harding, Howick, Ladysmith (part), Margate, Newcastle, Utrecht.	61 000	Cedarville, Chesterville (Dbn), Colenso, Dannhauser Emergency Camp, Dundee, Glencoe, Greytown, Howick, Ladysmith, Mooi River, Paulpietersburg, Klaarwater (Pinetown), Stanger, Umzinto, Vryheid, Weenen Emergency Camp, Winterton Emergency Camp.
INFRASTRUCTURAL	15 000	Dams, development projects, game reserves, forestry.	?	Sodwana Bay, Inanda Dam, Mvumase Dam, Umfolosi Dam, Mkomanzi Dam.
STRATEGIC	3 500	Missile range, northern boundaries + coast.	?	Ingwavuma ?
SUB-TOTAL	450 000		606 000 + ?	
GROUP AREAS	295 000		?	
TOTAL	745 500		606 000 + ?	

⁺ Urban african freehold areas moved in Newcastle, Charlestown and Vryheid counted under black spots. These figures do not include the far larger group of people excised from the prescribed area of Durban by boundary adjustments incorporated into KwaZulu at Kwa-Mashu (with 200 000 people) in 1977. A similar fate threatens Clermont (Pinetown) and Lamontville (Durban) as well.

It should be stressed that these figures are estimates and, furthermore, do not cover all aspects of relocation in the province. It has proved impossible to try to quantify reasonably accurately the numbers of people affected by 1) betterment planning (which, as suggested in the chapter dealing with it, may well exceed one million people), 2) the enforcement of influx control and 3) the elimination of informal settlements, except where such removals have overlapped with one of the other categories listed - as in the case of those african informal settlements which were affected by group areas proclamations in Durban in the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, and which have consequently been included in the figure for group areas removals.

What these figures show is that, in the categories listed, about three quarters of a million people have been removed to date, about three quarters of them african and the remainder indian (predominantly) and coloured, with a tiny number of whites affected as well. As the next chapter describes, not all the african people who have been re-located have ended up in KwaZulu. Nevertheless, combining the total number of africans known to have been moved with the million or more people affected by betterment planning, influx control etc. and then comparing that figure of between one and two million people with the total population for KwaZulu - calculated as 3 187 987 in 1980 - it becomes apparent that it would not be too farfetched to state that perhaps as many as 50% of the population of KwaZulu have suffered the trauma of removal. Furthermore, well over half a million people more - over 10% of the total population of the province - are living under threat of removal in just three categories - the three where projections of this sort can be made. The total number of people who are likely to be moved in the future as a result of farm evictions and infrastructural development cannot be accurately predicted at this stage but, as the chapters dealing with these categories indicate, is likely to be substantial.

SOURCES

These figures are estimates but, if anything, they err on the conservative side. They have been compiled from a large range of statistical sources, both official and unofficial, balanced against extensive fieldwork over the past two years.⁺ The cross-checking of library research work against fieldwork has been essential since there are many problems associated with official statistics which make them inadequate as a final source.

One of these problems is that official data on vital issues is often either lacking or not publicly available. The extent of population removals in this country has been deliberately hidden from the public and suppression of statistical data has been one of the means of achieving this. The tendency for the responsible Minister not to answer parliamentary questions concerning removals has become more and more marked in recent years and, in terms of the ominous Laws on Cooperation and Development Amendment Act of 1982, this trend is bound to become even stronger in the future. Clause 1 of that Act provides for 'the preservation of secrecy in connection with matters dealt with by the Commission' of Cooperation and Development, and foremost among those matters, as the parliamentary debate made very clear, is the question of the consolidation of the bantustans.

Another problem is that the official data that is available is often wildly inconsistent or simply inaccurate. For instance, Dr Koornhof told the House of Assembly in 1980 that a black spot known as The Swamp, near Himeville, had been moved in 1976 with 125 people. (Hansard, Question 537, 22.04.80) In fact, it was not moved until 1978 and the population was closer to 700. Official terms are not consistently applied, with

⁺ Details on the statistics consulted are contained in the chapters dealing with each of the various categories and in the bibliography.

'black spot' and 'squatter' being two particularly loosely applied and confusing terms - for some officials any area they want to move is labelled a black spot and any person they want to remove is labelled a squatter, regardless of the actual legal standing of either place or person. This can lead to double-counting - a place that is classified as a black spot in one instance and a badly situated area in another being recorded under both the black spot and the consolidation categories, for example - unless one is familiar with the areas being discussed.

A more fundamental problem in trying to quantify forced population removals is that because of shifts in government policy over the years, the boundaries of what is and what is not the white area in Natal have not remained constant and thus the areas to be removed have not remained constant either. The ultimate shape of KwaZulu has been an extremely controversial and inflammatory issue in Natal throughout the 1970s and Pretoria has not yet revealed its final boundaries; this obviously affects the estimates of those currently under threat of removal (the figures supplied in Table 8 for black spot removals and consolidation being based on the 1975 consolidation plans for the region) and also makes it very difficult to reconstruct developments between one year and the next. Some black-owned farms currently under threat of removal because of consolidation planning were previously incorporated into KwaZulu as released areas and have only recently become black spots, under threat of removal. Conversely, a small number of freehold properties that were formerly classified as black spots in the 1950s and 1960s have now, with the advent of the consolidation era, been offered a reprieve of sorts and may end up within a redrawn KwaZulu.

2. Historical overview, 1960-1982

THE 1960s

The priorities in the removal programme in the 1960s were:

- 1) The removal of black spots, which finally got under way in earnest in the early 1960s, starting with the relocation of Besterspruit just outside Vryheid; this was moved to Mondlo, established in 1963 as Natal's first 'rural village';
- 2) Enforcement of group areas proclamations in the major urban centres - Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle, Vryheid, Ladysmith and others.

During this time the previously rigid hostility of white farmers to the acquisition of quota land by the SADT began to ease and major land purchases were made by the Trust in the Klip River, Dundee, Mpendle and Ixopo districts, most of this land earmarked for relocation purposes. The focus of attention in the black spot removal programme was in Northern Natal. Many of the african freehold properties expropriated and removed during this time were located in the coal-mining belt stretching from Newcastle to Wasbank.

Conditions in the early relocation sites were appallingly bad. At Mondlo, the people moved from Besterspruit were provided with tents and nothing else - no sanitation, no permanent water supply (water had to be brought in by tankers), no schools or shops - and within a few months a major typhoid epidemic broke out. In the mid 1960s the Department of BAD developed a set of guidelines on relocation and relocation sites which laid down extremely basic minimum standards. Limehill was established in 1968 as Natal's first 'closer settlement' in terms of these new guidelines, but the facilities and conditions prevailing there showed little improvement over those provided at Mondlo five years previously. The removal of a number of black spots into the Limehill area

in 1968 received extensive publicity, throughout South Africa, largely through the efforts of a small, committed group of church leaders and other concerned people. This served to alert various pressure groups to relocation as a major, political issue. The negative publicity the government received, both locally and internationally, undoubtedly affected its approach to subsequent removals. During the 1970s it paid greater attention to providing a minimum infrastructure in relocation sites, particularly in the more accessible areas, and to promoting a more positive public image of removals as voluntary and part of a process of State-building and/or development.

While constitutional development in the Zulu bantustan proceeded very sluggishly, preparations for its establishment were being made. Already its future boundaries were being debated in government circles. In the early 1960s Pretoria set up a committee to look into the future of the State land in Natal; this committee reported in favour of obtaining the bulk of the outstanding quota land in Natal from the Makhathini Flats. More attention was paid to implementing betterment planning in the Natal reserves, despite strong local opposition to it in certain areas. In 1968 Pretoria established the industrial growth point of Isithebe, the first border area to be created inside the Zulu bantustan. At the same time it also announced an ambitious programme for the development of townships within the Zulu bantustan. Established african townships in urban areas throughout Natal came under threat of removals as a result; the first de-proclamations of urban townships, preparatory to their relocation into bantustan areas, were made at Utrecht, Ladysmith and Dannhauser at the end of the decade.

During the 1960s extensive but poorly documented removals took place in the northern coastal regions where a large afforestation programme was being developed on land formally owned by the State. The 1960s ended with the abolition of labour tenancy in the province. The massive evictions of farm workers and tenants that resulted were concentrated in the first half of the 1970s but the convulsive effects of this action were felt throughout the 1970s. A large number of closer settlements were established in Northern Natal to soak up the flood of displaced people from the white countryside.

THE 1970s

In 1970 a new political dimension was added to the situation in Natal with the establishment of the Zulu Territorial Authority and the passage of the Homeland Citizenship Act. During the 1970s planners in Pretoria were preoccupied with the attempt to consolidate the newly created homeland of KwaZulu into a more rational and unified geo-political entity. Their attempts ran into serious obstacles from the start, however. Organised agriculture, the powerful sugar industry and the Natal Chamber of Industries have opposed the various consolidation proposals put forward for the region in 1972, 1973 and again in 1975, and the KwaZulu government itself has refused to cooperate. Although the 1973 and 1975 proposals were approved by Parliament, only small aspects of the overall plan had been implemented by 1979, when Prime Minister P.W. Botha announced that the Commission for Cooperation and Development (the 'van der Walt Commission', named after its chairman) had been instructed to reinvestigate the whole matter of consolidation not only from the 'geographical point of view' but also from the point of view of the 'consolidation of nations' and the 'economic consolidation of States'. During the 1970s, the elimination of black spots became incorporated into the overall plan for the consolidation of the african areas of Natal. Here Pretoria was more successful, expropriating and removing large numbers of african-owned properties.

Other smaller but still important categories of removals in this time were removals for security reasons and township relocation. Since the late 1960s the security situation in the northern parts of Natal has been a matter of growing concern to Pretoria. The victory of the Frelimo forces and the ending of Portuguese rule in Mocambique in 1975 encouraged it to speed up its programme of removals in the strategically sensitive areas along the northern coastline and the borders with Mocambique and Swaziland. In the

first part of the 1970s the goal of relocating all the african townships in Natal's towns and cities into KwaZulu was pursued energetically. In 1977 a new phase in urban relocation was introduced when the Durban township of KwaMashu was incorporated into KwaZulu by means of adjustments to the boundary separating Durban from KwaZulu.

THE SITUATION IN MID 1982

The appointment of the van der Walt Commission to re-examine consolidation has introduced a new fluidity into the situation in Natal with regard to removals. In recent years there has been a discernible slackening in the pace of large-scale removals. A number of removals of both urban townships and black spots, which were described as imminent by officials in 1978/79, have not been carried through to date. Both financial and political pressures have contributed to this apparent slowdown. The ever-increasing cost of the war in Namibia, coupled with the falling price of gold, has meant that there is less money available for grandiose removals schemes than in the early 1970s, while the wide spectrum of opposition in Natal to consolidation, as well as the level of resistance in a number of threatened communities, has forced Pretoria to become more cautious in its approach.

There is no evidence to suggest that Pretoria had had a change of heart on relocation, however. Answers given by the Minister of Cooperation and Development to questions tabled in Parliament in the course of 1981/82 have repeatedly affirmed that the removal of various threatened communities will still be carried out; the secrecy clause in the Cooperation and Development Amendment Act of 1982 will make it possible for all information on these removals to be suppressed. Preparations for a large influx of relocated people are being made at the relocation site of Mzimhlophe, 60 km north of Kranskop. Influx control is to be tightened more ruthlessly in terms of the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, first published at the end of the 1982 parliamentary session; this Bill also raises the spectre of a further round of State-sponsored evictions of people off white farms in the near future. The current attempt to excise the Ingwavuma district and hand it over to Swaziland is a further indication of Pretoria's determination to push ahead with its programme of exclusion for the african people of Natal by whatever means it can devise.

The combination of pressures has, however, made the possibility of reprieves for a number of well placed threatened communities more promising (St Wendolins, near Durban, for instance). This, in turn, may benefit the organisation of opposition to removals in other less advantaged communities.

Note: For a visual comparison of the shape of the african areas in Natal/KwaZulu in 1965 and in 1982 readers are referred to maps no. 28 and no. 29 at the back of this report.



2. RELOCATION SITES: A SUMMARY

These lists refer to areas into which africans have been moved; details on indian and coloured group area townships are contained in Chapter 9. The summary is divided into four parts:

1. Relocation townships
2. Relocation closer settlements
3. Potential/proposed relocation sites
4. Unofficial relocation sites.

Although we have tried to make the lists as comprehensive as possible, there are gaps in our information which need to be filled by further fieldwork and research.

1. Relocation townships

General Circular no. 25, 1967, from the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, set out the guidelines to be applied in (its words) 'settling of non-productive Bantu resident in European areas, in the homelands'. This distinguished between four types of relocation settlements:

- a) 'Self-contained Bantu towns', to rehouse former municipal townships and provide accommodation for workers and their families in border industries;
- b) Towns with 'rudimentary services', 'usually situated deeper into the homelands' than type a); to provide accommodation mainly for the families of migrant workers;
- c) 'More densely populated residential areas', with a rudimentary layout, where people must provide their own housing, to accommodate those moved off farms and black spots;
- d) 'Controlled squatting' on Trust land, to absorb squatters from farms, black spots etc. quickly and from where they can be removed to types a), b) or c) as necessary. (Maré, 1980, Appendix 5)

In Natal there are at present at least 12 relocation townships conforming to types a) and b) above, with a few more planned. (Here one is referring only to townships established primarily as relocation areas, and not to those other townships established to house existing communities in their area; for a fuller list of townships in KwaZulu, see p. 180.) Facilities provided in these townships, while varying between types a) and b) and extremely basic, are far superior to those found in the closer settlements of types c) and d).

NAME & NEAREST TOWN	DATE ESTABLISHED	PRESENT POPULATION.	FROM WHERE	FACILITIES
1. Bilanyoni; Paulpietersburg 25 km <u>Under threat of further removal</u>	1970; c. 1974 closed.	18 000	Bivane mission; N. Natal labour tenant farms.	Type b). Taps in street; bucket toilets; prim. & sec. schools; 3 shops; post office. Now excised from KZ. See p.419-422 for more detailed account.
2. Ezakheni; Ladysmith 25 km	1972	50 000	Klip River bs; Ladysmith townships; some farms.	Type a), now in KZ. Township & site & service; tap per plot; flush toilets; prim. & sec. schools & Tech. institute; 2 clinics; local authority & police offices; community hall. Major bus boycott 1979. See p.332-353 for case study.
3. Gamalakhe; Port Shepstone 10 km	c. 1975	862 hh; 4 171 hh planned; squatters on edge	Margate township; S. Natal areas.	Township houses & site & service plots for sale.
4. KwaDabeka; Pinetown 8 km	Early 1970s	225 hh; est. + 2 000 pop; 1 300 pop. on waiting list. Pop. of 40 000 planned (1990)	Marianhill, St Wendolins.	
5. KwaMashu; Durban 20 km	1956	60 075 hh; 181 261 pop; 15 500 hostels beds. (1980)	Cato Manor; Durban hostels.	Type a). Hostels & rented housing; 36 schools; 5 clinics; 12 creches; shops & beerhalls; sports facilities; no libraries or parks (1979). Incorporated into KZ 1977.
6. KwaNdengezi; Pinetown 24 km	1977	3 500 hh; 1 500 pop. (1981); Pop. of 40 000 planned	Tenants from Clermont; Klaarwater, St Wendolins bs; threat of Chester-ville residents.	Type a). Rented housing; no toilets inside first; flush toilets & internal water; 3 schools; temp. clinic; 1 supermarket; no electricity, telephones, post office or police station as of July 1980.
7. Madadeni; Newcastle 15 km	Early 1960s	52 000 pop. officially; bs; N. Natal est. 92 000 townships. (1980)	Newcastle/Dundee townships.	Type a). Township rented housing & Deed of Grant sites for private building & site & service area & hostels ISCOR; tap per plot; flush toilets; part electrified; prestige projects e.g. Checkers supermarket; 30 schools incl. 3 High & Technical College.

NAME & NEAREST TOWN	DATE ESTABLISHED	PRESENT POPULATION.	FROM WHERE	FACILITIES
8. Mondlo; Vryheid 28 km	1962	Est. 21 000 3 142 hh.	Vryheid, Paulpietersburg bs; N. Natal farms & mission farms.	Type b). Conditions at first very poor - tents, no water or toilets; self-built houses; taps now in streets or plots; flush toilets; no electricity; clinic; several shops; schools incl. High. No labour bureau. Rent unrest 1980. Administered by KZ.
9. Mphophomeni; Howick 10 km	1969	5 575	Howick township; some farms.	Township rented housing; no shops (1981); schools; 1981 Community Council elected; 1 taxi (1981).
10. Mpumalanga; Hammarsdale 2 km	1968	5 317 hh (1977)	Bs in area which expropriated to allow border industry development.	Type a). Flush toilets; street lighting.
11. Ntuzuma; Durban 20 km	1973	Proposed pop. 60 000	Overflow from existing townships; possibly Chesterville.	Township housing + core housing with optional electricity.
12. Osizweni; Newcastle 25 km	Early 1960s	44 000 pop. officially	N. Natal farms; bs; Charlestown; Utrecht township.	Originally type b). Township rented housing; self-built houses & large section of fletcraft; rudimentary shopping centre.
13. Wembezi; Estcourt 12 km	c. 1969	Est. 5 000	Estcourt township; some farms & mission land.	Street lighting, bucket toilets; school; bus boycott 1980/81.

2. Relocation closer settlements

The relocation areas listed here conform broadly to types b) and c) described above. They are the classic dumping-ground type of relocation area, known officially as closer settlements because the people moved into them are, with a few exceptions, allocated residential sites only (generally about 25 metres square). Despite the complete absence of any semblance of an urban or township infrastructure, and the distance from urban and metropolitan centres, there is no scope for the people placed in these settlements to try to make a living from subsistence agriculture. When people are relocated to these places they are usually (but, again, not always) provided with temporary accommodation (tents or fletcraft huts) and expected to build their own permanent dwellings. The government is on record as saying that schools, clinics, clean water and even shops are always supplied 'free' in relocation areas - most recently when Dr Koornhof assured Parliament in April 1982 that various black spots in Natal would not be removed until after 'the necessary housing facilities, water-reticulation, sanitation, school and clinic facilities, shops, roads and other services have been provided'. (Hansard, Question 450, 22.04.82) As the following summary makes clear, these bland assurances do not necessarily match the actual situation that they purport to describe.

SFP is aware that this list is incomplete; to provide a comprehensive list of relocation areas would be a near-impossible task and would probably amount to compiling

a blanket list of african rural settlements in Natal/KwaZulu. There are numerous settlements, scattered throughout the province, which have absorbed large numbers of people displaced as a result of government relocation policies but which were not originally established, whether officially or unofficially, as relocation settlements. Such places include: Ngwanase (Maputa); the Nkundusi district near Lake St Lucia; KwaMkhize near Ntabamhlophe, Estcourt.

There are also examples of relocation settlements which, on closer inspection, turn out to consist of not one but two or three small, scattered settlements, geographically separate and each with its own local name yet officially a single place with a single name. One example of this is 'Qudeni', which name covers at least three places: Mzimhlophe, Singabantu and Gubazi. Although these three places are listed separately on this list, there may be other instances of composite relocation sites which we have missed and listed as single settlements.

In addition to these problems, SPP was unable to trace or visit a number of very small, obscure settlements that local people mentioned to us in passing but could not identify positively as relocation points. Most of these sounded like quite old communities, probably located on Trust land, and some at least may have been betterment communities. Places mentioned include: Kwanobamba, Sgoje, Esivubu (Babanango); Mvunyane, KwaMhlongo, Nhlanhleni, Vulamehlo (Nqutu); Tolekela, Ophuzana, Piensrand (Paulpietersburg); Makuzeni, Ntombela (Polela). It should be noted that closer settlements known to have been established in terms of betterment planning in KwaZulu have not been included in this list unless a substantial number of outsiders have been relocated there as well. While betterment is recognised as a category of relocation in this report, it has special features that require a particular treatment. (For more details on betterment in KwaZulu, see p. 271-274)

Despite these limitations, this summary can be regarded as a guide to the major official relocation closer settlements in the Natal region.

NAME & NEAREST TOWN	DATE ESTABLISHED	PRESENT POPULATION	FROM WHERE	FACILITIES
1. Asynkraal; Pomeroy c. 35 km	1968		Bs incl. Mali, Trosa, Nietgedag; Missions incl. Nazareth.	Part of Limehill complex.
2. Bulwer Trust Farm; Stanger 26 km <u>Under threat</u> from proposed dam on Tugela River.	c. 1980	69 hh (1981); 613 sites & 1982 described as 'full'.	Tenants of bs; farms in Lower Tugela district.	Sites 135x84 ft; pit latrines; people build own shelter; 4 boreholes and c. 5 taps; nearest school, shop, clinic c. 6 km; bus stops several km from Bulwer; single fare to Stanger 80 cents; wood is free from surrounding hills.

NAME & NEAREST TOWN	DATE ESTABLISHED	PRESENT POPULATION	FROM WHERE	FACILITIES
3. Compensation; Bulwer 30 km	1978	c. 160 hh	The Swamp, bs (1978); Kwapi-tela, bs, tenants only (1981).	Tents & fletcraft for newcomers; pit latrine per site; 2 water tanks at one end of settlement at first; supplemented by new reservoir; temp. fletcraft prim. school till 1981 when brick building opened; nearest shop several km away; no clinic service. More relocation into area planned. + 360 new latrines installed. See p. 373-388 for detailed case study.
4. Ekuvukeni; Ladysmith c. 50 km	c. 1972	est. 20 000	Ladysmith, Wasbank bs, incl. Criemen, Ruigtefontein, Steinkoalspruit tenants.	Fletcraft for newcomers; bucket system toilets; taps in street; schools; shops; beerhall; fuel gathered from surrounding hills; commuter buses to Ladysmith.
5. Emakhosini; Melmoth 25 km <u>Under threat</u> of further removal, though possible reprieve	1960s first hh; further influx since then.	est. 50 hh	Farms in Melmoth/Babanango area.	First few hh got land (c. 2 acres) & treated similar to betterment; induna & agric. officer allocate sites; stock, max. 15 head cattle, allowed; water from river; private toilets only; wkly mobile clinic; 1 prim. school; 1 shop. See p. 417-419 for more details.
6. Folweni/Gologodo; Umbumbulu nearest centre. In KZ.	1981 (as relocation area)	c. 300 hh	Malukazi squatter camp, by KZ GG.	Sites with a tap & bucket toilets; people to build own shelter; resettlement of original residents who see their agric. land settled. See p. 204 for more details.
7. Frankland; Port Shepstone 20 km	1970s		Umzinto bs; squatters on Umzinto State land.	More fieldwork necessary.
8. Gubazi (Qudeni); Kranskop 60 km	1970s	est. 80 hh	Farms in N. Natal.	Plots; small prim. school. More fieldwork necessary.
9. Halfdale; Bulwer 25 km. Trust farm.	1940s	c. 30 hh	App. from coloured farm near Ixopo.	No details but appears betterment type arrangement on Trust farm.

NAME & NEAREST TOWN	DATE ESTABLISHED	PRESENT POPULATION	FROM WHERE	FACILITIES
10. Hlungulwana; Babanango c. 20 km Under threat but possible reprieve.	First hh pre 1970 but maj. moved in c. 1974	est. 80 hh	Neighbouring farms - labour tenants.	1974 influx not supplied with temp. accommod. or toilets; water from river; first hh got fields, sim. position to No. 4 above, recent hh do not have; stock allowed for a fee; shop few km away; clinic 12 km away; higher prim. school nearby; administered by KZ.
11. Inanda Newtown; Durban 35 km	1980	15 000; 4 600 hh planned (30 000)	Tenants on neighbouring freehold land (in a re-leased area).	Site & service scheme being developed by Urban Foundation & GG; pit latrines; water points; garbage removal; people build temp. shacks & encouraged to upgrade; temp. school; mobile clinic; buses to Durban. Procl. as township 23.04.82. See p.389 for detailed case study.
12. KwaMaqikizani; Umzinto 30 km	1981/2	30 - 50 hh	Tenants from indian farm in Braemar dist.	People living in tents early 1982 but they have since built houses. Latrines provided; water close by.
13. KwaMbono; Harding c. 10 km	Officially opened 1982	66 hh	'Civil servants'; people from Harding hostels.	
14. Limehill; Pomeroy, c. 35 km, Ladysmith, c. 55 km	1968	350 hh (1978)	Bs in Wasbank area, incl. Lyell, Meran & Maria Ratschitz Mission.	At first: tents; c. 1/4 acre plots; water in tank; rations after publicity; temp. school; latrines; no clinic. Now: perm. mainly mud houses, taps in street - 10 total; bucket toilets; clinic; 2 prim. schools; 3 shops. See Desmond, 1970, 1978.
15. Loskop; Estcourt c.25 km	c. 1975	Several hundred hh	Tenants on near-by mission land.	High & sec. & prim. schools; large plots but no stock or agric. land.
16. Mbazwana; Ubombo c.55 km	1974 first relocation; people already resident too. Subsequently 1976, 1979, 1981/82.		State lands south Sodwana Bay - military & forestry; Makhathini Flats (1981/2) - CED projects.	People relocated into general area & not into closer settlement as such; tents; no latrines; no agric. land; water very scarce. See p. 266 for details.
17. Moyeni; Estcourt c.30 km	c. 1975		Neighbouring white farms; removed bs.	High, sec. & prim. schools; more field-work necessary.

NAME & NEAREST TOWN	DATE ESTABLISHED	PRESENT POPULATION	FROM WHERE	FACILITIES
18. Mpungamhlophe; Babanango 35 km	1959 first hh; most hh moved in 1966/68; few evicted hh still move in currently.	1 500 (1969); little increase since.	White farms.	1960s no temp. tents or latrines or transport for those being removed but mobile clinic, prim. school; 2 shops, some taps & 1 or 1/2 acre plots. (Desmond, 1970, 61) Now better established, perm. clinic, sec. school planned.
19. Mysieland; Umzinto 25 km Under threat in terms 1975 consol. plans.	1972	125	Tenants from Umzinto bs.	More fieldwork necessary.
20. Mzimhlophe (Qudeni); Kranskop 60 km	1975	c. 800; large influx of 800 hh planned. Hansard Sept. 1981 states 5 766 pop. in Qudeni - must refer to 8 & 31 as well.	White farms in Dannhauser, Louwsburg, Babanango districts; individ. hh from bs, other farms.	Fletcraft & tents to new arrivals; pit latrines; no official water supply but 1981 private contractor putting in dam & taps per plot, residents to pay; temp. lower prim. school, but reviewed 1982; nearest shop & bus stop several km away. For detailed case study see p. 354.
21. Nkonisa; Nkandla 10 km	c. 1967	est. 600 in area visited; Desmond est. 5 000 relocated in Nkonisa area in late 1960s.	Weenen townlands; white farms, incl. Dannhauser & Weenen districts.	Temp. tents on sites approx 20x20 metres, no toilets or taps when first moved in; still no water except river; higher prim. school nearby; nearest shop several km; mobile clinic; 5 head cattle per hh allowed but no fields except for chief. (See Desmond, 1970, for early details.)
22. Nondweni; Nqutu 20 km	1975	5 000; & 2 000 in unofficial settlement adjoining.	Paulpietersburg, Vryheid farms; squatters on Trust land at Paulpietersburg first; now Greytown; Weenen farms too.	Temp. fletcraft & pit latrines; taps in street; water system has frequent breakdowns & 1982 freeze on moving more hh in because of cholera fears; before a major relocation point for N. Natal; supermarket & bottle-store; perm. clinic opened 1980; fuel shortage; 1 prim., 1 sec. school.

NAME & NEAREST TOWN	DATE ESTABLISHED	PRESENT POPULATION	FROM WHERE	FACILITIES
23. Ntambanana (1)/ Mandlanzini; Empangeni, 35 km	1975	est. 10 000	Reserve 6, to make way for Richards Bay; farms.	Not closer settlement as people from Reserve 6 scattered across comp. land; betterment planning to be enforced; water serious problem - rivers & trucks supplying tanks; size of agric. land varies; fletcraft & pit latrines for most hh; 4 prim. schools & struggle to get sec. successful 1982. See p.534 for more details.
24. Ntambanana (2) (Police Station); Empangeni 30 km	1977/1978	est. 400	Southern part of Reserve 4, Richards Bay (which excised 1977).	Adjoins huge empty waiting closer settlement; no details but appears no agric. land & very depressed.
25. Ntingwe; Nkandla 35 km	Late 1960s	est. several thousand.	White farms in Weenen area; some from Themba-lhle, bs, in Estcourt, because of factional violence.	Name appears to cover several scattered settlement in area, possibly some have agric. land attached in betterment way; school, shops & bottle-store, GG sisal plantation adjoining.
26. Ntunjambili; Kranskop 10 km	1979	c. 54 hh	Kranskop townlands, farms.	Fletcraft; latrines; water tank (complaints that water not clean); no refuse disposal; shops in nearby reserve.
27. Oliviershoek; Bergville 15 - 20 km	1980		Upper Tugela Location & freehold areas to be flooded by Woodstock Dam.	A composite settlement area, with several scattered settlements; fletcraft & latrines & compensatory land but outside people have bought sites (illegally) in substantial numbers in this.
28. Polltax Farm/ New Politique; Pietermaritzburg 15 km <u>Under threat</u>	1967	500 - 600 hh	Pietermaritzburg bs; white farms.	Temp. emergency camp; people told not to build perm. houses & this still holds; no water when first arrived; 1969 reservoir & some taps installed; plots very small (30x20 metres); see Desmond, 1970, 85.
29. Roberts Farm, Ebrington, Hilder (all Trust Farms); Mpendle 5 - 10 km	1969		Bs in Upper Umkomaas area, to make way for expansion forest reserve.	Several settlements established; Zulu names not known. Landowners given comp. land & areas planned on betterment model; dissatisfaction re compensation. See Desmond, 1970, 71.

NAME & NEAREST TOWN	DATE ESTABLISHED	PRESENT POPULATION	FROM WHERE	FACILITIES
30. Sahlumbe, Nomoya, Msusamphi, Mashunka; Weenen 23+ km	1969	est. 5 000	Farms in Weenen & surrounding districts.	Rudimentary settlements, without grid plan; tents but no toilets when first moved in; water still from Tugela River & streams (when running); some land among original inhabitants mainly; a few scattered shops; mobile clinic; Msusamphi no road access. See p.308-323 for detailed case study.
31. Singabantu (Qudeni); Kranskop 60 km		est. 30 hh	N. Natal farms.	More fieldwork necessary.
32. Uitval; Ladysmith c. 55 km	1968		Alva and Ama-khasi Mission (2 miles away).	Water from dam c. 1/4 mile away; plots c. 30 metres square; part of Limehill complex.
33. Vaalkop; Ladysmith c. 55 km	1968	1 000 : 1968	Longland bs.	Part of Limehill complex
34. Vergelegen; Ladysmith c. 55 km	1968	500 hh 1968	Boschhoek/Hlatikulu bs.	Part of Limehill complex.
35. Vulandondo; Ladysmith 14 km <u>MOVED TO EZAKHENI 1972</u>	1963	- Moved 1972	Khumalosville/Besters bs.	1/2 acre plots & options to buy another 1/2 acre for R110; compensation for previous land at R42 an acre; tents & bag mealie meal. See Desmond, 1970, 78.
36. Wangu; Amatikulu c. 10 km	1978/79	est. 100 hh		Very small & isolated. Former tenants from Dunn Reserve.
37. Weenen Emergency Camp; Weenen c. 5 km	1968	896	Weenen townlands, farms.	Site & service; no regular water supply at first; first public building a beerhall.

3. Potential/proposed relocation sites

The following list contains names of places/areas which have been mentioned as potential new relocation points (i.e. over and above the expansion of existing settlements) by State officials in recent years or are likely to be developed as such. It is essential that developments at these areas continue to be monitored.

NAME & NEAREST TOWN/DISTRICT	PURPOSE
1. Bombalo; north of Hluhluwe Game Reserve.	Comp. land already acquired by SADT, to compensate for reserves moved in N.E. Natal for consolidation.
2. Eensgewonden; Babanango.	Comp. land for consolidation purposes. Dreyer, Commissioner-General in 1979 described it as a relocation site. (<u>Financial Mail</u> , 6.04.79)

NAME & NEAREST TOWN/DISTRICT	PURPOSE
3. Flint Farm; Dundee	Possibly for Sibongile Township (Dundee) & Glencoe Township. (Hansard, Question 213, 1.10.81)
4. ? ; between Ezakheni/Ekuvukeni (Ladysmith)	For Ladysmith bs; removals depot c. 5 km beyond Ezakheni.
5. Keates Drift; Greytown	Mentioned as possible site for Greytown township in 1979. (<u>Financial Mail</u> , 6.04.79)
6. Langespruit; Stanger	For Lower Tugela bs.
7. Luvisi; Nqutu	Possibly for Sibongile Township (Dundee) & Glencoe Township - 50 km away. (Hansard, Question 213, 1.10.81) Existing hh at Luvisi threatened with removal as squatters & talk of township of 30 000 hh being developed.
8. ? ; Makhathini Flats; Ubombo	Future of area uncertain but Flats proposed as major comp. area for consolidation purposes & possibly number of relocation sites could be established.
9. Ntambanana (2); Empangeni	Probably for Reserve 4. Large no. of empty fletcraft & latrines already assembled; no roads or other facilities (June 1982).
10. Platt Estates; Ixopo	Bought as comp. land for Ixopo bs in early 1960s but not yet used.
11. ? ; Port Shepstone	In the <u>Financial Mail</u> (6.04.79), Dreyer, Commissioner-General, referred to a 'point near Port Shepstone' as needed for relocation.
12. Qudeni	Commissioner-General, 1979, said possibly 2 new sites could be established here. (<u>Financial Mail</u> , 6.04.79)
13. - ?	In 1979 Commissioner-General said looking for a further 6 to 8 sites (in addition to those mentioned by him above) on which to relocate c. 300 000 'squatters, illegal labour tenants, and inhabitants of "black spots".' (<u>Financial Mail</u> , 6.04.79)

4. Unofficial relocation sites

As already mentioned, a comprehensive account of relocation points, both official and unofficial, would amount to a list of virtually every rural settlement in Natal/Kwa-Zulu. In all districts, everywhere one goes, one encounters displaced people - evicted from farms and black spots and townships, endorsed out of urban areas, forced to move for dams and railways and roads - people who either do not qualify for a site in an official relocation settlement or are trying to avoid the isolated, controlled, non-agricultural type of life imposed on those forced to live in such settlements. It

is impossible to compile a satisfactory list of places because of the magnitude of the task and problems with classifying areas systematically. The following paragraphs point to some major unofficial relocation settlements.

In their search for alternatives to places such as Limehill and Nondweni, many displaced people have moved onto black spots that have not yet been moved and from where they face a further threat of removal. Nearly all black spots, and particularly those fairly close to towns with employment opportunities (for instance in the Ladysmith district), have experienced an enormous influx of people in the last twenty years as a result of forced removals elsewhere. In addition some freehold areas that fall within KwaZulu have become major relocation centres of this type. An important example is Blaauwbosch, a freehold farm between Madadeni and Osizweni near Newcastle, with a population now estimated at 62 000, no planned sanitation and a serious water problem. Many people have moved there from white farms in Northern Natal and former black spots.

Other displaced people have trekked into the reserves proper and sought a place in an existing community from the local chief or induna (at times paying high fees for permission to settle). The Msinga district, notorious for its overcrowding and accompanying factional violence, is a very good example of this kind of informal relocation, with thousands of mainly ex-farmworkers crowding into an already overcrowded and strained environment in the last decade.

Still other displaced people have moved onto empty Trust farms and established new, informal relocation settlements. Examples of this are Nondweni no. 5, next to the official relocation site at Nondweni and Bekumthetho next to Mondlo. Nondweni no. 5 was established in the 1960s by families being evicted off white farms. They claim they were authorised to settle there by officials; they are now described as illegal squatters, however, and threatened with a further removal. The population is estimated at 2 000. There is no protected water supply. Plots are larger than at Nondweni proper and some of the older households have stock (up to a maximum of 5 head of cattle, hence the name Nondweni no. 5). Bekumthetho's population has been put as high as 10 000. It started in about 1977 and is settled mainly by people from farms and black spots in Northern Natal.

There are also numerous informal settlements on the edge of major towns and metropolitan areas throughout Natal into which a large proportion of the population has moved as a result of being evicted from somewhere else - black spots, deproclaimed townships, white farms etc. Examples are Bhobhoyi, outside Port Shepstone, released area 33 in the Inanda district, Mgaga adjacent to Umlazi township, Durban and KwaMakhutha, Durban. These are described more fully in Chapter 8.

3. FARM EVICTIONS

1. Introduction

Evictions of black workers and tenants off white-owned land has, as already pointed out, been a feature of the growth and increasing capitalisation of agriculture in Natal since the days when white settlers first started acquiring private title to farm land in the mid 19th century. In the last twenty-five years this process has intensified enormously. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people have been driven off land on which they had been living, often for generations, and forced to move or been forcibly re-located elsewhere - in State-controlled relocation camps, on Trust land, in KwaZulu, on nearby black spots, even on other white farms. It has been a complicated, confused process - a major social upheaval in the rural areas and an important but poorly documented category of removals.

There have been two definite though overlapping periods in the history of recent farm evictions in Natal:

1. From the late 1950s to the mid 1970s when the major category of farm evictions was that of labour tenants and squatters in central and Northern Natal; the latter half of this period saw massive State-sponsored evictions during which several hundred thousand people were either evicted or chose themselves to leave the white farms on which they were living.
2. From the mid 1970s to the present when, labour tenancy largely eliminated or controlled, evictions have been on a smaller scale than before and mainly the result of action taken by individual private employers against their workers, not of direct State intervention (although the latter has operated in certain cases).

2. The abolition of labour tenancy

STATE ACTION IN THE 1960s

The steps taken by the State to control labour tenancy in the 1950s and the evictions that resulted from that have already been described. In the 1960s the State moved more determinedly to eradicate the system entirely. By that stage the trend towards greater mechanisation was well advanced in South African agriculture and, nationally, the labour shortage of which farmers had complained so bitterly in the preceding decades was abating. Throughout the country there were many pockets of backward, under-capitalised farms which had not shared in these developments and which still relied heavily on labour tenancy; this was certainly true of Natal. They were, however, less and less of a force within the agricultural industry. In 1966 Froneman, then Deputy Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission, described labour tenancy as a system that was 'out of step with present trends in the field of employment, which demands the maximum utilisation of manpower.' (NAUNLU, 23.09.66)

In 1964 the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act was further amended to empower the Minister of Bantu Administration to abolish entirely or to limit the system of labour

tenancy in any one district of the country, by proclamation. Using these new powers (but acting only on the instigation of local farmers and in consultation with the provincial Agricultural Unions, according to the Minister) the government steadily declared district after district to be non-labour tenant areas. Initially attention was focused on the Orange Free State and the Transvaal where, it appears, white farmers were less embedded in the system than in Natal. The first districts to be proclaimed were Delmas, Groblersdal and Warmbaths, in June 1966. At the time the Minister denied that the abolition of labour tenancy would lead to massive evictions:

The first thing that is going to happen to those labour tenants is that they may all become full-time servants. They can still remain on those farms as in the past but they will now be there as ordinary full-time servants. The hon. member must not suggest that because we are abolishing the system we are going to load all the existing labour tenants on to a wagon and carry them off somewhere. We are not doing away with these people; it is the system that is being abolished. These people can still stay on under the new system. (Hansard, col. 2957, 12.03.64)

These reassurances soon proved to be false. In 1967 the government was reported to be considering introducing legislation to limit the number of african families allowed to live on white farms. (Natal Mercury, 15.09.67)

By the end of 1968 the Minister announced that labour tenancy had been abolished in 85 districts and some 11 507 people relocated off white farms as a result. (Desmond, 1970a, 16) At the same time he announced that the end of 1970 had been set as a target date for the complete abolition of the labour tenant system. In January 1969 the Natal Mercury reported that by then labour tenancy had been abolished in 25 districts in the Transvaal and all of the Orange Free State. (7.01.69) Cash tenancy and squatting on white farms was also being acted against strongly, and between January 1964 and September 1969 a total of 34 325 'squatters' were moved off farms throughout South Africa. (Hansard, col. 618, 10.12.70)

ATTITUDE OF NATAL FARMERS AND THE NAU

In Natal opposition to the elimination of labour tenancy came from both farmers and tenants. Many farmers argued that they could not afford to pay the necessary wages to a full time labour force; they also feared that they would lose their workers if they tried to force them to change over to full-time employment. While nationally the farm labour shortage had eased by the 1960s, in Natal many farmers were still complaining of problems in this regard. At the 1966 NAU Congress, speakers from the floor cited both the threat of a labour shortage and the burden of employing a full time labour force as reasons why labour tenancy should not be abolished too quickly. 'The tenant system was still in operation because it was the only one many farmers could afford', commented the President of the NAU. (Natal Witness, 16.09.66)

At the same time there is evidence that where to relocate farm workers who had already been evicted was a serious problem, since the acquisition of Trust land by the SADT was only just beginning to pick up momentum and very few relocation sites had yet been developed. In February 1962 the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Natal stated that land was urgently needed to fulfil Natal's quota obligation in terms of the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act and to relocate 250 000 surplus africans in the white farming areas. (NAUNLU, 16.02.62) Two months later he urged farmers who were intending to evict farm workers to contact the Department of BAD first, since the 'flood' of africans who were being driven off white farms without alternative accommodation was creating problems. (NAUNLU, 27.04.62)

As a result of these constraints the NAU continued to lobby within the SAAU and with

the central government against too rapid a phasing out of labour tenancy. In 1965 it re-iterated its previous stand that nothing should be done to upset the labour tenant system unnecessarily since the areas where it was still practised were fortunate enough not to be experiencing a labour shortage. (NAUNLU, 31.12.65) In 1968, when the government announced its intention to eliminate labour tenancy by the end of 1970, the NAU sent a delegation to the Minister of BAD to try to persuade him to delay the final date. At that stage, before labour tenancy had been fully tackled in Natal, the Department of BAD was not very sympathetic and all the delegation wrung from the Minister was the concession that while the target would not be abandoned, the situation could be reviewed if this became necessary. (NAUNLU, 19.04.68)

Because of this opposition from within the province, progress towards the elimination of labour tenancy in Natal lagged far behind the other provinces. In 1970 the NAU estimated that there were then about 400 000 labour tenants (workers and their families) on Natal farms. (NAUNLU, 9.01.70) By the beginning of 1969 only three Natal districts had been deproclaimed: Bergville, Kranskop and, in late 1969, Weenen. While the abolition of labour tenancy proceeded fairly smoothly in the first two districts, at least on paper, the attempt to enforce a full-time labour system in the Weenen district in 1969/70 turned the district upside down. It revealed clearly how entrenched in some rural areas the system still was and compelled Pretoria to reconsider its plans for the total abolition of labour tenancy by 1971.

EVICTIIONS IN WEENEN 1967 - 1972

Clearing the Townlands, 1967/68

Before labour tenancy was abolished in the Weenen district, some 5 000 blacks who were living as cash tenants on the Weenen Townlands⁺ had already experienced the trauma of eviction and relocation. Blacks had been living on the Weenen Townlands for generations, from the time when the municipality was first proclaimed in 1839. In the 19th century an unofficial system of collective labour tenancy developed, whereby 'the natives living on the Town Lands of Weenen have been required and have given labour to the Europeans in that village in lieu of rent.' (Letter from the Secretary for Native Affairs to the Weenen Magistrate, 5.03.02, File SNA 1/1/295, Natal Archives) By the 1960s, however, it seems that this system had been transformed into a straight cash tenancy one, with households paying the municipality an annual rent of R6 each in return for the right to live on and cultivate a piece of land. Most households depended on migrant workers to bring in a cash income.

The eviction of these tenants started in 1967 and continued through 1968 and 1969. It seems that it was part of the national drive against cash tenancy and squatting by blacks in white areas. According to a former resident, a chief now living in the relocation area of Nkonisa (near Nkandla), he and his people became illegal squatters because the Weenen Municipality was declared a prescribed area and all blacks living within its boundaries had to move. He reports that about 3 000 people were cleared off the townlands altogether. Although people had not wanted to move, they put up little resistance and the evictions were relatively peaceful. (Fieldwork)

About 600 of these evictees were transported by GG truck to the Nkandla district, 160 km away, where they were left at a relocation site called Nkonisa. Conditions there were very elementary - small sites, temporary tents, no latrines and no protected water supply. The one advantage it offered compared to most other relocation sites of that time was that residents were allowed to keep cattle, up to a maximum of 5 head per household. (For a fuller account see Desmond, 1970, 63)

⁺ A huge extent of commonage owned by the municipality and adjoining the village centre.

Those who were not taken to Nkonisa were eventually moved either into a hastily erected 'Emergency Camp' set up a few kilometres from the town of Weenen, or into the transit camps established in 1969 across the Tugela to accommodate evicted labour tenants from the district. Conditions at the Weenen Emergency Camp were initially appalling - according to Desmond, 'it made Limehill look like a holiday camp.' (Desmond, 1970, 67) Intended initially as a temporary transit camp only, the Emergency Camp has never been replaced by anything else and is still in existence today.

Although most of the people living on the Weenen Townlands were removed by 1970, a few individuals who were employed by the Municipality were allowed to continue living there with their families. In 1979, however, notice was served on these few remaining households (then numbering 5) as well. By then all the municipal workers in this group had either died or were too old to continue working for the Weenen municipality. No longer of any use to the town, they were to be evicted so that the land on which they lived - no more than a few hectares - could be used for grazing purposes instead. The case is well documented in the AFRA files. Despite attempts by the threatened households and some outside support groups to win a reprieve for this small group of mainly widows, pensioners and children, they were eventually all forced to leave the land.

Abolition of labour tenancy 1969 - 1972

While those evicted off the Weenen Townlands put up little resistance to their relocation, those threatened soon afterwards by the abolition of labour tenancy proved far more difficult to remove. Weenen was the third district in Natal to be deproclaimed but the first where State planning ran into serious local resistance. The backwardness of white agriculture in the area, the prevalence of labour farms with very large tenant populations who had been living on the land for generations and the large numbers of labour tenants in general, all combined to make the abolition of labour tenancy an explosive issue.⁺ According to the State, the local Farmers' Association asked for the area to be deproclaimed; either the Weenen Association did not represent the majority of farmers in the area or it underestimated the degree of resistance it would encounter from labour tenants themselves.

The proclamation abolishing labour tenancy was gazetted in late 1968 but only came into practical effect in July 1969 when tenants came to the end of their normal six-month labour commitment and were then faced with the choice of either remaining in full-time employment on the farm or being evicted. Some tenants did opt for full-time employment; the majority, it would appear, refused and were then subject to eviction and, if they refused to leave the land, to arrest and forcible removal. Several former tenants have indicated to SPP that had farm wages been increased sufficiently to make good the loss of earnings from industry or the mines, they might have been prepared to make the shift to full-time agricultural labour. Most farmers, however, either stuck to the former derisory wages (R2 a month) or offered only a paltry increase. (Amounts of R6 to R12 a month are quoted in Muil, 1976)

Contemporary newspaper reports estimated that between ten and twenty thousand former tenants (families included) were moved off farms in the Weenen district over a period of about three crisis-ridden years, starting in July 1969. For most of 1969, 1970 and 1971 the district was in turmoil. 'Concern over farm labour policy' (Natal Mercury, 16.07.69), 'Africans' homes and families are forced out' (The Star, 9.10.69), 'Shortage of farm labour in Weenen' (Natal Mercury, 31.01.70), 'Tractors demolish kraals -

⁺ In January 1969 the Natal Mercury reported that some farms in the Weenen/Estcourt area had as many as 1 500 people (tenants and their families) living on them. Public and official concern about the poor condition of the land on the labour farms in this area has already been described in Part One.

200 homeless' (Rand Daily Mail, 9.11.70) - newspaper headlines tell the story succinctly. Large numbers of tenants passively resisted eviction and had to be forced out by hut burnings, bulldozers, arrests and prosecution. A press statement issued by the Bantu Affairs Commission in October 1969 listed convictions for '291 kraal heads (2 246 souls)' who were squatting illegally on their former land. A feature of these evictions, which former tenants still remember with particular bitterness, was the forced stock sales. The authorities impounded stock belonging to tenants whose eviction notice had expired and those being relocated by the State were forbidden to take their cattle with them. White farmers flocked to the forced sales from miles around - from as far afield as the Orange Free State according to some witnesses - and bought up thousands of head of cattle and goats, often at a third or a quarter of their actual value.

Originally the government intended to relocate the bulk of the evicted tenants at Madadeni, near Newcastle, far to the north of their Weenen homes. These plans were thwarted, however, by the resistance of the tenants, many of whom hid their possessions and loaded trunks and packages filled only with stones onto the removal trucks. As soon as they had been offloaded at Madadeni, they found their own way back to the Weenen district, many returning to squat on their former land. (Fieldwork) Many others crowded into the neighbouring Msinga district of KwaZulu. Some appear to have gone to the Nkandla region to join those already relocated from the Weenen Townlands. Finally, the majority of Weenen tenants were relocated in hastily constructed transit camps pegged out on a strip of land acquired by the SADT on the north bank of the Tugela on the edge of the Weenen district. In this way the settlements of Sahlumbe, Nomoya, Msusamphi and Mashunka came into existence.

Conditions in these camps were extremely poor. Facilities were as rudimentary as those described for Nkonisa - temporary tents, no protected water supply, no latrines for many - with the further disadvantage that people were not allowed to keep stock. Although (like the Weenen Emergency Camp) these relocation sites were intended only to be a temporary solution to the crisis, officials have been unable to come up with any alternatives for the thousands living in them and these places are still in existence today. They are among the most depressed and impoverished of all the relocation areas in Natal. (For a detailed account of Sahlumbe, see case study, Part Three.)

FREEZE ON LABOUR TENANT CONTRACTS

The upheaval in Weenen made the NAU more anxious than ever to restrain the government from pressing ahead with its plans to abolish labour tenancy entirely by the end of 1970. In January 1970 NAUNLU published an editorial which slammed what it described as the unrealistic and impossible views of the Department of Bantu Administration:

This Union accepts the ideal of full-time employment of farm labour. In moving towards this goal it has, though, to deal with facts not theories. In so doing it diverges from some views held in the Department of Bantu Administration and Development in Pretoria - views which, to the man on the land, have an air of unreality about them. (NAUNLU, 9.01.70)

The editorial went on to reject the deadline of the end of 1970 as impossible - 'not because the farmers don't want this, but because the Department cannot deal with the consequences of such a policy.' In citing the reasons for the breakdown of the policy it listed, firstly, the unwillingness of many farm workers to work full-time and secondly, the problem of relocating the surplus tenants and their families. It also criticised the inefficiency of the influx control system which failed to control the migration of farm workers off the farms:

So until full time employment is desired by employees, or movement of

dissidents controlled, many farmers cannot abolish labour tenants. To decree from Pretoria that they shall do so is to ignore the facts. (NAUNLU, 9.01.70)

Implicit in the argument was the recurring fear of an inadequate farm labour supply; this fear was being given substance in the Weenen area where farmers were complaining bitterly of the disruption to their labour supply caused by the very evictions in which so many of them had taken part. So serious did the position become that, according to a journalist who covered the events, by 1972 Weenen farmers were trying to get the government to re-instate the labour tenant system in their area. (Mull, 1976, 5)

In response to these pressures, the government agreed to water down its proposals for the complete abolition of labour tenancy; instead a freeze on labour tenant contracts was announced. After consulting with the Agricultural Unions, the Minister of BAD promulgated Proclamation GN 1224 on the 31st July 1970 which declared that from the 1st August 1970 no new labour tenant contracts could be entered into or be registered throughout South Africa. With this announcement, restrictions on labour tenancy were introduced into the remaining districts in Natal. In August NAUNLU listed them as follows: Babanango, Camperdown, Dannhauser, Dundee, Estcourt, Greytown, Howick, Ixopo, Ladysmith, Ngotshe, Newcastle, Paulpietersburg, Pietermaritzburg, Port Shepstone, Richmond, Stanger, Umzinto, Utrecht and Vryheid. (NAUNLU, 21.08.70) (Howick had already been deproclaimed, some time after Weenen; date not known.)

The freeze meant that farmers could keep tenants whose contracts were already registered. It appears, however, that many labour tenants had never had their contracts registered and would thus not have been protected by this amendment. (Thus the SPP surveys undertaken at Sahlumbe and Mzimhlophe, among ex labour tenants, revealed that only 2% of tenants at the former and about 70% at the latter had had registered contracts when they were evicted.) Furthermore, in terms of earlier amendments to the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act, no labour tenant contract was valid for longer than 3 years. In early 1974 farmers started expressing concern about the implications as the three year limit approached. Once again the NAU organised a delegation to the Bantu Affairs Commissioner as a result of which farmers were told that contracts entered into before 1970 would be allowed to continue for an unspecified period. (NAUNLU, 16.08.74)

It is clear that these concessions did not protect most labour tenants. Large numbers were evicted during this period in all the districts mentioned above. It seems that the authorities continued to apply pressure on farmers to reduce the numbers of tenants living on their land and to register their workers. An ex-induna on a farm in the Dannhauser district who was removed to Mzimhlophe (Qudeni), in about 1975 along with several other households from his farm, told SPP that they had been evicted after their farmer refused to submit to instructions from the local commissioner to register his workers. (See Mzimhlophe case study, Chapter 3, Part 3.) During the early 1970s registration of workers remained a constant grievance of farmers and their dissatisfaction with these bureaucratic controls was frequently voiced in the pages of NAUNLU. In 1974 the function of registering labour was taken over by the newly created Bantu Administration Boards. In an editorial on the 21st June 1974 NAUNLU came out strongly in favour of a 'measure of control' (of the labour force) 'but as little interference as possible' and criticised the system of labour bureaux 'which doesn't work and never has' as well as the 'plethora of legislation which has been applied in fits and starts by some authorities and not by others - legislation in many cases totally ignored by the Bantu.'

In addition to the pressures from the authorities, it appears that by the mid 1970s many farmers in Natal were ready to make or had already made the change to a more capital intensive form of agriculture anyway. By 1977 the NAU could tell the State

that overall there was no labour shortage in Natal and farmers had no need of surplus urban labour, this in response to an approach from the State to see if there was a need for such surplus labour to be directed into agriculture. (NAUNLU, June 1977)

During this time, the mid 1970s, a number of relocation closer settlements were established on Trust land to deal with the huge numbers of surplus workers being moved off the farms. Ex-labour tenants from the Louwsburg/Paulpietersburg area were moved into a place called Bilanyoni, established in about 1970 some 20 km east of Paulpietersburg. Those from the Utrecht/Vryheid area tended to be moved either into the already established township of Mondlo, 20 km south of Vryheid, or to the new settlement of Nondweni, established in 1975/76 near Nqutu. Fieldwork undertaken by SPP in Northern Natal in 1980/81 revealed that large numbers of ex-farm workers from this area had apparently made their own way to the State lands of the Makhathini Flats to the east during this time as well. Ladysmith farm workers were officially moved into the relocation area stretching from Ezakheni (established 1972) to Limehill, but many chose to avoid official relocation and moved instead into neighbouring black spots where they faced a further eviction at a later stage. Babanango tenants were relocated on a string of closer settlements in the Denny Dalton region, including the already established settlements of Emakhosini, Hlungulwana and Mpungamhlophe. Dannhauser tenants were sent to closer settlements in the Nkandla district centering on Qudeni, e.g. Mzimhlophe which was established in 1975.

The exact number of people moved thus will probably never be known. Official figures show a marked drop in the number of labour tenant contracts registered in Natal during this time - from 20 040 in 1971 to 16 350 in 1973 (NAUNLU, 30.08.74) - but since many tenants continued to be unregistered, the figures are misleading. Certainly many of the 400 000 labour tenants referred to by the NAU in 1970 were pushed off land which they regarded as their own, forced to sell their cattle to eager white farmers at criminally low prices and relocated in the bleak rudimentary camps mentioned above. Perhaps as many as 300 000 people were affected altogether.

RESISTANCE BY LABOUR TENANTS

The elimination of labour tenancy in Natal during this period was not achieved without resistance. Both tenants and, as already indicated, some farmers themselves clung tenaciously to the only system of labour and land tenure that they knew. Generally those being evicted regarded the land as theirs. Many households had lived on white farms for generations; they could point to family graves that dated back well into the 19th century and proved their prior claim to the land. This claim was a particularly strong one in those parts of Northern Natal that had been lost by the Zulu kingdom to the Boer settlers in the late 19th century: Melmoth, Babanango, Vryheid and Louwsburg. At some stage title to the land may have passed to the white settlers, but the tenants' ties of settlement, cultivation and family history were far more binding to them than a mere title deed, a piece of paper that many could not even read.

Thus many tenants refused to accept their eviction notice and had to be driven off by police and farmers who came with dogs and guns and fire, burned down huts, impounded cattle and arrested the people still living on the land. A group of former labour tenants in the Dannhauser district, now living at Mzimhlophe, near Qudeni, have described how they were first arrested and later removed by GG trucks that arrived to fetch them accompanied by 'soldiers, police and their dogs.' (Report from Qudeni settlement.) See Appendix 1 to the Mzimhlophe case study, Part Three.) In this case, the tenants finally submitted to the removal trucks when they arrived. In other instances, tenants attempted to outwit the trucks, as in the case of those tenants in the Weenen district who went through the motions of being relocated but returned to their former homes as soon as they had been left at Madadeni.

Such resistance as there was, however, was localised, often individual and spontaneous,

reacting to the crisis as it hit. There were - and are - no farm worker organisations to take up the struggle on a wider basis, to lobby on behalf of those being evicted and mould them into a united group. Local tenant opposition could succeed in delaying the evictions. It could even, on occasion (as in the case of the group who refused to remain at Madadeni), win concessions from the State about where it would relocate the tenants. It could not, however, prevent the evictions when both the local farmer and the local authorities were agreed on the necessity or inevitability of enforcing them. As a result, the majority of labour tenants were removed from the land during this period and by the late 1970s government planners, cosy in their offices with their files, assumed that the system had finally been eliminated.

PERSISTENCE OF POCKETS OF LABOUR TENANCY

The Riekert Commission of 1979 made this assumption when it recommended that the provisions of the 1936 Development and Trust Act (as amended) relating to labour tenancy be dispensed with since they were 'nothing more than dead wood'. (Report, 1979, 183) It noted 'in passing' that 'several witnesses were of the opinion that the labour tenant system as contemplated in the Act still applied to some extent in Natal', but rejected this as grounds for retaining the labour tenant provisions in the legislation in the mistaken belief that all labour tenant contracts still in existence in 1970 would have automatically expired after 3 years as provided for in the legislation - 'so that any contracts which continued in existence after the abolition of the labour tenant system were in any case terminated by the passage of time.' (Ibid)

There was, however, a wide gap between the proclamation of policy at the centre and its effective enforcement and administration in the outlying areas; furthermore, in 1974 the NAU had been assured by the Bantu Affairs Commission that contracts already registered in 1970 would not be regarded as automatically expiring after 3 years and although never formally gazetted, this assurance appears to have been respected. Although the majority of farmers in Natal had shifted over to a full-time labour system by the end of the 1970s, a significant number had not, as some witnesses to the Riekert Commission had tried to point out - small-scale, undercapitalised farmers; absentee farmers; traditional farmers; also simply lazy farmers who had calculated what it would cost in terms of energy and time to try to get rid of stubborn tenant households and had withdrawn from the struggle.

One of the major areas where pockets of labour tenancy still persisted in the late 1970s was the thornveld area where labour farms had been so prevalent in earlier times, in the Weenen/Muden districts of central Natal. This has certainly been the best documented area. During 1979 farm conditions in general as well as the persistence of labour tenancy and continued eviction of labour tenants in the Weenen area received a fair amount of newspaper publicity in Natal, which probably served to focus official attention on the area and temper the sanguine view of the Riekert Commission. One case which received publicity concerned a group of nine households on the farm Mona, just outside the village of Weenen. Mona was a labour farm; its owner lived on and worked another farm in the Fawn Leas district closer to Pietermaritzburg. In 1979 he had 35 families living on Mona, many of them paying their labour rental by supplying their children to work for the landowner for six months a year for nothing. In some instances, individuals who did not have old enough children of their own were hiring children from other families to work for them - paying the parents of their surrogate workers as much as R100 for the six month period. (The case is well documented in the AFRA files.) When asked how she could tolerate allowing her children to work in this way, one woman answered tellingly: 'We do all this because we love our homes and are prepared to do almost anything to stay, especially as there is nowhere else to go.' (AFRA files.)

Less well documented but possibly as significant were the isolated northern farming districts around Louwsburg. Few journalists or researchers have studied this area seriously, so the evidence is sketchy. In September 1979, however, in an article dealing mainly with the exodus of white farmers from this border district, the Daily News reported that there were 23 'labour' farms out of a total of 180 in the district. (Daily News, 13.09.79) In fieldtrips to the Ladysmith, Dundee, Babanango, Paulpietersburg and Melmoth areas in the course of 1980 and 1981, SPP was told by many different individuals that some individual farmers in these districts still had labour tenant agreements with their workers.

The government's response to the evidence of continued labour tenancy that emerged in the press in 1979 was to issue Proclamation no. 2089, (Government Gazette 6663) on the 21st September 1979; this re-iterated that no new labour tenant contracts could be entered into from that date and set the 30th August 1980 as the final date for the automatic expiry of any registered contracts still in existence. As a result of this Proclamation, there was a spate of fresh evictions as the 1980 deadline approached and local authorities became more zealous in their enforcement of the labour control regulations.

It is clear that there are still pockets of labour tenancy, still a gap between intent at the centre and administration at the periphery, but these remnants are gradually being tidied up. Sometimes, the changes to the labour system have been purely cosmetic. In the Louwsburg area, for instance, there are reports that farmers have transformed the outer form of the labour tenant contract by converting the tenant family's labour obligation from a six-month one to a 12-month one, but without improving or even instituting wages, or without converting the tenants' obligation to work from a family one to an individual one. Still, in essence, a feudal relationship, but now a more onerous one for the worker than before. (Fieldwork. A similar phenomenon was operating in the Dannhauser and Babanango districts in the mid 1970s, as described in the Mzimhlophe case study in Part Three.) Overall, however, the labour tenant system has by now been replaced by a full-time, wage system in Natal. With this, one major phase in the history of land and labour relationships in the Natal countryside has been brought to an end and another one opened. Thousands and thousands of farm people have been transformed into a landless rural proletariat as a result.

3. Farm evictions since 1976

SCALE OF EVICTIONS

The tapering off of labour tenancy has not meant the ending of farm evictions. These are still continuing, though on a lesser scale and for somewhat different reasons than in the early 1970s. During the past five years, evictions have come, more and more, to be the result not of State-sponsored action but of private action - with State backing - of individual farmers and farming companies against full-time workers, workers who for a variety of reasons are no longer wanted on the land. The massive, State-sponsored evictions of the early 1970s are a thing of the past. Now it is a more gradual, less dramatic whittling down of the numbers of black people living and working on white farms. A family here, perhaps five or six there - but cumulatively, amounting to thousands of people. In 1980/81 AFRA collected details on about 200 farm eviction cases coming mainly from the central triangle of Weenen, Greytown, Mooi River; that figure represented the mere tip of the iceberg. Further north, clinic staff at Nondweni (the relocation camp south of Vryheid) estimated in April 1980 that about 60 farm families had moved in there since the beginning of that year. In the KwaZulu district of Nongoma an agricultural officer has estimated that about 20

families a month entered the area during 1980/81 looking for places to live, having been evicted off farms in the Vryheid/Louwsburg area. (AFRA Fieldtrip Reports)

It has proved impossible to quantify these evictions with any degree of precision. One report, in the Daily News, gave a figure of 29 000 blacks 'ordered to leave white farms in Natal' during the course of 1978, but did not quote its sources. (Daily News, 13.09.79) All that can be stated with confidence is that evictions are happening throughout the province and thousands of households are being affected each year.

What makes this process even more complex is that, according to Charles Simkins, the african population living in the white countryside is in fact not decreasing in absolute terms, suggesting that along with evictions there is a parallel process of re-infiltration of certain white farming districts by africans. (Simkins, 1981a) This process is likely to be confined to the more isolated border areas - both those bordering on South Africa's external boundaries and those bordering on the internal boundaries with the various bantustans. The degree and spread of this movement by people back onto the land from which so many of them have been recently evicted, has not been established for the Natal region. It is an area requiring further fieldwork.

REASONS FOR CONTINUED EVICTIONS

As far as evictions are concerned, several processes appear to be at work in the present period; these are outlined below. What follows is, however, a very general overview. A great deal more work still needs to be done to correlate and refine broad trends in Natal agriculture in relation to what is actually happening in particular districts and different branches of farming. (For some individual case studies, see appendices.)

Firstly, the trend towards increasing mechanisation of agriculture continues to encourage farmers to reduce their formerly large labour force and rely more on a small nucleus of permanent workers, supplemented by seasonal or casual labour at peak labour periods. Secondly, it appears that overall farm ownership is being concentrated in fewer hands and as previously separate farms become joined into a single management block, so their combined labour force is streamlined and reduced. Thirdly, linked to this, many farmers are wanting to extend the area under cultivation or grazing on their farms and to limit the amount of land set aside for their workers' own agricultural use. Farmers may, as a consequence, either give redundant workers notice directly or they may limit their workers' access to land and thus bring workers themselves to decide to leave the farm - the disadvantages of farm life coming to outweigh the advantages more strongly. Several tenants now living in desperately overcrowded and rundown informal settlements on black-owned land in the Stanger district (Ntshaweni, Etete etc.) have described to SPP how they used to live and work on white farms in the district but as sugar cane cultivation in the district spread, it encroached more and more on the land set aside for their use until they eventually decided to leave the farm themselves. (Fieldwork)

Many evictions seem to occur when farm ownership changes hands. Partly this relates to the factors above; partly to a fourth factor which is that farmers are less inclined today than before to shoulder the welfare and control tasks imposed on them by a large labour force and, particularly, by the extended families of the labour force, many members of which are not working on the land. Farmers complain bitterly that they are not only employer, they are doctor, ambulance driver, policeman and Father Christmas as well. In shedding these other roles, however, they are shedding people who have been tied in a particular relationship to the land, have served the needs of white agriculture over several generations, have only recently become redundant to its needs and

moreover, can make little claim on the State to provide them with viable alternatives: somewhere to live and to work.

The fifth factor at work is not new but has been true of conditions on South African farms from the beginning - the omnipotent position of the farmer, as employer and landowner, in relation to the families living and working on his land. Many current evictions are the result of what in an urban-industrial context would be described as victimisation of the worker by the employer. Farm workers are a completely unprotected category of workers. They are not, to date, covered by the Industrial Conciliation Legislation and in a dispute between employer and employee all power rests in the hands of the employer, the farmer. Provided he gives a worker legitimate notice - one month - he may legally evict him for any reason that he likes; and if, as often happens, he does not give a legitimate notice period he is likely to get away with it anyway. AFRA has on record numerous cases of workers injured during work hours who were given notice because they were no longer fit to work; of elderly people who have spent a life-time living and working on the land being given notice because they were too frail to work and their children unwilling to work for the farmer in their place; of workers who have complained about poor working conditions being dismissed for being 'agitators' and troublemakers.

Not all evictions are the result of private action by individual farmers. The State has continued to intervene in cases where labour tenancy or cash tenancy is still blatantly practised, as in the example already described at the farm Mona, in the Weenen district, in 1979. In February 1980 the Natal Witness reported that 'in a bid to control the number of Blacks living on Natal farms', the DAB had approached the Chief Commissioner of Natal to request that the previously established labour control boards be 'activated'. (Natal Witness, 16.02.80) A member of the DAB who was then also vice chairman of the NAU, (a Mr Schmidt) was quoted in the report as describing these control boards as 'the only machinery ... by which surplus workers can be moved.'⁺

Finally, there are also those farm workers who choose to leave the farms - who, weighing up the crudely limited options, decide that on balance they will be better off in KwaZulu or as a tenant on a black spot or in a squatter settlement on the edge of town. It is a private and individual choice - a form of voluntary removal, coerced and controlled by many hidden pressures and forces. What percentage of the total numbers presently leaving the farms is made up by this group is not known; it seems that it is a minority and that because of the very limited options available to ex-farm workers, most cling tenaciously to their places on the farms.

RELOCATION

The earlier period saw large-scale relocation by the State - the agent of eviction - into closer settlements, tintowns on Trust land. Today, since evictions are generally private, relatively few families are being relocated officially by the State. The local Commissioner may make a site in a relocation area available to an evicted farm worker if approached and asked for help but the majority of farm workers that AFRA has dealt with strenuously avoid this alternative if at all possible. In 1981 Dr Koornhof was asked in Parliament whether his Department provided alternative accommodation for evicted farm workers in Natal and replied:

No, but should cases of farm labourers leaving farms be brought to my Department's attention, efforts are made to transfer such labourers to other farms should there be any vacancies. Alternatively such labourers are at liberty to settle within the national states or on closer settlements on trust farms after obtaining permission from the authorities concerned. (Hansard, Question 160, 22.09.81)

Many families do eventually end up in relocation camps but that is often only as a last

resort. The largest single objection to these places is that people are not allowed to keep stock there. Rather than accept that, evicted farm workers go to enormous lengths to find a private solution to what is in fact a political problem. They may try to appeal to the evicting farmer to change his mind, often paying arbitrarily fixed 'fines' of cattle, or submitting to docked wages to achieve this. (See Appendix 2.) They may simply squat and hope, passively, to wear the farmer down into changing his mind or at least ignoring them - a precarious strategy at best. They may approach neighbouring farmers for a place (indawo) and a few may succeed. Farmers one speaks to will report a steady stream of supplicants for a job, a place - hat in hand, at the back door.

Other evictees are crowding into neighbouring areas of KwaZulu, often bribing the local induna for a site on which to build, or renting a space on a black spot where they face the threat of a further removal at some stage. In doing so, they place further strain on communities whose resources are already stretched or depleted. In the black spot on communities whose resources are already stretched or depleted. In the black spot of Matiwane's Kop near Ladysmith, for instance, 14 out of the 70 migrant households in the sample interviewed by SPP in 1980/81 had arrived there since 1976, most from white farms. At Trust Feeds, a small black spot near Wartburg, about 10 households that have moved there within the last year or two from white farms in the district have been served with summonses to appear in the local Magistrate's court in August 1982, to account for their presence. (Fieldwork) These are but two examples out of many that SPP could supply: nearly every freehold area visited in Natal over the last two years is providing accommodation to evicted farm workers and their families.

RESISTANCE

As in the past, resistance to relocation by farm workers is fragmented, localised and very individualistic. There are still no worker organisations straddling farm boundaries. Meetings, access to farms by outsiders, communication between farm workers and resource organisations are all enormously difficult undertakings. The KwaZulu government has not attempted to tackle the problems of farm workers who, as it points out, do not come under its jurisdiction anyway. Farm workers are generally dismissed as individuals now, making organised action even more difficult than in the past when large numbers of people in a single district faced the same crisis at the same time. Workers who have not been given notice are generally too intimidated to support those who have; they know how vulnerable they are.

Because of the unprotected status of farm workers in terms of the law, legal action against farmers by threatened workers is extremely difficult to pursue. Most farm workers do not have access to legal advice, anyway: they are excluded by virtue of their poverty, their isolation and their lack of education. In cases where threatened workers have sought outside legal help the outcome is generally unfavourable. Provided a legal notice period is served (one month in terms of common law), the farmer has a right to evict whom he chooses off his land and in such a case, all that court action can achieve is to buy time for the evictee in which he/she can try to make alternative arrangements.

Continued squatting and individual acts of sabotage against individual farmers' property are probably the two most common signs of overt opposition by evicted workers. This is described in some of the appendices. Another form of passive resistance encountered by SPP in the course of its fieldwork is for families relocated to closer settlements by the authorities to simply leave the site once they have been relocated there and disappear to some more promising locality. At the relocation centre of Nondweni one enterprising local resident with a large truck has developed what is reported to be a thriving business - transporting families brought into Nondweni by GG truck out of it to a destination of their own choosing. (Fieldwork)

⁺ See Note at end of Chapter.

Often, however, there is no destination. In July 1981, for instance, AFRA was approached on behalf of a family who had been summarily evicted off a farm in the Estcourt area and were simply camping on the side of the road. (AFRA files) Eventually a religious Minister intervened and a place was found for this family in Wembezi township.

In the plight of the evicted farmworkers and their families, wider issues of exploitation and of powerlessness are exemplified. An eviction notice means more than simply the loss of a job, serious as that may be; it also means the loss of a home, of access to land, of security, of a way of life - perhaps of life itself. The individual farm worker receiving that notice is a victim of processes of political and economic change over which he has no control. Without influx control, many people living on white farms would have moved to the cities long ago. They have been chained to the rural areas. Now, no longer needed by the white farms, they are being pushed out even further into the periphery.

Note: The Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill (1982) proposes the establishment of Farm tenement boards with powers to control and reduce the numbers of blacks living on white farms. This suggests a new determination by the authorities to crack down on the numbers of blacks in the white rural areas.



Appendix 1. Statements by four evictees, 1979/80

The following statements were made by four farm workers/dwellers under threat of eviction in the Weenen district in 1979/80. They were made to staff at the Church Agricultural Project (CAP).

1. STATEMENT OF N.M.

My husband works in Johannesburg so I went to this man on --- and he agreed that I could move onto his farm 9 years ago. My three children lived with me and the agreement was that they would work for him. The boy worked for 6 months and then the two girls worked for the other 6 months. The boy who is now 21 years old was paid R10 for the six month stint. The two girls received R6 for their entire 6 month period i.e. R1 per month per girl. The one girl is 12 years old and the other 10 years old.

The boy was working and had done about 4 months when he came home with a notice addressed to my husband to leave the farm.

On the 8th I appeared in court and was given 90 days half suspended.

The following is a copy of her dismissal letter

Posbus ---
Weenen
17 Oktober 79

N. M. het kennis om die plaas --- te verlaat. Sy moet neem al haar besittings familie en al haar vee. Sy moet binne 2 mnde vanaf 17 Okt 1979 van die plaas weg wees.
(Signed)

2. STATEMENT OF N.H., 8.04.80

We were given three months notice but now it has passed. We had to go in March but we still haven't found a place. We were told to go to Nondweni or Tendeni. We spoke to the induna near Estcourt and he said he would discuss it with the chief. This place is called Thembalihle,⁺ but it's very crowded. We saw that there's no room there for animals. We still haven't got anywhere to go. If we don't leave soon we'll be arrested and our animals impounded.

3. STATEMENT OF M.S., 1.04.80

I was born at --- and so was my father and my grandfather too. We have always lived there. My wife's name is Xoshile. I have eight children, the oldest being about 20, the youngest still a baby. My oldest son worked on the farm. He earned R12 a month. He has been working since he was about 15. I worked in Johannesburg for a long time. I was a builder. I earned R20 a week. I came back two months ago because we

⁺ Freehold area, under threat as 'badly situated'.

were given notice to leave our home.

We were given three months notice but now it has expired. I have no animals because long ago we were told to get rid of all our animals. The police arrested my wife when I was still in Johannesburg. She had to take her baby with her. She was sentenced to three months labour for squatting but was released for R45 bail immediately. The magistrate said she and her family must leave the farm quickly, by the end of March, but we have nowhere to go. The white man said we would be arrested if we didn't leave by the end of the month. Today is the first of April and perhaps the police will come today to arrest us.

4. STATEMENT OF N.N., 1.04.80

I have always lived at ---, and my father and my grandfather. I have 6 children. The oldest is about 18, the youngest about 5. My husband deserted us a long time ago. One of my children worked on the farm - a boy. He's about 16. He earns R12 a month. The farmer gave us three months notice. We didn't get a letter. This was before Christmas, but we had nowhere to go. So I was arrested with two other women. I was in jail for 6 days. There were 4 of us there altogether from ---. I paid R35 to get out, and am still staying on the farm. We expect to be arrested again at any moment.

Appendix 2. Papene Sibisi, case study of an eviction

The following case study is reproduced from AFRA Report No. 10, April 1981.

Papene Sibisi is one of the 188 cases AFRA has on file, of farmworkers who have been evicted off white-owned farms in the past couple of years. He appears twice in our files - first in late 1979 and again in January 1980. Both times the same farmer and the same farm are involved - eviction, reprieve and eviction again.

His story illustrates most of the themes touched upon in previous AFRA reports of farm evictions: the elimination of labour tenancy as an outmoded form of agricultural labour, the marginalisation of a significant section of the rural African population as a result, the tenacity with which these people have clung to their stock and their land, the lack of rights of agricultural workers. But Sibisi is more than a unit in a statistic, exemplifying a general trend. For him there has been nothing typical about his eviction at all; it has been a very lonely and private crisis, intensely suffered. His life, his very existence in the world, not a "system", have been under attack.

His Background Sibisi first approached us in August 1979, an elderly, greying man of perhaps 65, one of a group of farmworkers from several Weenen farms who had been given notice to leave the land on which they were living.

We gathered together some sparse details about his life. The farm on which he lived had been a labour farm, a large tract of rugged thornveld near the Tugela River. Successive landowners had used it to house their labour tenants and graze their cattle but had never lived on it themselves. Sibisi was born on the farm during the 1st World War, the son of a labour tenant whose way of life he inherited and in turn passed on to his own children. He spent most of adult life working away from the farm, as a migrant worker in Johannesburg, then Kimberley and finally Virginia in the Orange Free State. His family, however, remained on the farm and his children worked a six month stint for the landowner every year - without pay - to earn the family's right to live there, graze their cattle and plough some land.

In the early 1970s Sibisi returned home to stay. Labour tenancy had been outlawed in the Weenen district in 1969; henceforth only full-time farmworkers were legal. His 4 eldest sons were reluctant to switch to full-time work, however, and were restless for the more lucrative and attractive jobs of the city so Sibisi himself took over as the family's worker representative. His job was to oversee the grazing of the farmer's cattle for which, like his children before him, he received no pay. What made this apparently very one-sided arrangement worthwhile was that over the years the family had established a substantial herd of animals which they could graze on the farm. Sibisi regarded himself as first and foremost a stockowner. In 1979 he had 15 head of cattle and 69 sheep and goats legally on the farm plus some 25 concealed, unregistered beasts as well - an unusually large herd for a farmworker in the 1970s. With the produce and income from his stock plus the remittances sent home by his sons, the household survived.

Eviction 1979 Abruptly, on the 6th August 1979, this apparently stable existence was turned upside down when Sibisi was given notice to be off the farm, with all his belongings, his family and his stock, within 30 days. He claims that what provoked the farmer was a quarrel they had had, about rations: Sibisi had asked for payment of one bag of mealie meal a month, the farmer (a very prominent, wealthy Weenen farmer) had angrily refused. The farmer may have had other reasons for dismissing Sibisi - but since he is not obliged to supply them when giving notice, and since he would not discuss the matter with anyone, not even Sibisi's lawyers, these never became known.

The eviction notice threatened the entire basis of Sibisi's life. He had a large family - 13 people living permanently at home (himself, his wife, several children, 2 daughters-in-law and their children) plus the 4 migrant sons who returned home once a year. The farm was the only home they knew; both Sibisi's father and grandfather were buried there. The family were frightened by the lawlessness and overcrowding of the neighbouring Msinga district of KwaZulu and even more horrified by the thought of being moved to Nondweni, the nearest official resettlement camp, some 100 km away and without land, jobs or kin. Most disturbing of all was the fate of their stock. Sibisi knew he would not be allowed to take that with him to Nondweni; he also knew that even if he could persuade a chief to make a place for him in Msinga, grazing there was non-existent. It was impossible for him to conceive of a life without land and space and cattle. He was too old to start from scratch again.

So, when all appeals to the landowner had failed the family simply sat tight at their homestead. The sequence of events that followed was a grim as it was predictable. On September 10th 1979 Sibisi was arrested for illegal squatting and fined R90 or 90 days. Shortly thereafter his wife and 2 of his children were also arrested and fined R20 each. The family paid their fines and continued to 'squat' - where else could they go, they said? In November they suffered an even more crippling blow when 15 cattle and all their sheep and goats were impounded by the farmer as "strays". The animals were in the Weenen pound for 4 days; the final bill to release them came to R557,65, of which R360 went to the farmer for alleged damages. Sibisi borrowed the money from a local agricultural project, bailed out his cattle, and returned home.

Reprieve Then suddenly, as arbitrarily as he had given notice, the farmer changed his mind and agreed to let the family stay. Again we have only Sibisi's version of what happened. He says he had invoked the aid of a witchdoctor; he had also agreed to "give" the farmer an ox and arranged for a younger son and daughter to work on the farm. The total cost of reprieve to the family was in the region of R1 000 - R707,65 in court and pound fines, plus the value of the ox and the expense of numerous trips to lawyers, relief agencies, the witchdoctor. But the homestead appeared safe.

Eviction 1981 For a year life continued much as before. Sibisi's teenage son earned R20 a month on the farm; the daughter worked in the farmer's kitchen. In January 1981, however, the family was flung back on the treadmill of crisis once more. Sibisi received another eviction notice - a second scrap of paper, a second ultimatum to leave the land. According to Sibisi the reason this time was that his daughter was sick and failed to report for work one morning. When he went round to the farmhouse to explain, the farmer simply reached for a notepad. "I'm tired of your family" was his only explanation for the notice he handed over.

The weary, futile cycle of attempted negotiations and appeal was launched upon once more. Sibisi put on his city clothes and travelled to Pietermaritzburg to seek legal help. The lawyer spelled out what he did not want to hear - that the farmer was within his rights, that there was nothing the law could do for him because it did not represent his interest. He tried to get a place on another farm and spent several days trekking from place to place but without luck. He again consulted a witchdoctor: it had worked before, perhaps it would this time. Throughout he steadfastly refused to sell his

cattle. "I cannot see money in the bank like I can my cattle; I cannot get any pleasure from money like I can from my cattle".

On the 13th February 1981, the day his notice expired, the farmer impounded all his stock. They were in the pound for 11 days while Sibisi struggled to find alternative grazing for them. The final bill this time was for R2 992,04 - ten of Sibisi's cattle and 30 of his goats had to be sold to raise the money. During this time the farmer also knocked down the 7 huts that made up the Sibisi homestead, finally forcing them to move away from their - his - land.

Sibisi and his family are now camped precariously at a church building on a neighbouring farm. They found grazing for their severely reduced herd at R2 a beast a month; they have won another, temporary reprieve of a sort. We know there is absolutely no security in their future at all: they no longer look to any future, only to each day as it is salvaged from the refuse dump of our society.

Appendix 3. Case study of an eviction in the Vryheid district

The following case study is drawn from the AFRA files. It concerns a farm worker in the Vryheid district.

CASE OF MR K. M.

1. Of K.M.'s seven sons, two, F. and A., worked for the farmer for no pay or rations. On 22.02.81 the farmer accused F. of having thrown sand into the water pump engine. He allegedly assaulted F., punching and kicking him. The farmer also demanded one head of cattle from K.M. for damage to the pump. This has not been paid and the farmer has dropped this demand. On 23.02 K.M. took his son to Vryheid to lay a charge against the farmer. He was told that he should go to the police at Gluckstadt which he did later that day. There he was told that there were no grounds for a charge of assault because there were no witnesses. Subsequently F.M. left the farm for Johannesburg.

2. K.M.'s other son, A.M. drove a tractor for the farmer. On 26.02.81 he had an accident while bringing a load of wood from a plantation. The farmer then presented K.M. with a demand for R621 for repairs. K.M. refused to pay this although he could have afforded to. He said that his son had never asked to drive the tractor and never pretended to be a qualified tractor driver. The farmer knew that he had no licence so if he put an inexperienced driver on a tractor that was his fault. The farmer repeated the demand for R621 threatening K.M. with eviction if it were not paid. Subsequently A.M. also left the farm and went to Johannesburg.

3. On 5.03.81 K.M. went to the Labour Office of the Department of the Interior of the KwaZulu Government in Ulundi. He made a sworn statement about the assault on F.M. and the demand for money for the tractor. In this statement he said that he had agreed to pay the farmer one head of cattle for the pump damage (see para 1) but later he denied this. The Labour Office sent a letter about this case to the Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg and to the Commissioner in Vryheid.

4. K.M. got a letter from Vryheid summoning him to the Commissioner's office. There he was asked why he had taken the matter to Ulundi when it had already been referred to the police in Gluckstadt. He was also questioned about the case.

5. A letter dated 28.04.81 was sent from the Commissioner in Vryheid to the Labour Office in Ulundi to the effect that the Commissioner has no authority to intervene on the assault charge since the police were involved and re-iterated the objection of the absence of witnesses. The letter suggested that K.M. pay the farmer the R621 for the tractor. The letter also claimed that K.M. had contradicted some points in his sworn statement, referring to the point about whether compensation for damages to the pump had been agreed upon or not (see para 3 above).

6. On 28.05.81 the farmer gave K.M. a 'Trekpass': 'Hiermee opdrag aan K.M. om die plaas --- te verlaat met all sy besittings en familie voor die laaste dag van Junie 1981. Sy vee en kleinvee moet verwyder word binne 14 dae

(2 weke) vanaf 28 Mei 1981. Na die laasgenoemde datum sal hy en sy familie as ongewens op die plaas beskou word.'

7. K.M. has 29 head of cattle, 28 goats and 8 fields on the farm. He thinks that he will be able to stay at Denny Dalton⁺ if evicted but will not be allowed to take any livestock with him. This seems to be his greatest concern at the moment. He says that he would be prepared to reduce his holding of cattle if it meant that he could stay on the farm, but he will not pay for the damage to the tractor under any circumstances.

8. K.M. took the eviction notice to the Department of the Interior, Ulundi. On 10.06.81 an official from there wrote to the Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg asking him to use his influence to get an extension granted.

⁺ He was probably referring to the relocation areas of Hlungulwana or Mpungamphophe.

MP probes squatter eviction

THE adequacy of Black housing in Howick is to be investigated by Mr Ralph Hardingham, NRP MP for Mooi River.

Mr Hardingham was reacting to a report in The Natal Witness that 27 dwellers on a Howick farm had effectively been evicted by their new landlords with nowhere to go.

He said he would raise the question of Black housing in Howick with the Department of Co-operation and Development "at the soonest possible opportunity".

Three of the more elderly "squatters" were removed to Table Mountain and Impendhle by Department of Co-operation and Development vehicles on Monday.

The two official Black accommodation areas at Howick — Mpopomeni and Howick Township — are full, sources have said.

Mpopomeni has a waiting list of well over 100 people and additional building is only planned for after April.

"Last year I tabled questions in regard to Mpopomeni and was told it was envisaged that the township would be completed by 1985 and give accommodation to 35 000 people," Mr Hardingham said.

He said he wondered whether this would be adequate.

"In regard to the elderly people involved I am always concerned about the comfort and

circumstances of those effected by removals... I will make the necessary inquiries," Mr Hardingham said.

By late last week many of the 27 "squatters" had demolished their homes and moved rather than face re-settlement.

Some of the dwellers had spent most of their lives on the farm, one source said.

Mr Danie Schutte, nominated National Party MP for Natal, said the matter "looks very much a civil one — the people are living there illegally".

He added, however, that he was prepared to listen to any representations made to him by people concerned.

Mr Graham McIntosh, PFP Member of Parliament for Pietermaritzburg North, said yesterday the experience which the evicted families were undergoing in Howick "is sadly repeated almost every week in many parts of Natal and South Africa".

"They are caught in a tangle of circumstances which are aggravated to the point of being intolerable by National Party policies," Mr McIntosh said.

He believed the Government should "facilitate the urbanisation process" rather than increase the pressure on the already overpopulated Black areas.

"The answer is more housing in urban areas," he said.

4. BLACK SPOT REMOVALS

The removal of black spots has become one of the most widely publicised categories of relocation in Natal, partly because of the scale of the removals involved, partly because of the level of opposition displayed by a number of affected communities (Charlestown, Hlatikhulu, Groutville, Matiwane's Kop, St Wendolins), and partly because of the freehold nature of the land, which carries a stronger emotive appeal in the press and tends to legitimise such opposition in the white public's mind more readily than in the case of removals out of non-freehold areas. Eliminating the african freehold farms that have dotted the Natal countryside so widely has proved a larger task than the Nationalist government anticipated when it set out to reverse the 'beswarming' of the platteland in the 1950s. Over 100 000 people have been moved off black spots to date; nevertheless, on our calculations, the programme of clearing these black freehold farms has not yet reached the halfway mark and nearly a quarter of a million people are still living under threat of removal in these areas at present. Despite the relatively greater publicity surrounding black spot removals, most of the threatened communities are remote rural places where outsiders never visit, whose names have never been published in the press or other reports.


This chapter on black spot removals is divided into the following sections :

- 1) Problems of definition and calculation
- 2) Total numbers of black spots in Natal
- 3) Conditions
- 4) The removal of black spots, 1960 - 1982
- 5) Summary of african freehold black spots 1948 - 1982
- 6) Summary of mission black spots 1948 - 1982.

1. Problems of definition and calculation

Since both the definition and the classification of black spots have varied over time, as State policy towards the african reserves has evolved from the 'bantustan' era of the past to the 'national states' era of the present, any researcher trying to pinpoint exactly how many black spots there were in 1948, how many of these have been moved and how many still remain to be moved, faces innumerable problems and inconsistencies. In 1969 the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said: 'By black spots is meant land which is owned by Bantu and does not include small proclaimed Bantu reserves.' (Hansard, vol. 25, col. 326) However, some State officials use the term very loosely to describe - condemn - any black-occupied area that they want to move, whether freehold or not, and are not concerned with clarity or consistency. The list of black spots that Koornhof supplied in Parliament in answer to questions in April 1980 included both scheduled reserves - Reserve no. 6, Empangeni - and State lands - St Lucia. (Hansard, Question 537, 22.04.80)

In this report the criteria used for determining whether a place should be classed as a black spot or not have been those of ownership and locality of the land. 'Black spot' covers both african freehold land as described by the Minister of Bantu Administration in 1969 (the origins of which were described in Part One), and land owned by a church or



mission station but leased to individual africans - land which, in both instances, falls within what the State has defined as the white area. This definition thus includes freehold land that was formerly released for incorporation into KwaZulu but has subsequently been excised or earmarked for excision from its to-be-consolidated boundaries (e.g. the Driefontein block of farms north of Ladysmith). It excludes tribal and reserve land, even where these have been described as black spots by officials (e.g. the Ndoleni Mission Reserve outside Richmond).

The reason why this report maintains a distinction between freehold and tribal land is that it is useful to limit the usage of the term black spot. Obviously the term is a political one and not some pure concept that one is wanting to defend against corrupt usage. Nevertheless there are differences between freehold and tribal land - differences in legal status and differences in social organisation on and around the land - which are significant and which need to be taken into account when analysing the process of relocation and developing strategies for opposing it. The method of expropriation, the structures of authority, the relationships among landowners and between landowners and tenants are some of the aspects in which freehold properties are marked off from those in the reserves.

Even when one limits 'black spot' to freehold and mission properties in this way, there are still problems in trying to establish categorically how many of these properties there ever were and how many there are left, under threat, today. As already pointed out, because of the shifts in State policy towards the reserves, the boundaries of what is and what is not the white area have not remained fixed over time and thus the list of properties classified as black spots has not remained fixed either. Apart from problems in the changing status of land, much of the information that one requires is not available. When asked in 1981 what the total number of black spots and people remaining to be moved then was, the Minister of Cooperation and Development replied: 'The particulars and information required are not being maintained and kept up to date ... and can unfortunately not be readily ascertained...' (Hansard, Question 188, 26.02.81). In 1982 he repeated that the details on freehold properties still to be removed was 'not readily available' and 'cannot be ascertained without performing a large volume of work.' (Hansard, Question 391, 2.04.82). Having said that, Dr Koornhof then went on to say that there were 'approximately 75 Black areas scheduled to become White areas' across the country, but did not elaborate on this figure. He is clearly not referring to individual properties - we have calculated a total of 363 black spots in Natal alone. It is probable that he is referring to major blocks of land only, putting scheduled, released and freehold areas all together.

Even where official information is available, there are problems with its quality and its accuracy. If one tabulates all the answers supplied by various official sources at different times about how many black spots there are in Natal, the result is a set of contradictory, erratically fluctuating figures. 76 in 1955 (Tomlinson Report); 210 in 1961 (Bantu); 252 in 1962 (Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Hansard, Question II, 23.03.62) - the figures increase in this seven year period despite the fact that the removal of black spots in Natal was already under way. Then, during the course of 1964, parliament was presented with 2 different sets of figures within the space of one month. In March 1964 the Senate was told by the Minister of Transport, on behalf of the Minister of BAD, that there were 199 black spots in Natal; in April 1964 the House of Assembly was told, this time by the Minister of BAD himself, that there were 218. (Senate Debates, col. 2267, 17.03.64 and House of Assembly Debates, col. 4854, 24.04.64)

Since the 1960s officials have tended to talk in terms of the overall area of land cleared or still to be cleared rather than the numbers of individual properties affected - but have, as pointed out, often confused freehold and reserve land. Where individual

properties have been listed, there have been enough inaccuracies in the details supplied on particular places to raise doubts about the reliability of the information as a whole. The Swamp recorded as moved in 1976 instead of 1978, State land at St Lucia described as a black spot, removals in the Utrecht district listed under the Underberg district - these are three examples of inaccuracies in the list of black spots that were removed between 1970 and 1979 which Dr Koornhof presented to Parliament in 1980.

Because of these problems with official data, we have tried to verify information in the field as far as possible. However our fieldwork too has had its limitations. Some black spots are very isolated and hard to find; informants living on them are often hazy about details of time and scale; we have not had the resources to visit all places personally, and some properties that were cleared a long time back have been extremely difficult to trace. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that our figures represent the most accurate tally that has been made to date.

2. Total number of black spots in Natal

According to our calculations, the total number of freehold black spots that there have been in Natal since 1948 is 334, to which should be added a further 29 mission properties, i.e. 363 black spots altogether. This total adds to the core of black spots as defined in the late 1950s other freehold and church properties that find themselves similarly isolated and threatened as a result of consolidation planning today. It also includes information on the Mount Currie and Matatiele districts, formerly falling within the Cape Province but after 1976, when the Transkei was made independent by Pretoria, added to Natal. It is thus a more comprehensive figure than most other estimates of the past. Detailed lists of all these properties are provided in sections 5 and 6 below; a summary of the information is set out in Table 9.

Table 9. TOTAL NUMBER OF BLACK SPOTS IN NATAL, 1948 - 1982⁺

1. AFRICAN FREEHOLD PROPERTIES		
1.	Black spots as defined in the 1950s	196
2.	Threatened by 1975 consolidation plans	103
3.	Mt Currie and Matatiele districts	17
4.	Other	18
		334
2. MISSION PROPERTIES		
		29
TOTAL BLACK SPOTS		363

Of these 363 properties a total of 116 have been removed entirely to date, 7 have been partly removed, 195 are under threat (103 of them, as noted above, in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans), 28 are likely to be incorporated into KwaZulu (also in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans), and the status of the remaining 17 is not known. In terms of numbers of people affected, we estimate that in the region of 105 000 people have been removed off black spots in the past thirty years and more than twice that number - 245 000 people - are under threat.

⁺ The information on the freehold properties is considered reasonably comprehensive; that on the mission properties is, as explained in section 6 below, still very incomplete. For a map of Natal's black spots see map no. 28 at the end of this report.

Table 10. BLACK SPOTS REMOVED, UNDER THREAT 1948 - 1982

STATUS		FREEHOLD	MISSION	TOTAL
1.	Removed	103	13	116
2.	Under threat	183	12	195
3.	Part removed, part under threat	6	1	7
4.	Likely to be / have been consolidated	27	1	28
5.	Status not known	15	2	17
TOTALS		334	29	363

These figures show clearly that in terms of numbers still to be moved, the black spot removal programme is less than half way. We do not have accurate figures for the actual area of land still to be expropriated and cleared, but the available evidence shows that from this perspective, too, the programme is less than half way. After 1936 there were some 42 226 ha of african freehold land excluded from the reserves, i.e. neither scheduled nor released (see p. 35 above). In February 1981 Dr Koornhof stated that there were still 25 896 ha of black spot land to be cleared in Natal (Hansard, Question 188, 26.02.81) - 60% of the post-1936 figure. Had his definition of black spot been as rigorous and as comprehensive as ours - including missions and released freehold land now threatened by consolidation - the proportion of land still to be cleared would have been shown to be still higher. Nevertheless, even on the official figures, it is clear that despite the massive removals of the past, black spot removals in Natal are far from being completed.

SOURCES

The major sources from which these figures have been compiled have been the following:

- 1) An undated document of the South African Institute of Race Relations (Durban), compiled in the mid 1950s, called 'Preliminary Report on African Removals - Natal'. This extremely useful document listed details on freehold black spots that the Institute's researcher had managed to acquire from official sources at the time.
- 2) Answers given by the responsible Minister to questions asked in Parliament about black spots that had been removed by 1969 (House of Assembly Debates, col. 324 - 326, 1969) and between 1970 and 1979 (House of Assembly Debates, col. 612 - 619, 1980).
- 3) For the Mount Currie and Matatiele districts, an undated memorandum called 'Acquisition of land by the South African Native Trust and Abolition of Bantu Property Rights in land in European Areas' c. 1961. This was a report of the Department of BAD which was sent round to various Farmers' Associations urging their cooperation in the process of buying up outstanding quota land. It contained a list of black spots moved in the Transvaal and Cape Province, including Mount Currie and Matatiele, by that time.
- 4) The 1 : 250 000 and 1 : 50 000 topo-cadastral map series for Natal.
- 5) Fieldwork by SPP and AFRA between 1980 and 1982.
- 6) Various newspaper cuttings, memoranda, reports and other documents in the files of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Durban (mainly for the 1960s period) and of AFRA, Pietermaritzburg (for the period 1979 to the present). These include data compiled from official sources.

3. Conditions

OVERPOPULATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

There is a tendency on the part of opponents of removals to romanticise conditions on black spots. They are not, by and large, idyllic pastoral communities. Most are grappling with major problems of underdevelopment. Their biggest problems stem from overpopulation and the lack of capital with which to develop their land, either to practice largescale farming or to accommodate denser settlement and more intensive methods of agriculture.

The cycle of underdevelopment displayed in most black spots is similar to that found in other black communities and its origins can be traced to the same causes. Like the bantustans themselves, black spots have fixed boundaries with a growing population that is trapped by legislation, specifically influx control and the stringent limitations on black ownership and occupation of land, within those boundaries. Added to the pressures being put on the land by natural increase among the original families has been the enormous influx of new tenants in recent years, many of them victims of relocation off white farms or other black spots. Compounding these problems has been the complete neglect of these areas by agricultural extension services of any sort and the demoralising insecurity under which the owners and occupants live.

By the 1960s the process of sub-division and fragmentation of landholdings on Natal's black spots was in most cases well advanced. Reliable population figures for black spots are extremely hard to come by and the available information for this period needs to be treated cautiously, as a guide rather than an accurate statistical representation of the situation. Nevertheless, according to the Minister of BAD in 1964 there were 2 478 landowners and 45 144 tenants living on black spots in Natal. (Hansard, Question V, 24.04.64), giving a ratio of landowners to tenants of 1 to 18. (Although the Minister did not say so at the time, his figures must have referred to the heads of households, rather than to the total population.) These figures indicate a substantial increase in the proportion of tenants among the total black spot population compared to the situation reported by the Beaumont Commission in 1916, when the ratio had been in the region of 1 to 3.

Eliot Mngadi, himself a former landowner, has described the reason for the influx of tenants into freehold areas and the effects thus:

I have my house and my fields, I plough the land and I keep a few cattle. Then along comes an evicted farm worker. The farmer has given him a trekpass, his animals are in the pound, he has nowhere to go so he comes to me: 'Please, brother, if you can just give me an acre at the corner of your farm.' Out of sympathy I do that. Instead of looking for an alternative farmer to take him on, this man goes to Johannesburg to work ... This continues until you find yourself on this 50 acre farm with 20 tenants, each paying you R6 a year. You are not making any money out of them, they have deprived you of your land. You can't make a living so in turn you also go to Johannesburg to work. (Mngadi, 1981, 3-4. See Appendix 3, Chapter 2, Part 3.)

Black spots have become the victims of State relocation policies in two ways - both as targets for removal themselves and as informal dumping grounds. As farm evictions and black spot removals escalated in the 1960s and 1970s, the number of displaced people moving on to black spots as tenants increased further. The process has not been uniform. Properties closest to industrial centres and job opportunities have proved

the most attractive and have experienced the heaviest influx of tenants in recent years. The huge informal settlements that have developed on african and indian freehold land in the Inanda and Stanger districts, in close proximity to Durban, are extreme manifestations of this but the pattern is repeated on a lesser scale throughout the province. The more remote and isolated black spots have tended to be bypassed and the pressure on the land has not been as acute as a result. This contrast is well illustrated by two threatened black spots in the Ladysmith district: parts of Matiwane's Kop, 25 km from Ladysmith, resemble a fairly densely settled informal township, whereas Lusitania, 50 km from Ladysmith, retains a stronger rural character and has a more markedly agricultural base. However, no black spot has escaped the problems of in-migration and a rapidly expanding population. The mounting pressure on the land has led to a massive decline in agricultural production in these areas over the years. While there are individuals who still make an independent living out of the land, they are very few: most black spot households look to the wage economy of the urban - industrial centres for their survival. This is clearly borne out by the SPP surveys, written up in Parts Three and Four.

MIGRANT LABOUR

Many black spots are, therefore, already performing a labour reservoir function for industry. This fact undermines the argument advanced by some theorists that their removal by the State should be analysed simply in terms of labour control and allocation - that black spots are removed and their population relocated to conveniently placed closer settlements from which, deprived of an agricultural base, they can be drawn upon as migrant or commuter workers. In many cases the relocation sites are further out from job centres than the black spots that have been or are about to be moved, for instance in the Stanger District where the relocation area of Bulwer Trust Farm is further from Stanger and further from Durban than any of the numerous threatened freehold areas in the district.

Interestingly too, SPP fieldwork over the past two years indicates that relatively few black spot residents are employed as farm workers by neighbouring white farmers. In the Matiwane's Kop household survey only 4,6% of the full-time workers were employed in agriculture in 1980/81. In the Ezakheni survey, only 2,4% of workers were employed in agriculture before they were removed from their former home of Roosboom, in 1976. The more rural and further from urban centres a black spot is, the higher the percentage of agricultural workers is likely to be but nevertheless, in the Compensation survey only 15% of workers were employed as farm workers before the removal of the community from The Swamp. In an AFRA survey carried out at Kwapitela in 1980, few of the workers in the community were working as farm workers. Women and children undoubtedly are employed in agriculture on a casual or seasonal basis, but the significance of agricultural work as a source of earnings in black spot communities is not great.

SHACK - FARMING

Hostile opponents of black spots often accuse the landowners of deliberately choosing shack-farming in preference to agriculture because it is easier and more lucrative. In the densely settled informal settlements that have grown up in the peri-urban areas around the cities this is often undoubtedly the case. In the rural areas, however, rents have remained virtually static throughout the 20th century and are extremely low, ranging between R10 and R25 per annum. This amount generally covers access to ploughing land and to commonage, for grazing cattle, in addition to a residential site. Given their own lack of capital, many landowners probably do find rent-farming easier than farming. Many landowners are themselves migrant workers, unable to work the land, and therefore willing to rent out their land to others. The return is, however, very little and the accusation of rent-gouging generally not justified.

LANDOWNER / TENANT DIVISIONS

The growth of large tenant populations on black spots has affected the nature of these communities considerably. Black spots are stratified along class lines between landowners and tenants. The stratification is not always immediately obvious to an outsider - the type of housing and standard of living is not necessarily dissimilar - and long-established tenant families may be accorded a status approaching that of landowners in the community. Nevertheless the relationship to the land and to each other is an unequal and hierarchical one, and this is reflected in the nature of organisations within black spots.

The effect of the division between landowners and tenants on community efforts to resist removals have been very negative overall. Such community organisation as there is, is either controlled exclusively by landowners or else dominated by them: committees, councils, syndicates representing the community consist generally of landowners only. The payment of rent is always a potential source of conflict between landowners and tenants, and one that has been deftly exploited by the authorities to foster divisions within communities they want to move and thus to undermine resistance. The Kwapitela and Matiwane's Kop case studies in Part Four illustrate this point very clearly. Another commonly used strategy of the State is to separate the removal of landowners from that of tenants and to treat them as two different issues, each with its own timetable. It is common for the tenants to be moved first. At Steinkoalspruit, for instance, the tenants - over 11 000 of them, the bulk of the community - were moved in 1978, leaving a very small group of landowners to grapple with the problems of expropriation and compensation for their reportedly coal-rich land on their own since then.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

Government spokesmen and hostile white farmers have used ecological issues to justify the removal of black spots, arguing that they are badly eroded, overstocked and neglected and should therefore be eliminated simply to protect the environment. Thus at the annual meeting of the Ladysmith Farmers' Association, in June 1981, the President made an 'urgent plea' to the government to speed up black spot removals in the district. In his speech he claimed:

Subsistence farming on smallholdings in Natal has failed. It has, over the years, been detrimental to the province as a whole. The land has become denuded of vegetation and ecology and the soil destroyed with the consequent far-reaching damage to the Tugela - Vaal system ... Under the present system only one or two persons from the kraal are all that is required to provide an income, and others become hangers-on. (*Natal Witness*, 27.06.81)

This is a misleading and opportunistic argument for a number of reasons. Firstly, it completely disregards people's rights to their land and to be involved in the planning for its future. Secondly, it generalises about conditions and ignores the extent to which individual communities and individual properties within communities are well looked after. Thirdly, it conveniently overlooks the structural reasons for the deteriorating condition of the land in these areas, ascribing this to individual acts of laziness or indifference instead of acknowledging the destructive impact of land, labour and influx control laws on black agriculture. Furthermore it proposes removal as a solution to the problem when in fact relocation of black spots merely displaces the problems into the ecologically far more vulnerable and economically hostile environment of KwaZulu. This argument fails to acknowledge the devastating ecological damage that has been done to the country as a whole, by the underdevelopment of the bantustans in general and the massive relocation of people into economically unviable areas such as Ekuvukeni, Ntambana and Qudeni. The Matiwane's Kop case study establishes clearly that the majority of people living on black spots have a strong commitment to their land - they know what

a valuable asset it is - and given security and technical and financial support, would be strongly placed to improve their farming techniques and husband their land more productively. Those who have no interest in the land are those who, but for influx control, would have migrated to the cities long ago.

Despite the decline in agricultural activity in the freehold areas during the course of the 20th century, agriculture still plays a very important, if subsidiary, part in the overall economic and social life of these communities. This was strongly borne out by our fieldwork not only in the threatened areas - Matiwane's Kop, St Wendolins, Kwapitela - but also in those communities that had been moved off black spots into closer settlements. Access to land was the most positive asset people living on black spots enjoyed, its loss the most negative consequence, in both material and psychological terms, of being moved off a black spot into a closer settlement. Despite the undoubted poverty that exists in a community such as Matiwane's Kop, its people still ate better, on average, than the people living in the closer settlements of Sahlumbe, Compensation and Mzimhlophe. Furthermore, the SFP survey results also indicate that a far stronger sense of community spirit and greater social cohesiveness is likely to exist within black spot communities than within relocation areas where, in the words of one observer, 'all are strangers'.

4. The removal of black spots 1960-1982

ACQUISITION OF QUOTA AND COMPENSATORY LAND

Before the State could embark on its programme of eradicating black spots, it needed to acquire more Trust land a) for the establishment of closer settlements and b) for compensating the larger landowners who were to be removed (those owning 20 ha or more). Acquiring compensatory land for black spots became added to the SANT's task of buying up land to add to the Natal reserves in terms of the 1936 quota. This soon overshadowed its original brief; during the 1960s its activities were geared primarily to finding land to facilitate relocation, rather than to augment the reserves as such.

Although many farmers were still extremely suspicious of the land-buying activities of the SANT, the NAU began to respond more favourably. The amount of outstanding quota land to be acquired by the SANT, virtually static between 1936 and the early 1960s, dropped sharply as a result of large land purchases in the mid 1960s and again in the early 1970s. This land provided the basis on which the relocation of black spots and later, of african townships, could proceed: on it closer settlements and relocation townships were built.

QUOTA PURCHASES IN THE 1960s

In early 1961 the Department of BAD circulated a memorandum appealing to farmers 'to assist (the) Department in moving 'black spots' by making land available to the Department for the resettling of displaced people.' (*NAUNLU*, 14.04.61) The following month *NAUNLU* reported that 'in the interests of the farmer' the NAU was to meet with its affiliated Farmers' Associations to formulate a 'definite overall plan for the sale of white-owned farms to the Native Trust' (*NAUNLU*, 12.05.61) Subsequently it met with the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal (Mr A.J. Turton) to clarify the intentions of the SANT in this regard.

At that stage the outstanding quota for Natal was put at 650 000 acres (263 042 ha). Mr Turton was at pains to reassure farmers that the bulk of this land was to come from the State land in north-eastern Natal, from the Makhathini Flats:

Where land is sought in European areas in Natal proper it will be for

the purpose of eliminating 'black spots'; to facilitate the application of conservation farming methods, or to round off awkward areas of land. This will add up to about 100 000 acres,⁺ and will be land bought for Bantu use, whilst in turn other land at present occupied by Bantu in the white areas will be made available to whites. Over all, these adjustments will not encroach to any extent on the European-owned farmlands of Natal. (NAUNLU, 26.05.61)

He also summarised briefly the land needed by the SANT in the various districts of Natal; this assessment makes interesting reading compared to the proposals put forward during the consolidation era of the 1970s - 'very little' in Harding, 'very little' in Babanango, 'maybe a bit' at Mtunzini and Eshowe, possibly 'a little for labour purposes' at Estcourt.

Arising out of these negotiations, the NAU and the SANT agreed to a system whereby block purchases of land would be made by the Trust, on a district basis, in consultation with local Farmers' Associations. In June 1962 agreement was reached on the land to be acquired in the Ladysmith and Dundee districts (see Appendix 1). The following month the SAAU met with the Bantu Affairs Commission and the Minister of BAD and agreed that the first priority of the SADT was to eliminate black spots, the second to 'reorganise' the released areas. (NAUNLU, 6.07.62)

In April 1964 the Minister of BAD announced in the House of Assembly that a total of 55 462 morgen (47 697 ha) had been purchased or approved for purchase in the Newcastle, Vryheid, Klip River, Dundee, Mpendle and Ixopo districts (House of Assembly Debates, vol. 10, col. 4854-5) - most of it land earmarked for relocation purposes. Problems were being encountered in the Estcourt district where the attempt to buy up land, part of which was intended for the establishment of a township to serve the small border industrial area of Estcourt, conflicted with the long-standing ambition of white farmers in the area to remove all three of the Drakensberg reserves. (Locations no. 1 and no. 2 and the Upper Tugela Location at Bergville.) This issue, which is discussed in the next chapter on consolidation, has still not been fully resolved, although land has been acquired by the Trust and the township of Wembezi built on it.

By early 1971 the amount of quota land still outstanding in Natal had dropped to approximately 137 600 ha, to which a further 43 000 ha of compensatory land for black spots still to be moved, had to be added. (NAUNLU, 5.02.71) By 1973 the figure stood at 56 700 ha (Deputy Minister of BAD, quoted in NAUNLU, 23.11.73) - although it is not specified, it is likely this figure included compensatory land for black spots as well. Thereafter land purchase proceeded steadily and finally, in early 1981 it was announced that the original 1936 quota had been met, in Natal - the first province where this had happened. In answer to a series of questions tabled in Parliament, Dr Koornhof reported that the SADT had acquired a total of 442 790 ha of land in Natal and that the amount of quota land still to be acquired in Natal was nil. He did state, however, that a further 25 896 ha of land had still to be acquired in Natal 'as compensatory land for Black spots still to be resettled.' (Hansard, Q. 345, 26.02.81)

Unfortunately, Dr Koornhof's figures do not tally with figures derived from other sources concerning the total area of land due to be added to the african areas of Natal in terms of the 1936 legislation. According to Thorrrington-Smith *et al* (1978, 6), the total amount of quota land allocated for Natal in 1936 was 450 534 ha - 7 744 ha more than the figure given by Dr Koornhof in 1981 as representing the fulfilment of the 1936 obligation in Natal. It is a discrepancy serious enough to warrant further investigation.

The following table sets out the history of land purchases by the SANT / SADT between 1936 and the end of 1980, as recorded in the figures supplied by various officials at

⁺ 40 468 ha

different times.

Table 11. ACQUISITION OF QUOTA AND COMPENSATORY LAND (FOR BLACK SPOTS) IN NATAL, 1936 - 1980. (Ha.)

Sources: NAUNLU (11.03.55; 26.05.61; 5.05.67; 5.02.71; 23.11.73; June 1977; August 1978); Brookes and Hurwitz, 1957, 23; House of Assembly Debates (col. 4854-5, April 1964; Q. 345, 26.02.81)

DATE	LAND ACQUIRED BY SADT	QUOTA LAND OUTSTANDING	COMPENSATORY LAND FOR BLACK SPOTS OUTSTANDING
1936	247 295 released	203 239 ⁺	42 226
1961		263 042	
April 1964	47 697 ⁺		
1965	46 672 ⁺		
1971		137 600 ⁺ (approx.)	43 000 ⁺ (approx.)
1973		56 700	
February 1977	434 611 total	15 924	16 101
June 1978	455 905 total	10 034	11 091
December 1980	442 790 total	nil	25 896

Despite Dr Koornhof's claim to have met the 1936 quota, the process of buying up land in Natal by the SADT is still not complete. Apart from the land still required as compensation for black spots yet to be moved, the original quota has, since 1980, been superseded to some extent by the new land formulae being worked out to meet the requirements of consolidation in the various bantustan / national states. National Party leaders were adamant that consolidation would not involve any extra land being allocated to the bantustans beyond what was proposed in 1936. In 1980, however, government spokesmen indicated that more land may be forthcoming if necessary in order to 'satisfy the most important development needs' of the bantustans, provided that it would be 'utilised productively and on an economical basis.' (Dr Koornhof, quoted in the *Rand Daily Mail*, 31.10.80.) This is discussed more fully in the following chapter.

CHRONOLOGY OF REMOVALS

As already stated, the elimination of black spots and the enforcement of Group Areas proclamations were the two main categories of relocation in Natal in the 1960s. However, despite the acquisition of Trust land in the early 1960s, black spot removals proceeded sluggishly in the first half of the 1960s. During this time a couple of black-owned properties were bought out in Southern Natal (Lot FP 218, Bulwer and ES 7999, Ixopo). The main focus of attention was in Northern Natal where Besterspruit (Vryheid), East Hesselton, West Hesselton, Siwangu (all near Newcastle), and Khumalosville (near Ladysmith) were moved by 1963 and a start made with the removal of the urban freehold areas of Charlestown and Lennoxton and Fairleigh (both in Newcastle).

The NAU was not satisfied with progress and in August 1965 it was described as being 'very perturbed' by the unnecessary delays in the elimination of black spots (NAUNLU, 27.08.65), a complaint that was repeated the following year by the President of the NAU

⁺ Hectares calculated from original morgen.

in his address to its annual Congress. (NAUNLU, 23.09.66) In 1967 the NAU sent a deputation to the Minister of BAD to discuss the delays. In his reply, the Minister cited financial problems as the reason behind the delays but assured the delegation that more money would probably be available for removals the following year. (NAUNLU, 24.03.67)

The following year black spot removals in Natal shot into prominence with the removal of ten black spots in the Wasbank / Dundee area into Limehill. These removals were bitterly opposed by the people affected and generated considerable publicity and international condemnation. In 1969 the Minister of BAD reported that a total of 28 black spots had been removed in Natal by then, 1 each in the Alfred, Ixopo, Richmond, Pietermaritzburg and Polela (Bulwer) districts, 2 each in the Klip River, Port Shepstone and Utrecht districts, 3 in the Vryheid district, 6 in the Newcastle district and 8 in the Dundee district. (House of Assembly Debates, col. 326, vol. 25, 1969)

In the 1970s the programme of black spot removals became enmeshed in the consolidation proposals for KwaZulu and underwent some modifications, in content and in implementation, as a result. A small number of properties previously classified as black spots - for instance, Middeltown (Estcourt), Uitval (Helpmekaar) and a number of properties in the Ixopo district - became earmarked for inclusion in the proposed consolidated boundaries for KwaZulu. A far larger number of freehold properties previously considered part of KwaZulu became earmarked for excision from the bantustan, however, and were faced with the threat of removal as a result, notably the Driefontein block of farms outside Ladysmith and an extensive cluster of freehold properties, many of them very small, in the western foothills of Mpendle and Underberg districts.

During the 1970s black spot removals continued at a steady pace in Natal, the Minister of Cooperation and Development reporting that a total of 64 425 people were cleared off black spots in the province between 1970 and the end of 1979. (Hansard, Question 537, 22.04.80. However, as already noted there are inaccuracies in some of his figures.)⁺ By the end of the decade, however, the pace of removals slackened off markedly. No black spots were removed in Natal in 1979 nor in 1980 and only 1, the small farm, Kwapitela, near Himeville, with a population of 69 households, in 1981. (On Kwapitela see the case study in Part Four.)

THE POSITION IN 1982

In early 1982 a number of newspapers carried prominent reports suggesting that the government's black spot removal programme 'appears to have ground to a temporary halt' and that 'there are strong indications the authorities might change their tack.' (Natal Witness, 23.04.82) These reports were based on developments in Lebowa, where the government announced it had abandoned its previous intentions of relocating the people in the Matok - Ramagoep area and on speeches made in the House of Assembly by van der Walt, Chairman of the Commission for Cooperation and Development, and the MP for Klip River, Natal, Mr V. Volker. In his speech, van der Walt stated that

in the light of the new Government policy of economic development it was necessary to review whether it was necessary to remove some of the Black spots. (Natal Witness, 23.04.82)

Earlier, Volker had displayed what appeared to be a new and more pragmatic approach towards black spots when he had said that 'black farmers who farmed economically in white areas should be helped to keep farming by granting them loans, rather than forcing

⁺ For an account of the process of removal and the response to it by the people living in one of these communities, that of Roosboom near Ladysmith, see the Ezakheni case study in Part Three.

them to resettle elsewhere.' (Natal Mercury, 22.04.82)

The dangers in accepting these remarks at face-value were illustrated very soon afterwards, however. Less than a week after newspapers had reported so hopefully on the change in policy, Dr Koornhof confirmed that a number of specified black spots in Natal were to be removed, including all the african freehold properties in Val Volker's own constituency of Klip River. All these places have been under a threat for a long time and have not yet been moved, and it is still possible that if sufficient pressure can be brought to bear against their removal, from both the threatened communities and outside support groups, they may yet be left alone (at least for the time being). Nevertheless, developments in these places make it clear that at this stage the government is still determined to move them.

Thus Matiwane's Kop, one of the threatened communities, has already been expropriated by the State (in 1978) and despite various appeals, Pretoria has consistently refused to reinstate the landowners with their title deeds. Landowners and tenants (over 12 000 of them) are thus living on land to which they no longer have any legal claim - they are there entirely at the discretion of the State. Jonono's Kop, adjoining Matiwane's Kop, has also been expropriated. Earlier in 1982 the local magistrate told tenants they need no longer pay rent to their landlords since the land now belongs to the State: clearly a preliminary to removal. The magistrate's announcement, predictably, caused a furore in the community, fanning a demoralising sense of insecurity and setting landowners against tenants. In addition, the Driefontein block of farms lying to the south of Matiwane's Kop, with a population put officially at 70 980 in 1981 (Hansard, Question 200, 26.02.81) was excised from KwaZulu, by proclamation, in January 1981; its residents were informed in early 1980 that they were to be removed 'after further consultation' and 'after the necessary housing facilities, sanitation, water reticulation, school and clinic facilities and other infrastructure had been provided' on the compensatory land earmarked for their relocation, in the Klip River district. (Hansard, Question 465, 23.04.82)

Undoubtedly the enormous cost of removals has forced a slowdown in recent years. Undoubtedly too, opposition in Natal to both consolidation and removals, as well as the threat of serious resistance in a number of communities earmarked for removal has forced Pretoria to become more cautious in its approach and will continue to demand careful handling by the State. (For an account of resistance to being moved in two communities, see the Matiwane's Kop and St Wendolins case studies in Part Four.) However, despite these considerations, the available evidence suggests that far from stopping further removals, the central government is still determined to push ahead with a programme that necessarily involves the forced relocation of thousands of blacks in Natal (and elsewhere). Strategic adjustments in the programme when absolutely unavoidable, even reprieves in certain well publicised cases, perhaps; a halt to further removals at this stage, appears unlikely.

BLACK SPOT REMOVALS AND COAL

Although political factors have played an important part in generating the black spot removal policy, the choice of where to start in so massive a programme has been largely determined by economic factors, more specifically coal mining interests in Northern Natal. The focus of attention has been on black spots in the northern districts. All the black spots in the districts of Dannhauser, Dundee, Helpmekaar, Newcastle, Utrecht and Vryheid have been moved - 40 properties in all - while the major target at present is the Klip River district where 11 properties have been removed and a further 14 are under imminent threat. The available evidence suggests very strongly that coal-mining interests have benefitted considerably from the expropriation and removal of black spots in Northern Natal. This is an issue urgently needing further follow-up and research.

Of special importance would be an investigation into the amount of compensation paid to the expropriated landowners and the manner in which coal companies have acquired mining rights in these properties.

A preliminary investigation into the coal deposits found on the 66 black spots (removed and under threat) in the eight northern districts of Dannhauser, Dundee, Helpmekaar, Klip River, Newcastle, Ngotshe, Utrecht and Vryheid has shown that at least 30 of them have coal deposits, much of it of a high quality, 5 of the 66 do not have any coal deposits on them while the position on the remaining 31 requires further investigation. Furthermore, of the 40 properties already removed in the Dannhauser, Dundee, Helpmekaar, Newcastle, Utrecht and Vryheid districts, 22 have significant coal deposits, 12 are being mined at present, while another 4 have been mined in the past.

The available information is set out in the following summary of coal deposits found on black spots in these northern districts. The letters in the column headed 'Coal Seams' refer to the various types of coal seams found in the area. According to our information there are 6 such seams in the area, abbreviated as E A G D C T in the summary. The abbreviations indicate the presence of the following seams:

- E : Eland Coal Seam; export-quality metallurgical coal which is however difficult to mine except where it is at the surface.
 A : Alfred Coal Seam; suitable for use in local power stations.
 G : Gus Coal Seam; also suitable for use in local power stations.
 D : Dundee Coal Seam; also suitable for use in local power stations.
 C : Coking Coal Seam; export-quality metallurgical coal.
 T : Targas Coal Seam; non-economical and seldom mined.

<u>DISTRICT</u> <u>BLACK SPOT</u>	<u>MOVED</u>	<u>COAL SEAMS</u>	<u>DEPTH</u> (in metres)	<u>COAL MINES</u>
<u>DANNHAUSER</u>				
1. Gardens	1970/73	No		
2. Crane Valley	1970/73	No		
3. Loch Lomond	1970/73	Yes E A G D C T	0	Natal Cambrian Colliery, Old Newcastle Colliery, Natal Navigation Colliery and local workings.
4. Koppie Alleen	1970	Yes A G D C T	0	Natal Navigation Colliery and local workings.
5. Jubilee	1970	Yes G D C T	0	Natal Cambrian Colliery, Old Newcastle Colliery, Natal Navigation Colliery and local workings.
6. West Hesselton	1963	Yes E A G D C T	100	Durban Navigation Colliery
7. East Hesselton	1963	Yes E A G D C T	100	Durban Navigation Colliery
8. Siwangu	1963	Yes E A G D C T	100	Durban Navigation Colliery
9. Wykeham	1960s	Yes E A G D C T	200	Durban Navigation Colliery
10. Waagalles	1970	Yes E A G D C T	100	Durban Navigation Colliery
11. Cardwill	1960s	Yes E A G D C T	0	Durban Navigation Colliery
12. Not named	1977	?		

<u>DISTRICT</u> <u>BLACK SPOT</u>	<u>MOVED</u>	<u>COAL SEAMS</u>	<u>DEPTH</u> (in metres)	<u>COAL MINES</u>
<u>DUNDEE</u>				
1. Longlands	c 1970	Yes E A G D C T	0	Many defunct mines
2. Menteith	1960s	Yes A G D C T	0	
3. Boschhoek	1968	Yes E A G D C T	150	
4. Lyell	1968	Yes A G D C T	0	-
5. Meran	1968	Yes D C T	0	-
6. Williamsgeeluk	1968	Yes D C T	0	-
7. Mooispruit	1968	Yes G D C T	0	Defunct Natal Methyn Colliery.
8. Ruigtefontein	1972	Yes A G D C T	0	Defunct Natal Steam Colliery
9. Van Rooyen	1960s	Yes A G D C T	?	Many defunct mines
10. Raemar 6942	1960s	No		
11. Raemar 6504	1960s	No		
12. Italanu	1976	?		
<u>HELPMEKAAR</u>				
1. Uitval	Incorporated into KZ	Yes A G D C T	0	No active collieries.
2. Nietgedag Part 1	1968/69	?		
3. Nietgedag Part 2	1968/69	?		
4. Mali	1971	?		
5. Trosa	1968/69	?		
<u>KLIP RIVER</u>				
1. Lusitania	Under threat	?		
2. Ndongane	Under threat	Yes E A G D C T	200	
3. Matiwane's Kop	Under threat	Yes E A G D C T	100	Natal Steam Colliery, Elandsplaagte Colliery and Newcastle Platberg Colliery adjacent; drillings in area.
4. Jonono's Kop	Under threat	Yes E A G D C T	100	Natal Steam Colliery, Elandsplaagte Colliery and Newcastle Platberg Colliery adjacent; drillings in area.

DISTRICT
BLACK SPOT

MOVED

COAL SEAMS

DEPTH
(in metres)

KLIP RIVER (continued)

5. Steincoalspruit	Under threat (tenants moved). Expropriated 1978.	A? Yes G D C T	0
6. Roosboom	1976	?	
7. Good Hope	1976	?	
8. Welcome	1976	?	
9. Rietkuil	1976	?	
10. Trekboer	1978	Yes E A G D C T	100
11. Doone	1970s	Yes A G D C T	0
12. Besters	c 1963	Yes (thin) E A G D C T	300
13. Kirkintilloch	1973	?	
14. Balderskraal	Under threat	?	
15. Driefontein	Under threat	?	
16. Kleinfontein	Under threat	?	
17. Doornhoek	Under threat	?	
18. Burford	Under threat	?	
19. Rooival / Watersmeet	Under threat	?	
20. Roodepoort	Under threat	?	
21. Riversdale	Under threat	?	
22. Vulandondo	Under threat	?	
23. Hobsland	Under threat	?	
24. Wasbank	1974	Yes G D C T	0
25. Umbulwane	Under threat	?	

NEWCASTLE

1. Bulwerton	1960s	?	
2. Milton	1970	?	
3. Vreda	1972	Yes E A G D C T	0
4. Thokozeni	1960s	?	

COAL MINES

Defunct Collieries on property. Platberg Colliery was interested in prospecting prior to expropriation in 1978. At present there is a dispute re value of coal - GG claims no commercial value which expropriated landowners question.

Natal Steam Colliery, Elandslaagte Colliery and Newcastle Platberg Colliery adjacent; drillings in areaa.

Defunct Natal Steam Collieries.

Defunct Natal Methyn Colliery.

Natal Navigation Colliery

DISTRICT
BLACK SPOT

MOVED

COAL SEAMS

DEPTH
(in metres)

COAL MINES

NEWCASTLE (continued)

5. Annandale	1960s	Yes E A G D C T	0
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Natal Navigation Colliery, Natal Cambrian Colliery, Old Newcastle Colliery; local workings.

NGOTSHE

1. Mooiplaats	Under threat	?	?
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Coal deposits on property not known, but prospectors have visited the property and there is active mining in the vicinity.

UTRECHT

1. Klipspruit	1960s	?	
2. Groenvlei	1960s	Yes E A G D C T	300
3. ?	1980	?	

VRYHEID

1. Voorslag	1960s	?	
2. Apologie	1960s	?	
3. Besterspruit	c 1963	No	

BLACK SPOT REMOVALS AND THE SUGAR INDUSTRY

An analogous development to that relating to coal-mining in the north has taken place in the black spot removal programme in Southern Natal, although on a far smaller scale. A number of the black spots in the Umzinto, Port Shepstone and Ixopo districts that had high agricultural potential have been bought by sugar and timber companies which presumably formed a powerful lobby for their removal. Thus out of the 20 removed, at least 5 have been bought up by white (mostly sugar) farmers (Bergvliet in Camperdown, Ballaraat and Roselands in Port Shepstone, The Cape and Headlands in Umzinto) and another 5 in the Ixopo district were acquired by a single timber company. (These properties are identified by lot numbers only as S 72 5222, BP 7892, DA 7185, BA 8146 and 22 6831). Another 3 black spots that have not yet been moved are under pressure from the sugar industry. (The Rock, Valschrivier, Fairview).

5. Summary of African freehold black spots, 1948-1982

The list of properties starting on p.108 summarises the information that we have been able to compile on all the african freehold properties that can be classified as black spots since 1948. The properties are listed according to Magisterial district. The symbols in the left hand margin indicate the current status of the property as follows:

- Removed
- ? Status not known
- C Consolidated or likely to be consolidated into KwaZulu
- T Tenants only removed
- P Part of the community removed.

The summary of Mission black spots follows from p. 128.

1. SUMMARY OF FREEHOLD BLACK SPOTS REMOVED : 1948 - 1982

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>BERGVILLE</u>			
1.	1. Nooitgedacht 1041 (Acton Homes)	SAIRR list	Under threat; houses have been numbered.
2.	2. Klipplaatsfontein 1235 (Hanbrook)	SAIRR list	Under threat; houses numbered c. 1971; title deeds reported- ly taken by GG 1976/77. c 50 hh; landowners in a syndicate.
3.	3. Earthcote of Venterslaagte 1291 (Hanbrook)	SAIRR list	As above.
4.	4. Lot 2 4977 (Bethany)	SAIRR list	4 & 5 under threat; houses not numbered. GG attempt to take title deeds in 1979 apparently fell through.
5.	5. Lot 3 4976 (Bethany)	SAIRR list	
6.	6. Woodford Lot 4 5026	SAIRR list	Under threat. Numbered 1981; Local committee intervened & numbers removed.
7.	7. Langkloof 8281 Sub. B	SAIRR list	Under threat.
8.	8. Rooihoek C of Oppermankraal 12 (Malota's Kraal)	SAIRR list	Under threat.
9.	9. Greenpoint 12596 (Malota's Kraal)	SAIRR list	Under threat.
10.	10. Wittekop no. 1 7083	SAIRR list	Under threat.
11.	11. Howe 5453	SAIRR list	Under threat; houses numbered but numbers removed, as no. 6 above.
12.	12. Ingula 7991 Sub. A	SAIRR list	Under threat.
13.	13. Riebokspruit 9 14	SAIRR list	Under threat.
? 14.	14. Bulwer 5034	SAIRR list	Not traced yet; probably on OFS border and likely not moved.

Note: Rookdale 8855 and Crowfield 8854, released freehold land adjacent to Upper Tugela Location, were affected by the building of the Woodstock Dam and landowners and tenants moved to compensatory land in nearby Oliviershoek area, 1981/82. These properties were not black spots as such, since they fell within reserve land.

BULWER

15.	1. Lot I G 6413	SAIRR list	Not expropriated yet (June 1982) & under threat.
16.	2. Alderney 6477 Lot A (Marwaqa)	SAIRR list	Under threat.
17.	3. Lot GR 17 11795 (Marwaqa)	SAIRR list	Not expropriated yet (June 1982) & under threat; adjoins no. 16.
18.	4. Free State Lot FP 278, 9352	SAIRR list	Not expropriated yet (June 1982) & under threat. Original Grant dated 12th December 1918.
19.	5. Beersheba Lot FP 213, 8112	SAIRR list	Not expropriated yet (June 1982) & under threat. Grant dated 1912.

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>BULWER (continued)</u>			
20.	6. Lot S 14 6057 (Tarr's Valley and Mlaba)	SAIRR list	Not expropriated yet (June 1982) & under threat.
- 21.	7. Lot FP 218 8478	SAIRR list	Bought from Nxasana family by whites in 1963 but expropria- tion not listed in Hansard; was next to no. 22. Original Grant dated 1914.
- 22.	8. Lot 1 3636 (Dronkvlei/ Donkervlei)	SAIRR list	Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969)
<u>CAMPERDOWN</u>			
23.	1. Lot 1 of A Valschriver 1148	SAIRR list	Under threat; owner apparently has resisted pressures to sell thus far.
- 24.	2. Lot 9 Uitzoek 1104 Manderston	SAIRR list	Moved Feb. 1982; very small, with 1 owner who moved to Inchanga.
- 25.	3. Part of Bergvliet 1197	SAIRR list	Moved 1972; 747 pop. (Hansard 1980). People moved to Umbu- bulu, other bs and Imfume. Whites bought land direct with permit; one who then re-sold it claimed 3-fold profit. (Fieldtrip). Now under sugar.
- 26.	4. Hammarsdale, including Georgedale Fredville Nchanga	SAIRR list	Moved 1968/69 after land expro- priated (1961) to make way for establishment of Mpumalanga township and border industrial area. 200 to 300 landowners, some resistance. People moved to Mpumalanga or neighbouring bs. See Desmond, 1970.
<u>DANNHAUSER</u>			
- 27.	1. Gardens 7239	SAIRR list	27 - 29: Moved 1970/73; 2 835 pop. (Hansard, 1980). People warned re removal 1964/65; eviction notices 1968. Moved to Madadeni. See Desmond, 1970.
- 28.	2. Crane Valley 7576	SAIRR list	
- 29.	3. Loch Lomond 7577	SAIRR list	
- 30.	4. Koppie Alleen 8516	SAIRR list	Moved 1970, 900 pop. (Hansard, 1980) / moved 1972, c 5 000 pop.
- 31.	5. Jubilee 9642	SAIRR list	Moved 1970; 330 pop. (Hansard, 1980). Moved to Madadeni.
- 32.	6. West Hesselton 7512	SAIRR list	32 & 33 moved c 1963. 34 moved later. These 3 among the first bs to be moved, being bought out direct by Durban Navigation Collieries, after being declared bs. Observers have seen the direct sale as an attempt to soften resistance from other bs. Landowners moved to comp. land near Madadeni (e.g. Riversmeet for E. Hesselton) and tenants to Osizweni where some still in fletcraft. 27 landowners in syndicate at E. Hesselton & c. 200 tenants; no figures for 33 & 34. No resistance.
- 33.	7. East Hesselton 6783	SAIRR list	
- 34.	8. Siwangu 8404	SAIRR list	

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>DANNHAUSER (continued)</u>			
- 35.	9. Wykeham 7582	SAIRR list	Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969). Sold by State to Durban Naviga- tion Collieries.
- 36.	10. Waagalles 8899	SAIRR list	Moved 1970; 840 pop. (Hansard, 1980) to Osizweni. Sold by State to individual whites, 1979.
- 37.	11. Lot 1 Cardwill 4340	SAIRR list	Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969).
- 38.	12.	Hansard 1980	Moved 1977, 107 pop. (Hansard, 1980). This property is not named by Dr Koornhof in his reply in Parliament and has not been identified by field- work.
<u>DUNDEE</u>			
- 39.	1. Longlands 8803	SAIRR list	Moved but not listed in Hansard. Under threat to Vaalkop in 1968, at time of Limehill removals, & expropriated in 1970. Approx. 1 000 pop. and substantial stone ruins today.
- 40.	2. Menteith 3328	SAIRR list	Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969).
- 41.	3. Boschhoek 1312 (Hlatikulu)	SAIRR list	Moved 1968 to Vergelegen, near Limehill; some resistance. Land bought 1870 by Kunene tribe; c. 170 original owners. GG claimed tribe authorised sale 1966; this disputed by tribe. Boschhoek today used by army for manoeuvres.
- 42.	4. Lyell 2398 (Telaphi)	SAIRR list	42 - 45 moved Jan. 1968, to Limehill; approx. 900 pop. (SAIRR) Other estimates put Meran pop. alone at 1 500, however.
- 43.	5. Meran 4247	SAIRR list	
- 44.	6. Williamsgeluk	SAIRR list	
- 45.	7. Mooispruit	SAIRR list	
- 46.	8. Ruigtefontein 1179 (Kameel- kop; Subdivision E; Asse- gaalkraal Native stands)	SAIRR list	Moved 1972; 1 166 pop. (Han- sard, 1980); to Ekuvukeni.
- 47.	9. Van Rooyen 4252	SAIRR list	Moved by 1969. (Hansard).
- 48.	10. Raemoir A 6942	SAIRR list	Expropriated 1964 and moved by 1969. (Hansard). Sold by State to individual white 1970/71.
- 49.	11. Raemoir 1 of 6504	SAIRR list	Moved by 1969. (Hansard)
- 50.	12. Italianu	Hansard 1980	Moved 1976, pop. 186 (Hansard). Hansard lists it under Klip- river; not identifiable in that district & sug. was in Dundee. (Fieldwork)
<u>DURBAN</u>			
- 51.	1. Chateau Estates	Fieldwork	Moved 1965/66, 434 hh (tenants & landowners). To KwaMashu?

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>ESHOWE</u>			
C 52.	1. Rest of Amanda	SAIRR list	Likely to have been incorpor- ated into adjacent KZ. SAIRR 1950s list describes it as held in trust for landowner by the Minister of Native Affairs.
<u>ESTCOURT</u>			
C 53.	1. Middleton 4924	SAIRR list	Probable consolidation into KZ in terms 1975 plans.
54.	2. Itendele 3508	SAIRR list	Adjacent properties, not yet moved, no numbers on houses & threat not immediate. Est. 50 hh. (Fieldwork)
55.	3. Lots 1 - 5 3279		
56.	4. Thembalihle (part of Hatting 1222)	1975 plan	Under threat; released area & 'badly situated' in terms of consolidation. Houses numbered 1979 but local GG denies nos. are official. Koornhof con- firmed proposed removal (Han- sard 26.02.81) and put pop. at 5 000. 58 landowners. (Field- trip) Opposition to move.
57.	5. Cornfields (part of Hatting 1222)	1975 plan	Under threat. As no. 56 re- leased freehold land threatened by consolidation.
<u>HARDING</u>			
58.	1. Mount Nebo 8178	SAIRR list	58 to 64 not yet moved and do not fall within area to be con- solidated but do not appear to be under an immediate threat. Uncertainty re future of black and white areas in Harding dis- trict in terms of GG consolida- tion plans holds out some possi- bility of reprieve but nobody in these areas knows what the future is likely to be. In the meantime, these areas appear to be administered by KZ (Field- trip)
59.	2. Dilingile 7703	SAIRR list	
60.	3. Nongoboza of Umgigimini 8052	SAIRR list	
61.	4. Lot A of Umgigimini 4853	SAIRR list	
62.	5. Janyana 8204	SAIRR list	
63.	6. Eureka 8573	SAIRR list	
64.	7. FC 5807	SAIRR list	
65.	8. Lot R 7747	Local GG	
66.	9. Farm Lot YA 6400	Local GG	
- 67.	10. Klaas	SAIRR list	
? 68.	11. Horseshoe	SAIRR list	Not located on map or traced in field.
69.	12. Tridale 7869	SAIRR list	69 - 72 all on local GG list of bs, 1981 but position not est- ablished clearly on fieldtrips.
70.	13. Enqabeni	Local GG	
71.	14. GH 8133	Local GG	
72.	15. Umbelline 6995	Local GG	

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>HELFMEKAAR</u>			
C 73.	1. Uitval 1244	SAIRR list	Incorporated into KZ late 1960s.
- 74.	2. Nietgedag, Part 1 of B 7938	SAIRR list	74 & 75 expropriated 1968 & moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969) to Asynkraal, part of Limehill complex. Their farms sold by State to private white, 1975.
- 75.	3. Nietgedag, Part 2 of B 7938 (Notgedog?)	SAIRR list	
- 76.	4. B of Mali 12177	SAIRR list	Expropriated in 1971 and moved 1970; 150 pop. (Hansard) to Asynkraal.
- 77.	5. Trosa 5858 (Trosa?)	SAIRR list	Expropriated in 1968 and moved by 1969. (Hansard) To Asynkraal.
<u>IXOPO</u>			
78.	1. Bartman Part A 11656	SAIRR list	78-81 under threat; all on Mkomazi River and numbered c. 10 years ago; to be moved to Platt Estates. Op- position on grounds insufficient water and not yet moved.
79.	2. S 56 7959	SAIRR list	
80.	3. S 57 8157	SAIRR list	
81.	4. S 58 7550	SAIRR list	
? 82.	5. Umyesa Part B of A 7744	SAIRR list	Not clear if expropriated and moved, or not.
C 83.	6. Lot 3 Umgodi 6557	SAIRR list	83-91 fall within area to be con- solidated into KZ in terms of 1975 plans; administered by KZ. (Fieldtrip)
C 84.	7. Lot AU 8164	SAIRR list	
C 85.	8. Lot 20 Umhlabatyan 6959	SAIRR list	
C 86.	9. Hillside 0002	SAIRR list	
C 87.	10. Lot 13 Hlokozi	SAIRR list	
C 88.	11. Lot BW 8972	SAIRR list	
C 89.	12. Cleveland 9362	SAIRR list	
C 90.	13. Lot CW 9361	SAIRR list	
C 91.	14. Lot 8 Umgodi 5263	SAIRR list	
- 92.	15. BA 8146	SAIRR list	Bought by timber company 1969 & apparently moved.
93.	16. S 36 9327	SAIRR list	93 - 103 under threat c. 10 years ago but not moved and do not appear under an imminent threat at present. (Fieldtrip)
94.	17. S 31 9284	SAIRR list	
95.	18. S 71 5269	SAIRR list	
96.	19. S 73	SAIRR list	

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>IXOPO (continued)</u>			
97.	20. S 75 5374	SAIRR list	93 - 103 under threat c. 10 years ago but not moved and do not appear under an imminent threat at present. (Fieldtrip)
98.	21. S 74	SAIRR list	
99.	22. BN 7976	SAIRR list	
100.	23. BL	SAIRR list	
101.	24. BI 7740	SAIRR list	
102.	25. BQ 8475	SAIRR list	
103.	26. BR 7340	SAIRR list	
- 104.	27. Lot ZZ 6831	SAIRR list	Bought by timber company 1969 & apparently moved.
- 105.	28. S 72 5222	SAIRR list	Moved 1972; 138 pop. (Hansard, 1980) Bought by timber company but by beginning 1982 most people still living there as no alterna- tive offered them. (Fieldwork)
- 106.	29. S BP 7892	SAIRR list	Moved 1973; 242 pop. (Hansard, 1980) But as above (105) most people had not left land by 1982. Also bought by timber company. (Fieldwork)
- 107.	30. S DA 7185	SAIRR list	Also moved 1973; pop. 63 (Hansard, 1980) and also most people still living there 1982. Farm bought by timber company. (Fieldwork)
- 108.	31. ES 7999	SAIRR list	Bought out by individual farmer 1963. Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969)
- 109.	32. BO 7764	SAIRR list	Bought by individual farmer in 1977. Landowner swapped his farm for EO 6629 which he believed to be inside KZ and took all his tenants with him. Recently in- formed new farm still in the white area (116 below).
? 110.	33. Lot DW Sub B	SAIRR list	More fieldwork on 110 - 113 necessary.
? 111.	34. Lot FF	SAIRR list	
? 112.	35. Lot EY	SAIRR list	
? 113.	36. Lot 1 - 5	SAIRR list	
114.	37. Lot S 29 9026	SAIRR list	Under threat
C 115.	38. Lot GD 12411	SAIRR list	Falls within area to be consoli- dated into KZ in terms of 1975 plans.
116.	39. EO 6629	Fieldwork	See 109 above. Under threat.

Note: Many of these properties are very small. Consolidation

IXOPO (continued)

plans are very uncertain, with speculation that the 1975 plans may be abandoned and large area declared black. White farmers are lobbying against this.

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>KLIPRIVER (LADYSMITH)</u>			
117.	1. Lusitania 1345	SAIRR list	Under threat. Houses not numbered but Koornhof confirmed to be moved, (Hansard, 26.02.81) and put pop. at 1 827. 20 original landowners in a syndicate; now 27. Opposition to removal.
118.	2. Ndonyane 5342/Droogwal	Fieldwork	Under threat. Houses not numbered. c. 74 hh. Land bought 1894. (Fieldtrip)
119.	3. Matiwane's Kop	SAIRR list	Under threat; land expropriated & Koornhof confirmed to be moved, pop. 12 502. (Hansard, 26.02.81) Strong opposition. Houses numbered.
120.	4. Jonono's Kop	SAIRR list	Under threat; land expropriated & Koornhof confirmed to be moved, pop. 1 701. (Hansard, 26.02.81) Houses numbered & some opposition, with adjoining Matiwane's Kop. 1982 tenants instructed by GG not to pay rent to landlords.
T 121.	5. Steincoalspruit 1171	SAIRR list	Tenants moved 1978; 11 188 pop. (Hansard, 1980) Was under threat with Limehill bs in 1968, but only moved later. Land expropriated 1978. Landowners not yet moved; opposition to compensation esp. re coal. Syndicate bought land 1874; 59 shareholders in 1966. Plus 5 individ. african subdivisions, 1 indian, 1 coloured.
- 122.	6. Roosboom 1102	SAIRR list	122 - 125 moved to Ezakheni 1975 - 1977; pop. 7 353 (Hansard, 1980) 1 landowner remaining in area.
- 123.	7. Good Hope	Fieldwork	Hansard 1980 claims 'Klippoorst' moved at same time but this always a white farm. (Fieldwork)
- 124.	8. Welcome	Fieldwork	
- 125.	9. Rietkuil 1067	SAIRR list	
- 126.	10. Trekboer/Criemen 4225	SAIRR list	Moved to Ezakheni 1977 - 78; pop. 2 856. (Hansard, 1980)
- 127.	11. Doone 5566	SAIRR list	Moved by 1980 and as adjoins Steincoalspruit probably to Ekuvukeni at same time. (Fieldwork)
- 128.	12. Khumalosville/Besters	SAIRR list	Bought 1908 by a syndicate; moved to Vulandondo c. 1963; Vulandondo subsequently moved again 1972. (See 138.)
- 129.	13. Kirkintilloch 2105	Hansard 1980	Moved 1973, pop. 50. (Hansard, 1980) Was in Driefontein area.
130.	14. Balderskraal of Rooykop 1090	SAIRR list	Under threat in terms of consolidation plans; in Driefontein area but not formerly released.

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>KLIPRIVER (continued)</u>			
131.	15. Driefontein 1079	1975 plan	131 - 137 under threat in terms of consolidation planning; freehold, formerly released land but January 1981 excised from KZ. People only informed February 1982. Houses numbered at Peacetown, Burford & Watersmeet and section still known as Kirkintilloch, even though most of this moved in 1973. See 128 above. Koornhof confirmed removals to take place & put pop. for whole complex at 70 980. (Hansard, 26.02.81) 131, 132 & 133 bought by Trust in 1867; other farms bought up later. In addition to these listed properties, there are areas within them known as Peacetown, Rantjiesvlakte and Watershed which residents regard as distinct communities. 20 people moved from Burford 1972/73, probably with 139 below. (Hansard, 1980)
132.	16. Kleinfontein 1072	1975 plan	
133.	17. Doornhoek 1223	1975 plan	
134.	18. Burford 2946	1975 plan	
135.	19. Rooival/Watersmeet 1101	1975 plan	
136.	20. Rodepoort 1069	1975 plan	
137.	21. Riversdale 4224	1975 plan	
- 138.	22. Vulandondo	Hansard 1980	Moved 1972 to Ezakheni. 1 080 pop. (Hansard, 1980) Was a relocation area next to Driefontein, created for people from Besters. (128)
- 139.	23. Hobsland 2118	Hansard 1980	Moved 1972 to Ezakheni, pop. 2 118. (Hansard, 1980) Same position as 138 and local people regarded 138 and 139 as one place.
- 140.	24. Wasbank 1076	Hansard 1980	Moved 1974 - 78, pop. 1 160 (Hansard, 1980)
T 141.	25. Umbulwane	Fieldwork	Under threat; pop. c. 1 000. (Fieldtrip) Falls within municipal area of Ladysmith and landowners pay rates; no services. August 1980 houses of tenants demolished as illegal, by BAAB. Opposition to removal. Previous removals of tenants to Ezakheni.

Note: Ladysmith area has been given priority as an area to be cleared of bs by the State and threats to the places listed above should be seen as imminent. Local Farmers Associations have been lobbying for removals. There is coal mining and prospecting in northern part of the district, around Steincoalspruit and Jonono's Kop. At the same time, there is organised opposition to removals in threatened communities.

MELMOTH

142.	1. Mfanifile	Fieldwork	Under threat although some locals believe may be incorporated into consolidated KZ. Houses not numbered. Pop. est. at 200 hh. (Fieldwork)
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MOUNT CURRIE AND MATATIELE

- 143.	1. Annex Riverlands	Hansard 1969	Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969)
- 144.	2. Riverlands	Hansard 1969	Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969)
P 145.	3. Pakkies	Memo 1961	According to 1961 memo, had been moved by 1961. However part still under investigation by Van der Walt Commission 1982.

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>MOUNT CURRIE AND MATATIELE (continued)</u>			
- 146.	4. Pofaddershoek	Memo 1961	Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)
- 147.	5. Spienskop	Memo 1961	Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)
- 148.	6. Treurfontein A55	Memo 1961	Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)
- 149.	7. Vogelvlei	Memo 1961	Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)
- 150.	8. Blydefontein	Memo 1961	Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)
- 151.	9. Swartbooiokop	Memo 1961	Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)
- 152.	10. Alwinrein	Memo 1961	Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)
- 153.	11. Lundi	Memo 1961	Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)
- 154.	12. Tambaansfontein	Memo 1961	Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)
- 155.	13. Poortkraal	Fieldwork	Moved before 1961. (Fieldwork)
- 156.	14. Kraaikop	Fieldwork	Moved before 1961. (Fieldwork)
- 157.	15. Willeary	Hansard 1980	Moved 1973; 12 pop. (Hansard, 1980)
C 158.	16. Polygon	Fieldwork	Was under threat; subsequently added to Transkei. (Fieldwork)
C 159.	17. Simpson	Fieldwork	Was under threat; subsequently added to Transkei. (Fieldwork)

Note: Before 1976 Mount Currie and Matatiele were in the Cape Province and thus bs within these districts would not have been included in earlier calculations of bs in Natal. After the Transkei was given apartheid-style independence, they were transferred to the administration of Natal.

<u>MPENDLE</u>			
C 160.	1. Crowle A and B 2260	SAIRR list	Appears likely to be consolidated into KZ in terms of 1975 plans.
- 161.	2. F.P. 149 (9802?)	Hansard 1980	Moved 1971; 120 pop. (Hansard, 1980) Seems that this refers to farm 9802 which adjoins Larance (see 274 below) on Mpendle side of the Mkomazi River and was moved to make way for the Vergelegen forest reserve. (Fieldwork) 9802 was released land but freehold.
162.	3. Maitland 5348	1975 plan	162 - 169 are a block of adjacent farms under threat in terms of 1975 consolidation plans. As with 161 and 170 - 179, these are free- hold but released areas. Local people do not appear to regard threat as imminent and houses have not been numbered. There is a chief at Hlatimbe who has juris- diction over this grouping of farms and the Stepmore grouping as well.
163.	4. The Ridge 11247	1975 plan	
164.	5. Otley 5484	1975 plan	
165.	6. Hlatimbe 6530	1975 plan	
166.	7. 5407	1975 plan	
167.	8. FP 178 9494	1975 plan	
168.	9. 11248	1975 plan	
169.	10. 6893	1975 plan	

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>MPENDLE (continued)</u>			
170.	11. 11659	1975 plan	170 - 179 under threat in terms of 1975 consolidation plans as 162 to 169. Appears from fieldwork that all are freehold but details lack- ing. All were released and thus would not have appeared on the 1950s SAIRR list. This group stretches on the Mpendle side of the Mkomazi River from Vergelegen Forest Reserve to Stepmore/Buck- lands area.
171.	12. 6003	1975 plan	
172.	13. Greenhill/Thethwane?	1975 plan	
173.	14. 8438	1975 plan	
174.	15. 11782	1975 plan	
175.	16. 11269	1975 plan	
176.	17. 8499	1975 plan	
177.	18. 6229	1975 plan	
178.	19. NE 2 14532	1975 plan	
179.	20. 7345	1975 plan	
180.	21. Bucklands 5615	1975 plan	180 - 188 under threat in terms of 1975 consolidation plans as 162 to 179. These farms appear to fall within the area loosely known as Stepmore or Bucklands, but have different landowners and are sur- veyed as separate units. There is also a Trust farm, tentatively identified as GR 19, settled by people who pay rent to the Bulwer magistrate. Houses are not number- ed and residents do not seem aware of any imminent threat although they know about other removals in the area. A secondary school is planned, indicative of possibility of a reprieve. Westlynn has col- oured owners. (Fieldwork)
181.	22. Bucklands 7508	1975 plan	
182.	23. GR 9 7450	1975 plan	
183.	24. Stepmore FP 154A 7482	1975 plan	
184.	25. Stepmore FP 154B 7482	1975 plan	
185.	26. Rutland 7597	1975 plan	
186.	27. The Gorge 7598	1975 plan	
187.	28. Peak Farm 5278	1975 plan	
188.	29. Westlynn no. 2 14589	1975 plan	
189.	30. 8841	1975 plan	189 - 214 under threat in terms of 1975 consolidation plans as 162 to 188, but details not known. It is possible that some of these are not freehold farms but Trust farms owned by the State; further field- work is necessary to identify these. There is also a rumour circulating in the area that a dam will be built in the vicinity of Glen Farm which may lead to removals. (This place is definitely freehold land.) (Fieldwork)
190.	31. The Crescent	1975 plan	
191.	32. 11576	1975 plan	
192.	33. Kilkenny	1975 plan	
193.	34. 5954	1975 plan	
194.	35. 6002	1975 plan	
195.	36. 4604	1975 plan	
196.	37. 5510	1975 plan	
197.	38. FP 138 7860	1975 plan	
198.	39. 9480	1975 plan	
199.	40. 10892	1975 plan	
200.	41. 8525	1975 plan	
201.	42. 9405	1975 plan	
202.	43. 9395	1975 plan	
203.	44. The Glen/Glen Farm 6320	1975 plan	
204.	45. 8901	1975 plan	
205.	46. 10722	1975 plan	
206.	47. 5627	1975 plan	
207.	48. 10740	1975 plan	
208.	49. 11725	1975 plan	
209.	50. 9148	1975 plan	
210.	51. 5753	1975 plan	
211.	52. 5801	1975 plan	
212.	53. 8666	1975 plan	
213.	54. 8111	1975 plan	
214.	55. 13527	1975 plan	

Note: Many of these properties are very small (as in the Ixopo

MPENDLE (continued)

district). More fieldwork is required to establish the total population threatened by removals if the 1975 consolidation plans are implemented in this area. These farms are threatened along with farms listed under Underberg as released, and total population threatened in the 2 districts is estimated at about 15 000. (Fieldwork)

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>NEWCASTLE</u>			
- 215.	1. Bulwerston	SAIRR list	Moved by 1969. (Hansard)
- 216.	2. Milton 10447	SAIRR list	Moved 1970; 730 pop. (Hansard) 16 landowners and c. 70 tenant families, acc. Desmond. ISCOR plant sited on land now.
- 217.	3. Vreda 9922	Hansard 1980	Moved 1972; 795 pop. (Hansard)
- 218.	4. Lennoxton	Fieldwork	Freehold areas within Newcastle municipal boundaries, moved between 1961-1970 to Madadeni; pop. estimated at 15 000 to 20 000. (Fieldwork) Lennoxton now an Indian Group Area; Fairleigh a coloured Group Area. No organised resistance to removal although people did not want to move. Pressures such as closing school, cutting off water applied.
- 219.	5. Fairleigh	Fieldwork	
- 220.	6. Thokozeni	Fieldwork	Moved, probably in 1960s, to Madadeni and Osizweni. Pop. not known. Near Normandien. (Fieldwork)
- 221.	7. Annandale	Fieldwork	Moved, probably in 1960s to Madadeni and Osizweni. Not located on map and possibly in Dannhauser or Dundee district. (Fieldwork)

Note: Within the area released for incorporation into KZ, south-east of Newcastle, are a number of freehold farms that are not currently under threat.

NEW HANOVER

C 222.	1. Appelsbosch 1293	SAIRR list	Not yet moved and possibly will be incorporated into adjacent KZ in terms of 1975 consolidation plans.
223.	2. Rest of Lot 1 Broughton 925	SAIRR list	Appears not yet moved; more fieldwork required.
224.	3. Camelhoek Part A 1320	SAIRR list	Appears not yet moved; more fieldwork required.
225.	4. Trustfeed/Parts of Part B of Camelhoek 1320	SAIRR list	Under threat; Dept of C & D confirmed to be moved but alternative site not yet available. (Natal Witness, 20.03.82) Pressure on new tenants from authorities to leave.
- 226.	5. Albert Falls Village	SAIRR list	Coloured and african owners & residents; appears africans moved. (Fieldwork)

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>NGOTSHE (LOUWSBURG)</u>			
227.	1. Mooiplaats B of 181	1975 plan	Under threat in terms of 1975 consolidation plans; released land adjoining tiny scheduled reserve of Kambi and bought by the Kambi tribe in early 1900s. Residents aware of threat but no timetable set nor houses numbered. Coal prospectors have been working in area. With adj. Kambi farm c. 300 to 400 hh. (Fieldwork)
<u>PIETERMARITZBURG</u>			
228.	1. Hopewell 881	SAIRR list	Under threat. Shop owners warned 1971 intention to move them to Wilgefontein, near Pmb. Est. 400 hh.
- 229.	2. Ockertskraal 1336	Fieldwork	Moved 1967 to Polltax Farm; pop. 400 africans, 300 indians. See Group Areas.
- 230.	3. Hollingwood of New England 1462	Fieldwork	Moved c. 1969 to Polltax Farm; pop. c. 400. See Group Areas.
- 231.	4. New Scotland Road	Fieldwork	Moved c. 1969. See no. 339, Missions.
C 232.	5. Slangspruit 1448	SAIRR list	Intended for incorporation into consolidated KZ. But overcrowded and poorly serviced so likely that tenants could be moved to make way for township style development.
C 233.	6. Wilgefontein 869	SAIRR list	Incorporated into KZ as Trust land; released 1964. People settling on land (with permission of induna) being harried as squatters 1981/82. Talk of site and service type settlement 1982.
<u>PINETOWN</u>			
234.	1. St Wendolins	Fieldwork	Freehold and mission land; has been under threat + some removals off mission land but poss. reprieve for freehold area. See case study.
<u>PORT SHEPSTONE</u>			
- 235.	1. The Patch	SAIRR list	Moved 1948 to 1953.
- 236.	2. Roselands 10900	SAIRR list	Bought by sugar company 1965. Moved by 1969. (Hansard)
237.	3. Part of Fairview 7915	SAIRR list	Under threat but does not appear imminent. Pop. est. at 1 000 (Fieldwork)
- 238.	4. Ballaraat	Hansard 1980	Bought by sugar company 1968/69. Moved 1973; 80 pop. (Hansard, 1980)
C 239.	5. Riverside	Fieldwork	Likely to be consolidated according to 1975 plans.
<u>RICHMOND</u>			
- 240.	1. Inhlazukaview	Hansard 1969	Sold to RCC 1965. Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969) However, now 120 ex farm hh moved onto the mission.
241.	2. Newlands 1861	1975 plan	Under threat; released land & freehold but threatened in terms 1975 plans. Deputy Minister Morrison confirmed intention to move them but date not set. (Natal Witness, 20.03.82) Publicity against removals 1982.
242.	3. Vinks Rivier 1057	1975 plan	Under threat; released land and freehold as 241.

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>STANGER</u>			
243.	1. Prospect	SAIRR list	Under threat but a small group of tenants moved to Bulwer Trust farm 1980, through PNAB and landowners it seems. (Fieldwork) Pop. put at 16 landowners, 3 005 total pop. (Official 1980)
244.	2. Lot 9B Deepdale	SAIRR list	244-247: appear from Hansards that none have been moved yet, but fieldwork required to confirm.
245.	3. Lot 10 Shootershill	SAIRR list	
246.	4. Lot 13A/Hlawukana	SAIRR list	
247.	5. Trevalis Lot 54, 56	SAIRR list	
248.	6. Driefontein	SAIRR list	Under threat. (Fieldwork)
249.	7. Kruisfontein Lot 4	SAIRR list	Under threat. Houses numbered. (Fieldwork)
- 250.	8. Sebastopol	SAIRR list	Moved 1972; pop. 25. (Hansard, 1980)
251.	9. Shakaskraal/Nkobongo	SAIRR list	Under threat; adjoins Groutville, no. 252 below. Pop. est. 212 hh.
252.	10. Groutville, including: Groutville Township Etete Ntshaweni Memorial Charlottedale Thembeni Lloyds Melville Cranbrook Gledhow (Kwavuzanyano, Nkukwini)	1975 plan	Under threat in terms of 1975 consolidation plans but opposition, including intervention of KZ administration in 1979 led to suspension of immediate threat; no definite promise of reprieve, however. Township pop. c. 900 hh on plots sold off by Congregational Mission from 1856. Etete some indian landowners. Large influx of tenants into these communities; total pop. est. at c. 20 000. Living conditions very poor; cholera outbreak 1981/82. PNAB has numbered tenant hh and local residents feel threat of removal as real, with dates of 1982/83 being suggested by them and Bulwer Trust Farm or Langspruit as likely relocation place. (Fieldwork)
T 253.	11. Sakamkanya	Fieldwork	Most tenants moved to Bulwer Trust Farm 1980/81; pop. put at 308 in 1980. (Official, 1980) Landowners remain.
T 254.	12. Sans Souci	Fieldwork	Most tenants moved to Bulwer Trust Farm 1980/81; pop. put at 485 in 1980. (Official, 1980) Landowners remain.
<u>UMZINTO</u>			
- 255.	1. The Cape 10644	SAIRR list	Moved 1974; pop. 287. (Hansard, 1980) Land bought by a sugar company; and used for labour.
- 256.	2. Headlands Sub B 10537	SAIRR list	Moved 1973; pop. 287. (Hansard, 1980) Headlands planted under sugar by same sugar co. as bought The Cape and some former residents now working on it.
- 257.	3. Sub C The Rock 10490	SAIRR list	Moved 1972; pop. 67 acc. Hansard 1980 but some people still living there, under threat, houses numbered. Sugar company apparently wanting land. Landowner already compensated. (Fieldwork)

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>UMZINTO (continued)</u>			
- 258.	4. Sub 2 AW S9 7454 and Rem A	SAIRR list	Moved 1972; pop. 130 (Hansard, 1980) Tenants to Mysieland; landowner compensated with Lot CY Turton. (Fieldwork)
- 259.	5. Umkomanzi Drift 1357	SAIRR list	Both 259 and 260 moved c. 1974, and apparently no alternative accommodation offered. To make way for indian Group Areas, incl. township of Craigieburn, procl. 1972. Some people moved themselves to Willowglen Township; others moved to Magabeni were regarded as squatters.
- 260.	6. Woodlands Lodge 2364	SAIRR list	
C 261.	7. Helmsley 8781	SAIRR list	261-263 not yet moved and possible that could be incorporated into a consolidated KZ.
C 262.	8. 5583 Sub 1 C10; Sub 2; Rem of 3; Sub 4 - 8; Rem.	SAIRR list	
C 263.	9. Powell 3927	SAIRR list	
C 264.	10. The Goat 7761	SAIRR list	Section bought by SADT 1940. Not yet moved but houses numbered; 1980 Govt Gazette schedule called for those claiming to be owners to submit evidence, to sort out title. Some speculation that area could be incorporated into consolidated KZ. (Fieldwork)
? 265.	11. Santombi 9755	SAIRR list	Not traced.
? 266.	12. B of C6 5734	SAIRR list	Not traced.
? 267.	13. AB 28834	SAIRR list	Not traced. Not on local GG list of bs in 1981, so possibly moved or to be incorporated.
268.	14. The Stick 6984	SAIRR list	10 ha bought by white 1976; rest not yet moved. (Fieldwork) Confusion re property nos. - SAIRR list gives 9220, local GG 1981 list gives 6984. (These properties adjoin on map.)
269.	15. Lot 60 Umtwalume 3476	Local GG	Not yet moved; on local GG list of bs.
270.	16. B6 8612	Local GG	270 to 273 all on local GG list of bs, 1981, but future status unclear.
271.	17. Farm B2A 8034	Local GG	
272.	18. BB2 12218	Local GG	
273.	19. Guliga 7942	Local GG	
Note: Consolidation plans for area appear to be uncertain and this affects future of these bs. Role of sugar companies in moving onto expropriated bs reminiscent of coal companies in north, in Newcastle and Dundee districts.			
<u>UNDERBERG</u>			
- 274.	1. Larance 9230	SAIRR list	Moved 1969 to Roberts Farm, Mpendle, to make way for Vergelegen Forest Reserve. Desmond refers to 1 370 people from Upper Mkomazi moved; this could include both 275 and 161.

122

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>UNDERBERG</u> (continued)			
- 275.	2. 9590		Appears was moved with 274 and with no. 161 above. (Fieldwork) This was released but freehold land as 281 to 289.
- 276.	3. The Uplands 5771	SAIRR list	No trace of it now and appears was moved although not listed in any Hansards. Near Stepmore/Bucklands (see under Mpendle) and local people not familiar with it now. (Fieldwork)
- 277.	4. The Swamp 5741	SAIRR list	Moved to Compensation 1978; c. 700 pop. Hansard that moved 1976, 125 pop. incorrect.
- 278.	5. Hogback 5220	SAIRR list	Appears was moved but details lacking. (Fieldwork)
T 279.	6. Kwapitela FP 334 A and 334 B 9819	SAIRR list	Tenants moved to Compensation July 1981; c. 630 pop. 4 landowner families still to be expropriated and moved pending settlement of estate of deceased original purchaser. Farm bought by P. Hlophe 1900 at public auction; subseq. sub-divided into A and B 1904.
280.	7. Colville FP 313 9223	SAIRR list	Under threat March 1982, apparently imminent. (Fieldwork)
281.	8. FP 190 9152	1975 plan	281 to 289 under threat in terms of 1975 consolidation plans; all released but freehold lands. No numbers on houses and people do not appear to regard threat as imminent although some loose rumours circulating. Many of these properties are very small and appears a few families own most of the properties.
282.	9. 6004	1975 plan	
283.	10. 6467	1975 plan	
284.	11. Tunis Farm 11646	1975 plan	
285.	12. 7176	1975 plan	
286.	13. 7177	1975 plan	
287.	14. 7178	1975 plan	
288.	15. 7720	1975 plan	
289.	16. 11796	1975 plan	
290.	17. The Kloof 11970	1975 plan	290 to 318 are also threatened with removal in terms of consolidation plans of 1975, but very preliminary fieldwork indicates threat not recognised locally. Precise details on all these properties lacking; released and freehold land but some may be Trust, on further investigation. Bushside and Stoffelton/Sitofela freehold and names appear to describe wider area than simply the surveyed farms of that name. Adjacent, in Bulwer magisterial district are number of what appear to be Trust farms, also released and threatened by 1975 plans.
291.	18. 9073	1975 plan	
292.	19. Bushside 10797	1975 plan	
293.	20. FP 323	1975 plan	
294.	21. 5624	1975 plan	
295.	22. 5625	1975 plan	
296.	23. 11934	1975 plan	
297.	24. 11424	1975 plan	
298.	25. 3962/5962 (Topo-cadastral maps 1959 and 1978 disagree)	1975 plan	
299.	26. 8931	1975 plan	
300.	27. 5587	1975 plan	
301.	28. 7814/7914	1975 plan	
302.	29. 12212	1975 plan	
303.	30. 11453	1975 plan	
304.	31. 10705	1975 plan	
305.	32. 7872	1975 plan	
306.	33. 7646	1975 plan	
307.	34. 8964	1975 plan	

NO. DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION CURRENT POSITION

<u>UNDERBERG</u> (continued)			
308.	35. 7645		1975 plan
309.	36. Stoffelton/Sitofela S3 5144		1975 plan
310.	37. S4 5059		1975 plan
311.	38. 7429		1975 plan
312.	39. 8956		1975 plan
313.	40. 5141		1975 plan
314.	41. 8955		1975 plan
315.	42. 5171		1975 plan
316.	43. Stephendale 4118		1975 plan
317.	44. 5801		1975 plan
318.	45. 7624		1975 plan

Note: Hansard 1980 lists under Underberg a bs 'Utrecht' with pop. of 4 242, moved in 1976. No property by this name has been traced in the Underberg district and it seems that this is a typographical error and that instead of referring to a bs, 'Utrecht', it refers to the magisterial district of that name. See 321 below.

281 to 318 fall within the same block of released land as that listed for Mpendle 170 to 214 and the consolidation threat they face is the same.

<u>UTRECHT</u>			
- 319.	1. Klipspruit	SAIRR list	319 & 320 both moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969) From topo-cadastral map appears that these are Kingsley and Kingsley smallholdings as listed on the SAIRR list.
- 320.	2. Groenvlei	SAIRR list	
- 321.	3. ?	Hansard 1980	Hansard 1980 lists 4 242 as moved from Utrecht in 1976; name of farm not listed but fieldwork has led to contact with individuals who were moved from the Kingsley/Blood River at about this time. See note on Underberg, above.
<u>VERULAM</u>			
C 322.	1. Groenberg 844	SAIRR list	Farm is owned by indians, a white company and africans. Appears that african section falls within released land and unlikely to be moved.
? 323.	2. Amatikwe	SAIRR list	Not traced.
? 324.	3. Inanda 818	SAIRR list	Position very confusing as name Inanda applied to wide area, not only the surveyed freehold farm west of Verulam by that name. This farm outside released area and owned by white, indian and african people. Status not clear, but still listed as african-owned 1980. (Fieldwork)
- 325.	4. Nuwe Plaas/New Farm	SAIRR list	Moved early 1970s to make way for Group Areas township of Phoenix, Durban. Possible pop. 60 000 ? (Fieldwork)
? 326.	5. Redcliffe/Roodekrans 828	SAIRR list	Appears only white and indian owners by 1980; position not clear.

NO.	DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY	SOURCE OF CLASSI- FICATION	CURRENT POSITION
<u>VERULAM</u> (continued)			
? 327.	6. Grangetown	SAIRR list	Not traced.
C 328.	7. Amaotana	SAIRR list	Falls within released area but some tenants have been moved, 1980/81 as squatters, & others threatened with eviction.
C 329.	8. Amaoti	SAIRR list	Released area but harassment of tenants as 328.
? 330.	9. Cottonlands	SAIRR list	Falls outside released area but position not known.
<p>Note: Position in this area very complex and more research is necessary to untangle land ownership and occupation. Very dense informal settlements on released, freehold and reserve land have come under strong pressure from the local and central authorities. See report on Inanda site and service scheme (Case studies) for more information.</p>			
<u>VRYHEID</u>			
- 331.	1. Voorslag, part of Bellevue 25	SAIRR list	Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969)
- 332.	2. Apologie	Hansard 1969	Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969)
- 333.	3. Schaapkopje/Besters-spruit	Hansard 1969	Moved to Mondlo & some to Vryheid township c. 1963 under very poor conditions. Had been within municipal area of Vryheid. Lots sold to africans from 1904. 2 500 - 3 000 pop. moved.
<u>VOLKSRUST</u>			
- 334.	1. Charlestown	Hansard 1980	Moved 1960s to Osizweni. Hansard 1980 states 8 148 moved from Charlestown 1978.
2. SUMMARY OF FREEHOLD PROPERTIES REMOVED 1948 - 1982			
BERGVILLE	0		
BULWER	2	Lot FP 218; Dronkvlei	
CAMPERDOWN	3	Uitzoek; Bergvliet; Hammarsdale	
DANNHAUSER	12	Gardens; Crane Valley; Loch Lomond; Koppie Alleen; Jubilee; West Hesselton; East Hesselton; Siwangu; Wykeham; Waagalles; Cardwill; name not known	
DUNDEE	12	Longlands; Menteith; Boschhoek; Lyell; Meran; Williamsgeeluk; Mooispruit; Ruigtefontein; van Rooyen; Raemoir A; Raemoir 1; Italianu	
DURBAN	1	Chateau Estates	
ESHOWE	0		
ESTCOURT	0		
HARDING	1	Klaas	
HELPMEKAAR	4	Nietgedag 1; Nietgedag 2; Mali; Trosa	
IXOPO	7	Lot ZZ 6831; S72 5222; S BP 7892; S DA 7185; ES 7999; BO 77649; BA 8146	
KLIPRIVER	13	Steincoalspruit tenants; Roosboom; Good Hope; Welcome; Trekboer; Doone; Rietkuil; Khumalosville; Kirkintilloch; Vulandondo; Hobsland; Wasbank 1076; Umbulwane tenants	

MEIMOTH
MOUNT CURRIE

MPENDLE
NEWCASTLE

NEW HANOVER
NGOTSHE
PIETERMARITZBURG
PORT SHEPSTONE
RICHMOND
STANGER
UMZINTO

UNDERBERG

UTRECHT
VERULAM
VRYHEID
VOLKSRUST

TOTAL

3. SUMMARY OF FREEHOLD PROPERTIES UNDER THREAT (JUNE 1982)

BERGVILLE

BULWER

CAMPERDOWN
DANNHAUSER
DUNDEE
ESHOWE
ESTCOURT
HARDING

HELPMEKAAR
IXOPO

KLIPRIVER

MEIMOTH
MOUNT CURRIE

0	
15	Annex Riverlands; Riverlands; part of Pakkies; Pofaddershoek; Spioenkop; Treurfontein; Blydefontein; Swartbooiokop; Alwinrein; Lundi; Vogelvlei; Tappaansfontein; Poortkraal; Kraaikop; Willeary
1	FP 149
7	Bulwerton; Milton; Vreda; Lennoxton; Fairleigh; Thokozeni; Annandale
1	Albert Falls Village
0	
3	Ockertskraal; Hollingwood; New Scotland Road
3	The Patch; Roselands; Ballaraat
1	Inhlazukaview
3	Sebastapol; Sakamkanya tenants; Sans Souci tenants
6	The Cape; Headlands; The Rock; 7454; Umkomanzi Drift; Woodlands Lodge
6	Larance; 9590; The Uplands; The Swamp; Hogback; Kwapitela tenants
3	Klipspruit; Groenvlei; name not known
1	Nuwe Plaas
3	Voorslag; Apologie; Besterspruit
1	Charlestown
109	TOTAL ESTIMATED POPULATION: 100 000
3. SUMMARY OF FREEHOLD PROPERTIES UNDER THREAT (JUNE 1982)	
13	Nooitgedacht/Acton Homes; Klipplaatsfontein/Hanbrook; Earthcote/Hanbrook; Bethany 4977; Bethany 4976; Woodford; Langkloof; Rooihoek/Malota's Kraal; Wittekop; Howe; Ingula; Riebokspruit; Greenpoint
6	Lot IG 6413; Alderney/Marwaga; Lot GR/Marwaga; Free State; Beersheba; Tarr's Valley
1	Valschriver
0	
0	
0	
4	Itendele; Lots 1 - 5; Thembalihle; Cornfields
13	Mount Nebo; Dilingile; Nongoboza; Lot A Umgigimini; Janyana; Eureka; FC 5807; Lot R 7747, Lot 7A 6400; Tridale; Enqabeni; GH 8133; Umbelline
0	
17	Bartman; S 56 7959; S 57 8157; S 58 7550; S 36 9327; S 31 9284; S 71 5269; S 73; S 75 5374; S 74; BN 7976; BL; BI 7740; BQ 8475; BR 7340; Lot S 29 9026; EO 6629
14	Iusitania; Ndonyane; Matiwane's Kop; Jonono's Kop; Steincoalspruit landowners; Balderskraal; Driefontein; Kleinfontein; Doornhoek; Burford; Rooival/Watersmeet; Roodepoort; Riversdale; Umbulwane
1	Mfanifile
1	part of Pakkies

MPENDLE	53	Maitland; The Ridge; Otley; Hlatimba; 5407; FP 178 9494; 11248; 6893; 11659; 6003; Greenhill; 8438; 11782; 11269; 8499; 6229; NE 2 14532; 7345; Bucklands 5615; Bucklands 7508; GR 9 7450; Stepmore FP 154 A; Stepmore FP 154 B; Rutland; The Gorge; Peak Farm; Westlynn; 8841; The Crescent; 11576; Kilkenny; 5954; 6002; 4604; 5510; FP 138 7860; 9480; 10892; 8525; 9405; 9395; The Glen; 8901; 10722; 5627; 10740; 11725; 9148; 5753; 5801; 8666; 8111; 13527
NEWCASTLE	0	
NEW HANOVER	3	Broughton; Camelhoek; Trust Feeds
NGOTSHE	1	Mooiplaats
PIETERMARITZBURG	1	Hopewell
PINETOWN	1	St Wendolins
PORT SHEPSTONE	1	Fairview
RICHMOND	2	Newlands; Vinks Rivier
STANGER	11	Prospect; Deepdale; Shootershill; Hlawukana; Trevalis; Driefontein; Kruisfontein; Shakaskraal; Groutville; Sakamkanya landowners; Sans Souci land-owners
UMZINTO	6	The Stick; Umtwalume; B 6 8612; Farm B 2 A 8034; BB2 12218; Guliga
UNDERBERG	40	Kwapitela tenants; Colville; FP 190 9152; 6004; 6467; Tunis Farm; 7176; 7177; 7178; 7720; 11796; The Kloof; 9073; Bushside; FP 323; 5624; 5625; 11934; 11424; 3962/5962; 8931; 5587; 7814/7914; 12212; 11453; 10705; 7872; 7646; 8964; 7645; Stoffelton; S 4 5059; 7429; 8956; 5141; 8955; 5171; Stephensdale; 5801; 7624
UTRECHT	0	
VERULAM	0	But 5 are freehold properties whose present status is not clear
VRYHEID	0	
VOLKSRUST	0	
TOTAL	189	TOTAL ESTIMATED POPULATION : 230 000

4. FREEHOLD PROPERTIES LIKELY TO BE / HAVE BEEN CONSOLIDATED (JUNE 1982)

ESHOWE	1	Amanda
ESTCOURT	1	Middelton
HELPMEKAAR	1	Uitval
IXOPO	10	Umgodi; Lot AU 8164; Umhlabatyan; Hillside; Hlokozi; Lot BW 8972; Cleveland; Lot CW 9361; Umgodi; Lot GD 12411
MOUNT CURRIE	2	Polygon; Simpson
MPENDLE	1	Crowle
NEW HANOVER	1	Appelsbosch
PIETERMARITZBURG	2	Slangspruit; Wilgefontein
PORT SHEPSTONE	1	Riverside
UMZINTO	4	Helmsley; 5583; Powell; The Goat
VERULAM	3	Groenberg; Amaotana; Amaoti
TOTAL	27	

5. STATUS NOT KNOWN (June 1982)

Further fieldwork necessary.

BERGVILLE	1	Bulwer 5034
HARDING	1	Horseshoe
IXOPO	5	Umyesa; Lot DW Sub B; Lot FF; Lot EY; Lots 1 - 5
UMZINTO	3	Santombi; B of C 65734; AB 28834
VERULAM	5	Amatikwe; Inanda Farm; Grangetown; Cottonlands; Redcliffe



6. Summary of mission black spots, 1948-1982

INTRODUCTION

The information on mission-owned black spots is far scantier than that on african freehold properties and the following summary is not, therefore, regarded as comprehensive. This is a subject requiring further investigation, not simply for its academic interest but because in many instances the churches on whose land these communities are established need to be awakened to their social responsibilities towards them.

The black spots listed here refer to rent-paying, agriculturally-based african communities that have developed on mission-owned properties that do not fall inside scheduled or released areas. They have many features in common with the freehold properties previously listed, but title is vested in the mission, not the occupants of the land. These properties were previously acquired by the churches in one of two ways:

- 1) The various churches or mission societies bought these properties, generally in the 19th century, on behalf of their african congregations - often with money raised by these congregations - in order to establish mission communities;
- 2) Individual Zulu kings or chiefs allowed various churches or mission societies to establish missions on tribal land in the 19th century, so that they would establish schools etc. to benefit their people. Subsequently the Colonial or Union Governments deeded these properties to the churches and not to the african residents who, in many cases, had been living there since before the churches arrived.

Mission black spots need to be distinguished from mission reserves, the origins of which have already been described in Part One - unlike the mission reserves they were not scheduled in 1913. They also need to be distinguished from church farms, i.e. from church-owned properties which are run as farms along commercial lines - although in some instances, e.g. KwaMagwaza, no. 336 below, the distinction may be blurred. The status of africans living on these commercial farms is that of farm workers, not tenants, and the purpose of the farms is to produce an income for church or mission funds. There appear to be many more of these kinds of properties than there are mission black spots. The Hermannsburg Mission Society, a Lutheran society and historically the major church landowner in Natal, owns 36 farms scattered throughout the province, although concentrated mainly in the northern districts of Vryheid and Ngotshe. (9 other farms once owned by the Society have been sold). Of these 36 it appears that only a few still support mission communities, although far more fieldwork and research would be necessary to confirm and detail this. The Roman Catholic Church too appears to have a large number of commercial farms across Natal.

It appears that a number of commercial farms have been or are being developed by various churches out of land that formerly housed established mission communities. In some instances former african residents and tenants of this land have been given the choice of either becoming farm workers for the mission or of being evicted. In other instances the mission has simply encroached on the land set aside for its congregation until all or some of the tenant households have left of their own volition.

As tenants, residents on missions which the authorities have declared black spots are even more vulnerable than their counterparts on african freehold farms. The church is the legal landowner and thus, in terms of the law, all negotiations about expropriation and compensation take place between the government and the church and may and frequently do by-pass the occupants of the land entirely. There are instances where the affected church has fought for the rights and future of its mission community. There are, however, also cases where the church has completely ignored its responsibilities to its congregation - who have contributed to the development of the property - and treated expropriation purely as a business transaction, willingly co-operating with the authorities and diverting compensation not to the people who have thus been deprived of their land but into central revenue funds. In our fieldwork we have come across several instances where churches have taken the initiative in evicting their tenants (so that they can farm the land for their own profit) and have sheltered behind the justification that in terms of government policy they have had no alternative. There are also cases where the church has been ignorant of the implications of expropriation and compensation and allowed removals to go through by default.

1. MISSION BLACK SPOTS 1948 - 1982

In the following summary the properties are grouped not according to magisterial district, but according to the denomination of the mission involved. The numbers on the extreme left follow on from the cumulative numbering system used in the previous summary on african freehold properties. It should be stressed again that these figures are not complete; the properties listed here are ones SPP has come across in the course of fieldwork. Only further research can show how incomplete they are.

NO.	DENOMINATION PROPERTY AND NEAREST TOWN	CURRENT POSITION
<u>ANGLICAN</u>		
- 335.	1. Bivane, Paulpietersburg	Moved to Bilanyoni c. 1970; about 50 population.
336.	2. KwaMagwaza, Melmoth	Under threat but consolidation uncertainty in district has meant threat not immed. Establ. as mission community on land granted by Mpande, but in 20th century registered as farm; tenants technically farm workers & sec. school had to close. 1957 GG limited pop. to 60 hh & building prohibited, leading to overcrowding & out-migration of younger people.
337.	3. St Chad's, Ladysmith	Under immed. threat, to make way for Ezakheni expansion. 184 hh, 6 000 acres. GG wanting to buy but church unwilling to sell. Local community opposed to removal. School to be closed & moved to Imbali.

NO. DENOMINATION
PROPERTY AND NEAREST
TOWN

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND

338. 1. Impolweni,
New Hanover
- Under general threat but not seen as such locally. Est. 500 hh in several sections. Residents claim they paid for land originally; court case re ownership in early 20th cent. won by church. Rent R21 p.a. with stock (2 beasts max.) or R15 p.a. Very inadequate water in some sections and attempts by community organisations to deal with this have encountered blocks.
- 339. 2. New Scotland Road,
Pietermaritzburg
(See 231 above)
- Moved to Polltax Farm c. 1969. Properties owned by both mission and indian and african landowners (hence listed under freehold bs too). c. 250 people in all affected. See also Appendix 2, Group Areas.

LUTHERAN⁺

- C 340. 1. Emangweni,
Estcourt
H.M.S.
- Likely to be consolidated tho' status adjacent reserves not finalised. Approx. 200 hh. Rent R10 p.a. (fields) or R6 p.a. (no fields); 2 cattle per hh max. Prev. covered much larger area but large pieces apparently sold off; is claimed that some of original missionaries acquired private title to parts. H.M.S. has handed over admin. to black Lutheran church.
- 341. 2. Georgenau,
New Hanover
H.M.S.
- Moved c. 10 yrs ago; details not known.
- 342. 3. Inyane,
Melmoth
- Sold to white farmer c. 1980 & closed down. Small pop. had to move.
343. 4. Isihlengeni,
Gluckstad
- Under threat. Houses apparently numbered 1970s & people warned would be moved to Paulpietersburg area.
344. 5. Khumalo's Kraal,
Gluckstad
H.M.S.
- Under threat; 50 - 60 hh. H.M.S. farms some of land; appears it wants to farm all commercially (cotton) & strong rumours locally that either move/become farm workers. Rent R15 p.a. Stock limited to 7 cattle max. and fields to 2 ha per hh.
- ? 345. 6. KwaMondi,
Eshowe
N.M.S.
- Status not known.
346. 7. Mfule,
Melmoth
N.M.S.
- Under threat. Houses numbered 1981 without warning but appears (temp.) reprieve; c. 56 hh. Rent: R5 p.a., house, + R5 p.a., fields. Stock at R1,50 per head p.a.
- 347. 8. Nazareth,
Dundee
H.M.S.
- Removed c. 1968/69 with Limehill removals. c. 300 pop.

⁺ The following abbreviations are used to distinguish the different Lutheran Mission Societies that own property (where the Society has been established): B.M.S. - Berlin Mission Society; H.M.S. - Hermannsberg Mission Society; N.M.S. - Norwegian Mission Society. As already pointed out, the H.M.S. certainly owns many more properties than listed here but it is not known how many if any of them do or used to house communities.

CURRENT POSITION

NO. DENOMINATION
PROPERTY AND NEAREST
TOWN

LUTHERAN (continued)

- 348. 9. Nkindini,
Melmoth
- ? 349. 10. Nkombe,
Melmoth
- 350. 11. Rietbult/Gombe,
Winterton
H.M.S.
351. 12. Rosenstein,
Bergville
B.M.S.
352. 13. Stendahl,
Weenen
B.M.S.
353. 14. Zedelingspost,
(Luneburg)
Paulpietersburg
H.M.S.

Denomination not certain. Moved 'a long time ago' and school closed.

? Under threat.

15 hh given notice 1981 - H.M.S. claimed under pressure from GG. Subsequently, after some outside intervention, H.M.S. directed them to no. 340 above.

Was under threat from Woodstock Dam. B.M.S. expropriated by GG & B.M.S. made no provisions for tenants, neither altern. land nor a share of compensation. Intervention of local Ad Hoc Committee, repr. Bergville bs and local reserve communities, has led to apparent reprieve. Hh can stay on unflooded land - 7 have to move to above floodline. Much agric. land lost, however. Long-term future of area in view of consol. planning not assured.

Sold to citrus estate late 1978 & 5 hh given notice early 1980. After outside intervention, reprieve reported.

Under threat since 1975 by H.M.S. which attempting evict tenants. Latter claimed they the rightful owners since site allocated to H.M.S. by Mpande in c. 1870, to establish a mission to benefit people who kept usufructuary rights in terms of Zulu customary law. Court case followed, 1979 - 1981, Tvl Supreme Ct (J. Shongwe & others vs H.M.S. & others) which H.M.S. won. Subseq. H.M.S. has stated that threatened residents will not be moved after all, possibly in response to some external pressure. Future not assured, however.

Removed to Limehill, July 1968, 220 pop.

METHODIST

- 354. 1. Evansdale,
Dundee

ROMAN CATHOLIC

- 355. 1. Alva,
Dundee
- 356. 2. Amakhasi,
Dundee
- 357. 3. Dumbe,
Paulpietersburg
358. 4. Inhlazuka,
Richmond
- P 359. 5. Mariannhill,
Pinetown

Removed to Uitval c. 1968, 270 pop.

Removed 1968 to Uitval, 2 miles away, c. 12 hh + 80 pop. Church allowed to keep 50 out of 500 acres. School closed.

Removed to Bilanyoni, early 1970s, c. 6 hh. Possibly still some resident farm workers.

Appears this mission adjoined bs 238 which was sold to the mission in 1965 and removed. In last 10 yrs c. 120 hh evicted off farms have moved onto the mission.

Mission-owned land expropriated c 1980 and many tenants as individ. hh moved to KwaDabeka and KwaNdengezi. Area not cleared entirely & residents trying win reprieve from Group Areas Board. See St Wendolins case study in Part Four for details.

NO.	DENOMINATION PROPERTY AND NEAREST TOWN	CURRENT POSITION
<u>ROMAN CATHOLIC</u> (continued)		
360.	6. Mariathal, Ixopo	Under threat. Rumours 8/10 yrs ago would be moved to Location 5 but not carried through.
- 361.	7. Maria Ratschitz, Wasbank	Removed to Limehill 1968, 385 pop. Mission abandoned but apparently not yet expropriated. Reports of coal prospecting.
362.	8. Reichenau, Himeville	Under threat, 80 hh. Properties not numbered but near the Swamp which moved 1978. Primary school, fenced common & c. 500 head of cattle in all.
- 363.	9. St Francis Xavier, Durban (The Bluff)	Removed late 1940s, early 1950s, several thousand people, many of them part of Zanzibari community, to Umlazi mainly. Church then sold most of land - only church building left. For more details see Informal Settlements.

2. SUMMARY OF MISSION BLACK SPOTS REMOVED 1948 - 1982

ANGLICAN	1 Bivane
CHURCH OF SCOTLAND	1 New Scotland Road
LUTHERAN	5 Georgenau, Inyane, Nazareth, Nkindini, Rietbult/Gombe
METHODIST	1 Evansdale
ROMAN CATHOLIC	6 Alva, Amakhasi, Dumbe, Mariannhill (part), Maria Ratschitz, St Francis Xavier
TOTAL	14

3. SUMMARY OF MISSION BLACK SPOTS UNDER THREAT (JUNE 1982)

ANGLICAN	2 KwaMagwaza, St Chads
CHURCH OF SCOTLAND	1 Impolweni
LUTHERAN	6 Isihlengeni, Khumalo's Kraal, Mfule, Rosenstein, Stendahl, Zedelingspost
ROMAN CATHOLIC	4 Inhlazuka, Mariannhill (part), Mariathal, Reichenau
TOTAL	13

4. STATUS NOT KNOWN

- 2 KwaMondi, Nkrombe (both Lutheran)

5. LIKELY TO BE CONSOLIDATED

- 1 Emangweni (Lutheran)

Appendix 1. Naunlu report, 8.06.62

LADYSMITH AND DUNDEE AGREE ON COMPENSATORY LAND FOR 'BLACK SPOTS'

THE plan of the Natal Agricultural Union to work in close liaison with the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development in settling the land requirements of the Native Trust, district by district, in block deals, got under way last week when agreement was reached among farmers at both Ladysmith and Dundee as to what European land to offer in exchange for the elimination of "black spots" in those districts. A spirit of reasonableness prevailed at the meetings and the president of the N.A.U., Mr. G. A. van Rooyen, congratulated those present on the "wise and responsible decisions taken".

At Ladysmith representatives of seven associations agreed to the sale of five European-occupied farms, together with portions of two others if necessary, in return for the elimination of certain "black spots" enumerated by the Department of Bantu Administration totalling 25,000 acres. The sale of these properties was agreed to on condition:-

- That they be used solely for the removal of "black spots";
- That the transactions and negotiations be expedited in order to enable the farmers who have sacrificed their land to make alternate arrangements at the earliest opportunity;
- That permanent boundaries now be established in the Klip River district between European and Bantu occupied land;
- That proper farming measures and soil conservation practices be applied regardless of whether the farms will in fact remain as Bantu-owned property;
- That an effective buffer zone be created around the Bantu areas.

DUNDEE
At the Dundee meeting it was agreed to offer eleven European-occupied farms as compensatory land for the removal of some 15,500 acres of "black spots". The following stipulations were made:

- That these farms be utilised for the elimination of the "black spots" listed by the Department of Bantu Administration and that no further purchase of land for Bantu settlement in the Dundee district be considered;
- That the mission stations in the district also be moved to this new land;
- That the transactions and negotiations be expedited in order to enable the farmers to acquire replacing land at the earliest

opportunity;

- That the areas be declared as Betterment Areas and that the proper farming and soil conservation practices be applied;
- That an effective buffer zone be created;
- That adequate provision be made for squatters who will have to be moved from the "black spots" in the process of elimination.


ESTCOURT
At a meeting of farmers' associations in the Estcourt district, held to discuss the elimination of "black spots" in the district and

the establishment of a Bantu township, no final decision was reached. Owners of land in which the Department is interested are not desirous of selling and there was opposition to increasing the amount of Bantu-occupied land in water catchment areas.

Two sub-committees were appointed to work out a solution:

One from the Estcourt Farmers' Association to investigate, and report back within one month, on a suitable site for a Bantu township; and

One from the farmers' associations at Estcourt, Colenso and Weenen, to investigate the elimination of "black spots" and to recommend suitable land for this purpose within three months. The latter committee will consider a proposition put forward relating to the land situated north of the road between Colenso and Weenen in the district of Estcourt.



Appendix 2. Memorandum from Lusitania syndicate, a threatened black spot

FEBRUARY 1982

MEMORANDUM OF LUSITANIA SYNDICATE

INTRODUCTION:- Lusitania is a black-owned farm on a white district - a "Black-spot" in the centre of white farmers as described by the now said government. It is some 8 km from Cundycleugh and 13 km near Collins-Pass (on the border of the Orange Free State and Natal) in the district of Klip-River, the magisterial district of Ladysmith, Natal.

The land is approximately 1 165 ha in area, well watered, with the Sundays River running through one end of this property on the East, as well as a stream in the centre of our commonage which enters the Sundays River which we use for our stock to drink, as well as irrigation for our homes. It is also well grassed and relatively free from soil erosion. This property also has a lot of water-fountains here and there all over the land and on the mountain-side. This water we use for our food and drinking consumption and it is very clean water. We are a very peaceful rural community. There is also a big natural forest on the mountain-side with all different indigenous trees of many kinds; wild animals, big and small, enjoy their life here i.e. Buck, birds, snakes, snails etc.

All kinds of fruit trees grow very well at this place, e.g orchards of oranges, lemons, nartjies, peaches, plums, pears, apricots, grapes, guavas, etc., and we use these for our family consumption and supply our nearest fruit-shops and supermarkets, as well as some farmers near us come and buy these fruits. There is a main road from Ladysmith to Newcastle on the boundary of our commonage and family freehold lands. This road goes through our place. It is easy for us to go to Ladysmith, Newcastle and Dannhauser with the value of this road.

HISTORY:- The farm was bought from Mr Chomerald Marais by 20 (twenty) landowners shortly after the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, at a Public-Auction at Ladysmith, Klip River District, and was surveyed amongst the twenty. It was then sub-divided into a commonage on the mountain side, and family Free-hold lands on the eastern side. On these freehold lands each of the twenty landowners has his own Title Deed. The commonage is approximately 380 ha, and the twenty each have equal shares in this commonage. Lusitania has its General Title Deed of which the landowners are the rightful heirs, with approximately 40 ha to each holder.

The first buyers were Ndabambi, Mavuso and Mtityane Mahlambi. The Syndicate had a Chief Trustee and two other Trustees. Up to now this place is still under 3 Trustees and their 6 Committee members.

The last of our fathers died in December 1972, Rev. Eliam Hadebe. On the death of our fathers, some willed to their sons, and a few sold their shares, now bringing the total number to twenty-eight landowners. We also have tenants at this place, approximately eighty households, with an additional eleven at the commonage. This brings the total to one hundred and nineteen kraals and families at this farm, who will suffer if removed.

HISTORY OF RESETTLEMENT:- In 1964 the Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal invited us to a meeting, where we were called a "Black-spot" which in terms of Departmental policy will have to be eliminated in due course. In the very same year the Government

Officials visited Lusitania to inform us we were to be counted and the Deeds of Transfer should be made straight, to the heirs amongst everybody at Lusitania. Since then we have heard nothing from the Officials but we know the plan is to remove us, along with Matiwane's Kop etc. We discussed this and agree that we do not want to be moved.

TENANTS' LAND:- Tenants have an average quarter ha residential plot for growing their crops. No tenants are self-supporting on their land, but their agricultural lands add to income derived from wage employment. Their standard of living is high.

IMPROVEMENTS:- There is mixture of concrete block, wattle and daub huts and stone houses. There is a school building, concrete Dipping tanks and domesticated wattle and Gum trees as well as Palm trees etc. All households have put in other improvements i.e. fencing, toilets, cattle kraals, fruit trees. As well we have sub-divided our Common-age for grazing. It has been fenced very well, with the graveyard on the same common-age. The value of improvements runs to many thousands of rands.

CROPS:- All of us grow some products, the main crop being maize, plus kaffir-corn, potatoes, beans etc. We make a good living from our land; some of us do not have to work in town.

LIVESTOCK:- There is no limit to the number of cattle. Tenants' cattle varies from 1 to 5 head of cattle, plus goats, horses, pigs and as many poultry as he is able to keep. Total numbers of stock are as follows: cattle 278, 6 horses, 352 goats, 16 sheep, 16 pigs and approximately 800 poultry. Our stock is usually sold to Sales camps, stock brokers and speculators at reasonable prices.

EMPLOYMENT:- Most people who are working are working in town while some are working outside the district. Many are farm labourers or waiters, domestic servants, commercial workers etc. Many of the women and girls work casual or seasonal employment on neighbouring farms.

SCHOOLS:- There is a school (Lower and Higher Primary) up to Standard 5 with 7 teachers and 380 to 400 children. The community is already building and has raised some funds for another continuation (Big Building) for Standard 7, 8, and 9 as they wished. They have donated money every season to raise school-funds. We have our church and want to build a clinic.

CONCLUSION:- We are all well to do here and the place is healthy, with daily transport from Lusitania to Ladysmith. We have lived here for almost 83 years, with our tenants, without quarrels and frictions. You could hardly see a Police van coming in for cases at Lusitania. There are no shebeens and we are peacefully settled. We are friendly with the farmers surrounding us. We are their Fire Brigades, casual workers and seasonal workers. During harvesting season and in destroying unrequired wattle forests we are useful to them and they are useful to us. The owners do not stay on most of the white farms surrounding Lusitania, except for one or two. In most cases these farms are used for their stock grazing, and cultivation for crops and hays in feeding their stocks. There are rich farmers surrounding us, who do not want us to be removed from this place.

We pray we should not be removed from our Lusitania Syndicate.

Lusitania Committee
c/O Lusitania H. P. School
P. O. Box 860
LADYSMITH
3370

Appendix 3. Memorandum from a former landowner

The following memorandum was written in February 1981 by a former landowner at the black spot of Ruigtefontein in the Dundee district. (No. 46 above.) He was relocated to the closer settlement of Ekuvukeni and subsequently tried to buy a piece of land in the threatened Driefontein area west of Ladysmith. (Nos. 131-137 above.) At the time that he wrote this memorandum he did not know that Driefontein had been excised from KwaZulu.

MEMORANDUM

I was born and stayed at Ruigtefontein 1914. It was a freehold property. In 1945 we became under Health Commission of Natal Ordinance No. 20 of 1914 we were notified that Ruigtefontein is declared as Public Health Area of Wasbank from there on we were paying rates for 20 years without service. Any of those who failed to pay these rates, their properties were taken from them, others lost their livestock for failing to pay their rates. In 1963 were taken out of the Health Commission Area of Wasbank Ordinance 30 of 1963. We became a regulated Area so that we must be affected by Act 38 of 1927 as a Black spot.

2. In 1960 there was an inquiry which informed us that we are a black spot, we should remove from Ruigtefontein. Our properties were expropriated by the government in 1968. My property was transferred to the State in 1969 and I did not get my compensation until I fought that through Attorneys and I got it after four years. We were removed to Ekuvukeni, we were told that we are not allowed to plough the land there. We cannot rear any livestock in exception of a dog, cat and fowls. They did not build houses for us, each family was offered a plot of 20 by 20 yards where one can build himself a house. Before we could build, we were offered tin houses which were approximately 42 by 30 ft, they did not mind how many in each family and how much goods they possessed. This was very hard for me to bear especially at this stage because I was living on farming and on livestock. I thought of looking for another place which would help as my old place, because I was used to live on farming.

3. I got a farm although it was not big as the one I had before and not the same as that one and it has no transport to town. Now I am in difficulty of getting the transfer of this farm. This is not from the person who sold to me this property. This difficulty I am having seems to be made by the authorities who are responsible for the removals of the Black Spots because the person who sold me this property is not saying anything against the transfer of the property to me.

(SIGNED)

5. CONSOLIDATION

The consolidation of KwaZulu has been one of the most contentious issues in Natal politics during the 1970s and into the 1980s; it is far from being resolved at the time of writing. At issue is the government's attempt to consolidate the numerous scattered bits and pieces of land that presently make up KwaZulu into a more coherent geo-political entity and, thereby, to lend credibility to the bantustan as a separate political unit. Completion of the process of consolidation of the bantustans has not been a prerequisite for their taking of independence, but consolidation itself is part of the process of shaping 'national states' out of the reserves; it is thus part of the process of withdrawal of South African citizenship from african South Africans.

Political credibility has not, however, been the only issue at stake. The actual shape of the consolidated bantustans and the decisions about what land to leave in and what to leave out have been governed by other, material and strategic interests as well - for instance, in Natal, to keep white control over the Drakensberg water catchment area and white control over the northern coastline. Only two scheduled areas have been moved in terms of consolidation planning to date: Reserve Six, moved in 1976 to make way for the development of Richards Bay town, and a small portion of Reserve Four, moved in 1977/78 to make way for Richards Bay airport - their excision from KwaZulu, the priority accorded to their removal and the actual timing of the moves all determined by the interests of the developers of Richards Bay.

At the time of writing the policy is in a state of flux, if not of crisis. Despite numerous reiterations of commitment to the policy, Pretoria has still not been able to produce an enforceable plan for Natal and its intentions for the future are not clear. Under the circumstances it becomes very difficult to provide a comprehensive overview of consolidation. This chapter looks at the available material under the following headings:

- 1) Numbers of people and areas affected
- 2) Summary of consolidation plans 1955 - 1975
- 3) The financial cost of consolidation
- 4) Opposition to consolidation
- 5) The van der Walt Commission and after
- 6) The Ingwavuma land deal.

1. Numbers of people and areas affected

Few, if any, people are confident about stating exactly how many pieces of KwaZulu there are today because of the constant adjustments being made to its boundaries by means of SADT purchases, black spot removals and the excision and addition of land under its sphere of jurisdiction. However, in 1978 the official planners for KwaZulu stated that the bantustan consisted then of 48 relatively large and 157 very small pieces (Thorington-Smith *et al.*, 1978, vol. 1, 6) - these figures give an indication of the immensity and of the absurdity of the task undertaken by the consolidation planners. KwaZulu is the most fragmented of all the bantustans and any attempt to reduce the number of its separate pieces to the point where it can be claimed to be a single and distinct entity will have to involve massive land swaps between 'KwaZulu' and 'Natal' and, with that,

massive relocation and dislocation of people, almost all of them black.

NUMBERS AFFECTED BY THE 1975 PROPOSALS

In the absence of the van der Walt Commission's report on consolidation, the most concrete set of guidelines to government thinking that we have at the time of writing is that approved by Parliament in 1975. These proposed the political caricature of a ten piece KwaZulu devoid of any of the major economic assets of the province. (See map on p. 146) In 1979 demographers at the University of Natal estimated that at that stage these plans threatened 300 000 african people with removal; they stressed, however, that they were working with limited information. (*Daily News*, 28.06.79) Today SPP estimates that the implementation of the 1975 consolidation proposals would involve the relocation of about 300 000 african people off reserve land alone. This figure does not include the 245 000 people under threat on black spots - so, together, these two aspects of consolidation threaten over half a million people in Natal. The details of the plan are discussed below; a summary of the reserve areas threatened with removal and estimates of the population in each is set out in Appendix One. (For details on the black spots, see the previous chapter.)

Yet although some significant changes to the boundaries of KwaZulu have been made in terms of consolidation planning since 1975, to date relatively little of the removals envisaged at that time have been carried out: at most 10 000 people in Reserve Six (in 1976) and a small portion of Reserve Four (in 1978). A further estimated 150 000 people are living under a particularly serious threat of relocation since their land has already been excised from KwaZulu - over 70 000 people in the Driefontein area near Ladysmith, about 50 000 in the Paulpietersburg area, 20 000 in the rest of Reserve Four and about 700 people near Sodwana Bay; the Minister of Cooperation and Development has refused to commit himself to a timetable for their removal.


At this stage it seems highly unlikely that so enormous and costly a process of demographic manipulation as is contained in the 1975 plan can succeed *in toto*, although the threat to the large numbers of people living in the four excised areas mentioned above is a very real one. Pretoria itself has had second thoughts and, as described below, has been struggling since 1979 to produce a revised blueprint - the proposed Ingwavuma land deal whereby some 96 000 people would be incorporated into Swaziland representing one of the options that it would like to pursue. The situation is probably more fluid now than at any stage in the past; thus any estimate of the numbers of people currently threatened with removal by the consolidation of KwaZulu must be provisional.

2. Summary of consolidation plans, 1955-1975

TOMLINSON COMMISSION

The term 'consolidation' has been used in various contexts for a long time. As far back as 1955, the Tomlinson Commission recommended that consideration be given to consolidating the 'bantustan areas':

Save for a few blocks like the Transkei and Vondaland, the Bantu areas are so scattered that they form no foundation for community growth ... this fragmentation can result in nothing else than a supplementary growth attached to the European community. The fragmentary pattern also results in scattering and consequent incoherence between historically and ethnically related Bantus, and this means that cohesive forces in the social and psychological sphere are paralysed. (UG 61/55, 180-181)



Tomlinson went on to recommend that the 'bantu areas' be consolidated into 7 blocks - a Tswana block, a Venda-Tsonga block, a Pedi block, a Swazi block, a Zulu block, a south-eastern Nguni block and a South Sotho block. He also envisaged incorporating the three British Protectorates of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland into his scheme. He did not draw precise boundaries but demarcated what he termed 'heartlands' as the basis on which these ethnic units should be constructed. Their dimensions are shown on the accompanying map: of note is that these proposals pointed to the incorporation of the Ingwavuma area into an enlarged Swaziland and were also considerably more generous in their allocation of land to blacks than anything proposed by government officials since. In making these recommendations, Tomlinson did not commit himself to any political blueprint beyond stating that in these areas, 'on the basis of the Bantu Authorities Act',

the Bantu themselves will exercise administrative functions to an ever-increasing extent, suited to the normal process of development and according to the demands of the time. (UG 61/55, 207)

The Tomlinson recommendations were far more radical than anything the government was prepared to consider at that stage. Although the then Prime Minister, Dr H.F. Verwoerd, conceded in 1959 that it was possible that the newly created bantustans could achieve independence at some future date, the State was not contemplating either independence or major land adjustments for them with any seriousness. In 1962 the Minister of BAD stated in Parliament

It is the policy of the Government to consolidate the Bantu areas as far as possible. In this process white spots will also be eliminated.

He went on to add, however, that it was impossible to give details 'at this stage' (House of Assembly Debates, col. 3076, 23.03.62): such details did not begin to emerge until the end of the 1960s.

In Natal such land purchases as were made in the early 1960s had little to do with establishing a less fragmented homeland for the Zulu people. They were undertaken in terms of the 1936 quota and geared towards eliminating black spots. Both activities were related to consolidation - the 1936 Development Land and Trust Act stipulated that quota land could only be acquired in areas adjacent to existing scheduled and released lands, and the removal of black spots meant that isolated black farms were being cleared off the map. However, the existence of isolated pockets of scheduled or released land was not seen as a serious problem since the possibility of their ever forming part of an independent state was remote. Such areas which were later to be described as 'badly situated' - Reserve 6 near Richards Bay, the Kambi reserve near Louwsburg, the Groutville farms, for instance - were not yet threatened by the activities of the SADT.

PLANS FOR THE MAKHATHINI FLATS

In the early 1960s the NAU was lobbying strongly for the State land on the Makhathini Flats to be used to fill the outstanding quota of land allocated to the african reserves in Natal in 1936. Since the State lands in Zululand have featured so prominently in the various plans advanced by Pretoria for the consolidation of KwaZulu and, more recently, for the excision of Ingwavuma, it is worth looking at developments in this regions since the 1960s in some detail: this land has long been used as Pretoria's consolidation joker card, to be used to make up whatever suit is needed at the time.

The origins of the State land in Zululand have been described in Part One. The important aspect to note about this land is that although it is classified as State land, it has always formed a continuity with the scheduled reserves that surround it and has been settled by african people since long before whites first came to Natal. When the borders of the Zululand reserves were demarcated by the settler government in 1909, the

people living outside these borders became technically squatters on their own tribal land. As a former Commissioner in the area has made clear, these people were only informed of this much later, in 1935. (See Appendix Two.)

The State has been quick to use accusations of squatting as a justification for removing those who are in the way of its own plans for the area. Thus Wentzel, Deputy Minister of Development and Land Affairs, in May 1981, referring to people living in the area of Sodwana Bay:

It should be noted that the people occupying State land not included in KwaZulu territory were squatters who had no claim to the land. In the interests of orderly development, it stood to reason that people could not be allowed to settle on land haphazardly. (Rand Daily Mail, 21.05.81)

An official in the area has calculated the present population of the Makhathini Flats as about 40 000 people. The implication that these people are lawless new arrivals is as false as it is cynical. However, in legal terms these people do not have any claim to the land and hence have been totally disregarded in the plethora of plans drawn up for the area since the 1960s.

In 1961 the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal confirmed that the bulk of the outstanding quota land in the province was to come from the Zululand 'Crown lands which are already occupied by Natives.' (NAUNLU, 26.05.61) That same year, at least partly in response to the NAU lobby, the government appointed an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the potential of the Flats and to make recommendations about future development. In early 1962 in a lead article headlined 'NAU decides on consolidation of land in Zululand', NAUNLU urged that land ownership in Zululand be rationalised, 'by the adjustment of boundaries and the allocation of State-owned land', so as to meet 'the needs of game and nature preservation, settlement of Bantu and for occupation of Europeans in Natal.' (NAUNLU, 2.02.62) Its specific recommendations are spelled out in the copy of the article reproduced in Appendix Three. These envisaged making over reserve land in the Mkuze and Ubombo districts to whites and in this way they foreshadowed the consolidation proposals that were to be made in 1972.

Although the Nationalist government accepted the principle that the State lands should be used to meet at least some of its land obligation to Natal's african population, it was not decided on how much and which land to hand over; in the last 20 years it has changed its mind on numerous occasions. It seems that it has long earmarked the southern coastal portion (round Lake St Lucia) for State purposes: forestry and, from the late 1960s, military requirements. The task here has been to move people out of this land, using the justification that they are squatters. (See p. 262) Plans for the northern portion of State land have, however, been subject to numerous revisions.

In the early 1960s the State had ambitious plans for developing the Makhathini Flats as a major sugar-producing area under white settlement. In about 1962 work started on a huge dam on the Pongola River near Josini - known variously as the Josini, J.G. Strijdom, and now the Pongolapoort Dam. (Some have labelled it merely 'the white elephant'.) It was envisaged then that the dam would bring a vast area of the Makhathini Flats under irrigation - some 64 000 morgen initially, rising to about 70 000 morgen - and thus support a white settler community of 3 500. (SAIRR Natal region, NR 120/1960) From the start, however, the scheme ran into problems, with both conservationists and many soil scientists and agriculturalists critical of it. There were technical problems in the construction of the dam and the whole matter was further complicated by the discovery that the dam, when full, would flood into part of Swaziland.

The Ad Hoc Committee finally reported in 1969: its slowness to produce a report a source of frustration for the NAU. Its recommendations echoed those of the NAU in 1962 - that the southern area of the Flats and of Reserves 15 and 16, as well as the

whole of Reserves 12 and 13 be opened up for white settlement. At that time these recommendations clearly found favour with the government and were repeated in its first comprehensive plan for the consolidation of KwaZulu, in 1972.

Subsequently, however, these plans were revised and in terms of the 1973 and 1975 proposals, all of the Makhathini Flats were to be incorporated into KwaZulu. It appears that this remained the intention until late 1978: in August 1978 the Department of Plural Relations circulated a memorandum proposing that compensatory land for Reserve Four be found on a part of the Flats in the Ingwavuma district. (For details on this see p. 537) Then in early 1979, the planners redrew their lines, re-juggled their maps and planned to add the whole of the Ingwavuma district, including the northern reaches of the Makhathini Flats, to Swaziland.

It seems clear that the failure of the Josini Dam to meet the former high expectations of it, to date, has influenced the planning for this region - that now it appears that the irrigation potential of the scheme is much lower than originally projected, the Makhathini Flats has become a less valuable region for white agriculture to keep under its control. At present there has been a radical scaling down of the dimensions of the irrigation scheme; an official in Ubombo has reported, in late 1981, that the latest plan is to bring only some 3 000 ha under irrigation and even this has still to be achieved. There are a few scattered development projects and research stations on the Makhathini Flats, including perhaps 1 000 ha cleared as a CED cotton-growing farm, but most of the land has not yet been touched by any of the rhetoric of the last 20 years. (Unpublished AFRA fieldtrip report.) The pressure on Pretoria to use all the available State land to consolidate KwaZulu, coming mainly from the NAU, has also been a factor to be balanced against any possible agricultural advantages to flow to white South Africa from the area.

ESTABLISHMENT OF KWAZULU, 1970


By the late 1960s, with the establishment of self-government in the Transkei (in 1963) and of enhanced Territorial Authorities in the Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Qwa Qwa, Gazankulu, Lebowa and Venda, consolidation had begun to move to the fore as a major political issue in South Africa. Although, as described in Part One, the establishment of a Territorial Authority and subsequently a Legislative Assembly were delayed in KwaZulu, the debate on the shape of its future boundaries was also becoming more prominent. When a Territorial Authority was constituted in KwaZulu, in 1970, Chief Buthelezi used his inaugural speech to call for more land and greater consolidation of the territory. (Horrell, 1973, 20)

In February 1971 the Secretary of BAD told the NAU Congress that the future of the Zululand State lands and the extent to which they should be made available to the SADT were under consideration and that a decision would be made later in the year. Then in September of that year Pretoria announced that it intended to consolidate the territory; the following month it announced that its blueprint would be available for public discussion within eighteen months. At that stage it was negotiating to replace the existing Territorial Authority in KwaZulu with a more high-powered Legislative Assembly. Consolidation was seen as part of the process of creating a separate Zulu 'homeland'.

THE 1972 PROPOSALS

Pretoria's preliminary plans were published in June 1972 and immediately came under fire, from white and indian farmers and from KwaZulu. The proposals envisaged a major restructuring of land so as to reduce KwaZulu to only six pieces - 5 large blocks and one small strip along the coast, to the south of Richards Bay. Major recommendations were:

1. The 3 Drakensberg reserves (Locations 1 and 2 and the Upper Tugela



Location) be excised entirely - something for which local white farmers and the NAU had been lobbying for a long time;

2. The piece of KwaZulu near Newcastle be linked to Msinga in the south by the addition to KwaZulu of land in the Dundee district;
3. The white-owned Harding corridor be added to KwaZulu in the south, but the coastal reserves between Port Shepstone and Port Edward be excised;
4. The southern Makhathini Flats be reserved for whites - as had been recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee in 1969;
5. The coastal reserve north of the Tugela River mouth be excised. (See accompanying map.)

Public reaction, outside of the National Party, was negative. The NAU estimated that these proposals would cost R250 million to implement, would lead to the removal of 360 000 blacks and involve the buying out of 300 white farms. (NAUNLU, 15.09.72 and 23.06.72) Its constituent Farmers' Associations voted 32 to 4 against them and its President, Donald Sinclair, declared

We are not prepared to give additional land to the Bantu because the land they have at present is not being used to its fullest potential. (Zululand Times, 7.09.72)


In Stanger white sugarcane farmers objected to the proposed incorporation of 16 of their farms into KwaZulu and argued that indian canegrowers' land should be incorporated instead, since this already had a substantial african tenant population. (Daily News, 8.09.72) Not surprisingly, the Natal Indian Canegrowers' Association objected both to this suggestion and to the proposed expropriation of indian land in the Verulam and Inanda districts, arguing that there was too little land available for indian ownership anyway. (Daily News, 8.09.72)

In January 1973 Chief Buthelezi also publicly condemned the proposals. He laid claim to Richards Bay (its development as a major harbour by then already in the pipeline) and to all the State land in Zululand which he described as 'automatically' part of KwaZulu. He also said that whites would be welcome to stay on in a consolidated KwaZulu, on their own land, provided that they obeyed the laws of the land. (Daily News, 17.01.73)

THE 1973 PROPOSALS

Concessions were made to some of the critics and in April 1973 revised and 'final' consolidation proposals were tabled in Parliament. These were approved by the House of Assembly on the 4th June 1973, the United Party and Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party objecting. What they proposed was that KwaZulu be reduced to ten pieces instead of six; in broad outline they foreshadowed the later proposals of 1975. The major departures from the 1972 proposals were:

1. The Drakensberg Locations no. 1 and no. 2 were to be retained, consolidated into one block by the addition of the white farm land that separated them, and only the Upper Tugela Location was to be moved, into that added farmland.
2. The Dundee district was to remain white, and the piece of KwaZulu near Newcastle to remain an isolated piece of KwaZulu territory.
3. The Harding corridor was to remain white.
4. All of the Makhathini Flats were to be incorporated into KwaZulu while the reserves to the south of Mkuze were to become white.



This was the age of grand apartheid. Speaking in support of these proposals the Minister of BAD, M.C. Botha, stated

There are many whites who will be uprooted from land on which they have lived for a long time. And there are even more Bantu who will have to leave long-established dwelling places ... Hundreds of millions of rands are necessary for the land purchases which will be given free to the Bantu. Services will also be needed. All these are gifts which the Government gives to the Bantu. (*Daily News*, 5.06.73)

Once again the recommendations were sharply criticised in Natal. Chief Buthelezi rejected the plans as soon as they were published, stating that his administration would not be associated with the removal of 132 000 people (*Sunday Tribune*, 29.04.73. This figure was the official estimate for the number of blacks who would have to be moved; it appears to have been a gross underestimate.) In May the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly passed a counter-resolution which called unanimously for the incorporation into KwaZulu of the following towns: Eshowe, Empangeni, Pomeroy, Nongoma, Nkwalini, Melmoth, Nkandla, Babanango, Ingwavuma, Ubombo, Mtunzini, Gingindlovu, Amatikhulu, Richards Bay, Mtubatuba, Kosi Bay and, 'amid laughter', Stanger. (*Rand Daily Mail*, 8.05.73) In June, Barney Dladla, then the Executive Councillor for Community Affairs in KwaZulu, was even more outspoken in his rejection of the proposals. Speaking at the Bergville Agricultural Show he declared that only 'the barrel of a gun' would make people move from the Upper Tugela and Drakensberg Locations. Whites, he said, seemed determined

to dispossess us of everything that constitutes wealth in order to keep us in semi-slavery conditions. (*Daily News*, 6.06.73)

The major criticism of Natal farmers centred on the proposal to consolidate the three Drakensberg locations into a single block. In December 1973 the *Natal Mercury* carried a story on the objections of farmers in the Natal Midlands to the proposal; one farmer claimed that the land earmarked for consolidation between Drakensberg 1 and 2 locations was the best grazing land for sheep and cattle in Natal. (13.12.73) In January 1974 Farmers' Associations in the Bergville/Weenen area put forward an alternative proposal, suggesting that land be acquired for the relocation of the Drakensberg reserves along the Tugela River in the Weenen district. Their proposals were rejected by the Minister of BAD because the land in question was 'not suitable for intensive settlement and unacceptable to Africans' (*Natal Mercury*, 5.01.74); subsequently, however, the Deputy Minister of BAD promised that the farmers' objections would be considered. (NAUNLU, 18.01.74)

THE 1975 PROPOSALS

In March 1975 revised consolidation proposals for all the bantustans were published and, predictably, approved by a Parliamentary majority. The Natal plan retained the broad outlines of the 1973 proposals but involved minor adjustments in the detail. It also envisaged a ten-piece KwaZulu, the boundaries carefully drawn to exclude all the major industrial areas of the province and to keep to the limits of land area laid down by the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act. In the debate that followed the Minister of BAD, M.C. Botha, pledged that once the 1936 quota had been met, no more land would be made available to the bantustans; he also described consolidation heroically as 'one of the most urgent tasks ever tackled to ensure peaceful cooperation of peoples in South Africa.' (*Daily News*, 21.05.75)

The proposed excisions and additions to KwaZulu envisaged in the 1975 proposals are illustrated in the accompanying map; details of the particular areas involved are contained in Appendix One. Broadly they followed the 1973 plan. The three Drakensberg locations were still shown as consolidated into a single reserve (to the indignation of Bergville and Estcourt farmers); the Makhathini Flats were included in

KwaZulu; Reserve Four, the Paulpietersburg area and the Mkuze reserves were excised, as were a number of small but densely populated reserves in Southern Natal. Several blocks of released freehold land were excised as well, including the Driefontein area near Ladysmith, Groutville and a string of properties in the Mpendle/Underberg districts. (Details on the freehold areas are contained in the summary of black spots in the previous chapter.)

According to Butler *et al.* (1977, 93) the proposals meant that 300 000 ha of african land would become white and a total of 463 000 ha of land would be added to KwaZulu, giving KwaZulu a net gain of 163 000 ha of land. These figures do not tally with more detailed figures supplied by Thorrrington-Smith *et al.* (1978, vol. 1, 7) and the interpretation of a general 'gain' of land for KwaZulu appears to be based on a serious oversight, in that neither the debt still owed to KwaZulu in terms of the 1936 Land Act quota nor compensatory land due for the removal of black spots have been acknowledged as separate items. According to Thorrrington-Smith the total area of KwaZulu in 1975 stood at 3 273 367 ha; the total area after implementation of the 1975 consolidation plan would be 3 316 000 ha. These figures mark a 'gain' to KwaZulu of 42 633 ha, approximately the same amount of land still needed at that time to compensate for black spots that had yet to be removed and thus no gain at all. (See Table 11, p.101 and Table 12 below. As already pointed out in Part One, compensatory land for black spots was not included in the original quota for Natal; furthermore, black spots do not form part of KwaZulu and this african-owned land would not, therefore, have been included in the figure for the total area of the bantustan in 1975.)

Thorrrington-Smith *et al.*'s detailed breakdown of the land purchases involved is set out in Table 12.

Table 12. LAND PURCHASES REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT 1975 CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS FOR KWAZULU

CATEGORY OF LAND	HA
Outstanding quota	54 800
Compensatory land for black spots	43 100
'Badly situated' reserves	317 200
TOTAL	415 100

KwaZulu gained no significant economic assets out of the proposed exchange and stood to lose some of its most productive agricultural areas - Groutville, Reserve Four and the Ifafa mission reserve, described in 1972 as 'some of the finest (Zulu) agricultural land in Natal'. (*Pretoria News*, 17.06.72) The major consequence to flow from the 1975 consolidation proposals for the bantustan could only be massive relocation and dislocation of people and communities.

3. The financial cost of consolidation

The 1975 proposals have formed the basis for subsequent negotiation and discussion about the shape of the bantustans. As already indicated in Part One, in trying to implement these proposals in Natal/KwaZulu Pretoria has encountered serious obstacles - obstacles at the physical level (the sheer logistics of trying to reduce the extremely fragmented african areas of Natal to ten pieces), the economic level (the enormous costs of such a programme) and the political level (widespread opposition to the proposals within Natal and growing disagreement within the ranks of the National Party).

The cost of the envisaged programme can only be described as prohibitive. Initially it was estimated that the implementation of consolidation country-wide would involve the

removal of about 200 000 people and the purchase of about 1 million ha of land (mostly from white farmers) at a cost of about R300 million. (*Natal Mercury*, 1.09.75) These figures were soon replaced by much bigger ones.

In 1976 BENBO stated that the plans would involve the removal of about 175 000 families or one million people (BENBO, 1976, 23); the SAIRR survey for 1976 stated that 2 million ha of land would be needed to be bought, at a cost of R417 million, and that the removal of the 175 000 families affected would cost R380 million. In 1978 the then Minister of Plural Relations (Connie Mulder) stated that 777 000 ha of quota land and 1 million ha of compensatory land were still needed to be bought to complete the consolidation programme and that the cost of purchase alone would be between R400 million and R500 million. (SAIRR survey 1978, 268) In September 1979 the chairman of the van der Walt Commission estimated the overall cost of consolidation to be R3 000 million (*Rand Daily Mail*, 24.09.79); the following year he was reported as saying it would cost a staggering R6 000 million. (*Natal Mercury*, 5.09.80)

In the light of these figures, the allocation of funds for consolidation were absurdly small. Already in October 1975, M.C. Botha had to announce that there would be delays in the purchasing of white farms for consolidation purposes, because of an 'unforeseen depletion of funds':

It is however trusted that the financial position will improve in the near future and the outstanding offers will be made as soon as funds have been made available. (*Natal Mercury*, 17.10.75)

Clearly the financial position did not improve. In 1980 BENBO carried a story on the financing of consolidation in which it was claimed that for the government to complete the consolidation programme by 1985, it should have been spending R100 million per annum on it since 1975; in order to complete the programme at all, it needed to have been spending a minimum of R60 million per annum. (*Daily News*, 18.08.80) Its actual allocation of funds for the purchase of land had consistently fallen far short of that; in the very best year (1975/76) it fell short of the stated minimum by R1 million, as the following table illustrates.

Table 13. ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR PURCHASE OF LAND FOR CONSOLIDATION PURPOSES, SOUTH AFRICA 1974/75 - 1980/81.

Sources : *Financial Mail*, 20.04.79, quoting Dr Koornhof and *Daily News*, 18.05.80 (for 1979/80 and 1980/81 figures)

YEAR	FUNDS ALLOCATED
1974/75	R25,6 million
1975/76	R59 million
1976/77	R53,6 million
1977/78	R47,3 million
1978/79	R40,4 million
1979/80	R47,4 million
1980/81	R57 million

As the 1970s progressed, the declining price of gold put a strain on the Treasury. Even more important was the ever-increasing cost of the war being fought against SWAPO in Namibia and Angola - a cost which has continued to escalate into the 1980s and shows no sign of abating. With money in increasing short supply, the programme of consolidation land purchases and population removals fell further and further behind projected deadlines and this, coupled with the intense opposition to consolidation emanating from a wide range of political groups, finally forced Pretoria to embark on a re-assessment of its plans, in 1979. Speaking in Parliament in April 1982, the chairman of the commission entrusted with the task of reviewing the 1975 proposals, Hennie van der Walt,

admitted 'that the progress we are making with our policy is not rapid enough.' (Hansard, col. 4977, 21.04.82) Commenting indirectly on the financial pressures they had been encountering, he stated:

The hard reality is that money is required for South Africa's priorities with regard to this matter. Talk is cheap but money buys the whiskey. Therefore we shall have to find some way of obtaining the money required for taking steps of this nature. (Hansard, col. 4981, 21.04.82)

Yet despite the inadequacy of the funds allocated to the consolidation programme, the amount still represents a very substantial slice of the total allocation of funds by the central government to the bantustans. According to a report in the Rand Daily Mail in March 1980 a total of R89 million had been allocated for the consolidation of the non-independent bantustans for the 1981 tax year - about 20% of the total allocation for these areas of R434 650 000. (Rand Daily Mail, 27.03.80. It appears that this figure refers to the total cost of consolidation planning, not simply to the cost of purchasing land.)

4. Opposition to consolidation

Opposition to the 1975 consolidation proposals in Natal has been widespread: a remarkable range of political groupings agree that they are unworkable. They disagree however on their reasons for believing this, and the alternatives they propose in place of these. The position and significance of the most important of these groupings is outlined below.

AFFECTED COMMUNITIES

In 1981 Dr Koornhof stated that one of the major obstacles to consolidation was 'the unwillingness of the Zulu people to be moved.' (Natal Witness, 14.05.81) Opposition to being relocated within threatened communities is general, but the level of political effectiveness of organised resistance varies enormously. In general it would seem that organisation within threatened communities is poor, the people handicapped by isolation, ignorance, intimidation, insecurity and the absence of progressive and democratic leadership. Tribal chiefs and councillors dominate organisation; the chiefs are not strictly accountable to the community and, as individuals in the employ of the State, dangerously susceptible to pressures of various kinds from the authorities. An example of this was found at Reserve Six where, it has been alleged, the chief was encouraged to agree to the move to Ntambanana by being given one of the farmhouses left standing in the relocation area for his own use. (Fieldwork)

However, several instances have been reported where Pretoria has been forced to give way, at least temporarily, because of the opposition of the local people against being moved. In the Upper Tugela Location residents reportedly backed up their demand that those people affected by the construction of the Woodstock Dam from 1979 should not be moved to compensatory land outside the district, by sabotaging earthmoving and other dam-building equipment. The removal of these people was seen as the first phase in the planned removal of the entire reserve; eventually, the community won a major victory when the State agreed to compensate for the land flooded by the dam by buying up adjoining white farms instead. (See p. 251) In Reserve Four the chiefs have led the struggle to keep this area as part of KwaZulu and the local people appear to have acquired an inhibitory reputation for militancy with the local authorities. (See case study, Part Four.) In Groutville local people succeeded in staving off the threat of removals in 1972 and, in 1979 when the threatened removals appeared imminent once again, enlisted the support of KwaZulu; a reprieve was announced as a result. (See Appendix 4.)

KWAZULU

KwaZulu's contradictory position on relocation has already been discussed in detail in Part One. It has repeatedly stated its objections to the various consolidation proposals put forward by the planners at Pretoria since 1972, but it has not objected to the idea of consolidation of the bantustan itself. Rather, it has called for more land to be added to it e.g. by calling for the various Zululand towns to be incorporated into KwaZulu in May 1973, and by laying claim to the game reserves and the Makhathini Flats as 'naturally' part of KwaZulu. Chief Buthelezi is anxious to build a more powerful base for himself and to build up KwaZulu as an autonomous unit within a greater South Africa. He has however stated that even if he were offered 'meaningful' consolidation, he still would not accept independence:

KwaZulu will never seek independence. A lot of people misunderstand us when we talk about Natal as one region. It simply means Natal is the home of all the people who live here. There might well be a new political dispensation involving a new area, but this will be within the framework of a single South Africa. (Daily News, 17.01.80)

KwaZulu's objections to consolidation have been two-fold: 1) not enough land has been offered it while such land as has been offered excludes all the major areas of economic development and sources of wealth within Natal, and 2) it will not be party to the massive relocation of people envisaged in the government's plans. In objecting to such removals it has publicly elevated to the point of principle a refusal to be seen to have anything to do with consolidation. Speaking in May 1981 Chief Buthelezi stated:

We have refused to have anything to do with even the consolidation committees - because we do not want to give the impression that we acquiesce in any way to being moved around by the South African government. (Rand Daily Mail, 22.05.81)

However, as already discussed in Part One, KwaZulu has not managed to keep as consistently aloof from relocation as it maintains. Furthermore, this lack of cooperation has extended to the point where it has failed to provide a clear lead to certain areas faced with excision from within its own boundaries, until it has become politically embarrassing for it to be seen to be acquiescing. Two major examples of this are Sodwana Bay and Reserve Four, which are described more fully in other parts of this Report.

In other instances KwaZulu has shown greater interest and initiative in opposing relocation, e.g. Groutville and, most recently and spectacularly, Ingwavuma (discussed below). What needs further analysis is why it selects certain areas as worthy of involvement and appears to ignore others. It seems the role of local Inkatha members and KwaZulu MPs is important - where they are active, the community is in a stronger position to enlist support from Ulundi. Linked to this is the type of relationship that exists between local tribal authorities and Chiefs or Councils with the Ulundi hierarchy and, more particularly, with Chief Buthelezi himself. Where this is amicable, support from Ulundi is likely to follow; where there is strain, it is not. The political significance of the proposed removal is important too: the attempted excision of Ingwavuma, where land was being offered to the Swazis, struck a far deeper blow to KwaZulu's and Inkatha's political credibility than the excision of Reserve Four and was seized upon by Ulundi as an issue to confront with a vigour that has been totally lacking in the case of Reserve Four.

KwaZulu's alternative to consolidation has been recently crystallised in the Buthelezi Commission, whose findings on consolidation are described briefly below. Although KwaZulu has stressed that the Buthelezi Commission was an independent enquiry and that

it does not agree in all respects with the recommendations of the Commission, it has adopted the broad findings of the Commission as representing its counter-proposals for the Natal/KwaZulu region.

THE NAU

The history of consistent hostility by Natal farmers to making more land available for blacks in the province has been outlined in Part One and in the previous chapter. When the 1975 proposals were first made available, the NAU objected on the grounds that too much good land was being given over to african occupation. 'They make Natal look like a moth-eaten doughnut' the President of the NAU, Donald Sinclair, commented. (Natal Mercury, 17.10.75) Subsequently the NAU adopted a more conciliatory approach to the proposals. As the years passed with little progress being made towards buying up the necessary white farms, and as rumours began to circulate of yet more radical exchanges of land between white and black areas, the NAU came to take its stand on the 1975 proposals as the maximum that it would be prepared to accept. At its 1980 Congress it passed several resolutions to this effect:

Congress requests that the 1975 consolidation proposals with smaller practical adjustments be completed as speedily as possible; and Congress rejects further consolidation which exceeds the 1975 proposals. (NAUNLU, September 1981)

In lobbying for these resolutions, the NAU, acting often in conjunction with the SAAU, has organised several deputations to meet the Prime Minister, the Minister of Co-operation and Development and the Chairman of the Commission for Cooperation and Development, Hennie van der Walt. In May 1981 it organised a special Congress to focus on consolidation and invited Dr Koornhof to address the meeting. Dr Koornhof's tone was conciliatory but essentially noncommittal.

My Department has always been prepared to consider sound reasoning based on facts and local considerations.

And later:

I am glad to be in a position to report that most of the administrative and financial constraints of recent years have been overcome and that no reason can at this stage be foreseen why purposeful effort cannot be made towards the implementation of the proposals. (NAUNLU, June 1981)

The NAU has isolated several major objections to consolidation and the way in which the policy has been implemented - or not implemented. The continual uncertainty about boundaries and the damaging effect that that has had on agriculture has been a central concern. Many of the white farms earmarked for purchase and addition to KwaZulu in 1975 have not been formally bought by the SADT (because of financial problems); the owners of the land have been obliged to continue farming without any guarantee of how long they will be able to stay on their land or that they will receive a worthwhile return on such long-term capital expenditure as they may wish to undertake. This has been a major source of discontent in the Highflats area where 13 of the 21 white farms earmarked for addition to KwaZulu in 1975 had been bought by May 1982, but the remaining 8 were still 'in limbo'. (NAUNLU, May 1982.)

A further grievance relates to the manner in which farmers are paid for their land, which has been 40% in cash and 60% in Government Shares (RSA Registered Stock), redeemable 22 years after the date of issue. (NAUNLU, April 1982) It seems that this method of payment was devised by Pretoria as a way of circumventing its shortage of cash. Farmers have complained bitterly that they suffer considerable financial loss in the process and are hampered in buying farms to replace those that have been expropriated. In February 1981 it was reported that in future farmers would be paid in cash

for their land (Natal Witness, 18.02.81) but by April 1982 this change in policy had still not been put into effect. It was reported at this time that the SAAU was planning a further meeting with the Prime Minister to convey farmers' 'extreme dissatisfaction':

Landowners should not be placed in a weaker financial position as a result of the implementation of the consolidation policy. (NAUNLU, April 1982)

In confronting the issue of consolidation, the NAU Executive has battled to try to appear non-partisan in what is essentially a party political issue. There is a deep-seated fear that to attack consolidation as a policy will split the Union between its Nationalist and non-Nationalist supporters. Speaking at the 1980 NAU Congress about the NAU's contribution to the van der Walt Commission, Donald Sinclair explained:

The Natal Agricultural Union has been accused of playing a minor rather than a leading role in these investigations; this may be true although your representatives ... supported these recommendations which had been made by our affiliates. Since the whole exercise is unfortunately a political one which calls for support for or opposition to a particular philosophy, it did restrict the sphere in which the Union could operate ... If we had taken any particular stand on this consolidation business, it would have split the NAU down the middle, and that would have been a sad day for Natal farmers. (NAUNLU, October 1980)

On the other hand, there is also the long-standing fear that not to become involved in the issue will lead to proposals being adopted by the central government that are yet more damaging to the interests of commercial agriculture. In trying to steer a middle course, the NAU has been driven into some contorted positions. At the 1981 special Congress on consolidation, a resolution proposed by one of the delegates that stated that 'Congress does not believe that it is practical or economically feasible to consolidate KwaZulu into a viable and separate state within the boundaries of Natal, even by the provision of more land' was rejected by the majority of delegates because of its political content. 'Farmers should express their views but should confine them to the economic effects' said the NAU President. Instead of the offending resolution, the Congress adopted a second resolution that stated simply that it rejected further consolidation which exceeds the 1975 proposals. (NAUNLU, June 1981)

Consolidation has not only created tensions between Nationalist and non-Nationalist supporters within the NAU. It has also created tensions between constituent Farmers' Associations which have been lobbying the central government to protect their own particular local interests when finalising its plans. At the 1981 Congress on consolidation, one delegate described how 'uncertainty over the consolidation proposals was creating hostility between farming districts in Natal'. The Natal Mercury reported:

Natal farmers were slipping off to Pretoria for secret talks aimed at persuading the Government that their districts were too valuable for consolidation and suggesting alternative areas. The 'cloak and dagger' approach of some farming districts was described as 'traitorous' by incensed delegates at the special Natal Agricultural Union congress in Durban yesterday. (Natal Mercury, 15.05.81)

The two districts most affected by this have been the Bergville and Harding districts. It appears that Bergville farmers have been lobbying for the removal of the Upper Tugela and the Drakensberg Locations right out of their area, into Southern Natal, into the Harding district - to the indignation of Harding farmers.

SOUTH AFRICAN SUGAR ASSOCIATION (SASA)

The position of SASA has been very simple: valuable cane land should be kept in white hands, for fear of endangering the R1 billion sugar industry. This was the gist of a

confidential report submitted by SASA to the van der Walt Commission in 1979, which was leaked during a by-election in the sugarcane-growing area of Eshowe - an area then rumoured to have been earmarked for incorporation into KwaZulu. (Financial Mail, 30.11.79) In February 1980 the Managing Director of C.G. Smith, a major sugar-milling company, stated in reference to the van der Walt Commission of Enquiry:

I am confident that the authorities are well aware that the wealth of Natal is closely bound up with that of the sugar industry and that the decisions finally handed down will not be inimical to the interests of an industry which is important, not only to Natal, but to the wider national economy as a significant export earner. (Natal Mercury, 8.02.80)

Clearly, however, the sugar industry has had serious reservations about the nature of the decisions still to be 'finally handed down', for in April 1980 it commissioned the Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis at the University of Pretoria, under the direction of Professor J. Lombard, to see 'whether there are alternative solutions to the problems the Government of the Republic hopes to solve through the 'consolidation of KwaZulu'.' (Univ. Pretoria, nd, 5) In announcing this the Chairman of SASA said:

We want to emphasise that the Sugar Association is strictly a non-political body. We are looking at the situation of consolidation purely from an economic point of view. Consolidation would be detrimental to the stability of the sugar industry and because it is the major industry of Natal, it would therefore be bad for the province as a whole. (Natal Mercury, 28.04.80)

The proposals put forward by the Lombard Report in August 1980 envisaged 'a regional approach to the problem of political accommodation' based on three 'geo-political areas', which were identified as KwaZulu, the white-owned area along the main transport corridors and the Durban Metropolitan Area, and three layers of authorities - the inclusive Natal/KwaZulu layer, the regional layer consisting of the 3 areas identified above and the local government layer.

The functions of the Natal/KwaZulu authority would be confined by the constitution to affairs truly common to the region, and not particularly to any one of the constituent areas or any particular group of local authorities. (Univ. Pretoria, nd, 51)

The Report was released just before the central government was due to meet to discuss the van der Walt Commission's findings. This was clearly timed to put pressure on Pretoria and it has been suggested it did succeed in helping to delay the release of the van der Walt proposals and the Cabinet's position on them. (Natal Witness, 15.08.80) Publicly, however, the National Party rejected the proposals out of hand as involving 'power-sharing' - it could only lead to the 'total domination of Natal by KwaZulu' according to one Nationalist MP. (Natal Witness, 15.04.81) Some responses were even more violent. A few days after the release of his report, Professor Lombard was the target of a rightwing terrorist attack, when his offices at the University of Pretoria were bombed.

The sugar industry also played an influential role in the Buthelezi Commission, whose establishment was announced in May 1980 and which started working in October 1980. Tony Ardington, of the South African Cane Growers' Association, and Chris Saunders, head of the Tongaat Group, were both Commissioners.

THE BUTHELEZI COMMISSION

The Buthelezi Commission was established on the initiative of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to 'explore the possibility of finding a way, within the overall framework of the Republic of South Africa, of developing a regional constitutional arrangement (for

Natal) which might provide an alternative to the programmes to which the white political parties had become committed'. (Buthelezi Commission, 1982, vol. 1, 31) Its area of enquiry was thus far wider than that of consolidation alone. However, Pretoria's efforts to pursue the goal of consolidating KwaZulu as a separate 'national state' was a major incentive towards its appointment. In discussing the background to its appointment, the Commission noted:

The proceedings of the Eastern Regional Committee of the Consolidation Commission caused disquiet, especially amongst businessmen who were very aware of the singleness of the economy of KwaZulu/Natal. (vol. 1, 30)

The Commission represents an embodiment of the political alliance that has been developing within Natal since the early 1970s between KwaZulu and liberal business interests in the province. Included among the 46 people who served as Commissioners were representatives of the Natal Chamber of Industries, the Institute of Bankers in South Africa, the Durban Chamber of Commerce, the Associated Chambers of Commerce, the Urban Foundation, the South African Federated Chamber of Industries, the Inyanda Chamber of Commerce, the South African Institute of Civil Engineers and the Chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, Harry Oppenheimer, as well as the two representatives from the sugar industry already mentioned. Representing KwaZulu were Dr Dhlomo, Secretary General of Inkatha, his wife (head of KwaZulu Nursing Services) and Gibson Thula, a member of the Central Committee of Inkatha; representatives of KDC and the KwaZulu Planning, Coordinating and Advisory Committee were also present. In addition, there were nine academics serving on the Commission (including the Chairman of the Commission, Professor G.P.L. Schreiner, vice-principal of the University of Natal) and representatives from the Natal Law Society, the Natal African Teachers' Union, the Natal Teachers' Society and the NAU. The political spectrum formally represented ranged from the NRP, through the Indian Reform Party of South Africa and the coloured Labour Party to the PFP; the Commission noted that it had tried but failed to get representatives from both the National Party and the ANC to serve on it.

The Buthelezi Commission's findings were finally released in early 1982. The Commission rejected the division of Natal/KwaZulu into two separate States as not being 'in the interests of the people of the area KwaZulu/Natal as a whole' and proposed instead a system of regional government based on a 'consociational model'. This would involve initially a coming together of the Natal Provincial Administration and the KwaZulu government into a joint executive for the region, with representatives of the Indian and coloured communities drawn into that as well. Although this executive would be constructed on ethnic lines, the Commission did express the hope that over time a system of political groupings and alliances would emerge which would not be based on ethnic considerations but on common material or other interests. In making these recommendations the Commission thus fully accepted the credentials of the KwaZulu government as the authentic representative of the African people of Natal; it did not call for new elections or a regional convention at which a new political dispensation could be worked out free from the legacy of separate development.

As far as consolidation specifically is concerned, the Buthelezi Commission rejected the 1975 proposals as a viable solution to the political and economic problems of the region. It noted the massive relocation of people that the 1975 proposals would necessitate - 'estimated at between 300 000 and 500 000, the vast majority of whom will be Black South Africans' (vol. 1, 78) - and recommended that 'all enforced removals' be stopped. (Ibid) One of its major concerns was the economic implications of consolidation. It recorded evidence it had received about this to the effect that

the region cannot afford to allow any further land to be used below its maximum productivity ... It was also put to the Commission that the Sugar Industry would be seriously affected by some land transfer proposals, because of the essential link between sugar mills, transport

costs and changes of productivity, even if the transferred land was still used for sugar farming. The enormous costs involved in the relocation of people would be far better spent by applying it to agricultural improvement in the poorer areas. (Ibid)

It was also noted that the 1975 proposals 'leaves a KwaZulu which has little or none of the major infrastructure on which the region depends for its economic success' and that 'any development of industry and commerce in KwaZulu would necessarily be that much more expensive because the infrastructure system would need extension if it were to serve significantly in that area'. (vol. 1, 80)

The release of the Commission's findings in early March 1982 was widely reported upon, in Natal and the other provinces. The Government rejected the constitutional and political sections of the Report on the grounds that they advocated a single political unit for Natal and 'ran counter to the policy according to which the Government believed race relations should be regulated in South Africa'. (Sen Horwood, quoted in the Natal Witness, 10.03.81) Nevertheless, as with the Lombard Report, it was obliged to take note of the Report privately as embodying the viewpoint of the influential liberal business establishment in Natal.

5. The van der Walt Commission and after

DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE NATIONAL PARTY

As the magnitude of implementing the 1975 consolidation proposals became more apparent, pragmatists within the National Party began to have second thoughts and divisions appeared between the reformists and the hardliners within the Party. Influential individuals within the Government began to ask questions about the economic viability (and, ultimately, the political stability) of the proposed bantustans. In May 1977 the Chairman of the BIC suggested that whites should be allowed to stay inside the consolidated bantustans in the interests of their economic development; the Transvaal Congress of the National Party rejected this idea. (SAIRR Survey, 1977, 312) In 1978 Professor Botha, a member of both the Prime Minister's Planning Advisory Council and the Transvaal Head Committee of the National Party, proposed that several major border towns (Richards Bay, Pietersburg, King William's Town) be incorporated into the bantustans but this was rejected by the government. (SAIRR Survey, 1978, 268)

Important differences also began to emerge publicly concerning the amount of land to be allocated to the bantustans. In late 1978 the Minister and Deputy Minister of Plural Relations (Connie Mulder and Ferdie Hartzenberg respectively) reiterated that the government would not go beyond the 1936 quota but P.W. Botha himself was reported in September 1978 as saying that the 1936 quota was not a 'holy cow'. (Rand Daily Mail, 31.10.80)

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY

Finally, in February 1979, P.W. Botha announced that 'an exhaustive investigation' into consolidation was necessary a) to determine how the process could be speeded up and b) to reconsider whether the existing proposals could achieve the desired 'freedom' of all the peoples of South Africa. (NAUNLU, May 1981) This investigation was to be undertaken by the Commission for Cooperation and Development, under its Chairman, Hennie van der Walt: hence the name, the van der Walt Commission.

In making this announcement, Botha also spelled out the guidelines that had been set for the Commission. These marked a tentative shift away from the former rigid adherence to the 1936 quota and the ascendancy of the reformists within the National Party: while the land purchases required in terms of the 1936 Act, as embodied in the 1975

proposals, should be speeded up, consolidation henceforth needed to be considered not only from the 'geographic' point of view but also from the point of view of 'the consolidation of nations' and the 'economic consolidation of states'. (Ibid)

The appointment of the van der Walt Commission has sparked off a fresh round of speculation, rumour and intense politicking behind the scenes. The proposals of the Eastern Regional Committee, established as a sub-committee within the van der Walt Commission to consider consolidation in the eastern Transvaal and Natal (Kangwane and KwaZulu), have not been published, although there have been a series of leaks and denials in the 2 years that it has been in operation. It is clear that the Cabinet has not found the recommendations made to date acceptable and has delayed publication of the report; it has, however, failed to work out an acceptable formula in its place.

PROGRESS OF THE COMMISSION

The story of the van der Walt Commission's report for KwaZulu has been a story of delayed deadlines:

- December 1979: Inaugural meeting of the Eastern Regional Committee;
- March 1980: Announcement that the van der Walt Commission would not complete its enquiry by the end of March as planned;
- April 1980: Report that the Commission would report to the Cabinet at the beginning of June;
- August 1980: The Cabinet considered the Commission's proposals and referred them to two Cabinet Committees for review;
- September 1980: van der Walt was reported as urging the Cabinet to publish his report; (Natal Witness, 4.09.80) Koornhof appealed for patience (Natal Mercury, 5.09.80) and later told the NAU that he could not say when the report would be finally available; (NAUNLU, October 1980)
- April 1981: van der Walt stated that the Eastern Regional Committee had not reached agreement or made any final recommendations; (Sunday Tribune, 5.04.81)
- November 1981: Koornhof announced that the final consolidation recommendations would be completed by the end of June 1982;
- July 1982: It was reported that van der Walt had handed over to the Cabinet his Commission's recommendations which, it was stressed, were not final; the proposals for Ciskei, Venda and possibly Kangwane would go before Parliament in 1983 but the recommendations for the other bantustans, including KwaZulu, would not be published until 1984. (Daily News, 20.07.82)

It appears that initially the van der Walt Commission favoured a radical redrawing of maps to reduce substantially the number of separate bantustan pieces in the country - KwaZulu to be reduced to three or four pieces, Bophuthatswana to be reduced from seven pieces to one. Thus in Natal there have at various times in the past three years been rumours that the South Coast and the towns of Ixopo, Eshowe, Melmoth and Babanango will be handed over to KwaZulu - rumours which have excited indignation and strong counter-appeals from the white communities concerned.

The van der Walt Commission also developed the strategy of handing bantustan areas bordering on to neighbouring black States over to the States concerned, a strategy which clearly did find favour with the Cabinet. In June 1979 the Rand Daily Mail reported that the Commission was considering a radical form of consolidation which would involve Lesotho and Swaziland: Qwa Qwa was to be linked to Lesotho and Swaziland given access to the sea via the district of Ingwavuma. (25.06.79) This was the first public reference to the proposal to excise Ingwavuma from KwaZulu and it passed largely

unnoticed at the time. These proposals were repeated in a further report on the Commission in the Rand Daily Mail in September 1979; at that time Buthelezi was reported to have expressed 'astonishment' at the suggestion concerning Ingwavuma. (Rand Daily Mail, 24.09.79)

CRITERIA FOR GOING BEYOND THE 1936 QUOTA

Mounting costs, the growing opposition to consolidation already described within Natal, and the concern by pragmatists within the National Party at the economic consequences of consolidation forced further refinement to the tentative reappraisal outlined by P.W. Botha in early 1979. In October 1980 Dr Koornhof described consolidation of the bantustans as a process that would be 'in addition to rather than instead of alternative forms of economic assistance' and could, within certain definite limits, go beyond the quota of land allocated for african occupation in 1936. The conditions governing such an increase in land allocation were described as follows:

- Preference would be given to the fulfilment of the 1975 proposals;
- Land transferred from the white area to black areas must be 'utilised productively and on an economic basis';
- Such transfers would only take place after it had been established they would satisfy the 'most important development needs' of the bantustans;
- White landowners should be allowed to remain on their land if incorporated into the bantustans. (Rand Daily Mail, 31.10.80)

In November 1980 he described the state of consolidation planning as 'a completely new ball game' and said there might be changes to the van der Walt proposals. (NAUNLU, November 1980) In May 1981 he was more outspoken. In urging farmers at the NAU Congress to ignore 'secret talk' he said

We have stated categorically that the van der Walt Commission proposals will be drastically changed. (Zululand Observer, 15.05.81)

Van der Walt himself began to modify his position. In January 1981 he admitted that 'geographical consolidation' was no longer possible:

We have to accept that we can't have 10 or 20 separate economies here. We may have managed it 40 years ago, but today we would have to think in terms of more than 3 million hectares of mainly agricultural ground which would have to be added to the independent and national states at a cost of about R6 000 million over the next ten years. (Sunday Tribune, 1.02.81)

What the final outcome will be remains to be seen. It appears that the central government is still determined to push through a form of consolidation, using the 1975 proposals as its starting point. In January 1981 it excised the four areas of Reserve Four, Paulpietersburg, Driefontein and Sodwana Bay, despite the fact that the van der Walt proposals had not yet been published, and it has stated repeatedly that the removal of these areas is a priority. Most maps of KwaZulu already present the 1975 proposals as reality, despite the fact that very few of the removals required to make it so have yet taken place: 'consolidation at that level literally a cleaning up of the map.' (AFRA Special Report no. 1, 1981, 4) A major planning report on KwaZulu (Thorington-Smith *et al*'s 'Towards a plan for KwaZulu') has been developed on the basis of the 1975 proposals and its ten-piece KwaZulu. In 1982 Pretoria announced that it intended to complete the process of consolidation country-wide within four years, by 1986, and that the total cost would be in the region of R1 000 million. In view of its past record, this seems an overly optimistic prophecy to make, but it does indicate that it is preparing to launch a further drive against 'badly situated areas'. In Natal the

communities most immediately at risk are those in the four areas mentioned above.

Particularly ominous at this stage is a clause contained in the Laws on Cooperation and Development Amendment Act which was passed in early 1982. This empowers the government to prohibit publication of documents of the Commission for Cooperation and Development, by proclamation in the Government Gazette. Although Hennie van der Walt has denied that this clause will muzzle the press (Rand Daily Mail, 24.07.82), government speakers in the Parliamentary debate on the Bill made it very clear that they are anxious to limit public discussion on consolidation and to control what Val Volker, the Nationalist MP for Klip River, described as 'an over-emphasis on the public's right to know.' (Hansard, col. 5633, 28.04.82)

Also ominous is the attempted excision of the Ingwavuma district which developed into a major controversy in mid 1982. This entailed the proposed excision of the Ingwavuma district and its population of a little over 96 000 people from KwaZulu and the incorporation of the district into Swaziland. At the same time similar attempts were launched in Kangwane (involving the incorporation of the entire bantustan into Swaziland) and, it is suggested below, are being considered for the trans-Pongola district of KwaZulu in the Transvaal, known as Sindlangentsha. These developments mark yet a further refinement of the consolidation strategy in the post-1975 era.


6. The Ingwavuma land deal

The Ingwavuma land deal has been reported on extensively in the press and various journals and it is not proposed to repeat all the details here. Readers are referred to the DSG/SARS Information Publication no. 7 (August 1982) on 'The Land Dispute: Incorporating Swaziland?' for an analysis and comprehensive chronology of developments in both Kangwane and Ingwavuma to the end of July 1982. This section looks briefly at the origins of the Ingwavuma dispute, the developments to the outcome of the Appeal Court hearing on the 30th September 1982 and the effects of the dispute between KwaZulu and Pretoria on the region; it also looks at the possibility that a similar deal has been envisaged by Pretoria for the trans-Pongola district of KwaZulu.

ORIGINS OF THE INGWAUVUMA LAND DEAL

Although Swaziland has justified its claim to the Ingwavuma district on historical and ethnic grounds, the validity of such arguments is confined to the western part of the district; the Thembe tribal area between the Pongola river and the sea, inhabited by the Thonga people, has never formed part of a greater Swaziland. (See accompanying map) In the NgomeZulu area kinship and historical links with Swaziland do exist and Swaziland has long fuelled a pro-Swazi nationalism in the area. Reports indicate that the NgomeZulu people themselves are divided in their loyalties. In 1976, rivalry between pro-KwaZulu and pro-Swazi factions led to the flight of 'thousands' of Swazi loyalists across the border into Swaziland. (Natal Mercury, 21.08.81) Much of the support for Swaziland appears to come from the ruling group within the tribe and until recently the local chief resisted having a KwaZulu Regional Authority constituted in his territory.

Pretoria's interest in the area appears to date from late 1978 or early 1979 and can be seen as part of the process of trying to revive and refine the consolidation programme that was initiated by the appointment of the van der Walt Commission of Enquiry. As late as August 1978 the Department of Plural Relations was still planning to use the State land in the centre of the Ingwavuma district (the northern reaches of the Makhatini Flats) as compensatory land for Reserve Four which was due to be excised from the 1913 Land Act schedule for Natal. By May 1979 it had abandoned this idea in favour of using land in the Nkandla district as compensation for Reserve Four - clearly, the Ingwavuma land deal had taken on substance in government circles in the



intervening months. As already mentioned the van der Walt Commission was reported in June and again in September 1979 to have proposed the incorporation of Ingwavuma into Swaziland, but these reports provoked little response at the time.

In August 1981 the matter came to the fore when newspapers reported on talks which had been going on between the South African and Swaziland governments for some time on the question of 'boundary adjustments'. (*Natal Mercury*, 19.08.81) What these proposed adjustments amounted to was that Pretoria was considering ceding not only the Ingwavuma district of KwaZulu but the entire Kangwane bantustan to the west of Swaziland to the Swazis. While Pretoria and Mbabane were working towards this objective in obvious harmony - for Pretoria it is a new and more sophisticated variation of well-established tactics of ethnic control - neither Kangwane nor KwaZulu had been consulted and the response of both to the news was vehemently hostile. Buthelezi immediately warned Pretoria that 'it was playing with fire' and threatened to take the matter to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). (*Daily News*, 19.08.81 For a discussion on the Kangwane situation, see volume 5.) He followed this up by releasing details on KwaZulu's own development plan for the area, based on the Tinley/van Riet Report, which called *inter alia* for the establishment of controlled 'resource areas' along all the strategic international boundaries, including the Swazi one. (On this plan, see p. 247)

While the Kangwane issue continued to receive attention - with agreement on the Swazi takeover being described by a 'top source' as 'imminent' in the *Daily News* on the 2nd of March 1982 - that of Ingwavuma receded into the background until early May 1982. Then it exploded into the news again when Chief Buthelezi released details of a placatory - and startling - land deal he had been offered by Pretoria - that in exchange for agreeing to Swaziland taking over the Ingwavuma district, KwaZulu would be given 300 000 ha of land, including both the Umfolosi and Hluhluwe Game Reserves (long claimed by Ulundi) and the State land in the Ubombo district (already promised to KwaZulu in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans, anyway, as described above).

KwaZulu rejected the offer and in so doing and in publicising the deal, it succeeded in provoking a storm within white Natal as well. Both the NRP-controlled Provincial Council and the powerful Natal Parks Board expressed their indignation and strong opposition to the proposals. Even the Nationalist-appointed Administrator in Natal, Stoffel Botha, was disapproving of both the proposals and the unilateral way they had been conceived. Faced with stiff opposition from not only KwaZulu but white Natal as well, Pretoria appeared to back down from its position and announced on May 14th that it no longer intended to pursue the matter.

However, on the 14th June Dr Koornhof - looking 'pale and strained' (*Natal Mercury*, 15.06.82) - announced to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that the land deal would go through, and on June 18th a proclamation excising the Ingwavuma district from KwaZulu in terms of the National States Constitution Act (of 1971) was gazetted. Ten days later a further proclamation excising the district in terms of the Black Administration Act was gazetted, in an attempt to foil legal objections to the validity of the first proclamation raised by a KwaZulu legal team. Their objections to the first proclamation were based on the grounds that Pretoria had not consulted with Ulundi over the proposed alteration to its boundaries, as laid down in the National States Constitution Act.

KWAZULU'S RESPONSE

Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha have led a campaign of resistance to the excision that has resulted in the disputed area being restored to KwaZulu and has boosted their credibility within Natal enormously. After a series of court actions they eventually succeeded in getting the second proclamation excising the district declared finally invalid by the Appeal Court on the 30th September 1982. (This was not the end of the saga since the

validity of the first proclamation, deemed to have been rescinded by the second, had still to be judged. However, in view of the course of the previous legal argument, the outcome looks promising for KwaZulu. The return date for the application concerning the first proclamation was set as the 15th October 1982). Their popular campaign has been characterised by a strongly Zulu-nationalist fervour which has been described in the DSG/SARS publication already cited as 'one of the most serious aspects of this land grab.'

The depressing prospect is that apartheid policies are going to win whichever way the dispute turns out. If Ingwavuma is saved, it will vindicate Buthelezi and Inkatha and their particular brand of ethnic politics. If Ingwavuma goes to Swaziland, KwaZulu will be hurt, and national pride will be roused, again an ethnic reaction. The government will have been able to threaten and perhaps discipline two of its dissident creations (KwaZulu and Kangwane) while never once leaving the arena of ethnic politics. (Ibid, 20)

It has already been noted how vigorously KwaZulu has defended its territorial integrity in respect of Ingwavuma, compared to its feeble response to the excision of Reserve Four, Driefontein and the areas at Sodwana Bay and Paulpietersburg. It seems that the explanation for this lies precisely in this phenomenon of ethnic politics - KwaZulu regarding the incorporation of land formerly controlled by it into Swaziland as far more outrageous, politically threatening and politically easier to exploit than the incorporation of its land into the white area within South Africa.

It has been suggested that Pretoria hoped that the Ingwavuma land deal would, among other things, serve to put pressure on KwaZulu for its recalcitrant stand against taking independence. If that is so, the plan has misfired: Chief Buthelezi's personal standing and Inkatha's position have been considerably strengthened within Natal/KwaZulu as a result of their courtroom victories.

The final outcome of the land deal is not yet clear. Swaziland has made it known that it does not intend to relinquish its claim to the land; although Pretoria has had to retreat temporarily in Ingwavuma, there is no guarantee that it has abandoned its intentions altogether. In its conception the Ingwavuma land deal constitutes a further refinement to Pretoria's strategy to turn as many black South Africans as possible into foreigners - in this case by manipulating a fully independent black state and member of the OAU.

THE SIMDLANGENTSHA DISTRICT

This district occupies an ambiguous position in KwaZulu and its present status has not been finally established. It consists of 68 200 ha of released land (Horrell, 1973, 30), lying across the Pongola River in the Piet Retief district of the Transvaal. It is bordered by Natal in the south and Swaziland in the north and has a population estimated at perhaps 100 000. In the early 1970s it was considered part of the Swazi bantustan but the consolidation plans of 1973 called for it to be excised. However, it was also being shown as an area of KwaZulu and is included as such in the 1970 and subsequent schedules of land falling under the jurisdiction of KwaZulu. However, the 1975 consolidation proposals do not show it as part of KwaZulu and it rarely features on maps of KwaZulu. In September 1982 a local official described its present status as ambiguous - 'The land is South Africa's, but the people are KwaZulu's'. Thus Health Services fall under the control of State Health but education is controlled by KwaZulu. (Golden City Press, 19.09.82)

There has been no mention in any of the reports on the Ingwavuma land deal about the fate of this area but the likelihood that it is a candidate for incorporation into Swaziland as well is very real. Incorporation into Swaziland would be a far more effective way for Pretoria not simply to relocate but to excise the people from white

South Africa and convert them into foreigners. Speculation to this effect is present in the district and at least one well-informed source has stated that it is being discussed at government level. (Fieldwork) It is clearly a matter for urgent investigation. In September 1982 Golden City Press carried a front page story on the possible incorporation of the area into Swaziland but this provoked very little response. It is a forgotten area, falling outside the bounds of Natal itself but yet linked to KwaZulu.



Appendix 1. Reserve areas to be exercised, 1975

The following summary lists reserve areas (i.e. non-freehold) threatened with excision from KwaZulu in terms of the 1975 proposals.

AREA	STATUS	ESTIMATED POPULATION
1. Upper Tugela location, Bergville	Scheduled	80 000
2. Part, Drakensberg Location no. 2, Estcourt	Scheduled	
3. Part, Drakensberg Location no. 1, Estcourt	Scheduled	
4. Farms east of Paulpietersburg	Released	50 000
5. Location no. 3, Bulwer	Scheduled	
6. Location no. 4, Bulwer	Scheduled	
7. Kambi Reserve, Louwsburg	Scheduled	1 400
8. Farms south east of Greytown		
9. Farms east of Greytown		1 000
10. Farms north west of Melmoth		4 000
11. Reserve no. 2 (Mhlekeze), Mkuze	Scheduled	
12. Location no. 5, Ixopo	Scheduled	
13. Ndahleni Mission reserve, Richmond	Scheduled	? 30 000
14. Reserve no. 17, Eshowe	Scheduled	
15. Nommyatuli's Location, Port Shepstone	Scheduled	
16. Farms west of Port Shepstone	Released	
17. Part, Location 5, Port Shepstone	Scheduled	40 000
18. Ifafa Mission and farms	Scheduled	40 000
19. Umahafongwe Mission Reserve, Durban		
20. Farms north west of Durban		
21. Reserve 7a, Gingindlovu	Scheduled	1 500
22. Part, Reserve 17, Empangeni	Scheduled	1 500
23. Part, Reserve 5, Empangeni	Scheduled	
24. Reserve Four	Scheduled	20 000
25. Part, Reserve 12, Hluhluwe	Scheduled	5 000
26. Part, Reserve 3, St Lucia	Scheduled	3 000
27. Reserve 1, (Nibela)	Scheduled	15 000
28. Part, Reserve 14, Sodwana Bay	Scheduled	700

In addition to the above areas within Natal, with a total population estimated at roughly 300 000, there is the Simdlagentsha district of KwaZulu in the Transvaal, on the north bank of the Pongola, with a population estimated as from 100 000 people upwards.

Appendix 2. Natal Mercury report, 18.05.82

The rape of Tongaland

INGWAVUMA, that beautiful, fascinating area in the north-eastern corner of Zululand, was in the news last week.

There is apparently some proposal that it should be handed over to the Government of Swaziland.

It is bounded in the west by the Transvaal and Swaziland, in the north by Mozambique and in the east by the Indian Ocean.

Among its many attractions are the Ndumu Game Reserve, the Pongola River with its many pans, as well as Kosi Bay and Lake Sibaya — some 80 square miles of crystal-clear fresh water separated from the ocean by a narrow strip of bush-covered sand dunes.

The news item has brought memories of the worst day in my official life.

Some four years before World War II, I was asked by my Government to tell the Tongas of Tongaland (known also as Maputaland) that portion of the Ingwavuma district lying between the Lebombo range and the ocean was Crown land destined for occupation by Whites, and that they would have to pay rent.

Distress

These happy, docile, hard-working Tongas were in great distress, no less than my own because I knew by what treachery they had been deprived of their land, together with their only lifeline, the Pongola River.

They said they had never been told of the loss of their land, and asked when it had happened. I said in the year 1904 at the hands of a Natal Government commission.

They asked why they had not been told of this. I had no answer, as I knew that they had never been

told until I, on that disastrous day, had come to tell them.

Tongaland was never part of Zululand, and the Tongas were never at war with Britain as were the Zulus, who were conquered in 1879.

The Tongas, nervous of Portugal and of German colonial aspirations, sought British protection,

By A J TURTON, former Chief Native Commissioner of Natal

and a treaty of amity was negotiated in 1887 by which the Tongas retained their complete independence.

A step further was taken in 1887 when Britain, at their request, incorporated the territory into the Province of Natal. It was never a part of Zululand, except in the geographical sense.

Then came the disaster of 1904 when the Zululand (the italics are mine) Delimitation Commission was appointed to take certain areas from the conquered Zulus for white occupation.

They went further. They moved into Tongaland and declared a huge area on both sides of the Pongola River to be Crown land reserved for whites.

All that was left to the Tongas was the semi-desert area well east of the river, with no water other than the Mozi swamp and Lake Sibaya, and no arable land whatsoever.

The Tongas did not complain. They could not be expected to, as they were never told of the shocking theft, and they continued in peaceful occupation.

When the Lands Act of 1913 confirmed that the land was Crown land for eventual occupation by whites, there was again no complaint from the Tongas as they were not told of the loss of their land.

They continued in occupation, as whites were reluctant to settle there largely on account of the heat, low rainfall and malaria.

By no stretch of imagination had the Zululand Commission any legal or moral right to confiscate land from a tribe whose only fault was trustingly to agree to annexation to the Colony of Natal.

Parliament in 1913, in confirming the confiscation, was almost certainly never informed of the true state of affairs. At least I like to think so.

No whites

As at today whites have not yet moved in and, it is to be hoped, they never will.

At Ulundi last week the Tonga chief rejected any idea of incorporation into Swaziland, and declared his support for KwaZulu.

The Tongas have had no real contact with Swaziland, and they differ in language and customs from the Swazis.

In fact, they controlled the southern portion of Mozambique until in 1875

President McMahon of France, in his capacity as arbitrator, sliced the Tonga territory in half and allotted the northern portion to Portugal.

They apparently saw no omen in this when they entered into negotiations with the British.

It may be of interest to know that the Tonga women and girls speak only siTonga, but understand Zulu.

Conversely, the men and boys speak only Zulu but understand siTonga. The origin of this most unusual custom is apparently unknown.

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N.A.U. DECIDES ON CONSOLIDATION OF LAND IN ZULULAND

THE allocation of adequate land to meet the needs of game and nature preservation, settlement of Bantu (particularly in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936) and for occupation of Europeans in Natal has been given considerable attention for many years by the Natal Agricultural Union. In the context of this overall policy the Union has recommended the rationalisation of land ownership in Zululand by the adjustment of boundaries and the allocation of State-owned land in accordance with the above needs.

Following the 1959 Congress & deputation from the Natal Agricultural Union met the Ministers of Lands, Bantu Administration and Development, Water Affairs, to discuss the specific problems of Zululand. At this meeting the Minister of Lands promised the appointment of an Inter-Departmental Committee of Enquiry to investigate the whole matter, but he pointed out that prior to the functioning of this committee a complete soil survey of the Makatini Flats would have to be undertaken.

All Natal Agricultural Union affiliations in Zululand were asked to finalise any recommendations they might wish to submit to this Committee. A considerable amount of this preparation was done under the auspices of the Zululand Public Bodies and Development Association.

THE PROPOSALS

After receipt of the terms of reference of the Committee a meeting of Natal Agricultural Union affiliations in Zululand was held at Riverview on 20th January, 1962. The majority at this meeting expressed support for the following proposals drawn up by the Land Tenure Committee of the Zululand Public Bodies and Development Association:—

(a) All European owned land in Zululand should remain in

white ownership. This is of particular importance if it is borne in mind that only approximately 16 per cent. of the total area of Zululand is in white ownership.

(b) It is desirable to have an unbroken strip of white-owned land from the Tugela to the Usutu Rivers.

(c) The corridors of white-owned land connecting the districts of Eshowe, Ntumeni, Ntambanana, Nkweleni and Ntonjaneni with the coastal strip, be widened.

(d) The Game Reserves, Nature Reserves and Places of Public Resort (Umfolozi and Hluwe in particular) consisting of land in white ownership, be given access by means of corridors of white-owned land to the white coastal strip.

(e) The present Forestry strip between Bantu Reserves 9 and 10 in particular, as well as other Government Forest areas, remain as White State-owned land.

(f) Main lines of communication, both road and rail should be straddled by white-owned land, and adequate roads and/or branch lines be provided to these communications from the Bantu areas.

(g) Any plan of rationalisation of land ownership should have as

its object the displacement of as few persons as possible.

A SAY FOR ALL

In view of the difference of opinion expressed at this meeting it was decided that it be left to the individual associations to submit their views to the Inter-Departmental Committee thus ensuring that all points of view would be taken into consideration.

GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES

At its meeting on 25th January, 1962, the Executive of the Natal Agricultural Union decided to support the proposals of the Land Tenure Committee, which fit in with the terms of reference of the Inter-Departmental Committee which is investigating the future of State Land in Natal and the extent to which it can be utilised in order to achieve the following objectives:—

(a) The possibility of making available compensatory land in exchange for Bantu Reserves Nos. 1, 2, 13, 15 and 16 (portion);

(b) The possible changing of the boundaries or the exchange of Bantu Reserves Nos. 3 (portion), 4, 5 (portion), 6, 7A and 10 for other land;

(c) The provision of a passage through the southern portion of Bantu Reserve No. 14 to ensure access to Sordwana Bay;

(Continued on page 4)

Zululand Consolidation

(Continued from page 1)

(d) Making available to the S.A. Native Trust as much as possible of the approximately 300,000 morgen of land which, according to the Act, is still to be obtained by the Native Trust in Natal (quota land).

and Development, Mr. M. D. C. de Wet Nel, recently told the Natal Agricultural Union in a letter that this policy decision was receiving his attention.

While welcoming the decision of the Natal Agricultural Union accepting the commitment under the 1936 Act and asking for the removal of "black spots", the Minister has also told the Union that as far as possible its policy towards block buying of land will be implemented but this is not always possible. Development schemes sometimes make it necessary to purchase odd portions of ground.

N.A.U. POLICY

The decision of the Natal Agricultural Union in regard to the allocation of land in Zululand is in accordance with the policy of the Union decided on at its 1961 Congress.

The cornerstones of this policy are:—

1. The farmers of Natal accept the commitment of the 1936 Act — 650,000 acres are still required in Natal and Zululand.

2. Urgent measures be taken to remove "black spots" and compensatory land be found for that purpose by liaison between the N.A.U. Bantu Affairs Committee and the Department of Native Affairs, in consultation with Farmers' Associations in various parts of the province.

3. That block buying of land be the practice and that such buying be part of a planned programme.

4. That as much land as possible be found from the Crown Lands of Zululand to meet the 1936 commitment, provided that the interests of European farmers in Zululand be guarded.

5. That immediate steps be taken to safeguard the water catchment areas, if necessary by obtaining compensatory land in other areas on which to move the local populations.

6. That all land purchased by the Native Trust be done in consultation with the N.A.U.

7. That this Congress requests the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development to suspend the acquisition for Native settlement of European-owned and State Land in Zululand until the delimitation of European areas is settled.

STATE LAND FIRST

The basis of any land settlement in Zululand hinges on the utilisation of State land there to meet, as far as possible, the debt of 650,000 acres owed to the Bantu under the Act of 1936.

While adjustments between European-owned land and Trust land in Natal south of the Tugela will be made with the purpose of eliminating "black spots", rounding off salients of European and Trust land, and providing compensatory land, it is the policy of the Natal Agricultural Union that the bulk of the 650,000 acres be provided from State land in Zululand. The Minister of Bantu Administration

The Minister has promised to give attention to the preservation of watersheds. This protection, he avers, perhaps being better applied in some Bantu settled catchments than in many European areas.

The Minister has reiterated his agreement that all land purchased by the Native Trust will be done in consultation with the Natal Agricultural Union, provided undue delays do not occur.

Development schemes make it impossible for the Minister to suspend, as requested by the Natal Agricultural Union, the acquisition for Native settlement of European-owned or State land in Zululand until the delimitation of European areas is settled.

The Natal Agricultural Union feels that if the consolidation of European-owned land in Zululand is to take place its recommendations offer the least disruption to the lives and economy of the people of the territory of all races. The exchange of only some 45,000 acres of Native Reserve — the balance of the total of 147,000 acres to be excised is State land — involving 14,000 Bantu and not 200,000 as some reports have it, is required to carry out this plan.

Appendix 4. Notes on Groutville

HISTORY

This area of 50 000 acres came into existence as Mission land in 1848, under control of the Congregational Church. The mission was established round a core of five families. In about 1856 the minister in charge began to sell freehold plots to his converts and to non-Christians.

In the 1860s sugar became a commercially viable crop, and with the encouragement of the church people turned over their land to the cultivation of sugar, and soon after a mill was established on the mission. Today about 2/3 of the reserve is held in freehold title in the hands of 180 landowners.

In 1958 the government established a scheme at Groutville whereby plots of 10 acres of Trust land were leased to landless individuals for the sole cultivation of sugar cane.

In 1970 thirty residential plots were set up - these are government tenants with small gardens. There has been a subsequent large influx of people evicted from indian zoned land. The population of the area is put as anywhere between 5 000 and 9 000 people.

A Cane growers association was established by Albert Luthuli in 1936 to promote the interests of Groutville farmers by means of a block quota for Groutville farmers. Today the Groutville Sugar Cane Association has 800 affiliated members.

The mill no longer belongs to the mission reserve, as it has been taken over by one of the sugar companies. In 1978 Groutville farmers delivered 53 000 tons of cane to the mill.

REMOVALS HISTORY

In the mid 1960s plans to clear the area for a proposed airport were put forward. The community responded by holding a church service to honour the minister who was a founder of the community. For reasons unclear to the community the plan was dropped.

In 1972 the community was again threatened with removal. A general meeting was called and a memorandum drawn up and submitted to Pretoria. The document apparently drew attention to the fact that the area had been occupied for a long time, that it had been developed agriculturally by the community, the fact that the community was attached to the graves of its ancestors, and the nearby burial site of Shaka. No reply or acknowledgement was received from Pretoria, but the threat was dropped.

Early in 1979 a house to house census was conducted by BAD officials. This was regarded by the community as a preparation for removals. The community felt that the government was using illegal shack dwellers as a pretext for getting rid of landowners as well.

Two members of the KwaZulu government were invited to meet with the people and the outcome of this meeting was the proposal that Groutville should remain in KwaZulu.

In March 1979 Dr Treurnicht announced in Parliament that Groutville would have to be moved to Langespruit near Mapumulo - a smaller area of land and more difficult to cultivate. Newspaper reports indicated that a delegation consisting of Groutville members and Dr Mdlalose were to meet Koornhof. According to a research report on the area the

chief autocratically appointed a number of delegates and since it was felt that these men did not properly represent the interests of the farmers, the delegation foundered on general mistrust of the motivation behind it.

According to news reports the decision to make representations to Koornhof was taken by the KwaZulu cabinet.

Buthlezi told the press that KwaZulu did not approve of the movement of people and, bound by a 1972 decision of the Legislative Assembly, could not participate in the shunting around of people. KwaZulu, he maintained, felt very strongly about the fact that sugar cane was the only cash crop among the african people. Dr Mdlalose stated in a news report that this land is worth 'at least R10m'.

On the 24th March 1979 Buthlezi conveyed to the press that he had met with Koornhof and that Koornhof had said that if the people of Groutville did not want to move they must be left alone. But no promises had been given that the people would not be moved against their will according to Dr Mdlalose. The delegation of Groutville members and Dr Mdlalose had not yet met with Koornhof and Buthlezi had said that the Minister had indicated he would be happy to see them.

The NRP MP for Umhlanga called for action to improve living conditions for Groutville residents. His party did not approve of the development of 'festering squatter camps'.

The removal was frozen due to the direct intervention of Buthlezi and it is now thought likely that Groutville will be consolidated into KwaZulu.

Acknowledgements: Newspapers

Kiernan, J. : A social anthropological study of African sugar cane growers, 1981.

6. URBAN RELOCATION

The categories of urban relocation, influx control and removals in terms of legislation designed to eradicate or control informal settlement - the categories dealt with in the three ensuing chapters - are interlinked. All three have been used to limit and control african access to the towns and cities of South Africa, so as to exclude the 'unproductive' (the wives and families of workers, the aged, the unemployed) and to bind african people to one or other of the bantustan/national states. The Group Areas Act, used mainly against coloured and indian people, has also been used against africans living in urban areas outside of proclaimed townships, to force them to move either into segregated townships or out of the prescribed area altogether. Further research is needed to draw out the interrelationships and points of difference between these various categories and the way they have been applied in Natal; they are treated here descriptively rather than analytically, as separate sub-categories within the broad context of urban political geography in Natal.

1. Background to urban relocation in Natal

GENERAL CIRCULAR NO. 25, 1967

The policy of urban relocation - the deproclamation of african townships falling within prescribed (urban) areas and the removal of their residents to newly created townships (described euphemistically as towns) in the bantustans - got under way systematically from the late 1960s. Previously certain removals of african people out of the central city area of Durban had taken place between 1959 and 1962: three hostels in central Durban, with a combined population of 8 240, some tenants at the township of Chesterville as well as the small township of Baumannville were all moved out to the newly established township of KwaMashu. These removals predated the establishment of KwaZulu, however - KwaMashu still fell within the metropolitan area of Durban - and appear to have related to an earlier phase of urban segregation rather than to urban relocation as it developed subsequently.

General Circular no. 25 of 1967 presented urban relocation as one of the methods for ensuring that 'the Bantu are only temporarily resident in the European areas of the Republic, for as long as they offer their labour there' when it listed the four types of relocation settlements to be developed in the bantustans. The first of these types - 'self-contained Bantu towns in the homelands' - was described as

- Mainly developed in accordance with Government policy as substitutes for the municipal Bantu residential areas of European towns or cities situated near the boundaries of the homelands, or to provide accommodation to Bantu (and their families) employed in industries founded in the border areas.
- (Quoted in Maré, 1980, Appendix 5, 76)

Workers moved to these substitute residential areas would either commute daily from the bantustans to their places of work or live in single hostels in the towns where they were working and return home weekly or monthly. In 1971 the Deputy Minister of BAD said

it was feasible for workers to commute up to 113 km daily between points - i.e. 226 km round trip. (Quoted in Horrell, 1973, 139) Subsequently the criteria were slightly softened and the standard guideline that came to be adopted was that where there was a bantustan within 80 km of a town, the african township of that town should be relocated across the boundary.

In Natal, because of the fragmentation of the african reserves across the province, most major towns are situated well within 80 km of KwaZulu. In 1969 a Ph. D. student at the University of Potchefstroom noted that

Whereas the patchwork nature of Bantu areas in Natal is a stumbling block on the way to political development, it is, with an eye to township creation, an advantage because it is located relatively close to white development areas. (Quoted in Maré, 1980, 27)

This 'advantage' has been used since about 1968 in three ways that relate to urban relocation:

1. Various townships in Natal have either been deproclaimed and removed to new townships established inside KwaZulu, or placed under threat of such removal - the classic type of urban relocation as described above. This form of relocation, although not officially abandoned, appears to have lumbered to a halt in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
2. The boundaries of KwaZulu have been or are to be manipulated so as to incorporate townships formerly falling within the white area into KwaZulu without involving any physical removal of people - a variation of urban relocation that has affected many more people in Natal than has the first type.
3. As outlined in General Circular no. 25, new townships planned to serve the metropolitan areas of Natal have been established on land that either is or is to become part of KwaZulu. As with the strategy of incorporating already existing townships into the boundaries of KwaZulu, this process does not involve the deproclamation and removal of townships as such, but achieves the same end: Natal's urban african population is located inside KwaZulu, their status in the province's urban-industrial centres reduced to that of commuters, not permanent urban residents.

2. Deproclamation and removal of townships

TOWNSHIPS REMOVED

In 1968 the Minister of BAD presented Parliament with impressive statistics for 40 towns that had been planned for KwaZulu, to house an eventual population of 851 700 people. (SAIRR Natal, 45/1968) Of these only 15, with a total population of 164 712, had been established at that stage and at least three hardly qualified as townships - Ndoleni, a mission community (subsequently threatened with removal), Mpungamhlophe, a relocation closer settlement in the Babanango district and Vulandondo, a relocation closer settlement near Ladysmith that was subsequently removed. Since then there has been marked growth in the urban population of KwaZulu but of the 40 actual and projected townships in 1968 only about half could be considered formal townships in 1982. The remainder are either closer settlements (without formal township housing) or have never been developed. (See Appendix 1 for an updated summary of the 1968 statistics.)

At about this time, and in keeping with the plan to provide urban housing in the bantustans only, housing programmes were frozen - i.e. no more houses were to be built - in a large number of the already established townships in white Natal. This was presumably

in anticipation of their deproclamation and eventual removal. Townships affected in this way included those at Colenso, Dundee, Glencoe, Greytown, Ladysmith, Mooi River, Paulpietersburg, Umzinto, Vryheid and the Pietermaritzburg township of Sobantu.

Compared to the number of townships earmarked for removal, the actual process of elimination and relocation did not proceed particularly rapidly in Natal in the 1970s. More research, particularly on the role of local municipalities and the Administration Boards in this regard, is required. It is possible that given the scale of black spot and farm removals taking place in the early 1970s in Natal there was not sufficient money to build as many of the 'substitute' townships in KwaZulu as required. Much of the 'township development' taking place in KwaZulu at this time was of the closer settlement variety, as already pointed out, and much of the housing that was being built in the relocation townships that were established (Bilanyoni, Ezakheni, Madadeni, Osizweni, etc.) was being used to rehouse former black spot residents or, in some cases, ex labour tenants.

SPP has managed to trace six townships definitely deproclaimed and relocated during this period: Utrecht, to Osizweni in about 1968; Estcourt, to Wembezi in the late 1960s and early 1970s; Umlazi Glebe, an Emergency Camp in Durban, in 1970; Newcastle, deproclaimed in 1973 and shifted out to Madadeni, along with the african freehold areas of Fairleigh and Lennoxton; Margate, to Gamalakhe in the mid 1970s and Harding, to Kwa-Mbono in 1980/81. In addition the township of Dannhauser was deproclaimed in 1969 and it seems was probably removed - there is some confusion over this however, as there is still an Emergency Camp at Dannhauser, established in 1964.

The above list refers to completed relocations; sections of the Ladysmith township were moved to Ezakheni in the early 1970s and Zenzele township at Howick is in the process of being relocated to Mphophomeni as well. (This latter removal is expected to be completed in the near future. For an account of an individual act of defiance to the removal of Zenzele see Appendix 2.) Combining the official and estimated population figures for these various townships one reaches a total of between 15 and 18 thousand people removed from deproclaimed townships in Natal since 1968.⁺

TOWNSHIPS UNDER THREAT

Because of the relatively small number of completed urban removals in this period, there are still a large number of townships under threat. Since the announcement of the 99 year leasehold scheme (discussed below) a small number of townships previously under threat have apparently been reprieved, but there are still an estimated 61 000 people, living in 14 townships and 3 Emergency Camps, under threat of relocation if the official statements of intent in this regard are to be taken seriously. The 14 townships that SPP has been able to identify are those at Cedarville, Colenso, Dundee, Chesterville in Durban, Glencoe, Greytown, Ladysmith, Mooi River, Paulpietersburg, Klaarwater in Pinetown, Stanger, Umzinto, Vryheid and the remainder of Zenzele township at Howick. The three emergency camps - all established as temporary transit camps in the 1960s are those of Dannhauser, Weenen and Winterton.[‡]

⁺ For details on these and the other townships mentioned see the summaries below.

[‡] The Weenen Emergency Camp has been classified as a relocation site earlier in this report since people were definitely removed from an established settlement into it. The Winterton and Dannhauser Camps have not been classified as such. It appears the Winterton Camp was established to house local workers living in shacks, back yards etc.; no details on the Dannhauser Camp are known.

There is considerable confusion over the status of these various townships but it seems, at the time of writing, that officially they are all still under threat of removal. In 1981 in response to a question asked in Parliament Dr Koornhof confirmed that the townships of Vryheid, Paulpietersburg, Dundee, Glencoe, Ladysmith and Chesterville were to be removed 'where it is considered to be expedient and in the best interests of the communities concerned' and 'as and when alternative accommodation becomes available pending a final decision on their removal.' (Hansard, Question 213, 1.10.81) The proposed removal of Chesterville was reconfirmed in early August 1982. (*Natal Mercury*, 6.08.82) In September 1981 the Chief Commissioner for Natal stated that the township of Shakaville at Stanger was to be removed 'as soon as possible after the outstanding housing loans ... have been redeemed.' (Letter to PNAB, 17.09.81) In April 1982 it was announced that the removal was being 're-investigated' (Hansard, Question 5, 21.04.82) but in May 1982 officials told the community that they would be removed after all. (Fieldwork) According to information gathered by SPP in the course of fieldwork, the intention to remove the townships of Klaarwater at Pinetown and Shayamoya at Umzinto has not been altered.

It seems that in all the above townships, except those at Greytown and Paulpietersburg, the freeze on housing that was first introduced in 1968 is still in force - although the DAB was reported to be making quite extensive improvements to the public facilities available in several of the townships in 1980/81. Because the housing position is still frozen the existing housing stock has become desperately overcrowded and run down. This has had a demoralising effect on many residents and, coupled with the general uncertainty about the future, has encouraged some residents either to move to a more secure situation inside KwaZulu or to accept their pending removal as the lesser of two evils. The township of Shakaville, for instance, was built in 1946 and consists of 189 houses, most of them two-roomed, without internal running water or flush sanitation. On a fieldtrip to the area in July 1981 SPP was told by community leaders who are fighting the threatened removal that 'improvements are promised but never made.'

Yet despite the present neglect of these areas, the position with regard to their long-term future appears to be more fluid now than it was in the early 1970s. Considerable confusion and uncertainty about their future is apparent among the residents of these townships, and the official viewpoint too appears to be vacillatory.

THE INTRODUCTION OF 99 YEAR LEASEHOLD

To some extent this can be interpreted against the background of policy shifts at a national level. Since the late 1970s the State has been forced to retreat from its previous rigid commitment to the viewpoint that all africans in urban areas were to be regarded as temporary sojourners who eventually would be relocated within the bantustans. It has now embarked on a more expedient policy of differentiation, by which a very small class of urban residents are to be recognised as permanent, with certain privileges in relation to jobs, housing and mobility and cut off from the great majority of african people whose exclusion is to be more rigorously policed and controlled. The first signs of this came in 1978 with the announcement that a system of 99 year leasehold tenure for qualified people in selected urban areas was to be introduced. The proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, introduced in the 1982 parliamentary session, takes this a further step forward. This Bill introduces the category of 'permanent urban residents' in place of those formerly qualifying for permanent residence in terms of Section 10(1) of the Urban Areas Act and extends to this tiny, regulated group, the privileges described above.⁺

⁺ For a brief synopsis of this Bill in relation to urban areas, see Appendix 1 to the chapter on influx control.

At the time it was made, the announcement of 99 year leasehold appeared to hold out the promise of a reprieve to qualified residents in certain of the threatened townships in Natal. Paulpietersburg township, Steadville township at Ladysmith, Sobantu township in Pietermaritzburg, Hambanathi township at Tongaat, Lamontville in Durban and the township at Matatiele have been mentioned at various times since 1978 as places where this form of leasehold tenure is to be introduced. However, despite various promises, no such tenure has been introduced at Paulpietersburg, Greytown or Ladysmith as yet and, as described above, Dr Koornhof has confirmed that all three are among the townships to be relocated at some stage.

It appears now that the number of townships that will benefit from the 99 year leasehold scheme in Natal is small. In October 1981 the Natal Mercury quoted the chairman of the DAB as saying that the board 'would soon be in a position to sell modern houses' on the 99 year leasehold scheme in only three areas - at Sobantu, Matatiele and Greytown. (17.10.81) Of the townships still falling under the jurisdiction of the PNAB only Hambanathi, at Tongaat, and Lamontville, in Durban, appear to be candidates for the scheme. Even in those areas thus singled out there have been numerous delays in the implementation of the scheme which have angered and frustrated residents. By October 1981 no 99 year leases had been registered in any of the townships run by the two Administration Boards in Natal. (Natal Mercury, 1.10.81) In August 1982 the PNAB announced that because of 'unexpected legal hitches' and snags in purchasing land, 99 year leases would not be in operation in either Hambanathi or Lamontville for at least two years. (Natal Mercury, 7.08.82)

OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELAY IN REMOVALS

Although more research is required on this it appears that it has been mainly local factors that have served to delay the process of urban relocation in this province and that the ultimate intention in Pretoria is still to remove as many of the townships remaining outside KwaZulu as possible. Four such delaying factors are listed below.

1. Consolidation: Uncertainty about the final boundaries of KwaZulu has been mentioned by officials at both a local and more senior level as a reason for delaying the relocation of townships: the implication being that no suitable relocation point for these areas can be fixed until the boundaries of KwaZulu are finalised.
2. Finance: In a memorandum published by the Department of Community Development with the Budget in 1981 it was calculated that it would take R411 million a year to wipe out the backlog in black housing (outside the bantustans) within the next ten years. (Natal Witness, 13.08.81) In the debate on his department's budget the Minister for Community Development said 'it was impossible for the State to finance the housing backlog' of 85 000 units for whites, coloureds and indians and 160 000 units for africans. (Natal Mercury, 15.09.81) At the same time KwaZulu does not have the financial resources needed to cope with the enormous backlog of housing in the townships already administered by it - 'conservatively estimated' at 100 000 units in April 1982. (Natal Mercury, 23.04.82)

In addition to the lack of funds available to finance new township development, in general, a major factor advanced for delaying the removal of the townships of, inter alia, Dundee, Glencoe, Chesterville and Stanger has been that the original loans advanced by the State towards the establishment of these townships have not yet been redeemed. Local community councils have been informed on several occasions that only once this has happened will their townships be abolished. This is still some time away - 1992 has been advanced as the earliest date by which this can be anticipated to happen.

3. Local authorities: The available evidence suggests that both Administration

Boards in Natal (the DAB and the PNAB) appear cautiously sympathetic to the appeals from local township leaders that their communities be allowed to stay. Several municipalities too, notably at Dundee, Glencoe and Stanger, have come out in support of the retention of their local townships. This does not signify a willingness to expand the townships beyond their present boundaries, only to allow those qualified to be there to remain. It appears that in the case of Steadville township at Ladysmith there is a difference of opinion between the DAB on the one hand, which is in favour of retaining the township within the municipal area of Ladysmith, and the local Town Council on the other, which wants the area cleared and the people relocated to Ezakheni 25 km away.

4. Resistance from communities: Opposition to their proposed removal has been voiced in most of the threatened townships but has tended to take a very low-key form and it is not clear what effect this has had on official policy. This opposition has been directed mainly along official lines, through existing Community Councils or Advisory Boards in the townships and mediated either by the Administration Boards or by Ulundi. One of the more publicised campaigns has been that at Shakaville, Stanger, where a key factor in the campaign has been the township's historical siting, at 'the birthplace of the Zulu nation', the former home of Shaka. (See Appendix 3.) Residents have repeatedly reiterated their objections to being moved, most recently to officials in May 1982. In many areas, as already described, the overcrowded and dilapidated living conditions that have been allowed to develop have acted as a form of indirect pressure on residents to move by themselves and this has made the task of mobilising popular opposition more difficult.

The interplay of these factors, taken in the context of the State's new strategy of concessions to a very limited urban middle class, may mean that some of the communities presently under threat will not be moved: particularly those where local opposition is strong and there is outside attention as well. However, even if all the threatened townships win a reprieve, this will not represent any major breakthrough in policy. The numbers of people involved are small compared to the rest of the african population who, as described below and in the subsequent chapters on influx control and informal settlement, are not being permitted to settle in the urban areas except in townships located in KwaZulu.

3. Location of townships inside Kwazulu

This, as already mentioned, has been achieved in two ways - 1) by extending the boundaries of KwaZulu to incorporate already established townships that formerly fell in prescribed areas and 2) by locating all new township development inside KwaZulu.

INCORPORATION THROUGH BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS

This was first demonstrated, most dramatically, when the township of KwaMashu in Durban was incorporated into KwaZulu in April 1977. Without any physical removal of people, the boundary of KwaZulu was amended to extend around KwaMashu, former residents of Durban, with Section 10 rights, were excised from the prescribed area and turned into 'commuters', and the total urban population of KwaZulu was increased by about one third. (The implications of the loss of Section 10 rights are discussed in the chapter on influx control.) KwaMashu had been established as a relocation township on the edge of Durban in the late 1950s; both squatters, many from the Cato Manor area in central Durban, and people moved from former townships and freehold areas in the city were relocated there. At the time of its incorporation into KwaZulu its population was set officially at 145 000 but unofficial estimates put it as high as 200 000.

Numerically then this form of urban relocation has proved far more significant in Natal than the deproclamation and physical removal of townships. It has been announced that a similar process is to be applied to the township of Clermont near Pinetown, with a population of 60 000 (Natal Mercury, 6.08.82) although the Chief Commissioner for Natal has stated that this is not imminent. (Natal Mercury, 7.08.82) It is also likely that the small Durban township of Lamontville will be excised in this way. Lamontville is one of two townships left in the prescribed area of Durban (the other is Chesterville) and the only one not yet officially earmarked for removal. Dr Koornhof has denied in Parliament that the State intends to remove it (Hansard, Question 213, 1.10.81); it appears that the 99 year leasehold scheme is eventually to be implemented there. Several observers have speculated that the reason why Lamontville has been left unscathed is that it can conveniently be incorporated into the Umlazi area of KwaZulu at some stage in the future.

The excision of KwaMashu in 1977 has its parallels with the attempted excision of the Ingwavuma district in 1982. In the latter case the same principle of exclusion of people without removal was being tried for a whole district and the boundary being amended was an international one.

TOWNSHIP DEVELOPMENT INSIDE KWAZULU

All the new township development for africans that has taken place in the metropolitan areas of Natal in the 1970s has been inside KwaZulu: the patchwork of Natal/KwaZulu being carefully used to ensure that the urban african population qualifying for Section 10 rights in Natal is kept so small as to be insignificant. In the Durban/Pinetown area the new townships of Ntuzuma, KwaDabeka and KwaNdengezi and, most recently the site and service scheme at Inanda Newtown (described in detail in the case study in Part Three) have all been developed on land to be handed over to KwaZulu. The new townships built to serve the expanding industrial centre and harbour of Richards Bay - Esikhawini and Nseleni - are built inside KwaZulu. Similarly at Pietermaritzburg, the township of Imbali has been built on SADT land that is to be handed over to KwaZulu.

One of the major implications of the location of Natal's urban african population inside KwaZulu is that the provisions of the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill relating to 'permanent urban residents' will barely apply in the province since very few africans enjoy Section 10 rights in Natal as it is.

4. Urban relocation in Natal: a summary

The following summaries set out the information on urban relocation in Natal as follows:

1. Townships moved
2. Townships under threat
3. Townships where reprieve promised.

1. TOWNSHIPS MOVED (chronological order)

TOWNSHIP	DATE MOVED	EST. POP.	MOVED TO
1. Baumannville, Durban	Deprocl. 1962; removals started late 1950s	120 hh	KwaMashu
2. Durban hostels: 1) Bell Street 2) Ordnance Rd 3) Somtseu Rd	1) & 2) in 1959; 3) in 1962	8 240	KwaMashu hostels

TOWNSHIP	DATE MOVED	EST. POP.	MOVED TO
3. Chesterville tenants	1959	?	KwaMashu
4. Utrecht	c. 1968	4 000	Osizweni
5. Ladysmith Township (part)	Deprocl. 1967,	?	Ezakheni
6. Dannhauser	Deprocl. 1969	?	?
7. Estcourt township	Late 1960s/early 1970s; 1 200 remained in hostels	Several thousand	Wembezi
8. Umlazi Glebe, Durban	1970		? Was an Emergency Camp (procl. 1949) and moved to make way for hostels
9. Newcastle location ⁺	Deprocl. 1973	2 000	Madadeni
10. KwaMashu, Durban	Not physically moved but incorporated KZ 1977	Officially 145 000 in 1977, but est. at 200 000	KZ boundaries redrawn around it.
11. Margate township	Deprocl. c. 1975	277 hh	Gamalakhe; Bhobhoyi and Murchison (informal). Only KZ citizens allowed into Gamalakhe & many Transkeians excluded.
12. Zenzele, Howick	Late 1970s. Removals continuing	Several thousand	Mphophomeni
13. Masinenga, Harding	1980/81 Hostels remained	66 hh	KwaMbono

2. TOWNSHIPS UNDER THREAT (Towns in alphabetical order)

TOWNSHIP	EST. POP.	PROPOSED REMOVAL TO	POSITION
1. Cedarville	154 (1980)	? Into Transkei	Housing unfrozen but 1981 possibility of removal rumoured.
2. Inkanyezi, Colenso	1 226 - 993 + 233 in hostels	Ezakheni	Housing frozen; Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed, 1981.
3. Dannhauser Emergency Camp	1 319 (1980)	?	Procl. 1964. Future not known but status of temporary Emergency Camp still.
4. Sibongile, Dundee	7 977 - 6 109 + 1 868 in hostels (1980)	Nqutu/Flint Farm	Deprocl. 1967; housing frozen. Threat surfaced 1977 and predicted would be removed by 1980/81. 99 yr leasehold refused, later verbal promise would be offered. Community Council opposed to removal. Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed, 1981.

⁺ Does not include freehold areas of Fairleigh and Lennoxton, moved between 1961 and 1970 and classified as black spots.

TOWNSHIP	EST. POP.	PROPOSED REMOVAL TO	POSITION
5. Chesterville, Durban	1 265 hh, 10 500 pop.	Ntuzuma	Built 1940; housing frozen 1945 with 1 265 houses. Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed 1981. PNAB in August 1982 said not to be moved for 10 years.
6. Thembalihle, Glencoe	4 490 - 3 657 + 833 in hostels (1980)	Nqutu/Flint Farm	Deprocl. 1967; housing frozen. In similar position to nearby Sibongile township, Dundee
7. Enhlalakahle, Greytown	4 114 - 3 739 + 375 in hostels (1980)	Keates Drift?	Housing frozen till 1977 when 100 new houses announced. DAB built council chamber, library, hostels & tennis court 1980/81. Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed 1981.
8. Zenzele, Howick	1 008	Being removed to Mphophomeni	Removals to be completed 1982.
9. Steadville, Ladysmith	8 227 - 6 802 + 1 425 in hostels (1980)	Ezakeni	Housing frozen; 1980 promised 99 yr leasehold and reprieve anticipated but not yet assured. Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed, 1981.
10. Bruntville, Mooi River	4 265 - 3 433 + 832 in hostels (1980)	?	Housing frozen; DAB built library 1980/81. Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed.
11. Dumbe, Paulpietersburg	c. 3 000 (1979)	Mondlo/ Babanango district?	Housing frozen, then unfrozen & 99 yr lease promised (Natal Witness, 31.03.80) Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed, 1981, however.
12. Clermont, Pinetown	60 000	To be incorpor- ated into KZ when boundary redrawn. Date of transfer not finalised - Chief Commis- sioner, August 1982.	Freehold plus township & some informal settlement. (Demolitions in 1978).
13. Klaarwater, Pinetown	c. 2 000	KwaNdengezi/ KwaDabeka?	To be removed after 1992.
14. Shakaville, Stanger	c. 2 000	Bulwer Trust Farm	Housing frozen & reported to be removed after 1992. Local opposition & April 1982 're-investigation' announced; May 1982 removal confirmed.
15. Shayamoya, Umzinto	small	?	Housing frozen and to be removed.
16. Bhokuzulu, Vryheid	7 864 (1980)	Mondlo	Housing frozen. Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed, 1981. Community Council opposed to removal.
17. Weenen Emergency Camp	896	?	Future not known, but status of temporary Emergency Camp.
18. Winterton Emergency Camp	53 hh + 33 in hostel (1982)	'awaiting final consoli- dation pro- posals' (DAB)	Established 1961 to house local workers but only procl. as Emergency Camp 1982.

3. TOWNSHIPS WHERE REPRIEVE PROMISED

TOWNSHIP	POPULATION	POSITION
1. Lamontville, Durban		Was under threat but now offered 99 year leasehold. Threat of incorporation into KZ still remains.
2. Bangweni, Kokstad	4 043 - 3 688 + 355 in hostels (1980)	Housing never frozen; DAB upgrading area.
3. Matatiele	781 - 655 + 126 in hostels (1980)	Housing unfrozen; DAB upgrading area. 99 year leasehold promised.
4. Sobantu, Pietermaritzburg	11 713 (1980)	Under threat till c. 1979 when housing unfrozen; 99 yr leasehold promised 1981.
5. Hambanathi, Tongaat		December 1980 Minister C & D said would remain and 99 year leasehold to be instituted.



Appendix 1. Towns in Kwazulu 1968-1982

The following summary sets out the list of planned/established townships for Kwazulu that was provided by the Minister of BAD in Parliament in 1968, and describes the current status of those areas.

Sources: SAIRR NR 45/1968; Hansard, col. 354, 24.07.70 and fieldwork.


TOWNSHIPS PROPOSED/ ESTABLISHED 1968	POPULATION IN MAY 1968	POPULATION IN DECEMBER 1970	CURRENT STATUS
1. Annandale, Dannhauser	-	-	Never established. A bs by this name apparently removed in the 1960s.
2. Appelbosch, New Hanover	-	-	Was a bs by this name in 1960s which apparently consolidated into KZ now. Level of development not known - is a school & teachers' college.
3. Bulwer, Stanger	-	-	Relocation closer settlement, establ. c. 1980. Under threat.
4. Clermont, Pinetown	1 500	1 500	Township of c. 60 000 (freehold & informal settlement too). Not yet incorporated into KZ but this planned.
5. Dassenhoek, Pinetown	-	-	Township of KwaNdengezi establ. in 1977; pop. of c. 1 400 hh in 1981.
6. Gezinsila, Eshowe	1 150	1 111	Township. People living in local informal settlement moved into it.
7. Hluhluwe, Hlabisa	-	-	? Is a town called KwaMsane in Hlabisa district but very small; it serves Mtubatuba.
8. Josini, Ingwavuma	-	-	? Construction of Josini Dam has led to establ. of a construction town; also an army base.
9. KwaMakhutha, Umbumbulu	6 846	7 061	Township with informal settlement adjacent.
10. Kwezi, Alfred	-	-	Small relocation closer settlement of KwaMbono established 1980/81.
11. In Location 3, Umzinto	-	-	Does not appear this ever established.
12. Madadeni, Newcastle	11 922	15 841	Relocation township.
13. Magabeni, Umbumbulu	2 508	2 784	Township establ. in 1950s to house SAICCOR workers at Umkomaas; now c. 562 hh.

TOWNSHIPS PROPOSED/ ESTABLISHED 1968	POPULATION IN MAY 1968	POPULATION IN DECEMBER 1970	CURRENT STATUS
14. Mondlo, Nqutu	4 986	7 658	Relocation township.
15. Montrose, Howick	-	428	Relocation township of Mphophomeni establ. late 1960s.
16. Woody Glen, Camperdown	534	12 375	Relocation/border industry township of Mpumalanga.
17. Mpungamhlophe, Babanango	516	1 500	Relocation closer settlement, establ. 1959.
18. Mtubatuba, Hlabisa	?	?	See no. 7 above.
19. Ncotshane, Piet Retief	1 286	1 823	? More fieldwork necessary.
20. Ndaleni, Richmond	318	900	Black spot/mission reserve under threat by consolidation.
21. Ngoye, Mtunzini	-	-	Township of KwaDlangezwa establ. in 1970s adjacent to University of Zululand.
22. Ngwelezana, Empangeni	4 026	6 400	Township.
23. Nkwadini, Melmoth	-	-	Does not appear this ever established.
24. Nondweni, Nqutu	-	-	Relocation closer settlement establ. c. 1975.
25. Nseleni, Empangeni	-	-	Township.
26. Nthandeni, Mapumulo	-	-	? Relocation closer settlement of Ntunjambili establ. 1979.
27. Ntuzuma, Verulam	-	-	Relocation township establ. 1973.
28. Osizweni, Newcastle	11 622	8 798	Relocation township.
29. Pieters, Ladysmith	-	-	Relocation township of Ezakheni establ. 1972.
30. Platt Estates, Ixopo	-	-	Never established.
31. In Reserve, Mahlabathini	-	-	Township and KZ capital of Ulundi establ. late 1970s.
32. In Reserve, Port Shepstone	-	-	Relocation township of Gamalakhe establ. mid 1970s.
33. In Reserve 21, Eshowe	-	-	Does not appear ever establ.
34. Rietvallei, Camperdown	-	-	Not identified.
35. Sundumbili, Eshowe	3 024	4 336	Dormitory township for KZ growth point of Isithebe.
36. Umlazi, Umbumbulu	99 684	121 598	Township.
37. Vulandondo, Ladysmith	1 290	1 584	Relocation closer settlement, removed 1972.

TOWNSHIPS PROPOSED/ ESTABLISHED 1968	POPULATION IN MAY 1968	POPULATION IN DECEMBER 1970	CURRENT STATUS
38. Waaihoek, Ladysmith	-	-	Relocation closer settle- ment of Ekuvukeni establ. 1972.
39. Loch Sloy, Estcourt	-	375	Relocation township of Wembezi establ. c. 1969.
40. Zandbult, Dundee	-	-	? Limehill relocation closer settlement - but that establ. 1968.

Notes:

1. The 1968 list does not include the townships of Imbali, Pietermaritzburg (which has been built on SADT land in stages since 1975) and of KwaDabeka, Pinetown, established in the late 1970s.
2. More details on the relocation townships are found in the summaries at the beginning of Part Two.



Appendix 2. Natal Witness report, 20.08.81

'I stay where my roots are'

by Thandi Moses

MR Velaphi Mkhize — whose house at Zenzele, near Howick, was demolished by the Drakensberg Administration Board (DAB) over a year ago — is still refusing to budge from the land his family has occupied for generations.

At the moment he is barely surviving in a crude construction made out of two old car bonnets and a piece of corrugated iron (see picture on left). But he's determined not to move and said he would rather die or spend the rest of his life in jail than leave the place of his birth.

Early last year the DAB moved in and served evic-

tion orders on all the residents of Zenzele because it had been declared a "black spot" in a white area. They were all offered alternative accommodation at Mpophomeni — a township in which they were to be resettled.

Mr Mkhize, who had been living in his self-built home for more than 30 years, refused a township house on the grounds that he would not be able to pay the rent, as he was unemployed. He said he was an asthmatic, and had been certified medically unfit to work. It was only his farming activities that had kept him alive since February 1979, when he stopped working.

In the middle of last year he was locked out of his home by the DAB officials and a week later they demolished his house.

Undeterred Mr Mkhize, who was intent on staying at his old site, pitched a tent and stayed there with his dog. A few days later, he says, the DAB officials pulled his tent down. He claims his dog was killed at the same time.

In October, he told Echo, he was incarcerated for squatting on the property from which he had been

evicted, and he remained in jail for three months. On his release in December he had to start from scratch as his few possessions had vanished.

It was then that he constructed his bonnet-and-iron "home," which has sheltered him throughout the icy winter.

Mr Mkhize told Echo that he could not understand why blacks are always moved from one place to another — "the other" normally being a barren tract of land with no job opportunities.

Evicted

Mr G. Rix, the DAB Townships Superintendent, confirmed that Mr Velaphi Mkhize was one of those evicted from Zenzele early last year. He also confirmed that his house had been demolished because he had refused to move. Mr Rix said, however, that he did not know why Mr Mkhize had been arrested.

He added that Mr Mkhize had been offered alternative accommodation despite the fact that he owed the DAB rent for eight months. "It's unfortunate that Mr Mkhize turned down our offer," he said.

Appendix 3. Letter of appeal, Shakaville

The following letter was drawn up by members of the Shakaville Advisory Board and sent via the offices of the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior in August 1981.

The Hon. Deputy Minister
Dept of Cooperation & Development
PRETORIA.

Dear Hon. Sir

RE: SHAKAVILLE RESIDENTS OBJECTION TO THEIR REMOVAL.

Some time in July 1981 a copy of a Memorandum was given to members of the Shakaville Advisory Board. In this Memorandum an impression was created that residents of Shakaville were willing to be removed from their homes. As a result a public meeting was held on the 29th July 1981. The residents of Shakaville expressed their strong opposition to the removal of this township.

The following were the main points stressed at this meeting:-

1. Shakaville in Stanger (or Dukuza as is known by the Zulus) is the birth place of the Zulu Nation.

The Mighty King Shaka lived here and so were his subjects who surrounded their King. The ruins of their homes and Kraals which were built here were still noticeable at this Shakaville Township when it was first established in this area.
2. King Shaka's Tomb Stone which is so highly valued by all Zulus cannot be left surrounded only by non-Zulus. This would be tantamount to the destruction of the birth place of the Zulus. King Shaka is the Founder of the Zulu Nation.
3. Mbozamo River - is where the King washed and the Tshelenkosi was so named because it is where he relaxed and also this served as a Fortress. After this stone the present Tshelenkosi School was named.
4. A well or Spring from which his drinking water was fetched is still in existence even now at Mbozamo.
5. Memorial School.

The present school is a token of appreciation from the white sector to the Zulu Nation for having sacrificed their lives and for having died for the country during the last world war 1939-1945. The graves of some local soldiers are standing at the local cemetery - and some of them still live with us in the township. It seems to us ridiculous that the Republican Government should destroy the living sign of appreciation by the White Sector, of Zulu participation in the last world war.

6. This location was established in 1946 and in 1947 residents were promised that its borders would extend to the Doesberg Road and to College Road. Although these areas are now occupied by other racial groups the Zulus in Shakaville have not complained. It is now hurtful

and surprising to note that Zulus are being driven off from Shakaville.

7. The spirit of cooperation between the Zulus and the Whites in Stanger is remarkable. Friendship is evident in the streets. Even all the local White Schools have Shaka's Shield as the background of their badges. The monogram used on vehicles of the Borough of Stanger is Shaka's Tomb Stone. Despite all this there is not a sign of resentment by the Zulus. On the contrary Zulus regard this as a sign of appreciation of their Culture by the Whites. Why must this be destroyed?

8. Ownership.

The Evangelist and lay preachers of different denominations i.e. the Lutheran Church, Methodist, Apostolic Faith and Anglican requested on behalf of the people of Stanger for the establishment of this Location. Negotiations started as early as 1940 with the Borough of Stanger. With painstaking efforts these men of God persisted until the site was shown them in 1942.

In 1946 when they first occupied these houses they were given a promise and assured that the houses would become their own after having been paid for over a period of 25 years.

We the undersigned members of the Shakaville Advisory Board are in complete agreement with the sentiments of the Residents as expressed at the meeting of the 29th July 1981.

We therefore plead with you, Hon. Sir, to place our request before the Republican Government to the effect that the Residents of Shakaville would like to continue living in Shakaville indefinitely.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed by 4 members of the Advisory Board.)

7. INFLUX CONTROL

1. Introduction

Gerry Maré, in his book African population relocation in South Africa, describes relocation through the operation of influx control as:

a process which increasingly functions to keep people out of the urban industrial production areas, rather than to allocate labour between production areas.⁺ (Maré, 1980, 16)

He goes on to describe influx control as 'the single most important instrument in the control of the African population, more particularly the African working class population.' (Ibid) That this is so, and that the State has no intention of relaxing this form of control, has been heavily underscored by the publication of the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, in June 1982. This Bill aims to widen the gap between a small core of relatively privileged urban insiders, africans who qualify for permanent urban residence by virtue of birth and lengthy continued residence, and the great mass of outsiders whose right to seek work in the urban areas will be more heavily circumscribed and controlled than before. In keeping with this approach, the Department of Cooperation and Development has nearly doubled the funds allocated in its annual budget for the maintenance of influx control - from R3 600 000 in 1981 to over R6 million in 1982. (Rand Daily Mail, 20.03.82) The related activities of 'residential control' and repatriation of foreign citizens have similarly received financial boosts between 1981 and 1982, from R1 million to R2 100 000 and R1 million to R1 600 000 to R2 500 000 respectively. (Ibid. On repatriation, see below.)

There are 2 aspects to influx control - 1) the prevention of rural outsiders from entering the urban areas through the operation of the labour bureaux system and the pass laws, and 2) the expulsion of people from within the urban areas, either those considered to be illegally there or legal residents who are considered 'idle and undesirable' in terms of Section 29 of the Urban Areas Act. This latter aspect clearly falls within the definition of relocation since it involves the physical removal of people from one area to another. The former aspect can also be seen as a hidden form of relocation: although not physically removed from the urban areas, people are being prevented from moving there themselves and are penned into or directed towards rural ghettos which they can only leave legally on an approved (and temporary) work contract. In many bantustan areas the chances of ever being legally recruited in this way are becoming more and more slight.[†] Were it not for the operation of influx control, many of the hundreds of thousands of redundant farm workers and evicted residents of black spots would migrate to the urban-industrial centres: to where the jobs

⁺ He notes, however, that the latter function does still exist, particularly with regard to the low-income sectors of the economy, e.g. agriculture.

[†] For a recent account of the workings of the labour bureaux and recruiting system in bantustan areas, see the unpublished paper by H. Gilomee and S. Greenberg: Labour Bureaucracies and African Rural Areas: A Field Research Report.

and wealth of the society lie. Instead they are being forcibly displaced into impoverished bantustans by one of the most vicious and far-reaching systems of population control devised by any contemporary political system.

In Natal both aspects of influx control can be seen at work. What has given a particular twist to their application in this region is the fact that large parts of KwaZulu abut onto the major metropolitan areas of the province. While this has made it easy to exclude large numbers of urban africans from qualifying for permanent urban residence and the privileges attached to that - by the simple expedient of drawing the boundaries of KwaZulu so as to incorporate the townships in which they live - it has also given africans in Natal a semi-legal springboard for illegal entry into the urban areas. The proliferation of informal settlements in the peri-urban regions of KwaZulu adjoining metropolitan Durban represents an indirect attack on the system of influx control. Recognising this, State officials have tried to limit and control these settlements, harrying and attempting to push their residents back into the more remote rural areas. (See the Inanda case study in Part Three for details on this.) Despite the evictions, the demolition of houses, and the prosecutions, the aggregate numbers in these settlements are not decreasing. Here the pressures on the system of influx control are becoming increasingly apparent.

The following section looks at influx control as it is applied in the Durban region. Details and statistics on the operation of influx control in the rest of Natal are hard to come by; a full treatment of this (very important) subject would require a far deeper and more narrowly focused investigation than SPP was able to undertake.

2. Influx control in the Durban region

OPERATION OF THE LABOUR BUREAUX SYSTEM⁺

In Durban the process of exclusion and the stratification of africans into a hierarchy of increasingly less privileged groups in relation to residence rights and employment opportunities is clearly marked. Most privileged is a small (and threatened) group of insiders, those with Section 10 rights, living within the prescribed area of the city. As one moves out from there, through the formal townships located outside the prescribed area to the informal settlements on the edge of the city, one encounters increasing restrictions on people's access to employment opportunities within the city.

Urban boundaries have been manipulated in such a way that most of the african township population now lives in KwaZulu and are classified as commuters: they do not qualify for any of the privileges being proposed for 'permanent urban africans' in the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill. Umlazi township was built on land already within KwaZulu while KwaMashu, developed as a relocation township in the late 1950s, was incorporated into KwaZulu in 1977 when the KwaZulu boundary was redrawn to extend around it. In this way, by a few strokes of a pen, approaching 200 000 people ceased to qualify as urban insiders. Durban now has only two small townships left within the prescribed area - Lamontville and Chesterville. Both are under threat of relocation - Chesterville by actual physical removal and Lamontville by boundary revisions as in the case of KwaMashu. In the meantime, both are controlled by the PNAB

⁺ All the information in this section has been gathered from Black Sash Advice office workers and the SAIRR fieldworker in Durban during the course of 1981/82. SPP is very grateful for their help.

and a Community Council, and residents are given certain privileges in that they are allowed to seek work in Durban directly without having to wait at the labour bureau for a job to be offered.

The townships of KwaMashu, Umlazi and Ntuzuma, although inside KwaZulu, have also been given certain privileges. Until recently residents were allowed to seek work directly as well. However in the last year this has been tightened up. In mid 1981 it was announced that KwaMashu and Umlazi residents would no longer be allowed to seek work by themselves but that they would have to queue at the labour bureaux in their respective townships. This provoked a tremendous outcry - the Umlazi labour bureau was stoned and eventually threats that the labour bureau would be burnt down resulted in the PNAB offering a compromise: Umlazi and KwaMashu home-owners or renters would be allowed to seek work, but lodgers would have to queue at the labour bureaux. In June 1982 the PNAB attempted to go back on the compromise by claiming it was simply a 'gentleman's agreement' that had been reached with the mayors of KwaMashu and Umlazi, and that it was no longer operative. Once again this provoked a violent reaction from within the townships with the PNAB offices at both townships being stoned. After being warned by the mayor of KwaMashu that if this decision were enforced there would be 'big trouble', the PNAB backed down. (Ilanga, 12.06.82)

The procedure for seeking work is still more difficult and cumbersome than for Chester-ville and Lamontville residents. Residents of these townships do not get issued with work seekers' permits as with Chesterville and Lamontville; they are given a form which is valid for a year which the prospective employer has to fill in. The township manager also has to fill it in and certify that the owner of the form is a resident of the township. Once the person has found a job, he/she has to return to the labour bureau with a completed form. Only then is he/she given a work seeker's permit which has to be taken back to the employer to be filled in all over again. The process is a lengthy one. Often employers do not realise the procedure involved; they grow impatient before it has been completed and may employ somebody else with Section 10 rights instead. Black Sash Advice Office workers have confirmed that many people lose potential jobs in this way.

Work seekers living in informal settlements in the Inanda district are required to go to the Verulam labour bureau to seek work: further out from the city centre. Only those who have lived in the Durban area since before 1968 are allowed to seek work at the central labour bureau in Ordinance Road, Durban. Judging by various cases reported by Black Sash Advice Office workers, they are not given jobs freely there. A special dispensation has been granted to residents at Inanda Newtown in that they are allowed to go to the nearby KwaMashu labour bureau as well as the Verulam one. However, in the allocation of jobs by the KwaMashu bureau they are considered last, after KwaMashu work seekers.

Those living in the south of Durban, in the Umbumbulu area, are obliged to seek work in the Isipingo/Amanzimtoti area. Recently the Black Sash Advice Office in Durban had a case of a young man of 21 who had been living with his mother for most of his life in Umlazi. When he tried to apply for a reference book in Umlazi he was told that since his mother had come from Umbumbulu, he had to get a reference book from there. Having done so, he found a job as a gardener in the centre of Durban and lived at the Glebelands Hostel in Umlazi. A year later his employer found him a job at a factory in Jacobs; he went to the Jacobs Labour Bureau for the necessary authorisation and was told that since his reference book came from Umbumbulu, he was only eligible for a job in Isipingo or Amanzimtoti. Even with a letter from his prospective employer he was not allowed to take up the job. When the Advice Office telephoned the Labour Bureau at Jacobs, the person working there expressed surprise that he had been offered that job. 'We like young men to work as gardeners for a few years before

they go into the factories.'

The procedure of allocating jobs between the various labour bureaux also favours the inner areas. There are labour bureaux at the industrial area of Jacobs (for Lamontville), Ordinance Road (for Chesterville), Umlazi, KwaMashu and Isipingo. Employers report their vacancies to Ordinance Road and Jacobs; vacancies which are not filled there are sent to Umlazi or KwaMashu and from there out to Verulam and Isipingo. This procedure shows up a definite attempt to provide the Chesterville and Lamontville residents with first choice. Residents of Inanda Newtown get only what is rejected by everybody else.

While controls over work seekers have been tightened in recent years, so too have the controls imposed on the employers' freedom to employ whom they choose. Before 1980 employers were obliged to register vacancies with the bureaux for three days; thereafter, if there were no applicants, they could make appointments from elsewhere. In 1980 the three day period was extended to a week. At the same time the fine for employing an illegal worker (somebody not sanctioned by a labour bureau) was increased to R500 in 1980 and, if the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill is enacted, it will rise drastically to a maximum of R5 000 or 12 months imprisonment or both.

ENDORSEMENTS OUT

The available figures for Durban show a big gap between arrests for offences in terms of the pass laws and influx control, and actual endorsements out of the city. In 1980 a total of 7 251 africans were arrested by the South African police and other officials for such offences - 1 785 of them female and 5 466 of them male. (Hansard, Questions 84 and 85, 25.02 and 26.02.81) However, only 379 individuals were removed from Durban 'to a Black State' in the second half of 1981. (Hansard, Question 536, 21.04.82) As already described, most africans in the Durban area are already located outside the prescribed area of the city, in 'a Black State', by virtue of the fact that the major residential areas for them have been built inside KwaZulu. It would appear that because of this, endorsement out of the city is not as important a method of influx control in this region as it is in other regions such as the Western Cape for instance.

As already mentioned, not only illegal entrants face the threat of prosecution and endorsement out of the city. For those living in Lamontville and Chesterville, the privileged ones, there is still the threat of being charged under section 29 of the Urban Areas Act. The 1982 annual report of the Natal Coastal region of the Black Sash has referred to this provision thus:

This section, which has been described by a Supreme Court judge as 'unprecedented in western jurisprudence', provides for the arrest, without warrant, of any Black in the urban area who is suspected of being 'idle or undesirable' and for his imprisonment for up to 72 hours before being brought before a Commissioner. Supposedly designed to rid the white areas of unemployed criminals, it can in fact result in someone with no criminal record at all being sent off to a Work Colony for two years. (Black Sash Natal, 1982, 3)

A work seeker is allowed three work seeker permits, each valid for 30 days, before he can be charged under section 29. There are reports that officials at the labour bureaux do not warn new work seekers about the provisions of section 29. If a work seeker applies for a third permit, the issuing clerk will write 'section 29' in the corner and if that individual tries to apply for another permit after that, he can be apprehended at once and charged in terms of section 29. There are numerous reports of summary trials, with those found guilty being sentenced to work on Free State

potato farms for two years. (See Black Sash Natal, 1982, 3 - 4)

3. Repatriation

Repatriation refers to the removal of foreign citizens back to their country of origin. Although on a small scale in Natal compared to other categories of relocation, it has grown in significance in recent years. The two main groups of people affected are 1) Transkeians and 2) Mocambicans.

Transkeians have become foreigners in Natal since Pretoria imposed its particular brand of independence on the former bantustan in 1976 and thereby severed all legal claims of those living in the Transkei to their South African citizenship: influx control at its most radical. Since 1976 Transkeians' chances of getting employment in Natal have steadily deteriorated. Formerly recruited in large numbers to work in the sugar cane fields in the south, Transkeian agricultural workers are now being replaced by local workers from KwaZulu. Access to urban employment is becoming even more restricted. In Durban any Transkeian who has entered South Africa after 1976 is automatically refused registration by the labour bureaux. Those who have had jobs in the Durban area since before that date and subsequently lose them will not be allowed to take new jobs but are obliged to return to Transkei. (Black Sash Advice Office)

In Northern Natal a similar process is being applied to Mocambicans who for generations have been living and working in the coastal regions. In the mid 1960s Zululand farmers were reported to be anxious to step up the level of recruitment from Mocambique because of labour shortages in the sugar industry. (Natal Mercury, 26.02.65) Now this same group of people is being cast aside. In 1981 SPP was told by a local priest at Mtubatuba on the north coast that he knew of at least 50 men who had been repatriated to Mocambique (transported to the border and left there) in the previous 18 months; the tempo of this process was increasing. No exemptions were being allowed, even for individuals who had been living in South Africa for many years, had local families and had lost all ties with their birthplace. All that could be won was a temporary reprieve for a maximum period of 18 months: the applicant had to complete a form (PBO1125 : 'Application for suspension of repatriation of foreign black') and pay a fee of R50 for this concession.

Repatriation has led to many families being split or threatened with dissolution. Several examples of this were cited to SPP. One concerned a man of 62 years, who had lived in the Mtubatuba area for 21 years without ever returning to Mocambique and had a common-law Zulu wife and two children. He had been ordered to leave but was trying to challenge his threatened repatriation on the grounds of his marriage. Another case concerned some children whose father was from Mocambique and whose mother was Zulu. They had been refused entrance to KwaZulu schools in the Mtubatuba district because of their father's nationality and eventually were obliged to go to Mocambique to continue their education.

SPP was also told that many men threatened with repatriation were resorting to costly bribes and attempts to buy KwaZulu citizenship, paying hundreds of rands in the process.

Appendix 1. The new influx control bill: a synopsis

The following summary of the provisions in the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill that deal with influx control in the urban areas was prepared by Sheena Duncan, National President of the Black Sash and issued in July 1982. SPP is grateful to the Black Sash for permission to use it.

THE ORDERLY MOVEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF BLACK PERSONS BILL

This is not the law yet. It still has to be passed by Parliament but it will probably be law by the middle of 1983. If it is passed by Parliament it will make influx control much more efficient. It will be almost impossible for people who do not have a permit to stay in town.

Black people will be able to visit a town during the day time without needing a permit to be there. As long as they have their Reference Book or homeland Travel Document they will not be arrested.

But they are not allowed to work in town unless they are permitted. If they are found at work without being registered both they and their employers can be fined or sent to prison.

Black people who are found anywhere in town - either in the streets, or in a house in a black township, or in a house in a white suburb - between ten o'clock at night and five o'clock the following morning will be arrested if they do not have a permit to be there.

Who will be allowed to stay in town at night between 10p.m. and 5a.m.?

1. Permanent Urban Residents. Permanent Urban Resident is the new 'qualification'. These people will be like the people who have Section 10 qualifications now. They will be able to work where they want to work (except that the Coloured Labour Preference policy will still make it more difficult for black people in the Western Cape). A Permanent Urban Resident must have 'approved accommodation' otherwise he loses his exemption.

They will be able to rent or buy a house. They will be able to have their wives and children and aged parents to stay with them.

- 1.(a) Section 10 disappears altogether but people who have 10(1)(a) or (b) now will be Permanent Urban Residents under the new law.
- 1.(b) A person who owns a house in a black township under 99 year leasehold will be a Permanent Urban Resident provided he is a South African citizen or a citizen of an independent homeland.
- 1.(c) People who are South African citizens who have been legally living in a town for ten full years can apply to be Permanent Urban Residents. Because this says South African citizens only it means that people from Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda cannot apply after they have been in a town for ten years.

(We think that contract workers will also not be allowed to apply.)

We are not sure about this yet and we hope we are wrong but the Government's policy is to prevent migrant workers from getting urban qualifications.)

- 1.(d) People who were born in town who are South African citizens or citizens of independent homelands will also be Permanent Urban Residents if both their parents are Permanent Urban Residents. This is very difficult for those children whose parents never married. Often they do not know where their father is so they will not be able to prove that he is a Permanent Urban Resident.
2. Dependants of Permanent Urban Residents will also be allowed to stay in town between 10p.m. and 5a.m. A dependant is a wife or unmarried child, or parent or grandparent who is too old or sick to work, or a disabled adult child who cannot work.

If the Permanent Urban Resident dies his dependants will be allowed to stay in the town until they become Permanent Urban Residents themselves. They will become Permanent Urban Residents if they were born in town and both mother and father were Permanent Urban Residents, or if they inherit the father's house or if they are South African citizens and have lived in the town for ten full years.
3. Visitors can stay in town between 10p.m. and 5a.m. if they get a permit to stay. This permit will only be given to them if they have approved accommodation. No-one can have a visitor's permit for more than a total of 14 days in any one year.
4. Black people who are in hospital or a medical institution or who are staying in a hotel will be allowed to be in town between 10p.m. and 5a.m. until they are discharged from the hospital or leave the hotel.
5. People who live in a rural area and work on night shift can be in town between 10p.m. and 5a.m. if they have a permit to be in the job.
6. People who are registered to look for work or who are registered in work will be safe from arrest between 10p.m. and 5a.m. if they also have a permit to stay in town at night. A person might be given a permit to work but be refused to stay in town at night if the Designated Officer thinks he can travel to his home outside the urban area each evening. (Designated Officer is the new word for Labour Officer, or Influx Control Officer etc.)

What are the penalties?

If a black person who is not a Permanent Urban Resident and who is not permitted to stay in town is arrested between 10p.m. and 5a.m. he can be fined R500 or sent to prison for 6 months.

Any person who allows a black person who is not permitted to stay in his house between 10p.m. and 5a.m. can be fined R500 or sent to prison for 6 months. This is the same for black and white householders.

A black person who looks for work in town or takes a job in town without a permit can be fined R500 or sent to prison for 6 months.

An employer who gives a job to a black person who is not a Permanent Urban Resident

or who is not permitted to work can be fined R5 000 or sent to prison for 12 months.

Inspectors can come into any house or place of employment at any time to look for 'illegal' people.

People who settle on any land such as the people of Crossroads or the Nyanga Site can be removed by the police without trial if the Minister of Cooperation and Development thinks that they are trying to campaign to have the laws changed. If the Minister orders such a removal by notice in the Government Gazette the people can be moved to any place decided on by the Director General. If such an order is made the people cannot go to court to try to prevent the removal.


There are other things in this Bill dealing with people on the white owned farms but there is not much change in their condition.

The Minister can still impose a curfew at night to prevent black people from being outside in public places anywhere in town except in a black township.

Aid Centres will stay the same.

People will still have to produce a pass or a certificate showing that they can stay in town when it is demanded by a policeman.

The pass laws will still be in force and will be much worse than they are now for everybody except those people who are Permanent Urban Residents.



8. INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

1. Introduction

The proliferation of informal settlements in Natal/KwaZulu over the past thirty or forty years has been a development with profound sociological and political implications. Despite the State's attempts to eradicate or control them, the number of settlements and the numbers of people living in them have continued to grow. Informal settlements are found on the edges of all the cities and many of the towns in Natal; many of the townships that have been built inside KwaZulu have satellite informal settlements on their boundaries as well (e.g. Blaauwbosch between Madadeni and Osizweni, Bekumthetho on the edge of Mondlo, Nyanyeni near Gezinsila). Some have been in existence for a long time while others are fairly recent developments.

CHARACTERISTICS

It is easier to describe than to define rigorously what an informal settlement is, since the distinction between formal and informal becomes blurred in many rural communities where housing is not controlled by minimum building standards. The question of illegality is clearly important: the State regards informal settlements as illegal and describes all who live in them as squatters.⁺ However most black spots, in themselves long-established and officially recognised albeit threatened, have large and growing tenant populations that are regarded as illegal squatters by the authorities and one could therefore class them all as informal settlements if illegality was the only criterion. A number of communities commonly regarded as informal settlements have in fact developed on african freehold land (for instance Amaoti and Amaotana in the Inanda district, Etete and Ntshaweni near Groutville). However, what is significant about them in addition to their illegality is their scale: the size and density of their populations.

Informal settlements, then, are characterised by a number of interwoven attributes: lack of official authorisation, informal housing structures (the building materials including car packing cases, beer cartons, corrugated iron and scraps of wood), high population densities and a lack of basic services such as water, sewerage and electricity. They have developed as close to the urban-industrial centres as possible because that is where the jobs, or the possibility of jobs, are. Their exact locality is generally determined by the status of the land adjacent to the town/city: they are more likely to expand in indian and african freehold areas (released or black spots), inside KwaZulu and on Trust land than within white South Africa, since controls are generally less rigorously enforced in the former areas than the latter. The fact that there are parts of KwaZulu very close to all the major metropolitan areas in Natal has facilitated the mushrooming of informal settlements in the province.

One of the myths that the authorities have fostered about informal settlements is that

⁺ It should be noted that the illegality of informal settlements is in most cases in terms of the State's legislation only. In informal settlements that have developed on freehold and even tribal land the residents are generally living there with the approval of the legal landowner or land controller, to whom they pay rent.

they are made up of rural people who are flocking to the cities and imposing an unbearable burden on urban resources and facilities. Although some of those who live in informal settlements are relatively recent arrivals from the outlying rural areas, a substantial proportion of the population of informal settlements is made up of urban people, people who have spent all or most of their lives in the urban area and have no clear ties with rural communities. This has been shown up by surveys conducted in Malukazi and Richmond Farm (described below) and in Phizangu, Inanda (described in the Inanda Newtown case study in Part Three).

ORIGINS

The origins of informal settlements are linked to events in both the rural and the urban areas. As already described, it is State policy to exclude as many Africans from the urban areas as possible; informal settlements are both a product of and a major source of pressure on the system of influx control.

Many of the people living in informal settlements have suffered removal from other areas because of farm evictions (e.g. Bekumthetho near Mondlo), black spot removals (e.g. Blaauwbosch, near Madadeni, Newcastle), township abolition (e.g. Murchison and Bhobhoyi on the South Coast) and group areas removals (e.g. the Inanda district outside Durban). They have moved to informal settlements either because they have wanted to avoid the official relocation sites or because they have not qualified for these sites, as in the case mentioned in the chapter on urban relocation, of Transkeians affected by the abolition of Margate township in the mid 1970s.

Residents of informal settlements are not necessarily living illegally in the area. In the Durban area in particular, informal settlements have grown in response to the severe housing shortage in the African townships; they accommodate large numbers of people who are legally allowed to be in the urban area but cannot find anywhere to stay in the formal townships. In 1981 the Black Sash in Durban reported that there were 15 633 applicants on the official waiting list for houses in the seven Durban townships of Umlazi, KwaMashu, Ntuzuma, Chesterville, Lamontville, KwaMakutha and KwaDabeka. (Black Sash Natal Coastal region, 1981, 4. For details see Appendix 1.) The official housing backlog in the townships controlled by KwaZulu has already been mentioned - 100 000 units in April 1982. (Natal Mercury, 23.04.82)

As in other parts of the country (e.g. Winterveldt near Pretoria) informal settlements have also come about as a result of the granting of independence to adjacent bantustans. This has happened on the south coast near Port Shepstone where hundreds of families reportedly moved across the Transkeian border just before its independence, so as to avoid becoming Transkeian citizens. The informal settlements of Bhobhoyi and Murchison have provided a home for some of these people.

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

The State regards informal settlements as dangerous for a number of reasons. Chief of these is the way these settlements serve to undermine influx control and the much looser control that the State exerts over their residents in general, compared to what it has managed to establish in the formal townships. Informal settlements are regarded as politically volatile, centres (real or potential) of subversion. In addition they present serious health hazards, threatening not simply their own residents but, more importantly, the residents of the towns and cities on which they border.⁺ The State's response to informal settlements has, therefore, been to move forcefully against them.

⁺ For an account of the State's response to the typhoid epidemic in Inanda in 1980 see the Inanda Newtown case study in Part Three.

It has attempted either to clear and eradicate them entirely, or to reduce their populations to more manageable numbers by acting against individual households and pushing them back into the rural areas from which, it is maintained, they have originated.

The following extract, taken from an article printed in the official journal Bantu, in August 1960, which describes the conditions prevailing in the huge informal settlement of Cato Manor in Durban, gives an indication of the fears which were uppermost in the authorities' minds then and which still prevail today.

Before the clearing operations started, approximately 100 000 Bantu lived in these shack areas ... The results of these deplorably poor living conditions were:

- a) poor or no control and therefore poor or no public conveniences.
- b) uncontrolled influx with a resulting overflow of all types and elements coupled with unemployment and delinquency.
- c) developments of all kinds of malpractices.
- d) social, ethical and moral decay.
- e) fertile soil for politically-inspired bodies to cash in on grievances and complaints which must naturally arise out of such conditions of living.
- f) unrest and ultimate riots. (Bantu, August 1960)

The clearing of informal settlements and the removal of their residents by the State have been and are effected by a whole barrage of laws which can be brought into play depending on the status of the land on which the informal settlement is found and the degree of opposition encountered in the settlements. These laws include the Black Administration Act of 1927 (as amended), the Slums Act and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 (as amended). In addition, informal settlements have been moved or are threatened with removal in terms of inter alia legislation empowering the State to eliminate black spots or consolidate the bantustans (e.g. in the Groutville area), the proclamation of Group Areas (e.g. at Cato Manor), the enforcement of influx control (e.g. at Malukazi south of Durban) and the establishment of townships or other infrastructural developments (e.g. at Bhethemba, south of Durban).

Not only the illegal occupants of the land have been harried in informal settlements. In cases where there are landowners who themselves have given permission to people to erect shacks on their land and are collecting rent, the State has put pressure on them to evict their tenants and has prosecuted those landowners who have failed to comply. This tactic has been applied in the Inanda area and also at various black spots, e.g. at Umbulwane near Ladysmith.

Possibly one of the laws used most successfully by the authorities has been the Group Areas Act. Many informal settlements in the Durban area developed on Indian freehold land and were thus adversely affected when the land was proclaimed for whites and the landowners expropriated and relocated. The Department of Community Development has admitted the usefulness and limitations of the Act thus:

Group Areas legislation has contributed towards much being done as regards slum clearance and urban renewal. This legislation enabled the clearing of rundown areas like Sophiatown, Cato Manor ... which were unfit for human occupation. Group Areas legislation was, however, not the complete solution because it could not sanction urban renewal in those areas where there was no change in the racial group in a particular area. (Summary of Activities of the Department of Community Development, 1981, 24)

However, despite all the legislation at its disposal the State has not always managed to remove informal settlements easily. In a number of instances the removal of people from informal settlements has been delayed and hampered by legal intervention on behalf of those to be removed. The elimination of Cato Manor in Durban in the late 1950s and early 1960s was accompanied by a number of court cases which slowed down the pace of removals. A more recent example of legal intervention has been at Richmond Farm, described below; another, contemporary example is found at Inanda.

Lawyers acting on behalf of threatened residents and, in some cases, threatened landlords have been able to make use of loopholes in the laws and win reprieves for their clients on technicalities. The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act in particular has proved vulnerable to such tactics. It appears that because of this, the State has often favoured the use of health regulations as a way to effect removals in informal settlements. This has the added advantages of obscuring the political issues involved and defusing local or international protests to the removals. In November/December 1981, for instance, the authorities ordered landowners in the Inanda district to provide services (sanitation etc.) to their tenants or face prosecution and the eviction of their tenants.

RESPONSE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

In many instances local authorities have initiated or supported the removal of informal settlements, e.g. at Cato Manor in Durban in the late 1950s. Sometimes, however, the response of local authorities, supported by big business, has been to counter the State's attempts at eradication and to defend informal settlements. This has happened primarily where they have seen that these settlements provide workers to their cities and industries or where they fear the politically destabilising consequences of large-scale removals. One alternative they have advocated is to provide more formal housing. Recently the Urban Foundation has also been promoting site and service schemes as the solution to the housing crisis. The most prominent example of this has been at Inanda Newtown, which is described in Part Three.

2. Informal settlements in the Durban region

Durban has had informal settlements since the 1930s. In 1952 it was estimated that about half of Durban's african population - about 200 000 people - were 'illegally housed in shack slums.' (Univ. Natal Econ. Dept, 1952, 357) Despite various attempts to clear these settlements, undertaken by both the State and the local authorities, there are now estimated to be about half a million people living in informal settlements in the Greater Durban area. (Sunday Tribune, 5.07.81) The reasons behind the various clearing operations have not all been the same and the localities of informal settlements have moved over the years. However, what has become clear is that the majority of families presently living in informal settlements in the Durban area have been living there for a substantial time; they are not 'flocking in from the rural areas' as the authorities would like the public to believe.

HISTORY OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENT DEVELOPMENT

The growth of shack settlements in Durban in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s stemmed from a number of factors:

- 1) The deteriorating living conditions in the reserves and the consequent flow to the towns of thousands of africans;
- 2) The 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act which prohibited africans from buying land in urban areas and from living in white urban areas, unless they were housed

in hostels, locations or in the servants' quarters of employers. Their only other option was to lease land or a shack from indian or already established african landowners.

- 3) The minimal township housing provided for africans, especially families.

During the period 1923 to 1937 the authorities were concerned chiefly with housing migrant workers in hostels and compounds. In 1923 46 000 Africans were housed (in hostels). (Maasdorp and Humphreys, 1975, 11)

Until the mid 1930s Baumanville was the only location to offer family housing - it had 500 houses. Lamontville was first established in 1933 and Chesterville in 1940.

- 4) Industrial expansion in the area which was dependent on the employment of cheap african labour; the availability of jobs attracted people to the city far faster than housing was provided for them.

One of the first major informal settlements in the Durban area was that at Cato Manor. The building of shacks was relatively uncontrolled since the land was owned by indians who were prepared to rent out their land and this area only fell under municipal control in 1932. During the 1930s and 1940s the DCC attempted to prevent the growth of the settlement by exerting pressure on the landowners but their efforts were largely futile:


Between 1940 and 1944 in one area at Cato Manor the number of Native occupied shacks grew from 500 to 3 000 ... During 1944, over a hundred notices were served on owners of some 1 800 shacks requiring them to provide basic services. During the following year similar attempts to compel owners of shack-built land to provide basic sanitation were held up by protracted litigation ... shack landlords still failed to provide necessary water or sanitary services for their squatter tenants. Instead they tried to evict them ... The Courts were reluctant to give them the required authority to do so ... Although more than a £1 000 was paid in fines, only 2 out of more than 700 landowners had made any attempt to improve conditions. (Univ. Natal Econ. Dept, 1952, 358-359)

Two other major shack settlements developed at about this time on the Bluff, the one based on the St Francis Xavier Catholic Mission and the other on land owned by the Muslim Trust. Both settlements were founded on the Zanzibari community, the so-called 'lost tribe', captured slaves who were apparently brought to Durban by the British in the 19th century. As the african population of Durban grew in the course of the 20th century, so more and more newcomers moved into the Catholic and Muslim settlements. By the late 1940s there were in the region of 3 500 people living there, many in appalling conditions, sheltering in rough shacks and converted oil drums. Other shack settlements developed at South Coast Junction, Umhlatuzana and Happy Valley (also on the Bluff).

REMOVALS BEGIN

Until 1971, when the Administration Boards were created and took over this function, african housing in urban areas was controlled by the local authorities of each area. Before 1949 the Durban local authorities had no power to demolish shacks. However in that year the DCC passed an ordinance empowering them to demolish shacks on condition alternative accommodation was provided to those whose houses were demolished - a limitation that was often not respected.

The removal of informal settlements in the Durban area got under way from this time, with the Zanzibari communities on the Bluff among the first victims. In the late 1940s and early 1950s these settlements were cleared bit by bit, most of the residents being moved to Umlazi.



In 1958, both Cato Manor and the Bluff were proclaimed white under the Group Areas Act. Cato Manor was moved during the period 1958 to 1966 while Happy Valley (situated on the Bluff) was moved in 1967. It has been estimated that about 120 000 africans and 40 000 indians were affected at Cato Manor while at Happy Valley 'about 640 shacks ... housing at least 10 000 persons, were demolished.' (Maasdorp and Humphreys, 1975, 64) The move at Cato Manor was used to filter out 'illegal elements' and it is estimated that in the removal about 30 000 to 40 000 people 'disappeared'. (Ibid, 61)

The majority of residents were resettled either in Umlazi or in KwaZulu or KwaMashu, which was developed by the DCC and finally handed over to KwaZulu in 1977.⁺ Life in these townships placed unfamiliar controls over its residents as the following description made by a woman who was moved there at this time makes clear:

Actually, many people came here to KwaMashu but many of them were not very quick to adjust themselves to this life. Others, they stayed here for a few months or six months, then they jumped off to go build those 'squatters' at Inanda. They were real Cato Manor people, Umkumbane people. Because there were so many laws to deal with now, in a somebody's four-roomed. Then, in Cato Manor, we were not even paying for this water. And you see the life changed totally, became too expensive a life, you know. And then they couldn't tolerate it, they said; 'Oh no, I better go and start another Umkumbane further out here,' you know, rather than pay this water. If I don't pay the rent I'm being told that, 'Well, we've got to kick you out.' There were some policemen harassing us in the township. People couldn't do what they were doing in Cato Manor and couldn't brew all those things which I've mentioned. So life changed completely for some people. They said, 'Ugh, life here! Because there is somebody who is on our shoulders. It shows that this is not your land, this is not your house, you never paid a thing over it, you just pay rent.' And so they jumped off. (Interview with Mrs M., Staffrider, February 1980)

Those previously living at Cato Manor who could not find places in the existing townships or were not eligible for houses had no option but to make their own arrangements. Many of those who disappeared during the Cato Manor removals moved to new informal settlements further out from the city centre. Some went to the Inanda district as described above, where much of the land was owned by individual indians and africans who were prepared to rent plots out. Others moved to St Wendolins or to Clermont, both freehold areas in the Pinetown district.

Other areas cleared of informal settlements included those near Clairwood which were situated on land wanted either for industrial development or, as at Bayhead, for the expansion of the South African Railways yards; near Sea Cow Lake, affected by the proclamation and development of the area as an indian group area and the expansion of industry, and near Queensburgh, which was proclaimed a white group area in 1966 and from where various informal settlements were moved as a result. More recently, in the 1970s, informal settlements next to the township of Umlazi (Bekithemba and Malukazi, described below) and KwaMashu (Richmond Farm) have been affected by removals in order to allow for the expansion of their parent formal townships. In a similar vein, the black spot of New Farm was moved in the early 1970s so that the indian group area township of Phoenix could be built.

⁺ KwaMashu itself was built on land from which some 2 800 indians were removed (at Duff's Road) in the 1950s.

NUMBERS REMOVED 1966 TO 1979

The map on p. 200, compiled from comparing aerial photographs taken in 1966 and in 1979, shows the areas where informal settlements were cleared during this time and those where already established informal settlements grew or new ones developed. The information derived from these photographs is limited since they show shacks and not people; this and the general lack of detailed information on action against informal settlements during this time means that the figures derived from the comparison are crude. What such a shack count shows is that between 1966 and 1979, 2 391 dwellings were demolished in the Durban area. (Haarhoff, 1980, 2) Furthermore, that while the central areas of Durban were largely cleared of informal settlements during this time, the absolute numbers of informal structures was not reduced - rather, informal settlements were simply shifted out to the outlying reaches of the city. The areas to experience a major increase in informal settlement were either within KwaZulu (both to the north and to the south) or in freehold areas such as Clermont (destined for incorporation into KwaZulu) and Dassenhoek.

Despite the many thousands of new township houses that have been constructed during this 13 year period the absolute number of informal dwelling units in this area has increased by over 137% ... The most dramatic increases have occurred in areas of KwaZulu ... Whereas in 1966 these areas only had a total of 2 745 informal dwellings, the estimate for 1979 is 15 304, an increase of 458%. (Ibid, 3)

CONTROL OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS TODAY

Despite the fact that most informal settlements are located within KwaZulu now, the authorities are still anxious to contain them as far as possible. Tightening up of influx control (described in the previous chapter), continued evictions (as described in the sections on Malukazi and Richmond Farm below and in the Inanda Newtown case study) and, to a very limited extent, the establishment of site and service schemes at Inanda Newtown and Folweni (see next section on Malukazi) have been among the methods used. Alternative accommodation has been offered to some threatened residents, but on a selective basis, with criteria such as marriage (Malukazi) and length of residence at a particular settlement (not the Durban area in general) being used to filter out people. In general the standpoint has been that men with employment may be accommodated in the hostels but the women and children and the unemployed must go back to 'their place of origin' in the rural areas.

Despite the stringent controls and the massive bureaucracy that enforces them, the State has not managed to prevent the walls it has attempted to erect around Durban from being breached. The new Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill drastically increases the penalties for illegal employment and illegal entry into the urban areas of South Africa and will undoubtedly impose heavy burdens on people once enacted. It is unlikely, however, to succeed in closing off the cities to all those it aims to exclude in Natal. Informal settlements represent a meeting point between the urban-industrial centres of power and the rural periphery; in certain parts of Natal such as Durban that meeting point extends right up to and into the metropolitan limits.

3. Malukazi

INTRODUCTION

Malukazi is situated on the edge of Umlazi township, Durban, but within the Umbumbulu district of KwaZulu. None of the land is freehold but some of the longstanding residents have had relatively large tracts of land allocated to them by the chief; these people can be classed as traditional landholders. The bulk of the population are tenants and have no legal status to be there.

In general there are two ways to achieve residence in Malukazi: either to pay a traditional landholder for the right to build on his holding, or to rent a dwelling - either built by a tribal landholder, or from someone who has already acquired permission to build from a landholder. (Stopforth, 1978, 2)

In late 1977 the population was estimated at 16 000 people. As with other informal settlements, surveys have shown Malukazi to be a stable, settled community. A survey done in 1977 in the area showed that '55% of all people were born in Durban, or in a nearby peri-urban area, only 23% recorded a clear rural origin as their place of prior residence before moving to Malukazi, and 57% have spent all their lives in or near town.' (Ibid, v)

The same survey also revealed that the masculinity rate was 0,99 and that only 3,4% of households comprised one person. 73,6% of the male population and 38,9% of the female population were formally employed (Ibid, 35, 36) while only 3% of the male population and 1,7% of the female population was unemployed. (Ibid, 27) (These figures should be compared to the figures for the various rural relocation area case studies presented in Part Three, where male migrancy and high unemployment are the norm.)

NEW INFLUX OF PEOPLE

In February 1978 5 000 households arrived overnight from another nearby informal settlement known as Bhekithemba - it had been expropriated to make way for the expansion and development of Umlazi township. The Bhekithemba people were moved in GG trucks and dumped at Malukazi with no housing provided. Both KwaZulu and the central government were involved in this removal. At this point there was only one tap in Malukazi, which now had to service an extra 5 000 families.

REMOVALS OF PEOPLE

In 1979 Malukazi itself was incorporated into Umlazi township. The status of the land thus changed. No longer under tribal tenure, the land now came under the regulations controlling townships. This made the originally tenuous legal position of the tenants even more tenuous. Landholders were no longer entitled to receive rent from tenants since they had been expropriated; tenants were unaware of this and landholders continued to charge rent, and tenants to pay. At the same time landholders were ordered to hand in lists of the tenants on their properties and, once they had been expropriated, were ordered to demolish their tenants' houses. Landlords were offered either houses

or site and service plots in Umlazi and moved there themselves. Tenants were offered no alternative accommodation. At this stage the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior expressed his concern that houses were being demolished and people were being removed from Malukazi.

FURTHER REMOVALS

Despite the expropriations, tenants continued to remain on the land until 1981 when some people were again served with eviction notices, this time by the KwaZulu government. By this time it was estimated that there were 27 000 residents at Malukazi. People were given 3 months notice to quit their homes and demolish them or risk being charged. The KwaZulu government claims that it was not a forced removal since, as Mr J. T. Zulu, the urban representative for KwaZulu, has explained it the people have been offered alternative accommodation at a place called Folweni (Gologodo) in the Umbumbulu district.

We have had big gatherings there (Malukazi) to explain the position to the people. The South African government wanted to clear the place for Umlazi years ago. But the KwaZulu government pleaded that the people of Malukazi should not be removed until alternative accommodation could be obtained for them. They now have this alternative accommodation at Folweni. (Sunday Tribune, 24.05.81)

The three months notice period at Malukazi was intended to give people sufficient time to build a new house at Folweni. However, not everyone has been offered alternative accommodation at Folweni.

Only people who are legally married, either by Christian rites or customary union, qualify for the plots at Folweni. The fate of the others - there are thousands of them - hangs in the balance. (Sunday Tribune, 24.05.81)

Many people have expressed their unwillingness to move to Folweni, but have nevertheless signed the application forms for a site there because they feel they have no alternative.

CONDITIONS AT FOLWENI

Folweni is situated 10 km to the south of Malukazi, further away from Durban. It falls within the magisterial district at Umbumbulu which means, in terms of influx control and labour bureau practices, that residents are more disadvantaged in relation to job opportunities in Durban than before when they lived in the Umlazi area.

Folweni is a site and service scheme. Those qualifying for sites in Folweni are required to pay R5 for the plot and R2 per month for services (i.e. water taps and bucket toilets). The sites measure 12 m by 16 m and by January 1982, 1 600 sites had been made available to people from Malukazi. (Daily News, 7.01.82) Basic services have been provided by contractors with funds made available by the Department of Cooperation and Development, supervised by the KwaZulu Department of Works. The cost per site for the services put in by the Department was a mere R500 compared to the standard cost of R3 500 per site in a township. No shacks are allowed on the site; most houses are made from wattle and daub, building materials being available from local black entrepreneurs. Some people are putting up houses worth R500, but most of the houses cost in the region of R1 000. The total cost of an average house (including the cost of the services put in by the State) is, therefore, about R1 500 - in contrast, a township house with the same number of rooms would cost the State R10 500. In January 1982 there was a waiting list of 2 000 at Folweni while it was reported that 5 000 additional sites were being planned by KwaZulu. (Daily News, 7.01.82)

Originally the land at Folweni was also under tribal tenure. Some of the original residents had sugar quotas at the nearby sugar mill, others kept cattle. With the expropriation of their land for the site and service scheme, these residents have had their homes demolished and given 'tents and aluminium huts to live in until they are able to build their new homes for themselves. Taps have been provided and sheds for bucket toilets erected.' (Sunday Tribune, 24.05.81) Many former residents were reportedly angered at the expropriation of their land and there were reports that the new residents from Malukazi were terrified of moving to Folweni because they had heard that the old residents were planning to fight them. (Umbumbulu is noted for its high incidence of faction fighting.)

RECENT EVICTIONS FROM MALUKAZI

As already mentioned, large numbers of people at Malukazi did not qualify for a site at Folweni and remained behind. In June 1982 about 12 families reported to the Black Sash Advice Office in Durban that they had received 90 days notice to vacate their premises. Notice sheets were given to children, from the Umbumbulu Magistrate's office, while their parents were at work. The notice sheets stated clearly that only employed people would be allowed to stay in the area and then only on condition that they took up legal accommodation in the townships or in hostels. It also stated very clearly that no alternative accommodation was to be provided for their families and that they would have to go back to 'where they came from.' (See Appendix 2.)

People immediately went to Folweni to enquire whether there were sites for their families there. The official at Folweni told them that the place was full and confirmed the terms of the eviction notices concerning the destination of non-workers. On further investigation by the Black Sash, the magistrate stated that he was acting under instructions from the Squatters Inspector based at Umlazi. Officials at Ulundi have, however, claimed that Folweni is not full and that legally married couples or women with children would therefore be allowed to take up residence there. At present the Black Sash Advice Office is still waiting for written confirmation of this claim by the officials in Ulundi and the future of these people is unclear.

4. Richmond Farm

INTRODUCTION

Richmond Farm is an informal settlement of about 3 000 families, on the northern outskirts of Durban. It falls within the land set aside for the expansion of Ntuzuma township. Many of its residents came originally from Cato Manor, when it was first cleared, and still have their names on the waiting list for housing in KwaMashu or Ntuzuma. Others had moved into Richmond Farm because of the overcrowding in the existing townships. However Richmond Farm's population has not been static, as shown by the following brief history.

In 1971 the area was totally cleared for development and those squatters living there were rehoused in Ntuzuma. However, during 1972 and 1973 indunas sold sites illegally to squatters and there was a further influx of people - the indunas were subsequently prosecuted. The PNAB surveyed and recorded the population and those that were working in Durban were relocated in Ntuzuma; their survey revealed a total of about 500 families living in the settlement. At this stage the land was owned by the SADT and the Department of Cooperation and Development was administering it through their agents, the PNAB.

In 1977 an additional 2 500 people moved in according to the Department of Cooperation and Development; in October 1977, they were given notice to vacate the area because they were in the way of the development of Ntuzuma township. At this time some - not all - of the houses were numbered. Then in January 1978 prosecutions began in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act.

SIGNED UNDERTAKING, 1978

Black leaders made representations to the Department of Cooperation and Development and reached an agreement that there would be no prosecution of Durban workers who would be allowed to stay on if they were not in the way of development and provided they signed an undertaking drawn up by the Department. (See Appendix 5.) This undertaking forced the inhabitants of Richmond Farm to declare that they were unlawful residents of Richmond Farm and that as soon as they received written notice to vacate their premises, they would demolish their premises and vacate them with their belongings. If the occupant did not demolish his/her structure by the time stated, then in terms of the undertaking the Commissioner would have the right to demolish it 'and to dispose of the materials at his discretion.' The occupant further declared that the State would not be liable for compensation for any buildings, or structures the inhabitant had put up, nor for 'any expense, inconvenience, loss or damage of whatever nature incurred as a result' of the occupant having to vacate the premises. The occupant also had to declare that he/she would immediately take steps to find alternative accommodation.

The final part of the declaration was the most drastic -

I acknowledge that this document does not confer on me any occupational rights or any preferential claim on alternative accommodation on State-owned land.

This forced inhabitants into a viciously paradoxical situation - to be allowed to stay at Richmond Farm they had to sign the undertaking, a document which merely reinforced their powerlessness and vulnerability to a later removal anyway.

At the same time the Department of Cooperation and Development insisted that the local residents' organisation, the Richmond Farm Committee, would have to aid the Department in the control of squatting. This meant that Richmond Farm inhabitants became very wary of newcomers who threatened their already tenuous position. Not only were they to control newcomers, but they would also have to assist in getting non-Durban workers out of the area.

The Department of Cooperation and Development claimed that during 1978 this control broke down and there was a further influx of people. Another survey was carried out by the Department; they found that two-thirds of the people worked in Durban while one-third were not workers. (Some of these were unregistered, others self-employed.) The Department claimed that those who had worked had done so for many years and so would have to have hostel accommodation provided for them somewhere. They also claimed that single lodgers were bringing their families into Richmond Farm; the implication of this was that families should go back to where they came from and should not 'squat' in the urban areas.

ARRESTS IN 1979

In 1979 many people were arrested under the Illegal Squatting Act. In July/August 1979 two shacks were demolished to make way for an electricity pylon. Lawyers intervened and the township manager of KwaMashu was approached. He agreed that homes could not be demolished without alternative accommodation being provided. Appeals to the Durban Corporation, who were putting up the pylon, were successful and resulted in the pylon being resited so that it missed other houses.

In September 1979 29 people were arrested for illegal squatting; in three cases charges were withdrawn soon afterwards. Most of those arrested had signed the undertaking, which shows how limited the protection it gave them was. In October 1979 a further 14 people were arrested for illegal squatting. Three of these were people who were visiting friends in Richmond Farm while one was unemployed. Of the 29 arrested in September, 6 had been born in Durban, 1 had a father who was born in Durban; more than 21 had lived in Richmond Farm for more than five years and some for over 30 years. People with Section 10 rights and people who had names on the waiting list for housing were among those arrested.

After a long court case the charges were eventually withdrawn in December. It is not clear why the charges were withdrawn - it appears that the one policeman who was supposedly responsible for rounding up all the 'squatters' and arresting them was an unreliable witness and in some instances told blatant lies. There were also allegations that those arresting the squatters had offered them a chance to go free if they 'paid' R10 to the person arresting them, and had stolen money. Another squatter was allegedly assaulted by one of the PNAB rangers arresting him.

1979 SURVEY

During 1979 the Richmond Farm committee approached Diakonia (an ecumenical church group in Durban) and the Black Sash to help them with the problems they were facing. These bodies helped organise a questionnaire which they hoped would dispel the myths being used by the Department of Cooperation and Development as an excuse to force out the people of Richmond Farm. The Department claimed that 'hundreds of (illegal squatters) come into Richmond Farm all the time.' The survey represented a 27% sample of households and produced the following results:

- 42% had at least one adult with Section 10 rights;
- 48,4% had lived at Richmond Farm for 5 to 10 years;
- 66,9% had lived in Durban for more than 15 years;
- 1,3% had lived in Durban for less than 1 year;
- 76,21% had 1 adult in employment;
- 74% had their names on the 1977 survey;
- 72% did not have their names on the township waiting list for housing;
- 66,8% had not signed the undertaking.

This information was put into a memorandum and sent to Dr Koornhof. His reply was that the people would still have to go eventually to make way for the development of Ntuzuma, but he accepted that only new arrivals would be arrested.

Since then no-one has been arrested and there have been extensive negotiations between the Department of Cooperation and Development and the Richmond Farm committee. The threat to the community has not abated, however. In November/December 1980 the Department said that they would only allow those whose houses had been numbered (in 1977) to stay. It was also announced that the extension of a railway line to Ntuzuma had been planned to go through Richmond Farm.

In March 1981 the Department produced a list of about 200 names, some with the requisite numbers and some without, and said that those people would have to move. When the Committee asked for a reason, they were told that those people had broken some regulations which were not specified. When they pressed the Department for details, they got no response. The Committee then called a meeting with the community which was just as puzzled about the developments. The Committee reported back to the Department and the list was cancelled.

INCORPORATION INTO KWAZULU

In April 1981 officials from the Department of Cooperation and Development came to Richmond Farm with the manager of KwaMashu township. He was introduced to the Committee as the new go-between since Richmond Farm, Ntuzuma and another place called Dalmeny Farm (adjacent to Richmond Farm) had just been handed over to KwaZulu: Richmond Farm was now his problem. The Richmond Farm Committee subsequently met with the Manager and questioned him about the future of those people with no numbers on their doors. He said he was keeping to what the Department of Cooperation and Development had originally said; presumably this means that they still have no right to stay there.

It seems inevitable that people will be moved eventually. There are rumours that the railway line will definitely go through Richmond Farm. A newspaper report in late 1981 mentioned that a 'wet core' housing scheme had been proposed for Ntuzuma and that building operations would start in 1982. It seems unlikely that those on Richmond Farm will be able to afford the new core houses - basically one bedroom, with a bathroom and kitchen and provided with flush sanitation and reticulated water. It was reported that the PNAB, which is to develop the new houses, will provide loans but only for the extension of the core: loans will not be provided for buying the site and the house itself. (Daily News, 9.12.81)

The State has not only harassed the people directly with threats of arrests and evictions, it has also played a more subtle role in undermining the community through the following means:

- 1) Children born at Richmond Farm or in Durban but who live at Richmond Farm are unable to get Durban reference books or to get work-seekers permits. Some of them have no families left in the rural areas which means that they cannot get reference books from there either.
- 2) The building of extensions to shacks has been stopped recently, forcing many people to go and live elsewhere because of the consequent overcrowding.
- 3) Many people have moved away by themselves because of the continual insecurity in the area.
- 4) Although many Richmond Farm residents have worked in the Durban area for more than 15 years, because they have moved out of registered lodging in hostels or townships, they have forfeited their right to qualify under Section 10 1 (b) of the Urban Areas Act and are not able to put their names on the housing waiting list.⁺ If they lose their jobs they find that they have lost their work-seekers permits for Durban as well, and are forced to try to find work in Verulam and other outlying areas.

⁺ It seems that this stipulation does not apply to the site and service scheme at Inanda Newtown and provided applicants from Richmond Farm are working in Durban and are KwaZulu citizens, they can apply for sites there.

5. Informal settlements in Natal: a summary

The following list represents a summary of the major informal settlements found in Natal in recent years, using the loose criteria of official illegality, scale, informal housing and locality as discussed in the introduction to this chapter. Black spots and traditional reserve settlements are not included on the list. The summary is divided into two parts: 1) Greater Durban and 2) Rest of Natal.

NAME	ESTIMATED POPULATION	CURRENT STATUS	FACILITIES
1. <u>GREATER DURBAN</u>			
1. Bhekithemba; Mgaga	30 000 (1977)	Adjoins Malukazi.	
2. Clairwood	428 (indians)		
3. Clermont	60 000	Freehold land, with extensive shack farming. 1978 5 000 shacks demolished, no alternative accommodation offered. 1981/82 evictions continuing, by landowners & PNAB. Area to be incorporated into KZ.	Taps, bucket toilets. Some substantial housing.
4. Dassenhoek	4 000	Part cleared in late 1970s to make way for estbl. KwaNdengezi township.	
5. Emmaus; Mariannhill	65 000		
6. Inanda	68 000 (1977)	See case study.	No facilities.
7. Malukazi	27 000	See above.	
8. Melkhout	279 (indians)	South of Phoenix.	
9. Motata Farm		Proclaimed white group area 1966; proposed indian group area 1981 - presently controlled area. Some shacks under threat 1982 but granted reprieve by Pinetown Municipality, June 1982 (Sunday Tribune, 27.06.82).	
10. Newlands East	585 (indians)		Taps.
11. New Farm	113 (indians)		No facilities.
12. Parlock	2 163 (indians)		
13. Phoenix	113 (indians)		
14. Richmond Farm	3 000 hh	See above.	

NAME	ESTIMATED POPULATION	CURRENT STATUS	FACILITIES
15. Shallcross	8 000 - 10 000 (1977)		
16. Thornwood	25 000		
17. Welbedacht	3 000 (1977)		
2. REST OF NATAL			
1. Barclay Site; Babanango		People evicted off farms moved here to avoid Hlungulwana (relocation site). Late 1970s warned would be moved as illegal.	
2. Bekunthetho; Adjoins Mondlo	10 000?	On Trust land. Established c. 1977 by evicted farm workers under leadership of 1 man who controls allocation of sites.	Some local organisation - a committee, community built school, some shops.
3. Bhobhoyi; Murchison; Port Shepstone	36 000 (1981)	Inside KZ but threatened by consolidation Dec. 1979 1 000 people being evicted from Murchison. Many people who did not qualify for Gamalakhe moved here when Margate township abolished; also Transkeians settled here to avoid independence.	Inadequate water; 1981/82 cholera outbreak.
4. Blaauwbosch; Newcastle	62 000	Freehold area inside KZ. Massive influx of tenants in last 15 years, mainly off farms.	No sanitation; inadequate water supply. High school & clinic.
5. Craigieburn; Umkomaas	1 000 (1979)	Indian group area.	
6. Empangeni		Coloured squatter area north of town, due to lack of pre-claimed group area.	
7. Georgedale; Hammarsdale		Freehold land in released area. People squeezed off bs that cleared for expansion of Hammarsdale, Mpumalanga moved here. Reports to be moved 1983 for extension of Mpumalanga.	Taps.
8. KwaMakhutha; Amanzimtoti	45 000	Within KZ. Informal settlement adjoins township section. Attempts to control building materials & rumours of site and service.	
9. Magabeni; Umkomaas	400 (1981)	Informal settlement adjoins Magabeni township. Many people moved here off bs. 1981 under threat because of complaints by township dwellers but KZ granted reprieve.	
10. Mbozama; Stanger	150 hh	Indian-owned land. Shacks numbered 1972, 1976. Removals threatened in 1980/81 but KZ organised reprieve. Notice of removal to Bulwer Farm 1985.	
11. Mistake Farm	240 (1980)		

NAME	ESTIMATED POPULATION	CURRENT STATUS	FACILITIES
12. Nondweni no. 5; Adjoins Nondweni	2 000 +	On Trust land. Residents claim directed to settle here by officials in 1960s. Under threat of removal as squatters but threat does not appear immediate.	No water or sanitation.
13. Nyanyeni; Eshowe		Informal settlement adjoining township of Gezinsila.	Very poor.
14. Sundumbuli; Eshowe		Squatting on edge of township.	
15. Willowfontain; Pietermaritzburg		Trust land. Induna allowing hh to build, for a fee. Prosecutions 1981/82. Rumours of site and service.	

Appendix 1. The housing backlog, Durban townships

Source: Black Sash Natal Coastal Region Report 1.03.81 to 31.07.81.

UMLAZI:

No houses built since 1979
 No houses rented out since 1979
 1 400 houses bought between January and December 1980
 8 400 still on the waiting list.

KWAMASHU:

370 houses built between January and December 1980
 100 houses rented by people on the waiting list
 270 bought by people on the waiting list
 1 000 still on the waiting list.

NTUZUMA:

96 houses built between January and December 1980
 All given to people on the waiting list
 3 000 still on the waiting list.

CHESTERVILLE:

No new development since 1945
 400 on the waiting list
 However, there is a proposal to move Chesterville?

LAMONTVILLE:

No development since 1968
 333 on the waiting list.

KWAMAKUTHA:

No houses built over the last year
 1 200 on the waiting list.

KWADABEKA:

225 houses built in the last year
 105 houses about to be completed
 1 300 on the waiting list.

Appendix 2. Notice of eviction, Malukazi

The following notice of eviction was served on several households living at Malukazi in June 1982.

To the Occupier
 Malukazi and
 UMBUMBULU
 4105

UNAUTHORISED STRUCTURE(S) AND TAKING UP ABODE ILLEGALLY.

1. It has been reported to me that you have, without permission erected, established or occupied a building or homestead on the Malukazi commonage in contravention 64(4) of Chapter 6 of Proclamation No. R 188 of 1969 (BLACK Areas Land Regulation).
2. You have rendered yourself liable to prosecution and in your own interests you are warned that you should remove yourself and your family (if any) and demolish the building within 90 days from the date of receiving this notice.
3. As you have not received prior approval from neither the Chief nor the Bantu Affairs Commissioner to enter and live in the area, there is no responsibility on the Trust to provide an alternative site for you.
4. As this land is required for a development of new houses it is necessary that the buildings be demolished.
5. You are advised to seek accommodation for your family in your home district and if you are employed in the Port Natal area to take up hostel or alternative accommodation.

(signed)

THE MAGISTRATE : UMBUMBULU

Hundreds bitter at living conditions

Daily News
Reporter

HUNDREDS of people living at the Efolweni resettlement camp in the Umlazi district, south of Durban, are bitter about their living conditions — and have criticised the Department of Co-operation and Development for what they call unfulfilled promises of "decent and healthy homes".

A group of sugar cane planters near the camp have complained that the Department of Co-operation and Development "robbed" them when they were paid compensation money for their lands which were regarded as "obstacles" in the way of resettlement.

Efolweni resettlement camp is a 35-minute drive from Durban. It is a barren piece of land which shows all the characteristics of a shanty town or squatting area.

Exposure to malnutrition and other health hazards are common. There are heaps of rubbish rotting without anyone removing them.

Due to the lack of recreation centres and without nursery or pre-primary schools or a creche, toddlers play in narrow drains while parents are at work.

The Daily News team

which visited the camp found some toddlers playing with empty sorghum beer cartons filled with mud.

According to a recent Daily News survey, most of the householders work in Durban, which means heavier transport expenses than they had when they used to live at Malukazi.

Shacks and makeshift rooms dominate the camp, but some residents are busy trying to build more established houses.

Schoolchildren are now having to travel long distances from the camp to Umlazi, which was a stone's throw when they were still at Malukazi.

Mrs Maria Thabethe (46), a mother of 14, told The Daily News that she was paying R5 for each child attending school whereas she had been paying less than R2 while they were at Malukazi.

"My husband is working just as a labourer and we really feel now that it is becoming impossible for us to meet our expenses. Moving from Malukazi to Efolweni probably brought us more problems and a critical financial situation," Mrs Thabethe said.

There are no clinics in the resettlement camp. In order to get medical attention residents have to pay

about R1.60 for transport (only 20 cents from Malukazi) to the nearest hospital, the Prince Mshiyeni Hospital which caters mainly for Umlazi and Lamontville township people.

Interviewed residents said they had not yet been paid for their houses destroyed at Malukazi.

"We had bought our site at Malukazi but when we were moved we were not refunded," said one man.

Some residents ex-

pressed strong feelings about the Government's relocation policy.

"At present we are paying about R250 a year in school costs for each pupil coupled with this new long distance we have got to travel to work," added Mrs Thabethe. Shops are kilometres away; people have to board a bus or taxi to get there.

Mr J. S. de Wet, officer in charge of the camp for the Umlazi Township office, was not available for comment.

Efolweni: A slum or an exciting experiment?

SIR — I refer to the report headed "Hundreds bitter at living conditions" (The Daily News, August 3).

I find it difficult to understand how it is possible for such a report to get into print in a newspaper like The Daily News. The reporter who wrote it is obviously ignorant of the true facts about Efolweni. But what is really disturbing is how those charged with the responsibility of editing can allow such a biased and incorrect report to be published. Since the Daily News has itself published incisive and balanced background articles about Efolweni

quite recently, I must conclude that you have acted irresponsibly. Efolweni is widely regarded as the most exciting development taking place in South Africa. Delegations of academics and administrators from all parts of the country visit the township regularly. Only last week a deputation from the Cape Town City Council visited the township and was highly impressed.

Despite all this, your reporter glibly refers to the township as exhibiting "all the characteristics of a shanty town or squatting area". Not only is this a shocking state-

ment, but is an insult to the people of Efolweni who have erected their own homes and are thus solving a problem which no State authority can solve unless there were dramatic revision of the nation's current priorities.

You should know, sir, that the housing shortage in Durban alone is 93 000 units. The shortfall in KwaZulu as a whole is 170 000 units. It would cost almost one billion rand to eliminate this backlog.

The residents of Efolweni have demonstrated that they are prepared to help themselves and thus provide a possible solution to the housing crisis. They deserve thanks for this, not insults.

The report so bristles with mistakes, that I cannot correct them all. Allow me to point out some of them. Nobody was "robbed" of his land. The land was acquired after lengthy and democratic negotiations with Chief A. Mahanya and his people.

It is wrong to claim there are no clinics serving Efolweni. A mobile clinic visits the area regularly. The bus fares in your report are incorrect.

Compensation is paid to all people who move to Efolweni from Malukazi. If anybody did not receive compensation, I shall personally investigate the matter. Incidentally the KwaZulu Government bears all the costs involved in the move. It is incorrect to claim that people bought sites at Malukazi. The land on which they lived is tribally owned.

Finally, sir, allow me to say that we are proud of the achievements of the people of Efolweni. We are convinced that they have shown us we can begin to provide the hundreds of thousands of people without proper housing with facilities that at least provide security and a foundation for a better future. We intend to continue to provide basic services such as roads, clean water and toilet facilities at Efolweni, and in other areas, so that the quality of life of the people is improved.

As regards schooling, the KwaZulu Government is currently having schools built for the children of Efolweni. Although the Government is paying for the schools,

the actual building is done by The Daily News Learm Fund in conjunction with the local community.

DR. F. T. MDLALOSE, Minister of the Interior, KwaZulu.

The report was written by a Zululand reporter who spent at most an entire day interviewing people living at Efolweni. He maintains that he quoted them correctly in stating their alleged grievances. We accept that assessments of living conditions in a township of this kind tend to be subjective, and that Dr Mdlosi's argument may well be the valid one.—Editor.

Appendix 5. Richmond Farm Undertaking

The following undertaking had to be signed by people at Richmond Farm in 1978, in order to be allowed to continue living there.

UNDERTAKING

I, - - -, N.I.N. - - -, occupier of shack No. - - - on the South African Development Trust Farm Richmond/Dalmeny do hereby acknowledge that I am occupying premises and have erected structures on the said Farm without permission and that I am, therefore, illegally in occupation. I do hereby undertake that:-

- (a) I will demolish the structure erected by me and remove the Building materials and other property belonging to me and my family, and
- (b) vacate the aforesaid Farm together with my family,

immediately I am advised by written notice that the structures I am occupying are in the way of developments in the area or of any planning of the area. In my absence at the time of delivery of the notice at aforesaid premises, the service of the notice on an adult inmate or the fixing of the notice to the door of said premises shall be deemed to be sufficient notice for purposes of this undertaking.

Should I not have demolished aforesaid structure occupied by me and not have removed the materials upon my departure from the place I hereby give consent to and acknowledge the right of the Commissioner Durban or his authorised representative to demolish said structures and to dispose of the materials at his discretion.

I specifically acknowledge that the State shall not be liable to pay or compensate me for any buildings, structures or improvements and for any expense, inconvenience, loss or damage of whatever nature incurred as a result of my having to vacate premises or having to remove from aforesaid area, and specifically also in respect of any building material or other property left behind upon my departure.

I undertake to take steps immediately to find alternative accommodation and, in any event, to organise now to place myself in a position to build a house of my own elsewhere should a residential site become available to me in a planned area. I acknowledge that this document does not confer on me any occupational rights or any preferential claim on alternative accommodation on state-owned land.

WITNESS

1.

SIGNED

2.

Signed before me at NTUZUMA on this the -- day of --- 19 .

(SIGNATURE)

DESIGNATION

9. GROUP AREAS REMOVALS

1. Introduction

The Group Areas Act of 1950 has had a devastating effect on South African cities and towns. The Act 'provides for the proclamation of areas for occupation by members of a particular race group, and controls by permit inter-racial property transactions and changes in the occupation of properties.' (Schlemmer, 1967, 13) It thus enforces a system of ethnic residential segregation in urban areas and supports the rigid race classification system refined by the apartheid policy. In the course of the implementation of this Act approaching 120 000 families, almost all of them black, have been forced to move and many long-standing communities destroyed. Black people have been driven out of their homes in central urban areas and relocated in bleak crude townships on the outskirts of the metropolitan areas. Transport costs and rents in these townships are generally high; in addition there are many social problems: crime, unemployment, alienation amongst residents.⁺

Nationally the Group Areas Act has affected coloured and indian people the most severely since african occupation of land in urban areas was already largely controlled by the Urban Areas Act (consolidated in 1945). However, the Act has affected african people as well, particularly in Durban as discussed below. In crude statistical terms, coloured people in the Cape followed by indian people in Natal have been the two-groups worst hit by Group Areas legislation. Whites represent only 1,9% of the total numbers of families officially affected by the Act, as indicated below. Altogether a total of 27 629 white, coloured and indian families, 84% of them indian had been relocated in terms of this Act in Natal by 1981. Furthermore, it was estimated in 1961 that some 80 000 african people had been affected by the Act in Durban alone. (Motala, 1961, 4) The numbers of africans affected in Durban to date is still greater, at least 135 000. (For details see p. 227) The way in which the Group Areas Act has been used to remove africans living within urban areas but outside of proclaimed locations is a topic needing further research.

Table 14. FAMILIES MOVED IN TERMS OF THE GROUP AREAS ACT BY 1981, BY PROVINCE AND RACE CLASSIFICATION (EXCLUDING AFRICANS)[†]

Source: SAIRR Survey, 1981, 220

PROVINCE	WHITES	COLOURED	INDIANS	TOTAL
Cape	757	61 119	2 774	64 650
Transvaal	688	11 186	10 911	22 785
Orange Free State	-	2 300	-	2 300
Natal	814	3 588	23 227	27 629
TOTAL	2 259	78 193	36 912	117 364

⁺ For an account of the two Group Areas townships in Durban, see the case study on Phoenix in Part Four and the appendix to that case study, on Newlands East.

[†] Africans moved because of the implementation of the Group Areas Act have not been officially recorded with the other groups moved and do not therefore appear among the SAIRR figures.

One of the notable features of the way in which the Group Areas Act has been implemented in Natal has been the frequent proclamation of formerly african freehold areas as coloured or indian group areas. One of the obvious results of this has been to direct the hostility and resentment of the africans moved from their land against the coloureds and indians moved onto their former land, rather than against the white legislators. In Newcastle, for instance, the african owned areas of Lennoxton and Fairleigh were expropriated by the State and the entire african population (estimated to have been as large as 20 000 people) moved out to Madadeni and Osizweni; Lennoxton was subsequently proclaimed an indian and Fairleigh a coloured group area in 1962. In Vryheid coloured families displaced from the centre of town by the Group Areas Act were allowed to squat on Besterspruit, an african owned area removed in about 1962/63. More recently, in 1966 sections of the mission freehold area of St Wendolins outside Durban were proclaimed into white, coloured and indian areas and the african landowners and tenants living on the land subjected to removal or the threat of removal. (On St Wendolins and the most recent developments in terms of the Group Areas Act, see the case study in Part Four, below.) In 1972 the indian township of Craigieburn, outside Umkomaas, was proclaimed on the former african freehold area, Umkomanzi Drift. The adjoining black spot, Woodlands Lodge, was also proclaimed an indian area and both communities removed.

EFFECTS OF THE ACT ON TRADERS

Black traders have been drastically affected by the Act. Many have complained of being offered inferior alternative sites and of not being offered 'goodwill' compensation even though the provision of the latter is provided for in the Community Development Act. Since the Riekert Commission (1979) legislation has been amended to allow for open trading areas but only seventeen such areas exist in the country at present.

Indian traders have been the hardest hit. Nearly 2 000 of them had been moved in terms of the Act by the end of 1979 - 1 182 of them in the Transvaal and 484 in Natal. A further 421 were still to be moved at the end of 1979, most of them in the Transvaal. By comparison, only 21 white traders had been affected by the end of 1979, with a further 79 under threat at that stage. The competition that indian traders offered their white counterparts constituted a major reason for the implementation of the Group Areas Act in Natal.

Table 15. TRADERS AFFECTED BY THE GROUP AREAS ACT, BY PROVINCE AND RACE CLASSIFICATION

Source: SAIRR, 1981, 350 - 351.

PROVINCE	REMOVED BY END OF 1979			STILL TO BE REMOVED AT END OF 1979		
	white	coloured	indian	white	coloured	indian
Cape	3	70	304	43	163	-
Transvaal	8	48	1 182	24	33	351
Orange Free State	-	-	-	-	-	-
Natal	10	11	484	12	4	70
TOTAL	21	129	1 970	79	200	421

HOW THE ACT IS IMPLEMENTED

Before a group area is declared, the Group Areas Development Board (now operating within the Department of Community Development) hears evidence from interested groups, e.g. city councils, ratepayers' associations etc. However, the Board has the final say in the proclamation of areas and has rarely been known to alter its proclamations once made.

Once an area has been proclaimed for a particular group, a list is drawn up of the affected properties, i.e. those owned and/or occupied by people disqualified in terms of the proclamation. Initially this task was handed over to the local authorities who were also responsible for the relocation of the affected people. However, most local authorities responded slowly and it was partly for this reason that the Group Areas Development Board was created in 1956, to take over this function. The powers of the Group Areas Board were consolidated and strengthened by the creation of the Department of Community Development in the late 1960s, under whose auspices the Board now functions.

Once an owner is affected, a basic value is placed on his/her property which represents the declared value of the property before the group area was proclaimed. The owner can then only sell in the following manner. First he/she has to notify the Board of an intention to sell. The Board is entitled to buy the property at its basic value and it has first option on the sale. If it refuses to buy, then the owner can sell to a private individual. Up until 1967 if the owner sold the property for more than its basic value, 50% of the excess had to be paid to the Board. Amendments to the legislation in 1967 and 1971 provided that if a property were sold within eight years of either the 1st of February 1967 or the date when the particular group area was proclaimed (whichever was the later), then the owner did not have to make a contribution to the Board. However, in the ninth year the owner would have to pay a 25% appreciation contribution and at any time thereafter a 50% contribution. In 1978 this contribution provision was abolished - but by that time many thousands of families had already been affected by this levy.

If the price received by the owner in a private sale is less than the basic value, then the Board has to pay a 'depreciation contribution' of 80% of the deficiency. If the owner sells a property without first referring it to the Board, then he/she loses the right to receive any depreciation contribution. Those who receive more than the basic value through selling in this way have to pay 75% of the difference to the Board. The above methods of selling are classed as voluntary sales.

The Board can also expropriate the property from the owner at any time and pay the owner the basic value. In many cases the original owners have been allowed to remain on their properties as tenants of the Board, to their detriment. For instance, one indian family in Durban bought some land in 1949 for R580. They subsequently built a house on the property and then, in 1961, were forced to sell the property to the Board for R1 650. They remained in their house as tenants and in the years from 1961 to 1974 they paid R4 320 in rent to the Board. (Meer, 1975, 10) Another example, of a house in Cato Manor (Durban) which was bonded in 1960 for R1 600 and then sold the same year to the Board for a mere R150, also shows up how black property owners have often been on the losing end in Group Areas transactions. (SAIRR Natal, NR 42/1962, 4)

2. Forerunners of the Group Areas Act in Natal

Forerunners of the Group Areas Act in Natal can be found as far back as the 1880s. The major difference between the early legislation and the Group Areas legislation was that the former sought to control the spread of indian traders and, through 'pegging' particular areas for indian occupation and acquisition, to restrict their settlement to certain areas, while the latter has involved large-scale removal of predominantly black people into segregated residential and business areas.

Agitation against the indian community began in Natal and the Transvaal as soon as indian traders arrived in South Africa in the late 1800s. Using family labour they were soon competing with and sometimes undercutting the white traders; with the capital they had

accumulated in the trading sphere, they were then able to invest in property - two spheres in which restrictions were soon imposed. As early as 1889, Superintendent Alexander of Durban recommended that 'no licences be given to any Indian for any building in either of our two main streets.' (Henderson, 1904, 139)

The Lange Commission of 1921 recommended that segregated areas be developed for trading. Evidence from the Licensing Officer in Durban to the Commission merely showed up the existing restrictions.

We do what we can to restrict further licences ... A European licence is granted as a matter of course, whereas the Indian is refused as a matter of course, if it is a new one. (Calpin, 1949, 45)

As a result of the Lange Commission, special streets were set aside for Indian traders in Durban. The Commission also touched on the right of Indians to acquire land in rural areas. For Natal it recommended that that right be limited to a strip stretching from the coastal belt to 20 to 30 miles inland, but this was never implemented. In the following year, 1922, the Durban City Council restricted the sale and lease of property under its jurisdiction to whites and this restriction was extended to all Natal towns (Council land only) a year later. In 1927 an even more extreme and discriminatory measure was introduced in Northern Natal when, in terms of the Asiatics in Northern Districts of Natal Act, Indians were prohibited from living in various towns in this part of the country - Vryheid, Hlobane, Paulpietersburg, Utrecht, Babanango and Louwsburg. Indians wanting to work in these areas had to apply for special permits and commute long distances daily. This Act, as described below, is still in operation today.

The Pegging Act of 1943, which applied in the Transvaal and Natal, prohibited the purchase and occupation of white properties by Indians. The subsequent Asiatic and Land Tenure Act of 1946 divided Natal into 'controlled' and 'uncontrolled' areas. Indian and coloured acquisition of white-owned land in controlled areas was only allowed by special exemption. No restrictions were placed on uncontrolled areas, but these were areas already largely occupied by Indians. The 1946 Act also prohibited Indians who had previously purchased but not occupied land in white areas from occupying it after January 21st, 1946.

The Land Tenure Act affected most seriously those Indians capable of purchasing land in white areas for either residential or investment purposes. It did not immediately affect the majority of less affluent Indians who had no plans for either living in or investing outside existing Indian ghettos. (Johnson, 1981, 78)

3. Group Areas removals in Durban

The Group Areas Act was directed first at the major metropolitan areas of the country - Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria - with group areas beginning to be proclaimed in these centres from the mid 1950s. The following section looks mainly at the effect of the Group Areas Act on the Indian population in Durban. Coloured people have been affected too, but on a smaller scale since they constitute a far smaller proportion of the city's population. In 1980 there were 395 092 Indians, 209 573 whites and 59 980 coloureds in Durban. (City Engineer's Research Dept, Population Estimates, 1980. Most of the African population, as already described, are located outside the city's official boundaries.)

INDIAN SETTLEMENT IN DURBAN BEFORE 1951

Indians began to arrive in Durban in the late 1800s. The majority were brought out by the Natal government to work as indentured labourers on the sugar farms and later in the first factories in Durban. Having worked out their period of indenture, most of them then moved to leased properties, or, in a few cases, bought their own small-holdings.

The extreme poverty of the indentured Indians (ensured) that most Indians were obliged to settle in areas of low cost, on the Alluvial Flats near marshy ground, on the outskirts beyond municipal control, or in blighted central areas, areas to which Europeans were not attracted. (Kuper, Watts and Davies, 1956, 138)


The following quote describes this process of settlement in the Riverside area:

The original and early settlers in this area were those who had come out as indentured immigrant labourers and who were employed in one or other of the early pioneer industrial enterprises and plantations of the Colonists in this area as well as in the immediate neighbourhood. As these mills and plantations tended to terminate operation, the Indians gradually turned to other areas of occupation for economic existence. A number of them acquired land in this area and followed agricultural pursuits by market gardening and providing the people of Durban with fresh vegetables. Many were employed in the Lion Match factory, the quarries and brickyards. In fact in almost all the early industry and enterprises, Indians were the pioneer workers, for they were eminently suitable and reliable. (Memorandum from Riverside-Briardene and District Ratepayers Association, 1953, 2 - 4)

Many ex-indentured labourers took up market gardening in areas such as Riverside, Cato Manor, Bayhead, Sea View, Hillary, Bellair, Malvern, Wentworth, Sea Cow Lake and Springfield. Most plots were small and not economically viable. Thus, as industrial development boomed, some plots were turned over to more profitable shack farming, e.g. in Cato Manor. In other areas industrial expansion engulfed the market gardeners' land or market gardeners were squeezed off their land by financial pressures. By 1951 the census revealed that only 921 males and 59 females were still involved in market gardening. A survey done in 1949 of 278 market gardeners had shown that only 64% of the sample worked full time; the remaining 36% were involved in gardening part time and were otherwise involved in wage labour. At that time over 90% of the land cultivated by market gardeners was leased and many areas were already doomed by encroaching industry. Bayhead and Springfield Flats were just two examples. (Dept Economics, UND, 1961, 14)

Thus by the time the Group Areas Act was passed, the majority of Indians had already moved out of the agricultural sphere into other sectors. The Act did not, therefore, cause the decline of market gardening within the Indian community of Durban. It did, however, affect the small number of people still remaining in market gardening in the 1950s, as described below.

In the city itself, various restrictions were imposed on the sale and lease of property owned by whites or the City Council to Indians long before the Group Areas Act was passed. Durban initially comprised only the area now called the Old Borough. This stretched northwards to the Umgeni River, inland to the Berea Ridge and southwards to the Bluff. It was in this area that the 1922 clause restricting the sale and lease of property owned by the City Council to whites only was first implemented. Various other individually owned white properties also had anti-Asiatic clauses attached to them. By



1943 Indians owned only 4% of the total area of the Old Borough. (Maasdorp and Pillay, 1977, 90) However, the total Indian population living in this area, in white-owned or municipal housing, was substantial: over 30 000 by 1951. (1951 Population Census)

The restrictions on property ownership in the central areas served to direct much Indian settlement into the uncontrolled areas, outside the Old Borough, into areas such as Sea View, Bellair, Hillary etc. where there was no control over building or shack settlements.

If they desired possession for residential purposes there was no other outlet, and the valuation roll of the 'added areas' indicated that most of the land owned by Indians was used residentially, mainly on a very low standard. (C.A. Wood, 1954, 10)

Despite the small number of Indian property owners in the central area, whites in Durban agitated against what they crudely described as 'penetration' by Indians into the property market in this area. As a result, in 1940 the First Indian Penetration Commission was set up to investigate this process. According to its report, there had been 512 cases of 'penetration' by then, most of these in Block AK, Block AL and the Botanic Gardens. It noted that 362 of these cases had not been followed up by actual occupation of the properties by Indians and declared that there was no cause for alarm. The white inhabitants of the Berea were not to be silenced, however. Three years later, after further agitation by them, the Second Indian Penetration Commission was set up to look at any further cases of 'penetration' in the intervening three years. This Commission found that there had been 326 more cases of Indian purchases of property in the Durban area, 17% of which had led to occupation by Indians. It reported that Block AL had formerly been a 'respectable' white suburb but in those three years it had experienced 78 cases of 'penetration.' (Maasdorp and Pillay, 1977, 88)

The Pegging Act of 1943 which came straight after this Commission, was an attempt to restrict further penetration.

It inhibited the natural expansion of Indian-occupied areas and restricted outlets for investment. Indian land ownership comprised only 4% of the total area of the Old Borough, but this did not mean that all of that 4% was available for Indian residence. (Maasdorp and Pillay, 1977, 90)

The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946 entrenched the Pegging Act. It created 2 kinds of areas, controlled and uncontrolled. The uncontrolled areas were 'free from restrictions on acquisition or occupation of properties'. The controlled areas were 'non-Asiatic areas except for properties already owned and occupied by Asiatics on 21st January 1946'. (Univ. Natal Econ. Dept, 1952, 409) Most of the controlled areas were within the Old Borough.

Generally then, the settlement of Indians in Durban prior to the Group Areas Act was overdetermined by both economic and legislative factors. The poorer class of Indians set themselves up in areas outside of the main area (although some were housed in shacks in the central area), while the wealthier tended to try to acquire property in the centre of town, probably more as an investment than with the intention of living in those areas. The 1951 census indicated the main areas where Indians were living prior to the Group Areas Act as follows:

- Old Borough	31 149 ⁺
- Greenwood Park	17 311
- Sydenham	27 194
- Mayville	30 231
- Umhlatuzana	6 039
- South Coast Junction	33 447
TOTAL	145 371

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GROUP AREAS ACT

The implementation of the Group Areas Act in Durban has led to massive removals of people and a decrease in the amount of land available for indian occupation. In 1956 it was claimed that whites would gain almost 3 000 acres in the city, at indian expense. (Kuper, Watts and Davies, 1956, 172) In 1961 a spokesperson against the group areas removals reported the effects of the Act on Durban thus:

Briefly we may record that the 1958 proclamation in Durban envisaged the uprooting of about 75 000 Indians, 80 000 Africans and some 8 000 or 9 000 Coloured people. Affected Indian property is valued at about 20 million pounds and the loss of some of the oldest and best cherished institutions of our people, such as mosques, temples, schools and a cemetery. All this, notwithstanding the fact that in some of these areas Indians first settled some 80 to 90 years ago. (Motala, 1961, 4)

Although the first proclamations for Durban were made in the 1950s, expropriation of property and removals only started getting under way in the 1960s. In the early 1960s the new group areas township of Chatsworth, to the south of Durban, was developed but there was not enough alternative housing available and some of those displaced by the Act had to be housed 'temporarily' in the Springfield Emergency Camp. This developed rapidly into a slum. Another Emergency Camp, called Minitown, had to be established in a section of the indian area of Merebank in 1971. In 1976 the relocation township of Phoenix was begun to the north of Durban. (On Phoenix, see the case study in Part Three.)

In 1967 it was reported that 6 146 indian families had been relocated in Durban as a result of the Group Areas Act, and a further 13 000 indian families were estimated as still under threat. (Schlemmer, 1967, 15) This meant a total of just over 120 000 individuals affected by the Act - either moved or threatened with removal. By 1970 599 traders had been disqualified but only 60 had been found alternative sites by the Department of Community Development and 40 by the Durban City Council. Market gardeners were displaced in Chatsworth, Shallcross, Queensburgh, Riverside and Bayhead and forced to move into municipal housing schemes thus depriving them of their access to land and subsistence. The fishing community on the Bluff was moved away from the sea and their livelihood.

The implementation of the Act in Durban has forced the indian community into a heavy dependency on the municipality to meet its housing needs. All displaced people have the choice either of applying for municipal housing in Chatsworth or Phoenix, or of applying for serviced plots controlled by the Department or the City Council, or of buying from the few indian property developers in proclaimed indian areas. The price

⁺ 6 000 of these housed in municipal barracks.

of serviced plots and houses has rocketed since land allocated to indians is small relative to their population. In some cases plots have sold for three times the price of a plot of the same size in an adjacent white area. In 1966 75% of the indian population still lived on private freehold land but it was estimated in 1977 that as a result of the Group Areas Act, 80% would be living in rented council housing by 1990. (Minority Rights Group, 1977, 13)

At the same time the indian community has been shifted out of central city areas to the edges of the metropolitan area. In 1951 21,43% of the total indian population of Durban lived in the Old Borough. The 1980 census figures show that by then only 2,24% lived in the same area while 60% lived in the two townships of Phoenix and Chatsworth. (Calculated from Population Estimates of the City Engineer, 1980)

What also needs to be stressed is that indians were moved out to undeveloped areas where infrastructure was poor and services inadequate. There were few existing houses to be rented. People were forced into putting their names on the waiting list for council or government provided housing. By 1959 there were 3 624 applications for housing in the indian townships and by 1967, 12 419 applicants were still on the waiting list. (Memorandum to City Council from Indian Housing Committee, 1967, 4) The present housing shortage for indians is close to 17 000 units and, as a result, slums are developing in areas such as Merebank.

ROLE OF THE DURBAN CITY COUNCIL

Agitation against indians had been strong on a local level as well as a national level and the Durban City Council (DCC) was right behind the central government's proposals for race zoning in the city. Even before the Group Areas Act of 1950, in 1943/44 the DCC had drawn up its own plan together with a map detailing 'Probable Population Expansion.' This map showed the future Umlazi, Chatsworth, Phoenix, KwaMashu and Ntuzuma townships. It even shows a large area of Cato Manor as an indian area which, after various deproclamations and proclamations it has finally been declared. (On Cato Manor, see Appendix 1.) The Province of Natal also contributed its own plan for race zoning to the Post War Reconstruction Committee in 1944.


Both these proposals were used by the City Council when they drew up zoning plans for Durban subsequent to the Group Areas Act. More research needs to be done on the motivations behind the City Council's moves. There is evidence in the James Commission (a committee set up in the early 1960s to investigate allegations of corruption amongst City Councillors in Durban) to show that certain councillors, including the Mayor, were taking advantage of their positions to buy up land cheaply from indians who had been affected by Group Areas proclamations. But these occurrences hardly seem significant enough to have motivated such radical removals of people.

OPPOSITION TO THE PROCLAMATIONS

Before group areas were proclaimed, 'interested parties' were invited to attend hearings. Various ratepayer organisations, as well as political organisations such as the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the Natal Indian Organisation, together with the African National Congress (ANC), gave evidence to the Board. The NIC and the ANC declared their total abhorrence to the Act. The NIC declared that the Act was nothing but the

Redistribution of wealth and resources in favour of Europeans and removal of non-Europeans from their developed areas of residence and trade to remote outskirts of towns and cities, far from centres of commerce and industry. The main target is the Indian population. (Quoted in Kuper, Watts and Davies, 1956, 161)

The ANC looked at the effects of the Act on africans :



The sole purpose of the Group Areas Act, is to deprive them (Africans) of the free occupation and ownership of land, so as to ensure that they will be Government tenants at all times, and hence a source of cheap labour. (Quoted in *ibid*, 162)

Evidence before the Board at the hearings was detailed and well prepared by various ratepayer organisations but as Kuper, Watts and Davies aptly comment:

The procedures of the Government Group Area Board, public hearings, invitations to interested parties to submit plans, examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and the whole paraphernalia of judicial process appear to have little relevance for the final result. The Board's decisions could have been reached by discussion between its representatives and the Durban City Council. (*Ibid*, 187)

They also point out how white interests were recognised. At one stage there were recommendations that an area to the south west of Durban be given over to Indians. Within two months those whites affected had lobbied supporters in the City Council and the suggestion was reversed. The area was given to whites, involving the removal of over 6 000 Indian people.

EFFECTS ON TRADERS

As already mentioned, white commercial interests regarded Indian traders as a threat and the Group Areas Act was partly a response to that. In 1953 evidence submitted to the Group Areas hearing on the proclamation of Cato Manor as a white area revealed that the following Indian-owned businesses would be forced to close or relocate: 69 shops, 4 clothing factories, 2 box factories, 1 bicycle factory, 1 cinema, 1 crematorium, 98 buses. (Evidence of Mr Baijnith to Land Tenure Board, 1.09.53) At the same hearing it was reported that 10 businesses with a total capital investment of £55 000 would be forced to move from Riverside, 10 businesses (£57 000 capital) from Prospect Hall, 9 businesses (£97 000 capital) from Umgeni and 6 businesses (£59 000 capital) from Briardene. (Evidence of Mr Gopaul to Land Tenure Board, 1.09.53) In 1958 the Mayville Indian Ratepayers reported that the Group Area proclamation in their area threatened businesses and factories valued at £20 million. (Memorandum from Mayville Indian Ratepayers, 30.04.58)

Obviously many Indian-owned businesses and factories have been adversely affected by the Act. However the Indian business and trading sector is still a very powerful force in Durban. More research needs to be done on the process of relocation of factories and businesses; possibly this would show up what has determined who have managed to remain in the sphere and who have been pushed out. It is possible that the Group Areas Act has aided the process of increased capital concentration in a few hands, as it seems that it was mostly the smaller Indian traders who have been pushed out.

SUMMARY OF GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATIONS, DURBAN

AREA	PROCLAMATION, DATE	POPULATION AFFECTED	
1. Rossburgh Seaview Bellair Hillary	white, 1958	Indians	6 100
		coloured	500
		Africans	3 300
2. Woodlands Montclair	white, 1958	Indians	150
		coloured	30
		Africans	1 600

AREA	PROCLAMATION, DATE	POPULATION AFFECTED
3. Sparks Estate	coloured, 1950s	whites 250 indians 10 500 africans 1 050
4. Bluff	white, 1958	indians 840 africans 3 359 coloureds 181
5. Cato Manor	white, 1958 (See Appendix 1 for update)	indians 40 000 africans 120 000
6. Wentworth	white, 1958	indians 1 320
7. Central Durban	white, 1959	indians 533 coloureds 200
8. Chatsworth	indian, 1959	coloureds 323 africans 1 012
9. Duikerfontein	coloured, c. 1960	whites c. 1 200 indians 1 300
10. Shallcross Burlington Halt	indian	africans 570 hh
11. Botanic Gardens	white, 1963	indians 500 coloureds 140 africans 530
12. Marriott Road	white, 1963	indians 1 080 coloureds 170 africans 530
13. Block AK	white, 1963	indians 5 000 hh
14. Riverside	white, 1963	indians 2 770 coloureds 130 africans 70
15. Prospect Hall	white, 1963	indians 3 150 coloureds 110 africans 100
16. Austerville	coloured, 1963	
17. Treasure Beach	coloured, 1963	
18. Merebank	indian, 1963	
19. Isipingo	indian, 1963	
20. Effingham Heights	indian, 1967	
21. La Lucia	white, 1970	
22. Glenwood	white, 1970	
23. Block G	white, 1970	
24. Phoenix	indian, 1970	
25. Newlands	coloured, 1972	
26. Grey Street	indian, for business purposes only, 1973	
27. Cato Manor	reproclamation as indian, 1980	

4. Group Areas removals in the rest of Natal

More work needs to be done on the extent and effects of Group Areas Proclamations in the rest of the province outside of the metropolitan area of Durban. The following is a brief and incomplete summary of developments in some other parts of the province.

ZULULAND

In 1970 the Minister of Planning and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said that from that date indians and coloureds would be canalised to areas south of the Tugela River. Employers in those areas had to apply for permits to retain the services of those affected. (SAIRR, 1970, 195) In 1977, with the development of the harbour and industrial town of Richards Bay under way, it was announced that from November 1977 coloured and indian employees would no longer be required to have permits to be north of Tugela River. The Group Areas Board announced that it was looking into proclaiming areas for coloureds and indians and whites in the area. Finally, in July 1981, indian and coloured group areas were proclaimed in Richards Bay (Sunday Times, 12.07.81) and, also in 1981, in Melmoth. In January 1982 a coloured group area was proclaimed in Eshowe and both coloured and indian group areas were proclaimed in Mtubatuba. (Natal Mercury, 13.01.82) In May 1982 coloured and indian areas were proclaimed for Gingindlovu. (Natal Mercury, 11.05.82)

As a result of the lack of proclaimed areas and thus sanctioned housing for them, coloured and indian people working in Zululand were forced either to commute long distances - many living in Stanger, south of the Tugela River - or live in illegal and rundown squatter areas. One such squatter camp, described to SPP as a slum, exists to the west of Empangeni. In July 1981 the Chairman of the Zululand Indian Welfare Workers Association described living conditions for indians in the Richards Bay area prior to the proclamation of an indian group area as 'primitive'.

Some have had to stay in caravans or make do with whatever accommodation was offered, usually at exorbitant rents. In the early days of the industrial boom many workers even slept in the bush. Others have had to commute over long distances from proclaimed Indian areas. (Sunday Times, 12.07.81)

NORTHERN NATAL

The restrictions on indians living and working in Vryheid, Hlobane, Paulpietersburg, Utrecht, Babanango, Louwsburg, first legislated in 1927, was still in operation in 1980. In July 1980 the Natal Mercury carried a story reporting that 'determined efforts' to get the 1927 legislation repealed were 'being strongly renewed.' (17.07.80) In Vryheid coloured people were displaced from the centre of the town in 1962 when that was proclaimed a white area but no alternative township was established for them. As a result these people were forced to move to Besterspruit, a black spot that was expropriated and cleared of its african landowners and tenants at about the same time. According to the Sunday Tribune (20.12.81) the coloured families moved to Besterspruit with the permission of the Department of Community Development but no formal housing was provided. In 1981 there were 107 families living there, still in shacks, without piped water and formal sanitation arrangements. The Vryheid municipality and Department of Community Development both denied responsibility for the area but there were plans for building a township for 78 families 'as soon as the Government gave money.'

(Sunday Tribune, 20.12.81) According to a survey undertaken in the area, 60% of the residents earned more than R600 a month and could afford to build their own houses 'if land was made available.' (Ibid)

In Newcastle african owned land was also used as a relocation site for black victims of the Group Areas Act. In this instance official indian and coloured Group Areas townships were proclaimed in 1962 on the former african freehold areas of Lennoxton and Fairleigh respectively - two areas falling within the municipal boundaries of Newcastle from which some 15 000 to 20 000 africans, landowners and tenants, were moved between 1961 and 1970. Further south, at Ladysmith, coloured and indian group areas were proclaimed in 1962. In 1980/81 the indian business community was being forced to move out of their premises on the main street of the town to a separate shopping centre. In this instance, however, it seems as if white commercial interests on the main street may in fact lose from the move since the centre of gravity in the commercial life of the town appears to be shifting with the indian traders away from the main street.

PIETERMARITZBURG

Group Areas proclamations were first made for Pietermaritzburg in 1960. The main thrust behind the proclamation was to reserve most of the central city areas, both residential and commercial, for whites and to push africans, indians and coloureds to segregated townships on the perimeter of the city. According to T. Wills, of the Department of Geography at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg:

The major effect was felt by the Indian community, many of whom had been for nearly a century occupying areas of the city now zoned exclusively for white occupation. (Wills, nd, 5)

According to him a total of 984 indian families and 75 traders were forced to move, mainly from the Upper Church Street area in the central city. (Ibid)

In 1961, at a conference called to protest the proclamations, it was claimed that a total of 7 000 indians, 1 175 africans and 1 000 coloureds were affected by the enforcement of the Act in Pietermaritzburg, compared to a 'negligible' number of whites.

Table 16. SUMMARY OF EFFECTS OF GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATIONS, PIETERMARITZBURG, 1961⁺

Source: Motala, 1961, 10

	NO. OF AFFECTED PROPERTIES	ACREAGE AFFECTED	MUNICIPAL VALUE OF AFFECTED PROPERTIES (£)	NO. OF PEOPLE AFFECTED	NO. OF BUSINESS HOUSES AFFECTED
INDIANS	671	379	1 130 000	7 000	81
AFRICANS	107	91	43 700	1 175	-
COLOUREDS	95	27	106 500	1 000	-
WHITES	9	Under 5	22 000	Negligible	1
TOTAL	882	c. 500	1 302 200	9 175	82

Having summarised his information as above, Motala comments :

⁺ A complete list of the areas affected by the Group Areas Act in Pietermaritzburg in 1960/61 is contained in Appendix 2.

It is glaringly obvious from the above

- (i) that European interests remain practically untouched;
- (ii) that the non-European people must bear almost all the losses caused through the Proclamation.

(Motala, 1961, 10)

SOUTHERN NATAL

Indian group areas have been proclaimed in Port Shepstone, Harding, Park Rynie, Umkomaas, Umzinto, Richmond and Cliffdale. Tourism dominates a large part of the south coast region and many indians are employed in the services sector in these towns. Indians have developed successful farming ventures in some areas as well, mainly on lots granted to ex-indentured labourers in the late 19th century in the Umzinto/Braemar and Cliffdale areas.

The vegetable growing area of Cliffdale was for many years under threat from the Group Areas Act, with local white farmers pushing for it to be proclaimed white. However the Cliffdale indians finally got the support of industry which was wanting an indian township to be developed there for the workers of Hammarsdale, Cato Ridge and Camperdown. R. Cadman, then MP, also lent his support, saying that the area supplied much of Durban's vegetable needs.

It will be in the national interest to allow Indians to develop the area as well as for housing ... Natal produced only 10% of its vegetable needs. (Natal Mercury, 5.06.75)

Cliffdale was finally gazetted an indian area in 1978.

The expansion of indian farming outside of these areas has been largely prevented by the Group Areas Act, since indians have been prevented from buying land outside their proclaimed group areas unless they have a permit. A recent report in a Natal newspaper documented the case of an indian farmer at The Paddock. He had used another, white, farmer to buy a badly eroded farm. After two years of hard work on that farm, the indian owner wanted to transfer it into his own name. Once the local Farmers' Association found out, there was a tremendous outcry, and the farmers refused to have an indian farmer in their midst. (Sunday Tribune, 4.04.82) The dispute is still continuing.

Very little provision has been made for coloured housing in Southern Natal. In both Port Shepstone and Richmond, coloured families are living semi-legally in indian areas. A coloured group area has been promised in Port Shepstone. At Richmond attempts to establish a coloured group area township, for 260 people, during the course of 1981/82 has run into opposition from local whites and indians who may be obliged to give up some property. A proposed coloured group area was gazetted for this town in July 1982 but approval has not yet been finalised.

GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATIONS⁺

The following list sets out in chronological order the dates in which Group Areas were proclaimed in various Natal towns. The list is not regarded as comprehensive. Furthermore, the fact that an area has been proclaimed does not necessarily mean that people are moved immediately; this list can therefore only be treated as a guide to the implementation of Group Areas legislation in the province. Far more fieldwork is necessary to uncover what has actually taken place on the ground.

⁺ Major sources include: SAIRR 1963, Government Gazettes and various newspapers.

DATE	TOWN	GROUP AREA	DETAILS
1956	Dundee	white, coloured indian (SAIRR 1963)	
1958- 1980	Durban	white, coloured, indian	see above
1960	Pietermaritzburg	white, coloured indian	see Appendix 2
1960	Estcourt	white, coloured, indian (SAIRR 1963)	
1961	Glencoe	white, indian (SAIRR 1963)	
1961	Queensburgh	white	9 000 indians affected
1962	Newcastle	white, coloured indian (SAIRR 1963)	see above
1962	Vryheid	white (SAIRR 1963)	see above
1962	Ladysmith	white, coloured, indian (SAIRR 1963)	see above
1962	Colenso	white, coloured	see above
1962	Weenen	white, indian (SAIRR 1963)	
1965	Port Shepstone	white, indian (SAIRR 1965)	
1965	Kokstad	white, coloured (P123/65)	
1966	Dannhauser	white, indian	Indian g.a. proclaimed 1966; 120 hh affected. Small part deprocl. to white 1970. (SAIRR 1970)
1966, 1979	Howick	white (1966); coloured, indian (1979)	1966 600 indians affected. All coloureds and indians under threat but subse- quently g.a. declared for them 1979
1966	Tongaat	indian	
1966	Motala's Farm (Pinetown) Stockville (Gillitts)	white	+ 4 000 indians threatened but subsequently, 1981, proposed for indians again. Now controls on shacks; site & service scheme. (Sunday Tribune, 27.06.82)
1966	Pinetown	white	
1966	Amanzimtoti	white	
1967	Bulwer	white	29 indians and 2 indian shops affected. (SAIRR 1967)
1967	Mooi River	white, indian	
1968	New Hanover; Dalton; Wartburg; Albert Falls	white	40 indian hh affected. 1980 indian township of Cool Air established and 13 hh moved by April 1980. (Daily News, 13.12.81)
1968	Kranskop	white, indian	
1968	Verulam	white, indian	

DATE	TOWN	GROUP AREA	DETAILS
1968	Stanger	white, indian (SAIRR 1969)	
1968	Richmond	white, indian	No g.a. for coloureds pro- claimed and 260 under threat. July 1982 proposed g.a. gazetted but local white opposition.
1968 1981	Umzinto	white, indian (1968); coloured (1981)	
1969	Bergville	white	13 indian hh, 7 indian businesses affected. (Daily News, 2.12.69)
1969 1981	Greytown	indian (1969); coloured (1981)	32 coloured hh under threat after 1969 until g.a. pro- claimed 1981
1970	Park Rynie	white, indian (P313/70)	
1972	Umkomaas	white, indian	Indian township of Craigie- burn proclaimed on b.s. of Umkomanzi Drift and Wood- lands.
1978	Cliffdale	indian	Originally under threat but reprieve when g.a. proclaimed 1978.
1978	Stockville	coloured (1978); then proposed indian 1981	Originally 10 000 indians under threat but proposed for indians November 1981.
1979	Harding	white, indian, coloured	
1980	Cedarville	white, coloured (F196/80)	
1980	Shakaskraal	indian	
1981	Ifafa Beach	coloured	
1981	Richards Bay	white, coloured, indian	see above
1981	Melmoth	white, coloured	
1982	Mtubatuba	white, coloured, indian	see above
1982	Gingindlovu	white, coloured, indian	
1982	Eshowe	white, coloured	

Note: In 1978/79 an estimated 100 african households were moved from the Dunn reserve, a small coloured reserve north of the Tugela river and south of Gingindlovu. More research is required on why they were moved and whether the impetus came from the government or the local coloured land-owners. The people were relocated at Wangu, a little to the north.

Appendix 1. Cato Manor

Cato Manor was founded by George Cato in 1845. By early 1928 the beginnings of shack developments were becoming evident, largely because of the increased movement of indian immigrants in and around Durban. After the Second World War, with increased industrialisation and therefore urbanisation, thousands of african labourers were attracted to the cities. As a result of the lack of accommodation for them, shack farming in Cato Manor became a lucrative business for indian landowners. Much of the land at this time was also being used for market gardening.

By the mid 1950s Cato Manor had an estimated population of 120 000 africans and 40 000 indians. The area stretched from the University of Natal as far as Westville, Mayville and Hillary. Overcrowding was rife and crime and disease widespread. Despite these problems the community was a well organised one. The residents established schools, religious institutions, old age and children's homes etc. They also developed their own political and welfare organisations.

In 1954, the Group Areas Board recommended that the area be proclaimed for white occupation. At this time the area was in fact rejected by the Durban City Council and white people in general on the basis that the poor condition of the area, and in particular the widespread presence of ecca shale made it unsuitable and expensive for white housing. There was also much opposition to the rezoning of the area from the Cato Manor residents themselves. The Natal Indian Congress branches of Mayville and Cato Manor organised mass meetings around the removal of people from this area.

Cato Manor was officially proclaimed a white area in 1958 and massive removals got under way. By 1964 the demolition of shacks in Cato Manor was completed. By 1965 the african community had been largely relocated to the new townships of KwaMashu, Lamontville and Umlazi, while most of the indian community was moved to Chatsworth.

All properties were frozen for development and the land owners forced to sell to the Department of Community Development or the Durban City Council. In most areas compensation paid to those whose properties were expropriated was poor.

By 1968, Stella Hills, a section of Cato Manor had been developed by whites. The University of Natal had also bought almost the entire Second River complex. The Department of Community Development was, however, able to dispose of very little of the land and it was for this reason that in November 1979 about one fifth of Cato Manor was deproclaimed a white area and, in May 1980 was gazetted for indian occupation once again. With this reproclamation the 500 indian families still resident in the area faced many problems. The Department of Community Development wanted to move all residents out of the area in order to develop the area. There was no consultation with the people on the redevelopment plans. All the land had been expropriated with the result that the residents of Cato Manor were now tenants of the Department of Community Development.

The need for an organisation of the residents became evident and in November 1979, the Cato Manor Residents' Association (CMRA) was formed. The immediate tasks facing this association were vast, but from the beginning their demands were clear:

1. Removals from the area must be stopped immediately.
2. Cato Manor must be re-developed in stages - thus allowing residents to remain in the area while re-development takes place.
3. No auctioning of plots to take place.

4. Housing must be provided for all income groups in Cato Manor.
5. The authorities must consult with residents on any plans they may have for the area.
6. Residents and ex-residents must be given priority in terms of housing.

In December 1980 the Durban City Council took a decision to sell the land they owned in Umkumbaan, which made up 27% of the reproclaimed area, by public auction at prices ranging between R15 000 and R17 000 a plot. As part of the CMRA campaign against the auction of plots, which would cause the area to become an elitist suburb, a conference on Cato Manor was held in February 1982. 48 organisations were represented. At the conference the Department of Community Development was called upon to expropriate the land from the Durban City Council. The residents asked for the plots to be sold at cost, and that the city council, besides disclosing the formula for pricing the plots, be made to absorb the cost of providing services there.

Early in May 1982 Durban's management committee announced that there was no hope of a significant reduction in the selling price. (In order to recover all costs, the DCC needs to charge R13 191 per site. If the cost of the land having been left unoccupied for 20 years - after the Group Areas removals - is subtracted, the land would cost only half that figure).

The South African Indian Council has also entered into negotiations with the government around the issue of providing housing for the low income group in Cato Manor. They are also in favour of the Department of Community Development taking over the entire development of the area from the DCC which only owns 20% of the land.

At the end of May a massive campaign was planned in Durban by the CMRA to bring public pressure to bear on the authorities, as both the DCC and the Department of Community Development were then refusing to negotiate with them, whereas they were continuing to negotiate with the Local Affairs Committee and the SAIC. A petition was therefore organised to back the demands being made by the CMRA for the area to be developed for all income groups as well as requesting the State and the DCC to accept responsibility for subsidising housing for the low income groups.



Appendix 2. The effects of the Group Areas Act in Pietermaritzburg

GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATIONS, PIETERMARITZBURG, 1.04.60

Source: Motala, 1961.

AREAS PROCLAIMED	GROUP	EFFECTS
1. Central area, city	white	200 properties affected; 81 indian owned, with municipal valuation of £ 266 000; 50 coloured owned, with municipal valuation of £75 000. c. 1 000 indians and 500 coloureds to move. Indian traders given 1 yr to wind up businesses.
2. Upper Church Street	white	36 business properties + 42 indian owned shops affected, with total municipal valuation of £271 000; 43 indian residential plots also affected, plus mosque, school and library.
3. Pentrich - Campsdrift	white	294 properties affected - 273 indian, 17 african, 4 coloured. Total municipal value of indian properties approx. £250 000. Approx. 2 500 indians and 200 africans to move. Properties included 4 indian schools, 1 mosque, 7 shops.
4. New Scotland Road	white	37 properties affected - 24 african, 13 indian. Municipal value of properties £27 000. Approx. 250 people to move. (See Black Spots Summary.)
5. Cleland area	white	47 properties affected - 43 indian, 4 african. Municipal value of affected properties £9 500. Approx. 150 people to move. Area first settled by indians and africans c. 1920.
6. Ockerts Kraal	white	58 properties affected - 40 indian, 10 african, 8 coloured. Total value of these properties - £40 000. Total acreage - 97 acres. Approx. 400 africans and 300 indians to move. (See Black Spots Summary.)
7. Sweetwaters	white	6 indian properties, valued at £15 000, affected. Approx. 60 people to move.
8. Hollingwood	white	52 african properties, valued at £11 000, affected and 400 africans to move. African Title first acquired c. 1922. (See Black Spots Summary.)
9. Lower Church Street	indian	1 white (a hotel) & 6 coloured properties affected. Municipal value of coloured properties £10 500.
10. Raisethorpe	indian	No white properties or residents affected. 22 coloured properties, municipal value of £15 000, and approx. 350 coloured people affected.

AREAS PROCLAIMED	GROUP	EFFECTS
11. Woodlands	coloured	1 white and 38 indian properties affected. Value of indian properties £ 38 000.
12. Hathorns Hill	coloured	30 indian houses built on Corporation land affected. 287 indians to move.
13. Lower Greyling Street	coloured	1 white-owned & 6 white plots affected, plus 151 indian properties. Municipal value of indian properties £303 000. 2 400 indians to move.
14. Hilton	white	
15. Winterskloof	white	
16. Lincolnmeade	white	
17. Northdale	indian	
18. Allandale	indian	
19. Dunveria	indian	

10. INFRASTRUCTURAL/DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

1. Introduction

One could argue that ultimately all removals in South Africa have been related to infrastructural development in its broadest sense; control over and exploitation of the country's wealth and resources being the basic concerns shaping the policies of the ruling class. So broad a definition creates problems of classification: how to delineate a separate category for infrastructural development and how best to classify the many instances where the overlap between this category and the others that have already been described is very marked. Examples of this overlap at a descriptive level abound. Group Areas legislation, for instance, has been used to allocate much of the prime urban land in Natal to white commercial and property interests and to clear black occupants off land wanted for industrial development. The removal of black spots has been linked to the development of the coal-mining industry in Northern Natal and the expansion of the timber and sugar industries in the south. Township development has taken place on land formerly housing informal settlements (e.g. KwaMashu township, built at Duff's Road) and on black spots (e.g. Phoenix, Durban, on New Farm; Craigieburn, Umkomaas, on Umkomanzi Drift and Woodlands Lodge); industrial zones have been similarly located on land affected by Group Areas legislation, black spot removals and informal settlement removals.

This chapter looks at infrastructural development in a fairly narrow sense, applying the term to those projects and schemes that have been designed to expand the infrastructure serving the economy of the province and its regions, e.g. industrial sites, dams, roads etc. It also looks at certain development and conservation projects where these have led to the removal of people. To try to record every instance of population removals caused by these developments would be a mammoth and probably ultimately unenlightening task; instead this chapter makes some general observations about the nature of these removals and then isolates some major examples under the following sub-categories:

- Industrial and township development
- Agricultural and rural development projects
- Conservation and forestry
- Dams
- Roads

LACK OF BENEFITS FOR LOCAL PEOPLE

The relocation of people for such purposes is not unique to South Africa or the apartheid system. What links this category of removals as it is implemented in South Africa to the categories of forced removals already discussed is that 1) the people mainly affected by these developments have been black, 2) have, as a result, had no direct access to or political leverage with the people who make and apply the decisions about where schemes are to be sited and how they are to be developed and 3) generally do not benefit from the schemes developed on the land on which they used to live.

An example of this is provided by the Woodstock Dam that is currently being built near Bergville. 656 african families (Hansard, Question 520, 23.04.82) were removed from both scheduled and freehold land to make way for the dam, part of the function of which is to

generate power that those removed will not enjoy. Another example is provided by the excision of scheduled land from KwaZulu next to the Natal Parks Board fishing camp at Sodwana Bay - here some 700 people have been threatened with removal so that this camp site, which caters exclusively for whites, can be expanded. (Both examples are discussed more fully below.) Furthermore, even where one can argue that the relocation of people for a particular project is in the interests of society in general, the manner in which this is carried out tends to leave the affected community disorganised and demoralised and often badly off in terms of compensation and land.

Many of the major infrastructural and conservation schemes developed in Natal have been sited on black-owned or occupied land precisely because of the lower costs, both political and financial, that face the State or other development agencies in these areas when compared to what they would find in the white areas. Opposition from threatened black communities has not been non-existent - the people affected by the building of the Woodstock Dam, for instance, put up a strong fight between 1979 and 1981 and eventually succeeded in being relocated on compensatory land adjacent to their former homes instead of right out of the district as originally envisaged. Generally, however, the more isolated and rural the area, the smaller the chance is that the State will be troubled by serious local opposition or adverse publicity. Furthermore, the lack of infrastructural development in rural black areas in general means that compensation costs are kept low and relatively little in the way of already established resources (e.g. agricultural land) is destroyed when large-scale projects are built there.

The prospects for conservation projects and nature reserves, too, are most promising in the least developed areas of the country, where the natural environment has not been as radically transformed as in the white farming areas. This has been especially true in the north eastern corner of Natal, in Thongaland, where a number of game and conservation areas have been demarcated, all of which have encroached upon the land available to the local black people. Conservationists correctly describe this area as uniquely unspoilt and therefore ecologically extremely valuable, an area that should be conserved. However, the same could just as well have been said of Durban, before it was transformed into South Africa's major port, or Richards Bay before its industrial transformation. Environmental issues in Natal have, by and large, been diverted away from the urban-industrial centres where the ruling class is based - and where the ecological issues are as, if not more, pressing - to the underdeveloped rural areas where the least powerful and economically most vulnerable sector of our society lives.

Lack of consultation between planners and the local black population affected by development schemes is widespread. The local people are generally the last to be informed of what a hidden bureaucracy is planning for their area; often all that they have to go on are vague and unsettling rumours which may impel them to move of their own accord. Hard information, when it finally filters down to them, rarely takes the form of genuine consultation. Thus in the case of the proposed Inanda Dam (described below) very little attempt was made to inform the people to be affected about developments. Although 3 500 dwellings may be affected, people in the area have not been informed of what the authorities have in mind and do not know if or to where they may be moved. The only meeting between officials and locals seems to have been one at which the building of the dam was announced. Some people in the area only know about the proposed dam through the newspapers.

Lack of consultation can be as true of development projects planned by State bodies within and for the supposed benefit of KwaZulu as it is of other schemes. A coconut project planned by the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture in an area just to the west of Kosi Bay, for instance, was implemented without any forewarning to the 30 households whose land was to be used. According to local informants, the first these people knew about it was when large holes were dug on their land for the trees. The people were moved, but after

a few years the project was abandoned.

What makes this process even more confusing, is that often a large number of government departments (both central and KwaZulu) are involved in the implementation of schemes. The people do not have to deal only with the Department of Cooperation and Development, as in other removals. In some cases, coordination between departments is not effective and the various officials themselves do not seem to have an overview. In other cases, officials appear to exploit the potential confusion in the situation to conceal what is being planned, those who try to make enquiries being directed on a futile chase from one office to another. Attempts to investigate the proposed Mvumase Dam on the lower Tugela - which may necessitate the relocation of Bulwer Trust Farm, itself a relocation site that was established only about two years ago - have run into this problem.

2. Industrial and township development

The expansion of industrial undertakings in established urban centres such as Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Newcastle has frequently been sited on land formerly owned or occupied by black people. The ISCOR plant at Newcastle, for instance, has been developed on a black spot called Milton which was expropriated and cleared of its residents in 1970. In Pietermaritzburg land in the Pentrich/Campsdrift area which was cleared of its african and indian residents in the late 1960s, in terms of the Group Areas Act, has been proclaimed an industrial zone. In the Durban/Pinetown area a number of informal settlements have been cleared over the years because they have stood in the way of industrial development, e.g. at Clairwood, Bayhead and Klaarwater. Similarly, a number of townships developed to house black workers have been established or expanded on land from which other black communities have had to be removed first, e.g. KwaMashu, Phoenix and Umlazi. Mining development too, has taken place on land formerly owned or occupied by africans, e.g. at the black spots of East Hesselton, West Hesselton and Siwangu in the Dannhauser district; removals because of coal-mining have threatened people inside KwaZulu too, in the Okuku area west of the Umfolosi Game Reserve.

Another important aspect of relocation because of industrial development has been that caused by the establishment of new industrial growth points in response to the various border industry and decentralisation initiatives of the State. Two major examples of this have been at Hammarsdale and at Richards Bay. (See also Appendix 1 on Clairwood.)

1. HAMMARSDALE

Hammarsdale, established in the early 1960s to the west of Pinetown, was one of the first places to be set up as a border industry area in Natal. As already described, this involved expropriation of african freehold land that had been classified as black spots, to make way for the establishment of the township of Mpumalanga where the workers for the new factories were to be housed. 200 to 300 landowners and thousands of tenants were affected; many of them moved onto other, neighbouring black spots from where they were later moved into Mpumalanga.

The first factories were opened in 1961. By 1968 there were 12 industrial concerns, 11 of them clothing/textile concerns. Initially the Natal Chamber of Industries opposed the development of Hammarsdale which they described as presenting 'a grave threat to the stability of Natal's clothing industry.' (*Natal Mercury*, 7.03.62) Because of the lower wages paid in Hammarsdale, shirts being produced there were selling for R1,00 each, whereas in Durban, where labour costs were higher, they were being sold for R1,65 each. (Ibid) Although border industry concessions were withdrawn in 1968, Hammarsdale is generally regarded as one of the successes of the border industry policy. Ownership of

factories is dominated by both multi-nationals and local groups, e.g. Tongaat.

2. RICHARDS BAY AND THE REMOVAL OF RESERVE 6 AND RESERVE 4

Richards Bay has been described as 'the cornerstone of the Government's national policy of decentralisation.' (*Sunday Tribune*, 8.03.81) Although it was earmarked for development as a major port and industrial centre in the mid 1960s and granted border area status in 1967/68, construction did not get under way on the port until 1973. In the past decade the State has poured millions upon millions of rands into the development of the area, in a major effort to attract private industry; it appears that this policy is now beginning to produce results. One of the inducements the State is offering is a subsidised waste disposal scheme - a R20 million pipeline which will dump industrial effluent (including gypsum and paper mill waste) into the sea and, according to ecologists, cause devastating damage to the marine life. 'What on earth does it matter in the sea if plankton in that small area is affected?' a government advisor on the project has been reported as saying. (*Sunday Tribune*, 8.03.81)

The indifference shown to the environment at Richards Bay has been paralleled by the indifference shown to the local african people who were living on the land earmarked for the development of the town of Richards Bay. In early 1976, just before the new harbour was scheduled to open, about 6 000 people living at Reserve 6 in this area were removed and relocated to the Ntambanana area, about 45 km inland from the sea. In 1977 a small section of Reserve 4, just to the north, was excised from the schedule of african land in Natal and several hundred people removed to another part of Ntambanana as well; the rest of Reserve 4, home for 20 000 people or more, is under imminent threat of removal, having been excised from the schedule of african land in Natal in 1979 and excised from KwaZulu in 1981. (See case study, Part Four.)

Reserve 6 was a small scheduled area, lying in a lush sub-tropical belt that enjoys a high rainfall. Ntambanana, in contrast, is dry, bush country, suitable for ranching and not for intensive settlement, and agricultural production is far lower than it was at Reserve 6. Water has been a consistent problem there since the people were first moved in and in some parts people are dependent on supplies brought in by water tankers. People interviewed by SPP have claimed that the compensation paid them was inadequate and did not cover the true worth of the trees, both fruit and lumber, that they had to leave behind at Richards Bay.

Because people were removed from scheduled reserve land, they were not moved into a closer settlement situation but compensated, as a tribe, with some agricultural land. However, the people were moved in such haste that this land had not been planned along betterment lines before they were settled on it, as required by Departmental policy for released areas. The people were thus warned that their settlement was temporary and that at a later stage they would be shifted again, within Ntambanana. Six years later they have not yet been allocated their permanent sites, although it appears that plans for the area have now been drawn up. Much of the housing is of a makeshift type as a result, and in poor repair - a major source of frustration and bitterness locally.

3. Agricultural and rural development projects

As already described in the chapters on farm evictions and black spot removals, the development of commercial agriculture in Natal has been directly and indirectly linked to large-scale removals in the province. The abolition of labour tenancy and the increasing mechanisation of agriculture has led to a massive displacement of farm workers over the past two decades. In addition, commercial agricultural interests have formed a

powerful lobby against black spots and individual farmers and agricultural companies, in the sugar and timber industries in particular, have been able to expand onto former black spots once they have been removed.

The type of agricultural development encouraged by various State and parastatal agencies within KwaZulu has also been of a large-scale, commercial kind which has frequently necessitated the removal of people off land that they were formerly farming on a subsistence or peasant level. Here the benefits of such agricultural development, if any, have gone to the central KwaZulu administration and to those managing the projects; food production among local people has not been boosted, but diminished by the loss of their land.

The remote and isolated north eastern region of Natal/KwaZulu (Thongaland) has seen several examples of people being removed to make way for development projects. Many of these projects appear to have been poorly conceived and implemented, and have made little or no contribution to solving the problems of underdevelopment in the region.

1. FISH FACTORY, KOSI BAY

In the early 1970s a number of families were moved from a place called Ntlangweni, on the north bank of the Kosi Bay estuary, because of plans to build a fish factory there. The factory was never built.

2. COCONUT PROJECT, KOSI BAY

About 30 families were moved from the Hlomula area, to the west of the Kosi Bay estuary, because of a coconut plantation that was established there by the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture in about 1974. Families were apparently not actually told to move but were pressurised into doing so by discovering that their land was being systematically prepared for the planting of trees. Most families moved closer to Maputa (Mangusi) and were not paid compensation because they had moved voluntarily. The project was subsequently abandoned, after the trees had been planted.

3. COTTON AND CASSAVA PROJECTS, MAKHATHINI FLATS

Although the Makhathini Flats have not been developed on the scale anticipated in the 1960s, KDC and CED have started a few projects while some private agencies, including the church-based ACAT which has strong links with KDC, are interested in the potential of the area as well. Details are lacking but there are reports that households living in this area were removed in the early 1970s when land was cleared to make way for KDC and CED cotton and cassava projects in the proposed irrigation scheme area. Although the cassava projects have not proved successful, the cotton project is being pursued. It is estimated that about 1 000 ha has been cleared and fenced for a cotton farm and that a number of households living in this area have been driven off the land as a result, these removals taking place in 1980 and 1981. Some of the households threatened in this way were themselves cultivating quite extensive areas, some of it for cotton, but because the Makhathini Flats is classified as State land, they were regarded officially as squatters and had no claims to compensation or security of tenure. Once evicted, they have had to make their own alternative arrangements for somewhere to stay.

Threatened removals were also reported to SPP in 1981, at a place called KwaMbusi, 80 km north east of Josini. No details were available, but apparently the people threatened with removal were living on land earmarked for another KDC project.

4. Conservation and forestry projects

The development of conservation and forestry projects has occasioned large-scale removals in Natal, many of these also in the north eastern corner, in Thongaland. There are many State and parastatal development and conservation agencies active in this region, including the Department of Forestry, the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the Natal Parks Board, the Department of Nature Conservation, as well as various private development agencies. All are jostling for a stake in what has been described as a 'natural wonderland' - one of the last relatively undeveloped areas of any size left in South Africa and hence an obvious target for both conservationists and safari-type entrepreneurs. Until recently conservation and development planning for the region was conceived and implemented with little or no regard for the people already living there, whose land it in fact is. The people of the area were not, by and large, seen as part of the total ecology of the area, with, moreover, prior claim to its resources, but as problems, obstacles who could be and frequently were moved elsewhere so that the environment could be 'preserved'. One observer described the Natal Parks Board as 'cowboys' in this context; they preach a kind of conservation imperialism and have been accused of regarding areas inside the boundaries of KwaZulu and hence officially outside their jurisdiction, as their own to patrol and police.

These attitudes are clearly still entrenched in many quarters. More recently, however, there has been a debate within some conservation circles about whether it would not be better to allow those people whose land is to be conserved, controlled access to it. This approach has been suggested in a recent study of the ecology of the Maputaland area commissioned by KwaZulu, the Tinley / van Riet report. It advocates establishing resource areas in which the local people would be allowed to live although within strictly circumscribed and controlled limits. However, even though this approach would not lead to official relocation, it is likely that the lack of infrastructural development that would be allowed in these resource areas as well as the restrictions that would be imposed on people's ability to cull a living from the environment (e.g. by fishing or hunting) would lead to people relocating themselves in more promising areas.

There obviously is an important argument to be made for the preservation and nurturing of the environment and its resources, but at present it is a very one-sided preservation that is being propagated, at the expense of the local people who have no say in how the resources are to be conserved (or developed) and do not draw any perceivable benefit from such programmes. Furthermore, some of the conservation schemes being promoted are purely recreational, to provide fishing and pleasure resorts for the wealthy (and white), and cannot be justified at all in ecological terms. The most glaring example of people being threatened with removal to allow this kind of conservation to be implemented is that provided by the excision of the triangle of land edging the Sodwana Bay fishing resort.

Strategic considerations too have played an important part in determining the location of forestry and game reserves in Natal, with the removal of the local population out of strategically sensitive areas being an important consideration for State planners. Many forestry reserves have been located in the State land along the northern coast, thus sealing this area off from occupation by local black people; game reserves and conservation areas have been planned for border regions where they can provide an unoccupied buffer zone between South Africa and neighbouring States. (Removals for directly military purposes, such as at the missile range at Lake St Lucia, are discussed in the following chapter.)

1. SODWANA BAY : EXPANSION OF THE NATAL PARKS BOARD RESORT

The threatened removal of people in the triangle of reserve (scheduled) land to the north of the Sodwana Bay fishing resort received some publicity in Natal newspapers in 1981. At issue is the plan to extend the existing Natal Parks Board resort, situated on the southern boundary of Reserve 14, by adding this piece of scheduled land to it and removing the 700 african people living there. (See map on p. 280)

Background

The idea of shifting the southern boundary of Reserve 14 a couple of kilometres north of Sodwana Bay was already being canvassed in official circles in 1968/69 when the future of the State land in the Makhathini Flats was being considered. In 1973 the local commissioner at Ubombo said that the northern boundary of the Sodwana Bay Camp was still uncertain, owing to the lack of finalisation of consolidation plans for the area. However, it appears that a line establishing the northern boundary of a triangle of land to be excised from Reserve 14 for the enlargement of the camp was surveyed in 1973/74, known as the Isherwood line. This line, or one approximating to it, was incorporated into the 1975 consolidation proposals for KwaZulu and thus the proposed excision of land was made official.

The proposed hand-over of this area to the Parks Board was a source of friction and unease locally throughout the 1970s. Resentment at the high-handed manner of the Parks Board in demanding - and obtaining - access to water supplies for the camp from within KwaZulu and in treating the area north of the camp as though it were in their jurisdiction, was already strong: to the local people the Natal Parks Board represented not an agency of conservation and protection of the environment, but a despoiler of their land and their livelihood. In the late 1960s or early 1970s the Parks Board built a bridge across the estuary at Sodwana Bay which had the effect of causing the estuary to silt up and which destroyed a large mangrove swamp which had been a rich fishing ground for local people.

Although the Parks Board later admitted responsibility for the destruction of the mangroves, and replaced the bridge with a better designed one, the mangroves have not, to date, recovered and the local people have not received any compensation for the loss they suffered. In 1973 the Parks Board obtained access to Lake Ngobezeleni, within Reserve 14, to augment the inadequate water supply for the holiday resort. Although the local commissioner at Ubombo did not support their application for the water, his opposition was overruled by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. In opposing the Parks Board's application, the commissioner referred to the uncertainty about consolidation plans for the area and described the holiday resort as a potential point of friction with the local people - water was already a problem for them and they would resent fiercely seeing their water being used to service a holiday resort for whites. Once again he stressed the long-term security implications if local people were alienated from the authorities.

Local resentment about the activities of conservation groups was not directed at the Parks Board alone. In 1978 there was criticism of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry for planting forest on land that the Chief of the area, Chief Moses Zikhali of the Mbila Tribal Authority, claimed was their tribal land. There had been a long-standing dispute about whose land the area was; in challenging the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the Chief went so far as to instruct attorneys to take the matter up. The outcome of the dispute is not known - the KwaZulu officials denied that the land in question fell within the Mbila tribal area.

Excision from 1913 Land Act Schedule and KwaZulu

Local unease re the government's intentions for the area simmered throughout the 1970s.

Finally, in 1979, the excision of the triangle from the schedule of land allocated for african occupation in Natal in terms of the 1913 Land Act, was approved by Parliament and in January 1981, the area was formally excised from KwaZulu as well. (See House of Assembly Debates, 14.06.79 and Proclamation R19, 23.01.81.) Sodwana Bay was one of four areas affected in this way; the others were the Driefontein area near Ladysmith, the block of released land east of Paulpietersburg and Reserve 4 north of Richards Bay.

Opposition to the removals

At first the excisions from KwaZulu passed without notice, the local people not even being kept informed on developments. In May 1981 the excisions became publicised when Dr Koornhof announced at the NAU's congress on consolidation that removals were due to begin at the four areas in question. While little attention was paid to the other three areas at the time, the threat to Sodwana Bay developed rapidly into a controversial issue.


The press took up the story and gave it prominent coverage in both Natal and Johannesburg newspapers and both the central government and the Natal Parks Board came in for criticism. The KwaZulu government also joined the fray, with Chief Buthelezi at first saying that he had no knowledge of the impending removals and then lashing out at the excision which he described as part of 'the evil ideology of apartheid.' (Rand Daily Mail, 22.05.81) The proposed excision of Sodwana Bay and the other areas had, however, been discussed at some length between Pretoria and Ulundi in 1978/79, before the motion descheduling it and Reserve Four was passed by the House of Assembly in June 1979. While the KwaZulu Government had not been in favour of these proposals, they could hardly claim ignorance of them.

Press reports on the threatened removals put the number of people to be moved at between 600 and 700 people, and noted that many of them had moved several times before, linking them to the earlier removals out of the missile range area. (Described in the next chapter.) The Sunday Times quoted a Mr Steven Zikhali who had been moved in 1974 (presumably out of the 'danger zone' in the missile range area) on his previous experience of being removed:

I had 2 grass kraals, an iron-roofed house and a lot of land. My family and I were dumped in an open space and given tents to live in for four months. Then we were taken away again. (Sunday Times, 17.05.81)

The Daily News reported that the chief in the area, Chief Moses Zikhali, had himself been moved twice before and had lost about 2 500 of his tribesmen to other chiefs. (Daily News, 20.05.81)

The response of the officials responsible for the excision was to try to smooth the matter over by playing down the effects. Wentzel, the Deputy Minister of Cooperation and Development, denied that 700 people would be moved, saying the exact number had still to be determined. He claimed, however, that the area to be excised was very small and that his department had been negotiating with the Natal Parks Board to reduce the land so that as few people as possible would be affected. (Rand Daily Mail, 21.05.81) He also described those who had been moved from the State land previously as 'squatters' with no claim on the land. The MEC in Natal in charge of the Natal Parks Board, Dering Stainbank, denied all knowledge of the excision - 'I don't read the Government Gazette' - and promised that it would not lead to any removal of people. Rather, future developments in the area would lead to more job opportunities for local people. (Sunday Times, 24.05.81) Later he described the deproclamation as the result of a misunderstanding and said that the Natal Parks Board would exclude the entire area occupied by people within the deproclaimed triangle from the proposed additions to Sodwana Bay. (Natal Witness, 26.05.81) It would seem that this was intended to soothe Chief Buthelezi who, during



the course of 1981, has made several attacks on the Parks Board and conservationists in general. Finally, Dr Koornhof himself promised that there would be no removals, pending further investigation, and with that the matter faded from the press.

Position in 1982

The current position of the area is unclear. There has been no attempt made by the government to reverse the earlier excisions of the land so the legal status and tenure of the local people is an extremely tenuous and vulnerable one. In April 1982 Dr Koornhof confirmed in Parliament that the removal of people from this and the other affected areas were to go through. (Hansard, Parliamentary Question 465, 23.04.82) However since then, the controversy surrounding the proposed excision of the Ingwavuma district from KwaZulu has arisen and it has been reported that the Sodwana Bay area may be restored to KwaZulu as part of the compensation being offered for the loss of Ingwavuma.

While officials juggle their plans and redraw their maps, the local people live in a state of continued uncertainty and ignorance about their future.

2. GAME RESERVES

1. Thongaland

As already described, the north eastern areas of Natal have long been a target for conservationists; the military too have shown interest in the idea of enlarging existing game reserves or creating more as a way of establishing population-free (or strictly controlled) buffer zones on vulnerable borders. In recent years there have been several studies, produced under the auspices of the KwaZulu government, which have supported these proposals, notably the Thorrrington-Smith/McCrystal report, Towards a plan for Kwa-Zulu of 1978 and, in 1981, the Tinley/van Riet report. (See map opposite.) While it seems that the earlier proposals of Thorrrington-Smith *et al.* envisaged large-scale removals of people out of the areas designated for game reserves, the approach adopted by Tinley and van Riet is more sympathetic to the position of the local people and calls for the establishment of 'resource areas', to be linked to the economic development of the local people. It appears that their report envisages allowing people to continue living in these 'resource areas' but with strict controls on their use of the land. However, the report also refers to extending the boundaries of the Ndumu game reserve in the extreme north, to establishing wilderness trails and rustic camps for tourists as well as recreational areas, which would point to restrictions on the local people's access to some of the areas as well. As already mentioned, even if there were no official removals, it is likely that the controls on land use and restrictions on infrastructural development would pressurise many people into moving away from these areas of their own accord.

These plans are all proposing future developments. In the meantime, the threat of game reserves being established in these areas has already been pressurising people to move. Several hundred people at least have already moved south from the Mocambique border, near the Ndumu game reserve and the Mosi Swamps, over the last 5 years or so because of rumours circulating in the area that their land has been earmarked for game reserve territory (which, according to the above two reports, it has been). In addition, a couple of hundred households have been moving in from the coast south of Kosi Bay over the past ten years because of conservation plans for the area - a medical worker at a local hospital estimated the total number of households affected in this way to have been in the region of 250. (On the Ndumu area, see Appendix 2.)

2. Proposed game reserve, Lake St Lucia area

One result of the Ingwavuma proposals has been that all the State land on the coast north of the Lake St Lucia estuary has been promised to the Natal Parks Board for the

development of an enormous game reserve. This is in compensation for the loss of the Umfolosi and Hluhluwe Game Reserves which have now been promised to KwaZulu, also as compensation to make up for its loss of Ingwavuma.

It is not clear whether these promises are contingent upon the Ingwavuma land deal with Swaziland going through or not. If, as appears likely, this coastal stretch will be turned into a game reserve, then the african population living in the Nibela reserve, just to the north of the Lake (see map on p. 280) will be moved - perhaps 12 000 people altogether. However, these people have already been under threat in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans for the area, which called for the removal of this and several other scheduled areas in the Ubombo district. Development in the area has already been frozen and the people have been living with uncertainty and with rumours for the past six years; the latest threat does not, therefore, alter their position in any significant way.

As described in the following section on forestry and the next chapter on strategic removals, large numbers of african people used to live in the State lands along the coast which are also to be included in this proposed game reserve area; they have already been removed, however, during the course of the 1960s and 1970s.

3. Itala Nature Reserve

Details on this small reserve near Louwsburg are sparse. In about 1976 the Natal Parks Board took control of four farms in order to develop this nature reserve. The local commissioner was asked to remove the 1 600 people living on these farms but was unable to find alternative accommodation at the time.

4. Weenen Nature Reserve

This nature reserve was established on two former labour farms in 1975. These farms had accommodated several thousand people who were subsequently removed, many to the re-location area of Sahlumbe, when the farms were expropriated. (On Sahlumbe see the case study in Part Three.) The farms had been extremely overpopulated and neglected by their white landowners, but had provided valuable access to land to the tenant households living on them. Their removal and the subsequent use of their land as a game reserve for animals has left them angry and embittered. One former tenant on the farm who was interviewed by SPP remarked that he should have been born an animal - then the government would have taken care of him. His view of conservation was very clear: it meant that animals were provided with fenced land, while he was deprived of his land.

5. Corridor between Hluhluwe and Umfolosi Reserves

Details are lacking on this area too, but it appears that during the late 1960s and early 1970s household living on the State land separating the Umfolosi and Hluhluwe Game Reserves were removed. Numbers affected are not known; although these people had probably been living there for generations, they were technically squatters and thus illegally on the land.

3. FORESTRY PLANTATIONS

1. North eastern Natal

The development of forestry plantations in this region has gone hand in hand with the demarcation of conservation areas and the establishment of the military missile range on the coast next to Lake St Lucia. This too has been the cause of large-scale population removals over the past twenty years or so, most of it undocumented and unknown, however.

The entire coast from St Lucia Estuary to Sodwana Bay as well as the west bank of Lake St Lucia itself - all of it 'State land' - were proclaimed forest reserves long before the military moved into this area, and already during the 1960s there were removals both

within and from out of this area. Details are lacking; presumably it was the area actually planted with trees that was affected. In October 1972, when the local commissioner at Ubombo was trying to organise the removal of the families living in the danger zone of the missile range, the people affected complained of previous moves because of the forestry programme and said that large numbers of them had already had to move, some more than once.

In the 1970s removals because of afforestation programmes overlapped with the removals being enforced because of the establishment of the missile range in the area. Clearly the siting of the plantations served a strategic function; at what level the decision about the siting was taken is not known. In 1972 between 70 and 80 families living south of the missile range territory proper, in the vicinity of the Bangazi Pan, were threatened with removal. From information collected in 1981 from a Zionist priest and local leader living in the Nkundusi ward of Reserve 3, it appears that these families were moved during the course of 1973 and 1974 and settled, by GG truck, in the Nkundusi district - he claims to have been one of them.


During this period, or possibly earlier, people were also moved out from the western bank of Lake St Lucia in the areas known as Nhlozi and Nyalazi, and also settled in the Nkundusi area or further south, towards Mtubatuba but still on reserve land. Numbers and details of the actual numbers moved are not available. It seems that along with official State-implemented removals (in which the State actually provided the transport etc.) went private removals in which people moved elsewhere themselves because of rumours of their pending removal. According to the Zionist priest interviewed by SPP his community were told to move by officials; those that still remained in the area after a certain date were rounded up onto trucks and taken elsewhere. He reported further that some people got compensation but many did not; similarly, some people got the temporary use of tents while they were re-establishing themselves in the new area while others did not. According to him 'thousands' of people were moved during this time.

Those households in the Nkundusi ward may face a further threat of removal: the area is due to be excised from KwaZulu in terms of the 1975 consolidation proposals, although it too, as with the Sodwana Bay area, has been mentioned as possible 'compensation' to KwaZulu in the Ingwavuma land deal saga.

In the north, along the coast of Reserve 14 which stretches between Kosi Bay and Sodwana Bay, the concern of conservationists to protect the coastal dune forest has led to pressure being applied on people living in the area to shift inland - this process going hand in hand with other conservationist pressures, e.g. rumours about the establishment of a game reserve. In addition, there is also an afforestation programme in the vicinity of Lake Sibaya and Mbazwana. Currently, a small community at a place called Mabibi, near Lake Sibaya, is under threat of removal - perhaps 30 households in all. There were also earlier removals in this area because of afforestation programmes that were developed in the late 1960s. No details have been uncovered on these removals, although one local informant reported that there had been resistance to them among the affected people.

2. Vergelegen Forest Reserve

This forest reserve in the southern Drakensberg was established partly on three former african freehold farms - the black spots Larance and property 9590 in the Underberg district and FP 149 in the Mpendle district. The properties were expropriated and 1 370 people relocated to Roberts Farm in the Mpendle district in 1969. (For more details see Desmond, 1970, 71-72)



THE Tinley-Van Riet report on the development of the giant Maputaland resource area aims at avoiding what they call a "robber economy" — in which the introduction of large industrial and agricultural schemes inevitably impoverish the people who currently own the land and reduce them to "compound dwellers". Instead it recommends that development take place through the homestead so that the people can choose the type of development and the time for it. The report deals with two aspects—resource and conservation areas first and then the creation of development centres outside these areas.

5. Dams

Rivers in Natal/KwaZulu account for a quarter of the entire water runoff of South Africa and, because of the relatively low rate of evaporation compared to other parts of the country, these rivers account for more than 40% of the total useable water resources in South Africa. (Thorrington-Smith et al., 1978, 137) The tapping of water resources has been an important aspect of the economic development of the region; the construction of the Tugela-Vaal scheme will export the benefits from these resources out of the province, to the Reef, as well. Many of the major dams proposed or developed in the province have been situated on land occupied by blacks.

1. REMOVALS DUE TO DAMS ALREADY BUILT

Information is available on only a small percentage of the dams which have been built.

1. Pongolapoort Dam

Completed in 1972, the Pongolapoort Dam on the Pongola River in north eastern Natal has had adverse effects for the local population. Until the dam was built farmers used seasonal flooding of the river to advantage - as irrigation, and for fishing (supplying food between the planting season and reaping period). The construction of the dam has halted this utilisation of natural flooding. Now the floods occur irregularly, and at the wrong times of the year. It is not known how many people were moved in the process of construction, nor how many have been forced to move by irregular flooding.

2. Walkershoek Dam, Ladysmith

In 1972 the closer settlement of Vulandondo outside Ladysmith (established in 1963 to house people moved from the black spot Khumalosville) was moved to Ezakheni because of the construction of this dam, along with the neighbouring freehold area of Hobsland. 3 198 people were removed altogether, according to the Minister of Cooperation and Development in 1980. (Hansard, Question 537, 22.04.80)

3. Woodstock Dam, Bergville

The construction of the major Woodstock Dam, part of the Tugela - Vaal scheme, meant the removal of some 656 families between 1979 and 1981. (Hansard, Question 520, 23.04.82) People were moved off both reserve land in the Upper Tugela Location and adjacent freehold (and released) land at the farm Rookdale. In addition, several families were threatened at the nearby Rosenstein Mission, a Lutheran Mission Station. Originally the threatened people were to be moved out of the district altogether, since the 1975 consolidation plans called for the eventual removal of the entire Upper Tugela location. The people were strongly opposed to this. An ad hoc Committee was formed to represent not only the people threatened by the dam but all the other areas owned and occupied by africans in the district as well. After a lengthy and difficult struggle, they succeeded in getting compensated with a number of farms that were bought up from white farmers adjoining the reserves and the people have been relocated into a series of betterment-type closer settlements established on these farms.

In this instance effective organisation by the committee, backed up by the very real threat of violence from angry members of the community, managed to achieve important concessions from the authorities. Officials attempted to bypass the committee to deal with the chief only but the committee succeeded in asserting that they be party to the negotiations; they also managed to block private negotiations between officials and

individual landowners in the freehold area and to insist that all the landowners were interested in land-for-land and not cash compensation. Tensions between the supporters of the chief and the supporters of the committee spilled over into violence on several occasions; these problems were partly defused by the deposition and banishment of the chief in 1981.

2. THREATENED REMOVALS

Several dams have been proposed in various areas of Natal/KwaZulu. It is not clear how many people will be removed as a result of the construction of these dams, nor how many will benefit from their construction.

1. Mvumase Dam, Tugela River

The construction of the Mvumase dam on the Tugela River appears to be under way. The wall is apparently to be constructed 28 km from the mouth of the Tugela (Thorrington-Smith *et al.*, 1978, 151). The effects of construction are being felt over a wide area. On the northern bank of the Tugela, within KwaZulu in the Dendethu area, residents have reported the presence of surveyors. No explanation of the surveying activity has been offered to the residents. They are ignorant of the fact that a dam is to be built higher up the river. Rumours abound. Some believe that the land is to be used for sugar cane planting, others believe that a road is to be built. A few households have moved from homesteads close to the river, up onto the ridge above.

Further up the river, where the Mathi River flows into the Tugela, people have reported the presence of tractors engaged in ploughing four large furrows down the hillside towards the river. Again, they have no information on the purpose of these furrows. Some people have said that they have only managed to prevent their houses from being bulldozed by confronting the tractor driver as he was about to continue the furrow through their homes. Here too there are many rumours circulating about the future of the area. People believe that they will be relocated, and that their land will be given over for use as a game reserve, or for roads and railways. One resident said, 'Is this going to be like Ingwavuma where they give our land to somebody else?' Local people are employed to work in front of the tractor, clearing bush, at R7,00 per week.

On the southern bank of the Tugela, in the Lower Tugela district, the chief at the relocation site of Bulwer Farm has been told by officials that the 600 families at the site will have to move as a result of the construction of a dam on the Tugela. Some residents on this closer settlement have been there since 1981. Some have moved on even more recently than that (and many of the black spots in the Stanger/Lower Tugela area are under threat of removal to Bulwer Farm at present.) People have not been told where they are likely to be relocated to.

Reporters trying to investigate this dam have struggled to gather information but it appears that work is going ahead at the dam site. Chief Buthelezi said that the KwaZulu government 'had already agreed in principle with the South African Government to allow the construction of a pumped storage hydro-electric project on the river at Mvumase near Mandini. This will benefit the homeland because it will provide employment, irrigation, a new bridge over the Tugela and a large lake with a surface of 78 sq. km.' (Daily News, 10.05.82)

The same article reported that the South African Government proposes to transfer more than two-thirds of the water from KwaZulu's Tugela River to encourage centralization of industrial development in the Pretoria Witwatersrand Vereeniging Sasol region.' Both Chief Buthelezi and the economic adviser to the KwaZulu Government feel that this makes a mockery of the Government's decentralization proposals. A Department of Water Affairs spokesman, however, has denied this, saying that the Mvumase scheme would not provide water to the Transvaal; further -

Neither will the entire water supply of the Tugela be stopped by the new dams. Some of the water will be dammed and circulated to provide power. (Natal Mercury, 12.05.82)

2. The Goedertrouw Dam, Eshowe

A dam is planned for the Mhlathuze River, 13 km from Eshowe. The purpose is to make available a reliable water supply for urban and industrial use in Richards Bay, Empangeni and Nkwalini Valley. Information on the numbers of people to be affected by this dam is lacking.

3. Umfolosi Dams

On the Black Umfolosi River the Embiane and Mbizaneni Dams are planned. A dam is also proposed below the confluence of the Black and White Umfolosi Rivers - the Kwesi-Bomvu. Mr Roger Porter, senior ecologist with the Natal Parks Board, has opposed the building of these dams because if built 'they would have serious social consequences because a large number of Zulu people would have to be resettled.' (Daily News, 3.07.81) Precise details are not available.

4. Mpendle area

Rumours are circulating in the Mpendle area that people living in the Brooklands area are under threat of removal as a dam to supplement Midmar dam is to be built there. Details are not known. (Fieldwork)

5. Inanda Dam

Near Durban, in the Ndwedwe district the building of the proposed Inanda dam may affect 25 000 people. The project is to proceed in two phases. At the end of the first phase the dam will cover 655 ha and have a shoreline of 31,3 km. At the end of the second phase the dam will cover 1 440 ha. (Natal Mercury, 12.08.80) The dam will supply water for Durban.

The valley that is proposed as the base of the site is visibly a good natural site but is densely populated. In March 1981 a White Paper prepared by the Department of Water Affairs said the dam would flood an estimated 3 500 houses. The White Paper said that the Department of Cooperation and Development would have to spend an estimated R3 500 000 on relocation and a further R690 000 on buying land as compensation. (Natal Mercury, 25.03.81)

Around 1979 the four chiefs in the area were told of the proposed construction of the dam at a meeting with officials. However, since then there had been no discussion on the matter. Subsequently a delegation (including one of the chiefs) went to Ulundi to clarify the position on the dam. According to the chief, KwaZulu denied any knowledge of or involvement in the plans and sent the enquiry on to Pretoria. Pretoria also denied any knowledge of the plans. The first the people living in the area knew of the implementation of the plans was the arrival of surveyors to mark the site in late 1980. Two chiefs said officials had not been to consult them or inform them of the plans for the area.

In March 1981 the plan was temporarily halted. According to a spokesman from the Department of Water Affairs the decision to halt the project was made on human considerations and because there appeared to have been a breakdown in coordination between the Department of Water Affairs and the Department of Cooperation and Development at the outset of the project. (Natal Mercury, 25.03.81)

However roads in the area continued to be graded, on the site marked. In November 1981 an announcement that the Inanda dam project was to continue 'after land negotiations with the KwaZulu Government have been completed' appeared in the press. (Sunday Tribune,

8.11.81) A spokesman for the Department of Water Affairs in Pretoria said the project had never been scrapped, and that the project was going ahead on the site as originally planned. 'At present there are certain matters of access to site and land issues that have to be cleared up between KwaZulu and the Department of Community Development.' (Sunday Tribune, 8.11.81) When approached for comment, the KwaZulu Department of the Interior refused to say anything but the spokesman for the Department of Community Development said 'negotiations are still on between my department and KwaZulu.' (Sunday Tribune, 8.11.81)

Lack of consultation has meant that people in the area are confused about the plans, unsure whether they will be directly affected or not. Some have only heard of the plan through the newspapers.

In November 1981 the Headmistress of a lower primary school said some people had moved out of the valley because they feared the dam would go ahead.

I don't know what will happen to us, as far as I can make out they are having trouble resettling people from other areas so I don't know where they will find room for us. (Sunday Tribune, 8.11.81)

Opposition to the threatened removals is widespread. 'We will consent to move only at the barrel of a gun, because the land was owned by our forefathers', one local resident has been quoted as saying. (Natal Mercury, 12.08.80) A shop owner interviewed by the Sunday Tribune said residents had been aware of the project but were strongly opposed to it. 'Many have lived here for years and years and refuse to move.' He said the government would never be able to replace his shop because they would not be able to find as profitable a site for him. (Sunday Tribune, 8.11.81) People living in the area told the Natal Mercury that they were prepared to interdict the Department against their removal because they had not been consulted by Pretoria. (Natal Mercury, 25.03.81)

6. Roads

Very little information on the number of people affected by the construction of roads is available. Removals in the major urban centres are more likely to receive attention in the press than those in the rural areas. As the two examples below illustrate, access to organised representation to the authorities is more readily available in the urban areas than in the rural areas as well.

In the urban centres it is the local authorities who are responsible for the expropriation of properties. Usually relatively small numbers of households are affected by road construction compared to the numbers that may be involved in the construction of a dam. The following two cases illustrate that many of the issues are similar, however.

1. CHATSWORTH ACCESS ROAD

The creation of a second access road to Chatsworth (an Indian relocation township south of Durban) has been under consideration by the Durban City Council since 1961. The City Council has several optional routes for the road. One option involves placing the road just inside the boundary of the Stainbank Nature Reserve. This is land, originally owned by Mr D. Stainbank (a Member of the Executive Council for Natal), which was subsequently donated to the city on certain conditions, one of them being that Mr Stainbank reserved the right to object to any proposed development of the land. It has been alleged that the land was originally donated by Mr Stainbank in order to prevent the access road from being built near his property. (Daily News, 23.03.82)

The second option, and the one the City Council is most likely to choose, is to put the road through part of Umhlatuzana township, an Indian township adjacent to Chatsworth on

the western side of the nature reserve. This option will involve the expropriation of between 38 and 100 households and 5 owners of business premises. While property owners have been given assurances that 'every effort would be made to keep the number of affected properties as low as possible' and that compensation would be given, the residents of Umhlatuzana are bitter about the City Council's choice. (Sunday Tribune Herald, 28.03.82) They feel that the welfare of the 'birds, bees and buck' have been given preference over the wellbeing of people. (Sunday Tribune, 23.05.82)

The community to be affected by the road have launched a 'Save our properties' campaign through existing civic associations. A petition objecting to the expropriation has been signed by residents in Chatsworth and surrounding townships. The South African Indian Council are supporting the community's opposition to the road route.

2. AVOCA

Indian residents at Avoca, north of Durban, reacted strongly in May 1982 to the news that 40 properties are to be expropriated there in order to build a six-lane North Coast freeway linking Avoca to the outer ring road for Durban. This move comes at the same time as the move to expropriate properties for the second access road to Chatsworth. One resident at Avoca commented 'Why is it that Indians appear to be the only community which is forced to sacrifice their homes for roadworks?' (Natal Mercury, 11.05.82) The community's efforts to oppose the removal were supported by the South African Indian Council. A committee was formed at a public meeting on 10th May 1982 - this body is planning to make representations to the Durban City Engineer.



Appendix 1. Clairwood

Clairwood is an indian suburb of Durban, originally settled by ex-indentured indians who took up market gardening there. Situated on prime industrial land - flat, bordering the harbour and close to central Durban - it has, for the past thirty years, been the subject of a dispute between its residents who want it to remain a residential area, and the Durban City Council (DCC), who want to zone it for industrial purposes.

The DCC has been working to get Clairwood zoned as an industrial area since 1953. However it has no power to do this without the permission of the Administrator of Natal. The original proposal of the DCC was opposed by the Administrator of Natal who declared it a special indian residential zone instead. The DCC appealed against this decision in 1956 but their appeal was dismissed, the Administrator stating that one of the main objections to the scheme was that the Council had failed 'to demonstrate that the inhabitants of this 100 ha tract of land could be satisfactorily rehoused.' (Memorandum of Durban Town Planning Scheme, R.A. Pistorius, n.d., 1)

Residents claim that since then the DCC has been using indirect methods of forcing people out of the area. With zoning as special residential in 1953, all new buildings and structural alterations were banned, in terms of Section 67 of the Town Planning Ordinance, unless a permit could be obtained. (Memorandum to the Indian Affairs Committee, 19.07.65, 5) A direct consequence of this freeze on building has been that houses have become dilapidated; many have then been declared slums and their occupants evicted. 'Over the last 5 years quite habitable houses were declared slums in a move that would appear to be a ploy to get people out.' (Sunday Tribune, 6.09.81)

It has been alleged that the neglect of the area by the DCC is deliberate, to create a justification for the removal of people once its condition is 'beyond improvement.'

Once this cycle of self-fulfilling rationale is complete, the area can be demolished without conscience. At a recent meeting to discuss Clairwood, a city councillor put forward the view that the 'whole scheme amounted to no more than the usual slum clearance procedure'. (Bendheim, 1981, 7)

In early 1970, more than 50 families were moved out of one street to make way for an abattoir. (Sunday Tribune, 6.09.81) Many more families were moved to make way for the building of the new Durban market. The market was subsequently built and is operative but the abattoir was built at Cato Ridge, 40 km from Durban, instead. Most of the families who were moved went initially to Merebank Emergency Camp and were then moved again to Phoenix, once that township had been built.

Finally, in November 1978, the DCC obtained approval for the rezoning of Clairwood provided that alternative accommodation was made available for its residents. The Council, however, has not finally adopted this. Instead it has drawn up a 'comprehensive redevelopment plan' to 'facilitate urban renewal'. (Memorandum, Durban Town Planning Scheme, Pistorius, n.d., 1) This plan provides for roads to be widened, certain properties expropriated and services installed in a 10-phase programme over a period of roughly 10 years.

Even though industrial zoning has not been implemented, it appears that these plans for urban renewal have been designed to bring that a step closer. By widening roads, the

DCC can expropriate properties without needing the Administrator's approval, a move which makes the people of Clairwood powerless. It can also move people out gradually so that eventually no one will be left to object and the DCC will be able to go ahead with its industrial zoning. Road plans have already been used in this way. According to a report in the Natal Mercury in early 1982

More than a decade ago the local Indian Football and Sports Trust was forced to sell, out of fear, its vast football field in Archary Road as plans proposed by the council at the time showed new roads cutting right across its playing fields. These ghost road plans were never implemented and the lands in question are now occupied by large white owned businesses, Makro and United Transport. (Natal Mercury, 1.03.82)

Furthermore, residents claim that although the new services provided by the Council (road maintenance and sanitation) have not been substantial, rates have risen drastically. In addition vacant lots in Clairwood are being charged at industrial rates, assessments being as high as R600 p.a. (Bendheim, 1981, 6. Some of these vacant lots are the result of prosecutions under the Slums Act.) High rates act as another pressure on residents to leave the area.

Objections to the Council's moves have been coordinated by the Clairwood and District Ratepayers and Residents Association, a body which has continually refused to yield over the issue of Clairwood becoming industrial. They have advocated that the nearby Clairwood race course be used as industrial land instead, rather than have thousands of people uprooted. (Natal Mercury, 1.03.82) However this suggestion has never been taken up by the City Council, which seems determined to go ahead with its own plans.

Appendix 2. Ndumu Game Reserve

The following report outlines the contents of a meeting held between a development worker and 4 tribal leaders in the Bangweni area, just to the east of the Ndumu Game Reserve and just south of the Mocambique border. It illustrates the problems the local people have encountered in living in an area that has been earmarked for conservation. The establishment of the Ndumu game reserve has cut them off from the Pongola River and taken over much of their best agricultural land. There are approximately 450 homesteads in the area.

WATER SUPPLY

The tribe's main problem is their water supply. At the moment they are cut off from the Pongola River by the fence running along the eastern boundary of the Ndumu Game Reserve. Only women and young children are allowed to enter the reserve, to collect water, through two special gates. Men and boys are specifically prohibited from entering the reserve. It is thus very difficult for unmarried males to get water, since they have to rely on relatives to fetch the water. Males generally find it difficult to wash, as the women are unable to carry large quantities of water back to their homesteads. Cattle from along the Mocambique border have to be driven over 11 km, to a place called Fomotini, to be watered.

The scarcity of water also creates problems at the cattle dip. The Pongola River is less than 1 km from the dipping tank but if the hand pump is out of order - as it frequently is - it is impossible to fill it. The tribe has asked the KwaZulu government for a water tanker but have not yet got it. When the pump is not working they have to wait for heavy rains to fill the tank - they once waited for four months. At the time of the meeting, they were unable to dip as well; they simply took their cattle to the dip to be counted and were then dismissed. As a result the cattle are covered in ticks and numbers have died.

GARDENS

Before the game reserve was established, people used to cultivate vegetable gardens in the swampy areas and all the land up to the Pongola River belonged to them. The game reserve boundary incorporated their garden area, but even though they lost their access to this land, they were not paid any compensation. People then started making gardens along the Pongola River across the border, in Mocambique, but in 1975 the border was closed to them by Frelimo.

At the moment the people from Bangweni buy their vegetables from people living to the south of them. They do cultivate maize and cowpeas during the rainy season. If they have a good harvest, they are able to store some of the mealies for the winter; otherwise they are dependent on buying from the store. There is a good market for vegetables but they are unable to take advantage of it.

Being cut off from the Pongola river has also had negative effects on the quality of their houses. The best thatching grass and the reeds used for building the walls of their houses grow next to the river; they are both more difficult to gather as needed.

ANIMAL HAZARDS

The local people have complained to the game reserve officers about crocodiles in the Pongola river. A child was killed and a woman injured recently. As a result of their complaints, the Natal Parks Board appointed some game guards to look after the women while they were collecting water. Recently, however, the Parks Board has informed the indunas that the game guards are to be withdrawn because they should be patrolling instead.

Elephants living to the east of them, towards the Mosi swamps, are another serious hazard. Elephants periodically travel through the people's lands, causing enormous damage to their crops. People have heard rumours that there is to be an Elephant game reserve in the area but have not been told anything officially. When told that, according to the Tinley/van Riet report, the land separating their community from the elephant area is likely to become a 'resource area' to which both the local people and the elephants will have access, the induna's response was a rhetorical question: 'How can people and elephants stay together?'


REMOVALS

The people of Bangweni have never been told officially to move out of the area. However several households have moved by themselves to land to the south and to the west of the game reserve. The reasons given for this movement were: 1) the water problems, 2) loss of land and 3) rumours that the area is to be declared a nature conservation reserve.

FACILITIES

The area is very poorly served. There are no schools in the area and only 1 clinic. Transport is a major problem since there are no proper roads. Old people have to travel long distances to collect their old age pensions; they have requested that a local pay-out point be established but nothing has come of that yet. There is no local employment. The young men work on the sugar mills at Empangeni and in the mines; the induna estimated that about half of them are working out of the district; the rest are unemployed.

Despite the problems, people like the area because it is where they have always lived. In their view, if only the game reserve fence were removed, they would be able to make a better living.



11. STRATEGIC REMOVALS

1. Introduction

In addition to those removals for conservation projects in which strategic considerations have played a part, as already discussed, there have also been removals in Natal that have been initiated by the Defence Force (SADF) for directly strategic reasons. In an address to an Urban Foundation workshop on rural development held in Durban in 1979, Brigadier C.J. Lloyd, then Commanding Officer of the Natal Command, put the position of the Defence Force in relation to the people living in strategically sensitive areas thus:

To have or not to have a local population in the border and rural area, is the question. ... Wherever we have a local population in our border and rural areas we will have to secure their loyalty, goodwill and co-operation against the insurgents. Where this is not feasible, we will have to move them out of the critical areas and resettle them elsewhere.

He went on to say that:

The SADF is keen to see that i) there is a strong local population presence in our border and rural areas (White and KwaZulu), ii) this local population is loyal and co-operative towards the Republic of South Africa, iii) proper population control is exercised in these areas. (Lloyd, 1979)

In Natal there have been to date at least two instances of relocation of people by the military:

- 1) To make way for a restricted-entry missile range on the north coast at Lake St Lucia, between 1968 and 1979;
- 2) To establish a strip of open land along the Mocambican and Swazi borders.

It is estimated that about 3 500 people, mainly in the missile range area, have been affected by these two processes. In addition to these removals that have already taken place, some 96 000 people have been threatened with incorporation into Swaziland as a result of the attempted Ingwavuma land deal which has already been described in the chapter on consolidation. Although strategic considerations do not appear to have been the only ones involved, they must have played an important part in Pretoria's formulation of this scheme.

2. Removals from the missile range

Although the missile range was demarcated in 1968, the removals to clear the area of the people already living there only got under way in the mid 1970s. This area was cleared in several phases:

- 1) 1974 - about 400 people;
- 2) 1976 - about 1 000 people;
- 3) 1978/79 - about 2 000 people, including households in the region of the Upper Bangazi Lake.

The following account tries to set out the story of these largely unrecorded removals. It has been pieced together mainly from talking to local people in the area.

PRELIMINARY PLANS

In late 1968 Government Notice 1859 established the boundaries of a restricted zone under the control of the SADF, for the establishment of a missile testing range. The restricted zone takes the form of an elongated rectangle, stretching up the coast from just north of Cape Vidal for some 40 to 45 km, and inland for about 15 to 20 km. (See map.) It takes in part of Lake St Lucia and straddles both State land and the eastern part of Reserve no. 1 - all of it land settled by black people for a very long time. At that stage government officials estimated that about 4 500 people would have to be moved to make way for the missile range. It was envisaged then that they would be relocated on the State land in the Ingwavuma district - the northern Makhathini Flats - with some access to the proposed irrigation scheme for that area.

It seems that at first the removals were seen as urgent, but that it soon became apparent that the bureaucracy could not achieve so large-scale a removal at short notice. Clearing the land involved negotiations and allocation of duties between, *inter alia*, the Department of Bantu Affairs, the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Natal in Pietermaritzburg, the local Commissioners at Ubombo and Ingwavuma, the Department of Defence, the Department of Water Affairs, the Department of Agriculture and of Forestry, the Department of Justice (to determine the legalities of moving people from reserves; officials were apparently unsure what the position was and were anxious to close any possible loopholes), the Department of Health and the Public Works Department, quite apart from the negotiations necessary with the local people.

Apart from these immediate problems, the planning for the future development of the entire Ingwavuma/Ubombo region was in a state of flux and this also slowed down the process of removal. By late 1968 the State was already re-evaluating its earlier dream of establishing a large white sugar-growing settlement on the Makhathini Flats and was drawing up the first tentative plans for the establishment of a consolidated KwaZulu bantustan. (The Legislative Assembly of KwaZulu was finally established in 1972.) An Ad Hoc Committee to make recommendations on the future of the State lands and the reserves in this area, consisting of the Chief Bantu Commissioner of Natal, the two local Commissioners and senior agricultural and engineering officials, had been appointed. It reported in early 1969, recommending that the Makhathini Flats be divided for both black and white ownership and that the southern portion of the Ubombo district, including Reserves 1, 2, 13 and the southern ends of Reserves 16 and 14 become white - substantially the proposals later put forward in the 1972 consolidation proposals for KwaZulu.

It seems that already the planners for this region were concerned that the large-scale removals that such a plan would necessitate should not alienate the local people in a strategically sensitive area - a concern that local officials have consistently spelled out to their superiors throughout the 1970s. The Limehill removals taking place in the Wasbank/Dundee district at the time had generated a considerable amount of very negative publicity about removals which they were not wanting to repeat. The planners were therefore anxious that nobody should be moved until proper preparations had been made and facilities such as schools, clinics etc. provided.

The interplay of these various factors led to a relaxation of the pressure to remove the people still living in the missile range as soon as possible. While the removal was

thus temporarily shelved, the local commissioner was instructed not to allow any further capital expenditure in the affected area (presumably to reduce the amount of compensation due when the people were finally removed). Throughout this time local people had not been officially informed of what was in store for them - they were only finally notified in 1972 - but they were clearly aware that something was in the air. The prohibition on building added to their growing unease and suspicions.

THE FIRST REMOVAL PHASE, 1972 - 1974

Matters appear to have been allowed to lapse until about 1972, by which time Pretoria's first consolidation plan for KwaZulu had been drafted and made available to the public for comment. During 1972/73 the removal of people in the missile range became an issue once again, with two areas isolated as priorities. The first target for removals was to be those people living in what was known as the danger zone in the testing range - some 400 people altogether, living on State land in the central part of the missile range. The second target was to be a further 70 or 80 households living in the forest reserve just south of the missile range, in the vicinity of the Bangazi Pan at Cape Vidal. It seems that this group was removed in 1973/74 - part of the general relocation of households from this area at the time to make way for forestry development (already described in the previous chapter).

Local people's response

By the end of 1972 the news that they were to be removed had been broken to the people living in the danger zone. The newly established KwaZulu government had also been informed. It is not clear what the response of the government itself was, but certainly seconded officials in the infant KwaZulu civil service appear to have cooperated wholeheartedly with Pretoria. By that stage the proposals for the wider area were being modified once again and the earlier 1972 consolidation proposals were amended by the publication of new proposals in April 1973. In terms of these proposals the entire Makhathini Flats area was to be handed over to KwaZulu and the southern ends of Reserves 14 and 16 were to remain black land. Because of this the relocation planners had more land to play with; the original idea of relocating the people from the military zone into the northern Makhathini Flats was abandoned and it was decided to move them instead to the Mbazwana area, west of Sodwana Bay and within Reserve 14 - still within their own tribal area, as officials pointed out soothingly to the affected people.

Although resistance was not organised nor systematic, there was a widespread mood of opposition to the pending removals among the affected people. In October 1972 when the commissioner at Ubombo held a meeting with the local people to inform them of the removal they made it clear that they did not want to be moved. With an eye on their own powerlessness in the matter, they also stressed that if they were finally moved, it should be to a permanent place. They had already felt the pressure of the forestry programmes on the coast, as a result of which many people had been forced to move more than once in previous years as more and more of the State land was planted under forest. Although their opposition to the move was understated, it was nevertheless apparent and the commissioner was concerned about the negative response. Subsequently, when the commissioner arranged to show the people their relocation area hardly anybody came, while a government employee who was painting numbers on the doors of households to be moved was so severely threatened that he had to be transferred out of the district.

The removal

The removal finally got under way in mid 1974. It seems that it was planned as a full scale army manoeuvre, with the army undertaking to transport the people and their goods; in terms of numbers officially relocated, it was a dismal failure. When the trucks arrived to take the people to Mbazwana, most of the households to be moved had already

abandoned their homes, taken their movable possessions and disappeared into the neighbouring Reserve no. 1 or to the as yet unaffected State land to the north. Only a handful of households had waited for the trucks. The terrain over which the trucks had to move was also extremely sandy and rough and this made even the removal of those few people a slow, difficult and frustrating process which took several days to complete. By the end of the exercise less than 10 households had been transported the 50 km or so to their relocation site in the Mbazwana area, but the area as a whole had been emptied. Once the removal was completed, all the houses left were burnt to prevent the people who had been transported from the area or those who had moved by themselves from returning to their former homes.

Those relocated at Mbazwana were given tents on loan until they had built new houses, rations for a few days and poles for rebuilding. Other facilities were non-existent, although some schools and trading stores were scattered around in the wider district for the people already living there. The sites did not have latrines on them - people were told they were expected to build their own. Although the small number of families hardly made a closer settlement in the conventional sense, they were settled on small, township plots without agricultural land. This was a source of discontent from the start. The commissioner attempted to take up the people's request for more land with his superiors but this was turned down - revealingly enough by the Director of Agriculture and Forestry in the KwaZulu government, to whom the request was directed.

The available evidence suggests that the KwaZulu government service was fully involved in the removal - the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, in conjunction with the army, taking responsibility for the removal of the people out of their former lands and KwaZulu departments for their relocation in what was KwaZulu territory. (In this respect the removals differed from black spot removals in the Natal interior, where people are generally removed to Trust land.) To what extent the black members of the KwaZulu government were informed and active in the planning is not apparent; their white seconded civil servants appear to have taken an active part.

Compensation

The compensation paid to those people removed was, from all accounts, extremely low with figures ranging from R10 to about R60 or R70 per household being reported. A Pretoria official made the evaluations on which the compensation paid was based in late 1973. It appears that only buildings and agricultural produce were taken into account, not the value of the land itself since this was State land and the legal status of the people living on it that of squatters: despite the fact that they had been living there for generations and the land had never been occupied by other groups.

Housing in the area consists mainly of wood and reed structures, with each household generally having several such buildings. Most people had quite extensive and well-established agricultural assets in the form of sub-tropical fruit trees: banana, mango, avocado and orange trees as well as pineapples. One household which had had an orchard of some 200 banana trees as well as several mango trees and orange trees, was apparently paid out only about R70 for the lot. There was no legal assistance for the people removed, nor any publicity on the move. People were obliged to take what money they were offered, leave their land and start rebuilding on their closer settlement lots.

THE SECOND REMOVAL PHASE, 1976

It seems that by 1975, with the independence of Mocambique in the offing, the SADF had become anxious to speed up the removals from the rest of the area. Once again, however, it proved impossible to push through the necessary negotiations and planning in a short time and the actual removal, in the second priority area, only got under way in September 1976.

The removal

In late 1976 a further 1 000 people were removed from the area immediately north of the danger zone (see map). Once again not all the households were actually moved to their relocation site - established in the same general area as that set aside for the 1974 group - although the record was somewhat better than in 1974 and only a minority of those to be removed had disappeared by the time the trucks arrived. In these removals the allocation of tasks appears to have followed the pattern of 1974, with the South African government and SADF being responsible for the actual removal of people and the KwaZulu administration for their relocation at Mbazwana.

Despite the years of planning and replanning that had predated the removal, it was not without its attendant problems. No sooner had the people been placed at their new sites than it was realised that the area was unsuitable since it was intended for nature conservation purposes and had in fact been proclaimed a forestry area many years before. Attempts to get the people to agree to a further move ran into problems when they flatly refused. What the final outcome of this debacle was, is not clear. The commissioner seems to have been anxious to adopt a conciliatory approach and not to antagonise the people by any roughshod measures but it is probable that eventually they were shifted yet again, to the south of Mbazwana village but still within Reserve Fourteen. People living in this area, who are now threatened by the proposed removals out of the Sodwana Bay triangle, claim that some of them have been moved before. Thus, if the Sodwana Bay triangle is finally cleared of its residents it will mean that some local people will have suffered perhaps as many as three relocations since 1976.

Compensation and facilities

Both the compensation paid out and the facilities provided in this second phase of removals out of the missile range were inadequate, on a par with what those moved in 1974 had received. People have reported being paid compensation averaging out at about R50 per household, with the value of their land excluded from the calculations once again. People were moved into tents and no provisions were made for extra schools or a clinic. (The Mbazwana clinic only started operating in January 1981.)

THE THIRD REMOVALS PHASE, 1977 - 1979

The final phase in the removal of people from out of the military zone began in early 1977 but was not completed till 1979, when up to 2 000 more people were moved, also into the Mbazwana area. This brought the total number of people moved out of the military zone to a little under three and a half thousand; it appears, however, that the eastern region of Reserve no. 1, which falls within the restricted area, has not been cleared to date and if it is, this will boost the numbers still further.

There were two sets of people to be moved in this final phase: 1) about 500 people living in the northern parts of the military zone (as defined in 1968) round Lake Bangazi and 2) another group of perhaps 1 000 people who were living in the stretch of State land between the military zone and Sodwana Bay which previously had been proclaimed a Forestry Reserve. In mid 1978 this area was added to the military zone and the army thus came to control virtually the entire stretch of coast from Cape Vidal to Sodwana Bay.

Once again there were numerous delays and obstructions to the smooth implementation of the removal. It seems that by this time the Department of Defence had adopted a far more cautious approach to removals than it had had in the early 1970s when it had been so deeply involved in the actual physical shifting of people. Although, as Brigadier Lloyd made clear in his address to the Urban Foundation workshop in 1979, it still considered removing people from strategic areas as one method of 'population control', it did not want to be seen as the agent of removal by the local people since this would

prejudice its attempt to secure, in the words of Brigadier Lloyd, their 'loyalty, goodwill and co-operation against the insurgents.' It thus left the task of transporting people to other government departments.

Complicating the picture further, by 1977 discussions were already under way within government circles about the removal of people in the triangle of land that the Natal Parks Board wanted to acquire in Reserve 14 to extend the white holiday resort of Sodwana Bay. This threw the status of land to the south of Mbazwana into question, making it unsuitable for relocation purposes, and also meant that at a later date still more people might have to be accommodated at any relocation site chosen.

The removal

Despite all the forewarnings that had preceded this last set of removals, when finally carried out it too was at great speed and with minimal advance preparations. According to the staff of a mission hospital in the vicinity of the relocation site (in the Mbazwana area again), the local health authorities were not warned of the impending influx into their district. Not only was the hospital not prepared for the sudden influx of people, the malaria control officials based at Josini were not notified either, despite their need to monitor all dwelling places for their programme of spraying against mosquitoes. Furthermore, despite earlier promises of schools and clinics that were made to those being removed, no additions to the existing facilities at Mbazwana were made to cope with the added pressure of people. Most serious of all no advance preparations had been made to increase the water supply in the relocation area. The people were moved from well-watered places to a much drier site; the move also coincided with a severe drought so water was - and still is - an acute problem.

People were moved into tents, as in the previous moves. While no precise figures are available on the amount of compensation paid, this was also very low although possibly somewhat higher than what had been paid out in 1974 and 1976. Figures of between R80 and R100 have been reported as the usual amount paid out. A local doctor has described the situation during the removals as 'a pathetic sight' - people were unprepared, confused, disoriented. He reports considerable bitterness among the people but says there was little organised resistance to the move and there is still a low level of organisation among them today.

This latest removal was relatively recent, in the period of Dr Koornhof's public relations exercise in which forced removals were said to be a thing of the past and great play made on the minimum standards laid down for relocation areas - water, clinics, schools, shops etc. Because the area is so isolated, there was hardly any press coverage at the time and the lack of preparation and lack of basic facilities for the people who were moved was never sufficiently exposed.

PRESENT CONDITIONS AT MBAZWANA

Living conditions at Mbazwana are hard, the problems for those relocated there compounded by the lack of land available to them. There is very little local employment - the hospital at Mseleni is one of the major employers in the district. Recruitment of migrant workers in this district has also fallen off drastically in recent years, according to a local clinic sister: whereas previously local men could find jobs in Johannesburg or Durban, now 'the rule' is that they can only take jobs in Zululand north of the Tugela River - at Richards Bay and Empangeni - and unemployment is high. There is still no adequate water supply and people have to travel quite long distances to collect domestic water. This is collected mainly from rivers and streams and is not clean so bilharzia and other water-borne diseases are common.

The superintendent at the nearby Mseleni hospital has reported to SPP that half the malnutrition cases in the hospital's entire health ward come from the area of Mbazwana.

He attributes the high malnutrition rate directly to the relocation of people into the area, and the concomitant social and economic disruption to their lives.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MISSILE RANGE AREA

On the 25th June 1982 the central government announced that 140 000 hectares of State and scheduled land in the Mkuze/St Lucia area was to be handed over to the Natal Parks Board as a conservation area, the proposed area incorporating both the entire missile range and the neighbouring african area of Reserve no. 1. Although Dr Koornhof was at great pains to deny that this offer had any connection with the Ingwavuma land deal, it was clearly intimately connected. As part of that land deal Pretoria had offered Kwa-Zulu various pieces of land in return for the loss of Ingwavuma - including the Northern Natal game reserves of Mkuze, Hluhluwe and Umfolosi. This had outraged the Natal Parks Board, conservationists and the white public in Natal in general. The offer of this land at St Lucia to the Parks Board was clearly an attempt to mollify that outrage and to win acceptance of Pretoria's land deal in influential circles in white Natal.

The population removals that this game reserve will necessitate in the affected areas of KwaZulu have been discussed in the previous chapter. As far as the missile range area is concerned, local people will not be directly affected since they have already been removed - although those who used to live there will undoubtedly be embittered when they see their former land used as a sanctuary for animals and a holiday area for tourists. What is not yet clear is whether the missile range will be retained as a restricted military area within the new game reserve or not: this has not been discussed in the press. It does however seem improbable that the SADF would relinquish this area after they have invested so much time and energy to clear it for their own use.

3. Clearing land on the north-eastern borders

It is difficult to get accurate information on what has been happening in the border areas - to what extent removals have already taken place and to what extent they are still planned. The army apparently plans to build a military road along the Mocambique border. Although this has not been built yet, the few households in the way were instructed to move during 1980, and have settled further south, gravitating towards the growing settlement of Maputa (Manguzi/Ngwanase). In addition to the road, the army is also putting in a sisal fence along this border and about 20 families in the vicinity of Kosi Bay have been moved to make way for this. It does not appear as if the sisal fence has stretched very far yet.

Further inland, around the Mosi Swamps, about 30 households have apparently moved away from the border over the past four or five years, partly as a result of rumours circulating that they will be moved at some future date, and partly, according to local information, because of the attractions of the more built-up area of Maputa where stores, schools and a hospital are all to be found. There are also rumours (again, well-founded) that the Ndumu Game Reserve on the border is to be extended and this too has put pressures on the people living in the area to shift away from the border. This area is sparsely populated so the movement has not been significant in terms of numbers but is significant in terms of the increasing militarisation of the region. It does not appear as if any compensation has been paid to the people who have moved; certainly those who have moved themselves do not generally qualify for any such remuneration.

The position on the Swazi border (prior to the announcement of the Ingwavuma land deal) seems similar. A twelve metre strip along this border was cleared in readiness for the planting of a sisal fence but by April 1981 this fence had not yet been begun. However,

a few families living in its way have already shifted away from the vicinity of the border.

The Ingwavuma land deal has thrown the future of the entire area of north eastern Natal into question. It seems inevitable, however, that whether inside Swaziland or not, the area will become an increasingly sensitive one for the SADF as the political conflict within South Africa escalates and that further pressures from the military on the local population can be anticipated as a result.

12. BETTERMENT PLANNING

1. Introduction

Betterment planning grew out of an awareness within government circles in the 1930s and 1940s of the urgent need for rehabilitation of the reserve areas: that the increasing deterioration in the quality and productivity of this land was threatening the continued subsistence base of the migrant labour system. Already in 1916 the Beaumont Commission noted that soil erosion and the destruction of grazing land in the scheduled areas was on the increase. In the 1930s the authorities began to devise ways of protecting the land from the worst effects of overpopulation and overstocking, accepting always the fundamental constraint imposed on the reserves by the all-white Parliament - that their area could not be increased beyond the 13% of the total land mass in South Africa, as legislated in 1936. Given this refusal to acknowledge that both the unequal distribution of land between black and white and the prohibition on africans acquiring land outside the reserves were at the heart of the problem, the solutions put forward were necessarily flawed from the start - technical tinkering to an essentially political problem.

Proclamation 31 of 1939 introduced the first piece of 'Betterment Planning' for the reserves. It made provision for any area in the reserves to be proclaimed a betterment area where controls could be imposed on stock ownership (through cattle culling) and the demarcation of arable and grazing land. It was the enforcement of this land usage aspect that has led to massive relocation of people within the reserves over the years. Even though the distance moved might only be a short one, from scattered homesteads into a consolidated residential area within the community, households still have to rebuild their houses and restructure previous land tenure arrangements. The peasant response to these controls was generally hostile, with resistance becoming violent on occasion. (See B. Hirson, 1977 and J. Yawitch, 1982 for discussion on this.) The reaction of the authorities was to call for stronger legislation to enforce the controls rather than to review their manner of consultation with the affected people.

In 1944 a further Proclamation was passed making betterment planning compulsory on all Trust Farms, i.e. on all land purchased by the SADT in terms of the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act. The following year the scope of betterment was broadened to allow for the creation of 'rural villages' in which residents would have no access to arable or grazing land - forerunners of the closer settlements of the 1960s and 1970s. Those rural villages were intended for housing the families of africans regularly employed in industry. In 1949 Proclamation 116 was gazetted, introducing harsher penalties for transgressions of betterment regulations. Native Commissioners were given powers to declare and implement betterment schemes in their areas, to fine and imprison opponents of such schemes and to call on any adult african male to provide his labour free on projects associated with betterment e.g. fencing, making fire-breaks etc.

Despite these measures, little was achieved in practice in this period and by 1954 it was estimated that only about 3% of the reserve area had been planned. More land than this had been proclaimed as betterment areas but, largely because of local opposition, implementation of planning had fallen behind.

THE TOMLINSON COMMISSION

The Report of the Tomlinson Commission (UG 61, 1955) ushered in a new phase in the history of betterment planning. Yawitch has argued that the solutions proposed by the Commission did not differ radically from those already adopted by earlier government planners, but rather 'reflected and gave coherent form and rationalisation' to them. (Yawitch, 1982, 24-25) Had the Tomlinson recommendations been carried through in their entirety, the scale of removal of 'surplus people' into closer settlements without land would have escalated enormously. Tomlinson's solution to the manifest impoverishment and environmental degradation in the reserves was to propose that the practice of allowing each reserve family a piece of land be abandoned. The reserve population should be divided into a class of permanent, small-scale farmers and a class of fully proletarianised people dependent on wage employment, who would have to be removed from the land. Only 'economic units' of land, capable of supporting a middle peasantry should be allocated and 'sub maintenance farming' should be abolished. (UG 61, 1955, 114, para 15)

In trying to determine the size of an economic unit, the Commission came face to face with the degree to which the reserves were underdeveloped and overcrowded but refused to confront the fundamental political issues involved in this land shortage. The Commission was however obliged to take account of the potential impact of its recommendations on the local people and the likelihood of resistance to them. First it set out to determine the minimum income that an economic unit would have to yield if it were to provide for 'a class of contented, full time Bantu farmers.' Most of the witnesses before the Commission suggested a figure of £120 per annum. Acknowledging that 'no scientific reasons were given for these recommendations' the Commission nevertheless considered this figure and then halved it to £60 on the grounds that the plot capable of yielding £120 per annum would have to be larger than could realistically be aimed for within the area set aside for Africans. In a revealing paragraph it noted:

If £120 were to be adopted as the standard for determining the future size of the Bantu farming unit, this would mean that at least 80% of the present number of families in the Bantu areas would have to be removed from the land. Not only would this be impossible to carry out in practice but, from a broad sociological standpoint, it would be wrong to uproot so large a portion of the rural population. (UG 61, 1955, 113)

A target of £60 per annum per economic unit was preferable because it would only necessitate the removal off the land of 50% of the reserve population!

Thus Tomlinson advocated a form of betterment planning that in fact involved the relocation of the whole reserve population. 50% of them were to be removed to closer settlements where they would have no land and depend entirely on migrant labour or local wage employment for their survival, and the other 50%, those to remain in agriculture, would have to be relocated on their land to allow for the planned division of the land into residential, arable and grazing areas.

The Tomlinson recommendations were not adopted in their entirety and those that were have not been implemented in all respects either. While accepting the principle of a division between a farming and non-farming population in the reserves, the government refused to allow tribal tenure to be replaced by individual ownership. (UG 14, 1959) The government also rejected a further recommendation that white industrial enterprises be allowed to establish themselves within the reserves and drastically reduced the budget proposed by Tomlinson for the rehabilitation and development of the reserves, from a recommended £104,5 million to £36,6 million.

Despite the degree to which the Tomlinson recommendations were not adopted, the Report

remained a firm reference point for land use planning in the reserves in the years that followed. As the massive relocation of surplus farm workers and black spots into the reserves began to get under way in the 1960s, however, the ideal of a 'contented full time Bantu farmer' became more and more remote. At the same time the reality of a class of people living in closer settlements, without access to agricultural land, became more widespread: a group of landless people without access to local employment, however, and without assured access even to migrant labour. Within planned betterment villages themselves landlessness is on the increase and the average size of allocated farming plots on the decrease. With only a fixed amount of land at their disposal, these villages cannot expand to absorb the natural population increase, never mind the influx of people being forced back into the reserve areas.

2. Betterment in Kwazulu

Betterment planning in the Natal reserves started getting under way in the 1950s and by 1959 a total of 12,2% of the total area had reportedly been planned. According to a BAD report in 1964, between 1954 and 1959 a total of 320 948 morgen (276 015 hectares) had been 'reclaimed' and a further 73 626 morgen (63 318 hectares) 'stabilised', meaning that permanent residential areas had actually been demarcated on them. (RP 78, 1964, 15) By 1965 a total of 1 199 413 morgen (1 031 495 hectares) had been planned representing 32,87% of the total reserves in the province.

Table 17. AREA UNDER BETTERMENT PLANNING IN NATAL RESERVES, 1954 - 1965 (Morgen)

Sources: RP 38, 1962; 39, 1963; 39, 1964; 78, 1964; 14, 1965; 24, 1966; 37, 1967.

YEAR	TOTAL AREA PLANNED TO DATE	% OF TOTAL RESERVE AREA	TOTAL AREA PLANNED IN YEAR
1959	Not reported	12,2	41 300
1960	477 424	12,5	4 681
1961	583 151	16,7	105 727
1962	788 102	22,07	204 951
1963	950 866	26,54	162 764
1964	1 042 441	28,82	172 192
1965	1 199 413	32,87	156 972

After 1965 no statistics on betterment planning were reported.

In Natal, as in other parts of the country, planning an area did not necessarily mean implementation of the plan and the actual area of land where plans had been enforced was less than the figures supplied in the table above indicate. In 1967 a BAD report noted that in only 60% of the 1 199 413 morgen planned in Natal by 1965 had planning been physically carried out. (RP 37, 1967, 33) Natal revealed the greatest discrepancy between planning and implementation - by contrast 77% of the plan for the Ciskei had been implemented, 76% for the Northern Territories and 80% for the Western Territories. (Ibid)

Part of the reason for this was the strenuous opposition to the implementation of betterment planning in parts of the Natal reserves. In the 1960s the district of Nongoma in Northern Natal witnessed extremely violent opposition to attempts to cull cattle and relocate houses into residential settlements. Although betterment planning



was eventually enforced in the district, today there are many problems associated with the upkeep of the system. A local agricultural officer interviewed by SPP in 1981 admitted that fencing was in poor condition because the people living in the betterment villages were not interested in maintaining them. He also reported that the number of cattle grazing on the land was too high and that a culling programme was necessary, but described this as a 'thorny problem': the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture was afraid to implement such a programme because of the anger that that would engender locally. (Fieldwork)

Statistics on the extent of betterment planning carried out in KwaZulu in the 1970s are extremely hard to come by. In 1980, in answer to a question asked in Parliament, the Minister of Cooperation and Development disclaimed any responsibility for betterment planning:

The information required relates to matters over which the various National States have full jurisdiction and the Department of Co-operation and Development is therefore not in a position to furnish it. (Hansard, Question 540, 22.04.80)

KwaZulu is however firmly committed to betterment planning as a study of various of their policy documents, for instance 'The Final Report of the Select Committee on Land Tenure in KwaZulu' (1976), shows. Betterment planning has continued to be enforced, with 'Compensation payments ... in respect of ... resettlement necessitated by the implementation of agricultural planning and development' being an annual sub-category within the budget allocated for agricultural planning and development. Between 1972 and 1979 a total of R252 170,11 was allocated for this purpose in KwaZulu. The numbers to be paid out in this way are, unfortunately, not known. Assuming an average of between R300 and R400 compensation per household⁺ this would mean something of the order of 60 to 80 thousand households relocated in this period. These figures show a marked upsurge in the funds allocated for compensation between 1976/77 and 1977/78, indicating a renewed upswing in the implementation and enforcement of betterment.

Table 18. COMPENSATION PAID OUT FOR RELOCATION AS A RESULT OF BETTERMENT PLANNING, KWAZULU, 1972 - 1978.

Source: Seneque, 1982

YEAR	COMPENSATION	% OF TOTAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ALLOCATION
1972/73	R52 339,13	6
1973/74	R13 939,58	2
1974/75	R33 759,36	3
1975/76	R38 782,04	4
1976/77	R16 228,00	1,5
1977/78	R97 122,00	8
1978/79	Information not available	

From fieldwork it appears that it is mainly the northern and western parts of KwaZulu where betterment planning has been carried through - Nongoma, Mahlabathini, Nqutu, the Upland areas of Nkandla, Mpendle, Vulindlela, Polela and Estcourt.[‡] Many of the

⁺ This figure is based on the average household compensation paid out by the Department of Cooperation and Development to two black spots removed in 1978 and 1981 respectively (See p. 379 and p. 494 for details)

[‡] For an account of a betterment village in the Nkandla district see Appendix 1.

coastal areas - where the population density is high and the logistics of relocation correspondingly more intimidating - have not been planned or, if plans have been made, these have not been carried through. Similarly the extremely densely populated and socially unstable district of Msinga has not seen planning enforced.

The available evidence suggests that the speed with which betterment has been implemented and the areas chosen in KwaZulu has been influenced by the degree to which local resistance has been anticipated. In 1975 the authors of a study on social and political change in KwaZulu noted:

Buthlezi has privately expressed his fears ... in regard to peasant reaction to agricultural planning in KwaZulu, which must unavoidably cause discontent to many. (Schlemmer and Muil, 1975, 113, quoted in Maré, 1980, 30)

In 1980/81 planning was being implemented in the district of Hlabisa. In interviews with SPP, an agricultural officer for the region and a local priest at Hlabisa both stated that maximum consultation with the people and minimum relocation were the two overriding criteria for the way in which the plan for the area was to be implemented. According to the agricultural officer, the lessons of Nongoma had been learnt. Consultation was being achieved mainly through the chief, who approved of the plan and apparently had the support of his people.

The emphasis on consultation has been endorsed by the KwaZulu legislature. In 1980 a 'Guide to Land Use Planning' was passed by the legislature. This stipulates that no community can be 'bettered' unless it is willing and the community must be involved in the implementation of the plan, through a local Planning and Development Committee.

In practice it appears that indirect but compelling methods of coercion may be applied where a community persistently refuses to agree to betterment being introduced in its area. In a policy document entitled 'Land Use Planning' that was drawn up by E. le Roux of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the criteria or factors which should influence the selection of betterment areas are outlined. Priority is to be given to those areas where 'co-operation prevails'; next are 'Non-Betterment areas in which no co-operation is likely to be obtained. These areas should be left alone for the time being until the co-operation of the people can be obtained either by propaganda or by the application of sanctions.' (Le Roux, 1980, 5) In seeking clarification on the phrase 'application of sanctions' a researcher was told that this meant the withholding of government funds for the provision of infrastructure, services and community facilities. (See Seneque, 1981a, 17).

In 1981 SPP also heard of one instance where the local chief was applying pressure on his people to agree to betterment planning: in Reserve 7, a sugarcane growing area on the north coast, most of the local people did not want to move into a betterment village and the chief was reported to be refusing to allow an access road into the area to be fixed, as a means of pressurising his people to agree to planning.

Note : Readers are referred to a recent thesis by G. Seneque : Betterment Planning in South Africa, M.T.R.P., University of Natal, 1982, for a further discussion on betterment planning. Most of the above chapter is drawn from his work.

Appendix 1. Ngwengweni - betterment village.

The following is taken from a report on a SPP fieldtrip to the Nkandla district, in which a betterment village called Ngwengweni was visited and two women, one a local school teacher, were interviewed.

Ngwengweni is a betterment scheme, about 9 km from Nkandla hospital on the Babanango road. We estimated that there were about 100 - 150 households in it, although it was difficult to be confident of the assessment because there are several houses per lot. The settlement is up on a hill with the fields below. Most of the people are local and were moved there by the government. Some have moved in themselves, however. We spoke to one person whose family had moved there from the Qudeni area, because they did not like the conditions at Qudeni. Others have come from farms in the Babanango, Vryheid, Coronation and Dingaanstadt districts.

A teacher we spoke to said the place was now full. There are no more plots available, and she wondered what will happen when the young people are adults and want plots of their own.

HISTORY

The earliest date we got for its beginning was 1962, with other families coming in in 1963/64. We spoke to one woman who had been moved there in 1963/64. Previously she had lived nearby, on about 4 morgen of land. She was told that there was a new law and they had to move since their chief had agreed to adopting the new system - the flat places were to be turned into fields and they would have to move up the hill. The chief also told them that by accepting the new arrangement they would be benefiting their children. The new lands would be fenced so their children would not have to herd stock any more and could attend school. (In reality, because of poor supervision of the fences and gates, cattle are not looked after properly and still stray.)

Under the betterment scheme this woman's arable land was reduced to 1 morgen. Compensation for buildings on the old site was inadequate. They were paid a standard amount of R64 per building, being the estimated value of a rondavel. Our informant had had a cement house and the compensation did not cover its value.

LAND AND STOCK

Residential plots appear to vary in size between 1/8 and 1/4 an acre. Most of the houses were of wattle and daub. As people moved in they were allocated land by the induna - a residential site for their house plus a field. There is no rent for the residential plot but people must pay the induna R2 per year before they are able to plough their fields.

When people were moved in, they were told that the official limit on cattle was 10, but this is not strictly enforced. One informant said her family had no cattle although they had goats. The other informant had 2 cows. She complained about the lack of supervision of the animals. Animals are meant to graze in a separate, fenced off section most of the year and can only graze in the arable land after the harvest is in. Some men who live near the grazing lands are meant to check the gates and see that stock does not stray. However, they do not get paid for this task and take little responsibility for it. Nobody looks after the fences, which are in poor condition and animals can and do stray. If stock is caught in the fields, their owners

have to pay a fine.

The school teacher said cattle are not fat as there are too many households for the land. She thought however that people are probably better off than before. When asked what the signs of this were, she said that people had furniture and there were signs of competition between them over that.

There is an agricultural officer based in the district who visits the community. He does not come regularly but only if he wants to promote the growing of some particular crop. The teacher did not know his name - only knew that he drives a ZG jeep. We were told that people are interested in what he has to teach, especially the women who form the bulk of the permanent population. One problem is that he advocates the use of fertiliser which most people cannot afford. 'Even if one is trying to farm it is difficult without a cash income', commented the teacher.

WATER

Water is a problem, especially with the current drought (1980). There is a furrow which was built a long time ago (by the informant's grandfather) to harness water from a river. This serves some households. The furrow is checked by the residents about once a fortnight and the water is considered reasonably clean. Other households have to get water from rivers and streams and these are very low. Women have to walk long distances to find water.

The drought hit the community very severely and very little had been harvested. This has been the worst drought the teacher can remember. She knew nothing about drought relief schemes organised by the KwaZulu government. However, the local agricultural officer had initiated a scheme whereby each household was to contribute R2 a month towards a pump to pump up river water. This project is only at the discussion stage as yet but people are interested. The teacher thought people should contribute more, e.g. R5 per month, because of the great need.

SANITATION

Each household has a pit lavatory, built by themselves. These are compulsory and constitute a great improvement, according to the teacher, since before many people did not have any toilets.

FUEL

Those interviewed reported 'such a scarcity of fuel'. Where they can, people gather wood from the forests, but this is very scarce. The teacher buys wood from afar. One tractor load, which lasts her family 3 to 4 months, costs between R14 to R20. Most people cannot afford to buy wood and are dependent on what they can gather, a diminishing commodity. There are cases where people have chopped down their fruit trees to get wood. A couple of people do burn dung - we were told that they are not local people and that the local people are not familiar with that practice.

FACILITIES

There is one tea-room and several 'shackshops', but most shopping has to be done in Nkandla. Although our local informants did not report any shebeens, we were told by staff at the nearby hospital that Ngwengweni is a centre of liquor-brewing. When a community is dislocated, that was inevitable, commented one doctor.

The local school goes up to Standard 5, and has about 500 children enrolled in it with children coming from other areas too. There are 9 teachers altogether. There is another school nearby which goes as far as Form I. It also has about 500 children,

with 13 teachers. We were told that Agriculture is not generally a subject in primary school. Girls do needlework and boys gardening. There is no provision for any girls to learn gardening until they get to high school when they can choose Agriculture as a subject if they wish.

There is no local or visiting clinic but the Nkandla hospital is only 9 km away. Two churches were mentioned - Methodist and Anglican. The school teacher described the transport service as good. Except for Sunday there are two buses a day to Nkandla. There is also a daily bus to Kranskop from a place about half an hour's walk away. On Sundays, a railway bus service to Glencoe and Dundee operates.


WORK

Most men are forced to become migrant workers. They work mainly in industry in Johannesburg and Durban but some go to Iscor in Newcastle. Many come home over weekends. The teacher was not aware of people using the local labour bureau to find jobs. She said most jobs are obtained through relatives and possibly registered afterwards. She did not know of anybody working on farms. Apparently KwaTeba used to recruit and show films at the school but they have not been recently - she did not know why. Unemployment is high and men are coming back saying they cannot get work.

ORGANISATION

Women's Church Associations (Methodist and Anglican) are quite strong and give help to families in the case of deaths. There are also football associations. We were also told that Inkatha had a branch. 'We meet together and are taught, giving reasons for upholding Inkatha'. Attendance at these meetings is reportedly good. Teachers are compelled to teach Inkatha studies in the schools. They do not have text books nor is there a specialised syllabus but are expected to use 'our little knowledge' about Shaka and the Zulu kings to teach the children. We were told that another topic they teach is 'unity', 'how to get united'.

The teacher did not think that there were any serious points of friction or tension in the community. She did not regard land shortage as an issue 'because if there is no more land one simply has to move somewhere else'. The chief manages to control fighting with the threat of banishment. Generally people get on reasonably well, although there are inevitably those who do not co-operate, she reported.



13. REGIONAL OVERVIEW

The following chapter summarises very briefly the major aspects of relocation in each of ten geographical sub-regions in Natal. The chapter is intended to serve only as a guide for people wanting to research removals in particular areas of the province. Details on the categories and places mentioned will be found in the preceding chapters.

The map on the opposite page shows the boundaries of the ten sub-regions. These are discussed as follows:


- 1) North Eastern Natal
- 2) Northern Natal
- 3) North Western Natal
- 4) The North Coast
- 5) The Midlands
- 6) The Drakensberg
- 7) Lower Tugela
- 8) Greater Durban
- 9) Southern Natal
- 10) Griqualand East.

1. North Eastern Natal

This region consists of the three magisterial districts of Ingwavuma, Ubombo and Hlabisa. It is one of the least developed areas in Natal. There is a relatively small block of white farming land stretching from Mtubatuba in the south to Mkuze in the north. The rest of the area is divided between scheduled reserves and State land, the largest single stretch of State land left in South Africa. (The history of this land is described on p. 23) In recent months considerable attention has focused on the area because of the controversy surrounding the proposed Ingwavuma land deal with Swaziland. This is discussed on p. 159-163.

NATURE OF REMOVALS

In general, removals in this area have been of a more diffused nature than those in inland Natal. Rumour of impending removals has played a large role in getting people to shift themselves without the State having to intervene and provide transport, facilities and pay compensation. The movement of people from one area to another has been spread over several years, involving the movement of individual households over time rather than entire communities all at once. A major thrust of relocation in this area has been to shift people inland from the coast, which is consistent with the general strategic interest of the State to control and limit access to the northern coastline. Both the current consolidation proposals and forestry and conservation planning for this area see to it that virtually the entire coast, from Kosi Bay in the north to Richards Bay in the south will be controlled either directly by the military or indirectly by other State departments such as forestry, nature conservation etc. This pressure on coastal people to move inland has major economic implications for them since fresh fish has been an important element in their diet.



RELOCATION AREAS

There are no relocation sites of the typical closer settlement type. People who have moved by themselves as a result of rumour or other pressures make their own arrangements for sites with tribal indunas. The only official relocation site is at Mbazwana, an already existing centre that was used by the State as a relocation point for people being moved off State land in the St Lucia area. Little attention was paid to preparations before hand; conditions are still poor, with water a major problem. In addition, Reserve 1 has reportedly been used as a relocation area by the State for people described as 'trouble-makers'.

PROPOSED RELOCATION AREAS

State land on the Makhathini Flats has featured in numerous consolidation plans as compensation land for other areas to be excised from KwaZulu. This land is already settled by african people. Bombalo, north of the Hluhluwe Game reserve, has been acquired by the SADT as compensatory land for the excised Sodwana Bay triangle.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Strategic and Military removals

The following developments have led to thousands of people being moved in the region. (For details see the chapter on Strategic removals.)

Establishment of the St Lucia Missile range in the 1970s.

Pressure on households on Mocambique and Swazi borders to move away from the border area.

Strategically located forestry and conservation projects, since the 1960s.

There are predictions that the entire area north of Mkuze will become an operational area soon. The attempted Ingwavuma land deal has been partly shaped by strategic considerations.

2. Conservation and Forestry projects

The following are examples of projects that have caused or threaten removals. The numbers affected vary from a few households to hundreds of households. Details are available in the chapter on Infrastructural Development and Conservation.

Forestry plantations in the St Lucia area in the 1960s and 1970s.

Corridor of State land between Hluhluwe and Umfolosi Game Reserves cleared in late 1960s, early 1970.

Establishment Ndumu Game Reserve; rumours of expanded conservation resource areas in Thongaland.

Mabibi (Lake Sibayi) under threat of removal, to protect dune forests.

3. Parastatal development projects

Proposed fish factory, Kosi Bay, led to the removal of several households in the early 1970s.

Abandoned coconut project, Kosi Bay, led to the removal of about 30 households in about 1974.

Cotton and cassava projects, Makhathini Flats, have led to the eviction of people classed as squatters who have been living on this State land.

4. Farm Evictions

Large numbers of ex-farmworkers have been moving into the tribal lands in the south since the 1970s. In 1981 a mission doctor estimated that 150 households a year were moving

into the Josini area from off farms. In the sugar and pineapple plantations around Hluhluwe and Mtubatuba most farmworkers either live in compounds, with their families based in the reserves, or themselves commute from the reserves, so eviction is not a major issue. However major land purchases by Anglo American in the Hluhluwe area in 1980/81 reportedly led to some farmworkers being laid off on the 26 purchased farms.

5. Relocation of 'trouble-makers'

Reserve 1 (currently under threat of removal for consolidation purposes) has reportedly been used as a dumping ground by the State for 'trouble-makers' from other parts of KwaZulu. Households have been brought in over the years on an individual basis.

6. Betterment

Most of the sub-region has not been planned. In 1981 betterment was being introduced into the Hlabisa district, reportedly with the cooperation of the local people and with minimal removals involved.

7. Repatriation of Mocambiquan citizens

See chapter on Influx Control.

8. Consolidation

In this sub-region no whites are affected by the 1975 consolidation plans. If these proposals are implemented, then perhaps as many as 28 000 black people will have to move from the tribal land that will be excised. The reserves under threat are:

- Reserve 1 (Nibela), north of Lake St Lucia; 15 000 people estimated.
- Reserve 2 (Mhlekezi), west of the Mkuze Game Reserve; 4 000 people estimated.
- Part of Reserve 14, the triangle north of Sodwana Bay; 600 to 700 people; excision from KwaZulu already gazetted, January 1981.
- Part of Reserve 3, the Nkundusi ward south of False Bay; 3 000 people estimated.
- Part of Reserve 12, a wedge of land flanking the eastern boundary of the Hluhluwe Game Reserve; 5 000 people estimated.

The already populated Mahkathini Flats are shown as making up the bulk of the compensatory land due KwaZulu in terms of the 1975 plan. However the proposed Ingwavuma land deal has put the future of this area in question.

9. Migration from the Msinga district

This is an example of voluntary relocation. Since the late 1960s several communities of people have trekked north from the Msinga district of KwaZulu to settle in the Ubombo and Hlabisa districts. The Msinga community at Hlabisa now consists of several hundred households; it was started when a local induna sold sites at R20 per household to people in the late 1960s. Other communities have been reported at Ophansi, east of the Mkuze Game Reserve, Mamfene (Reserve 15) and Mhlekezi (Reserve 12). It appears that this migration has been prompted by a desire to escape factional violence in the Msinga district. The influx of people with different social customs and a reputation for violence, has exacerbated local social tensions.

10. Migration towards village centres

This is another example of voluntary relocation, involving a process of villagisation as people move from isolated areas towards village centres where facilities such as schools, shops and clinics exist. This has been reported particularly in the extreme north, where there has been a steady influx of people over the past decade into the Ngwanase / Mangusi area. Along with this process of villagisation goes a significant shift in people's domestic economy, from a greater degree of subsistence independence to a greater dependence on migrant remittances and the cash economy.

11. Group Areas

An Indian Group Area was finally proclaimed in Mtubatuba in 1982.

2. Northern Natal

This region consists of the magisterial districts of Utrecht, Paulpietersburg, Vryheid, Ngotshe, Babanango, Mtonjaneni, Nqutu, Nkandla, Mahlabathini and Nongoma - the last four all part of KwaZulu. Economic development in the white districts is uneven. There are extensive commercial farming areas - maize, cattle, timber and, in suitable parts, sugar cane - and large companies, including Natal Tanning Extracts and SAPPI, are becoming more prominent. There are also important coal mines in the north. In contrast, there are some very neglected, backward farming areas, particularly in the Louwsburg area where there is a high degree of absenteeism among landowners. Whites in these border areas are showing signs of insecurity about their future in the area. (Daily News, 13.09.79)

Economic development in the KwaZulu districts in the region is virtually non-existent. There are coal deposits in the Nongoma and Mahlabathini districts, due to be exploited, and the KwaZulu capital of Ulundi has been awarded 'industrial development point' status in most recent decentralisation / development blueprint of the government. Much of this area is chronically drought-stricken and deforestation and soil erosion are dangerously advanced.

RELOCATION SITES

<u>Official</u> :	Bilanyoni (Under threat)	<u>Unofficial</u> :	Barclay Site
	Mondlo	(major sites only)	Bekumthetho
	Emakhosini (Under threat)		Nondweni no. 5
	Gubazi		Paulpietersburg Trust
	Hlungulwana (Under threat)		Farms
	Mpungamhlophe		
	Mtingwe		
	Mzimhlophe (see case study)		
	Nkonisa		
	Nondweni		
	Singabantu		

In addition to the above, many existing reserve communities have experienced a large influx of people (coming mainly from white farms), in the past two decades. Places mentioned in this regard include Bazini and Mvulazi (Nongoma) and KwaMhlongo and Vulamehlo (Nqutu).

PROPOSED RELOCATION SITES

There is a very large block of Trust farms in the western Babanango district; the farm Eensgewonden has been mentioned as a potential relocation site. This whole area has been suggested as the relocation point for thousands of Zulu-speaking people living on three threatened black spots in the Piet Retief district of the Transvaal (Driefontein, KwaNgema and Daggakraal), and for an estimated 50 000 or 60 000 people living in the threatened released land east of Paulpietersburg. Luvisi, next to Nqutu, has been suggested as the relocation site for the two threatened African townships at Dundee and Glencoe. The Trust land in the Qudeni area appears to have been earmarked for relocation purposes in the near future as well.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Farm Evictions

This has been by far the largest single category of relocation in the region, with a significant scale of evictions being reported as far back as the 1950s and massive evictions of labour and cash tenants taking place in the 1970s. In 1970 it was estimated that there were 36 000 surplus labour tenants and 'squatters' needing to be relocated in the Louwsburg district alone. It appears that there are still pockets of labour tenancy and squatting in the northern part of the region, and these are gradually being eliminated. 15 households moved into Mzimhlophe by the State in early 1982 were evicted off a farm owned by a mine in the Hlobane area, where they had been living as cash tenants.

2. Betterment

This region was one of the first to be bettered in Natal. Beginning with Nongoma in the early 1960s, almost all the land has been planned and people moved into betterment villages by now. There was strenuous resistance to betterment in the Nongoma area in the 1960s.

3. Black spot removals

The small number of african freehold areas in the Vryheid and Utrecht districts have all been cleared, the main period of activity being in the 1960s. There are 2 african freehold properties left in the region - Mooiplaats, adjoining the tiny Kambi reserve near Louwsburg and under threat, and Mfanifile, near Melmoth, which may be incorporated into KwaZulu. A number of mission black spots have been cleared. Lutheran mission societies (notably the Hermannsburg Mission Society) still own large areas of land. In some instances the Hermannsburg Mission Society has been applying pressure to its tenants to move off the land, for instance at Luneburg / Zedelingspost (Paulpietersburg) and Isihlengeni and Khumalo's Kraal (both at Gluckstadt). In the Melmoth area the Mfulle Mission (Norwegian Mission Society) and possibly KwaMagwaza (Anglican) are under threat from the government.

4. Consolidation

In terms of the 1975 consolidation proposals the following reserve areas are to be removed:

- Released land east of Paulpietersburg, including the relocation township of Bilanyoni, already excised from KwaZulu in January 1981; population estimated at between 50 000 and 60 000.
- Kambi reserve, population estimated at between 2 000 and 3 000.
- Released land to the east of Babanango, possibly including the relocation settlements of Hlungulwana and Enakhosini.
- Land to the south of Melmoth, to open up a white corridor through to Eshowe and Richards Bay.

There are rumours circulating in the Melmoth area that the district may ultimately be handed over to KwaZulu, even though it is shown as white in the 1975 plans. In the Trans-Pongola region, in the Transvaal, there is a large block of released land that is excluded from the 1975 proposals for KwaZulu; there are reports that the government may try to hand the area over to Swaziland. The SADT has acquired white farms in the west of the Babanango and the south of the Vryheid districts.

5. Urban relocation

Utrecht township moved to Osizweni in 1968.
Dumbe (Paulpietersburg) and Bhekuzulu (Vryheid) under threat.

6. Group Areas

There are restrictions on indians living and working in Vryheid, Hlobane, Paulpietersburg, Utrecht, Babanango and Louwsburg. Coloured families squatting at Besterspruit, Vryheid, are agitating for a group area to be set aside for them.

7. Game Reserves and Dams

Establishment of Itala Nature Reserve, Louwsburg, affected 1 600 people.
Proposed dam on Black Umfolosi River threatens an unknown number of people.

3. North Western Natal

This region consists of the Newcastle, Dannhauser, Glencoe, Dundee and Klip River districts. Historically no land was scheduled as african reserves in the 19th century, but individual africans and syndicates bought up extensive areas. Part of this freehold land was released in terms of the 1936 legislation but much of it was classified as black spots. The SADT bought up large areas of white farmland in the Klip River and Newcastle districts in the 1960s; this has been used extensively for relocation purposes.

The region is rich in coal and this has made the removal of black spots in this region a priority in the general removals programme. Newcastle has developed into an important industrial centre, being the site of an ISCOR plant (sited on a former black spot) and surrounded by coal mines. The relocation townships of Madadeni and Osizweni serve as its labour pool. Ladysmith and Ezakheni, established as a relocation township in KwaZulu in the early 1970s, have been designated as industrial development points in the most recent decentralisation blueprint.

The region has seen very large scale removals since the 1960s, with black spot removals and the eviction of labour tenants being the two most important categories.


RELOCATION SITES

<u>Official</u> :	Ezakheni (see case study)	<u>Unofficial</u> :	Blaauwbosch
	Madadeni		
	Osizweni		
	Asynkraal		
	Ekuvukeni		
	Limehill		
	Uitval		
	Vaalkop		
	Vergelegen		

In addition, all the black spots in the region have experienced a large influx of displaced people, evicted from farms and other removed black spots. The relocation site of Vulandondo, established in 1963, was removed to Ezakheni in 1972.

PROPOSED RELOCATION SITES

Flint Farm, on the south-eastern corner of the piece of KwaZulu east of Newcastle, has been suggested as a possible relocation area for the threatened townships at Dundee and Glencoe. The Trust land lying between Ezakheni and Ekuvukeni is the likely relocation area for the large number of black spots still to be moved in the Klip River district. There is a major relocation works depot about 5 km east of Ezakheni on the Helpmekaar road, housing workers and storing disassembled fletcraft pieces, precast latrine blocks etc.



MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Black spots

All but one of the rural black spots (both freehold and mission) in the Dannhauser, Dundee, Helpmekaar and Newcastle districts have been removed; the one exception, Uitval (Helpmekaar), was incorporated into KwaZulu. In addition, 12 black spots in the Klip River district have been removed as well. A significant proportion of these properties had coal deposits and are being or have been mined; for details see p.102-106. In addition, the urban freehold areas of Charlestown and Lennoxton and Fairleigh, (both in Newcastle) have been moved. The focus of attention is currently on the remaining 15 black spots properties in the Klip River district (14 freehold and 1 mission). Local opposition within these communities to the removals has succeeded in staving off the threat thus far but the government has made its intentions to remove these areas very clear. The local Farmers' Associations have long been a very vociferous lobby for black spot removals. The Driefontein block of farms, formerly incorporated into KwaZulu, were excised from the bantustan in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans in January 1981.

2. Farm evictions

Labour tenancy was prohibited in this region in 1970 and large scale evictions followed, most concentrated in the first half of the 1970s.

3. Urban relocation

Newcastle location removed to Osizweni, 1973.

Dannhauser township deproclaimed 1969.

Parts of Ladysmith townships moved to Ezakheni in early 1970s. Dannhauser Emergency Camp, Sibongile (Dundee), and Thembalihle (Glencoe) under threat.

Steadville (Ladysmith) promised 99 year leasehold but Dr Koornhof stated in 1981 it was to be moved.

4. Group Areas

Indian : Dundee
Glencoe
Newcastle
Ladysmith
Dannhauser

Coloured : Dundee
Newcastle
Ladysmith

The urban black spots of Lennoxton and Fairleigh in Newcastle were turned into indian and coloured Group Area townships after the african occupants had been moved out.


5. Dam construction

Construction of the Walkershoek Dam outside Ladysmith led to the removal of the relocation site of Vlandondo and some adjacent african freehold areas in 1972.

4. The North Coast

This region consists of the districts of Lower Umfolosi, Mtunzini and Eshowe. When the Zululand reserves were demarcated in 1909, a strip of land along the coast and two strips leading inland to Eshowe and past Empangeni were opened up for white settlement. Much of this is cultivated under sugar cane.

The coastal areas of KwaZulu are densely settled; sugar cane and sub-tropical crops such as bananas, avocado pears and pawpaws are grown. Further inland the annual rainfall decreases and the land becomes more marginal. Isithebe, established in 1968 as the first industrial growth-point within KwaZulu, is located in the south of this region.



Apart from the recent acquisition of Trust land in the Ntambanana area, nearly all the areas presently occupied by africans were scheduled as reserves in 1913. The only quasi-freehold land in the region was at a farm called Amanda, and in the 'Amatikhulu lots', within KwaZulu. The farm Amanda was eventually incorporated into KwaZulu. There is no other african freehold land in the region and hence black spot removals have not featured here. In addition, township development has been located inside the reserves so urban relocation has not been an issue either. However, the provision of township accommodation is inadequate and informal settlements have developed on the edges of the major townships, at Sundumbuli, Gezinsila, Ngwelezana and KwaDlangezwa.

A major focus of relocation in the region has been to open up the white strip from Melmoth, through Empangeni, to the important new harbour and industrial growth point of Richards Bay. In the early 1970s KwaZulu laid claim to Richards Bay. These claims were firmly rejected although the van der Walt Commission has made some vague, pacifying hints that this development could be turned into a 'joint venture' area in the future. The development of Richards Bay has been accompanied by large scale relocation of people - 6 000 people were moved from Reserve 6 in 1976 and 20 000 people living in Reserve 4 to the north are under threat, their land having been excised from KwaZulu in January 1981. If Reserve 4 is removed it will mean that the entire coast between Richards Bay and Sodwana Bay will have been cleared of all its african occupants.

RELOCATION SITES

Ntambanana
Wangu

Ntambanana is the name applied to a large area of Trust farms that were acquired in the early 1970s. In addition to the two relocation areas already established within it, a third area has been laid out, apparently in readiness for the people remaining in Reserve 4. This site consists of empty fletcraft huts and latrines erected in closer settlement style. There are also, as already stated, informal settlements in the region outside the townships of Gezinsila, Sundumbuli, Ngwelezana and KwaDlangezwa.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Development of Richards Bay

6 000 people moved from Reserve 6 to Ntambanana in 1976. See p. 241.
A small number of people living in Reserve 4 in the vicinity of the Richards Bay airport moved in 1978.

2. Consolidation

In terms of the 1975 consolidation plans, the following areas are under threat:

- Reserve 4, with an estimated 20 000 people, already excised from KwaZulu in January 1981 (a small part of it has been removed already).
- Two parts of Reserve 17 : a small piece west of Empangeni and a larger piece in the Nkwalini valley north of Eshowe.
- Part of Reserve 5, north of Empangeni.
- Part of Reserve 7a, south of Gingindlovu.

3. Group Areas

Until the development of Richards Bay created a demand for skilled labour, it was official policy to block indian and coloured settlement north of the Tugela River. No Group Areas were set aside for them and people had either to commute long distances or live in squatter settlements. In 1981/82 coloured and indian Group Areas were

finally proclaimed in Richards Bay and Gingindlovu and a coloured Group Area in Eshowe.

In the late 1979s africans living on land occupied by the Dunn clan, on the northern bank of the Tugela, were removed to Wangu. It appears that the area was proclaimed a coloured reserve and the african occupants, who were living there in a labour tenant relationship to the Dunns, were made to move.

4. Construction of Dams

Proposed construction of Mvumase Dam threatens communities at Umlalazi and Nhlokohloko, on the north bank of the Tugela.

5. Repatriation

See chapter on Influx Control.

6. Clearing of State land

About 100 households living on a tiny piece of State land just north of the Tugela mouth, known as Red Hill, were threatened with removal in January 1981. The land adjoins the scheduled area of Reserve 7a and its occupants, who had lived there for generations, believed that it formed part of the reserve. The community appealed to Ulundi. In March 1981 it was reported that the Department of Cooperation and Development had ordered the eviction notices to the community to be withdrawn. (Daily News, 6.03.81)

5. The Midlands

This region consists of the districts of Kranskop, Umvoti, New Hanover, Pietermaritzburg, Lion's River, Mooi River, Weenen and Msinga. Most of the land is white-owned and well-favoured as a mixed farming and timber area. KwaZulu forms an irregular arc of land circling the eastern edge. The region includes the Msinga district of KwaZulu, notorious for its overpopulation, its droughts, its soil erosion and its factional violence. Consolidation planning has made little impact on the region; only two small areas east and south east of Greytown are due to be excised from KwaZulu while the former black spot of Appelsbosch is to be incorporated into the bantustan in terms of the 1975 consolidation proposals.

RELOCATION SITES

Mphophomeni
Ntunjambili
Polltax Farm / New Politique - established as a temporary transit camp in 1967 and under threat of relocation as a result
Sahlumbe, Nomoya, Msusamphi, Mashunka. (See case study)
Weenen Emergency Camp
Cool Air (Group Areas township, New Hanover)
Northdale

There has been extensive in-migration into the Msinga district and into the Edendale / Vulindlela area of KwaZulu west of Pietermaritzburg. Keates Drift, in the Msinga district north of Greytown, has been suggested as a potential relocation site for the Greytown location.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Farm Evictions

The abolition of labour tenancy in the Weenen district in 1969 led to massive removals stretching into the early 1970s; this had a convulsive effect on the district. It is described in more detail on p.70-78. The institution of labour tenancy continued to be

widespread in the Weenen / Greytown areas throughout the 1970s, with a further spate of removals of tenants occurring in 1979/80. Farm evictions, of both tenants and full-time workers, are still a major problem in the region.

2. Black spot removals

12 properties in the Pietermaritzburg and New Hanover districts were classified as black spots in the 1950s. 4 of them have been moved to date, 3 have been incorporated or are scheduled for incorporation into KwaZulu and 5 are under threat: Broughton, Camelhoek, Trust Feeds, Hopewell and the Church of Scotland property, Impolweni. The elimination of black spots and enforcement of Group Areas proclamations went hand in hand in Pietermaritzburg in the late 1960s since the properties which were removed were owned by both africans and indians. Tenants at Stendahl Mission, near Weenen, which was sold by the Berlin Mission Society in 1978, were initially threatened with eviction but in 1980 they reportedly won a reprieve.

3. Group Areas proclamations

<u>Indian</u> :	Pietermaritzburg	<u>Coloured</u> :	Pietermaritzburg
	Weenen		Howick
	Howick		Greytown
	Mooi River		
	Kranskop		
	Greytown		

The effect of Group Areas proclamations on Pietermaritzburg are described on p.

4. Urban relocation

Zenzele (Howick) being moved to Mphophomeni.
Enhlalakahle (Greytown), Bruntville (Mooi River) and Weenen
Emergency Camp all under threat but removals do not appear imminent.
Sobantu (Pietermaritzburg) was under threat before 1979 but reprieved and 99 year leasehold is being introduced.

5. Informal settlement

Squatters moving into the Willowfontain area (released land west of Pietermaritzburg) in 1980/81 facing prosecution.

6. Establishment of nature reserve


Weenen Nature reserve, established in 1975 on former labour farms which had had a population of several thousand.

6. The Drakensberg

This region consists of the Bergville, Estcourt, Mpendle, Polela (Bulwer) and Underberg districts, all lying along the foothills of the Drakensberg. Conservation projects and infrastructural development have led to large scale removals in the past and proposals to protect the watershed area threaten well over 100 000 people living in the 3 scheduled reserves in the Bergville and Estcourt districts.

RELOCATION SITES

Wembezi
Compensation (see case study)
Halfdale
Ioskop
Moyeni



RELOCATION SITES (continued)

Oliviershoek
 Roberts Farm, Ebrington, Hilder
 Winterton Emergency Camp

There has been a significant level of movement of people evicted off farms in the region into the Drakensberg 1 and 2 locations, e.g. at KwaMkhize near Ntabamhlophe. Uncertainty about the consolidation plans for the region has blocked planning of future relocation sites.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Consolidation

Controversy surrounds the future of the 3 major reserves - the Upper Tugela Location near Bergville and the 2 Drakensberg Locations (no. 1 and no. 2) near Estcourt. White farmers have been lobbying for the removal of all 3 reserves because of the damage they claim is being done in them to the watershed. The 1975 consolidation plans call for the removal of the Upper Tugela Location only and the creation of a consolidated area out of the 2 Drakensberg locations. The people of Upper Tugela Location are strongly opposed to being moved at all. The 1975 consolidation plans also threaten an extensive area of african freehold land in the Mpendle / Underberg districts, all of it released.

2. Black spot removals

This region saw extensive purchasing of land by africans in the late 19th and early 20th century. Much of the african-owned land in the Mpendle and Underberg districts was released and incorporated into KwaZulu but is currently threatened by the 1975 consolidation plans. Many properties were not released after 1936, however, but classified as black spots. A total of 9 of these freehold black spots have been moved in the Polela (Bulwer), Mpendle and Underberg districts. Tenants at Gombe / Rietbult, a Hermannsburg Mission near Winterton, were given notice and finally accommodated at Emangweni Mission in 1981. Major removals are still threatening in the Bergville, Estcourt and Bulwer districts. 3 black spots were cleared to make way for the Vergelegen forest reserves in 1969. Portions of 3 black spots (2 freehold and 1 mission) affected by the construction of the Woodstock Dam.

3. Farm evictions

Bergville was one of the very first districts where labour tenancy was prohibited, in about 1968. Labour tenancy was prohibited in the Estcourt district in 1970 and evictions followed. More work is required on developments in the southern districts of this region.

4. Conservation and Dam construction

Establishment of the Vergelegen Forest Reserve in 1969 led to the removal of 1 370 people off 3 black spots.


Building of Woodstock Dam, near Bergville, led to removal of 3 000 people on reserve and freehold land between 1979 and 1981.

Proposed dam in Mpendle district, in Brooklands area, threatens an unknown number of people with removal.

5. Urban relocation

Estcourt township moved to Wembezi late 1960s, early 1970s.

Inkanyezi (Colenso) and Winterton Emergency Camp under threat of removal but relocation sites dependent on final consolidation plans for the Drakensberg locations.



7. Lower Tugela

This region consists of the districts of Lower Tugela and Mapumulo, the latter in Kwa-Zulu. The coastal Lower Tugela district is under extensive sugar cane cultivation. It is largely white-owned but there are small indian-owned areas and a number of threatened african-owned areas as well. African sugar cane growers in this region delivered 53 000 tons of cane to the local mill in 1978. (*Natal Mercury*, 12.03.79) There are a couple of sugar mills and a paper mill in the vicinity of Stanger; wages in these and within the commercial sector of Stanger are very low. Some workers commute to Durban daily. Very little formal township housing has been provided for africans living in the Stanger area and this has led to a mushrooming of informal settlements. The only township in the district is Shakaville at Stanger, which is very small and under threat of removal. Accommodation in the mill compounds is inadequate as well. The pressure on accommodation is shown by the fact that tenants on black spots sub-let rooms to sub-tenants at exorbitantly high rents in relation to the rents they themselves pay.

RELOCATION SITES

Bulwer Trust Farm - apparently under threat from construction of the Mvumase Dam on the Tugela.
Langespruit - proposed.

In addition there has been large scale movement of displaced people into the informal settlements of Ntshaweni, Etete and Gledhow, which have developed on african and indian freehold land in the Groutville area. These areas are threatened with removal.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Black spot removals

The Lower Tugela district saw land purchases by both africans and indians in the 19th and early 20th century. Only one black spot has been moved completely to date, Sebastopol in 1972. There are a total of ten threatened african-owned farms of varying size scattered through the district; recently removals of tenants have begun on three of them. In addition there is the large Groutville area which is made up of several adjoining properties and has some indian property owners as well. This area was released and incorporated into KwaZulu but is due to be excised in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans. It is an important sugar cane growing area within KwaZulu. Plans to remove the area which were announced in 1979 were frozen after Chief Buthelezi intervened to support the protests of the threatened owners and occupants.


Large numbers of rent-paying tenants live on these black spots; many of the Groutville settlements south of Stanger are extremely densely populated. It appears many of the tenants used to live on an indian-owned property near Stanger known as Lot 14; this was cleared in 1968. Others formerly worked in the sugar mills but having been retired or lost their jobs have been driven to renting shacks or rooms in these settlements.

2. Consolidation

The Groutville area, discussed above, is under threat; there is speculation that it may be reprieved.

3. Informal settlement

The dense settlements in the Groutville region south of Stanger, at Ntshaweni, Etete and Gledhow are described as squatter settlements by officials and are thus threatened with removal even if the landowners are finally reprieved. Lack of water and sanitation pose



serious health problems; there were major cholera outbreaks in 1981/82. There is also a settlement of about 150 households at Mbozama, indian-owned land north of Stanger.

4. Urban relocation

Shakaville (Stanger) is under threat.

5. Dam construction

The construction of the Mvumase Dam on the Tugela appears to threaten a large number of settlements in the Lower Tugela valley, including the relocation site of Bulwer Trust Farm. Preliminary construction work is already under way. Local people have not been kept informed about developments and there is considerable confusion and insecurity as a result.

8. Greater Durban

This region consists of the districts of Durban, Pinetown and Inanda. Details on the history of settlement and housing in this region can be found in the chapters on informal settlements and Group Areas removals, as well as in the Inanda case study in Part Three.

RELOCATION TO THE PERIPHERY

Until the 1950s, when relocation began to be implemented in this area, many africans, indians and coloureds lived close to the centre of the city. The trend in relocation within the Durban - Pinetown metropolitan area has been to push african, indian and coloured residents in informal settlements, black spots and townships into large townships and informal settlements on the periphery of the city. To this end townships such as KwaMashu, Ntuzuma, Newlands and Phoenix in the Inanda district, KwaNdengezi, KwaDabeka, Mariannridge in the Pinetown district, and Merebank, Chatsworth and Umlazi to the south west, have been built over the last thirty years. The transformation of the city has been facilitated by the use of various types of relocation, including de-proclamation of townships or urban relocation, group areas removals, black spot removals and the clearing of informal settlements.

Today, even the peripheries are threatened. Informal settlements on the edge of formal townships on the periphery are under threat. In addition, a phenomenon of the 1970s has been that control of african townships has been handed over to KwaZulu. Most of the african townships in the Durban area, administered initially by the City Council and subsequently by the Port Natal Administration Board, are now either already under the control of KwaZulu, or are due to be incorporated at some future date. For the african residents this has meant an extension of their peripheral status. With the redrawing of boundaries they have become homeland commuters with a corresponding reduction of their rights in the urban areas.

RELOCATION TOWNSHIPS

Chatsworth
Inanda Newtown
KwaDabeka
KwaMashu
KwaNdengezi
Newlands East
Ntuzuma
Mariannridge
Merebank
Phoenix
Wentworth.

In addition to these formal townships, there are large informal settlements in the Inanda district and the Umlazi and Umbumbulu districts south of Durban, into which displaced people have moved.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Group Areas
See chapter 9, Part Two.
2. Informal settlement
See chapter 8, Part Two.
3. Influx Control
See chapter 7, Part Two.
4. Urban Relocation
Baumannville deproclaimed 1962, moved to KwaMashu.
Central hostels moved to KwaMashu in early 1960s.
Part of Chesterville removed to KwaMashu; 1959, remainder under threat of removal.
Emergency Camp at Umlazi Glebe removed in 1970.
KwaMashu incorporated into KwaZulu in 1977.
Clermont (Pinetown) to be incorporated into KwaZulu.
Klaarwater (Pinetown) threatened with removal.
Hambanathi (Tongaath) and Lamontville (Durban) have been promised 99 year leasehold.
5. Black spot removals
Roman Catholic Mission of St Francis Xavier on the Bluff removed in late 1940s and early 1950s.
Chateau Estates and Good Hope Estates (Cato Manor) removed to KwaMashu, 1965.
New Farm (Inanda) cleared to make way for development of Phoenix, early 1970s.
St Wendolins (Pinetown) under threat for Group Area township development; reprieve possible in one part.
(See case study in Part Four.)
Many thousands of tenants living in freehold areas in Inanda under threat from authorities.
6. Infrastructural development
Construction of Inanda Dam (Ndwedwe) may affect up to 250 000 people.
Clairwood (indian area) is under threat because the Durban City Council wants to develop it as an industrial zone.
Road construction has affected many areas; currently there are disputes about roads in the indian areas of Chatsworth and Avoca.

9. Southern Natal

This region comprises the 7 magisterial districts of Camperdown, Ixopo, Alfred, Umzinto, Port Shepstone, Richmond and Umbumbulu. White and black areas form a complex patchwork pattern; this has made consolidation planning an extremely contentious issue in the

area. The agricultural output in the white farming areas is high. Sugar cane is grown on the coast; dairy, beef, mixed and timber farms are found inland. On the 21st May 1980 the Natal Mercury reported that Ixopo supplies 25% of Natal's milk supply (and 37% of Durban's needs), 10% of the province's beef and 20% of the province's potato crop. All sectors of agriculture have seen increased concentration of farms in a few hands in recent years. In the sugar industry there are now 3 sugar mills in this region - at Illovo, Sezela and Port Shepstone. All are owned by C. G. Smith. The timber industry is dominated by plantations owned by Masonite, Saligna and SAPPI. The general impression from fieldwork is that farming has become increasingly mechanised, particularly in the dairy sphere, and this has led to a cutback in farm labour.

The african reserves include some of the most densely populated areas in Natal. Both in the Alfred and Umbumbulu reserves there are continual reports of faction fighting. Interviews with inhabitants of black spots in this region made it apparent that one of their greatest fears in moving from freehold land into KwaZulu is their fear of violence and fighting. Although a large section of this region is suitable for sugar cane, most plots are very small because of the high population density. However the South African Sugar Association (SASA) is promoting sugar development in this region and has set up a base in the Mtwalume area. There are a large number of african freehold properties in Southern Natal as well. Most of the 64 properties still in the region are small compared to the african farms in Northern Natal, but densely populated.

There are also small pockets of indian-owned land, mainly in the Umzinto and Cliffdale areas. Expansion of indian farming has been largely prevented by the Group Areas Act, however.

RELOCATION SITES


Gamalakhe
Mpumalanga
Folweni / Gologodo
Frankland
KwaMaqizana
KwaMbono
Mysieland.

Platt Estates bought in 1962 as a relocation site for africans living on black spots in the Ixopo and Underberg districts, has never been developed although plans for a township of 36 000 people were presented in Parliament in 1968. Many people who have been evicted or removed have been forced to find their own alternative accommodation. Some people have moved on to other black spots; others have been forced into an already overcrowded KwaZulu or into numerous informal settlements which have proliferated along the south coast, notably Rhobhoyi and Murchison near Port Shepstone.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Farm evictions

Although there was some labour tenancy practised in the region, mainly on the wattle and mixed farms, its extent did not compare with Northern Natal, and there have been no State-sponsored removals of labour tenants in the region. Eviction of labour tenants has been left largely to individual farmers and in most cases this seems to have fitted in with the changing labour requirements of farmers and forestry. Farmers on mixed farms now rely on a core of permanently resident essential workers such as tractor drivers and indunas, while nearby KwaZulu supplies them with ample casual labour - women, children and old men. Traditionally the timber and sugar industries have relied on migrant workers, housed in compounds but there has been a strong trend towards using more and more local



labour, commuting daily from KwaZulu, instead. Recruitment from Transkei has declined steadily over the last 5 to 10 years, and even the large sugar companies are becoming reluctant to recruit inexperienced sugar workers from Transkei. Instead they have introduced a graded card system whereby recruiting bases in Transkei filter out 'good, experienced' workers to go to work in Southern Natal.

To try to quantify farm labour evictions in this region has proved impossible. It is evident, however, that this has been a major category of removals in the region and that this has also created serious social problems. A recent report in a Natal newspaper stated that 'people who had been pushed out by white farmers in the Camperdown district' have been instrumental in raiding and burning down the KwaZulu residents' houses. (*Natal Mercury*, 2.04.82)

Tenants living on indian farms have also been evicted. Towards the end of 1981 about 30 to 50 african families living on an indian farm in the Braemar district were served with notice and relocated to KwaMaqikizana. The farmer told them that he wanted to cultivate the land that they were occupying. Coloured farmworkers have been affected as well. In 1980 the *Natal Mercury* reported on a farm at Foscadale near Ramsgate, where more than 130 coloured people were under threat because the farmer wanted to cultivate the land they were occupying. After representations to the farmer concerned, they were told they would be allowed to stay until the planned coloured township at Merlewood, near Port Shepstone, had been opened. (*Natal Mercury*, 31.07.80) Lack of proclaimed coloured Group Areas in Southern Natal makes it extremely difficult for this group of people to find alternative housing if evicted.

2. Consolidation

This has been a very controversial issue because the various proposals advanced during the course of the 1970s have affected substantial white interest groups adversely. In 1980 there were reports that the van der Walt Commission planned to hand over a large part of the Ixopo, Highflats, Harding and Donnybrook districts to KwaZulu. Local farmers' organisations put up strong resistance and managed to win a reprieve; the *Daily News* reported on the 3rd September 1980 that proposals that Ixopo would go to KwaZulu had been dropped after 'strong opposition from organised agriculture'. Another issue that has angered white farmers in the south has been reports that farmers in the Bergville area in the northern Drakensberg are lobbying for the three Drakensberg locations (1, 2 and Upper Tugela) to be removed into the southern Harding / Ixopo area. This created tension within the NAU in 1980/81.

The following areas are proposed for excision:

- Nomnyatuli's location (south west of Port Shepstone);
- Released area west of Port Shepstone;
- Scheduled area, part of Location 5 (Port Shepstone) - This is densely populated and includes the informal settlement of Bhobhoyi where the population is estimated at approximately 36 000 people;
- Farms north of Port Shepstone;
- Ifafa Mission and scheduled area, including Malangeni Mission - described in 1972 as 'some of the finest (Zulu) agricultural land in Natal' and having then a population of 30 000 people (*Pretoria News*, 17.06.72);
- Released area south of Richmond;
- Released farms and Ndoleni Mission south west of Richmond - population estimates vary between 30 000 and 100 000, depending whether only the mission land or the mission plus the two freehold farms of Vicks River and Newlands are considered. When attention was focused on this

excision in March 1982, the local Richmond Town Board came out against the removals, arguing that Richmond is 'dependent on labour from Indaleni ... if the people living there were removed, the economic structure of Richmond would collapse'. (Natal Witness, 20.03.82) The van der Walt Commission has paid another visit to the area in June 1982 and speculation that a reprieve may be forthcoming, is widespread.

- Scheduled area, Location no. 5 north of Ixopo;
- Scheduled Location no. 4, Donnybrook;
- Scheduled Location no. 3, west of Donnybrook;
- Scheduled areas and Umahafongwe Mission Reserve south east of Durban;
- Farms south east of Cato Ridge.

The following areas are proposed for addition to KwaZulu, in compensation for the above (some are existing african freehold areas):

- private farm south of Harding
- private farm west of Port Shepstone
- private farms south west of Port Shepstone
- private farm east of Harding
- private farms south and south west Ixopo (expropriated)
- private farms south east Ixopo
- private farms south of Pietermaritzburg (expropriated).

Although the final consolidation plan for this region is not clear at the time of writing, a number of white farms have already been expropriated by the State during the course of the 1970s for future incorporation into KwaZulu. The Ixopo / Highflats area has been the most affected by this. Altogether about 18 farms have been bought out in this area by the SADT over the last 10 years. (Daily News, 21.04.81) None are yet inhabited by africans, though some africans are grazing their cattle on the land. When plans were put forward for the expropriation of white farms in the area, not all farmers objected strongly. Some that were directly affected started putting improvements into their farms so as to get good compensation from the sale of their farms to the SADT. However, it seems that most farmers whose farms have been expropriated have been on the losing end. Some have been allowed to lease their farms back on an annual basis, but there is no security on this lease which may be terminated after a year. This means that farmers are reluctant to put money into their farms for fear of never seeing any return. There are also rumours in the area that if a 'friend' of someone in the SADT wants a farm for a few years he will get it, at the expense of the local farmer.

If the 1975 consolidation plans are accepted in their broad outline, well over 100 000 and perhaps as many as 200 000 africans on reserves, mission reserves and freehold farms will be moved.

3. Black Spots

This is a major category of threatened removals in the region. The first black spot to be moved in Natal, The Patch (Port Shepstone), was moved in this region soon after 1948. A further 20 african-owned farms have been moved since then, with a total population estimated by SPP as about 12 000. However, there are still 64 freehold farms (many very small) that have not yet been moved. While some are under imminent threat, others, mainly in the Umzinto district, may be incorporated into KwaZulu if the 1975 consolidation proposals for this region are ever put into effect.

The sugar and timber industries have benefitted from the removal of black spots in the region. In the Hammarisdale area a number of black spots were expropriated in the late 1960s to make way for the development of both the industrial township and the white and african townships built to serve it. In Umzinto, the two neighbouring black spots of

Umkomanzi Drift and Woodlands Lodge were expropriated to make way for an indian Group Area; the indian township of Craigieburn was proclaimed in this area in 1972.

In a number of cases where black spots have been expropriated and even reported in Parliament to have been moved, tenants are continuing to live on the land because they have nowhere else to go and have not been offered alternative accommodation by the authorities. Examples of this are S 72 (reported to have been moved in 1972), BP 7892 (reported to have been moved in 1973) and DA 7185 (reported to have been moved in 1973). (Hansard, Question 537, 22.04.80)

4. Urban relocation

There have been very few townships built in the prescribed areas; most african people live in KwaZulu. The townships at Margate and at Harding (the latter very small) have been relocated to inside KwaZulu, to Gamalakhe and Kwambono respectively. Only KwaZulu citizens were allowed to move to Gamalakhe; many who did not qualify, mainly Transkeians, went to the informal settlement of Bhobhoyi. The township of Shayamoya, Umzinto, is under threat.

5. Informal settlements

The major informal settlements under threat of removal are Malukazi, south of Durban; informal settlements adjacent to Magabeni township, near Umkomaas; Georgedale, outside Mpumalanga, and Bhobhoyi and Murchison near Port Shepstone.

6. Squatters on State land

There are reports that over 4 000 people living on State land in the Umzinto districts are under threat. Houses were numbered in 1979, even though there was resistance from residents who reportedly attempted to beat up the officials. Further follow up on this is required.

7. Group Areas

<u>Indian</u> :	Port Shepstone	<u>Coloured</u> :	Very little provision
	Harding		made for coloured
	Park Rynie		housing. Opposition to
	Umkomaas		proposed area in
	Umzinto		Richmond.
	Richmond		
	Cliffdale.		


10. Griqualand East

This region comprises the Mount Currie and Matatiele districts in Southern Natal. Before 1863 this area was under the Pondo chief, Faku. It was then ceded to Adam Kok III and his followers, who had trekked there from Griqualand West, near Kimberley. White settlement began in the 1880s; over time, whites acquired more and more farming land from the Griqua people until the district became a predominantly white farming area, with a few scattered african, coloured and Griqua farms.

Until 1977 the area fell under the administration of the Cape Province. In 1977, as a sequel to the Transkei being granted independence by Pretoria, it was incorporated into Natal. The whole area is claimed by Chief K. Matanzima as rightfully part of the Transkei.

RELOCATION SITES

There are no relocation sites in the region; people relocated as a result of black spot removals or consolidation planning have been relocated into the Transkei, which was made independent in 1976.



MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Consolidation

The location of this district on the borders of the Transkei have made consolidation a major issue. Starting soon after the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act was passed, nearly all the white-owned farms in the adjacent Umzimkulu district were expropriated. The only exceptions were a block of farms in the north-western part of the district which were incorporated into the Mount Currie district and a single farm, called Ebuta, near the town of Umzimkulu. The Umzimkulu district is now part of the Transkei. In the Matatiele district, large blocks of white-owned farms in the Qacha's Nek and Ongelukneke areas were allocated to the Transkei along with some farms in the southern part of the district, to the east and west of a part of the Transkei known as Kaka's Location. The farms in the Qacha's Nek area have been incorporated into the Transkei but the Ongelukneke and Kaka's Location farms are still under the control of the SADT.

2. Black spots

Griqua and coloured-owned farms have not been expropriated, but restrictions have been placed on these people's rights to purchase additional land; they can only do so with the consent of all their white neighbours. Removal of african-owned black spots started far earlier than in the rest of Natal. Of the 17 african-owned farms classified as black spots, 11 had been moved by 1961, another 2 by 1969 and 1 in 1973. In the case of one of the removed black spots, the owners (3 brothers) sold to white neighbours and stayed on on their former land as labourers. The farm Poortkraal was communally farmed and densely settled, and regarded by neighbouring white farmers as a 'den of iniquity.' It is not certain that the owners of this farm were compensated on removal.

Of the other 3 black spots, 2 have been incorporated into the Transkei and only 1, Pakkies, still remains in african ownership. It appears to consist of 3 surveyed farms, Donkerspruit, Waterval and Melkspruit. It is possible that some part of this property was cleared before 1961. The future of the farm is undecided. The van der Walt Commission was expected to visit the district in June 1982 and still has to publish its recommendations for the area.

3. Group Areas

In Kokstad all the plots were originally allotted to the Grikwas, except for those occupied by the magistrate and the clergyman. As white settlement increased, an informal grouping of people along racial lines took place, but this was not enforced and all racial groups lived in the town. When Group Areas legislation was enforced in Kokstad in the 1960s the Griqua and coloured community were forced to move out to a new township on the outskirts and had to sell many good houses, with well-established gardens, to whites at unrealistically low prices.

4. Urban relocation

Cedarville township possibly under threat of removal though 99 year leasehold also rumoured.


Bongweni (Kokstad) been granted Community Council and 99 year leasehold and appears will not be relocated into the Transkei.

Matatiele township likely to get 99 year leasehold.


It appears that the Transkei has refused to cooperate in allowing these townships to be relocated to within its borders.

5. Farm evictions

Labour tenancy has never been practised on any scale in the area.



PART THREE CASE STUDIES OF RELOCATION SITES



1. SAHLUMBE

1. Introduction

Sahlumbe is a rudimentary closer settlement of several thousand people, established on the north bank of the Tugela River about 23 km from Weenen and on the edge of the Msinga district of KwaZulu. It is one of several relocation sites that stretch for some distance along the Tugela on Trust land - former white farms that were bought up, apparently in the mid 1960s. Other sites are Nomoya, Msusamphi (see Appendix 3) and Mashunka. All these places were established in the late 1960s to provide a temporary relocation area for the thousands of labour tenants then being evicted off farms in the Weenen area; Sahlumbe is thus the oldest of the relocation sites surveyed by SPP. Although people understood that they were to be there only temporarily, they have not been offered any alternative site since.

The relocation area is bordered on its southern boundary by a CED farm, Tugela Estates. This has been a source of tension and deep resentment among the relocated people since they were not given any agricultural land themselves and have had to live next door to land that they know is supposedly for the people of KwaZulu but from which they draw no benefit. In the last year or two there have been negotiations between the local Tribal Authority, Ulundi and Pretoria about this land and as a result some land has been made available to selected individuals within the Sahlumbe area - apparently those considered potentially 'economic farmers'.

This area has been deeply scarred by factional violence over the last decade. For more information on this, see Appendix 2 at the end of this chapter. The origins and causes of the violence are enormously complex. There is an historical dimension that predates the resettlement of people into these closer settlements. However, conflict over land lies at the heart of the violence - landlessness, overcrowding, competition between people for inadequate resources, the pressure of newcomers on the original people's territory. The relocation of thousands of people into these closer settlements has thus contributed directly to the violence, but more work is needed to draw out the relationship between relocation and factional violence clearly.

THE SURVEY

The SPP survey was conducted in late 1980. 129 households were interviewed, selected more or less on an 'every third house' basis in one section on the western end of Sahlumbe. Sahlumbe, unlike most other closer settlements, was not laid out in a grid; it straggles out in a long thin ribbon on either side of a dirt road that runs along a narrow shelf between a line of hills and the Tugela. The houses are built fairly randomly along this axis over a distance of several kilometres. Because of the very jumbled layout of the community as well as its geographical spread, it was impossible to select houses for the interview according to a consistent grid pattern.

There were other problems with the survey as well. Although the sample interviewed was larger than at any other relocation site surveyed in Natal, there are a large number of missing answers on several questions. Partly this was because of resistance by the people interviewed to particular questions (for instance, concerning diet), partly because of difficulties they experienced in answering certain questions, especially those to do with time, number, age etc. These are difficult questions for illiterate and innumerate people to answer adequately - and there is a high level

of illiteracy in the community - and can antagonise the interviewee if he/she is pressed. Sometimes, therefore, the sample on which conclusions are based is smaller than 129. Where the gaps are large, this is indicated in the report.

2. Origins and background

ORIGINS OF HOUSEHOLDS

The bulk of the population were relocated at Sahlumbe by 1970. A very small number of households were already living on the farms on which Sahlumbe was established when these were taken over by the SADT; they would have been former tenants of the white farmers whom the SADT bought out. These people remained in the area and now form a small landed elite since they have retained access to the fields they had before. A few households arrived between 1965 and 1969, apparently having been evicted off other white farms during this time. The great majority of households - 84 out of 117 for whom this information is available, or 72% of the sample - came to Sahlumbe in 1969, at the time of the massive eviction of labour tenants in the Weenen district. A further 8% of the sample arrived at Sahlumbe in 1970; a small number of households continued to trickle in through the 1970s.

Sahlumbe was created by the State in response to the crisis precipitated in the Weenen district by the abolition of labour tenancy in 1969. As already described it tried first to relocate all the ex-labour tenants from Weenen outside of the district but, partly because of opposition from the tenants themselves, it was eventually forced to accommodate some of the displaced people in the immediate area. Thus most of the households interviewed by SPP came from the Weenen area where they had been settled for many years - often for generations - on white farms. 98% had been labour tenants (usually on a six-month basis) before they were relocated and most of these had moved or been brought to Sahlumbe under pressure. A few households had chosen to leave the tenant farms because of dissatisfaction with working conditions but they were exceptional. Almost all of the households surveyed (96%) went to Sahlumbe as a result of having been evicted. Some had been given notice by the farmer because their families were no longer supplying him with workers; most evictees were victims of the abolition of labour tenancy.

As already described, most labour tenants in Natal were bitterly opposed to the attempt to introduce a fulltime farm labour system in Natal and many - up to 20 000 in the Weenen district alone in some estimates - refused to sign permanent, fulltime labour contracts with their employer/landlords. When they refused, they were evicted. Of those interviewed at Sahlumbe, just under one third (32%) had been evicted and moved to Sahlumbe under their own steam because they had had nowhere else to go. A little under two thirds (64%) had been forcibly removed and brought there by GG truck.

AGRICULTURAL OPPORTUNITIES BEFORE RELOCATION

There were two major reasons why labour tenants clung so fiercely to the six-month system - 1) it gave them access to agricultural land and 2) it allowed the male members of the household some free time each year in which they could get wage employment in the urban-industrial centres. In the Weenen area many labour tenants were also relatively free from the direct and constant control of their farmers over their lives. Just over half those surveyed reported that their landowner had not lived on the land on which they used to live, i.e. they were living on labour farms and spent their farm labour period away from their homes on the

commercial farms of the landowner. Weenen was notorious for its labour farms - some with up to 1 500 people living on them - so this information is consistent with what is generally known about the district.

As labour tenants, most households at Sahlumbe had had access to some agricultural land before they were removed or evicted. This was one of the major and most devastating differences between their previous places of residence and Sahlumbe, where they were given only small sites and not allowed to keep stock. Out of 103 households for which information is available, 66% reported having had 2 or 3 fields beforehand while 17% had had 4. Only 7% had not had any access to agricultural land. There are no details about the size of the fields, but 70% described them as 'large', 27% said they were 'medium' and only 3% said they were 'small'. Mealies were grown almost universally; a very large percentage also grew sorghum (85%), while over half grew beans.

In addition to their arable land, most households had had stock in their previous places - mainly goats and cattle (93% had had goats and 91% cattle) with about a third reporting having had pigs as well. A small minority reported having had sheep and almost a fifth said they had had horses. Virtually everybody kept chickens as well.

Before they were moved, private agricultural production served a very important subsistence function for the people of Sahlumbe, contributing significantly to their survival since, as described elsewhere, cash wages on labour tenant farms were either nominal (R1 or R2 per month) or non-existent. Most households produced for their own consumption only, but a very small minority - 6% of those sampled - reported having sold their surplus. Meat, followed by dairy produce, hides and eggs were the most important products - 94% said they produced meat, though how much is not stated. As would be expected, people said they had produced more at their previous places of residence - most (80%) described it as 'much more' while a further 17% said they had produced 'more'.

The removal put an abrupt and severe end to this food production since households were not given agricultural land and not allowed to bring stock with them to Sahlumbe. While it seems that a number of households disobeyed and smuggled animals into Sahlumbe, the great majority were forced either to try to find alternative grazing for their stock or, in most cases, sell their animals. 82% of those who had had stock before had to sell them on removal and almost all of them felt they did not get a fair price for their animals. The forced cattle sales that accompanied the evictions in Weenen were, and still are, a potent source of bitterness in the area. Many labour tenants had had extensive herds, of 50 head of cattle or more, and were, by subsistence standards, wealthy. Because of the short time period in which they had to dispose of their stock, they were forced to take what prices they could get and many white farmers, both local and from as far afield as the Orange Free State, exploited the situation ruthlessly. Other households lost their stock when they were impounded after their notice period had expired. There are allegations, still vividly remembered in the relocation areas of Weenen, that some local whites made quick profits out of the mass impoundings of stock that accompanied the removals, by buying up the impounded animals of evicted labour tenants if their original owners could not afford to, or did not know they could, release them. Despite the passage of time since the removals, the resentment and anger caused by the losses people suffered do not seem to have abated: the memory of this period is still sharp.

EMPLOYMENT BEFORE RELOCATION

Unfortunately the questionnaire used in the survey was not designed to get much information about the working conditions on the farms from where the ex-labour tenants came. While almost all households were in a labour tenant relationship beforehand, hardly any - only 2% - had had formal registered contracts with the

farmer. This confirms the general impression that labour tenant contracts were not successfully enforced in many parts of Natal. Almost all households had had at least one member of the household working for their landowner (on a six-month basis), with the average being 2.2 members per household working in this way. Unfortunately the interviews did not pick up details on child labour on the farms but appear to have recorded adult employment only. Since child labour, both casual and regular, was common in this area, this is an unfortunate gap.

Information on employment outside of agriculture is unfortunately incomplete as well. As labour tenants, many of the workers in the sample worked on the land of their farmer/landlord for six months of the year and then went as migrant workers, most commonly to Johannesburg or the Rand or the greater Durban area for some of the remaining six months of the year. It was common for male labour tenants to spend about 3 months during their 'off period' working in the towns to earn cash wages to see them through the rest of the year. The other 3 months of the year would generally be spent at home, ploughing and working their own piece of land over the summer. However, the survey failed to pick up information on this part time employment which played an important role in the household's survival. Table 1 sets out the figures for previous employment which are available.

Table 1, Sahlumbe. PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, SKILL LEVEL AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

Note: 'Resident' refers to permanent or commuter residents;
'Non-Resident' refers to monthly or annual migrants.

INDUSTRY	RESIDENT			NON-RESIDENT			OTHER / MISSING		
	Semi-Skilled	Un-Skilled	T	Semi-Skilled	Un-Skilled	T	Semi-Skilled	Un-Skilled	T
Agriculture	4	53	57	1	83	84	-	2	2
Manufacturing	-	-	-	-	6	6	-	1	1
Transport	-	1	1	-	6	6	-	-	-
Finance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Service	-	-	-	-	6	6	-	-	-
TOTALS	4	54	58	1	101	102	-	4	4

As explained, this information does not include data on part time industrial work; the non-agricultural workers indicated in the table are fulltime workers, people who were not called upon to perform a six month stint on the farm of the family's landlord. Furthermore, the survey only gathered data on previous employment - the unemployed and those not economically active were not recorded - so one cannot reconstruct from it what the rate of economic participation by households before they were moved to Sahlumbe was. (It would be a difficult task to reconstruct an accurate picture of economic activity more than ten years previously in any case.) Details on the sex of the workers were not supplied either, but almost all, if not all, the workers were undoubtedly male.

The table shows that there were 164 wage workers before the removal in the 129 households interviewed. As would be expected, the overwhelming majority of them were in agriculture - 143 out of 164, amounting to 87% of the total. The rest were distributed very sparsely between manufacturing (7), transport (7) and service (6), with one person in finance. Almost all of these workers were unskilled - 160 out of 164.

Only 4 were semi-skilled and none were skilled workers. The low level of fulltime non-agricultural employment plus the lack of skills meant that workers from Sahlumbe were extremely disadvantaged on the job market after removal, when their former agricultural subsistence base on the white farms had been destroyed and their families had become totally dependent on wage and migrant labour for survival. These disadvantages continue today. (For a comparison of previous employment with the present situation, see below.)

3. Conditions

CONDITIONS IN 1969

Sahlumbe was, as already stated, a very rudimentary relocation camp when it was started in 1969. Although established at the time of Limehill, it did not achieve any of the publicity and notoriety that surrounded that place, even although its conditions were certainly not better. What made the difference was that at Limehill there was a group of church workers, with links with liberal organisations in the towns, and they saw to it that the story of Limehill was thrust into the national press. At Sahlumbe there was none of that. There were general press stories on the mass evictions in Weenen, but few reports on conditions at the other end. Without pressure on it, the State could afford to get away with absolutely minimal preparations at Sahlumbe.

For a firsthand account of the situation confronting the people relocated to Sahlumbe, see Appendix 1. As this account makes clear, very few facilities were available when the people started being brought in or moving there themselves. Only 7% had permanent houses, presumably those who had been living there before. Most people, 76%, were given tents and the remainder had 'temporary accommodation' - of what kind is not specified. Latrines were not provided by the authorities and people were expected to dig their own pits for latrines. People were allocated plots measuring 30 x 50 paces by government-appointed indunas. A very small number of households reported having paid a lump sum for land and a few said they paid rent. Neither cash payments nor rent were officially enforced so it appears that these people were involved in private transactions with other Sahlumbe residents.

No permanent water was laid on, though GG trucks brought in water temporarily to help with the building of houses. Once the trucks were withdrawn people had to revert to using the river, a kilometre or more away, or such small streams and springs as they could find. The other temporary service laid on by the authorities was to provide a supply of fuel; this did not last long and once it had been used up people became dependent on the vegetation in the surrounding hills for firewood for cooking and heating purposes.

There were no schools nor clinics nor churches built before people were brought in. 99 households in the sample said there were no shops when they arrived but 17 said there were. Since the community is strung out for some distance along the main through road, this probably influenced the reply and only those reasonably close to an existing shop recorded a positive reply. It does not seem that any preparations were made to supply extra shops before the influx of people and the community had to make do with whatever rudimentary facilities already existed to serve the former farm community.

Sahlumbe was thus almost entirely unplanned at its establishment: a hastily demarcated point in the veld at which the authorities could dump the troublesome but politically and economically unimportant surplus agricultural labour force in the

Weenen area. Having put them there, they could then forget about them.

PRESENT CONDITIONS

In the years that have elapsed since the relocation of people at Sahlumbe, conditions have improved but not very much - such improvement as there has been has come about mainly from the efforts of those relocated, with little input from government sources. Most people interviewed in fact see no real improvement in the conditions around them: 80% of those questioned felt this way and only 12% reported 'some' improvement in conditions.

There is still no protected water supply for the community and people are dependent either on the Tugela River, which is notoriously dirty and accessible only through the CED farm, or on nearer but less reliable streams and springs. These were badly hit by the severe drought in 1980/81, many drying up completely. A typical sight - illustrative of official development strategies and priorities for KwaZulu - is that of the women from Sahlumbe walking through the sprinkler-irrigated fields of the CED farm, containers on their heads, to collect water out of the Tugela. In early December 1981 an old irrigation furrow, built by a former chief and his people and allowed to fall into disuse, was finally reopened as a result of a two year undertaking initiated by a nearby agricultural project with labour supplied by the community. This may ease the water position and allow for some irrigation of gardens, if the furrow is adequately maintained. A clean and plentiful water supply still remains a major problem in the community, however.

Shops are still few and far between, with only 1 General Dealer and 1 Butchery in the area surveyed, supplemented by a number of illegal 'shackshops'. Prices are, as would be expected, high. In late 1980 500gm of powdered milk was selling for 65c, 1 kg of sugar for 47c, 750ml of paraffin for 45c and a packet of candles for 65c. A sack of mealie meal cost then R16,50. The community is dependent for many commodities on the shops in Weenen, 23 km away. Buses run through the community to Weenen three times a day, a single fare costing 65c at the end of 1980.

School facilities have improved but are still completely inadequate to meet the community's needs. There is one primary school serving a very large area with another primary school and a secondary school planned. In 1979, when factional violence was at its height, many children could not attend school because it fell outside of their territory. Even in times of peace, however, many children do not attend school - about 40% of the child population, according to one resident. There are a number of factors at work: inadequate facilities and poor teaching; the expense of sending children to school, both in the outlay required for school fees, uniforms, books etc. and in the loss of potential earnings that children who work on nearby white farms can bring home. There is also suspicion towards formal school education among some parents. School fees are reported to be 50c per child and children are expected to wear uniforms.

A mobile clinic now visits the community, three times a week. It is not clear whether this is a government-sponsored or private operation. Clinic fees are reported to be R1,50 a visit which, in an area where R20 is the average monthly wage for a fulltime male farmworker, is high.

The legal and administrative status of the area is ambiguous, for although it is (or was in 1980) officially Trust land, it falls under the KwaZulu magistrate at Ezakheni, about 35 km away. The distance to be travelled to reach the magistrate imposes an additional burden on the community, especially on old age and disability pension applicants who have to travel to Ezakheni for their applications to be processed. Locally Sahlumbe is governed by a system of tribal indunas, responsible to the local Chief (of the Mthembu Tribal Authority).

The results of the questions in the survey concerning household diet show up the poverty of the community starkly. 'When you speak of meat, you speak of the time of my ancestors. Bread? I have forgotten its taste', said a resident of Sahlumbe, a widow, when interviewed by the Sunday Tribune in 1980. Her daily diet consisted of 'a cup of pap fortified with spinach mashed from shrubs and weeds'. (Sunday Tribune, 7.12.80) The SPP survey has established that her diet is typical of the area. Maize is the only daily staple consumed by a majority of those surveyed. Sugar, tea and coffee are consumed daily by less than 40% of the population while bread is consumed daily by only 10% of the households surveyed. Over half of the households reported eating greens only once a week or less and almost 30% ate greens less than once a month: only 8% eat greens regularly. Proteins are also a luxury. Almost 70% of the households surveyed said they drank milk once a week or less while about three quarters of the total eat meat, fish and eggs less than once a month.

Most households (95) reported eating 3 times a day but a sizeable minority said they eat only twice (30) and 3 said they eat only once. (Information on one household is missing).

Compared to the other resettlement sites surveyed by SPP in Natal, Sahlumbe is one of the poorest and least developed. When it was established there was much less pressure on the State to provide basic facilities than there is currently. Carelessly flung together then, it has been neglected ever since. It is located in a very tough environment, dry and isolated, and the factional tensions in the area have exacerbated its problems, dividing the community into opposing factions and channelling such organisation as there is into bitter internal feuding.

4. Demographic features

POPULATION STRUCTURE

The total population count for the 129 households surveyed came to 992, of which 758 were permanent residents (76%), 23 were commuters (2%) and 200 migrants (20%), with details on the remaining 11 not supplied. There is a high degree of male migrancy. Of the total male population of 507, 60% are permanent residents, 3% are commuters, and 36% are migrants. In other words, approaching 40% of the male population are absent from the community for most of the time, almost entirely for reasons of employment. This can be put another way: the masculinity rate for the permanent population is 66,4 (i.e. 66,4 males for every 100 females) and for the permanent and commuter population combined this rate is only slightly higher, at 69. Sahlumbe has the lowest masculinity rate of all the closer settlement relocation sites surveyed in Natal, attributable to its very high level of dependence on migrant labour.

Table 2, Sahlumbe. TOTAL POPULATION BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

RESIDENTIAL STATUS	MALE	FEMALE	SEX NOT STATED (NS)	TOTAL
Permanent	302	455	1	758
Commuter	16	6	1	23
Migrant	185	15	-	200
Res. not stated	4	7	-	11
TOTAL	507	483	2	992

Unfortunately there is a very large gap in the recorded information about the age structure of this population. A large number of the respondents could not give the age of the members of their households. Many were illiterate and innumerate and do not measure time according to the calendar year. Unfortunately the interviewers left these answers blank, instead of trying to obtain approximate ages. There are 553 missing answers about the age of household members - 56% of the total sample. Most of these missing answers are for permanent residents. If one assumes, as is reasonable, that the 140 commuters and migrants whose ages are not recorded are all of working age then that still leaves a total of 413 missing answers - 42% of the total sample.

If one looks at the age sample that one is left with, then the masculinity rate amongst the permanent population of working age is very low, at 39,4. In the 25-64 age group it is still lower: 13,7. This corresponds broadly with the high level of male migrancy but these statistics should be viewed as indicators, rather than exact proportions.

Table 3, Sahlumbe. DISTRIBUTION OF PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION OF WORKING AGE

Note: Sample is incomplete. (411 out of 758 in permanent population have no age recorded).

AGE GROUP	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MASCULINITY RATE
15-24	31	31	62	100
25-34	3	24	27	12,5
35-44	2	12	14	16,7
45-64	5	37	42	13,5
TOTAL	41	104	145	39,4

Further demographic imbalance is revealed by comparing the age groups of the permanent population with that of the total population. Using the limited age sample, Sahlumbe has a high child-dependency rate - 42% (185 out of 439) are children of 14 years or younger. Because of the very high incidence of migrancy, over half of the permanent population are children - 52%. It is difficult to assess how useful this partial information is. The possibility that the smaller sample is a very skewed one is there. However, the results are not so extreme as to be completely implausible. Sahlumbe does have a particularly high male migrancy rate and a very small female migrancy rate.

The high rate of male migrancy has serious repercussions on family structure. 116 of the 201 male migrants and commuters are married so that whereas 36% of the permanent female population are married, only 12% of the permanent male population are. In general there are slightly more married women than men. 30% of all the men are married while 35% of all the women are. This can be accounted for by the incidence of polygamy in the area, still widely accepted, although not practised as frequently as before.

There are also many more widows at Sahlumbe than widowers. While 0,4% of the male population is widowed, 6,4% of the female population is. This seems a very high figure, even if one allows for the preponderance of female widows over male that is common in most societies. This may be a result of the factional violence that has periodically devastated the general area. Certainly a number of women have lost their husbands because of the feuding.

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

The survey covered 129 households, with a total population of 992, giving an average household size of 7.7. Household size is therefore generally large. 75% of the households had between 4 and 11 members. Only 14% had 3 or less members and a significant minority - 11% - had very large households of between 12 and 15 members each. The evidence is that the relocation of households to Sahlumbe encouraged and contributed to a nuclearisation of the household structure. Labour tenancy was based on an extended household family structure - the head of the household, his wife or wives, his unmarried children and his married male children all lived together in the unit and contributed to the family labour obligation. At Sahlumbe, however, the dominant (though not majority) type of household is a nuclear one. At the time of the survey, 44% of the households were nuclear, 36% extended, 13% compound, 5% extended-compound and 2% were households where individual members were not connected by marriage or parent - child relationships.

Relocation contributed to this increased nuclearisation in a number of ways. As in other closer settlements, the size of the plots encouraged large households to break up at the time of their removal, with some junior married members setting themselves up on their own plots. The forced sale of cattle also contributed since a number of households appear to have tried to minimise their losses by using their threatened cattle as lobola for unmarried sons who then married and set up their own households. A number of respondents described virtual mass family marriages with 3 or 4 unmarried sons all getting married at the same time, in 1969/70, for this reason.

98 of the households surveyed had male heads and 28 female heads - 78% and 22% of the total respectively. (The sex of 3 heads is not recorded.) Just under half of all the household heads are migrants, however, so the number of *de facto* female heads would be considerably higher.

5. Economic activity

ECONOMIC STATUS

Because of the large number of people whose age is not recorded, the sample of people who fall definitely within the working-age category (15-64) is much smaller than it should be and it is difficult to state how representative it is. If one considers the total population, not distinguished between children and adults of working age, Sahlumbe contains a very high level of people who are not economically active in the formal wage economy. Out of the 975 people in the sample, 734 (75%) are not economically active in this sense, 212 (22%) are employed, and 29 (3%) are unemployed. Thus only 25% of the total population are either engaged in wage labour or actively looking for work. Furthermore, among the permanently resident population only 29 are economically active - five with jobs and a further 24 looking for employment.

Obviously a high percentage of the permanent population are children, many of them at school, and a fair proportion are elderly people. Nevertheless these figures illustrate dramatically how heavy the dependence of Sahlumbe is on migrant labour and how many of the adults who remain behind are excluded from the job sector. The only local employment is of a casual or seasonal nature on white farms. Most farmers already have their quota of resident, fulltime workers - Sahlumbe was created specifically to accommodate their redundant farm labour force - and people looking for casual agricultural work from Sahlumbe compete with enormous numbers of unemployed people in the adjoining KwaZulu district of Msinga. Nevertheless

some women and children do work on a casual *togt* basis on white farms - this irregular, part time work is not recorded in the figures below, which look at fulltime employment only.

Table 4, Sahlumbe. ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, BY RESIDENTIAL STATUS

ECONOMIC STATUS	TOTAL	PERMANENT				COMMUTER				MIGRANT			RESIDENCE NS		
		M	F	Sex ns	T	M	F	Sex ns	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Not economically active	734	273	442	1	716	0	1	1	2	6	3	9	4	3	7
Employed	212 +	3	2	-	5	16	5	-	21	174	11	185	-	1	1
Unemployed	29	20	4	-	24	0	0	-	-	4	1	5	-	-	-
Economic status ns	17	6	7	-	13	0	0	-	-	1	0	1	-	3	3
TOTAL	992	302	455	1	758	16	6	1	23	185	15	200	4	7	11

EMPLOYMENT

As already described, the great majority of workers are migrants going to unskilled jobs on the Rand and the Durban/Pinetown area. Out of a total employment force of 212, 185 (87%) are migrants. Almost all the labour force is male - 193 out of the 212 workers, or 91%. (As noted, casual agricultural work which in this area is performed mainly by women and children, was not picked up by the survey: its scale and significance for household income can, unfortunately, not therefore be measured.)

The most important source of employment for Sahlumbe workers is provided by manufacturing industry, which employs over half the total number of workers. The next most important source of employment is in the construction industry, employing a little less than a quarter of the total. This industry is traditionally a major employer for rural, migrant workers, who are often illegally in the cities, poorly paid and vulnerable to being laid off periodically as the industry goes through cycles of contraction and expansion.

Significantly, in view of the origins of Sahlumbe, agriculture is not a large source of fulltime employment, for either men or women. Farmers do, however, depend on seasonal or casual labour, particularly at harvest time and labour trucks which drive along a pre-arranged route into neighbouring african areas, collecting whoever happens to be at the various pick-up points, are a regular sight. Casual agricultural work is extremely poorly paid - adult wages of 60 cents a day are widespread and sometimes workers get paid in kind only. Child *togt* labour is common too and it is likely that from time to time children from Sahlumbe work in the nearby fields of white farmers, earning between 20 and 50 cents a day, or a bucket of reject potatoes or whatever other crop is being harvested.

+ The one employed female for whom no residence status has been recorded is excluded from the subsequent calculations in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5, Sahlumbe. FULLTIME EMPLOYMENT, BY INDUSTRY, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

INDUSTRY	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			TOTAL			T AS %
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
Agriculture	0	0	0	9	3	12	4	2	6	13	5	18	9,6
Mining	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	8	8	0	8	4,3
PRIMARY	0	0	0	9	3	12	12	2	14	21	5	26	13,9
Manufacturing	1	0	1	2	1	3	91	3	94	94	4	98	52,1
Elect. etc.	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	3	0	3	1,6
Construction	1	0	1	0	0	0	42	1	43	43	1	44	23,4
SECONDARY	2	0	2	2	1	3	136	4	140	140	5	145	77,1
Trade	1	1	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	3	1	4	2,1
Transport	0	0	0	2	0	2	5	0	5	7	0	7	3,7
Services	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	3	4	2	4	6	3,2
TERTIARY	1	1	2	5	1	6	6	3	9	12	5	17	9,0
Industry ns	0	1	1	0	0	0	20	2	22	20	3	23	
TOTAL	3	2	5	16	5	21	174	11	185	193	18	211	

SKILL LEVEL OF WORKERS

The great majority of workers at Sahlumbe are unskilled - 90%, if unskilled industrial workers only are considered, and 95%, if semi-skilled and farm/forestry workers are included in the unskilled category. Although the number of women in employment is very small (only 18), the percentage of women workers in skilled jobs is higher than the percentage of men workers. The only 2 professional people in the sample are women (probably either nurses or teachers) while 5 out of the 18 women workers are in white-collar jobs - 28% of the total women employed.

Table 6, Sahlumbe. SKILL LEVEL OF WORKERS, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

OCCUPATION	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			TOTAL			T AS %
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
Professional	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	2	1
Business	0	1	1	3	0	3	0	0	0	3	1	4	2
Clerical	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0,5
Service	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0,5
Farm/Forestry	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	0	2	1
Skilled	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	1
Semi-skilled	0	0	0	1	0	1	6	0	6	7	0	7	3,5
Unskilled	3	0	3	10	3	13	157	7	164	170	10	180	90,5
Missing	0	1	1	0	0	0	9	2	11	9	3	12	
TOTAL	3	2	5	16	5	21	174	11	185	193	18	211	

UNEMPLOYMENT

The unemployment figures for Sahlumbe are high. The general rate is 12% - 11% for males and 21% for females. The available evidence suggests, however, that many

people have given up hope of finding a job and joined the category of 'not economically active' rather than remaining permanently unemployed, so this statistic does not convey an accurate picture of unemployment if read on its own. The high level of adults who are not economically active points to the depressed level of employment opportunities - a situation that is likely to get progressively worse as the State's strategy to tighten influx control and exclude rural people from the wealth and employment opportunities of the cities, becomes more developed.

REMITTANCES

Questions were asked about the regularity with which absent workers sent home remittances - obviously a crucial issue in a community as dependent on migrant earnings as Sahlumbe. However, neither the question nor the recorded replies are very satisfactory as an index of remittances since the amount sent home and the definition of 'regular' were not detailed. The replies indicate that most of the commuters remit regularly. Information was available for 20 out of the 23 commuters, of whom 17 brought money home regularly, and 3 irregularly. Amongst the migrants information was lacking for 17 but for the rest, the majority were reported to send money home, but generally irregularly. Thus 73 migrants - 40% - were said to send money home regularly, and 106 - 58% - irregularly. Only 4 were reported never to send money home - 2% of the total.

OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME

Earnings from employment are by far the largest source of income in the community but pensions and other grants play an important part too, particularly in view of the relatively small economically active population, the low wages and the irregular nature of most remittances. Old age pensions are important, as in other rural communities, with 29 people recorded as receiving them. Another 3 people get unemployment benefits and one a disability grant. Yet despite the importance of pensions, not everybody who is eligible receives one. 24 people of pensionable age are recorded as not getting any money, 6 because they have not, for one reason or another, applied and 18 because of problems with the bureaucracy that allocates and administers the pension payouts. The distance to be travelled to the local authority office in charge of this area - at Ezakheni, about 35 km away over dirt roads - inhibits old people from applying and also from sorting out any complications which may (and generally do) arise. In this regard the interviewer for the SPP survey noted:

There are many handicapped people at Sahlumbe who are entitled to disability grants but are not getting them. Some do not know that they are qualified. Some have applied but never got them. Old Age Pensioners are not getting the pensions to which they are entitled too. Some have not applied because they have to go to Ezakheni Magistrate's Office to apply. Ezakheni is about 35 km away. One trip by bus costs R2. These old people do not have the money to go there to apply. (SPP Field Report)

In addition to these formal sources of cash income, there is considerable informal activity as well. 38% of the households surveyed reported some informal sector activity, although details on the incomes derived from this are lacking. The most common activities reported are: making beer strainers and grass mats for sale, selling the traditional leather skirts worn by women, knitting and selling woollen hats and scarves, selling secondhand clothes, doing bead work, selling Maas (soured milk), hairdressing, chopping and selling wood. What the survey failed to uncover, not surprisingly, is the role of illegal informal activity in the community. One person reported running a shebeen but otherwise all the activities listed were legal. Yet Sahlumbe is in an area notorious for both its dagga trade and its illegal arms trade - both manufacturing pirate weapons and selling weapons. In a

society as depressed as Sahlumbe, many people are forced to rely on illegal activities to survive, but few would freely admit it.

AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY

Lack of land for agriculture is the single most important issue within the community. 74 of the respondents noted access to land as the major improvement they wished to see, and 45 listed landlessness as their major problem. Almost all the households questioned about the differences between their former place and Sahlumbe identified lack of land as the most telling one: 'We were farming and producing food before; here we have nothing.' 'Before, we had stock; we had land to farm.' 'Before it was better. I had cattle, goats, fields, so I was not starving.' 'Before my family had enough land to farm and had large livestock. Though we were under a white farmer, it was much better than here.' These responses are typical. Nevertheless, even though Sahlumbe is a closer settlement and access to land has been drastically curtailed for its residents, agriculture does still play a small part in the community's survival.

Only 9 households reported having fields - presumably the original inhabitants of the area or individuals who had managed to hire or otherwise gain access to this source of land. However 77 households reported having gardens in which small and varying amounts of maize, beans and other vegetables were produced, depending on the rain. Furthermore, 35 households reported having some cattle, 50 households some goats and 55 households some poultry; scattered through the community there were also a few pigs and donkeys and sheep. Although there is no official grazing - and 60 of the 68 households who reported having grazing said they paid no rent for it - it seems a substantial number of households have defied the official ban on stock. This has created problems however and several households complained of the managers on the neighbouring CED project who impound their stock if it strays.

The benefits derived from this small scale agricultural activity were not quantified in any detail, but 74 households reported that they produced 'some' meat (including chicken), 22 that they produced 'some' milk and a further 22 that they produced 'some' eggs. Only 5 households reported producing for sale - presumably most, if not all, of these would have been in that tiny minority of households with access to fields.

COMPARISON OF PREVIOUS WITH PRESENT EMPLOYMENT

The information on previous employment is, as already mentioned, incomplete and one cannot, therefore, draw too firm a set of conclusions. Nevertheless a comparison of the nature and level of employment before people were removed to Sahlumbe with conditions prevailing at the time of the survey reveals the following significant trends:

1. A shift to fulltime wage employment, with a larger number of people presently in wage employment than before (212 compared to 164);
2. A strong shift to migrant labour - before the removals permanent and commuter workers amounted to 35% of the total workforce but by 1980 this had dropped to 12% and the percentage of migrant workers had risen correspondingly from 62% to 87%.
3. A very marked shift away from agricultural employment; before being moved to Sahlumbe, 87% (143 workers) had been employed in agriculture but by 1980 only 10% (18/188) were employed (fulltime) in this area. Corresponding to this, manufacturing industry had risen from relative insignificance as an employer to being the major source of work while construction, previously not employing anybody from the surveyed households, had become the second most important source of work.

In the household histories of those now forced to live at Sahlumbe one can see clearly the process of complete proletarianisation of former labour tenants at work. Instead of being absorbed into the urban-industrial centres on which the community depends for its survival, however, the people of Sahlumbe have been forcibly blocked from that option, through government legislation, and deliberately diverted to this rural slum.

6. Education

The level of education in Sahlumbe is extremely low and likely to remain so for a long time to come. Although there is a primary school in the area - one of the few improvements noted by residents since they have lived there - the standard of education is low, many children either do not go to school at all or drop out at an early age, and there is no programme of adult education.

Because of the large category for whom information on age is missing, the available data cannot easily be analysed to eliminate the population of under schoolgoing age. In the population as a whole, 734 (74%) have no formal education at all. If one eliminates 50% of the total population on the assumption that they are children 14 years and under, that still means that approximately 230 to 240 adults have no formal education - almost half the adult population. 141 people have lower primary education only (14%), 84 (8%) higher primary and only 33 have reached high school, 26 of them (3% of the total) to lower secondary school and a mere 7 (0.7%) to Standard 9 or beyond. The community is thus severely disadvantaged when it comes to seeking work and as rural unemployment increases its disadvantages in this respect will become more marked.

There is no marked differentiation between the different residence categories as far as education is concerned. 75% of the permanent population, 74% of the commuters and 70% of the migrants have had no formal education. As might be expected in a society as traditional as Sahlumbe, females are less well educated than males, with 79% of the total female population non-educated compared to 69% of the male population. While 19% of the female population has had primary education, 26% of the male has had, and while only 2% of the female population has had any secondary level education, 4.5% of the male population has.

Table 7, Sahlumbe. EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

EDUCATION LEVEL	PERMANENT				COMMUTER				MIGRANT			MISSING			TOTALS				
	M	F	Sex ns	T	M	F	Sex ns	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	Sex ns	T	T as %
None	199	370	1	570	14	2	1	17	133	7	140	4	3	7	350	382	2	734	74
Low-Pri	58	53	0	111	2	2	0	4	25	0	25	0	1	1	85	56	0	141	14
High Pri	29	27	0	56	0	1	0	1	20	4	24	0	3	3	49	35	0	84	8
Low Sec	14	4	0	18	0	1	0	1	6	1	7	0	0	0	20	6	0	26	3
Std 9+	2	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	3	4	0	0	0	3	4	0	7	1
TOTAL	302	455	1	758	16	6	1	23	185	15	200	4	7	11	507	483	2	992	100

7. Organisation and attitudes

A far more in-depth study than that allowed for by the SPP survey would be necessary before one could provide an accurate picture of organisation within the community. The survey interviewed only one section of the community. All those interviewed, with one exception, reported that they did not have problems with their neighbours. Yet Sahlumbe itself has been riven with feuding and factional violence. While those interviewed were all within one geographic location and thus all inevitably located on one side in any faction dispute, the larger community is divided and torn with tensions and conflict.

It is probable that the most efficient organisations in the general community are the different factions, which often have an elaborate structure of leadership and rank, but about which no information was uncovered. Nearly half those surveyed said they belonged to no organisation and of those who reported that they were members of an organisation, almost all were Church members. A little over half those interviewed (70) were church members divided fairly equally between Zionist and more orthodox (mainly Lutheran) churches. The only other organisation mentioned among these households was Inkatha - 15 out of the 129 households mentioned it as an organisation to which they belonged. It is difficult to gauge how active these Inkatha members were - only 3 of the 129 respondents mentioned it later in the interview as an organisation from which they expected help.

The community is run by indunas, under the chief of the Mthembu, as already described. It seems that the indunas wield considerable power in the area - almost everybody interviewed described them as the local leaders - although to what extent they enjoy popular support is less clear. An attempt to organise a tractor-coop. scheme in this general area in early 1981 ran into immense difficulties with the local indunas and strongmen who objected to attempts to establish a cooperative membership and committee outside of the formal tribal structures. Eventually they forced control of the scheme into their hands, taking over the tractor and ousting the originator of the project from the committee.

Attitudes towards conditions at Sahlumbe were almost totally negative with the great majority of households surveyed reporting that there had been no improvements to the place since they arrived. A few respondents (13) noted that they were pleased to be away from the control of their former employer/landlords on the white farms but the tenor of their replies makes it clear that Sahlumbe does not represent a positive alternative - it is only the lesser of two evils.

The only difference is that before my family was under a farmer's rule, therefore being exploited by the farmer, so it is a little better here.

It is better here because we are not under the rule of the white farmers. But the poverty then was not like it is now. Before I had land to farm and had enough livestock.

Lack of land was the most bitter and frequent complaint about Sahlumbe and it is clear that most of those living there still regard farming as a desirable occupation - whether out of actual preference or because of the material subsistence advantages of having land and stock when jobs are so hard to find and wages low, is not, however, clear. The strength of this attachment to agricultural activity helps explain why most of those interviewed see their former lives as labour

tenants as better than what they are experiencing now.

The most common problems identified by those interviewed were⁺:

1. No land for farming -- 45.
2. Distant and scarce wood - 38. (One person noted that she has to walk 5 km to collect domestic firewood).
3. Faction fighting - 28.
4. Distant and dirty water - 24.
5. No toilets - 17.
6. The CED project in general or the fact that the CED managers impound their stock - 9.

These answers reinforce and complement those supplied when people were asked to list the improvements they would like to see in Sahlumbe. Once again, land was the most important issue, followed by decent water:

1. Land for farming purposes - 74.
2. Water, either simply a clean and close water supply, or water on tap - 40.
3. Employment and nearby factories - 15.
4. Clinics - 11.

Less frequent answers were schools (4), toilets (3), closer shops (1) and a nearby supply of wood (4). The fact that so many people cited collecting firewood as a problem, but so few listed a better fuel supply as an improvement they would like to see, is indicative, perhaps, of how the onerous chore of gathering firewood is accepted as part of the pattern of life.

The overall impression that the comments on conditions at Sahlumbe provide is a bleak and depressing one. 'Here there is nothing, we are starving', was a typical response. 'Before we had land to farm, before we had stock - here we have nothing' is another.

However, few people interviewed had any constructive ideas about how they could solve, or begin to solve, their problems. 109 out of the 129 people interviewed said there was nothing they could or intended to do themselves. The rest of the answers were either very limited - 5 planned to dig their own toilets - or looked to distant government or employment to help them - one planned to report the CED to the KwaZulu government, another planned to ask the government for help (unspecified) and four planned to buy water pumps if they could get jobs or the necessary cash. All these replies dealt with future possibilities. Nobody reported on present action. When asked who they felt could help them with their problems, people were more forthcoming but it appears that in replying they were not giving voice to an expectation that help would be forthcoming from these sources but rather that help ought to be forthcoming from there, if anywhere. The two major sources mentioned were either the local chiefs and indunas (63 times) or 'the government' (56 times, with the KwaZulu government mentioned specifically a further four times.) The implication in the latter set of replies was frequently that since 'they' had put us here, 'they' should do something about our problems.

Only three people mentioned the possibility of community action and organisation as a source of help. 'If the men of this place are organised like other places then our problems will be solved', said one of these respondents. All the evidence suggests, however, that constructive and democratic community organisation is far from being achieved in Sahlumbe as presently structured.

⁺ Figures represent the number of times each issue was mentioned; many respondents listed more than one problem.



Appendix 1. Dombi Khumalo's story

Dombi Khumalo is a woman of about 40 who lives at Sahlumbe. She is not one of those interviewed in the SPP survey. Her story was told in Zulu to workers at the nearby Church Agricultural Project, in March 1979, and then translated. This was at a time when factional violence in Sahlumbe was at its height. The two factions in the area were the Madondas (controlling the area where the SPP survey was carried out) and the smaller and weaker Majolas.

I was born in the Msinga area. My father was a migrant labourer in Kimberley. I married Figsom Khumalo and he took me to live on a farm in the Weenen district which belonged to a man who had a chicken farm at Botha's Hill. My husband worked on the six-month system and was paid £1 (R2) a month for the six months he had to work for this farmer on his Botha's Hill farm. His work was to pluck the fowls. At the end of this period, he would come home to Weenen and he then would work for the Town Hall in Weenen. He started working for them at three times what he was earning at Botha's Hill, at £3 (R6) a month.

Occasionally, after my husband's six month contract was up, he would find that the Town Hall had no vacancy for him and he would have to look around for another job. But he very seldom went to Johannesburg, preferring local work. Later he became a tractor driver and then the Town Hall would always keep him a job, because he was considered reliable with the tractor. He then earned R14 a month.

The Indian foreman on the chicken farm quarrelled with my husband and because of the bad blood between them, we moved to another farm in the Weenen district belonging to a Mr Hain. We called the farm 'Xatsheni'. This was a vegetable farm and we all lived at home all year round, but also working for the farmer on the six-month system.

We had four children during this time, three girls and one boy. The farmer gave us two fields, one to grow mabela and one to grow mealies. We had three cows, with one usually in milk. We also had twenty goats and so, compared to many of our neighbours, we were comfortably off. My husband would start work at 7 and finish at 5. I did not have to work on the farm because my children were very small and they did not have to work either for the same reason. My husband earned R6 a month when he was working for this man.

We then heard that the six-month system had been abolished and we had to work for the farmer all year round in order to continue living on our land. We were quite agreeable to this but said that our children would starve if we had to live on the low wages that we were getting on the farm for the whole 12 months. If the farmer would pay us more, we would gladly stay on the farm where we were happy. The farmers refused.

The Bantu Administration Department told us that if we were unwilling to work for the whole 12 months, we would have to go to the location across the Tugela River. They used GG lorries to cart some of the people and their belongings to this place. But as soon as we refused to work for the farmer at the wages he was paying us he ordered us off the land and threatened us with jail if we did not move at once. We could not wait for the GG lorries (which were busy elsewhere), without getting into trouble, so we had to hire lorries to take our belongings. It cost us R60 to hire the lorry.

We had heard that the government would give us compensation for our houses - nobody got this. A BAD man gave me a stand which had 4 poles at the corners and said that

was where I could build my house. I was given a tent to erect on the stand. As soon as we had put a roof on the first hut, the tents were taken away for someone else.

A water tanker was parked nearby so that we could get water to make the mud walls of our house. The moment the tents were taken away, the tanker was also taken elsewhere. After the tanker went, we had to carry water in 5-gallon drums from the Tugela which was a mile downhill from our new living places. This we still do.

There were no latrines. It was horrible to have to squat in public. The stands were clear and there were many of them and everybody had to do that. There was nowhere else to go that was private. We came from homes where the nearest neighbour was 1/2 a mile away and there were thick bushes to give one privacy. Now we were all living right on top of each other.

When we moved we were told that we could not take our cattle and goats with us because there were already too many in the location and that there was no land for us to cultivate. They told us not to worry about this because we would soon be moving to a place of our own. Our buildings must be temporary because this was a transit camp. They said it would be a short time before we would be moved.

When we heard that we couldn't take our animals with us, and the farmer was threatening us with jail if we didn't move at once, we all started selling our animals for what we could get. Our milk cow, which was a fine, heavy producer, was sold for R30. If we had not been rushed to sell it to whoever came along, we could have got R120 for it. For our other cows we got R18 (a two-year old heifer) and R17 (a one-year old ox) each. For our biggest goats we got R6 and for the smaller ones R3 or R4 each.

Because we were near the BIC farm⁺ my husband managed to get a good job as a tractor driver. He earned R36 a month. For several years there was peace in the area but then came rumours of people being killed.

I first heard that the burnings and killings had started further up the settlement. Each year this was getting worse. The troubles arrived at our doorstep when a man called Nduna was killed and his body thrown into the Tugela. He was a neighbour of ours. That was at Christmas time. Then on Good Friday they killed a man named Sithole, another neighbour of ours, and on Easter Monday they killed two men, Mkonza and Mlele.

The following Christmas my husband was ploughing on BIC land when the Madondas came and surrounded the field. Fortunately the white manager came to his rescue and took him home in his vehicle. This was on a Monday. On Tuesday the manager came to fetch him for work and told him to carry on with it. He would be guarded by the SAP. That evening the manager brought my husband home again. Shortly after he'd gone, we heard a report that the Madonda army was coming. All the men escaped to the mountains, leaving us women behind because, in those days, only men were attacked.

Early on Wednesday, a woman further down the valley started shouting that the battle had begun. We all went outside and heard the guns of the battle. When the gunfire had quietened down, we women went to look for our men and I found my husband lying on a path, hacked to pieces with an axe. There were some other bodies too. All had been terribly mutilated and some had had their ears cut off.

We heard afterwards that what had happened was that the Madondas had surprised my husband and a few friends in the place where they were hiding. My husband had expected to hide in the mountains overnight and then go to work in the morning. He had expected to be picked up by the manager and so he did not have any weapon with him. When he and his companions were surrounded by the Madondas they were helpless.

⁺ Tugela Estates, BIC being the former acronym for CED.

Four of them, including my husband, were killed straight away and four others managed to escape. They were chased down the mountain. One of them ran into somebody's home but the pursuers smashed the house open and killed him inside. The others got away. The corpses were all taken to Estcourt by the police. They were then brought back and we buried them.

The Monday after the Wednesday that my husband was killed, my brother-in-law was also killed when he went with other Majolas to seek revenge for the death of his brother. The Madondas were expecting them and they killed 23 Majolas. They did not lose anybody.

Then this last Christmas, one day early in December, we heard women screaming, saying that the attack had come, the people were being finished off. It was early on a Sunday morning. The men rushed out and up the mountain. One of our people was lame and he was chopped up in the ward of the induna Nkoma za Bantu. The other men went on and reached the top of the mountain where they hid.

Some hours later the police arrived. The women were weeping and asked the white police to accompany them as they had heard that a child had been seen being chased by Madondas on the hill.

Then the Madondas appeared ahead. The police leader fired at them to stop them. The Madondas returned heavy fire and the Sergeant then told the women that we must all run, which we did. That night the Madondas came back. We heard the dogs barking and then my door was banged and voices said: 'Who is in here?' I and my children kept very quiet and they then banged so hard that I replied. I said it was me. The voices said: 'Collect your belongings and leave tomorrow. When we arrive there is to be nobody here.' There were some shots fired and then they left.

The next morning we were saved from the Madondas by police arriving in helicopters. But the police went to where the Madondas had fired upon them and found Majola men collected on top of the hill, frightened to come home because of the promised attack, and they loaded them all into their helicopters and took them to jail. Then we were really frightened because many of our young men had been taken away and there would be nothing to stop the Madondas from coming again to kill us.

About two weeks later they came back as we had feared. It was a Sunday morning. The Madonda army split up into three groups. The one went and cut off the Majola men who were coming down the mountain where they had been sleeping during the night. The other group of Madondas waited in Madonda area and the third swung round to get between our people and their homes and drive them towards the Madonda houses. There were about 700 of them.

My boy was herding some cattle with his friends near the river. Suddenly the Madondas arrived and the firing frightened the children who stampeded through the cattle with the Madondas after them. There were running groups everywhere. The children hid in the reeds on the Tugela bank. Those who could swim, swam across the river to the other side.

Then some more Madondas arrived and they managed to cut our people at the river off and they also started shooting. My son was killed then.

I was told later by my son's friends, who escaped, that they all got into the water and lay with just their heads sticking out. The one boy who was saved saw a piece of black plastic stuck in the reeds and he took it and put it over his face. The Madondas arrived where they were and they all kept quiet but they saw my boy. They asked him why he had run away and he said that he was only a child and he was frightened. One of the Madondas then said that they would have to kill him because he had seen who they were. They told him to stand up and be shot. My son started crying and one of the Madondas shot him in the head and they also stabbed him in the chest and arm.

The tribe that's faced with extermination

A FIVE-year faction fight threatens a whole Zulu clan with extermination.

The tribal war between the Majola and Madonda clans, of the Masinga tribal district in northern Natal, has already claimed many lives and unless the authorities take decisive action to move the Majolas from their "temporary" resettlement area, the

clan may be wiped out.

The desperate situation was triggered off by the Government's policy of clearing "black spots" and removing people under the Squatters Act, says Mr Neil Alcock, a local churchman. It all began 10 years ago. Most of the peasants in the Weenen and Walsbank districts of Natal were tenant labourers on farms.

BY G. R. NAIDOO

Under the old law white farmers were entitled to employ tenant labourers for six months. The worker then had the option of becoming a migrant labourer for the next six months.

At the end of their six-month contract, most took their option and ventured to Johannesburg. Then came the crunch. In terms of an amendment, the law required that tenant labourers worked for 11 months for their farmer overlords, when they refused, they were thrown out.

The Majola and Madonda clans, of the Masinga tribal district, with their roots in the Tugela ferry area, were victims of the new law.

The Majola clan was told that they would be moved to the farm Duckponds (now Madondeni) in the Newcastle area. When the time came to move the first squatters, the families packed their "belongings" into cardboard cartons and hessian bags. But the cartons and

bags contained stones — the tribe had no intention of remaining in their new homes.

Once at Duckpond, they trekked back to the Tugela ferry area and lived with friends or relatives. As a "temporary" measure, they were allowed to live on pegged plots until they were to be moved to the Makatini Flats. Their "temporary stay"



Mr Mbide Majola points at the valley that separates the Majolas and Madondas in the Masinga district.

When the police arrived in the afternoon, they took away the bodies. My son was eventually left at Weenen. The white police refused to transport our corpses back to us so that we could bury them. They said they were not interested and would not cart the bodies. Two young white policemen then said they would do it if we paid them R40, R20 for each van. We said we had no money and they said that the bodies would have to go back to Estcourt and we could collect them from the mortuary there.

The black policeman at Weenen then asked the police from Tugela Ferry to help them bring the bodies so that we could bury them. My son died on Sunday and I buried him on Friday. He was about 14 or 15 years old. His name was Johnson.

When my husband was killed, I was pregnant with my seventh child. I then had six daughters and one son. I now have my six daughters. They are all staying with me. My eldest girl is about 18 years old. Sometimes she can get temporary jobs on nearby farms. In January she earned R10 and in February R14. My youngest child is still a baby. Both my parents are dead. I have a few chickens but have no cows or goats. I would like to move away from this place and have a brother who is living near Empangeni but I have no money to go and see how he is and whether we could go and stay there with him.

has now entered its 10th year.

On Christmas day, 1974, the bitter seeds of hatred between the Majola and Madonda clans, also victims of the Squatters Act, were sown.

A quarrel developed over a Madonda woman whose affections she shared with both a Madonda and a Majola clansman.

There was a fight and both men were arrested and tried by a Madonda induna. The member of the Majola clan was found guilty and fined R20. However, he was later cornered and shot dead.

This triggered off the "Msinga faction fighting".

The Majolas, who were at the butt end of the attacks, decided in 1977 to bring matters to a head. They mustered an army to attack the Madondas. But their plans were leaked and an ambush set up.

The Majola impi lost 23 men in the ensuing battle.

The Madondas, who had lost no men, claimed superiority in the area and the long history of murder and harassment began.

The Madondas mustered an army and decided to exterminate their rivals.

The migrant labourers from the Madonda clan, who were working in Johannesburg, were exhorted to join in the extermination bid.

The Majola migrant labourers were asked to return home to defend their families.

Disturbed by the threat to their lives, the Majola clan members appealed to Mr Alcock, head of the church agricultural project in the area.

"Magogogo," as Mr Alcock is known to the locals, immediately contacted the police, the KwaZulu authorities and the Government, advising them that the Madondas had planned to attack the Majolas on Sunday, November 28.

The police set up road blocks and stationed a contingent of men in the Majola area.

The Madondas lay low. They did not attack until two days after the police had withdrawn.

The sight of the oncoming Madonda impi was too much for the Majola clansmen, who bolted to the mountains.

The Madondas hunted the fleeing clan, but could not track them down.

The police were notified of the battle and a force of two white and one black policemen met the returning Madondas.

Shots were exchanged before the police withdrew.

Proud of their achievement, the Madondas told the Majola women and children that they should pack their belongings and leave the area before dawn the next day. If they did not, they would be killed.

Police were told of the threat and a helicopter arrived only to find the Majolas assembled to return home to defend their families. Forty-three were held.

Mr Mbide Majola, who came down from the mountains to talk to me in Msinga, said that after the arrest of the Majolas, the Madondas stopped an Indian-owned bus from transporting members of the Majola clan out of the area.

"They intimidated our women. Armed guards searched the buses and ordered the women to return home," said Mr Majola.

The trader in the area had to move his van under cover of darkness and park it on the banks of the Tugela River on the white side to have provisions transported by boat to the Majolas.

"This is no longer a faction fight. The faction fight ended with the defeat of the Majolas. It is now cold-blooded murder," said Mr Alcock.

After the police held two meetings with the indunas of both factions fighting stopped for a while.

But the battle scene switched to Johannesburg.

Majola clansmen were killed by Madondas who lived in different hostels. Ten men were killed in a week.

Clan's plea to Minister: Move us

By G R NAIDOO

TWO hundred and twenty kraal heads of the Majola clan in the Msinga Reserve, representing about 2 000 people, have petitioned the Minister of Plural Relations, the Minister of Justice and the KwaZulu Government to be moved from their settlement area.

Their plea follows the killing of 18 members of the clan since last December by members of the neighbouring Madonda clan.

In addition, a number of Majola migrant workers had also been murdered in related incidents in Johannesburg. The last murder was a week ago.

Both the Majolas and the Madondas were moved to the area when the labour tenant system was outlawed in the Weenen district in June 1969 and all labour tenant farms cleared of their black occupants.

In most cases, these people had been settled and farming on the farms for generations.

The traditional lifestyle and settlement pattern of both the Majolas and the Madondas were destroyed.

Thousands of tribesmen were crowded together in a "closer settlement" type of camp on the opposite side of the Tugela River from their former homes in KwaZulu.

The Majola clan claims that the local police seem powerless to stop the killings and secure protection for the people.

In December last year 43 Majola men were arrested and tried on a charge of armed assembly "while the Madonda aggressors went free", they say.

The life of the Majola community has been completely shattered by these raids and a whole community is living in constant fear.

Mr Neil Alcock, head of the church agricultural project at Msinga, told the Sunday Times that population pressure was one of the most serious reasons for the unrest and inter-clan fighting. One estimate puts the population in the area at 20 000.

The Madondas have said that they are attacking the Majolas because there was not enough room for both clans.

"When these people were moved, they were told that it was a temporary measure only and that proper accommodation would shortly be made available to them," said Mr Alcock.

"That was almost 10 years ago. The petition is a plea and a reminder to the authorities to find the Majolas alternative and secure land on which to settle before they are completely wiped out."

Appendix 3. Notes on Msusamphi

NOTES ON MSUSAMPHI

Msusamphi is a smaller relocation area, situated in the same belt of Trust land as Sahlumbe but a few kilometres further east along the river and inaccessible by road. The only means of access are along a footpath, from Sahlumbe at the road-end, or across the river by ferry.

These notes are based on research undertaken by J. Thomas (Dept of Social Anthropology, University of Natal) in Msusamphi during 1979/80 and offer some comparison with the results of the SPP survey at Sahlumbe. The origins of the community are the same. Formerly it was a white farm and a number of households were already living there then. It was taken over by the SADT as a relocation area for the labour tenants being evicted in 1969, along with Sahlumbe.

Population

There are a total of 61 homesteads and 279 huts in Msusamphi, with an average of 4,6 huts per homestead. The total population is 436, giving an average of 7,1 members per household. (This compares roughly to the household size found at Sahlumbe). Of the total population, 89 are migrants, distributed across 47 households. This means there are 1,9 migrants per each of the 47 households, and a total of 14 households with no migrant workers.

Destination of migrants

Johannesburg	65
Reef	4
Kimberley	9
Durban	4
Other Natal	4
No information	3

Origins of households

Original inhabitants	19 homesteads
Arrived before removals	11
Arrived with removals	27
Arrived after removals	3
No information	1

Access to fields

Origins	Have fields	No land
Original inhabitants	13	6
Arrived before removals	6	5
Arrived with removals	6	21
Arrived since removals	0	3
No information	0	1

Those who were relocated to Msusamphi were officially allocated 1/2 acre plots. Those of them who now have fields are either the head of the homestead or a son who has married a daughter of an original inhabitant with access to land.

It is not known why a third of the original inhabitants do not have land - possibly they have given up working them for lack of manpower or some such reason.

2. EZAKHENI

1. Introduction and background

Ezakheni is one of the major 'towns' of KwaZulu outside of the metropolitan area of Durban - a large township of some 50 000 people, first built in 1972 and situated in an area of KwaZulu that has been earmarked as an 'industrial development point' in the most recent government decentralisation proposals of April 1982. It is the first (and by far the fanciest) in a series of relocation areas that stretch in a dreary band along the Ladysmith/Helpmekeer road. (Beyond it lies Ekuvukeni and beyond that the Limehill/Uitval complex.)

Ezakheni has been built about 25 km from the town of Ladysmith, itself an industrial development point. Whether the industrial expansion that is planned for this area will take off is not, at this stage, certain. In March 1980 the outgoing President of the Ladysmith Chamber of Commerce described the industrial park of Danskraal, on the edge of Ladysmith, as 'under-utilised' and described how for years they had been pleading with their 'public representatives' to 'go out and find industrialists' to occupy it. (Natal Witness, 14.03.80) The Ladysmith region has to compete with the far more dynamic mining and industrial centre of Newcastle 100 km to the north; compared to many of the other non-metropolitan development points designated for Natal/KwaZulu in the April 1982 plan, however, it is relatively well-favoured.

One of the points in its favour that the Ladysmith Chamber of Commerce and the Town Council tout is the large labour force that has been located at Ezakheni. Because Ezakheni is a border area, industrial wages have not been governed by minimum wage legislation. Factory wages starting as low as R7,50 per week for women and R12 per week for men were reported to SPP in 1980. (Fieldwork) An industrial promotions supplement to the Natal Witness in October 1981 put it thus:

The Ladysmith to Colenso development area in the Tugela Basin, including the Ezakheni Black border area, is one of the most important complexes in Natal, one of the main reasons being that Ezakheni provides a vital labour pool for industry. (Natal Witness supplement, 26.10.81)

Thus Ezakheni, more self-consciously than any of the other rural relocation areas surveyed by SPP, was created as a dormitory township, to house and control Ladysmith's african labour force and their families within a nearby area of KwaZulu. As the SPP survey confirms, the bulk of the working population at Ezakheni work in the Ladysmith area, commuting the 25 km to work daily or sometimes weekly. Not only industrial interests were to be served by the creation of Ezakheni, however. Its establishment was also in response to the long history of agitation amongst farmers in the Klip River/Elandslaagte districts against the continued existence of the black spots in their area. In November 1980 the Ladysmith Gazette described Ezakheni as 'a starting point for a much larger residential and agricultural growth project' and noted:

Since the 1950s the farmers of the Klip River area have made available productive agricultural land for the purpose of extending the area of KwaZulu. This was done on the understanding that the land would be

used for the resettlement of the residents of the various black spots in a geographically consolidated area. (Ladysmith Gazette, 14.11.80)

By the process of creating this 'geographically consolidated area' the State destroyed a number of long standing african communities which were already well placed to house Ladysmith's labour force but were not inside KwaZulu.

ORIGINS OF EZAKHENI RESIDENTS

Ezakheni was built on Trust land acquired by the SADT in the early 1960s after initial opposition from the local Farmers Associations to the acquisition of more land in their district by the SADT. Removals into Ezakheni started in about 1972 and continued in waves throughout the 1970s. The following were the major communities to be re-located there:

- Vulandondo, itself a relocation settlement outside Ladysmith, established by 1963 for the people moved from the black spot Khumalosville; cleared in about 1972 to make way for a dam;
- Umbulwane tenants, moved from the threatened black spot on the edge of Ladysmith (within the municipal area) as 'illegal squatters' in successive batches in the 1970s;
- Rietkuil, a black spot near Ladysmith, in 1975/76;
- Roosboom, Good Hope, Welcome, all adjoining spots about 11 km from Ladysmith, in 1976; the total population moved from these 3 black spots and Rietkuil was, officially, 7 353; (Hansard, Question 537, 22.04.80)
- Criemen, a black spot about 15 km north of Ladysmith, in 1978; the total population moved from here was, officially, 2 856. (Ibid)

In addition large numbers of families moved or were moved to Ezakheni from the municipal township of Steadville in Ladysmith. The fate of Steadville is in the balance; under threat of deproclamation and relocation to Ezakheni for most of the 1970s, it has also been promised 99 year lease status in 1980. In the meantime there has been no building programme there and existing housing is extremely overcrowded. This has driven many former residents, particularly young married couples, to move out to try to find accommodation of their own elsewhere. Some of them have moved to Ezakheni, others to neighbouring black spots.

CONDITIONS AT EZAKHENI

Housing

From the start Ezakheni was divided into two clearly distinct sections. As one enters the township one encounters a large formal housing section. Here and there there are isolated fletcraft houses, but most of this section consists of row after row of standard four or five roomed township houses, each on a small plot. Beyond this section, further away from the main road, is a large site and service section. As Ezakheni has grown, this has expanded in a series of geographically distinct units or wards. Here people are allocated plots, measuring 15 x 20 metres and serviced with individual flush toilets and taps, and are then expected to build their own permanent structures.

Although this section has been in existence for six years and more, many of its occupants are still living in the original temporary fletcraft huts allocated to them by the authorities when they were first relocated to Ezakheni. Of the 96 households interviewed by SPP in 1980, only 21 were living in permanent houses. The reason for this is that the local soil is unsuitable for wattle and daub

construction and most people have found they cannot afford to build with brick or concrete blocks. Inadequate housing is one of the major complaints of the people interviewed - 'We would like to live in houses, not in these tins' - and lack of progress towards this has engendered a widespread sense of despair and bitterness in the community. Many people interviewed by SPP felt they were doomed to spend the rest of their lives in tin huts.

In mid 1981 the housing crisis came to a head with reports that the central government was demanding the return of their fletcrafts. People feared they would be left homeless. It now appears that the KwaZulu government, in response to overtures from the Ezakheni Community Council, has arranged to buy building materials in bulk and make these cheaper products available for sale to local people, so that they will be better placed to build themselves permanent houses. (See Appendix 1)

Transport

Transport has been another problem area in Ezakheni. As a dormitory township Ezakheni was relatively well-supplied with a regular bus service to Ladysmith from the start. For many years, however, the only road to Ladysmith was a dirt one, pot-holed and corrugated from the heavy load of buses and trucks it carried daily. In addition the distance to be travelled (25 km) meant that bus fares, even subsidised, were high. As in other african townships, dissatisfaction with the high costs and discomforts of commuting became a focal point of organisation in Ezakheni. In 1979 a proposed price increase in the bus fares sparked off a spectacular, largely unexpected bus boycott which was unanimously supported by an estimated 9 500 commuters. (Echo, 21.05.81)

The boycott succeeded in staving off the price increase temporarily (but not permanently) and also rattled the complacency of white Ladysmith, suddenly confronted with a well organised, well motivated mass protest movement amongst its african population. The most tangible result to have come out of the boycott has been the construction of a top-quality tarred road between Ezakheni and Ladysmith, finally completed in early 1982.

Public amenities

Because of Ezakheni's border industry and commuter township status, it has received preferential treatment in the allocation of public facilities to it. It is in the a) category of relocation areas described in the 1967 BAD General Circular - a 'self-contained Bantu Town'. Thus it has a 'modern post office and tele-communications centre' (Natal Mercury, 8.02.78) - but very few telephones - a garage, 2 eating houses, 3 beerhalls, several general dealers, a bottlestore, 2 fulltime clinics, 1 resident doctor (for 50 000 people), a community hall and several schools, both primary and high. It also has recently acquired a Technical Institute, erected at a cost of R835 000 by Goldfields of South Africa and donated by them to KwaZulu in 1980, to 'contribute towards providing trained personnel for future industry in the area'. (Natal Witness supplement, 26.10.81)

Yet despite the existence of some of the trappings of urban life, Ezakheni is in no way a self-sufficient urban centre, nor is it a model township. There are very few openings for local employment - only 18 out of the 187 workers in the SPP sample (just under 10%) worked in Ezakheni itself and unemployment, as described in more detail further on, is high. The township is a displaced suburb of Ladysmith which is where most of its workers are employed and where most of the income they earn is spent. Facilities, though superior to those found in many other more rural relocation areas, are inadequate to service the needs of 50 000 people. Water shortages have recurred periodically. In 1977 4 000 people were without any water for three weeks because their reservoir had dried up (Natal Witness, 4.11.77); work only started on a new reservoir to ease the problem in 1980 (prompted, no doubt, by the memory of the recent bus boycott.) There is no electricity in the site and

service section, and residents are disturbed about the lack of street lighting which they feel encourages crime and violence.

Ezakheni has not developed in an organic fashion. Most of the people relocated into it have come from rural backgrounds and have had no previous experience of township life. Adapting to their alien surroundings has been a struggle and the strain of that adaptation is evident in the social fragmentation, the violence and the high crime rate in the township. Eliot Mngadi, currently the mayor of Ezakheni, describes the place as 'proper hell'.

People are crowded like sardines. Even worse, it's dark at night. No electricity. The result is that after dark you cannot just walk in the streets there. And, a part I don't understand, out of every ten people there, eight have guns. I know they don't have licences, but still they have guns. (Mngadi, 1981, 8. See Appendix 3)

THE SPP SURVEY

The SPP survey was undertaken in late 1980, in one ward of the site and service area. This ward, consisting of about 300 households, was established in 1976, primarily to absorb the influx of people removed from the black spot Roosboom. A total of 96 households was interviewed, the sample consisting of every third house in the ward. The sample does not, therefore, reflect the range of origins of the residents at Ezakheni, nor does it cover those living in the formal township section. It does, however, reflect the experience and effects of relocation into the township for one formerly small, and relatively cohesive, rural community.

2. The removal to Ezakheni

ORIGINS OF SURVEYED HOUSEHOLDS

Almost all the surveyed households came from a rural background. 78 of the 96 households in the sample had been moved to Ezakheni from the black spot, Roosboom. 7 had come from white farms and a further 5 came from reserve or Trust land. Only 5 households reported an urban background. Although their place of origin is not specified, it is likely the majority of these people moved to Ezakheni from Steadville Township, in Ladysmith.

Table 1, Ezakheni. ORIGINS OF HOUSEHOLDS

ORIGIN	NUMBER
Freehold land	78
White farms	7
Town	4
Tribal land	3
Trust land	2
City	1
Origin not stated	1
TOTAL	96

About half the households surveyed had lived twenty years or more at their previous place, and a further 19% had lived there between 11 and 20 years. For most households being relocated to Ezakheni meant tearing up long-established roots.

Table 2, Ezakheni. LENGTH OF TIME AT PREVIOUS PLACE

TIME (years)	HOUSEHOLDS
0 - 5	19
6 - 10	10
11 - 20	18
21 - 50	45
51 +	1
Not stated	3

For most households surveyed the removal to Ezakheni was a coerced one. At least 73 of them were brought to Ezakheni by GG truck. Three households reported they had moved to Ezakheni by themselves after having been evicted off white farms. Only fifteen households (none of them from Roosboom) reported they had moved to Ezakheni by choice - to what extent this was a choice conditioned by a lack of other alternatives or intolerable conditions in their former place (for instance overcrowding at Steadville or poor working conditions on white farms) is not clear. (Information on the remaining 5 households is not available.)

Table 3, Ezakheni. MANNER OF ARRIVAL OF HOUSEHOLDS

MANNER	NUMBER
Removed and transported by GG truck	73
Evicted and moved themselves	3
Moved of own accord	15
Manner not stated	5
TOTAL	96

CONDITIONS BEFORE REMOVAL

Before their removal agriculture played a significant part in the lives of the majority of households interviewed. 75 households had had access to arable land, 53 of them having had one field, 12 two fields, 9 three fields and 1 four fields. Maize, potatoes and beans were the most important crops. Stock ownership had been less widespread. 57 households had had access to grazing land but only 24 households reported having kept cattle; 14 had had goats; 8, sheep and 2, pigs. Most households (77) had kept poultry and reported having produced both meat and eggs as a result. In most households agricultural produce was consumed by the family only, but in 14 cases produce was sold. (Information on a further 14 households was not available.) The regularity and extent of this sale is not detailed.

Farming clearly played an important part in the lives of most households before they were moved to Ezakheni and their access to land was valued. Over half those interviewed by SPP (50 households) complained about the lack of land at Ezakheni - 'We are too overcrowded. I wish I could keep some stock and plough', said one. Many of the relocated households were trying to grow some produce at Ezakheni - 53 reported that they had developed vegetable gardens at their new places and 44 reported that they produced some food from this, but the scale and significance of this activity had been drastically curtailed. Nevertheless, very few if any of the households were making an independent living off the land beforehand. Wage employment rather than farming, was already the major source of household income. Only 11 households did not have any wage workers before the removal.

There was a total of 123 people in wage employment in the 96 households surveyed before

their removal. The great majority of workers - 87, or 71% - were working in the Ladysmith/Colenso area and were thus able to commute on a daily or weekly basis to work. Roosboom itself was only 11 km from Ladysmith and it seems a number of people used to walk to work - 'Who cannot walk 7 miles?' Eliot Mngadi has asked. (1981, 9) Only 17 out of the 124 workers were working outside of Natal, 16 of them in the Johannesburg area and 1 in Port Elizabeth. The rest were distributed across various Natal towns - Estcourt (2), Durban (5), Newcastle (2), the Underberg area (6), Cato Ridge (1) and Nkandla (1). (Information on locality of previous work is missing for 2 workers). Manufacturing and the service industry were the two most important areas of employment. Skill levels were very low with the great bulk of workers (92%) being unskilled.

Table 4, Ezakheni. EMPLOYMENT OF WORKERS BEFORE REMOVAL

INDUSTRY	WORKERS
Services	46
Manufacture	45
Transport	10
Construction	9
Trade	5
Electricity etc.	3
Agriculture	3
Finance	2
TOTAL	123

This information confirms that Roosboom, as a black spot, was not a source of fulltime agricultural labour for the surrounding white farms although it may have supplied farmers with casual labour (not recorded in the survey) from time to time.

The available evidence suggests that at the time of its removal Roosboom was developing into a kind of peri-urban suburb of Ladysmith. If allowed to remain, and if assisted with the development of a local infrastructure - water, a sewerage system etc. - it would probably, over time, have evolved into a fully fledged suburb but one with a strong rural flavour to it.

THE REMOVAL OF ROOSBOOM

The removal of Roosboom is well described by Eliot Mngadi in AFRA Special Report no. 2, 1981, which is reproduced as an appendix to this Chapter. It was the first of the Ladysmith black spots to be removed in the 1970s; local white farmers appear to have seen its removal as the most urgent one because of its strategic location on the main Durban/Johannesburg through road. In a revealing report on a meeting held in 1974 by local farmers, businessmen and the Member of Parliament to discuss the removal of Roosboom, NAUNLU records that 'Nelson Mandela addressed several meetings there in 1963'. (NAUNLU, 15.02.74. See Appendix 2)

The threat to Roosboom first surfaced in the 1960s but it was not till after Ezakheni had been established that it was moved. In 1960 the Local Health Commission brought Roosboom under its control and in 1965 houses were numbered. Residents were not allowed to build or improve on their houses without permission from the local authority. Since this was generally refused, living conditions at Roosboom began to deteriorate and this fostered a demoralising sense of impermanence and dissatisfaction within the community, particularly among the tenants. In 1975 landowners were served with expropriation notices and the removal of landowners and tenants followed shortly. By 1976 the community had been entirely destroyed, with little overt resistance. All that is left today, for those who know where to look, are some scattered trees demarcating former residential sites, bits and pieces of rubble and

some abandoned graveyards on the side of the Durban/Ladysmith road.

The rift between landowners and tenants, the deterioration in living standards over the previous fifteen years as well as widespread fear in the face of the power of the authorities were all factors working against strong and organised resistance. When asked in the SPP survey why they thought they had been removed, most of the Roosboom households (45) said they did not know. The rest gave answers which were remarkably similar to the views expressed by the white farmers and businessmen of Ladysmith in 1974 - because Roosboom was in a white area, because it was too near the main road and the houses were unsightly to passing motorists, because the land was wanted by industry and commerce and because the white farmers complained of theft.

COMPENSATION

50 of the 96 households interviewed reported that they had received compensation but most complained of its inadequacy. They reported that those who lived in wattle and daub houses were only compensated for the value of the roofing, not for the house as a whole. Eliot Mngadi has commented on the level of intimidation among the Roosboom community which held people back from challenging the compensation they were awarded. He was the only person to take the matter of his compensation to court and eventually, after more than a year, he was paid out, two and a half times what he had originally been offered. (Mngadi, 1981, 7) Nobody else was prepared to follow his example, however. Most were too scared to challenge the authorities in this way; furthermore, very few households could afford either the court action or the time they would have had to wait before being paid out. They needed whatever cash they could get to cope with the immediate costs of being moved and having to start again at Ezakheni.

ADAPTATION TO EZAKHENI

The people from Roosboom chose to go into the site and service section because they wanted to remain together, as a community, rather than be absorbed into the larger and more anonymous formal housing area, and also because they hoped to be able to replicate something of their former rural lifestyle. In fact, as already pointed out, the high cost of rebuilding at Ezakheni has resulted in a situation where only a minority had built themselves decent, permanent housing at the time of the survey and the adaptation to township living has been a painful and profoundly dislocating experience. Almost all the respondents felt there had been no improvement in conditions at Ezakheni since they had been moved there. Many view their former life at Roosboom with deep nostalgia. In his account of the removal of Roosboom, Eliot Mngadi put it thus:

At Roosboom I had planned for my old age - I am well over sixty - that I would just keep five cows and my own chickens. You know, when you have your own milk, your own chickens, what do you want? I get a visitor, I slaughter a chicken; a best friend, I slaughter a sheep. In winter I slaughter a beast for my children - because it's cold, the meat would not spoil quickly. That's the life I had planned for my old age. But now, in my old age, I have to start afresh. (Mngadi, 1981, 9)

In spite of the poor organisation when confronted with the threat of removal, Roosboom was a well-established and reasonably coherent community. To quote Mngadi again:

Now at Roosboom we were a Christian community. We had no hooligans, no criminals, no people interfering with the stock of their white neighbours. At Roosboom you could walk safely both day and night without anybody interfering with you. (Mngadi, 1981, 8)

This way of life has been destroyed and the new situation into which people have been

thrust is regarded by most of those interviewed by SPP with extreme distrust and negativity. The SPP fieldworker noted in her report:

They have been at Ezakheni for five years, but very few have managed to build their own homes. Problems are numerous, ranging from people being too old to start a new life to the present stress of the high cost of living which presses this community further down into misery and poverty. The effects of such a life are disruptive. (SPP field report)

The most commonly cited problems, repeated again and again in different forms by almost all the respondents in the sample, centred on 1) the high cost of living, with transport and rent the main issues involved, 2) the lack of agricultural land, and the dense pattern of settlement, and 3) inadequate housing. 'We would like to live in houses because it is as if we are living outside', said one. Another respondent, a woman, linked the high cost of living to their poor living conditions very explicitly: 'My husband doesn't earn enough - the bus fare, the rent, food takes the whole salary and we won't be able to build a house.' After these three issues the high level of crime and violence and unemployment were the other major problems listed by respondents. Ezakheni has in fact been located on the edge of a part of Msinga that is notorious for its factional violence and this sometimes spills over into the township itself. Residents also complain of the violence within the township. 'It is difficult to go to shop because of tsotsis', commented one person.

Other problems noted less frequently were the great distance to a clinic, to shops, the inadequacy of the water supply, the lack of a secondary school and creche facilities, the lack of a telephone, the unhelpful attitude of the local authorities and police, the problems caused by the beer halls and alcohol, the difficulty in obtaining fuel, poor pension administration and the lack of public facilities such as churches and community halls.

The information on organisations to which people belonged is not detailed and it is possible that the variety and degree of voluntary associations to which people belong in Ezakheni was not recorded. By far the most important type of organisation mentioned was various Burial societies - 23 households reported membership in these. The next most important organisations were Church Guilds (for 8 households). Inkatha and women's organisations were each mentioned three times only.

The bus boycott of 1979, in which some people from Roosboom played a leading part, has indicated the potential that exists for new forms of organisation to emerge amongst the displaced people of Ezakheni, in response to the pressures they experience; for such organisation to endure, however, it has to contend with powerful negative forces of alienation and a sense of impotence in the face of their problems within the township. About half those interviewed in the sample expected the Community Councillors and especially the Mayor to deal with their problems but many had no expectation of any help from outside sources and, even more pessimistically, about two thirds of those interviewed either felt there was nothing they could do themselves to change things or did not know what they could do. 'We don't know to whom we belong'; 'I don't know. KwaZulu government is supposed to help but they can't'. One respondent put it even more forcefully:

Who could help because we are here by force and all we said was not considered properly by GG so who could help? I don't see any person, unless he is involved in trouble.

In the absence of concrete action, many respondents spoke wishfully of what they would like to see happen - two wished they could get jobs, one that the rent would decrease, one that her husband could earn more money - or what they might do. One wanted to try to make money, another was considering selling his car so that he could get money to

build a house, three were thinking of moving to the formal housing section and seven spoke of leaving.

3. Demographic features

PRESENT POPULATION STRUCTURE

The Ezakheni sample is in a number of respects unusual when compared to the other re-location areas surveyed by SPP. The total population in the 96 households surveyed came to 636, of whom 36% (230) were children under the age of 14 - a lower proportion of children than that found in the other surveyed areas and considerably lower than the figure of almost 50% suggested by the Buthelezi Commission as the proportion of children under the age of 14 in KwaZulu as a whole. (Buthelezi Commission, vol. 1, 70) There is also a marked preponderance of females over males in the total sample (354 to 282 or 56% / 44%). This imbalance is present to a greater or lesser extent in all the age cohorts so it cannot be explained in terms of a high degree of male absenteeism from Ezakheni. Finally, there is a relatively low proportion of migrants in the total population compared to the three other rural relocation areas surveyed (Sahlumbe, Mzimhlophe, Compensation). Whereas migrants account for only 10% of the total population at Ezakheni, they account for 20% at Sahlumbe, 16% at Mzimhlophe and (less dramatically divergent) 12% at Compensation. This can be accounted for by the much higher level of commuter employment opportunities available to the people of Ezakheni compared to the other far more isolated and rural relocation points.

Table 5, Ezakheni. TOTAL POPULATION BY SEX, AGE AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

RESIDENTIAL STATUS	AGE	MALE	FEMALE	T
Permanent	0 - 14	100	123	223
	15+	72	142	214
	Age ns	2	0	2
		174	265	439
Commuter	0 - 14	1	1	2
	15+	62	50	112
	Age ns	0	2	2
		63	53	116
Migrant	0 - 14	0	1	1
	15+	38	25	63
		38	26	64
Residence ns	0 - 14	0	4	4
	15+	7	6	13
		7	10	17
TOTAL		282	354	636

The sexual imbalance in the total population already noted works against the relatively

low level of migrancy in the sample to produce a masculinity rate within the permanent and commuter population that is comparable to the other areas surveyed and lower than one would expect given the employment opportunities in the Ladysmith area. Amongst permanent residents the masculinity rate is 65,6; amongst permanent and commuter residents it rises slightly to 74,5.

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

The average number of people in the 96 households surveyed was 6,6 but there was considerable range in the actual sizes of each of the households surveyed. There were 4 single member and 6 two member households. The majority - 56 or 58% - had between 4 and 8 members (both resident and migrant) and a substantial minority - 18 out of the 96 households - were very large households with 10 or more members each. (Two of these 18 had 15 members each.) Apart from the 10 single and two member households, households were divided fairly equally between nuclear on the one hand and extended and compound households on the other. 43 were nuclear, 39 were extended and 5 were compound. It seems therefore that at Ezakheni despite the pressures of small plots and single dwelling housing units many families have tried to hold on to more traditional, non-nuclear types of households.

Table 6, Ezakheni. HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND HOUSEHOLD SIZE

HOUSEHOLD TYPE	HOUSEHOLDS		MEMBERS PER HOUSEHOLD
	NUMBER	NUMBER	
Solitary	5		1
No family	6		2
Nuclear	43	29	3 - 5
Extended	39	36	6 - 9
Compound	3	18	10 - 15

Most of the households surveyed (62) had male household heads but just over 30% of the total (30) had female heads - this refers to the formally recognised heads not to de facto and/or acting. Proportionately, more of the female household heads whose ages are given are 45 years old or older than among the male household heads.

Table 7, Ezakheni. HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY AGE AND SEX

AGE	MALE	FEMALE	SEX ns	TOTAL
15 - 24	0	0	1	1
25 - 34	13	4	1	18
35 - 44	14	7	0	21
45 - 64	26	13	0	39
Other	9	6	2	17
TOTAL	62	30	4	96

EDUCATION

Education levels were low but not as low as in some rural communities. Only 15 people in the entire sample had a Std 9 or higher level of education; 22% however either had had or were receiving lower secondary education. Of the 163 people with no formal education, 97 were six years and under, leaving a total of 66 people of school-going age or older with no formal education - 12% of the total population 7 years and older. In the sample there was no apparent bias against female education - if anything females as a group were more and better educated, even if the preponderance of females

in the total population is taken into account. Thus 10 of the 15 people with Std 9 or higher education were female.

Table 8, Ezakheni. EDUCATION BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

EDUCATION	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			RES. ns			T
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
None	63	78	141	7	5	12	4	2	6	1	3	4	163
Lower Primary	45	62	107	16	7	23	6	6	12	3	1	4	146
Higher Primary	36	67	103	20	19	39	16	8	24	3	2	5	171
Lower Primary	27	50	77	19	21	40	11	9	20	0	4	4	141
Std 9 +	3	8	11	1	1	2	1	1	2	-	-	-	15
TOTAL	174	265	439	63	53	116	38	26	64	7	10	17	636

Table 9, Ezakheni. EDUCATION IN THE 7+ AGE GROUP, BY SEX

EDUCATION	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
None	33	31	64
Lower Primary	70	75	145
Higher Primary	74	96	170
Lower Secondary	57	83	140
Std 9+	5	10	15
TOTAL	239	295	534

4. Economic activity

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

There are several striking and inter-related features about economic activity in the Ezakheni sample which set it somewhat apart from the other rural relocation areas studied. Firstly, the level of participation in the formal wage sector is relatively high. The economically active group at Ezakheni (which includes both the employed and the unemployed) amounts to 37% of the total sample, compared to only 24% at Compensation, 25% at Sahlumbe and 30% at Mzimhlope. Within this group, however, the unemployment rate, particularly for women, is also high. The overall rate is 21% (15% for men and 27,9% for women).

Secondly, there is a marked preponderance of commuter over migrant workers. 59% of the total employed population are commuters, most of them working in Ladysmith, a further 10% are permanently resident (i.e. they live and work in Ezakheni itself) and only 30% are migrants. (Residence status of 1% of the employed is not given.) Migrant labour clearly plays a significant part in the economic life of the community, but it is less crucial to the survival of the community as a whole than in many other bantustan communities.

Thirdly, the proportion of women in the economically active population is high. 47% of the economically active and 43% of the employed population groups are women. Most of them - 71% of the total women workers - are employed at Ezakheni or within commuting distance from it.

Table 10, Ezakheni. ECONOMIC STATUS AND SEX OF THE POPULATION

ECONOMIC STATUS	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Not economically active	151	234	385
Employed	107	80	187
Unemployed	19	31	50
Status not stated	5	9	14
TOTAL	282	354	636

Table 11, Ezakheni. RESIDENTIAL STATUS OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE (EMPLOYED + UNEMPLOYED) POPULATION

RESIDENTIAL STATUS	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Permanent	26	36	63
Commuter	61	49	110
Migrant	34	23	57
Residence not stated	5	2	7
TOTAL	126	111	237

These features of wage employment in the Ezakheni sample can be related directly to its location as a labour reservoir for the border industrial area of Ladysmith. This has meant there are far greater local wage employment opportunities available for the population in general and women in particular, compared to most other rural relocation points. While in this respect Ezakheni is advantaged by comparison to these other places, wage and working conditions in the Ladysmith area are very poor: a major part of the attraction for industry in such an area is the cheap labour force at hand, especially that provided by female workers. A number of the industries that have established themselves at Ladysmith are textile or related concerns which traditionally draw on female workers and pay them extremely low wages.

At the same time, the existence of local employment opportunities has encouraged a far higher expectation of local work opportunities within the community, amongst both men and women. This helps explain the much higher proportion of people (and, again, of women in particular) who are without jobs but actively looking for work and, thus, the high unemployment rate. At Sahlumbe many adults have dropped out of the job market altogether, because they rate their chances of getting a job so much lower than the unemployed at Ezakheni. Of the 63 people in the economically active category who were known to be permanently resident in the Ezakheni sample, most were unemployed - 18 were employed, 45 unemployed and the unemployment rate for this subsection of the economically active group was therefore 71%. Of note is that unemployment is confined spatially to Ezakheni - there are no commuters and only one migrant who are classified as unemployed.

Table 12, Ezakheni. EMPLOYMENT / UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, BY RESIDENTIAL STATUS AND SEX

ECONOMIC STATUS	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			RES. ns		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Employed	10	8	18	61	49	110	34	22	56	2	1	3
Unemployed	16	29	45	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	1	4
TOTAL	26	37	63	61	49	110	34	23	57	5	2	7
Unemployment rate	61	78	71	0	0	0	0	4	2			

TYPES OF WORK

There is a degree of continuity between employment before and after the removal to Ezakheni. At Ezakheni as at Roosboom before it, by far the two most important spheres of employment for the households interviewed were the service and manufacturing industries. Together these employed 142 of the 187 workers in the sample. Interestingly, while the majority of manufacturing workers were commuters, a large proportion of the service workers, mostly female, were migrants. Employment in Primary industry was virtually non-existent - in the sample there was nobody in agriculture and only 1 male in mining.

In Ezakheni the labour bureaux system plays a large part in controlling access to employment. Only 5 workers, all in service, reported finding their jobs by themselves, 1 through the network of family and friends and 1 through a recruiting agent. 77, however, reported finding their job through the labour bureaux and a further 74 directly through their employer. (Details on 29 workers were not available.)

Table 13, Ezakheni. EMPLOYMENT BY SEX, INDUSTRY AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

INDUSTRY	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			RESIDENCE ns			TOTAL		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Mining	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	1	-	-	-	1	0	1
Manufacturing	6	4	10	22	24	46	8	2	10	1	1	2	37	31	68
Electricity etc.	-	-	-	4	0	4	2	0	2	-	-	-	6	0	6
Construction	-	-	-	5	0	5	2	0	2	1	0	1	8	0	8
Trade	0	1	1	4	1	5	1	0	1	-	-	-	5	2	7
Transport	0	1	1	13	1	14	6	0	6	-	-	-	19	2	21
Service	3	1	4	13	23	36	14	20	34	-	-	-	30	44	74
Industry ns	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2
TOTAL	10	8	18	61	49	110	34	22	56	2	1	3	107	80	187

The great majority of workers were unskilled, with only 4 professionals (all men), 2 sales workers, 2 skilled workers and 4 semi-skilled. 170 out of the 187 workers (91%) were unskilled, with a further 2 classified as service workers.

Table 14, Ezakheni. OCCUPATION LEVEL BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

OCCUPATION	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			RESIDENCE ns			TOTAL
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
Professional	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	3	-	-	-	4
Sales	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	-	-	-	2
Service	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	-	-	-	2
Skilled	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	-	-	-	2
Semi-skilled	0	0	0	2	0	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	4
Unskilled	7	7	14	55	47	102	31	21	52	1	1	2	170
Occupation ns	1	1	2	1	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
TOTAL	18			110			56			3			187

DIET

Compared to many other relocation areas, Ezakheni has material advantages. There are no details on wages earned and information on remittances is unsatisfactory, but an indirect indication of comparative income levels is supplied by the information obtained on diet. Compared to other rural relocation areas surveyed, the Ezakheni sample presents a picture of a more nutritious and more varied diet, on average, pointing to

a higher standard of living, on average. Nutrition standards are still very low and some individual households reveal as poor a diet as some of the most disadvantaged in the very isolated areas studied. Overall, however, the standard of diet is higher and some households eat reasonably well. While maize is still the daily staple, about two thirds of the sample reported eating greens every second day; a little over three quarters reported having milk daily and just under half ate eggs at least twice a week. Furthermore 5 households reported eating meat daily and a further 24 said they ate meat every other day, while 10 households reported eating cheese daily - a luxury unheard of in the other rural areas studied. (35 households however said they ate it less than once a month.)

CONCLUSION

As a relocation area Ezakheni is clearly in a different class from the other rural areas studied; its more favourable location on the boundary of KwaZulu and Natal and the material advantages that has made possible for its residents are indicative of a process of economic stratification that is taking place within the bantustan between commuter and non-commuter areas. Yet the economic advantages people at Ezakheni experience are 'advantages' only by comparison with the devastating disadvantages areas further removed from the urban-industrial centres experience. Furthermore, the political and social disadvantages the people of Ezakheni have suffered as a result of their forced relocation to this township and their perceptions of them do not differ substantially from those described in the other areas studied.

That is why I say : you people who are still at your own places, stay there! Sit tight! (Mngadi, 1981, 9)

Homes plan in township

RESIDENTS of Ezakheni near Ladysmith will soon be able to build their own houses following a decision by the KwaZulu Government to provide them with building material.

Dr Frank Mdalose, KwaZulu's Minister for Interior, has announced that building material would be supplied to would-be builders once they had bought sites in the township.

However, the cash for the building material, which would be initially paid for by the KwaZulu Government, would have to be refunded by the applicants over a period of 40 months.

Residents would have a choice of drawing their plans or choosing those provided by the KwaZulu Government.

Privately drawn plans, however, would first have to be approved before the houses are constructed, the Minister said.

Mr R P M Shezi, assistant manager of Ezakheni, said the KwaZulu Department of Works would supervise the construction of the houses which would be built by private builders.

He said the smallest site in the township sold at R52,80. Plans already drawn by the Department of Works were for two or five-room houses. There were no plans for four-roomed houses.

Mr Shezi pointed out that, although the scheme was attractive, he feared it would not be feasible for many, especially the poor. There was also a long delay by Pretoria in issuing the title deeds which meant applicants would wait a long time before starting to build houses.

Before the title deeds were issued it was necessary to get approval from his office, then KwaZulu's Ministries of Interior and Justice and, finally, the Department of Corporation and Development in Pretoria.

Most of the residents of Ezakheni were removed by Pretoria from Rosboom, Mbulwane and other areas. They were provided with tin houses at Ezakheni by the Central Government as a temporary measure until they built their own houses.

But for the past five years they have not been able to erect their houses because of financial problems.

Roosboom Must Go — Ladysmith Farmers Association

ROOSBOOM, the "Black Spot" just south of Ladysmith, should be given top priority in the Government re-settlement programme, says Mr. B. J. de Lange, Vice-President of the Ladysmith and District Farmers' Association. Mr. de Lange and Mr. Thys Wessels were the Association's delegates at a recent meeting of an ad hoc committee formed by Mr. V. A. Volker, M.P. for Klip River, so that farmers and representatives from commerce and industry could discuss the clearing of Black Spots, African housing, and other matters with top government officials.

At this meeting representatives from six farmers' associations in the Klip River and Bergville districts voted that Roosboom should head the priority list.

REASONS

The Ladysmith Association believes that:—

● "Over and above the ordinary 'border farmer' problems such as fences, stray cattle, dogs, hunting, theft of grazing, minor thefts, soil erosion, stock theft, veld-fires, vindictiveness, stock poisoning, Roosboom is unique in having certain outstanding problems.

(a) It is the only "Black Spot" through which the Durban-Johannesburg National Road passes, with a very heavy recurrence of road accidents, which is a constant source of possible racial friction;

(b) it causes harmful injury to the image of Ladysmith-Colenso border industrial potential;

(c) it causes harmful injury to the image of South Africa in the eyes of overseas tourists;

(d) it provides a golden opportunity to hostile overseas journalists and photographers.

● In event of terrorism, this Black Spot lies on both sides of the Durban-Johannesburg national road, and is within easy reach of the main Durban railway line. (Nelson Mandela addressed several meetings there in 1963; during the eleven months before his imprisonment).

● Notwithstanding any political grounds, Roosboom in its present state, will have to be moved when

the Ladysmith-Colenso area is to be planned, because:—

(a) It is a permanent source of danger to health in Ladysmith;

(b) more than 50 known cases of crippling to stock have occurred on adjoining farms.

● The inhabitants have no ties to any tribe, and need not be resettled in one area.

● The properties are not situated systematically for the possible development of a township in its present form.

● Nearly all the labour is employed in Ladysmith, which, in event of re-settlement, would cause the minimum of dislocation.

● To a large extent the soil consists of the very erodible Estcourt type soil which causes silt problems in dams. The only solution would be the immediate withdrawal from uncontrolled intensive human occupation.

● Owing to the continual influx of squatters the re-settlement becomes more difficult by the day.

EZAKHENI

The association emphasises that the highest priority should be given to the provision of water and housing at Ezakheni, and other site-and-service areas for re-settlement, and we feel that the Department owes a debt of honour to the farming community of Ladysmith, considering the record of continued and full co-operation with the Department.

Appendix 3. The removal of Roosboom: E. Mngadi

This is an edited version of a talk given by Mr E. Mngadi, formerly a landowner at Roosboom, now a resident of Ezakheni, outside Ladysmith, at a meeting held in Ladysmith in May 1981. It has been published as an AFRA Special Report (2, 1981)

History of 'black spot' removals

I will start with a short history of how 'black spot' removals came about. Before 1913 Africans could buy land anywhere in South Africa and they were allowed to do so by law. But in 1913 the government of that day legislated a law known as the Natives Land Act. That Natives Land Act restricted blacks from buying land in South Africa unless we got the consent of the Governor-General - we did not have the State President then. After that an African could only get land from a white person with permission. One of the reasons whites had for selling their land was that it was unproductive and seeing that blacks had nowhere else to buy land, they of course would buy that land.

Then, in 1936, the law was amended and given a new name: it became the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. One of the things that law did was to give power to the authorities - the Governor-General with the Committee working with him - to declare certain black areas in Natal, certain farms, 'black spots'. They would say: "Alright, Matiwane's Kop, since it is surrounded by white farms, it's a black spot. Roosboom, surrounded by white farms - black spot". They wanted those areas to become all-white and so they planned to remove these farms. That's how then 'black spots' came into being. It was before they legislated the Group Areas Act which I will leave to the town people to discuss, since it affects them. What I am talking about are the laws affecting rural people. As a result of this 1936 law, in the whole of Natal 242 farms owned by blacks became 'black spots'.

Northern Natal African Land-owners Association

After the 1939 war, in about 1956, the government first started moving people from these 'black spots'. One of the farms they started with was Besters. At that time I was an organiser of the Liberal Party and I was also one of the landowners at Roosboom, near Ladysmith. It was during this time, as part of my work, that I had to organise the African landowners in Natal to form a body of their own. In 1955/56 we formed a body called Northern Natal African Landowners Ass. I don't know whether fortunately or unfortunately, but I was elected Secretary of that body.

The main function of that body was to help people resist these removals. We tried very hard at Besters, as some will remember, and I think it took 5 or 6 years before they were moved. Next was Besterspruit, out at Vryheid. We tried to help those people there, but then, of course, the Government steamrollered the whole thing and in 1963 the people were moved to Mondlo. The same with Kingsley, the same with Gardensville, Crane Valley, Kopij Alleen, Waagalles, Siwang Farm This last farm was owned by Mr Nyembe who was Vice-President of Chief Luthuli's ANC. Well, the process carried on and on, but what I want to talk about now is the removal at Roosboom, where I come from.

The Removal of Roosboom

The Coming of the Local Health Commission

At Roosboom something very funny went on. In 1960, when we already knew that we were going to be removed - I remember the date very well because I was in gaol because of the State of Emergency - the Local Health Commission from Pietermaritzburg came to Roosboom to introduce their thing of running our area. When we came out from gaol we felt, as leaders of Roosboom, that alright, let's allow this Local Health Commission to come in. At that time, we thought that it would help to entrench us in the area, because we knew that they would spend a lot of money sinking boreholes and so on. Which they did, and then we had water from taps, for which we paid a blanket rate of £1 - R2 today.

As you all know, when you have the Local Health Commission people in your area, you cannot build without a plan. At first that seemed OK and we were happy with that. Then, after about three or four years, they said we must not pay rates any longer but they still insisted that if one wanted to build, one must get a plan. Then, round about 1965, the same people, the Local Health Commission working in concert with government people, started numbering our houses.

At that time too, we were told that we could not extend our houses unless we had a plan, and if one went to get a plan from them, the plan was refused. Some landowners were annoyed about this and just started building without a plan - only to find that the officials of the Local Health Commission charged them. They were brought down here, in Ladysmith, and charged in a court of law. The Magistrate found them guilty and after one had lost the action here, one had to pay and one's house was demolished.

As a result of that people, both tenants and landowners, were frustrated. They couldn't extend their houses - no extensions. They couldn't build another house either. Then came a time when those Local Health Commission people said "Alright, if you want to build another house, you must accept the fact that on the day when you will be removed, you will not be paid a cent for it". You had to sign a form of that sort. Now, even with the cheapest house of wattle and daub, you cannot build for less than R500. And no black person can play with R500, can take a chance and not mind losing R500.

In 1973/74 we had very good rains and as a result of those good rains, houses started cracking - you know wattle and daub houses can't withstand heavy rains. People were glad for the rain, only to find that they could not repair their houses. There was no hope for them in the area with this Local Health Commission.

In fact, when I think of this Local Health Commission, it reminds me of what happens in a war. In a war, say English soldiers against German, if one side has a very strong hold, the general of the other side uses big guns in order to soften those people. They will just shoot them, for several hours, and only then will the infantry rush them because they will have been softened by the big guns. In just this way, my people were softened by this Local Health Commission.

Rift Between Landowners and Tenants

As a result of what happened, because of the Local Health Commission, a rift was caused between landowners and tenants. Seeing that the tenants had no stake in the land, as far as they were concerned it was now better to go than to stay at a place where they could not make extensions for their children. For them - the quicker they went, the better; the sooner they were removed, the better.

For the sake of those who are not clear about tenants, let me explain how that comes about. In fact, you will find that in any African-owned land there are more tenants than landowners. The reason is this: for instance, I am Mngadi and I own, let's say, 50 acres of land. I have my house and my fields, I plough the land and I keep a few cattle. Then along comes an evicted farm-worker. The farmer has given him a trekpass, his animals are in the pound, he has nowhere to go so he comes to me: "Please, brother, if you can just give me an acre at the corner of your farm. I'll just be there for 6 months until I can find another farmer to take me on".

Out of sympathy I do that. Instead of looking for an alternative farmer to take him on, this man goes to Johannesburg to work. With a job in Jo'burg, he realises that he no longer has his six months to worry about - because you know when you are a labour tenant you have to work six months of the year for the farmer. His children are getting a good education now ... and I have no way of kicking him out. This man is just there - and that's how these people get onto our farms. They are not invited to come on. A question of making business from them does not come into it at all. For instance the rent is only £3 a year - R6 a year.

This continues until you find yourself on this 50 acre farm with 20 tenants, each paying you R6 a year. You are not making any money out of them; they have deprived you of your land. You can't make a living there so in turn, you also go to Johannesburg to work.

That's why on any African-owned land there are more tenants than landowners. For instance, at a meeting I attended at Jononoskop last year, I was surprised to find that there are about 3 or 400 households in the area, but only 17 of them are landowners. When the government removes the people, they use this division. The authorities call a meeting without differentiating between tenants and landlords. They simply ask: "Are you happy here?" If the tenants have had trouble with their landlord: "No, no, we're not happy". "Alright, we've come to offer you a good farm elsewhere. Now, those who would like to go there, raise your hands". I've already explained, 300 against 17. The 17 landowners, since they don't want to leave their lands, won't raise their hands. But the rest - the majority - do and, in a democracy they say, majority rules. So then the authorities start to go ahead with the removals.

Removals Start at Roosboom

Coming back to Roosboom then, officials from Pretoria came to the area in early 1975. They used exactly the tactics I've already described. I've already told you too, that people were crowded, they could not build - in fact, they were ready to go. As one of the leaders there, I called a meeting. The attendance was very good - 600 attending a meeting in a place like that is very good. We discussed the issues thoroughly at that meeting, only to find that the majority of tenants told us: "No, you landlords can keep your land, we are going."

When the officials from Pretoria came again, I told them not to do a thing until I had had a chance to call a meeting of all the landowners to discuss this first - most of them were away working, in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Cape Town etc. Pretoria agreed to that. In the meantime I wrote letters to all the landowners. The next thing, before they had assembled, I saw trucks, GG trucks, coming into the area, to remove people.

I was nearly arrested then. I drove to town, to the Commissioner to demand to know what was happening. The chap just laughed at me; he said, "Mngadi, can you read?" He showed me a list - one, two, three, up to a hundred people who had applied them-

selves. To be removed! In fact, when I went to this office, I had made such a noise - kicked desks and whatnot - and if they had not respected me, I would have served a sentence for disturbing the peace. What was happening was that the trucks were only going to certain houses, not moving them all at that stage.

That is how hard it is to be a leader. Many people were really surprised and disappointed. They had expected resistance, especially where I was. I'd been involved in resisting removals at Besterspruit, Besters, Kingsley and all over, but when it came to my own area, nothing happened. As far as I'm concerned, we were softened by this Local Health Commission. People were charged, for instance Mr Kamani who was fined, and went back and built again, was charged again, his house destroyed, until he just had to give up.

Expropriation and Compensation

Trying to dig up information for this meeting, I came across these documents. This document is what we owned at Roosboom; it is what we called a 'Freehold Titledeed'. A proper thing - a Freehold Titledeed - and when our fathers bought the land, they were given these documents which gave them the right to own the place for ever and ever, amen. Now this other document is what the people at Roosboom got before they were removed, you must get one of these, a document of expropriation, in terms of the Expropriation Act. Even though people gave themselves up, nevertheless we did not want to be moved and the landowners had to be expropriated.

This expropriation document is where the authorities say what the value of your land and your house is. If you are a landowner, you have to be given one of these before they remove you. You people who have not yet been removed must come to me and see what these things are.

Take this notice of expropriation which I have in my hand. It is for Zebulon Thusi. He had two stands of half an acre each. The heading reads: "Notice of Expropriation under Section 13, Sub-Section 2 of the Bantu Trust and Land Act 1936, Act No. 18 of 1936." In this notice, for his two stands the government offered Thusi R220 as compensation which was not fair at all! For his house - R39! Now, what can you do with R39? Can you build another home anywhere with R39? I am showing you these documents so that you who are still on your land may die there. Never accept this rubbish!

In fact, nobody was happy with the compensation they got for either their land or their houses. In my case, I had a tea-room which I built in 1964. People here have seen my tea-room; they will agree it was a decent place. You know what I was offered for that tea-room? For the shop I was offered R1 680; for the toilet, R5 (we had an outside toilet); for the trees (we had good trees around the shop), R10; the place was fenced and for the fence I was offered R5. Gross compensation - for everything - R1 700. That is what I was expected to take. But to build a shop elsewhere, today, you need R20 000! I was making a decent living with my shop at Roosboom; but now, because of this removal, I would not be able to build another shop with the money they offered me.

I am coming now to something very important. I was not happy about this. Now, in terms of this same Expropriation law, there is a clause which gives one thirty days to say whether you accept the government offer of compensation or not. Here it reads: "You are hereby required to notify me, in writing, within thirty days from the date of notice, whether you accept the said amount of compensation". This part is so important, Mr Chairman. I told my people about this thing - that you have the right to say "I do not accept your offer". You are not breaking

the law. But people do not want to fight their own battles. They want somebody else to fight their battles for them. In this case each landowner himself had to write to Pretoria to say he did not accept the offer. But they were afraid to do so because then they each had to be an individual, acting on their own against the government, not through me. So they did not do so.

In my case, I wrote to Pretoria and I refused this R1 700. I wrote to them on the 22nd July 1976. At that time we had already been moved out to the resettlement place where I am living now, Ezakheni. It took them almost a year to reply. I got a reply from them on the 28th June 1977, having written on the 22nd July 1976. I had employed the service of an independent evaluator who did a good job and charged me only R9,50. On the strength of his evaluation I claimed R3 500. Then when Pretoria finally replied, they gave me even more money - they gave me R4 255,50!

There is much more I could say about this removal but I am happy to have at least told you about the compensation : that you people who are still to be moved will not get the value of your land. My experience is clear proof. This was robbery : to be offered first R1 700 and then for the same people to give me R4 255,50. It shows it was daybreak robbery.

What you must understand is that after you have received letters of compensation, if you are not satisfied with the compensation offered, you can fight your way through, with the help of lawyers and other interested people. It is important to know, however, that at this stage it is you who must take the initiative. You cannot wait for outside people to do it for you.

What I am trying to explain is that - you must fight removals where you are. I am happy that most people involved in removals in the Ladysmith area are here. The Matiwane's Kop people are doing just the right thing. Jonono's Kop and Thembalihle people should follow their example and not give in to being moved from your own places. You people who have not yet been moved must learn from us who have been moved, how bad it is. It is proper hell. So what type of a fool would you be, after knowing all this, to agree to move to such hell?

Conditions at Ezakheni

Before we were removed to this new place, Ezakheni, we were told that we would not be allowed to keep cattle, goats or sheep. So we were deprived of our cattle, when you know that as peasant farmers, you must have your cattle in order to get your milk and goats and sheep to slaughter for your children, particularly in winter. Then, we were not told the size of our new plots. We took for granted that they would be half acre stands as we had at Roosboom. When we got there, to our surprise, we found that we were given a stand of twenty metres by fifteen. Twenty metres this way, fifteen that - just like that, the size of your plot.

Then you found on this site a thing they call a fletcraft. It is a tin hut, twelve by twelve. Tin walls, tin roof. And they also gave you a tent, an ordinary tent. Well, you have a family, but whether ten, twenty or thirty people, you just have to crowd into that thing, twelve by twelve with all your belongings. In my case I had had two four-roomed houses at Roosboom - eight rooms. Now I had to squeeze everything I had had in the eight rooms into the fletcraft and the tent. Which was an impossible thing to do and the result was - I lost a lot of my things. Of course I was not the only one. Nearly everybody lost things.

The only good thing was that since this was a site and service place, there were services - a toilet (a flush toilet) and a tap on each plot. Unfortunately, though, in the beginning there were breakages in the pipe and sometimes we went for two weeks

without water. So how can you flush your toilet without water? (Though now the situation with water is better).

Another hardship is the rent. When we got there we had to pay a rent of R2,10 per month for the site and the fletcraft. At the end of 1978, the KwaZulu Minister of Interior, Dr Mdlaose, announced that they had decided to double the rent in the township part of Ezakheni. Where there are these four-roomed and five-roomed house, people were paying R7 so that became R14. In our case, we from Roosboom had chosen to go to the site and service, and in our case the rent rose from R5,10 to R8,07 - for this tin thing! That's what people are paying for that twelve by twelve fletcraft, toilet and water. Eight rand and seven cents!

I told you that the sites are twenty by fifteen. That means that people are crowded like sardines. Even worse, it's dark at night. No electricity. The result is that after dark you cannot just walk in the streets there. And, a part I don't understand, out of every ten people there, eight have guns. I know they don't have licences, but still they have guns. You can imagine. Now at Roosboom, we were a Christian Community. We had no hooligans, no criminals, no people interfering with the stock of their white neighbours. At Roosboom you could walk safely both day and night, without anybody interfering with you. But Ezakheni - in fact, I must leave this meeting before five o'clock to get home before it's dark.

I've already said that when my people came from Roosboom we chose to take up the site and service area. People chose that because they were told that they would be allowed to build their own houses with daga. We expected to do that, only to find when we got to Ezakheni that we could not build with wattle and daub there because the soil is clay. You cannot build with clay, so if you want to build at all, it has to be with cement. But the price of a cement pocket out at Ezakheni is R4,50. If you get it from town, here in Ladysmith, it is cheaper, about R4 but then transport from Ladysmith to Ezakheni will cost you not less than R9, whether for two pockets or ten. So it is very very expensive to put up a house there and that is why there are some people there who will never be in a position to build their own houses. They are still in these fletcrafts, after five years!

Transport at Ezakheni is very expensive. At Roosboom we were only 7 miles from Ladysmith, with good roads coming into town. At that other end, Ezakheni, we are about fifteen miles - twenty-five kilometres - away from Ladysmith. Because of this long distance transport is expensive, bus fares high. At Roosboom you could just walk to town: who cannot walk seven miles? But from that other end, you cannot walk twenty-five kilometres. Whether you like or not, you have to board a bus.

I am just pointing out a few things that are so bad there. I don't know how to word it, how to tell you how dissatisfied we are with that area. And yet as it is, we are stuck with it. That is why I would like to advise my friends who are still at their own 'black spot', not to leave those 'black spots' - even if they come to shoot you!

At Roosboom I had planned for my old age - I am well over sixty - that I would just keep five cows and my own chickens. You know, when you have your own milk, your own chickens, what do you want? I get a visitor, I slaughter a chicken. A best friend, I slaughter a sheep. In winter I slaughter a beast for my children - because it's cold, the meat would not spoil quickly. That is the life I had planned for my old age. But now, in my old age, I have to start afresh, at this new place where I have to be careful that small boys do not shoot me. So that is why I say : You people who are still at your own places, Stay there! Sit tight!

3. MZIMHLOPHE

1. Introduction

At the time of the SPP survey, in late 1980/early 1981, Mzimhlophe was a small closer settlement of about 100 households. It was first established in 1975, primarily to serve as a relocation point for some of the many thousands of labour tenants and other farmworkers being evicted in Northern Natal at the time. It is laid out on Trust land, on a steep, high hillside about 60 km north of Kranskop. Its name means 'white house'; the name derives from the shiny tin huts into which its present inhabitants were moved when first relocated there. The place is also known as Qudeni because of its proximity to the trading store/bus stop by that name but this is misleading since there are several distinct relocation sites scattered around the trading store, all loosely known as 'Qudeni'. Across the valley from Mzimhlophe lies Gubazi; behind it, closer to the store, is Singabantu, both of them relocation settlements.

One of the most striking features of the area is its isolation. The bus journey from Qudeni to Kranskop, the nearest and very small town, takes about three hours and when it rains the road to Kranskop becomes impassable. Because it is located on Trust land, Mzimhlophe is administered not from Nkandla, which is where the nearest KwaZulu magistrate's office is (about 40 km away), but from Vryheid, about 115 km away and accessible to most people only after an arduous, cross-country bus journey that involves several changes and many hours of travel. Another significant feature of the area is the tough climate. Mzimhlophe is located on the edge of a high plateau, between 1 200 and 1 500 metres above sea level. It is in the mist belt and because of the altitude and the exposed nature of the land, summers are cool, often misty, and winters bitterly cold.

This isolated and austere site has been earmarked for further relocation on a large scale, apparently in the near future. The Qudeni area, with its large expanse of State-controlled Trust land, has long been used as a relocation point. In the late 1960s large numbers of ex labour and cash tenants from the Weenen area were relocated into the southern band of Trust land, at Nkonisa and Ntingwe. In the mid 1970s the area round Qudeni store, including Mzimhlophe, became the new dumping ground. Later, in 1979, the Chief Commissioner for Natal told the Financial Mail that they were looking for a further two new relocation sites at Qudeni. (Financial Mail, 6.04.79) Then in early 1981 a temporary government site office was erected on one edge of Mzimhlophe and the local people informed that construction jobs, preparing sites for the next influx of people, would soon be available. For a couple of months anxious workseekers from Mzimhlophe kept guard over the office, waiting for the officials to return. They eventually gave up, disappointed. There were no major developments in 1981 although a small number of households continued to be brought into Mzimhlophe by officials periodically, on an individual basis, as had happened in the past: generally evictees from farms with nowhere else to go.

Now, however, in 1982 matters have begun to move again. By May of this year about 30 new households had been brought to Mzimhlophe, all of them by GG truck, and more fletcraft huts are presently being erected on the slopes behind the older section. In May 1982 well-placed but unofficial sources heard reports, emanating from government departments, that there are plans to move an additional 800 households into Mzimhlophe in the near future. At the time of writing, these plans have not yet

materialised on the ground, but the signs pointing to their implementation are there - the new, empty huts; official enquiries at the local hospital 7 km away, about clinic facilities and prospects for expansion; unexplained visits to the area by anonymous officials.

One of the reasons for this revival of official interest in the area must be the fact that Nondweni, 60 km to the north and for the last five years the major relocation centre in Northern Natal, has had to be temporarily closed to further relocation because of serious problems with its water supply.

The hospital staff at Nqutu, near Nondweni, have been lobbying for some time for such steps to be taken to prevent a major health crisis erupting there. Finally, in early 1982, with the cholera epidemic in Natal reaching alarming proportions, the authorities agreed to suspend removals to Nondweni. Instead of abandoning relocation, however, they have simply abandoned relocating people to Nondweni. They now appear to be diverting people who would have been sent to Nondweni before, to Qudeni instead - sending them further down the road to a place where facilities are far more rudimentary than at Nondweni, with neither a clinic nor a reticulated water system.

Where the reported 800 households are to come from is not, at this stage, known. Possible areas, areas already under threat, include the excised Reserve Four near Richards Bay, the excised former released lands near Paulpietersburg and the relocation site of Bulwer Trust Farm near Stanger (which is likely to be moved to make way for a dam on the Lower Tugela). If the figure of 800 is correct it will mean a massive increase in the population - eight times the present number of people will then be struggling to build a living (and a community) at Mzimhlophe. The effect on those already living there will be no less convulsive than on those who are still to be forced to move there.

THE SURVEY

The SPP survey was undertaken in December 1980 and January 1981. At that time Mzimhlophe consisted of about 100 households, of which 97 were interviewed - almost a blanket survey. Subsequently however, as already noted, the population has increased. In June 1981 the Mzimhlophe committee estimated the population to be 118 households (Report from Qudeni, 1981, 3; see Appendix 1) and since then about another 30 households have been relocated there.⁺ Very limited fieldwork among these newcomers indicates that most of them have come from similar backgrounds to those interviewed by SPP before, mainly from white farms. One can reasonably extend the general conclusions that emerge from the SPP survey to their situation as well.

2. Removals to Mzimhlophe

ORIGINS

The people living at Mzimhlophe at the time of the survey came from a number of different areas in Northern Natal, their dates of arrival stretching over a period of five or six years. Thus the history of their removal is not a single one. Mzimhlophe was established primarily to take ex-labour tenants and other farm people

⁺ Speaking in Parliament in September 1981, Dr Koornhof put the population for the relocation area of Qudeni at 4 400; this is far larger than that at Mzimhlophe and must refer to all the various relocation sites scattered across the general area. (Hansard, Question 212, 14.09.81)

from the Dannhauser and Louwsburg areas in the aftermath of the abolition of labour tenancy in those areas. 79 out of the 97 households interviewed by SPP had come there after being evicted off white farms since 1975; a further 10 had been tenants on black spots (unfortunately not identified) which had been cleared in the Dannhauser area, 7 had come from other Trust or reserve land and only one had moved there from an urban area. Of those moved in since the survey, most appear to have come off white farms as well - including a group of about 15 households in late 1981 who were evicted off a farm owned by a mining company near Louwsburg where they had been living as cash (not labour) tenants. (For a case study of a widowed woman relocated to Mzimhlophe in 1981, see Appendix 2.)

The first group to be relocated to Mzimhlophe, numbering 14 households, arrived in 1975 from a number of different places - Louwsburg, Vryheid, Muden and Dannhauser. The largest single group - 33 households - arrived in 1976, over half of them from the Dannhauser district, the rest from Louwsburg, Vryheid and Babanango. A further 27 households arrived in 1977, from the same general areas; thereafter the number of removals into Mzimhlophe fell to 12 households in 1978 and only four in 1979, before rising slightly to 7 in 1980. The Dannhauser and Louwsburg districts were the two most common points of origin for all residents. Babanango, Vryheid, Dundee, Muden/Greytown and the Trust lands around Qudeni all supplied smaller contingents while a couple of households came from the Nqutu and Ladysmith districts (including one household that had been tenants at Umbulwane).

81% of the households interviewed reported that they came to Mzimhlophe because they had been evicted from their previous place. 60% of the total sample were brought there by GG truck and the other 21% came to Mzimhlophe by themselves after having been evicted: presumably because they had had no other alternative. The remaining 19% of households chose to move to Mzimhlophe without the direct coercion of eviction or removal. Unfortunately their motivation for doing so was not probed in the survey. 7 of this group came from tribal land, 4 from black spots and 7 from white farms.

Those relocated at Mzimhlophe did not reveal as high a level of residential stability at their previous place as in the other rural areas surveyed by SPP. Over half the households interviewed had lived at their previous place for less than 10 years, while only 6 had been there for many generations. This suggests that a number of households had been evicted or had had to move at least once already before their final relocation to Mzimhlophe. Since the majority of households were from white farms, it seems many of the farm people had been moving between white farms within the districts where they had been living beforehand.

Table 1, Mzimhlophe. LENGTH OF TIME AT PREVIOUS PLACE

YEARS	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
0 - 5	25
6 - 10	29
11 - 20	14
21 - 50	17
51 +	6
Not stated	6

CONDITIONS ON WHITE FARMS BEFORE REMOVAL

A small number of those moved off white farms (about 6%) had been rent-paying tenants - evidence of the continued existence of this form of african occupation of land outside the reserves until the present day, despite decades of official attempts to eradicate it. Most households however, had been supplying workers to

the white farmers on whose land they had been living. Although only about one third of these (28 households) had been labour tenants in the classic sense - working for the farmer for six months of the year for a nominal wage, in return for access to land - very few were working for cash wages and it appears that many of the farmworkers were in fact involved in a modified and more onerous form of 12 month labour tenancy. 52 households reported that they had had registered contracts with their farmer, but at least 23 households had not. (Information on the remainder was not available.)

The 42 households engaged in fulltime farmwork supplied a total of 88 workers to the farmer (just over 2 per household, on average); hardly any received cash wages or even rations - the total wages earned averaged out to 85 cents plus 3,8 kg of mealie meal a month per worker. The only real advantage accruing to these workers was access to land. Almost all of the households evicted off white farms (63 out of 70 for whom this information is available) had had some grazing rights and land for ploughing at their previous place, the number of fields ranging from 1 to 4. Subsistence agriculture played a central part in their lives and the loss of their land has been the most resented and difficult adjustment that people at Mzimhlophe have had to make.

The loss of land because of eviction affected not only the former farm residents but nearly all the households from rural backgrounds as well. Thus 86% of all the households interviewed had kept some cattle beforehand, 78% had kept goats, 25% - a quarter - had kept sheep, 16% had kept horses and 12% had kept pigs while almost everybody had owned poultry. In addition, 90% had grown maize, a little over 70% had grown sorghum and potatoes and over 50% had grown beans as well. A small number of households - 13% - reported 'some' sale of produce at their previous place.

PREVIOUS WAGE EMPLOYMENT

Information on previous wage employment, outside of agriculture, is not detailed nor is it necessarily complete. According to the answers obtained in the survey, there was a total of 51 wage workers distributed across the 97 households in employment in fields other than agriculture before they were relocated. All of them were unskilled, with the service industry, followed by manufacturing the two most important areas of work. A small number (5) worked in the mining industry, most probably on the coal mines of Northern Natal. Johannesburg was the most common destination of workers, being the place of previous employment for 20 out of the 51 in the sample. A little over 60% of all the workers went as migrants to jobs in the Transvaal. Most of the remainder worked in various centres in Northern Natal (most frequently Newcastle and Hlobane), with 4 out of the 51 travelling to the Durban area.

THE REMOVAL

The circumstances surrounding the removal of the farmworkers in the Louwsburg, Greytown, Dannhauser and Babanango districts are described in the 'Report from Qudeni' appended to the end of this chapter. A variety of factors were at work but overall the majority of these evictions could be broadly ascribed to the phasing out of labour tenancy and the move by farmers towards having a smaller resident labour force on their farms. A couple of households reported that they were evicted because junior members were not willing to work for the farmer any longer. One man from Dannhauser said he and several other households on the farm had been evicted after the authorities had ordered the farmer to register his workers in about 1974 (which was when the newly created Administration Boards had started to administer farm labour registrations). The farmer refused and when told he would have to, he evicted numbers of his workers instead.

It seems that by the mid 1970s the old labour tenant system had already undergone certain cosmetic changes in Northern Natal as a result of the pressures being applied

by the State over the previous twenty years on farmers who were unwilling to move over to a fulltime wage labour system by themselves : hence the number of households in the SPP sample who were working a 12 month stint (for no pay) and who had been evicted off other farms previously as well. After 1974 no new labour tenant contracts were allowed to be registered in Natal but those registered before 1970 were allowed to continue. The relocation of farm people to Mzimhlophe in the mid and late 1970s came after this and represented a further and more fundamental shift away from labour tenancy in Northern Natal.

Most of the ex-farm households at Mzimhlophe saw the reason for their eviction in very personal terms - 'The farmer did not want us' - and do not appear to have been at all aware of the State's role in the abolition of labour tenancy. This helps explain why many of them, as outlined in the 'Report from Qudeni' appended to this chapter, appealed to the local magistrate/commissioner for help after they had been told to leave their land, apparently in the belief that he would redress their problems. In two instances groups also approached Ulundi for help, but without success. One of these groups, coming not from a white farm but from an expropriated black spot near Dannhauser, reported to the SPP fieldworker that the KwaZulu authorities had promised to buy their farm for them, but had failed to do so - an unlikely promise, in view of the legal and political barriers to such a purchase.

In at least two cases the removals were accompanied by a show of force on the part of the authorities. 'GG trucks arrived with soldiers, police and their dogs. They said they don't need any argument but have just come to move us to Qudeni', recalled the spokesperson for a group of households relocated from the Louwsburg district. (See Appendix 1) In the face of such overt coercion there was no further resistance to being moved once the various appeals to the local authorities had failed and people submitted to being loaded onto trucks with their belongings and removed to Mzimhlophe. In at least one instance people did not know where they were going to be sent until they arrived at Mzimhlophe.

COMPENSATION

The question on compensation was not fully answered. 83 households reported they did not receive any compensation and the remaining 14 households did not answer the question. The only group likely to have qualified for compensation would have been the 10 households moved from black spots. As tenants, if they had been compensated, it would have been for their previous dwellings only. A number of households also complained of damages to their goods in transit, for which they were not compensated either.

CONDITIONS AT MZIMHLOPHE

The situation awaiting people relocated to Mzimhlophe confirms that the more isolated the relocation area and the less publicity attending the removals, the more careless the authorities are about the preparations they make. The fact that most of the people relocated to Mzimhlophe had come from white farms was also a factor in the lack of preparations - a comparison of facilities provided at relocation points indicates that places catering mainly for ex-labour tenants are the worst provided for.

Mzimhlophe was established in 1975/76, seven years after the fuss about conditions at Limehill and five years after Cosmos Desmond's book The Discarded People created such a furor. Nevertheless, all that people were assured of receiving once they had been dumped at Mzimhlophe was a fletcraft hut. A little over half of those interviewed said they were given a temporary supply of fuel initially as well. Latrines were not provided for all - 45% of the households interviewed said they

were not given latrines when they arrived. There was no water supply - only an unprotected stream - and barely any roads into the settlement. There was no school - the nearest primary school was across the valley, the nearest high school was then out of the district. There was no clinic, nor mobile clinic facilities. (There is a hospital about 7 kilometres from Qudeni store, at Ekombe, but it is desperately understaffed, with only one or two doctors serving an enormous district. There is also a small clinic, with one resident sister, at a mission some kilometres away, but it too is understaffed and overextended.) The nearest shop and bus stop was at Qudeni store a couple of kilometres away.

The one advantage Mzimhlophe does enjoy over the other relocation sites is that the demarcated plots are somewhat larger than the standard, being about 60 metres square - although for the people put there, this did not seem an advantage, compared to what they had been used to before. Also, although there was an official prohibition on stock being taken to Mzimhlophe, it does not appear that this was enforced and relatively few households sold their stock prior to being relocated. Many brought stock with them and have been grazing it unofficially on the surrounding unfenced Trust land since then; a number have been prosecuted for this. Thus, although on a greatly reduced scale from what it was before, agricultural activity has not died out completely in Mzimhlophe. 90 out of the 97 households interviewed by SPP were producing some agricultural goods in 1980/81 - mainly from small vegetable gardens - and this has made a significant contribution to their wellbeing as described below. Lack of agricultural land has been one of the major complaints in the community and this has served as a focal point of organisation (also described below).

In the five or six years that have elapsed since the first group arrived the only improvements made to the community have come from the people relocated there themselves or private, outside support. After a few years the community managed to organise two rickety fletcraft huts as classrooms for a kindergarten school. At the time of the SPP survey there were 50 children in Sub-standards A and B being taught there by a single teacher in a tin building that had no floor or ceiling or proper windows, and no desks or chairs either. The teacher was being paid by Kwa-Zulu.

The water position has improved thanks to the initiative of a private building contractor who was concerned about the water difficulties experienced by one of his workers who lives at Mzimhlophe. He offered to help the community build a dam and pipe water to their houses at a cost of R35 per household. After some initial opposition within the community - some of the men did not want to spend the money and were quite content for their wives to continue collecting water, and some people felt they should be paid for their labour - this scheme was accepted and went ahead in 1981. By now (June 1982) most of the households have a tap on their plots. The attitude of the authorities - who claim publicly that clean water is always supplied before they relocate people - was initially extremely obstructive. The contractor was reported to officials in the Department of Cooperation and Development who accused him of trying to make money out of the project and ordered him to stop. At first they said they were going to put in water, later admitted that they did not have the money to do so and finally 'bent the rules' and allowed the work to continue subject to various conditions and permits.

In June 1982, in answer to questions raised in Parliament, Dr Koornhof admitted that 'no permanent water supply system has been installed by the Department of Cooperation and Development at Qudeni' but added that the Department is 'investigating the provision of a permanent water reticulation scheme'. (Hansard, Question 711, 11.06.82)

3. Demographic features

POPULATION STRUCTURE

In June 1981 the local committee at Mzimhlophe estimated the total population at 789 - 224 adults and 565 children. The total population in the 97 households surveyed by SPP came to 701, of whom 518 (74%) were permanent residents, 55 (8%) commuters and 115 (16%) migrants. The bulk of the migrants (84%) are, as one would expect, male but the bulk of the commuters are, perhaps unexpectedly, female. 38 out of the 54 commuters whose sex was stated were female. Most of them were employed on nearby (State-owned) forestry and formium plantations.

Table 2, Mzimhlophe. TOTAL POPULATION BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

RESIDENTIAL STATUS	MALE	FEMALE	SEX NS	TOTAL
Permanent	232	286	-	518
Commuter	16	38	1	55
Migrant	97	18	-	115
Never returns home	1	0	-	1
Residence not stated	4	8	-	12
TOTAL	350	350	1	701

In the composition of its population, Mzimhlophe exhibited the imbalances that have come to be regarded as standard, if not normal, in rural areas. The masculinity rate in the non-migrant population was low - 81 if only permanent residents were considered, dropping to 77 if the permanent and commuter populations were combined (the drop reflecting the relatively large number of female commuters). The data on the age distribution of the total population is incomplete since ages for 62 out of the total of 701 (32 male, 29 female and 1 whose sex was not stated) were not supplied. Using the reduced sample of 639, the sexual imbalance between men and women of working age was even more marked, most notably in the 25 - 34 age cohort, where the masculinity rate for the permanent and commuter populations combined was 17.

Table 3, Mzimhlophe. MASCULINITY RATES AMONG THE PERMANENT AND COMMUTER POPULATION OF WORKING AGE

AGE GROUP	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MASCULINITY RATE
15 - 24	39	60	99	65
25 - 34	7	42	49	17
35 - 44	9	20	29	45
45 - 64	18	37	55	49
TOTAL	73	159	232	46

Mzimhlophe also has a high child dependency rate. The percentage of children 14 years and younger in the total population for whom ages were given came to 43%. (Of these, just over half were boys.) However, in the combined permanent/commuter population, the percentage of children was higher, being 48,5%.

Table 4, Mzimhlophe. COMPARATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN AND ADULTS IN THE PERMANENT / COMMUTER AND TOTAL POPULATIONS

Note : 62 individuals for whom no ages were available are excluded from these calculations.

AGE GROUP	PERMANENT + COMMUTER NO.	%	TOTAL POPULATION NO.	%
0 - 14	274	48,5	277	43
15 +	290	51,5	362	57
TOTAL	564		639	

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

The average size of the 97 households surveyed came to 7,2 which is relatively large. Just under half of the households in the sample (49%) ranged in size between 5 members and 8 members, while a quarter of the sample were very large households with 10 or more members. The majority of households were nuclear but 31% were extended families and a further 5% were compound or extended-compound. There were 2 households consisting of a single member only.

The great majority of household heads were male, with females accounting for only 14% of the total. These women were on average older than their male counterparts. Whereas 50% of the male household heads for whom this information is available were between the ages of 25 and 45, only 27% of the female heads were, none of them being younger than 35.

Table 5, Mzimhlophe. HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY AGE AND SEX

AGE GROUP	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
25 - 34	16	-	16
35 - 44	18	3	21
45 - 64	34	8	42
Age not stated	16	2	18
TOTAL	84	13	97

EDUCATION

The level of education at Mzimhlophe is very low, with a high degree of adult illiteracy. At the time of the SPP survey there were only 3 people who had attained a Standard 9 or higher level of education and only 48 people who had reached secondary school. Excluding the 126 children of pre-school age and the 62 individuals for whom no age was given from the calculations, 154 out of the total of 507 individuals left in the sample had not been to school at all - 30%. The low level of functional literacy among adults has been a major handicap for organisation within the community, focusing dependence on the few members with writing and arithmetic skills who tend to dominate on the committees.

Table 6, Mzimhlophe. EDUCATION OF THE POPULATION 7 YEARS AND OLDER, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS⁺

EDUCATION LEVEL	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			RES NS			T
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
None	28	56	84	9	13	22	40	3	43	2	3	5	154
Lower Primary	77	87	164	3	11	14	31	10	41	1	1	2	221
Higher Primary	24	38	62	1	5	6	13	3	16	0	2	2	86
Lower Secondary	12	21	33	0	3	3	7	2	9	0	0	0	45
Std 9+	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	141	202	343	14	32	46	90	18	109	3	6	9	507

4. Economic activity

ECONOMIC STATUS

About 30% of the total population in the sample were economically active - 182 in wage employment and 27 unemployed. Almost all of those not economically active were permanent residents (462 out of 476) and mainly children under the age of 14 (266 out of the 419 for whom ages were available in the permanent population). Of the 153 adults not economically active in the permanent population, 107 (70%) were women, most of them presumably occupied with household chores. However 46 permanent adults who were not economically active were men. Most of them were in the 15 to 24 age group; while it is possible that a very small number of these young people were still at school, most of them would not have been, given the small number of people at Mzimhlophe, with a senior school education. 8 out of the 46 were in the 45 to 64 age group.

Thus at Mzimhlophe, as at the other rural areas surveyed, there is a sizeable group of adults of working age who are not directly involved in the formal wage economy and who appear to have given up the idea of even looking for a job.

Table 7, Mzimhlophe. ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE POPULATION, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

ECONOMIC STATUS	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT ⁺⁺			RES NS			T
	M	F	T	M	F	NS	M	F	T	M	F	T	
Not economical-ly active	206	256	462	1	1	1	2	1	3	2	6	8	476
Employed	6	9	15	15	37	-	96	17	113	1	1	2	182
Unemployed	14	13	27	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	27
Not stated	6	8	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	16
TOTAL	232	286	518	16	38	1	98	18	116	3	7	12	701

⁺ This table excludes the 62 people whose ages were not supplied. Many, if not all of these, were of school-going age however. Educational levels of the 62 were : None : 32; Lower Primary : 24; Higher Primary : 4; Std 9+ : 21.

⁺⁺ Includes one male migrant who is employed and still considered part of the household at Mzimhlophe but never returns home.

Table 8, Mzimhlophe. ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE PERMANENT POPULATION, BY SEX AND AGE

AGE	NOT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE			EMPLOYED			UNEMPLOYED			ECONOMIC STATUS NS
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
0 - 14	139	127	266	1	0	1	0	0	0	4
15 - 24	30	37	67	1	5	6	5	8	13	4
25 - 34	1	27	28	1	1	2	3	4	7	1
35 - 44	1	11	12	0	2	2	2	0	2	0
45 - 64	8	27	35	2	1	3	3	1	4	3
65+	6	5	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Age not stated	21	22	43	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
TOTAL	206	256	462	6	9	15	14	13	27	14

EMPLOYMENT

Of the 182 workers in the sample, most - 63% - were migrants. The largest group of migrants, 139, were going to Johannesburg (possibly a general designation for the entire Reef area) with the Newcastle/Hloboane area of Northern Natal the next most common destination (for 29 workers). A far smaller group of migrants travelled south to Durban (6 workers) and Pietermaritzburg (5 workers), with the remainder scattered through various small towns in Natal. Most of the working population were male but compared to the other rural relocation areas surveyed (Sahlumbe and Compensation), Mzimhlophe had a relatively large group of female workers - most of them commuters (37 out of 64) and most of these commuters employed in agriculture. About 15 kilometres from Mzimhlophe there is a large formium project, apparently run by one of the parastatal development corporations (either CED or KDC), while closer to the settlement are some wattle and other forestry plantations and a saw-mill (also, it appears, State-controlled). It seems that most of the women workers were being employed on these projects as unskilled agricultural labourers.

These jobs, though very poorly paid, are highly valued since apart from them there is very little local employment in the area. SPP was told that in 1979 a serious dispute broke out between residents of Mzimhlophe and residents of Ntingwe, the older relocation area to the south and closer to the formium fields, about who was entitled to work on the plantations. The dispute threatened to erupt into violence on occasion, with the Mzimhlophe people claiming that they should be given first option on jobs since, unlike those relocated to Ntingwe, they had not been allocated agricultural land. The tension only abated after the plantation management agreed to recruit workers from Mzimhlophe as well as Ntingwe. The incident illustrates graphically the serious social tensions that can be generated in the rural areas by competition between landless people over scarce resources.

Because of this source of local employment, agriculture was, overall, the most important area of employment for Mzimhlophe workers, employing 31% of them. It was followed by service (26%), manufacturing (15%) and mining (13%). For men, however, agriculture was not a major area of employment, ranking only fourth in order of importance after service, manufacturing and mining. Almost all the workers - 96% - were unskilled. In the total workforce there was only 1 professional (a female commuter, a teacher), 1 clerical worker (a male commuter), 1 skilled worker (a male migrant) and 1 semi-skilled worker (a male commuter). As with the other rural areas surveyed, Mzimhlophe workers entered the labour market at the lowest and most vulnerable level of employment, that of unskilled labourers.

Table 9, Mzimhlophe. EMPLOYMENT, BY INDUSTRY, RESIDENTIAL STATUS AND SEX

INDUSTRY	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			NEVER RETURNS/ MISSING			TOTAL
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
Agriculture	2	9	11	8	30	38	3	1	4	2	1	3	56
Manufacturing	1	-	1	-	1	1	23	2	25	-	-	-	27
Electric. etc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	8	-	-	-	8
Construction	-	-	-	3	1	4	8	-	8	-	-	-	12
Trade	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Transport	-	-	-	1	-	1	6	-	6	-	-	-	7
Service	1	-	1	2	5	7	26	12	38	-	-	-	46
Mining	1 ⁺	-	1	-	-	-	20	2	22	-	-	-	23
Industry ns	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
TOTAL	6	9	15	15	37	52	95	17	112	2	1	3	182

REMITTANCES

Information on remittances was incomplete but of the 177 workers for whom this information was available, 82,5% were reported to be remitting to their households regularly, 16,5% were reported to be remitting irregularly and only 1% (2 workers) never sent money home. Thus overall Mzimhlophe workers displayed a high level of responsibility towards their families. In view of the very heavy dependence of the community on outside wage employment for its survival, this is a very positive factor in its domestic economy.

UNEMPLOYMENT

The general unemployment rate at Mzimhlophe was 12,9% - 10,6% for the men and 16,9% for women. Although the female unemployment rate was higher for women than for men, as in all the areas surveyed by SPP, it was lower than at any of the other rural areas surveyed, including Ezakheni. The sisal and forestry plantations have provided limited local job opportunities for some women while the distance from urban centres has precluded other women from entering the job market in the hopes of finding work (as at Ezakheni, for instance).

Table 10, Mzimhlophe. UNEMPLOYMENT

	PERMANENT			TOTAL		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
Employed	6	9	15	118	64	182
Unemployed	14	13	27	14	13	27
Economically active	20	22	42	132	77	209
Unemployment rate	70%	59%	64%	10,6%	16,9%	12,9%

Overall, it seems clear that the relocation of these households to Mzimhlophe has forced a greater participation in and dependence on wage employment than was in operation before when most households had a more sizeable stake in agriculture. On the available information the number of workers in fulltime wage employment has increased substantially. Physical areas of employment as well as the sectors of the

⁺ Where this person could be working has not been identified and it is probably an incorrect return.

economy in which people worked were not altered substantially by the relocation, however.

OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME

Wage employment was overwhelmingly the most important source of income for the people of Mzimhlophe, but most households - 90 out of the 97 surveyed - were still managing to produce some agricultural goods out of their small gardens or illegal stock to supplement this. This was considerably higher than at the other rural areas surveyed by SPP. Most households, however - 91% - reported that they were producing less than they had before - 79% said that they had produced 'much more' before being relocated to Mzimhlophe, and a further 11% said they had produced 'more' before. (7 households said they produced the same as before and only 1 said it produced more.) Interest in agriculture is strong in the community and in late 1981 a development project, aiming to promote local food production, was started at Mzimhlophe. If successful, it may boost agricultural production in the future.

Apart from this, pensions and grants constituted an important source of income for a minority of households. 14 people were receiving old age pensions, 1 was drawing unemployment benefits and two were receiving disability grants at Mzimhlophe at the time of the SPP survey. There was little reported informal activity with only 8 households claiming that they were involved in such occupations.

DIET

The information on household diet at Mzimhlophe revealed that the average diet was nutritionally inadequate, with maize, bread, tea, coffee and sugar forming the staple foods. However, compared to Sahlumbe and Compensation, the other rural closer settlements surveyed, there was a significantly higher level of consumption of greens, milk and eggs, although Mzimhlophe did not reach the levels prevailing in Ezakheni. 64% of the households in the survey reported consuming milk daily (compared to Compensation, where only 11% drank milk daily and Sahlumbe where 70% drank milk less than once a week). The same number, 64%, also reported eating greens every other day (Compensation : 68% ate greens less than once a week; Sahlumbe : over half ate greens only once a week or less). Furthermore 23% of the households surveyed at Mzimhlophe reported consuming eggs once a week. (At both Compensation and Sahlumbe most households reported that they very rarely ate eggs, less than once a month.)

The difference in diet between Mzimhlophe on the one hand and Compensation and Sahlumbe on the other can be explained almost entirely by the fact that at Mzimhlophe residents are more easily able to cultivate vegetable gardens, albeit on a restricted scale. Their plots are large enough to make reasonably sized gardens feasible and many have been keeping cattle (illegally) on the open Trust land surrounding them. (Once this land gets used up for residential purposes, as more people are relocated into the area, these relative advantages will probably wither away.)

The availability of some local employment for women is a positive factor as well. The comparative data on diet at Ezakheni, Mzimhlophe, Compensation and Sahlumbe suggests strongly that what makes the difference between poor nutrition and really serious malnutrition in relocation areas is firstly, access to local wage employment and secondly, access to some land for gardens and for stock : precisely the two resources most often deliberately denied relocation settlements.

5. Organisation and attitudes

The benefits derived from gardens and stock at Mzimhlophe have to be understood in

very relative terms. For the majority of households at Mzimhlophe, who had had quite extensive agricultural land and grazing rights before they were relocated, the biggest and most onerous readjustment they have had to make has been to the loss of land. This was emphatically the major grievance to emerge from the survey and access to land the major improvement sought. Most of the food that is consumed now comes from outside the area and has to be paid for in hard cash. As one respondent put it, 'We are becoming poorer every day because we must buy everything'. Another put it more strongly: 'I am starving. Buying everything is not good. Also, where to buy is a problem'.

Apart from landlessness, the next most common complaints concerned lack of fuel and the poor water supply; since the time of the survey this last has, as already described, improved. People also perceived unemployment as a serious problem, coupled to the distance between Mzimhlophe and work centres and general difficulties with transport.

Overall the respondents had a pessimistic view about the future and the chances of any help coming from higher authorities. Over the years a number of different government officials coming from both Pretoria and Ulundi (including the KwaZulu Commission that was set up in 1978 to investigate the compensation paid to relocated people) have visited the settlement. Nothing positive has been seen to flow from their visits and officialdom is perceived locally as an anonymous, remote and unaccountable force. The perception that they have been forgotten is strong within Mzimhlophe. 'Helping us is a problem', said one. 'I don't think anyone cares about us'.

ORGANISATION

At the time of the survey the only organisations of note in the community were Zionist Church groups - which appeared to have strong support, especially among the women - and a local committee. In about 1978/79, largely through the initiative of one resident, a former induna on a white farm at Dannhauser and leader of a local Zionist Church, this committee was set up to try to deal with some of the problems facing residents. It took up three issues that were regarded as major at the time - land for pasture and ploughing, fencing for their graves, and a school. The kindergarten classes, established in the two fletcraft huts, was largely a result of their efforts. In trying to grapple with the other problems, the committee has thus far had less success. This has had a demoralising effect on it since both members of the committee and the community at large have questioned the value of such an organisation if it fails to make any meaningful gains. Nevertheless, at the time of the survey it was the only organisation to offer any prospects of help and about half the respondents mentioned its chairman as the one person who might help solve their problems.

At first the committee wrote to Ulundi asking KwaZulu for help. They were directed by KwaZulu back to the central government, the reason given being that they lived on Trust land and not within KwaZulu. They then contacted the magistrate at Vryheid and at a meeting held in November 1979 presented their requests for land to him. The magistrate promised to forward these requests to Pretoria. In mid 1980 the magistrate returned with another official. According to one informant the two promised that a school would be built and the graves fenced but they refused to consider the requests for land. Subsequently, in August 1981 the committee sent a copy of their 'Report from Qudeni settlement' to Dr Koornhof in Pretoria. His reply, written by an administrative secretary over four months later, in January 1982, was to direct the committee back to the magistrate at Vryheid. It seems however that the report did have some effect on the Department since the magistrate paid another visit to the settlement in about May 1982, to investigate the circumstances surrounding the complaints and to check facilities, largely, it seems,

with a view to future relocation into the area.

The other potentially useful organisation to have emerged in the community recently is a self-help project called Phakamani Mzimhlophe. This was established in late 1981 (after the SPP survey had been completed) as a result of contact between the community and a resource organisation based in Pietermaritzburg. The primary purpose of the organisation is to encourage agricultural production through the establishment of a revolving loan fund. At the time of writing 51 households have joined the organisation, a committee has been elected and the first purchases with the fund made. The most immediate obstacles facing the organisation are its isolation - the nearest bank and railhead are three hours away - and the degree of illiteracy among members, which makes record-keeping an extremely difficult task.

One of the issues to have emerged in discussion at meetings of this organisation is the position of newcomers to Mzimhlophe: should they be eligible for membership or not. Although it has been agreed in principle that the organisation should be open to everybody, there is obvious concern that the established section of Mzimhlophe is to be swamped by new, and as yet unidentified groups and that the flimsy improvements they have built up will be swept away from them as a result. The people of Mzimhlophe are watching the tin huts going up behind them with restrained anxiety.



Appendix 1. Report from Mzimhlophe, Qudeni

This is a copy of a report prepared by the Committee at Mzimhlophe, Qudeni in June 1981 and sent to the Dept of Cooperation and Development and other interested groups to try to highlight their problems.

This is a report on the history of our resettlement. The people here were brought here from 4 places : Louwsburg, Greytown, Dannhauser and Babanango.

1. LOUWSBURG: We built our houses on a farm owned by whites because we were working there for them. When they told us to vacate the land they said it was because we were no longer keen to work which was in fact not true.

In 1974 the farmers gave us letters telling us to leave the farm. We took the letters to Louwsburg Bantu Affairs Commissioner who told us that he could not provide us with any place and further told us to go and see what we could get for ourselves.

For 3 months we tried to accommodate ourselves but in vain; thereafter we returned back to the Louwsburg Bantu Affairs Commissioner to report that we could not get a place anywhere. He told us that he was going to take us anywhere he likes by G.G. trucks. We were loaded on G.G. trucks without being informed where we were going to and left at Qudeni.

Some of our goods were badly damaged and some broke because they were not properly handled. Our houses were left behind.

On our arrival here we were placed in small G.G. tents and we started from scratch to buy building materials.

Here we don't do any planting, have no grazing land for our stock, no schools, no health clinics - in short there is absolutely nothing provided for us.

32 houses in all removed from Louwsburg.

2. GREYTOWN: Our houses were built on a white farm at Greytown. We were notified that we were no longer required on this farm which was for the M.C.C. company. They told us that they were going to place their beasts on the farm and we were given letters telling us to vacate.

We went to the Greytown Bantu Affairs Commissioner to report the matter. He told us there is a place for us at Qudeni and instructed us to go and sell what we had and be ready for the removal. On a certain date whites came on G.G. trucks and took us to Qudeni. On our arrival we had to buy everything i.e. building equipment etc. We also noticed that there were no schools, no clinics, we can't cultivate anything and there is no grazing land for our stock either.

4 houses altogether were removed from Greytown.

3. DANNHAUSER: We were removed from a farm of whites together with tenants who were staying at UTRECHT and also children. We only saw whites

arriving with police alleging that boys refused to work which allegation was denied.

Thereafter we were given letters to vacate which we took to the Commissioner's office at Dannhauser and reported the affair to Bantu Affairs Commissioner. The Commissioner wanted to know our ideas. We told him that we only needed assistance because our children were no longer keen to work in farms.

He promised to approach his senior officer at Pietermaritzburg to contact the KwaZulu Government. We then awaited the outcome.

While we were still awaiting police came to arrest us and we were kept in Dannhauser cells.

A fine of R30 per head was fixed. We requested the Magistrate to call senior Magistrate at Pietermaritzburg and also requested help from Minister C.J. Mthethwa from the KwaZulu Government. The 2 officers arrived at Dannhauser on the 6th January 1975.

Mr Dreyer and Mr Mthethwa welcomed our request and told us that there is a place at Nondweni but it is a town and no preparations had been made yet. They wanted our opinions about the suggested place. We told them that Nondweni can't be a good place for us; in particular that we have stock, and if we were interested in town life we would be going to nearer towns such as Osizweni and Madadeni. The reason why we don't go to these places is only because town life is not good for us.

Mr Dreyer advised us not to sell our beasts and further promised to fix something for us within a period of 6 months.

During the waiting period we were summoned to come before the Commissioner's Court at Dannhauser where we were told that we are not required in the place and further were threatened that if we do not move away we shall be arrested and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 6 months or pay a fine of R30. We told him that we were not refusing to move but were still waiting for Mr Dreyer as he promised to fix something for us. Then we were told to leave till a further order.

On the 15th July 1976 G.G. trucks arrived with soldiers, police and their dogs. They said they don't need any argument but have just come to move us to Qudeni. We enquired : - how could we be moved to Qudeni while we were still waiting for something from Mr Dreyer?

We were told that what was happening was his instructions. They also told us that we were already provided with 4 roomed houses which we discovered to be false.

All our building equipment was left behind and on arrival we had to start from nothing, buying building material. In addition this place has no schools, no clinics, no grazing lands for our stock and no lands for cultivating. We have got absolutely nothing and are very much surprised because Mr Dreyer made a fair promise to us and said he won't make any mistake.

34 houses were moved from Dannhauser.

4. BABANANGO: Our children who worked on a white farm were chased away, the reason is that they complained of starvation. After they had complained the land owner cooked food with a very big pot; he then stood behind the

children with a sjambok, ordering them to finish up all the food in the big pot, failing which it would mean they did not want to work. The children could not finish all the food and were assaulted. We referred the case to the Babanango Magistrate who gave judgment in our favour. The landlord said "Even if you win the case you can't stay in my land anymore".

Thereafter G.G. trucks arrived with soldiers and police. We were told that we were being moved to Qudeni; we wanted to know whether there was any food provision for us at Qudeni. They told us to come along with our planting equipment because there is land for us to plant. They also told us that accommodation is also available.

On arrival we noticed that none of their promises were available, no schools, clinics, no fields to plant and no land for our stock - there was absolutely nothing.

QUDENI SETTLEMENT: This is the size of this resettlement place

No. of houses	=	118
No. of adults	=	224
No. of children	=	565

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Appendix 2. Case study of a removal

The following case study is taken from the AFRA Advice Office files.

T.M.K. is a widow with seven children, five of whom are living with her, the youngest still a small child. She no longer knows where her two eldest children are, both young men in their early 20s. The last she heard of her eldest son was that he was in jail.

Before being brought to Mzimhlophe she had lived with her husband on a farm near Volksrust, beyond Newcastle. In early 1981 her husband, a worker on the farm, died but she was allowed to continue living there. Then, soon afterwards, the white farmer 'disappeared' and new whites appeared on the scene. On the 3rd of June 1981 these newcomers gave her a trekpass which instructed her 'to vacate the farm with your family and household' within three months. The trekpass was written on paper bearing the letterhead of a construction firm; it appears that the farm had been bought up to make way for a railway line. T.M.K. herself was not clear on why she had been evicted. All she knew was that the trekpass meant that she could no longer stay at her home. She showed the trekpass to AFRA - a tattered piece of paper carefully preserved, the notice written in English, a language that she could not even speak let alone read.

She tried to find another place on one of the neighbouring white farms but because the eldest of her children living with her was only 13, no farmer would take her on. After three months her notice expired and since she had not yet moved, the new landowners called the police. She was sentenced to one month in jail for being an illegal squatter. Her two youngest children stayed with her in jail; the three bigger ones were left with neighbouring families.

When her sentence was up she told the magistrate that she had nowhere to go. She was then loaded onto a GG truck, with her five children and few belongings, and brought to Mzimhlophe. She arrived there towards the end of October 1981 with a few sheets of galvanised iron, one broken table, one bench, a few sleeping mats, a couple of enamel dishes and pots and some clothing. She was assigned an empty fletcraft hut and left. She had no money of her own and no maintenance grant for her children. At the time that AFRA made contact with her at the end of October 1981 she and her children were being fed entirely by the other residents of Mzimhlophe. She was very thin, sick and apathetic. The best off of her children was the youngest who was still being breastfed.

In order to qualify for a maintenance grant for her children she had to present herself to the magistrate in person. The nearest magistrate, at Nkandla, was unable to help since she was living on Trust land and was, moreover, registered in her reference book as a Swazi, not a Zulu, citizen (although her husband had been Zulu). Her only alternative was to travel to Vryheid, a town she had never visited and a full day's bus journey away. Eventually she did manage to make the journey, after she had been provided with the bus fare. The magistrate gave her a food parcel and instructed her to contact the magistrate at Nkandla. He also promised to see that she was given work by the site manager in charge of the construction office at Mzimhlophe.

The food parcel saw her and her family through Christmas 1981 and in early 1982 she was hired as a casual labourer at Mzimhlophe. The work is erratic and there are

periods when there is no work - and no income - at all. She has not made any progress towards getting a regular maintenance grant for her children. She has, however, started to build herself a small wattle and daub house.



4. COMPENSATION

1. Introduction

Compensation is situated on Trust land, 73 km west of Pietermaritzburg, in the Mpendle district. Its Zulu name is 'KwaVulamehlo' - literally 'eyeopener', a blunt comment on how the people living there regard the place. The land on which it is situated is part of a block of Trust land acquired by the State probably during the early 1960s and used since 1969 for the relocation of people off black freehold areas in the Underberg/Himeville area. During 1969 about 1 400 people were resettled in this area from black spots in the Upper Mkomazi valley. (Hansard, Question 5, 14.03.69) Cosmos Desmond (1970, 71-73) describes the conditions they faced.

Compensation is thus surrounded by older relocation sites but is itself a relatively new one, having been established in 1978. It is a closer settlement. Plots measure 28 x 40 metres and they are laid out along a grid of roughly bulldozed roads. There is no grazing or ploughing land within the site. One of the residents, a former landowner, was given compensatory land adjacent to the site and he has been hiring out grazing to some residents. Most of his land is very steep hillside, however, and unable to support many head of cattle as well as being totally unsuitable for cultivation.

The SPP survey was conducted in July 1980. At that stage only a small section of the site had been settled and almost the entire community was interviewed - 80 out of 87 households. However, rows of tin toilets and a grid of recently bulldozed roads next to the settled part provided tangible evidence that the State planned to move more people in soon. In July 1981 a further 69 households were located there, tenants from a black spot known as Kwapitela near the Sani Pass. There are still many more rows of waiting toilets and further removals into the area are anticipated in the near future.

2. Conditions before the removal

ORIGINS : THE SWAMP

All 87 households at Compensation in 1980 came from a single black spot known as The Swamp, situated near Pevensey, a small siding close to Himeville and some 50 km distant from Compensation over dirt roads. The Swamp was one of several black spots in the Pevensey area and the first to go. (Beersheba, Free State and Reichenau Mission, very close to where The Swamp was, have still to be cleared.) It had been bought in the 1880s by Charles Mndaweni at a public auction of Crown land - the auction was authorised in October 1880 but the exact date of the sale is not clear. The full purchase price was paid off on the 17th June 1898. (The original freehold grant refers to the land being possessed by Mndaweni, his heirs, executors and administrators 'in perpetuity'.) The land remained in the Mndaweni family until April 1970, when it was expropriated. However, while title was thus taken from the landowners, there was no attempt to remove them and their tenants at that stage and it seems that with the passage of time any threat of removal they might have felt in the early 1970s became dimmed so that the actual removal, in 1978, was unexpected and caught them unprepared.

The Swamp was typical of many black spots in the area and conditions there had many

points in common with those described already at Roosboom near Ladysmith. It consisted of 219,2 ha of flat but, as its name indicates, fairly marshy land in the low-lying areas, supporting a population of some 700 people. The bulk of the residents were tenants who paid an annual rent to the landowner, in return for which they were allocated some land for ploughing and allowed to graze stock on the common. The amount of rent paid is not known; at Kwapitela, nearby, tenants paid on average about R12 p.a.

The officials branded the tenants as 'illegal squatters' when it came to moving them. In fact they were neither illegal nor squatters since most had been there a long time, they all paid rent and were there with the permission of the landowner. While the property had been in the Mndaweni family for approaching 100 years when they were moved, many tenants too had lived there a long time. 52,5% - over half - of the tenants had lived at The Swamp for 20 years or more; 20% had been there for over fifty years. Only 7,5% of the tenants had been at The Swamp for less than 5 years before they were removed.

All the households at The Swamp practised some agriculture. All had land, in most cases only one field but a substantial minority (29/77 respondents in the interview) had 2 or more fields. Field sizes are unavailable; the majority described their fields as 'large' as opposed to 'small' or 'medium' - probably between 1 and 2 ha each.

The most common crops produced were maize, potatoes and beans with a little sorghum grown in a few cases. 75 households surveyed at Compensation said they produced some maize at their previous place; an equal number said they grew potatoes before while almost as many (72) said they had grown beans before. Not as many households had cattle at The Swamp as had fields but a little over half did keep cattle (46/80 households in the survey - 58% of the sample) and more kept pigs (49/80 in the survey). A few households kept goats, sheep and horses, and almost everybody kept poultry (77/80 households).

Thus agricultural activities made a significant contribution towards household income although the value of goods produced varied probably quite considerably from household to household and year to year. Most households only produced enough for their own consumption - eggs and meat mainly but dairy products were also important and about a third of the households (36% of the sample) produced hides and a few produced wool in addition. However, approaching one third of those interviewed - 29% - reported that they did sell agricultural goods from time to time. There are no details on the frequency or value of goods sold but it is unlikely that any household produced enough of a surplus to be classed as fulltime market farmers.

There is no evidence that before people were moved from The Swamp they could make an independent living out of their basically subsistence agricultural activities. Nevertheless, agricultural produce provided an important supplement to incomes derived from other sources and the loss of their access to agricultural land was one of the most devastating changes the community as a whole experienced on being moved. The importance of agriculture to the community is reflected in the replies given in the survey at Compensation to questions concerning the perceived differences between Compensation and The Swamp, as well as the problems people were encountering at Compensation and the improvements they would like to see. All but one household interviewed complained about the lack of ploughing and grazing land at Compensation. While 22% merely pinpointed the lack of land as one of the main differences between Compensation and their previous place, 78% were more specific and cited the lack of lands as a problem and/or listed its provision as one of the improvements they would like to see.

EMPLOYMENT BEFORE RELOCATION

The information on previous employment in households before the removal is not as

detailed or as reliable as the information on conditions prevailing at Compensation at the time of the survey. A total of 62 people were reported to have been in wage employment before the removal to Compensation, distributed across 56 households. This meant that 24 households had no breadwinner, 42 households had one worker, 8 had two, 1 had three and the details for a further household were missing. Information on other possible sources of income, such as pensions, gifts or informal activity is not available - though clearly subsistence agriculture played an important part.

Job opportunities in the immediate vicinity of The Swamp were few, and most workers had to move away from the farm to work - 61% of the workers were 'not resident' at The Swamp and only 36% were (details lacking for 3%). However, 60% of all those in employment worked within a 25 km radius of The Swamp so, compared to many other homeland communities, long-distance migrant labour, as opposed to short-distance commuting, played a relatively small role in the community. The largest group of commuters travelled to Himeville, 16 km away (25%); the second largest to Underberg, 21 km away (19%). Only 5 individuals were reported to work outside of Natal, all in Johannesburg; the remainder were scattered between Bulwer, 25 km away (10%), Durban (13%), Kranskop, Pietermaritzburg and district and other Natal towns. This relatively high degree of local employment must have had important repercussions on the well-being of the community since it increased the likelihood of wages being remitted to the families dependent on them and reinforced family structures and support networks.

Details on work conditions and wages for this period are not available but wages were probably low, particularly since so many people were employed in country areas, while the majority - 76% - were described as unskilled. The most important source of employment was in the service sector - generally a low wage sector. 17 of the 62 reported to have been working before the removal, were employed in the service sector. Both Himeville and Underberg have a number of hotels and holiday resorts in their area and clearly a number of workers from The Swamp were employed by these - as waiters and kitchen or cleaning staff. The next most important category of employment was in the construction industry. 11 workers - 18% of the total - worked in this field, the majority as unskilled labourers.

Agriculture, while the third most important category of employment, was not a large area of work. 9 people - 14,5% - worked in agriculture, presumably on neighbouring farms. Thus The Swamp did not play a particularly important role as a supplier of workers to neighbouring farms. The number of fulltime agricultural workers it is reported to have had is, however, higher than that reported for Roosboom. This reflects the lack of opportunities for non-agricultural, particularly industrial or commercial work, for blacks in the Himeville area compared to the opportunities available to blacks in the Ladysmith area.

From the above information, a picture emerges of a poor but stable rural community, dependent on employment in the wage sector for its survival but drawing a vital supplement from subsistence-type agriculture. In its broad outlines it appears to have been a very similar community to that of Kwapitela, which is described elsewhere in this report and which was removed to Compensation in 1981. Because of its location, far from any major centre of employment, it did not experience the same degree of pressure from an influx of new tenants in recent years as those black spots situated more favourably in relation to employment centres have, for instance those in the Ladysmith and Stanger districts. If one compares the length of residence of tenants at The Swamp (before it was removed) with that of tenants at Matiwane's Kop near Ladysmith (currently under threat and written up as a case study in Part Four below), one finds that whereas at The Swamp only 11% of tenants had moved there within ten years of the date of removal, at Matiwane's Kop 20% of the tenants have lived there for 9 or less years.

Social stability, agricultural land, local employment - all positive advantages for a black rural community in South Africa in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the above information should not be interpreted to mean that The Swamp was a pastoral paradise and had the people only been left alone to get on with their lives, there would have been no problems. Detailed information on The Swamp prior to its removal is very sketchy. However, like other black freehold areas in 20th century South Africa, The Swamp would have faced many difficulties which were likely to be on the increase, not decrease: increasing pressure on the soil as an expanding population had to make do with a fixed amount of land, lack of capital, deteriorating quality of the soil because of the pressure of both people and stock on the land, lack of infrastructural facilities - no piped water or electricity, a haphazard sanitation system that depended on private initiative, poor schooling and shopping services, etc. In addition, there is some evidence of tensions between the landowning family and the tenants - also a common feature of other black spot communities. This is manifested in the lack of support for the ex-landowner within Compensation today. He is not a popular leader, although many people point to him as 'the leader' largely because his status as such has been confirmed by the local government officials.

Despite these real problems, stemming mainly from causes larger than the community could control by itself, there is no evidence that the people of The Swamp have gained any advantage by their unwilling removal to Compensation, as the following section shows. Rather they have lost the one material advantage they enjoyed at The Swamp - their land - without being compensated by secure access to wage employment.

3. The removal to Compensation

As already mentioned, The Swamp was expropriated in 1970 but the removal did not take place until 1978 - by which time most people had forgotten about the expropriation, if they ever knew about it. The removal itself passed almost unnoticed, with only a small report in the Natal Witness on the 6th December 1978, reporting that 84 'squatters' had already been resettled at Compensation and more were expected. During 1979 there was a little more publicity about Compensation itself. The Sunday Post used it as a case study in its exposé series on 'The Surplus People' in July of that year and the Natal Mercury (14.05.79), the Sunday Tribune (20.05.79) and the Natal Witness (30.08.79) carried feature articles on conditions at the site.

According to the Natal Mercury (14.05.79) some tenants claimed that they were given only ten days notice prior to the removal. The landowner, however, knew three months before - whether he did not inform his tenants or whether the Natal Mercury's information was inaccurate or misleading is not clear. Residents put up no fight when they were told to move. According to the landowner, they felt helpless and powerless to do anything. He says that he himself refused to hand over his title deed to the officials 'until police took him to the local magistrate where he surrendered it. He said police warned him that they would lock him up if he did not hand it over'. (Natal Mercury, 14.05.79)

This is how he described the removal in a letter to a Church agency in Pietermaritzburg, some time after the removal had happened:

It was in September when the Europeans from Pretoria came to our farm 'The Swamp'. They said they are the GG company. They told me that we are going to be moved from this farm because it is in the white area. We were told that they need no cattle, no sheep and no goats at Impendle, where we are at present, and that there is not sufficient place for

ploughing. We were given three month time notice. I did not want to move from The Swamp. I asked them to give me some more months so that I can have some provision. They refused to do so. There came the magistrate from Himeville Court telling me that we are left with three days. On Monday the GG lorries started their work. They finished their job within three days. (Letter in AFRA files)

According to the Natal Mercury report in May 1979, about 700 people and 95 households were loaded onto trucks and taken to Compensation. In July 1980, when the SPP survey was undertaken, there were 87 households at Compensation so either several had left since the removal (which often happens) or the Natal Mercury had slightly exaggerated the numbers moved.

The records of the Department of Cooperation and Development on this removal are hopelessly inaccurate. In April 1980, less than 18 months after the removal and only 8 months after correspondence between Dr Koornhof and Lionel Wood (MP) concerning the conditions prevailing during and after this particular removal (see AFRA files), Dr Koornhof gave incorrect figures and dates for this removal in an answer to a question asked in Parliament about black spot removals during the 1970s in general. According to this reply The Swamp was cleared in 1976 and a total of only 125 people were removed. (Hansard, Question 537, 22.04.80)


CONDITIONS ON ARRIVAL

The people relocated at Compensation were provided with tents for six months, during which time they were expected to build their own houses. They were also provided with a pit toilet per plot and water in two 4 500 litre tanks on one edge of the settlement. Dr Koornhof, in a letter to Lionel Wood in August 1979, claimed that the tents were available until the people had built their own houses; some people at Compensation have said, however, that the tents were removed after six months and those families who had not yet completed their houses were obliged to stay with neighbours until they did. In addition each household received rations for 3 days: mealie meal, soup and skimmed milk powder.

The only other facility at the site was a temporary lower primary school in the form of several tin fletcraft huts. There were no shops in Compensation itself - the nearest one is a trading store about 3 to 4 km away - no clinic, no bus service into the settlement and no church buildings either. According to the Anglican Bishop-Suffragan of Natal (The Bishop's Newsletter, July 1979) a local Roman Catholic mission provided the people with free poles for building.

Conditions were thus very rudimentary and considerably poorer than what Dr Koornhof claimed was the norm, in Parliament in April 1980, when he said that relocation areas are 'first planned, developed and certain basic requirements such as water, sanitation, schools and clinics are provided without any cost to the people resettled'. (Hansard, col. 622, 22.04.80) Earlier, referring specifically to Compensation, his account of the settlement was equally reassuring:

... the heir of the land was provided with compensatory land of equivalent agricultural or pastoral value - in size actually far bigger - and the squatters were placed in a properly laid out settlement with cash compensation for their improvements and adequate temporary accommodation. Previously these people were illegal squatters on the owner's land but the settlement area has now been provided in addition, and adjacent to his land. In conclusion I must say that the slum conditions under which these people lived on the swamp (sic) created a health hazard and we had no option but to remove them. (Private correspondence)



COMPENSATION

Details on the amount of compensation paid out are not available. While the authorities claimed that all people who were moved from The Swamp were compensated, only 60 out of the 80 households interviewed reported receiving compensation, while 9 said they were not compensated. (5 replies were classified as 'other' and 6 were missing.) Since all of the sample were moved from freehold land and thus equally eligible for compensation, it appears that a small number of households did not receive any money at all. However, because of the time that had elapsed since the payout and the possibility that the household member interviewed did not have the full information on the compensation paid to the household head, these results may be inaccurate. (For a detailed analysis of compensation paid to the Kwapitela people moved to Compensation in 1981, see the case study in Part Four. According to this study, 3 out of 54 households surveyed about 6 weeks after they had been moved had not yet received any money in compensation.)

In late 1979 a Pietermaritzburg Church worker tried to make enquiries with first the Drakensberg Administration Board, then the Chief Commissioner and finally the Department of Cooperation and Development about the amount of compensation paid out to The Swamp residents. The Secretary for the Department refused to give details, stating that it was a 'private and personal' matter, but said that all the people with improvements had been compensated - cash compensation for the 'squatters' and compensatory land for the landowner. (Private correspondence) According to the Minister of Cooperation and Development, the land was originally expropriated for R18 851,40 plus R6 672,00 for the improvements on it. Later the improvements were revalued and a total of R35 426,00 was paid out at the end of 1978. What the reasons for the substantial revaluing were, is not clear. (Private correspondence) The landowner received 365 ha of land in exchange for the 219,2 ha of The Swamp - more land, as officials were quick to point out, but mostly steep and rocky, as officials did not point out. (The compensation money awarded for the land would have all been absorbed by this transfer of land.)

Assuming the ministerial figure is reasonably accurate, then the 95 households moved received an average of R373 each. This is comparable to the average of R380 paid out to the people who were moved to Compensation in July 1981 from Kwapitela.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

By the time the SPP survey was undertaken, there had been little change in general conditions at Compensation. By then most people had built wattle and daub houses and the tents had been taken away. A few had planted vegetables in their plots but without water at hand, gardening was an arduous task that many families had abandoned. The temporary tin school was still the only school in use, with an enrolment of 102 pupils and 2 teachers. However, a new brick school, with 10 classrooms, was in the process of being built. These were the only tangible signs of improvement. There was still no clinic or mobile clinic service and the community was still dependent on the trading store across the valley. Prices were high - mealie meal at R20,90 for an 80 kg bag and paraffin selling at 65c for 750 ml. (July 1980) There were no churches either and it did not seem that any minister visited the area regularly.

Water still came from the 2 tanks originally provided although a windmill had been installed and work was proceeding on augmenting the water supply by the building of a reservoir - apparently in preparation for the next intake of people. The access road to the community was in very poor condition and no buses came into

the settlement; people had to walk to the main road, 3 or 4 km away. A single bus passed along this road to Pietermaritzburg daily, a one-way ticket then costing R1,85.

The impression that the SPP interviewer got of Compensation was of an apathetic and depressed community. In a report on the place she wrote:

'The people themselves are so depressed that they have lost touch with all the world around them. These people, they have difficulties in even naming their own kids by name ... They don't even know to whom they are responsible. They are chased from Bulwer to Mpendle magistrate if they have problems ... They really feel unattached, sort of hanging ... They have given up hope of helping themselves completely. They are about to be professional beggars. They fight even for the degree of poverty - no one wants to be seen as better off than the other'. (SPP fieldtrip report)

Since that time the Kwapitela households have been moved in. The water supply was augmented to cope with the influx of new households by the addition of the new reservoir and a few taps have been laid in the streets - 6 in 1982. The access road has been improved and the new school is in operation. Otherwise conditions are the same as before. The only major difference is that now the population has nearly doubled and there are more people struggling to cope with the inadequate resources available to them.

4. Demographic features

POPULATION STRUCTURE

The total population of the 80 households surveyed was 508 of whom 243 were male and 255 female, with 10 whose sex was not stated in the questionnaire. 41% of the total population were children 14 years and under, the percentage rising to 49% when only the permanently resident population at Compensation (i.e. excluding commuters and migrants) is considered. The level of child dependency at Compensation is thus high, but not exceptional by bantustan standards. Simkins, in 'The distribution of the African population of South Africa by age, sex and region type 1960, 1970 and 1980', has calculated that 48% of the total bantustan population were 14 years and under in 1980.

Table 1, Compensation. POPULATION BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

RESIDENCE	MALE	FEMALE	SEX NOT STATED	TOTAL
Permanent	186	230	9	425
Commuter	7	0	-	7
Migrant	39	19	1	59
Never return	2	0	-	2
Residence ns	9	6	-	15
TOTAL	243	255	10	508

In addition to having a high child dependency rate, Compensation also has a low masculinity rate if the sex ratio of its permanent population (i.e. excluding the commuter and migrant population) is compared to a hypothetical norm of sexual parity where the masculinity rate would be 100 (100 males for every 100 females). The reason for this low masculinity rate among the permanent population is that in Compensation, as in other bantustan communities, a significant proportion of the adult male population are forced to become migrant workers and spend most of the year away

from home. In Compensation there were 186 males and 230 females (of all ages) permanently resident in the survey, producing a masculinity rate of 81. If one adds the population that commute - leave the site but return home either daily or weekly - then the masculinity rate rises slightly to 84. The absence of men was most marked in the working age cohort, with the average rate for the various age groupings between 15 years and 64 years being only 68. The biggest discrepancy between the sexes was in the 45 - 64 age cohort where out of a total of 26 people of this age permanently resident, only 5 were male, producing a masculinity rate of 24 for this group.

Table 2, Compensation. MASCULINITY RATE IN THE PERMANENT POPULATION OF WORKING AGE

AGE GROUPING	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MASCULINITY RATE
Permanent, all ages	186	230	425	81
15 - 24	45	45	90	100
25 - 34	12	23	35	52
35 - 44	17	27	44	63
45 - 64	5	21	26	24
15 - 64	79	116	195	68

Unfortunately there is no masculinity rate for the community at The Swamp, before they were removed to Compensation, to compare with the position in the community after they were removed, since the available information on residence status of the population at The Swamp deals with workers only. This information is further limited in that it does not distinguish between permanent, commuter and migrant residents (as the data on the population at Compensation does) but only between 'resident' and 'non-resident'. However, as already described, 60% of the workers at The Swamp worked within a 25 km radius of the farm, so well over half the working population of The Swamp would have been able to commute, if not daily, then at least weekly. Thus the masculinity rate of the permanent plus commuter population must have been higher than that at Compensation where, as discussed below, only 44% of workers were either permanent or commuters and 54% long-distance migrants.

In addition, there was an increase in the level of employment - an absolute increase in the number employed in the wage sector - at Compensation as compared to The Swamp, from a total of 62 to 98. This also supports the argument that the sex ratio at Compensation is more distorted than it was at The Swamp. Furthermore, the relatively low level of migrancy at Compensation recorded in 1980 is likely to be a temporary phenomenon, as is discussed more fully below. A high proportion of men in employment at Compensation at the time of the survey were in temporary employment, with the local government, preparing sites for the next intake of relocated people. Once this temporary source of work dried up these men would be forced to find work as migrants elsewhere or join the ranks of the unemployed. The masculinity rate of the population living permanently at Compensation would then presumably decline. One can thus argue that their relocation to Compensation contributed to a greater level of male migrancy within the community and further distorted the family structure.

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

As far as household structure is concerned, there are no details on the position prevailing at The Swamp so no strict comparison between before and after can be drawn. However, the available information on Compensation supports the hypothesis that removals encourage the nuclearisation of families as already indicated in the Sahlumbe case study. Previous residence patterns are disrupted if not broken entirely. Loss of land and stock as a result of the removal help undermine the

authority and importance of the extended patriarchal family while the smallness of the sites at the relocation area also encourages junior married members of former extended households to establish themselves as separate units on their own small plots. These tendencies are further encouraged by the increased dependence on wage labour and the increase in migrancy. At Compensation 64% of the households surveyed (51 of the total) were nuclear while 27,5% were extended.

Table 3, Compensation. HOUSEHOLD TYPE

HOUSEHOLD TYPE	NUMBER	%
Single member	3	7,5
No family	3	
Nuclear	51	64
Extended	22	27,5
Extended-compound	1	1

The average number of members per household was a little over 6 - 6,35 (508/80), with 58% of all households surveyed ranging from between 4 and 9 members each. Three households, as indicated above had only one member each. The largest household had 15 members.

68% of the households were headed by men (whether permanently resident or not) and 32% were headed by women - a little under a third of the total and thus a substantial minority. In view of the general tendencies for greater poverty among female-headed households, related to the lower wages paid women and higher level of female unemployment, this figure takes on an added economic significance. The distribution of workers between male-headed and female-headed households at Compensation bears this general observation out. Although female-headed households only made up 38% of the total, 13 out of the 21 households (62%) reported to have neither local nor migrant workers were female-headed. Furthermore, while male-headed households had, on average, 1,3 workers each, female-headed households had less than one worker each - 0,9 on average. However the data on workers' remittances in the Compensation survey was not satisfactorily recorded and, furthermore, there are no details on how much the various migrant workers sent home in remittances. Thus there is not enough information for a precise comparison of incomes in the male- and female-headed households.

Table 4, Compensation. DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS IN MALE- AND FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS

Note: Sex of one household head not recorded.

CATEGORY OF WORKER	MALE HEAD	FEMALE HEAD
No workers at all	8	13
Local worker/s only	17	2
Migrant worker/s only	19	6
Migrant and local worker/s	10	4
	54	25

5. Economic activity

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The employment position at Compensation at the time of the survey shows some important shifts compared to the position already described for The Swamp. At Compensation

there was a total of 98 workers distributed across 59 households, with a further 21 households reporting no wage earner. Previously at The Swamp 62 workers had been distributed across 56 households, with 24 households reporting no wage earner, so the evidence points to a greater participation in the labour market within the community after relocation. This is consistent with the loss of land and stock which accompanied the removal which would have created a greater dependence on wage employment. However, while there has been a shift to greater participation in the wage sector as a result of the removal to Compensation, the rate of unemployment as well as the level of not economically active people of working age are both high. The total number of people who can be classified as economically active in the survey (i.e. both employed and unemployed who are seeking work) is 123, made up of 83 males, 38 females and 2 for whom no sex is recorded. Of these, 98 were employed and 25 recorded as unemployed. This gives a high unemployment rate of 20% (i.e. 25/123) for the community as a whole. The position is far worse among women where, out of an economically active population of 38, 16 were unemployed - 42% of the total. With the ending of the temporary employment that was being offered at the Compensation site itself at the time of the survey, the unemployment problem will probably become far more serious.

Table 5, Compensation. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

ECONOMIC CATEGORY	MALE	FEMALE	SEX NOT STATED	TOTAL
Employed	74	22	2	98
Unemployed	9	16	-	25
Economically active	83	38	2	123
Unemployment rate	11%	42%		20%

The available evidence suggests, furthermore, that, as at Sahlumbe, a number of people of working age have given up trying to look for work and that the rate of unemployment is actually being depressed by the large number of people of working age who are not economically active in the formal wage sector. In the SPP survey a total of 143 adults in the 15 - 64 age group were in this category - 54% of the adult population of working age.

Table 6, Compensation. NOT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION OF WORKING AGE, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

RESIDENCE STATUS	15-24 YRS	25-34 YRS	35-44 YRS	45-64 YRS	TOTAL
PERMANENT : Male	35	1	2	2	40
Female	44	15	20	16	95
Sex ns	3	1	-	1	5
TOTAL	82	17	22	19	140
COMMUTER : Male	0	0	0	0	0
Female	-	-	-	-	-
MIGRANT : Male	0	1	0	-	1
Female	1	0	1	-	2
TOTAL	83	18	23	19	143

What is of particular significance is the large number of males in this category, since the women were, arguably, busy with domestic responsibilities at home. 195 people in the permanent population were of working age in 1980; thus only 55 were economically active. (195 - 140). This means that while 28% of the population of working age who were permanently resident were economically active, 72% were not -

were neither working nor looking for work. Furthermore, about 30% of this last group were men (40/135), the great majority of them young men in the 15 to 24 age group.

The SPP interviewer, in her field report on the community, has suggested that not only is the absence of jobs a barrier. There is also the fear on the part of the household that if people go away to find work - as they must - they will be lost to the household. She noted in her report:

The young men and girls who could be working are not since they are discouraged by their parents from being migrant workers since they are in danger of not coming back home. As I gathered, most people who leave home to work in faraway places don't come back, even if they are heads of families and especially young people who are still free to choose between the new place and the old. So most women are not for the idea their husbands should go away to far places for work, hence the number of unemployed men. The idea is even stronger among old women who are threatened with the extinction of their home and family if their sons seek work far away. (SPP Fieldtrip report)

One result of this, she noted, was the increased dependence on pensioners within the family to bring in an income for the whole household.

LEVEL OF MIGRANCY

As with the other bantustan communities, Compensation shows a high dependence on migrant labour for its economic survival - over half of its entire workforce are monthly or annual workers. The level of migrancy in the community has increased since they were removed and it is now comparable with the figure of 56% supplied by the Buthelezi Commission as the percentage of KwaZulu's workforce employed outside the boundaries of the bantustan. (Buthelezi Commission, vol. 2, 155)

Table 7, Compensation. DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS ACCORDING TO SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

CATEGORY	MALE	FEMALE	SEX NOT STATED	TOTAL	%
Permanent	30	5	1	36	37
Commuter	7	0	-	7	7
Migrant	35	17	1	53	54
Never return	2	0	-	2	2
TOTAL	74	22	2	98	

What is also striking about these figures, apart from the high level of migrancy (which one would expect), is the high proportion of workers who are permanently resident at Compensation. This is a deceptive and temporary phenomenon. In 1980 the dependency of the community on migrant labour for its survival was being lessened for the time being by temporary employment on the site for construction labourers, putting in toilets and preparing roads etc. in preparation for the next intake of relocated people. The largest single group of workers according to residence and area of employment in the survey were a group of 23 permanent residents employed in the construction industry as labourers - 22 of them men and one whose sex was not recorded but who was almost certainly a man as well. It is likely that most, if not all, of the 5 permanently resident workers for whom no specific industry was recorded, were construction workers at Compensation as well. This group constituted 64% of the permanently resident group of workers and 23% of the total workforce. They appear to have been hired on a casual basis - through their ex-landowner, who had been

appointed foreman by the local government officials in charge of the construction site. Obviously this source of employment is only temporary. There is no other local employment at Compensation itself except for teachers in the school. Once the construction work dries up, these workers will be forced either to become migrants or to join the already high number of unemployed, and the dependency on migrant labour in the community will rise.

Undoubtedly the removal to Compensation disrupted previous patterns of employment. At The Swamp 27 people worked in the nearby towns of Himeville and Underberg, or vicinity - 44% of the then workforce. At Compensation 23 people were still working at these two towns in 1980 - 4 less than before and only 34% of the workforce. Instead of a 16 to 21 km commute to these two centres from The Swamp, workers from Compensation who continued to work there had to commute 52 to 55 km, almost all of it over bad dirt roads. Whereas previously at The Swamp 60% of the workers worked within 25 km of their homes, at Compensation, the large contingent of people working on the site itself notwithstanding, only 41% did. Almost all of these were employed at Compensation itself; 2 were employed at Mpendle, the small village 16 km away and 2 at Bulwer, about 25 km away. After Compensation, Underberg and Himeville, the Durban/Pinetown area was the main centre of work (10 workers), followed by Johannesburg (5). The remainder of the workers were scattered in small numbers through a number of Natal towns, including Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle and Port Shepstone.

TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT

Details on the type of employment, by industry and the level of skills of workers at Compensation, reveal that the great majority of workers in the survey were unskilled and employed in low-wage industries, notably construction and service. Of 89 workers for whom information on skills levels is available, 76 were recorded as being unskilled - 85% of the total. The most important industries were:

1. Construction, employing 34% of the total workforce;
2. Service, employing 28% of the total;
3. Finance, employing 10% of the total (including 3 clerical workers) and
4. Agriculture, employing only 7 - 8% of the total, and Manufacturing, also employing 7 workers.

For men, construction (39%), followed by service (16%), agriculture (9%) and transport (8%) were the most important industries. For women the order was service - fully 59% - with manufacturing and finance, each employing only 3 (14%), the only other industries mentioned. Less than a quarter of the total number of workers were women and most of the women who were working (17 out of a total of 22) were migrants.

Table 8, Compensation. EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

INDUSTRY	PERMANENT				COMMUTERS			MIGRANTS				NOT RETURN		TOTAL
	M	F	NS	T	M	F	T	M	F	NS	T	M	T	
Agriculture	0	0	-	0	2	0	2	5	0	-	5	-	-	7
Manufacturing	0	1	-	1	0	0	0	3	2	1	6	-	-	7
Electric. etc.	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	-	2	-	-	3
Construction	22	0	1	23	2	0	2	5	0	-	5	-	-	30
Trade	0	0	-	0	1	0	1	0	0	-	0	-	-	1
Transport	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	6	0	-	6	-	-	6
Finance	0	0	-	0	1	0	1	4	3	-	7	1	1	9
Service	2	1	-	3	0	0	0	9	12	-	21	1	1	25
Ind. ns	5	3	-	8	1	0	1	1	0	-	1	-	-	10
TOTAL	30	5	1	36	7	0	7	35	17	1	53	2	2	98

OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME

The most important source of income after wage earnings come from old age pensions. In this respect Compensation is typical of other bantustan communities where an aged grandparent in a family can make the crucial difference between total immiseration and grinding poverty. Unfortunately there is no data to compare the significance of pensions within The Swamp, previously, and at Compensation, currently. A total of 18 individuals recorded receiving old age pensions, 1 was getting unemployment insurance and 5 were drawing disability grants. The removal to Compensation undoubtedly disrupted this very important source of income within the community. A report in the Natal Witness on conditions at Compensation in 1979 noted that about 16 old age pensioners discovered that their pension files had not been transferred from Underberg to Bulwer and they thus missed at least one and probably more payments. (Natal Witness, 30.08.79)

As already noted, agriculture plays a very insignificant part in the community, since only the former landowner has land other than the small plots and there is no water laid on to each plot to encourage vegetable gardening. Only 2 households reported having 'some' cattle, presumably the former landowner and 1 other, while 1 household reported some goats and 1 again had some sheep. Surprisingly, the same picture appeared for poultry - 77 households reported no poultry, 2 reported some and 1 answer was missing.

More important as a source of income was informal activity with 15 households reporting some activity of this sort and about a third of those appearing to depend entirely on it to bring in an income. Details on the amount of money generated by this is lacking but it is unlikely to be much since Compensation is not on any major road and thus the only market available is a local one. The most common activities included making and selling mats, brewing beer and plastering other people's houses for them. The survey also uncovered a small number of households which have no apparent source of income - no more than 5, but nevertheless a large enough group to raise questions about firstly the sensitivity of the questionnaire and secondly the strategies for survival used by people in communities as depressed as Compensation.

DIET

In view of the above information it is not surprising that the average household diet at Compensation is totally inadequate, seriously deficient in both protein and vitamins. The staple diet as revealed in the survey consists of mealie meal, supplemented by other starch such as potatoes, rice, bread, and tea, coffee and sugar. Only 2 households reported eating greens daily; most (68%) eat them less than once a week. Cheese and fish are unknown items in the community while 65% of households eat eggs less than once a month, 42% eat meat less than once a month and 82% eat meat less than once a week. Only 11% drink milk daily. These figures are crude ones and do not indicate how food consumption is spread across the household, only what the household as a unit consumes. There was also some resistance among respondents to give details on these questions. Nevertheless the general picture that emerges, of a very poor quality diet with people living almost entirely on pure starch, is an accurate one. Although there are no details on food consumption patterns before the community was removed, it is a safe assumption that the loss of land without a significant increase in wage earnings has led to a drop in the consumption of meat and dairy products in particular within the community.

EDUCATION

The general level of education in the community is low, thus putting members at an

even greater disadvantage in trying to find employment. 19% of the population of school-going age (7 and over) had no formal education at the time of the survey, a further 40% had lower primary schooling only, barely enough to make those who complete this stage of schooling functionally literate. Only 2% of the community had a senior high school or higher education.

Table 9, Compensation. EDUCATION, BY STANDARD AND AGE CATEGORY

STANDARD	0-6 YRS	7+ YRS	AGE NS	TOTAL
None	79	77	-	156
Lower Primary	10	164	2	176
Higher Primary	0	129	-	129
Lower Secondary	0	34	-	34
Std 9+	0	10	-	10
Std not stated	1	2	-	3
TOTAL	90	416	2	508

The level of education among commuters and migrants is low, with only 15% of them (10 out of a total of 65) having progressed beyond primary school in 1980 and 21,5% (14 out of 65) having no education at all. The low level of education within the community is clearly related to the large number of workers from Compensation in unskilled occupations.

Table 10, Compensation. EDUCATION LEVELS OF COMMUTERS AND MIGRANTS

Note: Figures for commuters and migrants refer to people in the 7 years plus age group

STANDARD	COMMUTER	MIGRANT
None	3	11
Lower Primary	1	17
Higher Primary	1	22
Lower Secondary	2	5
Std 9+	0	3
TOTAL	7	58

The prospects for the people of Compensation overcoming their educational handicaps in the near future are very limited since educational facilities at Compensation are inadequate. Although the new brick school started operations in 1981, it is a primary school only. The nearest secondary school is 8 km away and there is no high school in the district. There is no literacy training programme for adults, either. In these respects Compensation does not differ from most other bantustan communities - but it can hardly be argued, as government officials have done, that the educational requirements of this relocation site have been met.

6. Organisation and attitudes

Compensation is a depressed and divided community. At the time of the survey, the people had been living there for over 18 months but there was little sign of any community organisation. At The Swamp there used to be at least one organisation, a Catholic Women's League, but that no longer exists. At the time of the survey, there

were no church women's organisations, no social clubs or community organisations, not even Inkatha.

The ex-landowner was recognised as the official leader by government officials and in 1980 was in charge of recruiting workers for the local construction site: a powerful position in a community as depressed as Compensation. He did not enjoy the support of his ex-tenants, however. He has complained that now that he no longer has a landlord relationship with the rest of the community, they are unwilling to listen to him. They complain that he does not represent their interests. Nothing else appears to have emerged to fill the vacuum left by the destruction of the old landlord/tenant relationship. What is interesting is the way Pretoria has co-opted that old relationship and attempted to transform it into an induna/tribe one. The community have acquiesced to the outward form of the relationship but it does not provide a channel through which they can organise or express their needs.

People willingly offered a formidable list of problems and complaints about the area, but as in other areas surveyed did not see themselves as capable of solving any of them. A universal complaint was the lack of agricultural land. Other common complaints were the overcrowding - people are not used to living so close together and this creates numerous social tensions - the absence of a local shop and a clinic, the unemployment and the distance to the bus stop. People's replies to questions about their problems in the survey were interspersed with such bleak comments as 'We are starving here' or 'We are too ill'. Everybody believes that they are worse off at Compensation than they were at The Swamp.

Very few people, however, had any constructive ideas about how they could improve their situation. The removal appears to have robbed them of initiative and of hope. When people were asked what they intended doing about their problems, most people answered along the lines of 'Nothing' or 'I feel so helpless' or 'I feel so confused'. The most frequent response to a question asking who they thought would help them was a vague 'GG' - 'They put us here, so they are responsible' - or an equally vague 'GG and the leaders'. Interestingly, the KwaZulu Government did not feature at all in these replies.

The community has been at Compensation for 3 years now. In July they were joined by a new intake of people from the black spot, Kwapitela, near Himeville. From the road the older section looks like many other bantustan communities to the casual observer - a collection of wattle and daub houses set on a hillside. What is not apparent to the uninformed observer is that the community has no land. Even more hidden is the apathy and lack of organisation described above: a position that is likely to have been exacerbated by the influx of newcomers in July 1981.

5. INANDA NEWTOWN

1. Introduction and background

Inanda Newtown is the name recently given to a site and service scheme implemented in 1980 by the Urban Foundation, in consultation with the Department of Cooperation and Development, in the densely populated, enormously complex area north west of Durban known as Released Area 33 (RA 33). RA 33 forms part of the Inanda magisterial district and is located about 35 km out from Durban city centre. The released land includes both Trust land, vested directly in the SADT, and privately owned african and indian freehold land. The whole of the Inanda magisterial district has been a relocation centre, both formal and informal, since the late 1950s. Inanda Newtown, a project put together largely by the private sector, represents a special kind of relocation and a particular phase in official relocation strategies in the greater Durban area.

Since it is impossible to understand developments at Inanda Newtown in isolation from developments in the rest of RA 33, the general events leading up to and following on the establishment of this scheme are set out in some detail below, before the results of the SPP survey itself are considered. This is followed by a section looking at the continuing crisis of water problems and evictions in the wider area of RA 33.

RELEASED AREA 33

Although falling within land designated for KwaZulu, RA 33 is in fact an extension of the greater metropolitan area of Durban city. Just to the south of it lie the formal african townships of KwaMashu and Ntuzuma; to the east lies the indian township of Phoenix. Because of its proximity to Durban and the employment opportunities there, as well as because of the desperate shortage of formal housing for africans within the Durban area⁺, this area has experienced a proliferation of informal settlements since the 1950s. Its population is currently estimated at over 250 000. The bulk of the population are tenants who rent rooms or structures or lease land on which to build their own places from the african and indian landowners in the area. Population densities of up to 100 or more people per hectare were found in the central and northern parts in 1980. (Urban Foundation Natal region, 1980, 3)

RA 33 is administered on behalf of the SADT by the Department of Cooperation and Development, whose agent is the Magistrate at the nearby town of Verulam. One of the major problems of this area for planners and residents alike has been that it has no local authority of its own. Because of its ambiguous legal status, there has been no legal body to take responsibility for the provision of services and planned infrastructure and residents have to make their own arrangements with regard to sanitation and water.

⁺ Thus in KwaMashu only 370 houses were built in 1980, and the waiting list was 1 000 families. Ntuzuma, a township in the process of development had 96 houses built in 1980, and a waiting list of 3 000 families. (Black Sash Natal Coastal Region, 1981)

The scheme proposed five alternative sources for a supply of water to Inanda :

1) mobile water tankers, 2) boreholes, 3) the Hazlemere Dam at Tongaat (these latter two proposals were considered to be uneconomic), 4) the Umgeni Water Board, and 5) the Durban Corporation. It indicated that the Umgeni Water Board was prepared to supply water from the proposed Inanda Dam. The report stressed that the whole scheme was not to be regarded as a temporary relief measure, but as a permanent upgrading of the facilities. It also noted that rehousing was not seen as a viable alternative to the problem. (*Daily News*, 28.03.80) According to the report the scheme would cost R2,5 million to implement, and african and indian community leaders were willing to contribute towards the costs.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SITE AND SERVICE SCHEME

It was apparent that the Urban Foundation and the liberal business interests it represented were extremely concerned by the typhoid epidemic and the threat this posed to the health and safety of white Durban. Although the details on the subsequent negotiations between the Urban Foundation and the central government have not been made public, it is clear from the timing of subsequent events that these must have got under way in early 1980. It seems likely that the Urban Foundation was pressing the central government to take some initiative on the crisis and that the central government, in turn, saw the Urban Foundation as a potentially useful ally.

At the end of March 1980, the Minister of Cooperation and Development announced in Parliament that the government was investigating, on a medium and long term basis, a water supply for Inanda. (*Natal Mercury*, 29.03.80) Then in June 1980 the Urban Foundation approached the Department of Town and Regional Planning at the University of Natal, Durban, with the suggestion that the students in the Department focus on RA 33 in a course planning project. The Urban Foundation explained that the Department of Cooperation and Development had agreed to the Urban Foundation preparing a report on the area which would serve as the basis for the drawing up of a brief for planning consultants. These consultants would then put together a plan for the formal, controlled development of the area.

In the meantime decisions about RA 33 must have been made at ministerial level and on the 15th July 1980 the Department of Cooperation and Development announced the proposed development of a site and service scheme on part of Piesang Rivier (SADT land) in conjunction with the Urban Foundation. At that stage the role of the Urban Foundation was described as a technical and resource one. It was to set up technical advice centres on the site and service scheme, encourage the building of permanent structures, and offer technical help and building plans for residents.

In contrast to its previous indifference to the area, the Department now moved with enormous speed to get the scheme launched. In a matter of weeks Department of Cooperation and Development planners put together plans for three parcels of South African Development Trust land in RA 33. The sites were surveyed and pegged, dust roads bulldozed, pit latrines with corrugated iron shelters dug on each site, and water stand-pipes put in every 100 metres. The areas chosen were extremely hilly and steep and this was to cause severe drainage problems later.

No announcement of the proposed resettlement was made to the people affected until the 13th July 1980, when the Verulam Magistrate called a meeting of residents in the Amaoti area in the north eastern section of RA 33. The meeting was attended by Cooperation and Development, FNAB and Urban Foundation officials. The Verulam Magistrate told residents that no-one would be compelled to move to the site and service scheme, but that people could start applying for sites, and trucks to transport them to the scheme would be available. It is not clear what else may or may not have been promised. As discussed below, many rumours that turned out

to be false began circulating in Inanda - rumours that township housing would be available free, that people had to move there. These rumours were widely believed and this contributed to a crisis of expectations among many of the people who moved onto the scheme. Once sites had been prepared, people began moving into tents on the new scheme at the end of July 1980. By early 1981 the total population of the first section to be opened up, Section A, was estimated to be 2 500 households. By mid 1982 the scheme was reported to be full, with about 4 200 households (25 000 people) divided into three sections (A, B, C). In April 1982 the scheme was formally proclaimed a township and given the name Inanda Newtown. (Proclamation R799, 23.04.82)

THE SPP SURVEY

The SPP survey of Inanda Newtown was undertaken between November 1980 and March 1981 when people were still moving into the scheme. A total of 100 households were interviewed in the western part of Section A, using a 1 in 10 sample.

2. The removals

CONDITIONS ON ARRIVAL AT THE SCHEME

Ematendeni (the place of tents) as it came to be known, was conceptualised as a scheme to provide residents with basic services and a rented site. Although hailed as a breakthrough in official housing policy, because of its flexible approach to the issue of building standards and its emphasis on self-help, the scheme in fact differed little from the relocation closer settlements that have been established in rural areas since the 1960s. People were given a surveyed site, serviced with a latrine and a water-point nearby. Once on site in a tent provided for 6 months by the central government, residents could build their own houses - first shacks, and then, with loans arranged by the Department of Cooperation and Development and technical advice from the Urban Foundation, a substantial structure. (See Appendix 1 for details.)

Rumours circulating in Inanda before the removals led people to think that they would get a month's rations free, and free building materials. A number of people claimed that they had been told houses would be built for them, that they would be able to move to a 'better place', and some expected to move into a regular township house. In reality, on arrival people found that they had to build their own houses, and live in tents until they could build; that they were given only a day's worth of rations; that many had to resort to bribery in order to obtain a tent and temporary building materials. (See Appendix 1.)

Living conditions were initially extremely poor. The summer of 1980 brought heavy rains following the severe drought, and tents and pit latrines were flooded. In a story on the scheme in December 1980 the newspaper *Post* noted:

... the entire tent city was flooded and residents had to dig trenches in a vain attempt to divert the water around their tents and toilets. The toilets which were constructed on a shallow pit were flooded. (*Post*, 17.12.80)

One resident was reported in this story as saying that

The area was so waterlogged that we could not even go to the toilet. I regret moving from my shack further down the road. Although it was a shack at least no water came inside when it rained. I now fear an epidemic breaking out.

Preliminary preparations, apart from the surveying and laying out of the sites were

minimal. At the time of the first arrivals, there were no schools, creches, community halls, police station, clinics, hospital, shops, recreational facilities, churches or street lights. Very soon shack shops selling basic foods or providing services such as watch repairs sprang up. People in fact responded to the lack of services very positively and the level of informal activity in the settlement is, as the SPP survey revealed, high. Nevertheless residents felt that better facilities should have been provided from the start. One person interviewed by SPP commented that 'except for pure water and a solid toilet, there aren't any differences' between the site and service scheme and their former homes.

A free bus service provided by the government transported children to their old schools in Amaoti. It is not known for how long this service operated. By mid-1981 a temporary tin shack school was operating but before then no school had been set up in the area. Parents were distressed to find their children were being turned away from schools in Ntuzuma, a nearby formal township. General transport was provided by PUTCO buses, but in the rainy season these were unable to operate on the extremely muddy roads on the steep hillsides on which the scheme was laid out.

Initially the area was administered as an emergency area 'pending proclamation as a township within a few years'. (Urban Foundation Natal region, November 1980) According to the Urban Foundation, once the township had been formally proclaimed, the purchase of land would be permitted and encouraged. 'Although the land so purchased will not be freehold, it is understood that it will offer security of tenure equivalent to 60 year leasehold.' (Ibid) In the meantime rent was fixed at R2,60 per month per site. In addition an initial lump sum of R10 per plot was levied on households, apparently to cover future refuse removal and water costs although many people were uncertain of its purpose.

ORIGIN AND ARRIVAL OF RESIDENTS

At the public meeting held in July 1980 to announce the scheme, the Verulam magistrate stated that to qualify for a site in the new project, applicants had to be resident in Inanda and be citizens of KwaZulu. The information on the origins of the households in the SPP survey confirms that official restrictions on who was entitled to sites were applied fairly successfully. Thus out of the 100 households in the survey, a total of 74 came from within RA 33 itself, a further 10 from the wider Inanda district and only 15 from areas outside of this geographical limit. (Information on the origin of 1 household was not available.)

Of those coming from within RA 33, 51 - just over half of the total sample - came from Amaoti and 23 from Bambayi and Nhlungwane, all freehold areas. People from these areas had paid rent to indian and african landlords, mostly renting rooms in overcrowded settlements and had not had access to gardens, fields or grazing land. Amaoti had been pinpointed by the authorities as one of the areas most severely hit by the water shortage and typhoid epidemic.

Of the 15 households coming from outside the Inanda district, 13 had come from other parts of Durban, either single men's hostels, other townships or back yards in white areas, and only 2 had come from more outlying rural areas. Thus the people came, overwhelmingly, from urban or peri-urban backgrounds. Only 3 of the households in the survey had had access to fields at their previous place and only one had owned cattle.

The great majority of households were resettled by GG trucks. Out of 94 households for whom this information was supplied, 84 said they had been brought to the scheme by GG truck while 10 said they had hired their own means of transport. One resident interviewed said he had hired his own transport because of 'government truck delays'. 14 households brought with them their own building materials from

their previous place of residence, intending to use them to build a shack on the new site.

LENGTH OF TIME AT PREVIOUS PLACE

Generally the households interviewed had not spent a very long time at their previous place before moving to the site and service scheme. Over half the sample - 53 households - had lived at their previous place for five years or less and only 15 for 11 years or more, 12 of these for between 11 and 20 years. Compared to the other african areas surveyed by SPP in Natal, the residents at Inanda Newtown showed a high degree of previous mobility. It seems that what this reflects is mainly movement in and around the greater Durban area, from hostels or townships out to informal settlements or from one informal settlement to another, rather than a major movement of households from outlying rural areas into RA 33 (although obviously this does form part of the total migration pattern). A study undertaken by the Isolomuzi Health and Family Welfare Organisation in early 1982 in a part of RA 33 known as Phizangu, established that 70% of the sample had lived there for between 1 and 9 years (this is comparable to the SPP figures) and also stressed that the majority of the people were urban, rather than rural. 37% had moved to Phizangu from other parts of Inanda and 41% from other Durban townships while only 8% had come from other parts of KwaZulu. (Daily News, 28.04.82) The area surveyed in the Isolomuzi study is very similar to the areas from which the households interviewed at Inanda Newtown had come. This data confirms that the bulk of people moved to Inanda Newtown were people whose orientation and experience was basically an urban one.

Table 1, Inanda. LENGTH OF TIME AT PREVIOUS PLACE

YEARS	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
0 - 5	53
6 - 10	27
11 - 20	12
21+	3
Not stated	5
TOTAL	100

REASONS FOR MOVING

At the public meeting held in Amaoti in July 1980, the Verulam Magistrate stated that no-one would be compelled to move to the site and service scheme, but that GG trucks would be provided to help residents move, and that tents could be obtained at the new site. In apparent confirmation of this, all the households interviewed by SPP reported that they had moved to the scheme 'of their own free will'. This response, however, requires further explanation, since there were many indirect pressures working on them. In March 1980 a reporter from the Daily News observed that 'most of those queuing for admission (to the scheme) believed that they did not have to move to the new area if they did not want to, but among those already on the sites the consensus was they believed they had no choice.' (Daily News, 30.08.80)

Given the circumstances under which residents had lived previously (rack-renting landlords, poor facilities and not much security of tenure), it seems that many tenants were motivated by their poor living conditions in RA 33 to move to the scheme. Said one respondent in the SPP survey:

The place where we were was filthy - people urinated behind our

houses. We had to fight for water and the toilets were hopeless compared to our present ones.

With the high percentage of rent-paying tenants in the sample (95%) one of the things which appeared to be attractive about the new scheme was that tenants would be able to escape 'fussy' landlords. Many tenants reported that the landlords had had a 'dictatorial' attitude to them, and tried to control their daily lives. What emerges clearly in the survey material is that the tenants found themselves subject to the whims of the landlord.

Here there is the prospect of building our own house. Where we were, we were going to remain lodgers for the rest of our lives,

said one of the respondents in the SPP survey. It was reported that one of the landlords had pressurised his tenants to move off his land to the site and service scheme. There were also positive attractions at the other end, some real, as the comments quoted above indicate, but many only rumoured but which nevertheless encouraged people to apply for a site at the scheme.

Although it is not entirely clear what status of land tenure residents of the site and service scheme have, one of the benefits of the scheme cited most frequently by residents was that they would have their 'own land' on the scheme. The residents' frequent use of the term 'own land' probably refers to the freedom from landlords which they experience at the scheme since many of the residents are not in a position financially to purchase their own land. Another major attraction at the scheme was piped water. 57 households in the SPP survey mentioned this as an improvement over their previous place of residence. The prospect of their own pit latrine was also seen as important, in an area struck by a typhoid epidemic.

Another very important motivating factor, which resulted in considerable confusion and disillusionment when disappointed at the other end, was the widespread expectation that those who moved to the scheme would be moving into a formal township. Where and how these rumours originated is not clear but that they were widely believed is evident. Almost everybody in the SPP survey believed that the government should provide them with a 'proper' township house and many of them said they had expected to be allocated one when they arrived at the site and service scheme. 'We haven't got any of the things we were promised initially', said one respondent. 'We would like the government to build houses and rent them to us on a buying scheme.' 'We expect the government to upgrade this place as promised at meetings with Mr Purvis (the Magistrate) from Verulam', said another. And another: 'We expect the government to build houses, schools, shops and roads as in other townships.'

Some respondents also said they had been told they would be given precious Section 10 rights if they moved. If true, this would have established them as urban insiders in terms of the State's influx control policies and given them the right to seek work in Durban directly. It would have been a compelling reason for moving. In fact, however, residents at Inanda Newtown have to go through the labour bureaux at Verulam or KwaMashu to get legally approved work.

95 households indicated that the time of removal there were households which remained at their previous place. The reasons given for their staying behind were that they had not wanted to move, did not find the site and service scheme an attractive proposition or did not wish to live in tents. 9 households said they had lost between 1 and 5 members of their household as a result of the move. Some of those who had left the household had been able to acquire their own plot at the scheme. Others had moved to township areas to stay with relatives instead of moving to the scheme.

3. Demographic features

POPULATION STRUCTURE

The total population in the 100 households surveyed was 483, of whom 44.7% were children 14 years or younger. There were hardly any migrants in the sample - only 5, 4 of them female and most of them domestic servants. Nearly 50% of the adult population (15 years and older) were commuters. Because Inanda is close to Durban most of the working population are able to commute on a daily or weekly basis. This allows for a balanced sex ratio within the permanent and commuter population. The masculinity rate for this combined group was 95, indicating an almost equal proportion of males to females.

Table 2, Inanda. TOTAL POPULATION BY AGE, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

AGE	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			TOTAL
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
0 - 14	108	108	216	0	0	0	0	0	0	216
15 - 24	19	36	55	7	8	15	1	1	2	72
25 - 34	4	37	41	48	17	65	0	2	2	109 ⁺
35 - 44	2	15	17	30	13	43	0	0	0	60
45 - 64	2	5	7	10	1	11	0	1	1	19
65+	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Age ns	1	0	1	1	0	1	-	-	-	2
TOTAL	136	206	342	96	39	135	1	4	5	483 ⁺

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

Compared to the other areas surveyed by SPP in Natal, as well as the commonly accepted average of 6 or 7 members for african households, the average household size in the sample at Inanda Newtown was noticeably smaller, being 4.83. 62 households had between 3 and 5 members and a further 23 had 6 or 7 members, these two groups accounting for 85% of the total sample. Only one household had more than 10 members - it had 11. These figures are even more striking when contrasted with the results of a study undertaken in the informal settlement of Malukazi, to the south of Durban, in 1977. This found the average household to be 8.3. (Haarhoff, 1977, 20)

In the absence of a more detailed investigation, the reason for this relatively small household size remains speculative. It may reflect a fragmentation of formerly extended households as a result of the move to the scheme where plots were small, controlled and available by application to an outside bureaucracy. 67 of the households were nuclear and only 19 extended, with another 7 reporting no family beyond the nuclear couple - possibly young married couples who had moved out of parental households and established themselves on their own site at the scheme. This process of nuclearisation has, however, been noted at the

⁺ Includes 1 woman for whom no residential status was given.

other relocation areas surveyed where average household sizes were still larger than at Inanda Newtown.

Also notable about the sample is that there were relatively few female headed households. Only 17 out of the 100 households in the sample (17%) had female heads (compared to e.g. 22% at Sahlumbe, 31% at Ezakheni, 32% at Compensation). This is also something requiring further probing and analysis. It may be related to the almost complete absence of male migrancy in the sample and hence the greater marital stability. However, at Ezakheni where male migrancy was not nearly as marked as the other rural settlements surveyed, the incidence of female headed households was relatively high.

EDUCATION

Education levels were in general higher in the Inanda sample than in the other areas surveyed, a further reflection of the advantages spilling out into the area because of its proximity to Durban. Although only 22 out of the 360 people of school going age or older had attained a Std 9 or higher level of education, a further 142 had reached lower secondary school. The proportion of the population 7 years and older that had reached high school was approaching 50%. There was little difference in education levels achieved by males and females; if anything females were slightly better educated, with 15 out of the 22 members who had reached Std 9 or higher being female. Higher educational qualifications have meant that there are more skilled and semi-skilled workers in the Inanda Newtown sample than in the rural relocation areas studied.

Table 3, Inanda. EDUCATION IN THE 7+ AGE GROUP, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

EDUCATION	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			T
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
None	7	17	24	8	1	9	0	0	0	33
Lower Primary	33	39	72	7	2	9	0	0	0	81
Higher Primary	15	38	53	21	7	28	0	1	1	82
Lower Secondary	13	46	59	53	26	79	1	3	4	142
Std 9+	0	12	12	7	3	10	0	0	0	22
TOTAL	68	152	220	96	39	135	1	4	5	360

4. Economic activity

The proportion of economically active people (employed and unemployed) in the sample was relatively high, again attributable to the proximity of the settlement to Durban and its incorporation into the economic life of the city. A total of 141 people in the sample, almost all of them (135) commuters, were employed. A little over two thirds of them (97) were male and just under one third (44) female. The unemployment rate was, however, high. 30 people in the total sample were reported to be unemployed, 11 of them female and 19 male. This gave an overall unemployment rate of 18% - 20% for females and 16% for males. 11 of the 30 unemployed had been working in the service industry beforehand. At least 4 of the unemployed had lost their previous jobs as a direct result of their move to Inanda.

Although a number of those who moved to Inanda Newtown expected that they would be issued with Section 10 rights and would be able to seek work directly in Durban, the residents of the site and service scheme have not been given this preferential treatment and have to work through the Verulam and KwaMashu labour bureaux. At the KwaMashu bureau residents of that township have priority. Unemployment and problems in getting workseeker's permits were two general complaints among the households in the SPP sample. Overall household income, by urban standards, appears low. According to the Urban Foundation in late 1980:

The community of Inanda comprises a large number of domestic servants mainly females who earn between R55 to R90 per month; and about a quarter of pensioners, disabled persons, unemployed and unemployable. Less than a quarter of the fully employed people earn well over R150 per month and the rest are mainly unemployed due to influx control measures against entering the city of Durban as work seekers and as a result of a lack of job opportunities at Inanda. (Urban Foundation Natal region, 1980, 10)

Table 4, Inanda. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

ECONOMIC STATUS	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			RES ns	T
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T		
Not economically active			311	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	312
Employed	-	1	1	96	39	135	1	4	5	-	141
Unemployed	19	11	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
TOTAL			342	96	39	135	1	4	5	1	483
Economically active	19	12	31	96	39	135	1	4	5	-	171
Unemployment rate	100%	92%	97%	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	18%

EMPLOYMENT

The most important area of employment overall was in the service industry, which employed 37 out of the total working population of 141 (27%). This is because almost all the female workers were in the service industry, mainly as private domestic workers in and around Durban. For men the transport industry was the most important employer. This may be explained by the fact that in October 1980 a large group of PUTCO bus drivers moved onto the scheme, whether by arrangement between PUTCO and the Urban Foundation or not, is not known.

Most of the workers were employed in the private sector - 128 or 91%. The number of white-collar workers in the sample was low - there was only 1 professional and 1 business person, but 10 workers, all male, were classified as clerical workers. The industrial workers were divided fairly evenly between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, with semi-skilled accounting for the largest group. In this respect, the contrast between Inanda Newtown and the rural relocation areas surveyed, where skilled and semi-skilled workers were extremely rare, is a very marked one.

Table 5, Inanda. EMPLOYMENT BY SEX, INDUSTRY AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

INDUSTRY	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			TOTAL
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
Manufacturing				15	9	24				24
Electrical etc				7	0	7				7
Construction				19	0	19				19
Trade				9	15	24				24
Transport				27	0	27				27
Finance				1	0	1				1
Services	1			17	14	31	1	4	5	37
Not stated				1	1	2				2
TOTAL	1			96	39	135	1	4	5	141

Table 6, Inanda. OCCUPATION LEVEL BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

OCCUPATION	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			TOTAL
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
Professional				0	1	1				1
Business				1	0	1				1
Clerical				10	0	10				10
Sales				2	1	3				3
Service	1		1	11	25	36	1	4	5	42
Skilled				24	1	25				25
Semi-skilled				25	10	35				35
Labourer				22	0	22				22
Not stated				1	1	2				2
TOTAL	1		1	96	39	135	1	4	5	141

INFORMAL ACTIVITY

In addition to a relatively high level of formal economic activity and probably related to the high unemployment rate, there is also a very active informal sector at Inanda Newtown. As already mentioned, within a very short time of the scheme having started, a host of small informal businesses and services sprang up, supplying many of the services that were not being provided by those in charge of the scheme. Whether the level of informal activity is higher than in the surrounding informal settlements of RA 33 is not known; it would be interesting to find out. 27 households in the SPP sample reported some form of informal economic activity. The most important forms of activity were sewing and knitting (9 households) and selling of vegetables and cooking oil (5 households). The other forms of informal economic activity were building shacks, running a shack shop, selling paraffin, selling straw mats, brewing liquor, braiding hair, operating an illegal taxi service, backyard panel beating, operating a herbalist practice.

DIET

90% of the households in the sample ate three times a day, 7% ate twice a day and 3% ate once a day. The staple diet consisted of maize, bread, tea, coffee, sugar and milk. Only 4% of households ate greens daily, and 11% ate meat daily. However, 1% reported that they eat cheese and fish daily, 35% that they eat eggs daily and 65% of the households said they eat meat every second day. Although

nutritionally deficient, these bald and very general figures do indicate that the diet of the Inanda Newtown sample was, on average, superior to that found in the rural relocation settlements surveyed, with a higher consumption level of proteins.

5. Organisation and attitudes

Community Organisation at the Site and Service Scheme

At the time of the removals from Amaoti to Ematendeni, a Liaison Committee was appointed by the Verulam Magistrate for RA 33. The committee did not involve representatives of the people affected by the removal, nor was it an elected body. One of the members was a KwaZulu MP and a major landowner, Mr R. Ngcobo. At a public meeting held in March 1981, he said that 'A committee had been selected before the meeting (the meeting at which the removals had been officially announced) by the Department of Cooperation and Development. I understand this to be improper as they were giving us a committee in a straitjacket.' (Transcript of meeting at Inanda Soccer Field, 15.03.81) Mr Ngcobo accused the Department of Cooperation and Development of failing to involve residents from Amaoti in initial consultation on the new Inanda Site and Service scheme. A second liaison committee was formed, and Mr Ngcobo emerged as chairman.

At Inanda site and service scheme itself attempts were made to create a more representative Residents' Committee. Confusion surrounds its formation which took place in about October/November 1980. It is not known how the voting was conducted, what the percentage poll was, or how representative this committee is. Residents themselves did not seem to be well informed on the committee's formation. 36% of the households in the SPP sample said they did not know of any organisation in the area. (The survey was conducted soon after the residents committee had been formed.) 45% did not belong to any organisation in the area. Eight per cent 'belonged' to the residents committee. 4% were involved in starting a burial club, and 2% in starting a self-help club. (5 households did not answer this question.) When asked specifically who the leaders in the community were the Residents' Committee figured more prominently. 59 respondents mentioned members of the Residents' Committee as their leaders and many looked to it to pressurise the government to improve conditions at the scheme. However, twenty-four households did not know of any leaders in the area, while 10 households said there were no leaders in the area whom they would support. 3 households said they had heard of elections, but had not heard the outcome of the elections. Only one respondent looked to Inkatha as a leading organisation.

Once the Residents' Committee had emerged, conflict ensued between the Chairman of the Liaison Committee and the elected Residents' Committee. At the time of the SPP survey it was rumoured that an attempt had been made on the Residents' Committee Chairman's life by Mr Ngcobo's 'men', since he was seen as a threat to Mr Ngcobo's power in the area.

REACTION TO CONDITIONS ON THE SITE AND SERVICE SCHEME

By the end of 1980 the public relations exercise on Inanda site and service scheme of Ematendeni had begun to founder and disillusioned residents reported to the press that they had expected houses either from the central government, KwaZulu government or the Urban Foundation; that they had not expected to be in tents, and that the pit latrines had been flooded in the rains. (Sunday Tribune, 28.12.81)

These and other complaints emerged strongly in the SPP survey. Almost every household interviewed mentioned the lack of a 'proper township house' as a problem -

despite the fact that most of them had not lived in such housing beforehand. The rumours and the misplaced expectations that many people had had before moving to Inanda Newtown have been described already. It is evident from the survey that most people felt that if the government was going to relocate them, only formal housing was appropriate: they did not regard the site and service scheme as a breakthrough. Respondents in the SPP survey also felt there was a need for better roads and bus services and several mentioned waterborne sewerage and electricity as improvements they would like to see. Clearly their expectations had been shaped by their knowledge of the facilities that were available in the townships and their perceptions of the facilities available in the white part of the city.

For many the blame for the lack of township facilities came to lie at the feet of the Urban Foundation. A meeting of 1 000 - 2 000 residents of Inanda site and service scheme was held at the Inanda Soccer Field on 15th March 1981. As a result of this meeting the Urban Foundation was accused of 'robbing the people' and was told that it should 'withdraw from Ematendeni'. (Daily News, 24.03.81) Mr Mountain, Natal Director of the Urban Foundation 'strongly dismissed accusations made against the Urban Foundation that it was doing the South African Government's dirty work in helping to accelerate mass removals and resettlement.' (Natal Witness, 12.02.81) In an attempt to sort out the conflict the chairman of the official Liaison Committee, Mr R. Ngcobo, and the Urban Foundation Natal Director, met with the KwaZulu Cabinet at Ulundi. It seems they were told to return to Durban and to sort out their differences through consultation and Chief Buthelezi appealed publicly to the Urban Foundation to remain in the scheme. (Sunday Times, 5.04.81) Subsequently the feeling against the Urban Foundation seemed to die down, and Mr Ngcobo said a year later that his accusations against the Urban Foundation had just amounted to complaints about toilets. (Daily News, 20.03.82)

SITE AND SERVICE SCHEME AS A HOUSING SOLUTION: THE EXAMPLE OF INANDA

The press, as already mentioned, hailed the site and service scheme as a breakthrough. 'In what is believed to be a major shift in housing policy, the Department of Co-operation and Development has announced a site and service scheme to be started in Inanda ... The announcement of the scheme ... is a big step forward from the days when the relevant department simply went ahead and built thousands of standard houses and moved in the 'squatters'.' (Daily News, 15.07.80) 'The Department of Cooperation and Development has decided to alleviate hardships caused by establishing a housing scheme in the area.' (Natal Mercury, 16.07.80) Headlines such as 'the hills are alive with the sound of building' appeared. (Daily News, 10.12.80) The private sector has also responded favourably to the scheme. Corobrik was reported to be setting up a building block production unit and running training courses at the Inanda site and service scheme (Natal Mercury, 7.03.81) while the Beare Group has decided to build an initial 14 houses for its employees living on the scheme.

At the time that the scheme was first proposed, a Daily News article outlined the advantages of the scheme as follows:

- Low income families have an intermediate stage between the unsanitary, fire-prone shacks in a squatter settlement and a permanent house which is initially beyond their means.
- Areas will develop with the incomes of the residents, ultimately offering a better quality of life for their inhabitants than the rows of boxes in the established townships could.
- Landowners who rent out minute patches of ground to shack dwellers, 'trapping' them by absorbing the money they could

otherwise have saved towards a better house, would be excluded.
(Daily News, 15.07.80)

Eighteen months after the start of the scheme the Daily News commented:

To the casual observer, Inanda New Town may appear little different to the older shack settlements which spawned it - thousands of packing cases and wattle and daub houses stretching over the rolling hills to the north of Durban. But the difference and the key to this kind of scheme is that the 'mjondolos' are built on surveyed and allocated sites, each supplied with the rudiments of civilisation - sanitation, piped water and roads.
(Daily News, 20.03.82)

In reality, how do these advantages come across to residents? Clearly, clean water and toilets are a distinct advantage, but as the section on conditions on arrival shows these 'rudiments of civilisation' were probably done on the cheap and the planning of the area does not appear to have taken the topography into account. Roads became muddy and impassable when it rained and toilets were inadequate.

Furthermore, the 'intermediate stage' described by the Daily News in July 1980 was never spelled out. In fact, people moved from established shack houses into tents. Heavy rains later turned the area into a quagmire and the tents became soggy shelters. A shack ('mjondolo') costs between R150 and R500 to build, depending on the materials used. Most people put up mjondolos as the intermediate stage - the same 'unsanitary, fire-prone shacks' as in the rest of RA 33. At one point it appeared that households with an income of less than R100 a month were being refused loans to build permanent structures. This would have meant a continued existence in a shack, with no hope of a substantial house, for those with a low income. It is not certain whether this ruling has now been reversed. One resident said 'I can do as I please, provided I have enough money.'

While residents say they will benefit from 'having their own land' and being away from landlords, and 23 households said their rent was lower on the scheme than it had been before, it is doubtful that savings accrued by living on a site and service scheme will ever amount to the kind of savings needed for a better house. One resident expressed concern in these words: 'We are worried about the way people are housed without a hope for improvement.' Of the 3 000 families on the scheme only 80 had started to build permanent houses by March 1981. (Daily News, 24.03.81) By March 1982 only 420 permanent houses have been built. (Sunday Tribune, 28.03.82) It seems simplistic to glibly assume that residents' incomes will improve and lead to a 'better quality of life.' The unemployment rate in the section of the scheme surveyed by SPP was 18 at the time of the survey. Many of the workers are domestic workers, earning low salaries and vulnerable to unemployment.

General information gathered from people informed about the scheme and the survey results point to the fact that lack of proper consultation with the people to be removed led to a crisis of expectations and the self-help aspect of the scheme lauded by the press, has a tenuous status in the community itself. The difference between the reality and what people were led to expect has been outlined above in relation to housing, rations, free building materials, the right to seek work, and the 'voluntary' nature of the removal. In addition, lack of consultation led to insecurity in the form of rumour. Since the beginning of the scheme there has been a consistent circulation of rumours concerning removals, housing, building materials and the Urban Foundation. The following are examples of the rumours which have been circulating:

1. That people had to earn R235 a month in order to qualify for a loan

- to build a house on the scheme.
2. That the Urban Foundation was behind people being turned away from a motor assemblies factory where they bought CKD plywood for building of 'mjondolos'. It was felt that the Urban Foundation wanted to secure a monopoly on the sale of building materials.
 3. That a block of flats was to be built on indian land in RA 33 and that Amaoti residents would be compelled to move into the flats, and pay R30 a month rent.
 4. That a large part of RA 33 was to be expropriated and the nearby indian township of Phoenix extended.

In spite of the fact that the site and service scheme is said to offer security to residents, some residents on the scheme have expressed their uncertainty about their future:

Amongst other things we don't know the real future of this place, for example we don't know whether the government is going to build houses for us, and whether we will really be granted permits to seek work in Durban. We are trying to save enough money in order to face anything.

With enough money here one has good prospects of developing one's own household land, although that will take some time. We don't know what is really going to happen to this place in the future. Things we were promised haven't materialised yet.

The official response to the scheme has been more difficult to gauge. The central government worked with the Urban Foundation in launching it and recognition of the scheme has now been formalised through its proclamation as a township, with further provision for a township council to be established. However, the scheme is now fully occupied and those currently under threat of removal in RA 33 are not being offered sites, and have simply been told to go back to where they came from. Many of those currently under threat are resident in the same sort of shack settlement at Amaoti as the residents of the site and service scheme occupied previously.

As the brief account that follows on developments in RA 33 since the site and service scheme was launched indicates, there is considerable confusion, at least publicly, over future plans for the area. Nevertheless, it does not seem that Inanda Newtown can be regarded as a pilot project, testing ways and means of accommodating the other residents of informal settlements in the area. It appears rather to have been a once-off response by the central government to a crisis situation in which it was facing mounting pressure from influential sources in the private sector to act. As at New Crossroads in Capetown, Inanda Newtown is to be regarded as an exception and cannot, at this stage, be seen to represent a fundamental breakthrough in either housing or influx control policies on the part of the State.

6. Subsequent developments in RA 33

PROPOSED PLAN FOR GREATER INANDA

On the 22nd February 1981, Dr Koornhof announced in reply to a question in Parliament that work on the provision of piped water to Inanda would only start when a master plan for the whole area had been completed. (Natal Mercury, 23.02.81) This, as far as can be established, was the first hint that further plans affecting Inanda residents were being considered. It has subsequently emerged that a private consultant is

undertaking work on a plan for the development of the greater Inanda area as a town. The plan appears to involve the upgrading of squatter settlements rather than their removal. 'The plan will cost more than R130 million in its first five years, providing 20 000 housing sites a year, with supporting infrastructure'. (Daily News, 14.04.82) It is not yet known whether the Department has accepted the consultant's plan but the experience of the people living in the area thus far suggests that they have not.

In October 1981, the water tankers - up until then still plying back and forth from Durban - were withdrawn from Inanda. It is still not clear what took place - whether it was some bureaucratic bungle at lower levels or not - but Mr Durandt, the Commissioner from the Department of Cooperation and Development denied all knowledge of the matter. (Daily News, 19.10.81) The tanker service was resumed at a cost of R6 000 to R8 000 per week. (Natal Mercury, 23.04.82)

EVICTIIONS

At the time of writing, evictions in the greater Inanda area are already under way. According to a report presented to the Black Sash conference in Durban in March 1982, 250 000 people presently resident in the greater Inanda area are to be systematically evicted. It is said that only people who are regarded as legal residents will be relocated in the new townships. Legal residents constitute about 4% of the population according to officials. The rest are expected to 'go back to where they came from' according to the Chief Commissioner for Natal. (Natal Mercury, 15.03.82) According to a press report the government was expecting to pump R8 million in 1982 into clearing squatter areas. (Daily News, 9.03.82) The Minister of Health was reported in April 1982 as saying that in future in squatter camps 'we shall act more determinedly for health reasons' (Natal Mercury, 21.04.82) Dr Morrison, of the Department of Co-operation and Development said 'Inanda is a health hazard - we cannot tolerate the situation any longer.' (Natal Mercury, 23.04.82)

Official views on removals appear to conflict in the Inanda area. In one instance the Verulam Commissioner issued eviction notices to tenants, only to have them withdrawn by the Chief Commissioner. (See below.) In a statement in Parliament the Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development announced that only 'new' squatters in RA 33 would be subject to evictions. (Hansard, col. 5132 - 5136, 22.04.82) This seems to make residents who arrived prior to April 1982 legal. However the Assistant Commissioner at Verulam has stated that those who moved onto the land after June 1981 (in the case of SADT owned land) would be evicted. (Work in Progress, 23.06.82) The discrepancies in the position at an official level have not made the situation for tenants on RA 33 land any easier. Evictions and prosecutions are under way, in some cases irrespective of when tenants settled on the land and where they have come from. The official strategy has been to act indirectly, by putting pressure on the landowners.

Chronology of Events

The water crisis and the subsequent outbreak of cholera in December of 1981 and January 1982 seem to have given the government an opportunity to begin evicting tenants on indian owned land in RA 33.

Towards the end of October 1981 indian landlords in Amaoti were told by the Department of Health to issue eviction notices to their tenants. Pressure was placed on landlords either to put in services such as water and sanitation (at great cost), or failing this, to evict their tenants. One landlord is said to have been told to upgrade 30 households in 90 days, otherwise he would be responsible for paying the costs of transporting those to be evicted off his land. The threats from the Department were largely ignored because the tenants had nowhere to go. However, some indian landlords have been issuing eviction notices (see Appendix 3), and it is rumoured that one landlord has been actively encouraging tenants to move off his land. Landlords are being pressured by a

threat from the Department of Co-operation and Development that their land will simply be bought out by the SADT. The Commissioner at Verulam has pressured one indian landlord to furnish the names and reference book numbers of tenants on his land. Actions by indian landlords exacerbate ill-feeling between tenants and landlords in the area. Some landlords have appeared in court, and have received suspended sentences. It is reported that the Department has replied to letters of protest from outside groups by saying that they are not responsible for the eviction notices - it is the work of the indian landowners.

Two Acts have been invoked to prosecute landlords and tenants. First the Prevention of Illegal Squatters Act (1951) was used. Under Section 1(a) of this Act, however, tenants are allowed to live on privately owned land if they have the permission of the landlord. This is the case in RA 33, making many of the tenants legal in terms of this law. The government then began to prosecute landowners and tenants under the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936. In April 1982, 23 people were charged and arrested under this Act, and the landlord prosecuted.

Evictions have also taken place on SADT land in RA 33. In mid-February 1982, 43 notices of eviction were given to families in Nhlungwane in RA 33. They were told to move by April 1st. The PNAB issued the notices on behalf of the Department of Co-operation and Development who were said to be understaffed. A PNAB official commenting on the evictions said that 'In all probability, what's happening now is that they are picking up people who have moved in over the last few months and telling them to get back to where they came from.' (Daily News, 24.03.82) In fact many of the people given notices have been there for ten years or more, and have employment in Durban. Some people began demolishing their own homes because they were afraid that their houses would be completely destroyed by bulldozers.

On the day of eviction about 100 women picketed the offices of the Verulam magistrate. A deputation headed by Gobizwe Bhengu, local MP for KwaZulu, and J.T. Zulu, KwaZulu's urban representative, had talks with the magistrate. Discussions between the PFP MP, Ray Swart, and the Department of Cooperation and Development also took place and a reprieve was granted. What emerged subsequently was that the eviction notices had been a mistake. The PNAB had been asked by the Department of Cooperation and Development to provide two officers to carry out a survey of the area. Instead, they served 382 eviction notices between February and April 1982, under instructions from Mr Durandt, Department of Cooperation and Development Commissioner.

Despite this temporary reprieve, no general reprieve has been granted in the area. The Chief Commissioner of Natal has said that 'People who squat in Inanda New Town could expect to be prosecuted 'as and when they are discovered'.' (Sunday Tribune, 4.04.82) Land bought by the SADT was for the development of the area and 'such development which will be for the benefit of the entire community, will be negated if we permit further uncontrolled influx of people onto the land. Action is therefore being taken to prevent squatters from moving onto land which is acquired by the SADT.' (Sunday Tribune, 4.04.82) In a letter to the lawyers of some Nhlungwane residents, the Commissioner at Verulam states that 'The residents who are taxpayers of Verulam district have been assured of accommodation by me, but those families of other areas who have moved into the area will have to return to the area from whence they came and put their cases to the authorities in that area. I am unable to assist them.' (Letter to V.A. Mxenge and Co., 11.03.82)

In early 1982, 19 people on SADT land were prosecuted under the Prevention of Illegal Squatters Act; this case continues. Lawyers for the 19 have been able to postpone the prosecution by raising technical points. One man was acquitted on the grounds that he had not known that the land on which he was living (previously privately owned) had been sold to the SADT. Subsequent to this the Department of Co-operation and Development issued notices to tenants to declare that the land was now owned by the SADT.

Appendix 1. The relocation and housing process

This outlines the various steps in the process of acquiring a house at Inanda Newtown.

1. Rented shack
2. Apply to DCAD site office
3. Application approved if RA 33 resident and KZ citizen
4. Allocated plot
5. GG truck removes household (no charge) to site
6. Pay R10 for services and R2,60 monthly charge
7. Tents as shelter
8. Purchase CKD boards etc.
9. Build mjondolo. (Most residents have not got beyond this point.)
10. Shack as shelter
11. Apply to Urban Foundation on-site Advice Centre for house
12. First interview - family details, occupation, income, savings, general family and financial assessment
13. Second interview - discussion and preliminary choice of house type, type matched to site
14. Decision on house type and building method
15. Total savings determined, loan need calculated
16. Starting date established
17. Interest rates and monthly payments established
18. Deposit (minimum R100) paid to Urban Foundation
19. Loan application signed before Commissioner of Oaths
20. Loan application assessed and agreed upon by Residents' Committee
21. Application to DCAD
22. Application processed and approved
23. Urban Foundation notified of approval
24. Loan agreement signed and Building assistance Agreement signed
25. House built.

The relocation and housing process: some details

What follows is a description based mainly on Urban Foundation documents. It merely expands on the steps set out above and does not necessarily reflect correctly or accurately the actual implementation of procedures on the ground. However an attempt has been made to fill in the picture with information from interviews and newspaper articles.

Step 1

This was outlined in the Verulam Magistrate's factsheet of 17th December 1980. In this it is stressed that no-one would be forced to apply. However it does state: 'It is an opportunity for people to own land and to build their own houses' (emphasis added). Further an Urban Foundation document states that:

'From the community it has been understood that the government has asked the people to abandon their original shanties, to go to the areas A, B

and C under the impression that a location will be built for them. They were later promised that the government was going to lend them money i.e. in the form of cash, partly as compensation for their original shanties which were abandoned and partly for the construction of their new houses. No details were given as to how much would be given to them to start a new life, and what would happen in the event of default of repayments towards the loans. People were promised that they would buy land from the government and having paid the price they would mortgage the plots as security for government loans.' (Urban Foundation Natal Region, 1980a, 2)

Add such inducements to the immediate experience of two years of severe drought, expensive or fouled water, endemic typhoid, gastro enteritis and measles, landlords and tribal police, chronic lack of services and facilities, and one gets some idea as to what motivated or forced people to take the first step in 'voluntary' relocation.

Step 2

These two 'filtering' criteria are stated in the Magistrate's factsheet. They do not seem to have been strictly applied. 'Those who want to build are mainly those who are not originally from Amaoti/Amaotana and Inanda areas.' This has resulted in the creation of a group who are under threat of further relocation: 'They are keen to build in order to establish security for themselves so that they may not be moved should they be discovered that they in fact did not qualify to be in the scheme.' (Urban Foundation Natal Region, 1980a, 2)

This assessment by the Urban Foundation needs to be treated warily since they later make what appears to be a contradictory statement: 'It is essential that any self-housing project be accompanied by adequate security of tenure for participants as it is only once tenure has been assured that personal investment by participants in the dwelling is encouraged.' (Urban Foundation Natal Region, 1980a, 8)

From the other Urban Foundation sources it is understood that the ethnic or homeland citizenship criterion was also not strictly applied and that an (unknown) number of non-KwaZulu citizens managed to obtain sites. They are (or possibly were) detected at the loan application processing stage, by the Department of Cooperation and Development. (See steps 17, 18 for further details.)

Step 3

It is not known on what basis a particular plot or site is allocated, nor whether the resident has the opportunity to influence the allocation in any way. The sites are approximately 20 x 15 m.

Step 4

At this stage in the process the Department of Cooperation and Development made what appears to have been a mistake - they did not demolish the shack being vacated. No 'painted number on the door' system was used. Further, one (unsubstantiated) report indicates that the landlords devised a strategy to ensure that demolition did not take place. On hearing that a tenant had applied for a site in the scheme, the landlord would evict the tenant. The GG truck would then arrive to find the household and their possessions waiting at the nearest roadside, their rented shack already re-let and occupied.

Steps 5 & 6

The R10 was a once only charge for services and the monthly charge of R2,60 covers site rental. On arrival the first wave of relocatees appear to have been faced with the confusing situation described in step 1 above. Then, 'they were told to build nothing permanent except mjondolos until some time in January when the government would either be giving them cash as loans, or building the promised houses, or compensating them for

loss of their shanties.' (Urban Foundation Natal Region, November 1980a, 2)

Step 7

According to Urban Foundation sources, the supply of CKD boards to the area was initially done by indian entrepreneurs. They sold these at about R10 a sheet. They obtained them from a large timber company, Macralls. Macralls have a contract for the boards with Motor Assemblies at Prospecton. The Urban Foundation sent in hired trucks to the timber yards to buy large quantities and sell these to the residents of the scheme, at cost (transport and labour included). The Urban Foundation were able to sell these at about R3,00 per sheet. At these rates a one room structure would cost R60,00.

However, Rogers Ngcobo tells a different story. At a public meeting held at Inanda Soccer Field on 15 March 1981, he maintained that:

When I complained that our people have been robbed by the indians who sold them wood material charging them R100 with one load (hawu! yebo!) the Urban Foundation said - I left it for the Magistrate because he has tried and failed, he hit until he stopped, he has stopped since (??) Now the Urban Foundation says to me and this committee of mine, (the Liaison Committee) and this committee now Mr Ngcobo I am now going to find a way of making wood material available to your people for R35. As time went on I discovered that this was a big lie. (Ah! yebo!) Do you ever get a wood material for R35? Heh ... Heh ... (a big noise from the people). Come to me and I will come to you. And listen carefully. The bone of contention is that I do not want the people to be played games that it is the story. The story goes that you buy wood material with R10,00 each to R15,00 each (yebo ...) from each load. Each load has 20 to 30 wood materials. If you buy each for R10 or R15 then how much is that load? It is R250,00. Is it that they want to reach from the sweat of the people. (Transcript of Public Meeting, 15.03.81)

Shortly after this meeting the Urban Foundation's new site manager took the decision to discontinue the supply of this building material.

It is difficult to lend much credence to Ngcobo's allegation. However he appeared to stir up resentment against the Urban Foundation and its decision was probably a tactical retreat from a conflict area.

Steps 8 & 9

We have not been able to find any minimum building standards laid down for the erection of shacks on the scheme. However, it appears that the Urban Foundation had some minimum standards prior to the relocation of the first residents. After the first public meeting of Sunday 13th July, 1980, called by Purvis, the Verulam magistrate, the Urban Foundation Natal Region Director, in an interview with the Daily News, said:

Among the advantages of the scheme are: low income families have an intermediate stage between the unsanitary, fire-prone shack in a squatter settlement and an expensive permanent home which is initially beyond their means. (Daily News, 15.07.80)

Of the 2 800 sites occupied by July 1981, under 100 had the formal Urban Foundation house erected on them. An additional 100 had filed housing applications. Most of the remaining residents sheltered in mjondolos.

Step 10

The Urban Foundation has an on-site Advice and Technical Services Centre. It is comprised of two main sections - the Building Division and the Liaison Division. It is to the latter that the relocatee must apply for a house. From this stage on we have to rely on the formal description of the Urban Foundation documents. To date we have

not undertaken an investigation of this phase and aspects of the relocation process. Therefore we have not been able to assess the implementation of the process nor to quantify the time-cost this has meant for the relocatees.

However Rogers Ngcobo has publicly voiced the feelings of some, at least, of the relocatees:

They say so the Urban Foundation that you cannot build here - you cannot build here, if you have not opened a file with them. Where does the Urban Foundation get such a right from that you cannot build if you have not opened a file with them? You must open a file with them, it is necessary that you open a file with them. If you are able to build yourself you must, of necessity, surrender your plan to them eh ... then, then they can open a file at their own sweet time, if and when they want to. How do they assume such powers? Who conferred such powers to them? And I say now to you if you have a plan that was issued by them, or if you have a plan of your own you have a right to build yourself even if ... we even discuss this at Ulundi and we said to them if a person wants to build and he has come up with his plan, you must allow him according to his financial ability to build one room. He can add another second room, allow him to add the third one and the fourth one until he finishes building an eight room house, according to his ability. (Transcript, Public Meeting, 15.03.81)

Step 11

The applicant must produce the original receipt issued by the Township Manager for payment of the site and 'should also have some proof of the number of the site'. During this first interview or screening the following data is collected: the plot holder's district of origin, family composition, occupation, address of present employer (so that he or she can be contacted if necessary to assist the applicant financially), income, fixed monthly repayments, savings, mortgageable assets, insurance policies.

The interviewer from the Liaison Division is required to make a 'General Financial and Family Assessment' at the end of the interview. These involve the interviewer's 'General impressions with regard to family structure, job stability and income ... any ... impressions that may help to clarify his (applicant's) ability to save and repay, and which may affect his choice of house type.' (Urban Foundation Natal Region, 1980a, 3)

Step 12

House types available to the applicant are discussed and a preliminary choice is made. Only at this point is an assessment made as to whether the site allocated to the relocatee suits his or her desired housing requirements - i.e. the size and gradient of the site. If there are problems the interview is suspended, the Liaison Division requests the Building section to carry out an on-site inspection. The latter must report back within two days on the suitability of house types for the site. The applicant and the interviewer then decide on a suitable house type. The document gives no indication as to what should be done if the site is unsuitable for the applicant's requirements, nor does it indicate what is to be done if any constraints then impose extra building costs which the applicant cannot afford.

Stages 11 and 12 would best have been carried out prior to stage 3. This is further indication of the role of 'sorting out the chaos' resulting from the removals that the Urban Foundation has been forced into.

At this stage the interviewer informs the applicant that if he/she has any building materials that he/she wishes to use, then the Urban Foundation will not undertake this

phase of construction but will merely supervise.

Steps 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17

These are carried out during the second interview. The maximum loan is arrived at by deducting the applicant's total savings from the value of the house type chosen. The minimum deposit required is R100. If there is a shortfall between the deposit lodged, the loan and actual costs, the applicant can at this stage apply to the Building section for employment as a 'sweat equity' worker.

The interest rates on the loan and the applicant's monthly payments are calculated. Interest rates are very low and vary according to income level:

0	-	R150 per month	=	1%
R151	-	R250	=	3,5%
R251	-	R350	=	5%

More than R350 - applicants referred to the KDC.

The loan is repayable over 30 years. The following tables are from the Urban Foundation's document 'Conditions of Building Assistance.'

1. APPROXIMATE MINIMUM MONTHLY LOAN REPAYMENT OVER 30 YEARS:

OPTION	DEPOSIT	LOAN	1%	3%	5%
A	R250	R2 500	R8,08	R11,33	R13,56
B	200	2 000	6,46	9,07	10,85
C	150	1 500	4,85	6,80	8,14
D	100	1 000	3,23	4,54	5,43
E	100	750	2,43	3,40	4,07
F	100	500	1,62	2,27	2,72

2. RECOMMENDED MONTHLY LOAN REPAYMENT OVER 30 YEARS:

OPTION	DEPOSIT	LOAN	1%	3%	5%
A	R250	R2 500	R10,00	R14,00	R16,00
B	200	2 000	8,00	11,00	13,00
C	150	1 500	6,00	8,00	10,00
D	100	1 000	4,00	6,00	7,00
E	100	750	3,00	4,00	5,00
F	100	500	2,00	3,00	4,00

This allows for approximately 20% extra which will serve as an insurance in case of default. The above is of course the formal description based on Urban Foundation documents. The reality is somewhat different - the scheme has not provided permanent houses for the majority of its residents to date.

Steps 18 and 19

These involve filling in the loan application form and signing it before the Commissioner of Oaths. The Urban Foundation has laid down a number of prerequisites for loan applications.

Other sources of finance are to be determined. Loans are to be regarded as a 'last resort' after other finance possibilities have been exhausted. (Urban Foundation, undated mimeo, 7)

Great stress is laid on involving the applicant's employer in the financing of the house. The obvious dangers here are those of increasing the applicant's dependence on the employer. This would limit the applicant's ability to participate in industrial action and to enjoy job mobility. The Urban Foundation recommends that the employer

be supplied with a project information sheet and 'where possible in marginal cases 'pressure' to be put on employers for provision of the deposit.' (Urban Foundation, undated mimeo, 7)

Another prerequisite is that the full deposit must be paid to the Urban Foundation at the time of application. This has in practice proved to be a point of conflict.

Rogers Ngcobo gives his view:

Now about the Urban Foundation I would like to explain this to you. It said to us, Liaison Committee, you people will pay a deposit of R100 (noise, clapping of hands and yeah! yeah!) What we are quarrelling about is that I said that they must straighten their feet ... They are still holding on ... The R100 which have been paid by our people some of whom are amongst you say that they have already paid R850 deposit. Some of them have already paid R650 deposit (yebo! yebo!) do you want me to agree to this and what this deposit is for (yebo! yebo!) And I am asking now where does this new story come from which you are now doing which is unknown to us and the community. Are you suggesting that our community is a heap of earth, no! They are not a heap of earth; the people can breathe, can see, can think. (Transcript, Meeting, 15.03.81)

Ngcobo does appear to articulate the doubts and suspicions of the residents on this point. Presumably this indicates that there was a long time delay between submission of the loan application and commencement of building. This conflict further confirms the level of distrust and suspicion about the Urban Foundation and its role within the project, at least in early 1981.

On the form applicants have to fill in their KwaZulu identity numbers or indicate that they have applied to KwaZulu for citizenship. As to the latter option the Urban Foundation document adds in a footnote:

It is unclear at the present stage exactly how the Department will play this one. It is felt that provided application for citizenship HAS been lodged and the applicant can give some assurance that it has been, then there is likelihood that the Department will accept the application. (Urban Foundation Natal Region, 1980, 8)

Our information to date indicates that the Urban Foundation was wrong. It appears that only KwaZulu citizens are having their loan applications considered. This point also indicates the role the Urban Foundation is playing in assisting the State in the implementation of its ethnic bantustan policy.

On completing the loan application form, the applicant must sign it before a Commissioner of Oaths. The Township Manager, 3 km from the Urban Foundation Advice Centre, is the nearest Commissioner during weekdays. The next nearest is the police station at Kwa-Mashu.

Step 20

Every week or two 'a representative of the Liaison Committee must meet with representatives of the Residents' Committee to agree on the loan applications being processed. A representative of the Residents' Committee must sign each application before it is submitted to the Department.' (Urban Foundation Natal Region, undated mimeo, 10)

The reasoning behind this procedure, whether it has in fact been implemented and if so how successfully, is not known. Whilst seeming to be a democratic procedure it would depend on the democratic nature of the Residents' Committee. Elections for the committee were supervised by Purvis, the magistrate and the percentage poll and voting procedures are not known. An Urban Foundation source indicated that they were a little uncertain as to how representative the committee was.

Steps 21 and 22

The loan application is then sent to the Urban Foundation Durban office. There it is copied and checked and sent to the Department of Cooperation and Development. Nothing is known of the Department of Cooperation and Development processing and approval procedure nor the time it takes. We also do not have figures as to how many loans have been rejected.


Steps 23 and 24

When the loan is approved, the Urban Foundation is notified and its Planning Co-ordinator arranges with the Commissioner at FNAB for the signing of the loan agreements. The applicant must have with him/her identity documents and the site allocation papers.

Step 25

The house is then built according to the Building Assistance Agreement i.e. either completely or partially by the Urban Foundation - and the applicant is able to occupy a shelter that meets most of the standards of formal sector housing. However until recently there were very few other aspects which might constitute a community - schools, leisure and sports facilities and community services of all types, including post office, telephones, police station, community hall etc. Piped water to standpipes, pit latrines, plots and roads are the contribution of the State. Frantic attempts at some minimum standard housing are being made by the Urban Foundation.

The position of those on the site and service scheme who do not have Urban Foundation houses is insecure. All that has happened is that the Department of Cooperation and Development and the Urban Foundation have transferred shacks from landlord areas to SADT land. Whilst it is a far more controllable settlement, it is equally liable to degenerate into a slum. In order to prevent this the authorities will have to set certain minimum housing standards and force all residents to meet these or move. Since, according to the Urban Foundation, the majority of the residents have an income of less than R150 per month, the possibility of further relocations out of the scheme is a real one.



Appendix 2. Natal Mercury report, 1.07.82

Eight more Inanda homes demolished

Mercury Reporter
IN THE face of implacable police by Inanda residents to stop the demolition of houses in the sprawling black township, another eight homes were destroyed yesterday — bringing the total demolished in recent weeks to nearly 80.

Mr Albert Ntombela, a spokesman for the residents, told the Mercury yesterday that in most cases all the timber from the demolished shacks

had been confiscated and the owners warned that they faced prosecution if they called to fetch it.

Yesterday the owners of eight houses, built recently, were unaware that their homes were demolished because they were at work.

The building materials — mainly wooden poles — were carted away in a convoy of trucks owned by the Department of Co-operation and Development, to their local offices in the township.

Mr Ntombela said the residents were angry that the timber had been confiscated.

'These people made sacrifices to buy the timber to improve their living conditions.'

'Now all the timber is gone even before the families could move into their new houses.'

He said the newly built houses and extensions to existing shacks appeared to be the target of the demolition gang comprising workers of the Department of Co-operation and Development and the Port Natal Administration Board.

The swoop on newly built shacks appeared to follow in the wake of a Government clampdown on the escalation of shack development in the sprawling township near Durban.

Mr Johan Oosthuizen, Press liaison officer of the department in Pretoria, told the Mercury last night that not a single family had been displaced.

'We demolished only the shacks which have been partly built and not yet occupied. We are forced to clamp down on shack development because of the influx of residents in the area, which is already grossly overpopulated.'

'In an over-populated area there is also the grave danger of a health hazard,' he said, adding that the timber was confiscated to prevent the owners rebuilding the shacks.

Appendix 3. Landlord's eviction notice

ESTATE LATE RAMDARIE

FARMERS AND GENERAL DEALERS

c/o GENERAL BODY BUILDERS

88 Swan Road, Duffs Road, Durban North 4051

16 /II/81.

DEAR

IN TERMS OF THE HEALTH AND THE GOVERNMENT BY LAWS WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO GIVE YOU NOTICE TO VACATE FROM OUR LAND BY THE END OF DECEMBER 1981.

IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY DEMOLITION BY THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES PLEASE FIND ALTERNATE SITES GIVEN BY THE DEPARTMENT AND BUILD YOUR HOUSE.

YOURS FAITHFULLY.

R. A. Oosthuizen

Signature of Servant

W. J. Oosthuizen

Appendix 4. Letter from Magistrate, Verulam

6. 1. 1982

REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Verw. Nr./Ref. No. N2/7/3

NAVRAE/ENQUIRIES: P.P.Weber

Tel No. 032222 x 21

KANTOOR VAN DIE—OFFICE OF THE

COMMISSIONER

VERULAM

4340

11 MARCH 1982.

Mesdame V.A. Mxenger & Co
Suite 503 Damjee Centre
158 Victoria Street
DURBAN
4000

ILLEGAL SQUATTERS RESIDENT ON SUB 1 OF C AND SUB 2 OF B OF THE FARM
PIEZANG RIVER 805: DISTRICT OF INANDA

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter VNM/IN/M1698 a letter of similar vain has been passed to me by the Manager Port Natal Administration Board, Stanger for attention.

The land has been acquired by the S.A. Development Trust and a take-over took place in July 1981, at which time the residents were made aware of this fact when the Induna, Khumalo of the former owner listed all the families on the property and handed them in at my office.

The residents who are taxpayers of Verulam district have been assured of alternative accommodation by me, but those families of other areas who have moved into the area cannot be assisted and will have to return to the areas from whence they came and put their cases to the authorities in that area. I am unable to assist them.

The employment position is no concern of mine at all, as every person in registered employment assured the labour officer, Durban that he or she had approved accommodation in either Kwa Mashu and Mtuzuma or the other residential areas such as Umlazi, Chesterville, Lamontville and the hostels. These people must return to such approved accommodation described above or that which was assured by the employer on his premises and return their families to the areas where they were not unlawfully squatting. Failing this, I will have to complain to the authority that they are squatting in my area and this could result in hardship.

Due to staff problems I have loaned officials from the Port Natal Administration Board to warn all people in the area and explain the position to them. According to plans in my possession the State has other

ideas about the use of this land and the extension of time sought cannot be entertained.

CC: INANDA/VERULAM/17

TWO OTHER RURAL RELOCATION SITES

This chapter describes more briefly two other rural relocation sites in Natal/KwaZulu. The two places are:

- 1) Emakhosini
- 2) Bilanyoni

Household surveys were not carried out in these areas. The description is thus impressionistic rather than statistically quantified. Both places were visited once, in 1980.

1. Emakhosini

Emakhosini is a very small relocation settlement that was established in the early 1960s on a Trust farm in the Mtonjaneni district and it differs in some important respects from later relocation places. It is clearly visible from the new Melmoth/Vryheid road, a few kilometres past the Ulundi turnoff as one travels towards Vryheid, on the left hand side of the road: a ragged grouping of an estimated 50 households set on a dry, thorn-covered hillside. When SPP visited there in July 1980 the severe drought then ravaging northern KwaZulu was at its height and its effects were clearly visible in the community. Visually it was one of the most depressed looking places we had yet visited in Natal, very dry, with empty, sandy fields lying exposed to the sun and listless children, many of them with clear signs of malnutrition: orange-red hair and pot-bellies.

Emakhosini is one of several relocation areas developed on Trust farms in the Melmoth/Babanango area to accommodate surplus farm workers in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Others are Hlungulwana and Mpungamhlope. Like these, it is not a standard closer settlement type relocation area since there is some agricultural land attached to the settlement and the first settlers were allocated fields of about 2 acres each. The settlement started in the early 1960s with an influx of labour tenants who had been evicted from their homes on white farms in the Melmoth area. This was before the period of mass evictions of labour tenants and before the 1967 guidelines for relocation of people had been formulated by the government. It appears that the farm on which Emakhosini is established had already been acquired by the Trust and evictees were allowed to move onto it, with their stock. Although not a betterment settlement as such, it was a Trust farm and thus settlement was planned on a betterment basis, with the residential sites grouped together apart from the agricultural land. Except for this basic division of the land into residential and agricultural sections, there were no other provisions made for those moving in: no water, no sanitation, no tents. Since that time there has been a steady trickle of households into the settlement, almost if not all from surrounding farms. Conditions have not improved very much.

Although our informant at Emakhosini did not appear to be aware of it, the settlement is under a further threat of removal, since the 1975 consolidation plans call for the excision of all the Trust land bordering on the western side of the Vryheid/Melmoth road. However, very recently, the central government has indicated that this proposed excision may be waived if the Ingwavuma/Swaziland land deal goes through - that the area may, along with several other areas earmarked for excision from KwaZulu in 1975, be retained by KwaZulu in 'compensation' for the loss of Ingwavuma. (Natal Witness, 19.06.82) Whether this will materialise or not remains to be seen.

PRESENT FACILITIES

Despite the length of time the community has existed facilities are extremely rudimentary. Until very recently the only water supply was the nearby river but in 1980 a windmill and 3 taps were installed - possibly in response to the drought. For fuel people rely mainly on wood gathered in the surrounding area - this is a rapidly dwindling resource. Sanitation is an individual matter and it appears that most households do not have latrines. There is a primary school - 2 to 3 classrooms - and a mobile clinic visits the community once a week. There is also one shop, with a limited range of goods and, as would be expected, prices are high. There are daily bus connections to Melmoth, Mahlabathini and Vryheid but transport costs are high: a single ticket to Melmoth cost R1 in 1980 and is probably more by now; a single fare to Vryheid was R2,30. Although Emakhosini is now located next to a major and very modern road, it is still isolated from the urban-industrial network that that road serves by its distance from town and its poverty.

LAND

As already mentioned, the first families to be moved into Emakhosini were allocated fields - about 2 acres each. All the available land has been exhausted by now, however, and more recent incomers do not get agricultural land of their own. Land is clearly a prize, but without capital and beset by the drought, landholders struggle to produce any yield. There is no water for irrigation purposes so dry-land farming only can be practised. There are no restrictions on cattle ownership, up to a maximum of 15 head per household, but, again, grazing is limited and of a very poor quality. What exemplified for SPP the crisis situation being faced by stockowners in 1980 was the sight of a cow trying to graze a prickly pear bush growing out of the sand at the corner of one of the residential sites. The severe drought of 1980/81 has, however, only exacerbated an already bleak situation; it has not caused it.

Although the exact status of the land on which the community is established is not clear, it is administered by KwaZulu and falls under a chief/induna system of local government. The chief does not live there himself but in the nearby reserve area; one of his indunas lives on the spot. It is the induna, in conjunction with an agricultural extension officer from KwaZulu, who oversees the allocation of land and the collection of rents. Residential plots, measuring approximately 70 x 50 paces, cost R1 a year; fields R2 a year.

EMPLOYMENT

In a single visit it was impossible for SPP to gather hard statistics on employment figures but we did get some impressions. There is very little local employment and the community depends on migrant labour - to Johannesburg and Durban mainly. In 1980 workseekers tended to bypass the labour bureau system, going out to get jobs by themselves or through the network supplied by families and friends and only registering jobs with the bureau once found. With the tougher regulations

on employment of 'illegals' this may have changed by now. SPP was told that unemployment is high; how high we could not establish. Our main informant was an elderly, frail man with 3 sons working in Johannesburg; he reported that they sent 'a little' money home to support him, his wife, his youngest son and the 5 grandchildren who lived with them.

COMMUNITY ORGANISATION

The only organisations mentioned to SPP were churches - many Zionist sects - and the distant tribal structure of chief and councillors. At first our informant was very reluctant to discuss problems encountered by the inhabitants of the place but eventually he relaxed sufficiently to list several. His preoccupation was with land, or the lack of it. The main problems, in his view, were:

- the fuel shortage which is getting steadily worse; people are driven to steal wood from neighbouring white farms, but this is risky since if they are caught, they are fined;
- insufficient grazing which leads to stock straying onto white farms; if caught they are impounded and securing their release is a costly business for the owner;
- the overcrowded, township-style living arrangement which is unfamiliar and leads to friction among neighbours;
- insufficient agricultural land for all.

Depressed, isolated, impoverished and bypassed - but Emakhosini is not unique in its problems. There are countless other rural communities like it. It was, however, one of the more extreme examples of a forgotten dumping ground that SPP visited in Natal.

2. Bilanyoni

Bilanyoni is a large township that was established in 1970 some 20 kilometres from Paulpietersburg, along the Piensrante road. It is extremely isolated and despite its size - now 18 000 people (Hansard, Question 15, 28.05.82) - few people outside of its immediate environs have heard of it. It thus represents a particularly dramatic example of a large-scale relocation that has been successfully hidden from the world. It is situated on one of several Trust farms which were acquired by the SADT some time ago, in the late 1950s or early 1960s. (A topo-cadastral map of 1962 shows the area as already released.) A string of informal relocation communities extends across the adjoining Trust farms to the east of Bilanyoni itself.

Despite Pretoria's use of this area as a relocation point in the early 1970s, the people moved or already settled there are under imminent threat of a further relocation. The 1975 consolidation plans called for the excision of this belt of Trust land from KwaZulu and in January 1981 this was put into effect, along with the excision of Reserve Four, the Sodwana Bay triangle and the Driefontein farms, by means of Proclamation R19/1981. In answer to a question in Parliament about these excisions, in April 1982, Dr Koornhof confirmed that removals would take place in the affected areas. (Hansard, Question 465, 23.04.82) However, in May 1982 he denied that his Department planned to move Bilanyoni. (Hansard, Question 15, 28.05.82)

His denial does not square with the above facts. Bilanyoni is in the excised area and it seems improbable that the Department would have gone to the trouble of excising it and thus transferring this land back to the area set aside for white occupation, had it not intended to clear it as well as the surrounding Trust



farms of their inhabitants. At what stage this will happen is not known. It does not appear that provisions for an extra 18 000 township people have been made at any of the existing relocation areas in Northern Natal (Nondweni, Mondlo, Qudeni). In his reply to the question in April 1982 the Minister spoke of compensatory land being acquired in the Babanango district and it seems that the people from Paulpietersburg will be re-located at a site still to be developed on Trust land in this district - possibly at Eensgewonden, mentioned by the then Chief Commissioner as a proposed relocation site in 1979. (*Financial Mail*, 6.04.79)

The people of the excised area are not fully aware of these plans, but unsettling rumours of further removals have been circulating in the area since 1976. In 1980, before the excision, one informant told SPP that they had been told they were to be moved to the Babanango district at some stage, 'but nobody will tell you the truth here'. The fact of excision passed most people by. In May 1982 a shopkeeper and prominent local resident at Bilanyoni, having received a copy of the Parliamentary questions and answers concerning the excision of the area from AFRA, replied thanking AFRA for passing on this information to him - it clarified what had been happening and explained for him why the KwaZulu officials had suddenly left. (AFRA correspondence)

ORIGINS OF RESIDENTS

Bilanyoni was established primarily to cater for ex-labour tenants who were being evicted in Northern Natal in large numbers in the early 1970s. The first group of people to be moved there came in about 1970, from a former Anglican mission farm called Bivane; they were given temporary tin huts with toilets initially. Thereafter large numbers of people - at times up to 4 lorry loads a day, SPP was told - were moved in, mainly from farms in the neighbouring districts. The inflow of people stopped in about 1974 and since then, presumably because of the consolidation plans for the area, no new households have been accommodated at Bilanyoni.

In addition to the official relocation of people at Bilanyoni, a parallel process of informal relocation was going on around Bilanyoni on the neighbouring Trust farms. Although it seems that there were people already settled on this land, with chiefs, before the 1970s, the abolition of labour tenancy led to a large influx of newcomers: families that had been evicted off white-owned farms but chose to avoid being re-located in a township situation such as Bilanyoni by seeking private alternatives with the local chiefs. Their main objection to Bilanyoni, shared by those tenants who ended up there, was that they could not keep livestock: an unacceptable imposition for rural people, which exemplified the generally unfamiliar way of life that a township represented. These private arrangements were not sanctioned by officials, however, and in about 1977 at least one group of these people was arrested by the authorities for being illegal squatters and taken to the closer settlement of Nondweni, near Nqutu.

FACILITIES

Bilanyoni looks like an average location - an incongruous sight, as one approaches it after having driven for about half an hour along dirt roads, at first through white farmland and then through a short stretch of noticeably drier and more barren Trust land. People are now housed in brick, township-style houses arranged in long rows on the side of a hill. Each house has an outside bucket-system toilet - buckets are apparently collected and emptied by the local authorities once a week. Water is piped to tap outlets in the street; approximately ten to fifteen houses are served by one tap. There is no electricity and people depend for their fuel supply on wood and coal, both of which are expensive because of the high cost of transport. Public amenities are very basic but considerably superior to many

other relocation settlements: three shops, a primary and a secondary school, a bottle-store, a permanent clinic, a labour office, even a Post Office depot in one of the shops. There are also twelve telephones in the community, few of them in private houses.

LOCAL AUTHORITY

In 1980 there was no permanent local authority office at Bilanyoni and the nearest police station was at Paulpietersburg. At that stage the area was incorporated into KwaZulu and the local administration overseen by a KwaZulu magistrate who visited the township once a week. Since the excision (but only after a year, it appears), administration of the area has reverted to the white magistrate at Paulpietersburg.

EMPLOYMENT

The picture presented to SPP was depressingly familiar. Informants perceived unemployment as a serious problem, with one man citing that and the general uncertainty about the future as the two major problems faced by the community. It is not hard to understand why unemployment should be high. Paulpietersburg, 20 kilometres away and the nearest town, is a tiny place with no industrial development and very few openings for jobs. The nearest industrial centre of any note is Newcastle which is about 180 kilometres away and already served by a huge labour pool in Madadeni, Osizweni and neighbouring areas. Commercial agriculture in the district is not labour-intensive - mainly maize and cattle - and generally farmers have all the full-time labour they need. The people at Bilanyoni in fact represent a surplus labour force that commercial agriculture deliberately jettisoned a decade ago. Farmers do drive in with their trucks to recruit casual or seasonal labour (mainly women) from time to time but wages were described as very low. As with other rural communities, Bilanyoni depends for its survival on migrant labour, with ISCOR at Newcastle and the Sasol plant at Secunda being identified as major employers and Johannesburg and the East Rand in general as the most common areas for work.

ORGANISATION

The impression gained during the SPP field trip was that community organisation is at a low ebb. The most prevalent form of organisation is religious, with the Wesleyan, Lutheran, Baptist, Anglican and numerous Zionist churches all present in the community and the Roman Catholic church visiting. Secular organisational structures do not appear to exist. Inkatha had a branch established there formally, but it was described as being inactive. One informant complained of the lack of unity in the community which he attributed to the fact that people came originally from many different areas. It is very likely that the possibility of another removal, which has been present as an unconfirmed, remote yet persistent threat for several years, has added to people's sense of insecurity and impermanence and worked against the growth of a community spirit: and that this very lack of cohesion will prevent any effective opposition to the pending removals from taking shape. SPP was told that having been through one relocation and begun to adjust finally to life at Bilanyoni, people do not want to go through the trauma and upheaval of being moved again. However, if people were offered agricultural land at the other end (which is extremely improbable) this might induce some of them to consider another removal more favourably.

7. PHOENIX

Phoenix and Newlands East, the township described very briefly in an appendix at the end of this chapter, are both examples of ethnic relocation townships created as a result of the Group Areas Act. Both are urban townships, in Durban, and as such they differ markedly from the rural closer settlements already described. They have been built to house non-african, urban, primarily working-class communities. Phoenix was built for indian people and is located right next to a prime developing industrial area; Newlands East was built for coloured people. While the facilities they offer their residents are inadequate and of an inferior quality, they are of a much higher standard than what is made available in the rural areas of Natal for african people. This disparity reflects the cleavages that are institutionalised in South African society, between urban and rural people and within the black population group, among african, indian and coloured people.

1. Introduction and background

THE SURVEY

Phoenix is divided into 18 community areas, each of which has been planned for 1 200 - 1 300 units. Each unit is planned to be as self-sufficient as possible with regard to civic, commercial, educational and recreational requirements. So far 12 community areas have been opened with plans to open 2 more by the end of 1982. The SPP survey undertook a 1 in 20 sample in 2 of these community areas, Clayfield and Greenbury, in August and September 1981. A total of 115 households were interviewed.

INDUSTRIAL LOCATION

Phoenix lies 25 km north of Durban city centre. The township has been built on windswept hillsides, land formerly under sugar cane and owned by Natal Estates. On approaching Phoenix, one is faced by a mass of semi-detached, terraced and high density cluster houses.

This township has been located in such a way as to serve an adjacent industrial area. On the south west border approximately 250 hectares were earmarked in 1966 by the Durban City Council (DCC) for industrial development by the private sector. Sanlam has bought this area and is in the process of erecting 10 mini-factories for lease. The project at present is running 2 years ahead of schedule. Phase one of the industrial park cost Sanlam approximately R5 000 000 to develop. Phase two began towards the end of 1980 and development of the next phase is expected to begin towards the end of 1982. Prices for sites are R215 000 a hectare without rail service and R225 000 with rail service.

Early in 1982 Coca-Cola bought 7,2 hectares at the industrial park for R1,7 million. According to a Sunday Tribune reporter this must rank as one of Durban's biggest industrial land sales. (Sunday Tribune, 21.01.82) The first phase of this development will cost about R3 million, and it is scheduled for completion by the end

of 1982. With the Coca-Cola deal, more than one third of the total saleable area at the industrial park has been taken up. Development costs so far have been greater than R10 million and could treble before the park is fully sold out within a planned 8 year period. Buyers at Phoenix thus far include Barlows, Metro Cash and Carry and Ninian and Lester. The Post Office has very recently (February 1982) bought a four-hectare site costing R1,08 million for the establishment of an engineering yard.

With the shortage of industrial land in Durban, Phoenix is likely to become the major industrial growth point of the decade. (*Sunday Tribune*, 21.01.82) The demand for industrial land at Phoenix is heavy and this trend is likely to continue.

ORIGINS OF RESIDENTS

The development of Phoenix township was planned in 1966 by the DCC when Group Areas removals in the city were getting under way. The plan envisaged the construction of 22 000 housing units to accommodate some 150 000 people. Construction of the housing scheme began in 1975 and the first people moved in in 1976. Unfortunately 41 of the households interviewed by SPP did not supply the year of their arrival. Of those who did, the biggest group (35%) arrived in 1978, with 19% having arrived in the early stages of the township's development. The influx slowed down progressively after 1978 and by 1980 only a few households in the survey were moving in. By March the total population stood at 35 000 and the original plans had been boosted to a projected 220 000 people.

Phoenix is a creation of the Group Areas Act. Indian families were moved there, mainly from 'affected areas' in terms of the Group Areas and Slum Clearance Acts in and around the Durban metropolitan area. In the SPP survey 88 of the 113 households for whom this information is available, came from various parts of Durban. They represent 78% of the total. The next largest category were 20 households who had moved from indian freehold land mainly on the outskirts of the greater Durban area. Of the remainder, 2 came from a small town, 2 from a white farm and 1 from Trust land. (2 households did not answer this question.)

14 households in the SPP survey were previously living in Springfield Flats, in the fluvial area of the Umgeni River, and a further 12 were living in Tin Town, a temporary emergency camp which was situated alongside Springfield Flats. At the beginning of the century the area was largely occupied by indian market gardeners who leased their land from the Corporation. (The area has now been declared a light industrial area.) Tin Town was established in 1959 by the DCC to house, in a temporary capacity, illegal indian shack dwellers who had been moved as a result of the enforcement of health measures. After the Group Areas Act came into operation in the 1960s many more families moved into Tin Town, as Chatsworth, the then major indian township to the south of Durban, was unable to cater for the vast numbers being removed in terms of the Act. The understanding was that those who went to Tin Town would receive priority in the allocation of housing in Chatsworth. As more and more people were displaced, however, it became evident that Tin Town would be more permanent than originally intended. A survey done by Maasdorp and Pillay in 1977 found Tin Town to be a 'relatively low income area by Durban Indian standards'. (Maasdorp and Pillay, 1977, 131) Families were reluctant to be moved to Chatsworth as this would involve an increase in rent and transport costs.

In March 1976 the Umgeni River flooded its banks and many Tin Town families had to be evacuated and moved to temporary accommodation at Springfield Flats. As a result of this the housing programme at Phoenix was speeded up with the aid of R2,5 million allocated from the National Housing Commission. Families from Tin Town were given priority in the Phoenix housing scheme.

A significant number of families surveyed by SPP (14) came from New Farm, indian-owned land which was expropriated by the Department of Community Development for the development of Phoenix. New Farm was an important sugar growing region and the indian farmers also grew fruit and vegetables. Over the years their holdings became fragmented into uneconomic farming units. Household income was derived more and more from sources other than farming. During recent years, therefore, many landlords were only too keen to rent the land for housing purposes. This process was particularly rapid from the 1970s onwards as a result of the vast housing shortage for indians in Durban. According to research carried out by Maasdorp and Pillay (1978, 18) 36% of the people living at New Farm in the 1970s had moved there after having been evicted in terms of the Group Areas Act. Accommodation costs were low at New Farm, the common site rental being R30 per annum and it is significant that the main reason given amongst the sample in Maasdorp and Pillay's survey for not wanting to move to Phoenix was the high rental they would have to pay there. All residents had been moved from New Farm by the end of 1975. Landowners were compensated, but tenants were not.

Eight families in the SPP sample arrived from Chatsworth, the older indian Group Areas township in Durban established in 1962/63. A number of these families were probably people living either in outbuildings in Chatsworth or in very overcrowded conditions because of the shortage of housing there. A further 23 families came from Overport, Mayville and Sydenham, residential areas close to the city centre. Most of these families had been affected by the Group Areas Act when their areas were declared white.

A few families came from the centre of Durban, from Greyville and Lorne Street. They were forced to move as a result of slum clearance. Because of the acute shortage of accommodation for indians in the central area, these people had little option but to move to Phoenix. Eight families arrived from Clairwood, a mixed residential and light industrial area which the DCC has been attempting since 1956 to have rezoned as an industrial area for whites. Two families arrived from Sea Cow Lake, previously a market gardening area alongside the Umgeni River.

Only one family arrived from Greenwood Park and one from Reservoir Hills, both fairly affluent areas. This corresponds with the almost total lack of professional people in the sample. The majority of people arrived at Phoenix from poor and working class areas, this accounting for the large number of semi- and unskilled workers among the sample population. Only 10% of the SPP sample had owned their previous dwellings. 87% had rented them - about two thirds of them from private landlords and one third from the local authorities. The remaining 3% of the sample reported that they had occupied their previous dwellings free of charge.

The majority had come from residentially stable backgrounds - 62 of the 115 families surveyed had lived in their previous place for 10 years or more. 24 of the families or 20% had lived in their previous houses for between 21 and 50 years. However another 20% had only lived at their previous place for between 0 and 4 years. The survey does not indicate to what extent this latter group of people had previously been forced to move as a result of the Group Areas Act or slum clearance. 11% of the sample had attempted to stay in their previous places, by putting up some form of resistance, but to no avail. Of a total of 112 families for whom this information is available, 14 had received compensation for their previous dwellings and 98 had not, chiefly because they had not owned the houses.

Table 1, Phoenix. LENGTH OF TIME PEOPLE LIVED AT PREVIOUS PLACE

NUMBER OF YEARS	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
0 - 4	24
5 - 9	19
10 - 20	38
21 - 40	20
41+	4
Years not stated	10

THE REMOVALS

Removals to Phoenix were and are conducted in a very different manner from those removals taking place in the rural areas. People were not removed by direct force but given a period of notice during which they could look for alternative accommodation. Because of the shortage of housing, however, most people had no alternative but to go to Phoenix. 28 of the families interviewed by SPP said they had moved to Phoenix of their own volition, 44 said they were evicted and decided to move there and 42 families said they were evicted and then removed. Since they were not moved by GG truck, they probably meant by this that they were compelled to go there since nowhere else was open to them.

On arrival at Phoenix the majority of households were provided with water and latrines in their houses. 65% were provided with electricity only after they had moved in. There were some roads and buses but very few taxis. Shops were few and far between and schools were only established in 1978. Churches, temples and mosques were not built at the beginning and a fulltime clinic was only opened in 1980.

43% of households interviewed said they paid a lump sum for their house. This can be interpreted as a deposit on buying a house, but it seems more likely that most of these lump sums refer to deposits on rent and electricity as only 13% of the sample have bought or are buying their houses. All rent is paid to the DCC. Each community area has a combination of sub economic, economic and houses for sale. In order to buy a house, residents need to pay a deposit and continue paying instalments which amount to about the same as paying rent. Rents are fixed on a sliding scale, according to income. In October 1981 the average rent was calculated to be R52,04 with lights etc. coming to a further R20,35 - thus R72,39 total on average. (Information supplied by CRU.) In February 1982 rents were increased. High rentals (in relation to income earned) have been a major source of discontent and community organisation within Phoenix.

COMMUNITY ISSUES

Attempt to excise Phoenix from DCC jurisdiction, 1978

The area in which Phoenix is situated was initially outside of the area of jurisdiction of the DCC, within the magisterial area of Inanda. Once the scheme had been planned, arrangements were made for Phoenix to be incorporated into the Durban municipality. On 13th April 1978, however, the DCC published a notice in the Provincial Gazette stating it had made application to the Administrator of Natal to excise Phoenix from the city of Durban, largely, it would seem, to save the Council money.

Once the residents of Phoenix became aware of the threat of being excised they began to mobilise around the issue. Mass meetings were held in 1978 and petitions stating the residents' aversion to autonomy were signed. Mobilisation

around this and other issues necessitated the development of a community organisation, the Phoenix Working Committee (PWC). Each community area in Phoenix has its own residents' association and from these representatives were chosen to sit on the PWC. As Phoenix has no Local Affairs Committee to represent it on the DCC (because of opposition to such a body) PWC has made a number of representations to the DCC although they are not officially recognised by it. The SPP survey found a fair amount of support for the PWC amongst the residents interviewed.

The autonomy of Phoenix would have meant an increase in rent and rates as well as a 10% rise in electricity as the DCC adds 10% surcharge to electricity it sells to areas outside the Durban municipality. It would also have involved the provision of community facilities by the autonomous local authority. In May 1978 an anti autonomy week, organised by the PWC, attracted police attention.

Many organisations and individuals lodged letters and memoranda objecting to autonomy for Phoenix. Amongst these bodies were the PWC, Black Sash and National Council for Women. PWC outlined the following grounds on which it objected to autonomy:

1. The proposed severance is on racial lines and implements the policy of apartheid and is therefore objectionable in principle.
2. The City Council's proposals are against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the residents of Phoenix.
3. There has been no prior consultation by the Durban City Council on the issue with the residents of Phoenix.
4. The proposed severance will further impoverish an already poor community.
5. The severance at present proposed by the Durban City Council is premature.

As a result of the overwhelming objection, on 8th August 1978 the appointment of a Board of Enquiry into the autonomy issue was announced in the press. By August 1979, after the Board had carried out a full investigation, the DCC decided to allow Phoenix to remain within the Durban municipality.

Housing standards and community facilities

At about the same time as the Phoenix autonomy issue, another issue was raging - the housing tender debate which concerned the lowering of housing building standards. There were charges that a tenderer was attempting to lower building standards with an alternative plan he had submitted for a new Phoenix contract. Although the allegations proved unfounded, they did highlight problems in tender procedures and the system has since been altered so that the only tenderers accepted are those that conform with the City Engineer's specifications. (Natal Mercury, 28.07.78) In July 1978, the PWC asked the DCC not to accept the next tender without prior consultation with the people of Phoenix.

In February 1979 the lack of schools and transport in Phoenix became a focal area; from the SPP survey in 1981, it can be seen that transport still remains a major problem for most residents. Soon after this and before the autonomy issue had been finalised, a statement in the Daily News (14.03.79) claimed that poverty in Phoenix was reaching crisis proportions and local civic leaders were planning to take the issue up with the Minister of Indian Affairs. In April 1979 a protest over the lack of amenities took place. Telegrams were sent to the DCC and the Department of Indian Affairs.

The Rents issue

In Phoenix there is no subsidy on housing - the selling price of houses and the rents are levied at levels to recover all costs. In March 1980 the DCC announced

proposed rent increases and in April a large group of women marched to the DCC in protest over the proposed rent increases. The Sunday Tribune (27.04.80) reported that Phoenix could become a ghost town if rents increased, as residents were prepared to return to squatting rather than starve.

In May 1980, the Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC) was formed by various organisations to deal with the numerous problems associated with black housing in Durban. In addition DHAC was formed to co-ordinate the activities of the various residents' associations, which represent people living in municipal housing schemes in different areas in Durban. It arose in response to a need being felt by these associations for greater unity and co-ordination of work on certain issues. In September 1980 DHAC presented a memorandum to the DCC stating that Durban's housing schemes have been plagued by high rentals from their inception, in particular those at Sydenham Heights, Phoenix and Newlands East. The memorandum gave four reasons for this:

1. It seems that a price higher than the market value was paid for the land.
2. The choice of land was poor: 50% of land in Phoenix is unusable for the construction of houses.
3. Construction costs were high, compounded by the presence of ecce shale in large proportions.
4. National and local policy in financing housing schemes are inadequate - the only form of State subsidy is the provision of loans at low interest rates. The municipality makes an absolutely minimal contribution to the operations of all schemes and attempts to recover all costs. (DHAC, 1980)

After much protest about the proposed rent increases in November 1980, the residents gained a victory when the DCC deferred rent increases for 4 months. By January 1981 Phoenix residents were in arrears with their rent and 1 000 were living without electricity. (Post, 14.01.81) In March 1981 when the proposed rent increases were to take place, a massive rent boycott was organised. 2 000 households refused to pay March rents. The boycott initially received widespread support and mobilised residents around the rent issue. After a period, however, residents began withdrawing from the intense struggle. The boycott did not, in fact, succeed in making the DCC defer rent increases and rents went up in March 1981. In October 1981 the DCC announced that rents would go up again as from the 1st January 1982. There has, however, been no mass mobilisation around this issue again, just a few low profile residents' association meetings to discuss the issue. The number of community struggles which have taken place in Phoenix have nevertheless led to an increased politicisation of its people and have nurtured an incipient community spirit which has helped to counteract the socially disruptive effects of relocation.

2. Demographic features

POPULATION

In analysing the results of the survey, the population was broken down into permanent residents and commuters, the former being those residents who spend all their time in Phoenix, and the latter those who commute daily to and from Phoenix. School children, old people and women thus predominate in the permanently resident figures. There is a high degree of adult commuting which would be expected - Phoenix is a dormitory township for Durban and there is very little local employment. The results of this demographic analysis illustrated graphically one of the major

differences between Phoenix and the other african and rural relocation sites surveyed by SPP - there is no migrant labour at Phoenix. Most of the adults who commute - 72% - are male.

Table 2, Phoenix. POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY AGE, SEX AND RESIDENCE STATUS

AGE IN YEARS	PERMANENT POPULATION			COMMUTER POPULATION		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
0 - 14	162	125	287	0	1	1
15 - 24	45	56	101	32	27	59
25 - 34	7	51	58	42	8	50
35 - 44	7	26	33	35	12	47
45 - 64	5	21	26	21	2	23
65 plus	3	6	9	0	0	0
TOTAL	229	285	514	130	50	180

HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION

The majority of households (66 or 57%) contain between 5 and 7 members, the average size being a little over 6. As the houses are small and cater only for nuclear families, most people (76 of those families interviewed) live only with their nuclear family. 22 live in extended families, 6 in compound families and 10 in extended - compound families. There were no single member households in the sample and only 2 households of 2 members each. At the other end of the scale there were 8 very large households of 10 or more members - 3 with 10 members, 1 with 11 members, two with 12 and 2 with 13 members each.

Compared to the rural relocation areas surveyed, the number of female household heads in the survey was very low: only 12 or about 10% of the total. Male dominance within the family is thus far more pronounced in this area than any other surveyed. The female heads were, with one exception, all over 35. Although most of the male heads were over 35 as well, nearly a third were under 35.

Table 3, Phoenix. HOUSEHOLD HEADS, BY AGE AND SEX

AGE	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
15 - 14	2	0	2
25 - 34	31	1	32
35 - 44	41	5	46
45 - 64	29	6	35
TOTAL	103	12	115

MARITAL STATUS

73% of the permanent population in the sample had never been married because most of them were children. 22% were married, 0,19% divorced and 3,8% widowed. In the commuter population 33% had never married, 65% were married and 2% widowed. The divorce rate seems particularly low compared with the average divorce rate in South Africa. This would seem to be the result not of families having a lower incidence of marital strife (the Child Welfare Society claims that the incidence of family disorganisation has been high in families since their removal to Phoenix) but to various other factors. The women in this area would find it difficult to rely on extended family support because of the lack of accommodation for large families,

should they choose to leave their husbands. Financial support is difficult if they do make the choice to leave their husbands as almost all the women in the sample have a low standard of education and their prospects of finding a job would not be good. A married woman is not allowed to rent a council house if she and her husband were previously living together in a council house and he remains in the house once she has left him. She has to wait until the divorce goes through before she can rent another house in her own name.

EDUCATION

In the permanent population 175 people (34% of the total permanent population) had no education, 59% of these being female. 105 of these were of pre-school age, however, and have thus been eliminated from Table 4 below. The degree of illiteracy is higher among the permanent than the commuter population - whereas 17% of the permanent population in the survey had had no education, only 9% of the commuters had had none. Proportionately the standard of education achieved by the permanent population was lower than that of the commuters. Part of the reason for this is the preponderance of females in the adult population permanently resident. Females have generally been less well educated in the Indian community, a generalisation borne out by the results of the SPP survey. 73.5% of the population 7 years and older without any formal education were female and just over a quarter (25.6%) of the population with a Std 9 or higher education was female. The lower literacy level amongst females is probably a result of previous generations' reluctance to send girls to school when money was in short supply and they were useful in the performance of household chores. However, proportionately more females in the permanent population group were found to be in each level of education than in the commuter population and thus, as commuter females are older women, it seems that a higher standard of education is now being encouraged amongst women than was previously the case.

Table 4, Phoenix. EDUCATION LEVELS OF THE POPULATION 7 YEARS AND OLDER, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

EDUCATION	PERMANENT			COMMUTER		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
None	14	56	70	9	8	17
Lower Primary	47	46	93	6	5	11
Higher Primary	50	67	117	31	14	45
Lower Secondary	44	61	105	71	21	92
Std 9 +	16	8	24	13	2	15
TOTAL	171	238	409	130	50	180

Despite the generally low standard of education - only 39 or 7.9% of those 7 years and older in the sample had attained a senior secondary or higher level of education - the standard is far higher than in the rural areas studied. Nearly 50% of the population of school-going age or older had reached secondary school, even though most of this group were in the lower secondary standards. As one consequence, the percentage of skilled and semi-skilled workers in the sample was relatively high - far higher than the rural areas surveyed, though comparable to the position in Inanda.

DIET

The results of that part of the survey dealing with diet indicate a generally low level of nutrition in Phoenix, and reinforce the points already made, that this is a poor, working-class community. Most of the households (74%) reported that they ate three times a day, but a significant minority ate less than that - 19% twice a day,

6% once a day and 1 household, clearly destitute, reported they ate less regularly than that. Starch and sugars were the basis of the diet. 78% of the households said they ate starch (rice, potatoes etc.) daily, 86% had milk daily, 99% had tea and coffee daily, 96% had sugar daily and 93% had bread daily. Most families did eat meat but sparsely, with 40% having meat twice a week and 37% fish once a week, while the rest ate meat less frequently.

Although the comparison is a crude one with this very general data, the aggregate consumption of protein - meat and milk - is higher in Phoenix than in the other areas surveyed. Nevertheless the information above describes a diet that is inadequate in absolute terms and suggests widespread poverty. These results are borne out by evidence from other sources. In May 1982 the Natal Mercury carried a story reporting on the level of poverty in Phoenix. It noted that according to a survey carried out by the Phoenix Indian Child Welfare Society, 53% of families in 5 Units spent more than a quarter of their income on rent and thus had very little money left for food and clothing. This survey also found that over 50% of the families interviewed were living below the poverty datum line. It noted:

The characteristic low wages of the tenants, high rents, increased transport costs and rising food prices manifest themselves in the under-nourishment of children, a feeling of hopelessness among many families, and eviction. (Natal Mercury, 18.05.82)

3. Economic activity

EMPLOYMENT

The survey did not pick up a precise picture of employment patterns before people moved to Phoenix; these questions caused some confusion and not all aspects were answered satisfactorily. On the available information, there used to be a total of 95 workers across the 115 households before the move to Phoenix. Over half of them (59%) were in industrial jobs - 23% of the total were skilled, 23% semi-skilled and 13% unskilled workers. 15% were in clerical jobs and another 15% in the service industry. Only 2% worked in business, 2% in sales and 2% in farming.

This pattern has been retained at Phoenix. There was only one professional person in the sample; semi-skilled industrial workers formed the largest single occupation group (25% of the total), with skilled and unskilled workers the two next most significant groups. Clerical and service jobs were also important, together accounting for 27% of the workers in the sample.

An analysis of the sectors in which people worked showed manufacturing as by far the most important, employing over a third of the total employed, followed by services, employing a little less than a quarter, followed by trade employing a little over 10%. Women accounted for only 27% of the total workforce, but the areas in which they worked did not differ substantially in ranking of importance except for an unexpectedly large group of 7 employed in the mining industry. It appears that most of these must have been clerical assistants in a mining firm's office.

The population surveyed were thus largely blue collar workers, relatively few were white collar workers and almost none were professionals. It is likely that when people were evicted from their previous places, professionals were able to afford to move elsewhere, whereas the relatively unskilled workers could only afford to move to Phoenix. In the permanent population 11% of the sample were self employed, 66% employed by the private sector, and 22% by the public sector. In the commuter population an even greater percentage were employed by the private sector,

and only 15% by the public sector, with 0,58%

Table 5, Phoenix. EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

OCCUPATION	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			T	T %
	M	F	T	M	F	T		
Professional	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0,5
Business	0	0	0	3	0	3	3	1,5
Clerical	0	1	1	19	6	25	26	14
Sales	0	0	0	12	3	15	15	8
Service	2	0	2	17	6	23	25	13
Farm	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	1
Skilled	2	2	4	21	6	27	31	16
Semi-skilled	1	0	1	36	11	47	48	25
Unskilled	2	0	2	17	13	30	32	17
Not stated	1	0	1	4	2	6	7	4
TOTAL	8	3	11	131	48	179	190	100

Table 6, Phoenix. EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

INDUSTRY	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			TOTAL
	M	F	T	M	F	T	
Agriculture	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Mining	0	0	0	3	7	10	10
Manufacturing	1	0	1	39	29	68	69
Electrical etc.	0	0	0	4	1	5	5
Construction	0	1	1	9	0	9	10
Finance	0	0	0	5	1	6	6
Trade	1	1	2	18	1	19	21
Transport	3	0	3	13	0	13	16
Services	1	1	2	34	6	40	42
Not stated	2	0	2	5	3	8	10
TOTAL	8	3	11	131	48	179	190

UNEMPLOYMENT

Of the 514 permanent residents involved in the survey, 494 (96%) were not economically active, 42% of them male and 57% female. Most of this group were either school children or housewives. This left a total of 9 unemployed in the permanent resident group, most of them male. In the commuter population 179 out of the 180 in this group were in employment; the single person not employed was a girl in the 0 - 14 age group and presumably attending school outside of Phoenix. Thus unemployment in the Phoenix sample was not high, amounting overall to only 4,5%. What the figures do not record, however, is the level of underemployment in the sample.

Table 7, Phoenix. UNEMPLOYMENT BY RESIDENTIAL STATUS

	PERMANENT		COMMUTER	
	Employed	Unemployed		
Employed	11	9	179	190
Unemployed	9	0	0	9
Total economically active	20	9	179	199
Unemployment rate	45%	0	0	4,5%

OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME

Only 2,6% of the sample or 3 households mentioned that they engaged in informal economic activities. In one family the wife of the head gave religious education to children for which she was paid. Another family sold excess fish after a weekend's hobby fishing. Their immediate neighbours readily buy this. The third household which engaged in informal economic activities stated only that they sometimes helped someone else and did not state in what field. 10% of the sample said they received gifts in the form of money, food and clothing as an aid to subsistence. As most of the families came from the city, the questions relating to agriculture were irrelevant.

4. Organisation and attitudes

The majority of households who answered the question about their relationship with neighbours reported that they have a positive relationship. 24 of the 64 who answered this question considered themselves to have a satisfactory relationship and 14 did not socialize at all with neighbours, 4 having a very poor relationship. A number of women interviewed appeared afraid of mixing with neighbours lest it should lead to trouble. Others just did not have the time or motivation, being fully occupied with housework and child rearing.

The questions regarding organisations to which people belong, as well as who community leaders are, were leading questions and people were probably reluctant to answer these truthfully or fully to a stranger, thus biasing the results. 87 of the households claimed that none of their members belonged to an organisation, 12 people belonged to religious organisations, 5 to sports clubs, 2 to social clubs and a couple of others to various other non political organisations. Only 6 households admitted to supporting civic organisations, 5 of them supporting the Phoenix Working Committee and 1 the Local Affairs Committee. The Phoenix Working Committee was the most popular choice of leader within the community but a high percentage of those respondents who answered this question - 66 out of 95 - said they did not know who their leaders were. Of the 29 who did, 18 singled out the Phoenix Working Committee, 8 the Local Affairs Committee, 2 the different residents' associations and 1 the South African Indian Council (SAIC).

In the recent elections for the SAIC Phoenix was one of the staunchest supporters of the anti-SAIC lobby which called for a boycott of the elections on the grounds that the SAIC was an institution of apartheid. Only 149 of the eligible voters at Phoenix went to the polls - a 4% poll, one of the lowest recorded and a clear indication of the level of politicisation within the community.

In their answers to the questions concerning the major differences between Phoenix and their place of origin, problems experienced and improvements they would like to see, respondents raised issues which have long been areas of organisation within the community. The one positive improvement noted between Phoenix and their places of origin for many was the existence of electricity in Phoenix. High rent and the distance from the centre of town and jobs were the other two major differences noted. Both of these were seen as pressing problems - 45 respondents saw high rent as a major problem and 25 saw transport costs as a problem. Other problems mentioned included a lack of a garden, the smallness of the houses, maintenance problems, crime, lack of medical and recreational facilities, the absence of a police station and the distance from the city.

Recreational facilities including a cinema were amongst the improvements most in

demand - 38 people mentioned the need for these. 29 mentioned the need for shops, 20 for better transport and 14 for lower rents. More religious institutions, pavements and a hospital (32 mentioned this⁺), bigger and better houses, a creche, better drainage, police station, public telephones and regular and free maintenance of houses were amongst desired improvements.

In Phoenix, far more strongly than in any other area surveyed by SPP in Natal, community organisations do exist which have taken up some of these issues in the past and achieved some gains. Although people only started moving there from 1976, it has a full history of community organisation and resistance. No high profile campaigns have taken place in Phoenix since the early part of 1981, when increasing rents was an issue. However people were made aware of many other issues other than high rents through that campaign. The low percentage poll in the SAIC elections indicates that generally people are more politically aware than in many communities. In the course of previous campaigns the people of Phoenix have acquired organisational skills and experience which will stand them in good stead in trying to achieve the improvements they wish to see in their lives.



⁺ There are plans for a hospital to be built at Phoenix, but only for 500 beds, whereas it has been recommended by the DCC and other bodies that the hospital should cater for at least 1 000 beds.

Appendix 1. Newlands East

ORIGINS

Newlands East is a Group Areas township for coloured people, on the outskirts of Durban. Government plans for the construction of Newlands East started in 1971/1972. The Coloured Affairs Department (CAD) bought the land from the Durban corporation with the aim of creating a distinct, separate coloured township, 20 km out of Durban. People were first moved there in 1978.

Reasons for being moved in are multiple:

- Some people had been living in very overcrowded conditions in their previous homes. People renting houses in areas like Sydenham would sublet servants quarters and garages, so that a whole family might be living in a single garage. Some of these people had put their names on a waiting list for houses to rent, with the CAD, as much as ten years previously. The houses they were finally offered were in Newlands East.
- Other people had to leave the places they had been living in before because the area had been declared a slum and was to be cleared. The houses were pulled down and often the area would then be used for industry. Coloured people living in such places in the greater Durban Area were given houses in Newlands East.
- Other people, who were living in mixed areas and areas not set aside for coloureds, were forced, by the Group Areas Act, to find other accommodation. One of the only legal places they could find was Newlands East. Some families were allowed to live out their leases in houses in Indian areas, but were not allowed to renew the lease.
- Many people moving into the Durban area from elsewhere in South Africa, when applying for a house to rent through the CAD, are allocated places in Newlands East.

Relocation into Newlands East is gradual and many people don't see themselves as having been relocated; they feel they chose to move. Some people are trying to move out, back to Wentworth and Sydenham, but accommodation there is very scarce.

HOUSING

Newlands East is being built in sections. One section of houses is built, and when this is nearly filled up, by people being moved in, building on the next section starts. By August 1980 Section I was built and largely occupied, and Section II was in the process of being built. The final plan calls for 5 sections. Approximately 5 000 people were reported to be living in Newlands East by August 1980.

The houses are basically all built in the same pattern, small, double-storeyed, with one, two or three bedrooms. (One woman, whose husband is a builder, told the SPP fieldworker that if her husband had built a house anything like the ones at Newlands East, it would never have been passed by the building inspector. She claimed that there is more sand than anything else in the bricks and that the

buildings are badly and carelessly built.)

It is ironic that although a large number of men in Newlands East are builders wanting work, none of them have been given contracts with the companies building at Newlands East.

The houses are very basic when people move in - cement floors, no plastering, no tiling. All the houses/flats have running water, electricity and inside flush toilets. Most but not all have hot water. When they move in, people must decide whether they want to buy their house or rent. Those who choose to buy will begin to pay instalments, and are allowed to improve their houses. Those who rent need to get permission to make any improvements on their houses, and pay a fee for what they do.

Officially when the Durban City Corporation is allocating flats or houses to people in Newlands East it allocates them according to family size - the larger the family the more likely it is to get a bedroom flat. In practice people say that they have no choice over which house/flat they will get, and that no account is taken of family size or needs.

Rent is meant to be paid according to the income of the household - households earning more pay higher rents. But in practice this is not always so and there are cases of people being charged rents higher than their income. High rent is one of the biggest complaints in Newlands East, as it is in Phoenix. One woman said the reason that the rents were so high is that the land bought from the Durban Corporation for developing Newlands East is bad land - much of it is not suitable for being built on. To make up for the loss of income from the places where it is impossible to build, the CAD has to charge high rents on existing houses.

FACILITIES

Facilities are poor (although there have been some improvements since the place was first established) and this is a cause of resentment. Most buses operating from Newlands East are PUTCO buses. When people first moved to Newlands East the bus service was very bad and irregular and buses did not come right into the area but stopped on the outskirts. The Residents' Committee fought for regular buses and have pushed to get buses into all areas of Newlands East, and the service is better now.

There are special buses to take children to school. At first they had to pay fares, but now it is free. Perhaps 20% of the families own cars. Most of the migrant workers have transport costs paid by their employers (e.g. to and from Sasol, or Swaziland).

The only shop in Newlands East is in a house that was already there when the land was bought by the CAD. It has been converted into a shop. It sells 'everything' but is very expensive. Most people try to do their shopping in Durban or Pinetown, although some things are also bought from vans that drive up and down Newlands East, selling goods at even higher prices than the Newlands East shop. (The vans are owned by a store just outside Newlands East.) There are no bottle stores, but many houses have shebeens - 'every second house', according to one respondent.

When the first people moved into Newlands East there was no school at all. Since then a high school and a primary school have been built.

There is no community hall and there are no church buildings. All services are held either in the school building or outside. Three denominations want to build, and the CAD says they will have to buy the land. The largest church, the Catholic one, would have to pay R36 000 for the land alone before it started on building costs. Some people think this is another way the CAD is trying to get back some of the money it spent on buying up the area from the Durban Corporation.

There is one clinic. Like the shop it is converted from an old house. A doctor comes once a week. The clinic provides no visiting service so people unable to get there are not catered for. There are 2 doctors in the area, with private practices, both very expensive.

There is a rent paying office in Newlands East. All other offices of the Durban City Corporation and all the officials dealing with Newlands East are in Martin West Building in Durban.

There is no police station. The nearest police station is in Greenwood Park, just outside Newlands East. Among the residents there is generally a very hostile feeling towards police, but some would like to have a local Police Station because of the crime in the area.

WORK


The nearest places of wage employment are Durban and Pinetown. Many people approach social welfare agencies, both private and government, for help in finding work. People also get jobs by applying personally to places, or through the newspaper, or friends. Many women work in factories - especially textile factories.

Many men, perhaps 40%, are migrant workers, working in places like Sasol, or Swaziland. The pay is much better there. Some come back once a fortnight, others once a month.


ORGANISATIONS

There are very few community organisations. There is a Newlands East Residents' Committee, started by the first residents of Newlands East. It has pushed for better bus services, and has done a survey on rents in Newlands East. There is also a Women's Improvement Group, and some Christian groups, formed out of the churches.

The level of crime and violence in Newlands East is very high. Contributory factors are that a lot of people are unemployed - especially the younger people - and many of the men are migrants, and so away for a lot of the time.



PART FOUR CASE STUDIES OF THREATENED AREAS





1. MATIWANE'S KOP

1. Introduction

Matiwane's Kop is the only threatened community in Natal where a household survey was undertaken by SPP. As well as providing an insight into the conditions prevailing in this freehold area (black spot), the survey allows for some useful comparisons to be drawn between an established rural community and the various relocation areas (particularly the rural ones) that were also surveyed by SPP.

Matiwane's Kop is a very large rural community of well over 12 000 people,⁺ situated on 3 300 hectares of land, about 25 km north of Ladysmith. Formerly african freehold, its landowners were in fact expropriated by the State in 1980. Many landowners seem to be unaware of this, however, and doubts have been raised as to the legality of the manner of expropriation - whether the notices of expropriation were served in the correct manner or not. As in so many black spots, the significance of that expropriation has not really penetrated into the community - the loss of title is buried among the papers in the Deeds Office in Pietermaritzburg and both social relationships (e.g. that between landowners and tenants) and the daily routine do not appear to have been seriously affected as yet. The most tangible restriction to have flowed from the expropriations (which many do not understand) has been the curtailment of further property transactions; this only affects a small segment of the total community, however. The community knows it is under threat - all the houses have been numbered - but many are hopeful of a reprieve. They have, through their spokesmen, registered strong opposition to being removed and received a fair amount of publicity as a result. They believe they have managed to stave off the threat, at least for the time being, and it is this, coupled with their continued occupation of the land, that is of significance to them - not the actual legal status of the property.

The Klip River district saw a large number of land purchases by africans in the 19th century and Matiwane's Kop is only one of a number of freehold farms to have been designated as black spots by the present government. On its southern boundary lies Jonono's Kop, with which it is closely linked. North of it, to the east and to the west, lie Ndongane and Lusitania respectively; further south, separated from Matiwane's Kop by a couple of ranges of hills, lies the Driefontein block of farms. Next to Ladysmith itself and incorporated into the municipal area is Umbulwane. None of these properties have yet been removed but all are under threat. In addition four other freehold areas have been either wholly or partly removed in the district to date: Khumalosville in the early 1960s, the Roosboom complex between 1975 and 1977, Criemen in 1977/78 and over 11 000 tenants from the large farm Steincoalspruit in 1978. (Landowners, although expropriated, have not yet been moved from there and are fighting a rearguard action to have their land restored to them.)

Now that all the african freehold properties have been cleared in the coal-rich

⁺ The official population in 1980 was 12 502. (Hansard, Question 200, 26.02.81)

districts of Newcastle and Dundee to the north, those remaining in the Klip River district appear to head the government's priority list in its black spot removal programme for Natal. Coal may be a factor in this district as well: there is a colliery (Platberg Collieries) very close to Matiwane's Kop and in the past twelve months new shafts have been established on land lying just to the east of the property. As already described, local white farmers have long been lobbying for the removal of the african farms in the district and they appear to have been a significant force as well.

Dr Koornhof has confirmed in Parliament in 1981 and again in 1982 that Matiwane's Kop, along with the other black-owned farms in the district, will be removed 'after the necessary facilities and services have been provided on the compensatory land and settlement areas applicable' (Hansard, Question 200, 26.02.81), in this case somewhere in the Ezakheni/Ekuvukeni relocation belt. The excision of the formerly released land of Driefontein from KwaZulu in January 1981 has underscored the State's determination to remove the remaining Klip River black spots.

Whether the removal of Matiwane's Kop will be finally pushed through or not and when, depends, however, on a number of factors among which the degree of local organisation and the strength of the community's stated opposition to being moved will be very important.

THE SPP SURVEY

The SPP survey was conducted in late 1980/early 1981. Because the community is very large and scattered in a random fashion over a wide area, it proved very difficult to select households on a systematic basis. Two interviewers were used and in an attempt to cover as much of the area as possible, they worked in separate halves of the community, each interviewing 50 households spread as evenly as possible through their chosen areas. 100 households were thus surveyed, having a total population of 714. In addition to this survey, there have been numerous follow-up fieldtrips to Matiwane's Kop and the information derived from these trips has been used to supplement the survey material.

2. General Conditions

Although larger in population and area than average, Matiwane's Kop is in many respects representative of other african freehold areas in Natal. Despite the problems caused by an expanding population that is confined to a fixed amount of land and has little or no capital with which to develop that land, it has many factors working in its favour when compared to the rural relocation areas surveyed by SPP: an agricultural base, both real and potential; a more stable demographic structure; long-established local institutions and strong ties to ancestral land, all of which feed and strengthen a sense of community and identity.

HISTORY OF ITS PURCHASE

The history of how the community of Matiwane's Kop came into being has been set out in a memorandum drawn up by 'the Chief, Trustees and Matiwane's Kop tribe' in 1979 and entitled 'Proposed Removal of the Matiwane's Kop Tribe, the Farm Matiwane's Kop No. 1393, County of Klip River, Province of Natal.' This document was forwarded to Dr Koornhof via the offices of the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior, in order to set out at length the community's objections to being moved. (See Appendix 1.) According to this, the farm was bought from the Natal Land and Colonisation Company by the Shabalala tribe between 1870 and 1880.

At this time the Shabalala Tribe ... was under Chief Mveli Shabalala whose scattered tribe was in the White farms in the region of Besters. Chief

Mveli died and Mbekwa, his son, was still too young to take over chieftainship ... The Shabalala tribe was warned about the rough treatment deliberately given to their Chief Mbekwa, by the white farmers. They then decided to buy a piece of land where Mbekwa would be peacefully settled with his tribe as soon as he came of age.

In making enquiries at the Deeds Office, representatives of the tribe were directed to Matiwane's Kop which whites were unwilling to buy because, so the memorandum reports, 'it was a mire and unproductive.'

120 members of the Shabalala tribe bought the farm, originally as a syndicate, the property later being subdivided and title vested in individuals. Although the farm was bought in the late 19th century, it was not registered in the names of its new owners until 1914/1915 when transfer was finally ceded by the Natal Land and Colonisation Company to 'Mbekwa Shabalala, Rev. Henry Mathebula and Ezra Shabalala, all Natives of Natal, in their capacities as Trustees ... and certain 117 other Natives of the Klip River division.' ('Proposed Removal of the Matiwane's Kop tribe', 3, quoting from the Deed of ownership and transfer.) According to local history, the Union Government also promised at that time that in recognition of the contribution made by those men from Matiwane's Kop who had joined the army during the 1st World War, it would link their land to the Driefontein block of land to the south, by buying up the intervening farms for african ownership and occupation. This promise (possibly a proposal put forward by the disregarded Beaumont Commission of 1916) was not honoured.

Instead of the Central Government fulfilling its promise now the Matiwane's Kop Tribe must be moved much against its will. ('Proposed Removal of the Matiwane's Kop tribe', 4)

INFLUX OF TENANTS

According to their descendants, the original Shabalala landowners drained the soil by building a number of canals and transformed what had been a marsh into productive arable land. During the course of the 20th century, however, pressure on the land began to mount as the population grew and agriculture waned in importance as a source of income as a consequence. Matiwane's Kop, because of its size and its relative proximity to Ladysmith has attracted a large number of tenants over the years, the influx exacerbated in the past twenty years by the abolition of labour tenancy in particular and, to a lesser extent, the removals of black spots in the district. Today a substantial proportion of the community - perhaps as many as a fifth or more - are relative newcomers, tenants of the landowners, who have only settled there within the past ten years. The land has become increasingly subdivided, in parts resembling a rural village, and most households are dependent on outside employment for their survival. In many respects Matiwane's Kop serves partly as a displaced township for Ladysmith, with commuters amounting to 37% of the total work force in the SPP sample.

HOUSEHOLD TENURE AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE

Of the 100 households surveyed by SPP, 24 were landowners, 65 were rent-paying tenants and 10, generally relatives of landowners, lived there rent-free. (Information on one household was not supplied.) Thus the landowner : tenant ratio is presently in the region of 1 to 3, a ratio that is remarkably similar to the overall ratio prevailing on the african freehold areas in Natal at the time of the Beaumont Commission in the early 20th century. (See p. 35) Since Matiwane's Kop has undoubtedly experienced a substantial influx of tenants since that time, this suggests that it entered the 20th century with a smaller tenant population than was usual on such farms.

Today the community of Matiwane's Kop is based on a core of households whose families have lived there for a very long time - 40 out of the 85 households for whom this information was available for forty years or more, and over half of the total for twenty years or more. Of the remaining households 17 had lived there for less than ten years, however seven of these for less than five years. The remaining 19 households had lived there for between ten and twenty years.

Table 1, Matiwane's Kop. LENGTH OF RESIDENCE OF HOUSEHOLDS

YEARS	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
0 - 4	10
5 - 9	7
10 - 14	14
15 - 19	5
20 - 39	13
40+	36
Other/not stated	15
TOTAL	100

The survey results confirm the general impression that the largest single category of people who have moved to Matiwane's Kop in the past fifteen years have come from white farms. 13 out of the 24 households for whom this information was available were ex-farm people, 7 of them having left their previous place because of the abolition of labour tenancy, 4 because they had been evicted and 2 of their own accord. The other reasons given for moving to Matiwane's Kop were: the desire for land (3 instances), the expense of urban life (2 instances), family quarrels (2 instances), a search for schooling and trade opportunities (1 instance each), the return to a parental home (1 instance) and a job transfer to Ladysmith (1 instance). Seven households gave no reasons.

AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY

Although agriculture is no longer the central economic activity of residents, it nevertheless makes an important contribution to the welfare of the community and, perhaps equally important, to its general image of itself.

We have cherished our land with jealousy because of the presence of the ever running streams and innumerable springs with crystal clear and cool water. Rain falls regularly and we have never experienced any droughts. Matiwane's Kop is a land of our comfort where we live creatively and peacefully. We cultivate all the different types of vegetables that suit the climate. People who cannot find employment are able to make a living through land cultivation. ('Proposed Removal of the Matiwane's Kop tribe', 4)

Several of the landowners cultivate quite extensive areas; a number own tractors which they also hire out locally. Two households in the SPP survey reported that they had 5 fields; 4 had 4 fields and 8 had 3. Apart from these 14, who could be considered the large cultivators, another 12 households reported having 2 fields each and 40 had 1 field each. In most cases fields were described as large (40 households) or medium (22 households). 33 households in the survey did not have any fields,⁺ but nearly all

⁺ Information on fields is missing for one household.

of these had vegetable gardens in which some produce was grown. Thus 91 households reported such gardens and 93 households stated that they grew agricultural goods - maize in all instances and sorghum, potatoes and beans as well in about 75% of the households. One landowner reported reaping 100 bags of potatoes in December 1979.

In addition to crop production, over half the households surveyed (57) kept cattle (grazed on the commonage), just under half (42) had goats and small numbers of households kept sheep (12), pigs (3) and horses (3). In addition, nearly all households kept chickens. 55 households reported that they produced some milk, 87 that they produced some meat and 75 that they produced some eggs. In addition just over a third (34) reported that they produced hides as well.

Most households produced for their own consumption only but nearly one fifth of the sample - 19 households - reported that they sell agricultural goods from time to time, and one household reported that it makes a living out of this. Although the survey did not probe the scale or frequency of such sales - both of which are likely to fluctuate quite considerably across the various households - this is nevertheless indicative that yields are large enough in certain instances to constitute a surplus. For most households agriculture is a supplementary but nevertheless valuable and valued activity, access to the land being regarded as one of the most critical differences between Matiwane's Kop and the proposed relocation areas into which the State wishes to move them. 'I am ploughing in this place and there is everything I need', said one respondent. Another respondent, who had only recently moved to Matiwane's Kop, had moved there from Soweto, Johannesburg because 'we were tired of the town-expensive life' and considered that 'to make a living is cheaper here.' This particular respondent was unequivocal about not wanting to move again.

I have just come to this place and I have already cultivated my field and am waiting for my crops.

Neighbouring white farmers have accused the people of Matiwane's Kop of poor agricultural techniques that are damaging the land; this has been one of their main justifications for pushing for the community to be removed. In February 1981 the chairman of the local Elandsplaagte Farmers' Association described the type of agriculture practised at Matiwane's Kop as 'of the poorest kind, with virtually no production':

Before anyone else could use this land, it would have to go through a long and very expensive process of rehabilitation. (Letter to the Sunday Tribune, 22.02.81)

This, as discussed in the chapter on black spots in Part Two, is an argument that raises extremely complex issues. There are two major constraints on agricultural production at Matiwane's Kop: 1) the population density which, as already described, is a product of a combination of factors over which the local community has no control: evictions from elsewhere, influx control which prohibits african people from living with their families in the places where they work, the land laws which prevent africans from acquiring land outside the already desperately overpopulated reserve areas, and 2) lack of capital for development - no State-provided infrastructure, loans or technical education similar to that which white farmers enjoy. In addition, the threat of removal has in itself had a debilitating effect on agricultural activity - in much the same way, though on a smaller scale, as the threat of expropriation because of consolidation has adversely affected some white farmers in the province. Thus a communal vegetable garden project initiated by a group of women with the Chief's consent in 1979/80 fell through because of the uncertainty surrounding the future of the community at that stage.

There is a minority of people living at Matiwane's Kop who, given mobility and a choice, would probably choose to give up their present rural lifestyle and live in an urban

township - provided there were accommodation, employment and security there. There is no chance of this happening, however. Influx control apart, Steadville, the only township at Ladysmith, is already desperately overcrowded and under threat of removal; Ezakheni, the major relocation township that serves Ladysmith from KwaZulu, is located as far from Ladysmith as Matiwane's Kop, is far more expensive, is also full and has a reputation of violence and lawlessness in addition. In any case, this group is not representative. Most of the people living at Matiwane's Kop have a genuine commitment to the rural way of life still possible there. Community leaders interviewed by SPP have expressed concern about the declining productivity of the land and are not unaware of the importance of conservation. Given security of tenure and some capital assistance, they would be very glad to husband their land better than they are able to now. In the meantime, although lacking the resources to practise a more intensive form of agriculture, most residents draw a yield from their land that makes a significant contribution to the well-being of their families. Their agricultural production is not irrelevant, as the chairman of the Elandslaagte Farmers' Association tried to suggest. Access to land is one of the most important material advantages enjoyed by the people of Matiwane's Kop, allowing for a generally higher standard of subsistence than that found in the average closer settlement in KwaZulu.

This is borne out by the data collected on household diets. Although the average diet is a very basic one, with maize and other starches serving as staples, it is far higher in protein than that found in the surveys undertaken by SPP in the rural relocation closer settlements of Sahlumbe and Compensation and also higher than that found at Mzimhlophe where, as already noted, agriculture is also practised. 57% of the households surveyed at Matiwane's Kop reported that they consumed milk daily; 16% said they ate meat daily and a further 31% said they ate meat every second day, and 52% said they ate eggs at least once a week or more. Furthermore 84% reported eating greens either daily or every second day. The following table contrasts these results with those already recorded at Sahlumbe, Mzimhlophe and Compensation.

Table 2, Matiwane's Kop. AVERAGE DIET AT MATIWANE'S KOP, SAHLUMBE, MZIMHLOPHE AND COMPENSATION (% of households and frequency of consumption)

	MAIZE	MEAT	MILK	EGGS	GREENS	CHEESE
MATIWANE'S KOP	98% daily	16% daily 31% every 2nd day	57% daily	1% daily 14% 2x week 35% 1x week	12% daily 62% every 2nd day	2% daily 62% less 1x week
SAHLUMBE	99% daily	1% daily 92% less 1x month	8% daily	4% daily 76% less 1x month	8% daily 23% every 2nd day	2% every 2nd day 91% less 1x month
MZIMHLOPHE	99% daily	1% daily 6% every 2nd day	69% daily	2% daily 19% 2x week	18% daily 64% every 2nd day	6% daily 82% less 1x month
COMPENSATION	95% daily	1% daily 3% 2x week 33% less 4x month	15% daily	1% daily 1% every 2nd day 3% 2x week	3% daily 1% every 2nd day	5% daily 90% less 1x month

FACILITIES

Facilities, although often very basic, are better than most closer settlements visited by SPP in Natal. Most of the facilities that have been developed at Matiwane's Kop have been financed and built by the community itself. Pride of place goes to a secondary school, recently completed (in 1981) and built almost entirely by community enterprise and funds, the principal of the school marshalling together as much money and credit as he could muster to ensure that the building would be completed in time for the opening of the school year in 1981. This school is attended by 400 students, mostly local. No sooner was the structure completed than numbers were daubed on the walls by officials, markings in their removal programme. The numbers represent a tangible sign of the threat of removal; the building itself, however, is a testimony to the commitment of the community to remaining on their land.

In addition to the secondary school, there are four primary schools catering for about 2 000 pupils, 12 shops and several churches scattered through the community. There is also a regular bus service to Ladysmith, which apparently allows residents of Matiwane's Kop to travel for nothing along its routes within the community. Housing is mostly of wattle and daub, generally in good repair; there are several substantial brick houses as well, in most cases belonging to long-established families. Water is not considered a problem because of the numerous springs and streams found on the property, although none of these are protected. There are 17 boreholes scattered through the community in addition. Fuel is becoming a problem, with much of the wood on the surrounding hills being chopped out, and more people are having to buy their fuel, either in the form of wood or coal.

As important to many people as the existence of schools and shops are two sites with religious and historic value - a cairn of stones that is associated with a previous chief who reportedly had rain-making powers, and the community and chiefly graveyards.

From the time of Matiwane himself to the very last Chief who recently passed away, their graves are in the area where they were traditionally buried. It is unthinkable to imagine that a tribe with a long traditional custom of burying Chiefs has to move away and leave these graves behind. The graves of our forefathers, the traditional burial places of our Chiefs, are the bonds that tie us inseparably with this place, Matiwane's Kop. ('Proposed removal of the Matiwane's Kop tribe', 4)

3. Demographic features

POPULATION STRUCTURE

Of the 714 people in the 100 households surveyed, 522 were permanent residents (219 male and 303 female), 120 migrants (81 male and 39 female) and 69 commuters (43 male and 26 female) with a further 2 individuals whose residence status was not recorded (1 male and 1 female) and 1, a child, whose sex was not stated.

Table 3, Matiwane's Kop. DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

	MALE	FEMALE	SEX not stated	TOTAL
PERMANENT	219	303	1	523
COMMUTER	43	26	-	69
MIGRANT	81	39	-	120
RES. not stated	1	1	-	2
TOTAL	344	369	1	714

What is of significance here, especially when compared to the various rural relocation areas surveyed, is the relatively high percentage of commuters in the sample - nearly 10% of the total population and 13% of the total male population fell in this category, while 16% of the population of working age (15 - 64 years) and 23% of the male population of working age were commuters. (See Table 4 below.) The percentage of male commuters is thus far higher than that found at Sahlumbe, Mzimhlophe and Compensation (where it was 3%, 4,5% and 3% respectively), although lower than that found at Ezakheni (22%). Apart from a few posts for teachers and traders, there are very few employment opportunities available in Matiwane's Kop itself but a significant proportion of the adult and especially the adult male population is able to work locally, mainly at Lady-smith, and return home daily or weekly.

Despite the relatively large proportion of commuters in the sample, the masculinity rate among the combined permanent/commuter population is not as high as one might expect, being 80. The higher proportion of commuters in the sample is nullified by the relatively large number of migrants, both male and female, in the community. Just under 17% of the population covered in the sample were migrants, about one third of them female. This figure of 80 is nevertheless higher than the masculinity rates found among the permanent and commuter populations in the various rural relocation areas surveyed by SPP, including Ezakheni, with the single exception of Compensation.⁺

As would be expected, most of the migrants fall within the working age group and the masculinity rate for the permanent/commuter population of working age (15 - 64 years) is still lower, being 65. The largest group of migrants in the sample were found to be in the 25 - 34 years age group where there were 42 (34 male and 8 female); the masculinity rate among the non-migrant population of this age was, correspondingly, the lowest of all the age cohorts, being 27. There were 25 migrants in the 15 - 24 age group (15 male, 10 female), 28 migrants in the 35 - 44 age group (15 male and 13 female) and 15 in the 45 - 64 age group (10 male and 5 female). Of note is that the female migrants were (on average) older than the male migrants. Matiwane's Kop's dependence on external employment and the demographic imbalance that that creates, is further demonstrated by comparing the age structure of the combined permanent/commuter population with that of the total population in the sample. Among the latter, 34,3% were children 14 years and younger, 54,4% were of working age and 5,6% were 65 years or older. (The age of a further 5,7% was not stated.) Among the combined permanent/commuter population, however, 41% were children, 47,1% adults of working age and 6,4% old people 65 years or older (with the age of the remaining 5,5% not recorded).

⁺ Masculinity rates for the combined permanent/commuter population in these places were as follows: Sahlumbe: 69; Ezakheni: 74,5; Mzimhlophe: 77; Compensation: 84.

Table 4, Matiwane's Kop. DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY AGE, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

AGE	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			RESIDENCE ns		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
0 - 14	122	120	243 ⁺	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
15 - 64	68	147	215	42	22	64	74	36	110	-	-	-
65+	14	23	37	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
AGE ns	15	13	28	1	3	4	7	1	8	-	-	-
TOTAL	219	303	523 ⁺	43	26	69	81	39	120	1	1	2

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

The average size of the 100 households surveyed by SPP was a little over 7 - 7,14. 21 households were however very large having 10 or more members each, 4 of them having 15 or more members. A little over half the households surveyed were extended or compound families: 46 were extended, 3 compound and another 3 extended-compound. Relocation into a closer settlement situation would undoubtedly put pressures on these households. Of the remaining 48 households in the sample 46 were nuclear and 2 consisted of a single member only.

Table 5, Matiwane's Kop. HOUSEHOLD TYPE

HOUSEHOLD TYPE	NUMBER / %
Single member	2
Nuclear	46
Extended	46
Compound	3
Compound-extended	3

Just over two thirds of the households in the sample (69) had male heads; the rest (31) had female heads. Proportionately many more of the female heads were 45 years or older compared to the male heads; whereas 87% of the 31 female heads fell in this age group, only 64% of the 69 male heads did. Just over half the household heads were permanent residents - 51 - while a further 22 were commuters, and only 27 were migrants. This conforms with the findings already noted, that the migrants from Matiwane's Kop tend to be in the younger age groups, i.e. less likely to have established households of their own, and suggests that traditional family structures and the relationships of authority within them are more entrenched at Matiwane's Kop than many other rural areas, where the head of the household is often absent for large portions of the time.

EDUCATION

Of the total population in the sample, 204 had had no education. 95 of them, however, were 6 years or under, thus leaving 109 people of school going age or older who had not had any formal education. 159 people had had a lower primary school education (17 of them in the 0 - 6 age group), 167 a higher primary and 133 a lower secondary education, while 51 people had attained a senior secondary or higher level of education. Commuters

⁺ Total includes 1 permanently resident child whose sex was not recorded.

and migrants tended to be better educated, although the permanent population contained a large segment of persons under school age. Taking the population as a whole there were more males than females among the non educated, and more females than males among those educated to primary level. At secondary level, however, there was parity between the sexes, although there were more males with senior secondary education.

Table 6, Matiwane's Kop. EDUCATION BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

	PERMANENT		COMMUTERS		MIGRANTS		RES. ns		TOTALS		
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	T
None	79	90	11	3	16	5	-	-	106	98	204
Low Primary	51	85	2	7	7	5	1	-	61	97	159 ⁺
High Primary	49	68	14	2	22	11	-	1	85	82	167
Low Secondary	30	50	9	9	24	11	-	-	63	70	133
Higher Secondary +	10n	10	7	5	12	7	-	-	29	22	51
TOTALS	523 ⁺		69		120		2		714		

Although there is adult illiteracy in the community the education levels found at Matiwane's Kop compare very favourably with the relocation areas surveyed. The percentage of people educated to senior school or beyond is higher than at any of the rural areas surveyed, including Ezakheni, and higher than that found at the peri-urban site and service scheme of Inanda Newtown as well. The completion of the community's secondary school has made post-primary education available to all of the present generation of primary school students and, if allowed to continue functioning, this school will serve to boost education levels still further in the future.

4. Economic activity

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Matiwane's Kop is dependent for its survival on wage employment, as already stated, and almost all of the workers have to leave the community to find work. In the 100 households surveyed by SPP there was a total of 173 workers, all of them working outside of Matiwane's Kop. Of the 523 permanent residents in the sample (215 of whom were of working age), 498 were not economically active and 25 were unemployed. Among the commuters 66 were in employment and 3 not economically active, while among the migrants 107 people were in employment, 11 were not economically active and 2 were unemployed. (The two individuals whose residence status was not recorded in the survey were both not economically active.) As already pointed out, the proportion of workers who are in a position to commute is relatively high when compared to the situation found in the rural closer settlements surveyed by SPP. Over one third (38%) of the total employed in the survey group were commuters.

⁺ The total includes 1 individual whose sex was not recorded.

Table 7, Matiwane's Kop. ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

	PERMANENT			COMMUTER			MIGRANT			RES. ns	TOTAL
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T		
Not economically active	205	292	498 ⁺	1	2	3	4	7	11	2	514
Employed	0	0	0	42	24	66	77	30	107	-	173
Unemployed	14	11	25	0	0	0	0	2	2	-	27
TOTAL	219	303	523 ⁺	43	26	69	81	39	120	2	714

The total number of economically active people in the sample was thus 200, amounting to 28% of the total population. This figure is made up of 173 employed and 27 unemployed people. The unemployment rate in the sample was thus 13,5%. Although the numbers of men and women who were unemployed were almost the same, the proportion of unemployed men was considerably lower than that of women, with the male unemployment rate being 10,5% compared to the female rate of 19,4%.

Table 8, Matiwane's Kop. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Employed	119	54	173
Unemployed	14	13	27
Total economically active	133	67	200
Unemployment rate	10,5%	19,4%	13,5%

TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT

Most workers in the Matiwane's Kop survey were unskilled - 126 out of 173, or 73% of the total with the distribution of unskilled workers between commuters and migrants showing no clear bias towards one or the other group of workers. The next largest occupational category was that of professional people, with 19 workers (11 males and 8 females) falling in this group: just over 11% of the sample, clearly drawn from the small but significant group of well-educated people in the community. 5 of these were commuters and 14 were migrants. Compared to the men, those women who had managed to find jobs tended to be in more highly skilled positions. Whereas 75% of the male workforce were in unskilled positions and only 9% in professional posts, 69% of the female workforce were in unskilled positions and 15% in professional posts.

⁺ The total contains 1 individual whose sex is not stated.

Table 9, Matiwane's Kop. OCCUPATION LEVEL OF WORKERS BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

	COMMUTERS			MIGRANTS			TOTAL		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Professional	3	2	5	8	6	14	11	8	19
Business	1	2	3	0	0	0	1	2	3
Clerical	0	2	2	3	0	3	2	3	5
Service	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
Farm	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
Skilled	1	0	1	3	0	3	4	0	4
Semi-skilled	4	2	6	5	2	7	9	4	13
Unskilled	32	15	47	57	22	79	89	37	126
Occupation not stated	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1
TOTAL	42	24	66	77	30	107	119	54	173

Overall the largest group of workers, 66, were employed in the service industry, with manufacturing the second most common area of employment, having a total of 43 workers. 17 of these service workers were in the professional class (teachers, nurses etc.) and 48 of them were unskilled, presumably domestic workers, cleaners etc. Although the majority of the 66 service workers were women, this being by far the most important area of employment for them, 31 of these workers were male and the service industry ranked only slightly below manufacturing industry as an area of employment for men. After the service and manufacturing industry, the next most important areas of employment were in the transport and construction industries, followed by trade, agriculture and mining. The relative unimportance of agriculture as an employer is of significance in view of the location of Matiwane's Kop within a white farming area. Although a number of women and children may be occasionally employed on a casual basis on neighbouring farms (this casual employment not being registered in the survey), very few people are employed in agriculture on a full-time basis. Matiwane's Kop does not supply a labour force for white agriculture in the Klip River district; the orientation of its workers is urban rather than rural.

Table 10, Matiwane's Kop. EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

INDUSTRY	COMMUTERS			MIGRANTS			TOTAL		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
Agriculture	2	2	4	3	1	4	5	3	8
Mining	3	0	3	3	0	3	6	0	6
Manufacturing	11	5	16	22	5	27	33	10	43
Electrical etc.	1	0	1	4	0	4	5	0	5
Construction	7	0	7	9	0	9	16	0	16
Trade	2	3	5	3	3	6	5	6	11
Transport	8	0	8	8	0	8	16	0	16
Finance	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	0	2
Services	7	14	21	24	21	45	31	35	66
TOTAL	42	24	66	77	30	107	119	54	173

Data on place of employment was only available for 148 out of the 173 workers. Within this reduced sample, the most important centre of employment was Ladysmith, 25 km away. 75 workers (48 men and 27 women) were reported to be working there - more than the

total number of working commuters in the sample which indicates that some migrant workers were based in Ladysmith but only able to return home to Matiwane's Kop less than once a week. (It is probable that a number of female domestic workers 'lived in' in Ladysmith in this way.) A further 14 workers worked relatively close to Matiwane's Kop - most of them (12) in Newcastle (about 90 km away), one in Glencoe, about 50 km away and one at Colenso, also about 50 km away. After Ladysmith, the largest centre of employment was Johannesburg, where 34 men and 14 women worked. 6 workers were employed in Durban (4 men and 2 women), 2 in Hammarsdale (both men), 2 in Pietermaritzburg (also both men) and one, a woman, in Piet Retief in the Transvaal.

OTHER INCOME

21 households reported some informal activity (apart from agricultural activity, already described) and 1 reported receiving 'gifts' from outside sources. In addition old age pensions represented a significant source of supplementary cash income, with 37 people recorded as pensioners - almost the entire population of 65 years and older. In addition one member of the permanent population received a disability grant. Only three households had no apparent source of regular income. When questioned how they survived, one was recorded as living on savings, another by selling stock from time to time; the third however had no apparent source of income at all.

The overall picture to emerge from the survey is of a community which is poor by urban standards but nevertheless economically viable, having a valuable subsistence agriculture base, and socially cohesive. In summing up the objections of the community to its threatened removal, the memorandum drawn up by the community for presentation to Dr Koornhof states:

The socio-economic life of the people has been so geared up that if this stable community were to be moved to another area:-

- they would not be in a position to live the same way of life as they are living
- no matter what amount of compensation would be given, money-wise, that would not enable the tribe to be the same tribe as before. ('Proposed Removal of the Matiwane's Kop Tribe', 5)

Furthermore

We are still living traditional life unspoiled by any outside influence. There is no hooliganism among our youth. (Ibid, 5)

5. The removal threat

Matiwane's Kop has been under a general threat of removal as a black spot for a long time. In the 1940s and 1950s white farmers in the Elandslaagte and Ladysmith districts were, as described in Part One, among the most vociferous opponents of the continued existence of those african freehold farms that fell outside the reserves. Until the necessary compensatory Trust land had been acquired, however, the removal of black spots could not get under way; when removals finally did start in the 1960s, the Klip River district was not on top of the priority list. Khumalosville was moved in 1963. Thereafter there was a lull until the mid 1970s when the Roosboom area, Criemen and Steincoalspruit tenants were moved in rapid succession.

EVENTS BETWEEN 1978 AND 1980

Matiwane's Kop was fourth on the list. The first serious warning the community had that they were to be removed came in October 1978 when an official from Pretoria arrived

to tell a hastily convened and poorly attended meeting that they were to be removed, probably in mid 1979. From the start the role of officials in the threatened removal has come across as devious and manipulative to the community's leaders. At this meeting the official apparently made two claims, both of which representatives of Matiwane's Kop have angrily rejected. The first was that their Chief had himself requested that Matiwane's Kop be moved, in 1974, which, as a spokesman for Matiwane's Kop has pointed out, is impossible since the Chief in question had died two years previously, in 1972. (*Natal Witness*, 19.11.80) The second claim was that the KwaZulu Chief Minister, Buthelezi, supported the removal because he wanted all 'his' people to be together inside KwaZulu - a claim rejected by both community leaders at Matiwane's Kop and the KwaZulu government.

If Pretoria expected an easy submission from Matiwane's Kop, they were quickly disappointed. The people at the meeting made it clear that they had no interest in moving and the official withdrew without anything conclusive having been arranged. The leaders of Matiwane's Kop followed up this apparent gain by drafting a memorandum setting out their objections to being moved (extracts from which have already been quoted). This they sent to the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr Koornhof, via the office of the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior at Ulundi. Thereafter they had no direct contact with Pretoria for almost a year. In the interim, however, local officials of the Department of Cooperation and Development moved onto the property and numbered all the buildings. When questioned in Parliament (nearly two years later) under what authority this had been done, Dr Koornhof stated that the officials had acted in terms of Section 5 of the Black Administration Act (Act 38, 1927), and had received permission to enter the premises 'from the landowners and tenants concerned.' (Hansard, Question 162, 22.09.81)

Ten months later, in August 1979, the official from Pretoria returned to try to organise members of the community to visit the relocation area that had been earmarked for them, near Ekuvukeni. On this occasion he apparently claimed that the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior (Dr Mdlaalose) supported the removal - another allegation that was rejected at the time and later discredited. This meeting was no more conclusive than the first. When the official attempted to arrange a further meeting date, he was told that that was unnecessary since there was nothing further to discuss; should the community desire a further meeting, they would organise it.

Having failed to make any headway with the more direct approach, the State tried to adopt an indirect line of approach through the Chief. In early October 1980 the local commissioner at Ladysmith summoned the Chief (a young and inexperienced man) to his office. There he instructed him to organise a general meeting at Matiwane's Kop for the end of the month (to be attended by more officials from Pretoria) at which a new committee could be elected, to represent the community on the removals issue. The Chief immediately reported these developments to his councillors who pre-empted the commissioner by first demanding to see the official communication from Pretoria about the proposed meeting (which letter was never produced) and then calling their own general meeting to discuss the latest developments without any officials present. Reports on this meeting indicate that it was made very clear to the Chief that the community would not tolerate private negotiations between him and the commissioner; the mood has been described as 'boiling' by one person who attended.

Having rallied the community to their support, the councillors and the Chief then went unannounced to the commissioner, accompanied by the local Member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (MLA). They informed him that there was no need for elections - the councillors as a body (and not the Chief as an individual) were already the community's legitimate representatives. They also repeated that no more meetings were necessary and took the precaution of taping the meeting. They followed this up with a number of

meetings at both Matiwane's Kop and the neighbouring and smaller Jonono's Kop (also under threat), which they held during the Christmas period, when most of the migrant workers had returned home for their annual holiday.

PUBLICITY

At this time a number of newspapers were alerted to the developments at Matiwane's Kop and during November and December 1980 several stories appeared in the press that were sympathetic to the community's struggle to remain on their land. This succeeded in making Matiwane's Kop more widely known and a number of individuals representing various outside support groups have visited it periodically since then as a result. Generally, however, except for publicity, the role of these outside groups in the community has been small. The councillors have deferred largely to Ulundi and to Inkatha in their campaign and kept a tight control over organisation within the community.

EXPROPRIATION

While the leaders of Matiwane's Kop succeeded admirably within their own community and had shown considerable skill and resolve in their direct dealings with officialdom, they were unable to exert the same control over events which took place off their land. Thus during the course of 1980, despite the fact that they had made it clear that they did not want to move, all the landowners were expropriated and title to their land transferred to the State. It appears that the landowners at Jonono's Kop were expropriated at the same time. Although matters have not yet come to a head, the effect of this has been to destroy the people's legal standing on their land and to place in jeopardy relationships between the landowners and their tenants, the bulk of the population. This could, potentially, have extremely damaging consequences for the unity of the community.

The social and material division that exists between landowners and tenants is a real one that has been successfully manipulated by the State in other black spot communities that they have wanted to move, for instance at Roosboom, as described by E. Mngadi in 'The Removal of Roosboom.' To date the State has not tried to exploit this division at Matiwane's Kop itself but has attempted to do so in neighbouring Jonono's Kop which they clearly regard as the weaker of the two communities. In early 1982 a dispute arose over rents between an individual landowner and his tenants at Jonono's Kop. When it reached the commissioner in Ladysmith he informed the tenants that the land no longer belonged to their landlord but to the State and that they had no need to pay any rent at all. This of course threatened to set landowners and tenants against each other. The community has managed to weather this storm by agreeing to continue with the rent arrangements as traditionally fixed and thus far there has been no further comeback. At the meeting at which this was decided (attended by people from Matiwane's Kop and also by the local KwaZulu MLA) a special committee was elected to represent Jonono's Kop in any further dealings with officialdom over removals.

As mentioned in the introduction to this case study, considerable controversy surrounds the expropriation of Matiwane's Kop. Many members of the community are unaware that it has happened and are ignorant of the legal implications. Some landowners that SPP has interviewed, maintain that they were either not served with expropriation notices at all or else not personally; there are reports of an official distributing 'papers' to whoever happened to be at home at the time, including to children. Because the State treats expropriation as a confidential matter between it and the individual landowner involved, there has been no coming together of landowners on this issue. Some may have notices of expropriation, others may not - the extent of this is not clear. Apart from the memorandum and the often repeated refusal by the community as a whole to move, it does not seem that any formal objection to expropriation has been lodged by the land-

owners of Matiwane's Kop themselves, although KwaZulu has apparently appealed for title to be restored to the people - without any positive results. (See below.) This makes the question of the compensation due in the event of the community ever being moved extremely confusing. Legally an expropriated landowner is given sixty days in which to lodge an appeal against the compensation offered him/her; if this is not done within the stipulated period the presumption is that he/she has accepted what has been offered.

DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE

That the State was still determined to remove Matiwane's Kop was confirmed in February 1981 when Natal members of the PFP tabled a series of questions in Parliament dealing with the removal of black spots in the province. On the 11th of February the Deputy Minister of Cooperation and Development acknowledged that his Minister had received representations from the people of both Matiwane's Kop and Umbulwane requesting that 'the proposed resettlement projects be reconsidered and that the residents be allowed to remain on the properties concerned.' (Hansard, Question 26, 11.02.81) This was the first acknowledgement the people of Matiwane's Kop had had that their memorandum had been received. When asked what the outcome of these representations would be, the Deputy Minister replied

The representations are still receiving attention and further negotiations will take place. (Ibid)

However, a mere two weeks later, when asked if Matiwane's Kop and five other black spots were to be removed, the Minister of Cooperation and Development stated very clearly that they would be.

Yes it is the intention of the Government to resettle the communities of the areas concerned. (Hansard, Question 200, 26.02.81)

The strategy adopted by the State during 1981 was to bypass Matiwane's Kop itself and to try to negotiate with KwaZulu instead. The role of the KwaZulu government in this has already been discussed in Part One. Although the KwaZulu government endorsed Matiwane's Kop in its objections to being moved and requested that its expropriation be reversed, it was apparently out-manoeuvred. In mid 1981 the Department of Cooperation and Development suggested to KwaZulu that steering committees should be established to deal with removals on a regional basis and this was accepted by KwaZulu at the time, without the matter about title having been resolved and also without consultation with the communities affected. Later, Pretoria made it clear that the purpose of these steering committees was, in effect, to administer relocation; it also claimed that KwaZulu had eased its former 'rigid opposition' to removals. Only then did the KwaZulu government try hastily to distance itself from the committees. Very little of what was being discussed or negotiated between Pretoria and Ulundi made its way to Matiwane's Kop whose only and very limited source of information on these developments appears to have been the occasional newspaper or radio report.

The position of Matiwane's Kop at the time of writing appears to be a static one. Apart from the local commissioner's intervention about rents at Jonono's Kop in early 1982, there have been no indications at a local level of what Pretoria's next move will be. In Parliament Dr Koornhof has confirmed, once again, that Matiwane's Kop will be removed. (Hansard, Question 450, 26.04.82) At the time he gave no hint of when this would be, merely stating

That the resettlement actions, as far as practical, be conducted after consultation and in collaboration with the committees concerned as well as the Government of KwaZulu. (Quoted in Natal Mercury, 27.04.82)

At the same time, in answer to another question on removals in general, the Minister gave an ominous warning, that because of their 'very sensitive and complicated' nature, future removals would be dealt with on a confidential basis between 'the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the various national State Governments and black communities.' (Ibid.)

LEVEL OF COMMUNITY ORGANISATION

That the people of Matiwane's Kop do not want to be moved is unquestionable. The SPP survey merely confirmed the point that has been made repeatedly at local meetings - the 100 households in the SPP sample were, with possibly one exception (one reply was not recorded), unanimously opposed to being removed. Support for established leaders was also general, and only 3 respondents in the SPP sample felt that there was no point in opposing the government on the removals issue. It appears however, that within the community, opposition has been organised along very traditional lines, with popular involvement relegated largely to attendance at mass meetings and the traditional leaders - councillors and landowners - making the crucial decisions. This has meant that the general population has not been kept fully informed on all developments and their campaign is heavily dependent on the skills and integrity of a limited number of individuals.

Most of the leaders are members of Inkatha and some of them have very strong personal ties with members of the KwaZulu government. They are members of the same relatively privileged rural elite. This has encouraged a dependency on Ulundi which may, in the long term, serve to undermine rather than enhance the community's campaign. Control has not always been retained within it; the as yet unresolved episode about steering committees has indicated how potentially damaging decisions made on behalf of the community but not with the community, can be.

Yet despite these limitations, the achievements of the community to date have been considerable. Matiwane's Kop has succeeded in warding off several attempts by the State to remove it. It has acquired a useful reputation of militancy; this and the adroit manner in which community opposition has been mobilised by its leaders have encouraged other threatened communities in the area to adopt a stronger position against being moved as well. In late 1980 a spokesman for the community summed up the position thus:

The Minister has promised that people will not be moved against their will. None of the people at Jonono's or Matiwane's Kop want to move. We will not move. We intend to carry on as we always have done. They will have to bring guns to push us out or bury us here. (Natal Witness, 22.11.80)

It is apparent that thus far the State has taken this message of determination very seriously, and that it has been obliged to hold back on its intentions as a result.

Appendix 1. Memorandum: Proposed Removal of the Matiwane's Kop Tribe

The following memorandum was compiled by representatives of the people of Matiwane's Kop for presentation to the Minister of Cooperation and Development in 1979.

PROPOSED REMOVAL OF THE MATIWANE'S KOP TRIBE THE FARM MATIWANESKOP NO. 1393 COUNTY OF KLIP RIVER, PROVINCE OF NATAL.

(i) Preamble

To the Honourable, The Minister of Co-operation and Development.

The Chief, Trustees and Matiwanoskop Tribe through our Government, KwaZulu Government hereby humbly submit the following facts regarding the above-mentioned matter for consideration and immediate salvation of the Tribe

1. On the 9 October 1978, the Ladysmith Bantu Affairs Commissioner introduced to a very few inhabitants of Matiwanoskop, consisting mainly of women, Mr van Rensburg from Pretoria, Mr H. Koster, Agricultural Supervisor, Mr van der Walter from Pretoria.
2. Mr van Rensburg who was the speaker, alarmed and disappointed us when he announced that he had come to notify the Matiwanoskop Tribe that they would be removed from Matiwanoskop Land before the 1979 winter season. The reason being that we, the Matiwanoskop Tribe requested in 1974 to be removed from our land Matiwanoskop.
3. Mr van Rensburg further stated that Central Government would provide buses to take the Matiwanoskop Tribe to see the new place for their approval or disapproval, but we should bear in mind that enough land is not available.
4. We were also informed that we could plough our fields at our own risk.

(ii) Facts

1. In 1974 Mr Aaron Nkabinde acted on behalf of the present chief T.R. Shabalala after the death of the late Nhlanganiso Ayliff Shabalala, chief T.R. Shabalala's father. As an acting chief at that time Aaron Nkabinde and the Matiwanoskop Tribe made no request to be removed.
2. The Ladysmith Bantu Affairs Commissioner sent Mr H. Koster to announce through our school children on the 7 October 1978 (on a Tuesday) that he would like to meet the Matiwanoskop Tribe on the 9 October 1978 (on a Thursday).
3. This approach was very unfair because the land owners who are the heads of the families, were at work as it could be expected. This notice was too short to invite the land owners from far and wide to attend; so as a result mainly women could attend.

4. Our Chief T.R. Shabalala has since the 9 October 1978 been pestered by the Ladysmith Bantu Affairs Commissioner with the idea that the Matiwanoskop Tribe is to be removed from the area they are occupying at present.
- 4.1 We the Trustees and the Tribe, would like to put it in no uncertain terms that we have never asked any Government to be moved away from our present property where the Chief, Trustees and the Tenants have become one solid Tribe and attained a standard of living and solidarity comparable to any tribal unit in KwaZulu and Natal.
- 4.2 Further we would like to point out that there is no record anywhere in the Tribal affairs where we ever intimated that we were dissatisfied with this area and therefore would prefer to be moved to another area.
- 4.3 We are therefore surprised to see our Chief every now and then being summoned to appear before the Bantu Affairs Commissioner in connection with the Matiwanoskop Tribe removal scheme.
5. We view this as a disturbing move on the confidence of the Tribe and the Chief because:-
 - (a) it gives the impression that the Chief is going into some 'private' agreement with the Bantu Affairs Commissioner on matters that are Tribal, without the consensus of opinion from the Tribe.
 - (b) such a step is side-stepping KwaZulu Government our Government on matters that should be worked through Ulundi.
 - (c) this perpetual private-message-sending to the Chief by the Bantu Affairs Commissioner is putting our Chief into a very difficult position, as it makes the Chief a private property owner and/or Tribe owner divorced from his Government KwaZulu and divorced from his Tribe Matiwanoskop Tribe.

N.B.: Some higher authority must step in to regularise the Chief, Trustees and the Tribe as any respectable law-abiding Tribe.

We demand this because we have no record of being a Tribe that has given the Central Government any trouble in any way that would have made it different from any other tribe in Natal.

(iii) Land and Ownership

1. We would like to put forth the history of Matiwanoskop land for wanting to remain here forever because we are proud of our history and inheritance of the place.
- 1.1 Matiwanoskop farm, Grant 1393, area 8 225 acres was originally owned by Andries Theodorus Spies from 29.10.1856.
- 1.2 In 22.10.1863 it was owned by Michael A.A.P. Browley - 741.
- 1.3 In 17.6.1869 it was taken over by the Natal Land and Colonization Co. Ltd - 148.
- 1.4 These previous owners were Whites - they abandoned the farm because it was not productive - not arable - they failed to make a living out of it - it was therefore abandoned and 'forgotten' for White men's habitation. The Natal Land and Colonization Co. Ltd then took it in trust, until some adventurer could take a chance on it. Nobody was forthcoming among the Whites because word had gone round that it was a 'White man's grave'.

2. At this time the Shabalala Tribe as it was then known, was under Chief Mveli Shabalala, whose scattered tribe was in the White farms in the region of Besters.
- 2.1 Chief Mveli died and Mbekwa, his son, was still too young to take over chieftainship. Batinisi, Mveli's brother, acted as regent for Mbekwa.
- 2.2 Mbekwa Shabalala grew up on a farm KwaNdengezi where he received rough treatment from a White farmer who knew that he was the future chief of the Shabalalas.
- 2.3 The Shabalala Tribe was worried about the rough treatment deliberately given to their Chief Mbekwa, by the White farmers. They then decided to buy a piece of land where Mbekwa would be peacefully settled with his tribe as soon as he came of age.
- 2.4 The Shabalala Tribesmen then went to the Deeds Office to look for land for sale. They were given Matiwanoskop farm and told that all the White farmers in the area did not want it because it was a mire and unproductive. It was during Sir Theophilus Shepstone's time as Chief Administrator of Natives in Natal. His idea concerning division of land was such that poor portions of land were set aside for the Blacks.
- 2.5 Between 1870 and 1880 the Shabalala Tribe completed the deal with the Natal Land and Colonization Co. Ltd but nothing was put on paper.
- 2.6 When the First World War broke out in 1914 the Natal Land and Colonization Co. Ltd summoned Chief Mbekwa Shabalala, Rev. Henry Mathebula and Ezra Shabalala, on behalf of the 117 others (total 120 people) to sign the agreement of the transfer of the title deed. This was done in order to protect the rightful ownership of the land against the Germans should they win the war.
- 2.7 The transfer and signing of the deed of ownership and transfer was put down as follows:-
- 2.8 'Grant 966 -
'Edmund William Pitcher of Pietermaritzburg, Solicitor, appeared before the Registrar of Deeds, He, the said appearer, being duly authorised thereto by special power of attorney granted to him by Walter Dixon Kimber, solicitor and Cecil Alfred Lucas Bull, Secretary of Durban, the Attorney and Agents of the Natal Land and Colonization Co. Ltd under power dated in London 10 April 1908, the special power in favour of appearer being dated 29 April 1915 and drawn up and signed at Durban, Natal in the presence of and certified by one competent witness, which power of attorney was exhibited to me on this day and the said appearer declared that his principals the said Natal Land and Colonization Co. Ltd did by these Presents cede and transfer in full and free property to and on behalf of Mbekwa Shabalala, Rev. Henry Mathebula and Ezra Shabalala all Natives of Natal in their capacity as Trustees and certain 117 (one hundred and seventeen) other Natives of the Klip River Division ... (names listed), their respective heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, a certain piece of land in extent 8 225 acres 2 roods and 20 perches more or less situated and being the farm Matiwanoskop in the county of Klip River, Province of Natal.

The boundaries and further particulars whereof will more fully appear on reference to the diagram of Matiwanoskop attached to Deed of Grant in favour of Andries Theodorus Spies I dated the 29 October 1856 and to the

Deed of Transfer in favour of appearer's said Principals dated 17 June 1869'. This quotation is taken from the Deeds Office, Pietermaritzburg.

3. The record of the Deed of Grant quoted above is known by every property owner, and the Matiwanoskop Tribe, as it was known after the acquisition of this property has always been under the impression that the Central Government was still to fulfill the promise made when during the World War I several men joined the army to defend the country that after the war, Matiwanoskop would be joined to the Amatungwa Tribe by the annexation of the White farms that separate the two tribes. It has been a complete surprise to learn that instead of the Central Government fulfilling its promise now the Matiwanoskop Tribe must be moved much against its will.
 4. We have cherished our land with jealousy because of the presence of the ever running streams and innumerable springs with crystal clear and cool waters. Rains fall regularly and we have never experienced any droughts.
 5. Matiwanoskop is a land of our comfort where we live creatively and peacefully. We cultivate all the different types of vegetables that suit the climate. People who cannot find employment are able to make a living through land cultivation.
 6. The Tribe is able to meet and satisfy its needs; housing accommodation is not a problem. There is ample space to accommodate houses according to our traditional and customary beliefs - taking into consideration the position and the status attached to the position each family member occupies.
 7. Among the people there are pensioners who have been loyal and honest to the Central Government during their youth. These people cannot make any fresh start elsewhere no matter how much they would receive as compensation.
It would be tragic to have an impression that the Central Government does not consider and sympathise with such old people and their descendants after being loyal to the Government in their lives.
- (iv) Improvements and Developments
1. Matiwanoskop Farm was bought after being rejected by White farmers as being unproductive and watery.
 - 1.1 The Matiwanoskop Tribe has worked up the farm and made it productive and comparable with any other farm with the same population density per kilometre.
 - 1.2 The socio-economic life of the people has been so geared up that if this stable community were to be moved to another area:-
 - (a) they would not be in a position to live the same way of life as they are living
 - (b) no matter what amount of compensation would be given, money-wise, that would not enable the tribe to be the same tribe as before.
 - (c) from the time of Matiwane himself to the very last Chief who recently passed away, their graves are in the area where they were traditionally buried.
 - (d) it is unthinkable to imagine that a tribe with a long

traditional custom of burying Chiefs has to move away and leave those graves behind.

(e) the graves of our forefathers, the traditional burial places of our Chiefs are the bonds that tie us inseparably with this place Matiwanoskop.

2. Our objection to the removal from our present property is based on the following reasons:-

- 2.1 On page 1 of the Journal of the Development Corporations, Growth, May 1979, the Minister of Plural Relations (now Co-operation and Development), Dr P. Koornhof says, 'The very least that I expect from the National Development Corporations are CO-OPERATION, GOOD HUMAN RELATIONS AND THE CREATION OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES.' On page 8 he concludes by saying, 'To achieve a happy and meaningful life for the Black people, housing, food, and employment had to be provided. Bearing in mind their 2,9 per cent per year rate of increase, which would double their number within 22 years, there had to be order, discipline and creative work in South Africa. This could only be achieved if there was hope, inspiration and national creative drive.'
- Dr Koornhof stressed that this approach would be to plan with and not for the Black people.
- 2.2 The relationship of the facts expressed above to the Matiwanoskop Tribe is self evident. We are a settled and an orderly tribe, well disciplined and law-abiding. We do not have any peculiar crimes distinct from other tribes. We have respect for the Government and the law, and we have never encouraged any subversive movement in our area.
- 2.3 We appeal to the Minister to exercise his good will as shown to the people of Alexandra Township when he said, 'There must be trust established between the different people of this country and cannot see why that cannot happen. If the White, Black, Indian and Coloured people will take each by the hand and really co-operate, we can build this into one of the most magnificent countries in the world.' (Sunday Times, July 29, 1979, p. 3)
- 2.4 The Matiwanoskop Tribe has lived very happily with the neighbouring White farmers. If there is any element of untoward behaviour, it must be a result of individuals recently expelled from the White farms and infiltrated into the tribe and vice versa.


(v) Conclusion

The Chief and his Tribe do not wish to be moved from Matiwanoskop land because:-

1. We are still living traditional life unspoiled by any outside influence.
2. There is no hooliganism among our youth.
3. We have lived peacefully for many years observing our tribal habits, customs and rituals.
4. The tribe has ever since been loyal to the Government.
5. We are able to live and prosper at no expense.
6. The Tribal achievements include inter alia
 - a) 10 church buildings
 - b) 16 school buildings
 - c) 1 laboratory
 - d) 1 library
 - e) 1 general mechanic shop and
 - f) 12 shops.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matiwanoskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worse come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.



2. ST WENDOLINS

1. Introduction and background

St Wendolins is a community of some 21 000 people, situated about 14 km from central Pinetown, on land owned by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Mariannhill (until this was expropriated in about 1979/80) and individual african landowners. (See map on opposite page.) Although listed as a black spot by officials in the 1950s, it only came under threat of removal in 1966 when the Group Areas Board zoned the general area in which it is situated for non-africans, demarcating various white, coloured and indian group areas on it as well as an industrial zone.

Removals of individual households began to get under way in a piecemeal fashion in selected areas in the late 1970s, once the relocation townships of KwaNdengezi and Kwa-Dabeka had been established for the Pinetown area. In 1979/80 the ongoing removal of families from this area and the threatened removal of the entire community began to receive press publicity. As the community's opposition to the removals has strengthened and outside groups rallied to their support, so the pressures have mounted on the State to reverse its decision to eradicate St Wendolins. At the time of writing a partial reprieve may be offered one section of the community; residents are trying to mobilise support to save the entire community. Although too early for the community to claim final victory, they have thus won some important preliminary rounds in their struggle.⁺

THE FOUNDING OF THE MARIANNHILL MISSION INSTITUTE

The history of St Wendolins is closely linked to the history of the Mariannhill Mission Institute, which was founded one hundred years ago by Father Franz Pfanner. Before the possession of this land by whites, the area was occupied by the Mapumulo and Mangengeni peoples. The latter were settled along the Umhlatusana river in the Pinetown area and their chief Manzini asked for missionaries to work among his people and to teach them to read. (Brain, 1975, 166)

In December 1882 Father Franz Pfanner purchased the farm Zeekoegat from the Natal Land and Colonization Company for the sum of £1 000. The Mariannhill Mission was built on this land. Subsequently the Mission bought the farm Klaarwater, adjacent to Zeekoegat, and established the mission community of St Wendolins on a part of this farm. African members of the church were allowed to buy or lease land at St Wendolins from the Mission.

This area was regarded as an outstation of the monastery and in 1932 St Wendolins acquired its own parish priest. The Mission Institute permitted a number of african Catholics either to lease or buy portions of this land until 1950, when it was warned against selling further land to africans. By then the area had been divided into 140 plots and during the period 1930 to 1950 about eighty freehold title stands were sold to resident Catholics at £10 a piece. This freehold area is now known officially as St Wendolins

+ The following account is compiled mainly from material drawn from a B.Sc. Honours thesis by S. Donald, submitted to the University of Natal in 1981; a research paper produced by the SAIIR Durban, also in 1981 (Information Sheet 5/81); various newspaper articles and documents of the St Wendolins Welfare Committee and interviews with residents. SPP thanks all those whose research and contributions have gone into this Report.

Ridge. Many people who did not purchase stands paid a small fee for the right to reside on the Mission land. This was in the area now described officially as Savannah Park. Although we have used these official names where unavoidable (for the sake of clarity), SPP agrees with the St Wendolins Welfare Committee that the two areas should not be regarded as separate but form a single community. Thus, in speaking of St Wendolins we include both St Wendolins Ridge and Savannah Park.

THE PROCLAMATION OF THE GROUP AREAS ACT

In 1966 the entire area surrounding the Mariannhill Mission, comprising 8 500 hectares, was subjected to the proclamations of the Group Areas Act and was zoned as follows:

- 1) Different group areas were proclaimed:
 - The land on which the monastery, hospital, schools and convent stand was zoned for whites;
 - The land to the west was proclaimed for coloureds and in 1976 the coloured township of Marianridge was established there;
 - The land to the east, incorporating St Wendolins, was proclaimed for indians.
- 2) A further 400 hectares of Klaarwater was zoned for industrial purposes. (Natal Mercury, 24.10.71)

Once their area had been proclaimed an indian group area, the residents of St Wendolins were told by government officials that they would have to leave. Some plots were sold to indians at the current prices and the rest of the land, both Mission and freehold, was earmarked for expropriation. Removals did not get under way until the late 1970s however, and thus the effects of the Group Areas proclamation were not felt immediately.

The proclamation of St Wendolins as an indian Group Area had the potential for deflecting the anger of its threatened residents away from the authorities who were responsible for their plight, onto the indian community who apparently stood to gain from the removal of St Wendolins. Subsequent support from progressive indian organisations for the people of St Wendolins has helped to counter this tendency and expose the divisive nature of the Group Areas Act within the black community.

INCORPORATION INTO PINETOWN MUNICIPALITY

In June 1970 the adjoining areas of Mariannhill, Zeekoegat and Klaarwater (including St Wendolins) were incorporated into the Pinetown municipal area. St Wendolins henceforth fell under the Pinetown municipality and the holders of title deeds became ratepayers. (Donald, 1981, 31) Concern arose over the general health situation in St Wendolins and this motivated the Pinetown municipality to erect taps along the main road, where residents could obtain fresh water. In 1973 a Council was established to make provision for more effective communication between african residents in the Pinetown area and the Pinetown Town Council. The St Wendolins/Pinetown Liaison Committee, acting for the Council, has made applications for lights, electricity, water and other services. As a result of this liaison various improvements have occurred in the community:

- The main road was tarred;
- Fresh water was laid along the length of the road;
- Street lights were erected along the road;
- A family planning and health clinic and a creche were established;
- Bus shelters were erected.

INFLUX OF WORKERS TO ST WENDOLINS

Industrial development in the Durban/Pinetown area, together with the migration to the

cities by people who could no longer be supported in the bantustans, has led to a massive increase in the peri-urban population of Greater Durban. This influx has been accompanied by a burgeoning of spontaneous housing and the growth of informal settlements, a process which became increasingly apparent during the 1970s and which has affected the St Wendolins area as well.

In recent years there has been a large influx of contract workers into the St Wendolins community. These contract workers, many from the Transkei, were attracted by job opportunities in the Pinetown textile industries. Since no official accommodation was available for them, the newcomers were obliged to find shelter among settled communities like St Wendolins, where they rented land or rooms from existing residents. These people were warned by the Administration Board not to erect substantial dwellings as their residence in the area was not permanent and they would not be compensated for their homes when removals occurred. Consequently many informal dwellings and shacks were erected at St Wendolins.

While unofficial, this informal settlement has provided homes for many families. In the eyes of the officials, however, this area has become a slum, a phenomenon which the urban authorities have used to justify removals in the area. A press statement from the Liaison Officer of the Department of Cooperation and Development described the area thus:

Many of the people who are at present squatting on the land are doing so illegally and are living there under deplorable hygienic conditions. (SAIRR Natal, 5/81, 6)

In 1981 in an interview in which the eviction of these tenants was discussed, an official from Pinetown stated:

The area is a slum. What are they (the tenants) complaining of? They are getting R150 to R200 (compensation) for a bit of scrap rubbish. (Donald, 1981, Appendix 3, Question 9)

2. General conditions

The official viewpoint overlooks the reasons for the growth of informal housing at St Wendolins - the lack of alternative housing for many workers in the Pinetown area - and exaggerates the health problems facing the community. Since 1973 there have been substantial improvements in the provision of water and the sanitation arrangements in the area, as already described; further upgrading of the area is a major objective of existing community organisations.

Overall the community is closely-knit and well-established. Many residents have lived there all their lives and their forefathers, family members and friends are buried in the local cemetery. (Concern over the fate of the graveyard if the community is removed is widespread). A survey conducted by the St Wendolins Welfare Committee in early 1982 revealed that 57,3% of the 581 households interviewed had lived at St Wendolins for 11 years or more. (See Appendix 2 of this chapter.)

Although incorporated into the Pinetown municipal area, the community retains a peri-urban, village character. Many residents, particularly in Savannah Park, have vegetable gardens and orchards. Some residents even have cattle. Although the community is far from being agriculturally self sufficient, the land is partially productive. Some commodities at least are home grown and this forms a supplement to household income from other sources.

There are a number of voluntary organisations in the community. Apart from the St

Wendolins Welfare Committee (described below) there is a vigilante corps, established to help maintain peace and order in the community, and various women's organisations. Some of these are church organisations while others are clubs where women teach each other skills such as needlework, cooking and handcrafts.

The community has its own creche, clinic and several schools. The St Wendolins creche was founded in 1975 by the Port Natal Administration Board and is run by the Pinetown Child Welfare Organisation, which provides the teachers' salaries and the meals for the children. Approximately eighty children attend this creche. The clinic was also opened in 1975 and is housed in a temporary building. A qualified sister visits St Wendolins regularly and patients who need special care are sent to the day hospital at KwaDabeka. The local lower and higher primary schools are popular among both parents and pupils. Parents have expressed confidence in the schools, over which they have a certain amount of control, and voiced concern about the unknown 'township elements' which they fear will prevail in the newly built schools in the relocation townships.

St Wendolins also boasts a few shops (some mobile, others substantial) where basic provisions can be obtained. The informal sector provides fruit, vegetables and poultry for sale. Other services available in the community include a butchery, cobbler, tailor and dry cleaner. A further substantial attraction for those living in the area is its relative proximity to central Pinetown. Bus fares to Pinetown cost, in late 1981, 50 cents daily, compared to 60 cents daily from KwaDabeka and R1,30 daily from KwaNdengezi.

HOUSING AT ST WENDOLINS

The following categories of occupants are distinguishable:

Landowners: Land is owned either by the mission or by a number of residents as described above.

Tenants: These people either lease a plot of ground and a dwelling (built by themselves or with mission aid) from the monastery or from landlords in St Wendolins. Most pay rents of R5 per annum, but widows and pensioners renting from the mission pay half this amount.⁺

Lodgers: These are mainly recent immigrants to the area, who rent rooms from landlords and from the tenants. They pay about R5 or R6 per room per month.⁺

The houses at St Wendolins are large - some have up to nine rooms - and can accommodate an extended family unit. (23% of the households in the Welfare Committee Survey's sample were reported to be 'multiple' - extended and/or compound.) There are 150 substantial brick houses and 1 142 informal dwellings many of which are well built. (Donald, 1981, 36) Accommodation is far cheaper at St Wendolins than at the new townships where the average house has only four rooms and rents in 1981 ranged between R16 and R35 a month. (SAIRR Natal, 5/81, 9)

EMPLOYMENT

Most workers from St Wendolins are employed in nearby Pinetown and New Germany - over 70% of the households interviewed by the Welfare Committee in 1982. (See Appendix 2.) Because St Wendolins has been incorporated into the Pinetown area, its residents enjoy Section 10 rights - rights which they will lose if relocated to KwaNdengezi and KwaDabeka

⁺ These figures exclude water costs and service charges, which are paid monthly to the Municipality.

since these two townships fall inside KwaZulu.

Loss of Section 10 rights will mean firstly that all workers will become contract workers, having to renew their contracts annually, and secondly, they will be prevented from seeking work in the Durban area and confined, through the Labour Bureau, to jobs in the pinetown area only. In July 1980 the Chief Director of the PNAB assured lawyers acting for the Mariannhill Mission that workers moved from St Wendolins to KwaDabeka or KwaNdengezi would suffer no loss of status as a result (see below), but these assurances have proved meaningless. The Black Sash Advice Office in Durban has had dealings with a number of ex St Wendolins residents, people who have already been moved into KwaDabeka, who claim that they have been refused work seeker permits even for the Pinetown area. They have been told that because KwaDabeka is in KwaZulu, they cannot look for employment themselves but must wait at the Pinetown Labour Bureau for any employment vacancies that are reported there.

Most workers from St Wendolins are unskilled or semi-skilled, earning low salaries. 23,2% of the workers in the Welfare Committee's survey earned less than R100 a month and 85,9% earned less than R250 a month. The average household income was found to be just under R300 a month. (See Appendix 2.) The survey notes that household income is higher in 'multiple' (extended) households than in nuclear ones. Since township housing is too small to cater for extended households, these households are likely to suffer a decline in living standards if moved to KwaNdengezi or KwaDabeka, since they will be obliged to break up into smaller nuclear family units. Further pressures on living standards will come from the increased housing, transport and subsistence costs awaiting families at these two townships. The average monthly transport costs for workers from St Wendolins is R10,55; from KwaNdengezi it is R28,24. (See Appendix 2.)

CONDITIONS IN THE RELOCATION TOWNSHIPS

Both townships of KwaNdengezi and KwaDabeka fall inside KwaZulu, although KwaDabeka is situated on land still administered by the SADT. KwaNdengezi has been planned to have a total of 4 200 houses, of which by 1981 about one third had been built, and KwaDabeka has been planned to have 8 500 houses, of which by 1981 only about 6% had been built.

Most housing in these townships is of the standard 4-room type and rented, but some tenants may convert their monthly payments to a purchase-by-installment plan over an extended period and so achieve home ownership. There is some provision for private development of above-standard housing by individuals or companies. In October 1981 the Natal Mercury Property News (31.10.81) reported that the Pinetown branch of the Southern Trident Insurance group intended to build 25 houses in KwaDabeka for home ownership, on land owned by the SADT and sold through Deed of Grant. The stands are small - 500 square metres, and the modest homes (2 bedrooms, living room, kitchen and bathroom) would cost between R12 000 to R13 000 - far beyond the means of the average resident of St Wendolins.

Most people from St Wendolins view these townships extremely negatively. 98% of the 581 households interviewed by the St Wendolins Welfare Committee in early 1982 were opposed to being removed. The most frequent reasons advanced related to the quality of life at St Wendolins (30,6% of all the responses), followed by the cheaper rents at St Wendolins compared to those in the townships (16,7%), the better work opportunities (13%), the lower cost of living in general (12,6%) and dislike of township life and its various problems (9,6%). In June 1981 an ex-resident of St Wendolins, one of those already moved (to KwaDabeka), summed up the differences between his former situation and life in the township thus:

We all lived together in St Wendolins in a house I built in 1964. It had 7 large rooms. I paid a rent of R4 a year to the Mariannhill

Monastery. I earned between R250 and R300 a year selling fruit I grew. The rent here (KwaDabeka) is R21,50 a month, and an extra R5 or so for water. In St Wendolins I spent about R40 a month on food, because we took a lot of what we ate out of the ground, and were able to buy eggs and poultry cheap from a neighbour. Here food costs us about R100 a month. (Sunday Tribune, 7.06.81)

3. Removals at St Wendolins

EVICTIIONS FROM SAVANNAH PARK

The first removals in the area began in the late 1970s when people living in the vicinity of Klaarwater Station, the area zoned for industrial use, were moved to make way for the industrial development in that area. Some moved over to St Wendolins proper, others were moved to KwaNdengezi.

In early 1979 PNAB officials issued notices to all tenants in both St Wendolins Ridge and Savannah Park, instructing them to vacate their premises within a year. (Daily News, 23.09.81) Nobody responded to these notices and on the 8th January 1980 the PNAB began to demolish houses. After representations from lawyers to government officials the removals at St Wendolins Ridge came to a stop but those at Savannah Park continued through 1980 and into 1981. By 1981 the PNAB claimed that a total of 68 families had moved 'voluntarily' from Savannah Park, 21 to KwaNdengezi and 47 to KwaDabeka. (Donald, 1981, 31. The question of whether the removals were voluntary or not is discussed below.)

It seems that the freehold status of the land at St Wendolins Ridge was partly instrumental in winning the respite for the people living there since this complicated the issue of the compensation due to those removed. In 1979/80 community leaders obtained lawyers and evaluators to help challenge official assessments of what individual properties were worth and this acted as a brake on the process of removals in the freehold area. As community organisation against the removals strengthened and outside support groups began to exert pressure to stop the removals as well, the authorities seem to have decided to focus their attention on the more vulnerable Savannah Park area and have tried to divide the community accordingly.

THE ROLE OF THE PNAB

The PNAB claim that the removals from St Wendolins have all been voluntary. Many members of the community however have complained of the deceptive tactics used by the PNAB to pressurise people to leave. The SAIRR Information Sheet (5/81) lists several such tactics, including the following:

1. Cases have been reported of officials who have plied residents with questions regarding their families and houses and, after signing documents testifying to the validity of their statements, the occupants have discovered that they had in fact signed a form requesting settlement in KwaZulu.
2. Many people feel that the compensation paid out constitutes a bribe. When people have complained to officials that they cannot pay the high rentals for houses in KwaNdengezi and KwaDabeka, they were misled into believing that the compensation would be sufficient to meet these requirements.

3. Further criticism is levelled at the PNAB for avoiding direct confrontation with the heads of households. Eviction notices have been served to wives, children, pensioners or lodgers while the breadwinners are away at work, so that when they arrive home they are presented with a fait accompli. When removals do occur the household heads are not available to protect their possessions.
4. The PNAB is alleged to have 'invited' certain individuals to their offices and have offered them alternative accommodation, thus making it appear as though people had gone on their own accord to request removal.
5. Families are given short notice that they are to be moved - usually only a week. This does not provide them with enough time to get their things in order, but they comply because they are frightened, sometimes because threats are made if they appear to hesitate, and sometimes because the removal of their neighbours has had a demoralising effect and they are afraid to be left behind alone. Many residents in the Savannah Park area have moved for this reason.
6. Some occupants complained that they were told they would receive cheques of compensation only after they had destroyed their homes, thus making it impossible for them to return to St Wendolins.
7. Many residents feel that the PNAB has tried deliberately to undermine the coherence and morale of the community by manipulating the impoverished, weaker and more mobile elements of the community first. In this way the community gradually dwindles away and even the most determined are rendered more vulnerable and will ultimately be unable to resist removals on their own.

In September 1981 the Sunday Tribune printed extracts from a letter issued by PNAB officials to a householder at St Wendolins instructing him of the date on which he would be moved to KwaNdengezi. The letter stated the bleak options open to this householder should he refuse to move, very clearly:

Should you, however, elect not to take up residence in KwaNdengezi, you are hereby notified to vacate the house you are at present occupying and take up residence in a black homeland and to vacate and demolish the house you are at present occupying.

Should you fail to accept the alternative accommodation offered and should you fail to vacate your present house and demolish same before this date, your house will be demolished and you may be prosecuted. (Sunday Tribune, 6.09.81)

This same report carried an account of an interview conducted by a journalist and a PNAB official named Vermaak in which the official insisted that people were moving willingly but later admitted that those who had been instructed to move, 'must go.'

I have been given a task and I am doing it until I get instructions to stop. (Ibid)

THE ROLE OF THE MARIANNHILL MISSION

The role of the Mission in the removal and subsequent negotiations for a reprieve for St Wendolins has been an ambiguous one; it has come under criticism from members of

the community as a result.

It seems that all of the land at St Wendolins except for the 80 individually owned plots was in fact expropriated by the Department of Community Development (the Department responsible for the establishment of Group Areas townships) at about the time when the first evictions began. Initially there was considerable confusion as to the exact status of this land. In June 1981 the Sunday Tribune reported on a family who had been told to leave Savannah Park in August 1980 'because the land had been sold' by Mariannhill. (7.06.81) However in September 1981, when the Sunday Tribune reported that a PNAB official had confirmed this sale and that all the land except for the 80 stands belonging to the individual african landowners at St Wendolins Ridge belonged to the Department, the Superior of Mariannhill denied that this was the case.

He is absolutely wrong ... The whole hill of St Wendolins, except for 80 private plots owned by residents, still belongs to us. We have no interest in selling it, nor are we prepared to do so. (Sunday Tribune, 6.09.81)

Then, a few weeks later, the Superior of Mariannhill admitted that 'we sold (Savannah Park) because we had to.' (Daily News, 23.09.81) He added that his negotiations with the Department had led to 'absolute assurances of compensation for the people's houses and anything they had established on the land, as well as provisions for rehousing and maintenance of jobs.'

However once the land had been expropriated and before this was public knowledge, the Mission did set out to obtain assurances from various government officials concerning the conditions of removal. This is apparent from the written replies received by the Mission from various officials during the course of 1980.

A letter from the Deputy Secretary of Community Development gave assurance that nobody would be moved without alternative accommodation being available in KwaNdengezi or KwaDabeka, a fact which was reiterated by the Chief Commissioner of the Department of Cooperation and Development.

The Regional Representative of the Department of Community Development stated that an amount of R605 085 had been made available in March 1980 'for the express purpose of compensating the blacks for the improvements to homes and dwellings which they had erected.'

The Chief Director of the PNAB gave assurance that workers removed to KwaDabeka and KwaNdengezi 'will be treated for employment purposes in the Pinetown magisterial district, as though they are still residents of the area'. (Letter to lawyers of the Mission, 29.07.80)

These (and subsequent) negotiations were carried out without the active participation of representatives from the community however and their thrust at this stage was not to stop the removals but to ameliorate the conditions under which people were to be removed. Later, after several groups inside and outside St Wendolins had raised questions about the role of the Mission, Mariannhill came out more strongly for the right of the people to remain. In 1982 they offered the very large sum of five million rand towards the upgrading of the area.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ST WENDOLINS WELFARE COMMITTEE

The St Wendolins Welfare Committee was established in 1979 at a public meeting held in the community in response to the threat of evictions and removals. In 1982 it described the reasons for its establishment thus:

To represent the community in all matters affecting it and to articulate the needs, aspirations and apprehensions of the residents with regard to removals. (Memorandum, 10.06.82. See Appendix 1.)

At first the Welfare Committee was composed largely of Inkatha members and looked to Ulundi for help. One of its main objectives was to secure adequate compensation for those who were being removed, rather than to fight the removals as such - although, as already pointed out, the haggling over the terms of compensation did serve to delay removals in the St Wendolins Ridge area.

From late 1980 the Committee began to establish links with liberal organisations in Durban which came out in support of the community's right to their land. On the 22nd November 1980, partly as a result of these contacts, the Welfare Committee decided to send a statement to the Minister of Cooperation and Development 'protesting against forced removals.' (Memorandum, 10.06.82, 10) This received no more than a brief acknowledgement from the Minister. For this reason the Committee organised a petition from the community to back up its claims.

The petition sent to Dr Koornhof on 16th April 1981 was signed by 1 300 household heads. It was a clear articulation of the community's opposition to the removals, laying down the following points:

- The community has deep roots in the area and many residents have lived there all their lives;
- Their families are buried there, 'so our identity and stability are tied up in St Wendolins';
- Their present houses are large (seven to nine rooms) while the houses in the townships are much smaller (three to four rooms);
- Schools are further away and transport costs will rise;
- The rents in the new townships are too high, while many at St Wendolins own land and pay only nominal rentals;
- They find it hard that other persons, viz. indians should enjoy the advantages of the land that has 'husbanded and sheltered us these many years.' (Echo, 23.04.81)

During the course of 1981 St Wendolins received an increasing amount of press publicity. Its proximity to Durban made it accessible to journalists and church and other community workers and this served to broaden and highlight its campaign. Partly as a result of these contacts and the experience, both positive and negative, of outside intervention, the composition of the Welfare Committee underwent some changes. Support for Inkatha dwindled within the community as KwaZulu failed to respond to their appeal for help. More conservative members of the Committee were either forced to take a more active role or to withdraw from the forefront of active organisation and decision-making. By the end of 1981 the Welfare Committee had come to emphasise the need to consolidate and mobilise grassroots support within the community, rather than to depend as heavily on outside support groups as before. The success of these tactics can be gauged by the overwhelming support the Welfare Committee currently enjoys in the community - about 90% of the 581 households surveyed in early 1982 recorded their support for it. (See Appendix 2.)

THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE GROUPS

1. The Durban and District Housing Co-ordination Committee (DDHCC)

This committee was convened in 1977 in order to co-ordinate the activities of several concerned white groups on the issues of black housing in Durban. The composition of this committee fluctuates to some degree but it is compiled mainly of representatives of Black Sash, Diakonia, National Council of Women (NCW), Women for Peaceful Change Now, the SAIRR and at one time the Urban Foundation. It has been particularly active in St Wendolins during 1981 although various members, notably from NCW, were involved from 1980.

At times there is a lack of consensus regarding the nature or extent of this committee's involvement. On occasions individuals have acted on their own initiative, whilst others have been particularly conscientious in attending regularly evening meetings with the Welfare Committee as well as Sunday morning community meetings. Lack of consensus stems from the fact that different organisations and their representatives have different conceptions of their involvement. While some believe in mobilizing the community, others lay more stress on creating awareness in the white community and still others are concerned with researching and monitoring events.

The DDHCC as a whole sees its role as 'supportive'. It regards St Wendolins as a Christian community, family-bound, united and economically independent - viable but for removals. There has been a tendency to see St Wendolins as something of a special case, deserving special concern and therefore isolated from other removals. There is however some awareness that if a successful struggle is waged at St Wendolins this may make removals in other areas of Durban (such as the threatened township of Chesterville) more difficult for the State to carry out. The DDHCC has been responsible for a large measure of the publicity that has surrounded the attempt to remove St Wendolins.

Chronology of actions taken by the St Wendolins Welfare Committee, in conjunction with the DDHCC, November 1980 - December 1981.

10th and 11th November 1980. Members of the NCW visited St Wendolins and drew up a brief account of the situation in preparation for a press release.

12th November 1980. Emergency meeting of the DDHCC called to discuss the St Wendolins issue and enlist the support of the Committee in backing an approach to the government, by the Welfare Committee, to end the removals.

22nd November 1980. Following a meeting of representatives of the DDHCC with the St Wendolins Welfare Committee, a statement from the people was sent to Dr Koornhof. In addition letters of support from organisations represented on the DDHCC were sent to Dr Koornhof.

January 1981. Brief replies to the statement by the DDHCC were received from the Department of Cooperation and Development indicating that the matter was receiving attention.

5th April 1981. Members of the DDHCC met with the people of St Wendolins following the Sunday morning service and a decision was made to draw up a petition to appeal to the government to end the removals.

8th April 1981. The DDHCC met to discuss possible ways in which public awareness of the situation could be secured and also to enlist the support of church leaders, Lawyers for Human Rights, the Member of Parliament and of the Provincial Council for Pinetown.

23rd April 1981. A petition of 1 300 signatures of St Wendolins residents was sent to Dr Koornhof.

26th May 1981. Members of the DDHCC met with the News Editor of the Sunday Tribune. This resulted in a long article on St Wendolins on 7th June.

22nd June 1981. Support of Church leaders secured, and a joint letter was sent to Dr Koornhof.

July 1981. Production of slide-tape presentation on St Wendolins 'Against our Will' commissioned by the DDHCC.

8th July 1981. Petition from several St Wendolins Women's organisations was drawn up and sent to Dr Koornhof.

August 1981. 24 000 'Month of Compassion' leaflets on St Wendolins distributed in Churches in Durban area.

18th August 1981. Telegrams sent by DDHCC to Dr Koornhof to stop removals from Savannah Park area of St Wendolins, and to Mr H. Pitman, PFP MP for Pinetown, requesting him to ask questions in House of Parliament.

22nd August 1981. Solidarity Service at St Wendolins preceded by guided tour of area. Much time was spent by school pupils on sprucing up the area in preparation for the visit. Two bus loads of whites came plus a number of car loads.

24th August 1981. Telegram from Department of Cooperation and Development received by DDHCC stating that they had 300 people on waiting list for housing at KwaNdengezi.

24th October 1981. St Wendolins Day Workshop, addressed by representatives of Black Sash, AFRA and various residents of St Wendolins.

26th October 1981. Telegram to Dr Koornhof following on one of recommendations from Workshop of 24th. Telegram called for 6 months moratorium on all removals in Savannah Park and St Wendolins during which carefully researched proposals could be drawn up by experts in consultation with the people.

16th December 1981. The DDHCC organised a one day public meeting in Durban to protest against removals. Eleven other threatened or removed communities⁺ sent representatives who addressed the meeting in addition to speakers from St Wendolins. This represented an attempt to link protests in St Wendolins to campaigns to stop removals in other areas. At the end of the meeting a resolution was unanimously adopted condemning removals and calling on 'all relevant authorities' to stop all forced removals immediately and to provide basic facilities to both existing relocation and threatened areas.

2. Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC)

The DHAC set up a workshop in conjunction with the Welfare Committee in late 1981. The main aims were to create channels of communication between coloured, indian and african communities in order to break down the suspicion and isolation created by the Group Areas Act and by State action over removals. This served to draw the St Wendolins community into the general struggle that DHAC has been waging on behalf of coloured and indian communities in the Durban area.

3. Legal Action

The SAIRR instituted a title deeds search in an attempt to clarify the legal situation with regard to title deed holders and to establish the nature of the land transaction between the Mission and the State. In addition, lawyers' letters were drawn up and given to Savannah Park residents for use in the event of attempted eviction by the PNAB. These letters referred the authorities to lawyers who were prepared to act on behalf of residents and asked that all transactions be directed to them rather than to the residents. Affidavits were also signed by all residents who did not wish to move, to counteract PNAB claims that no-one was being moved unwillingly.

⁺ The communities that were represented were : Reserve 4, Ntambanana, Amaoti, Amawotana, Shakaville, Matiwane's Kop, Steincoalspruit, Malukazi, Rookdale/Upper Tugela Location, Chesterville, and Weenen farms.

4. Group Areas Board hearing, 1982

In December 1981 the Group Areas Board announced that it would convene a hearing in 1982 to consider deproclaiming the St Wendolins Ridge area and rezoning it for african residence after all. This announcement was clearly in response to the pressures that had been exerted on the government to change its mind about St Wendolins and the increasing resistance being encountered within the community to the PNAB's methods of removal. However the St Wendolins Ridge area represented only a small part of the total community and, despite appeals, the authorities refused to reconsider the status of the land that had already been expropriated and from where removals had been taking place, at Savannah Park.

RESPONSE OF THE WELFARE COMMITTEE

The announcement of the pending hearing ushered in a new phase in the resistance to removals within the community. Up until this time the Welfare Committee had worked very closely with the DDHCC, often responding to its ideas, but the announcement of the proposed hearing altered this pattern. The Welfare Committee decided that it should concentrate on organising people within the community as its first priority. The DDHCC took a back seat role although it did help to engage lawyers to organise the signing of affidavits and also organised for the Architecture Department at the University of Natal to draw up a questionnaire on housing, to be used by the Committee.

For the purposes of mobilising the community more effectively, St Wendolins was divided up into twelve working areas, each of which was to have a working group - at present there are six such groups fully operative. The Welfare Committee also instituted weekly community meetings to report back on weekly events. These meetings provided a forum where issues could be discussed and future strategies planned.

In readiness for the hearing, affidavits were taken from about 1 500 people. These declared the length of time the individual had been staying at St Wendolins, the age and the status of the person as well as the fact that he/she did not want to move. These affidavits were taken by outside lawyers. The questionnaire drawn up by the Architecture Department was intended to gather background information - details of household size, structure, toilet facilities, age of household members, rent paid etc. - which could be used to draw up a plan for upgrading the area and to prove to the authorities that the cost of upgrading would be less than what they had in mind. (The authorities had told St Wendolins residents at one stage that they had to be moved because it would cost more to upgrade the area for St Wendolins residents than to develop an indian township.) Although this project was initiated by the Architecture Department, it was intended that all questionnaires would be administered by community members. This was so that the interview could be used as an opportunity for discussion of the issues within the community as well.

An outside research group, Community Research Unit, helped to draw up an additional questionnaire which detailed household size, length of residence in St Wendolins, origins of residents, place of work etc. The results of this survey, conducted by the Welfare Committee in early 1982, showed clearly that St Wendolins is a stable, settled community. Again, members of the community administered the questionnaires and used them to encourage people to participate in the community action and to attend meetings. (The results of the survey are summarised in Appendix 2.)

In May 1982 the Group Areas Board announced that the hearing would be held in mid June. Although given very short notice, the Committee rallied around to get its case prepared in time. It set up the St Wendolins Support Committee, composed of students from all the Universities in the Durban area and representatives of various church and community groups. Loosely structured, this Support Committee played a relatively minor role in organising for the hearing. Its input was mainly a resource and publicity one, helping collate the hundreds of affidavits, making posters advertising meetings, photocopying documents for the hearing (everything had to be submitted in quintuplicate prior to the hearing), giving advice on the drawing up of the memorandum and liaising with newspapers.

In St Wendolins itself, two mass meetings were organised. At both, the emphasis was on encouraging St Wendolins residents to attend the hearing. Members of DHAC and the Natal Indian Congress addressed the meetings, declaring their support for St Wendolins and making it clear that the indian community as a whole did not want to buy the land there. Members of the Committee held a number of jumble sales and had a collection at both meetings to raise money towards the costs of printing and organising for the hearing. The Committee also organised for a petition to be signed in Pinetown on two successive Saturdays. The petition declared that the people of St Wendolins did not want to move. Again St Wendolins residents were involved in administering the petition and in encouraging Pinetown residents to sign.

Because of the short notice given of the hearing the Architecture Department could not produce the comprehensive plan for the area that it had hoped for, but it did compile a draft plan.

THE GROUP AREAS BOARD HEARING

The hearing was held on the 18th June 1982. Although the Board had declared that it would only consider St Wendolins Ridge, all submissions made by the Welfare Committee and their supporters made it clear that they were also referring to the area known as Savannah Park. Memoranda were submitted by: Diakonia, the Mariannhill Housing Action Committee (an affiliate of DHAC), the NIC, the NCW, the St Wendolins Parish Council, the St Wendolins Residents Association and the St Wendolins Welfare Committee.

As well as submitting a memorandum, the Welfare Committee also submitted 1) about 900 affidavits and statements from people stating their unwillingness to move, 2) a report on the results of the household survey, and 3) a brief plan for the upgrading of the area prepared by the Architecture Department of the University of Natal.

The hall at which the hearing was held was packed with St Wendolins residents, some of whom gave evidence and who reiterated their desire to stay in St Wendolins. Other parties to give evidence included the Pinetown Municipality which declared that it was possible to upgrade the area but that certain parts of it would have to be 'tidied up'. The Mariannhill Mission gave its support to St Wendolins residents and stated, as already mentioned, that it was prepared to put in five million rand for the redevelopment and upgrading of the area as long as the people were not moved.

The Group Areas Board can only make recommendations as a result of such a hearing; it does not have the power to change the legal position of the land itself. However as a result of the hearing the Board has recommended that St Wendolins Ridge should be deproclaimed, to become a 'controlled area', and hinted that it would consider looking into the situation at Savannah Park as well. The residents of St Wendolins were given no indication of when the recommendation would be approved or disapproved, but the general consensus is that it might take up to a year.

Implications of St Wendolins Ridge becoming a controlled area

The effect of this is to freeze the sale of land according to race group; that is if

land is owned by an african it can only be sold to an african, unless a permit is obtained from the Department of Community Development. However, since St Wendolins falls within the Pinetown Municipality, laws such as the Illegal Squatting Act and the Slums Act will still apply and it seems that if the Municipality wanted to, they could use these laws to remove those elements which they regard as 'untidy' - tenants and lodgers mainly.

EVENTS IN ST WENDOLINS SINCE THE HEARING

The Welfare Committee's response to the hearing has been cautiously optimistic. They regard the present as a time to consolidate organisation, in the event of further removals. They are hoping to find funds for employing a full-time community worker who will be responsible for co-ordinating a community newspaper, will try to initiate or give support to self-help projects, will maintain links with outside organisations and will help set up an advice office in the community, to help residents. The Welfare Committee hopes to establish a card-carrying membership with subscriptions, as well as eventually to employ another person who will be responsible for organising administrative and clerical matters. It also hopes to continue with weekly community meetings which will draw on outside speakers to deal with various issues of general concern to the community.

The issue of Savannah Park has not been resolved and this remains of central importance. Because of the strength of local organisation and the degree of external support and publicity, it seems the government may find it expedient to make a partial concession to St Wendolins Ridge, presumably in the expectation that this will de-fuse the situation and draw public if not local attention away from the clearing of the rest of the area. The difficult task confronting the community is how to bridge the divisions that have been imposed and maintain the momentum already generated within it in the period of uncertainty before the official decision on the area is spelled out.



Appendix 1. Memorandum of the St Wendolins Welfare Committee

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE ST WENDOLINS WELFARE COMMITTEE TO THE GROUP AREAS BOARD INVESTIGATING THE DESIRABILITY OR OTHERWISE OF DEPROCLAIMING OF ST WENDOLINS RIDGE AS AN INDIAN GROUP AREA

1.

INTRODUCTION

We, the residents of St Wendolins, represented by the St Wendolins Welfare Committee, wish to submit the following memorandum explaining the history of our community, our present position and the reasons for our objection to the proclamation of our area as an Indian group area. We explain also our strong objection to our removal against our wishes to other areas, which will result in great hardship for the present residents of St Wendolins.

Consequently, we request that the proclamation of the St Wendolins area as an Indian area be set aside and that the present residents of the area be allowed to remain as the occupants. In addition, we request that the area known as Savannah Park also be deproclaimed.

2.

THE ST WENDOLINS WELFARE COMMITTEE

The community of St Wendolins is represented by the democratically-elected community organisation, the St Wendolins Welfare Committee. The Committee was formed at a public meeting in St Wendolins in 1979 to represent the community in all matters affecting it and to articulate the needs, aspirations and apprehensions of the residents with regard to removals. Since its formation, the Committee has maintained effective liaison with residents of St Wendolins and consulted them in all matters. The Committee is therefore the sole and authentic representative of residents of St Wendolins.

3.

HISTORY OF ST WENDOLINS AND SURROUNDING AREAS

The history of St Wendolins and surrounding areas can be traced back to the early years of the 19th century when the ancestors of the present residents first settled in the area. Indeed, the land held by the Catholic Church in Marianhill was granted to the missionaries by the ancestral chiefs of the present occupants of St Wendolins, namely the chiefs of the Maphumulo tribe and the chief of the Mangangeni tribe in the early 1880s.

Generation after generation of residents have lived on this land as a stable and settled community passing it on to their children, grandchildren and great grandchildren. Some of these generations lived on what is commonly called inherited tribal land. Others from 1930, until they were prohibited in 1950, purchased plots back from the Marianhill Mission Institute, whilst others paid a fee for the right to reside on the mission land.

Thus, the residents of St Wendolins believe that they have a legitimate right to reside

on this land and to resist any move which will disrupt their stable and secure community.

4.

The rapid industrialisation of the Pinetown area in the 1960s resulted in a marked increase in the population of St Wendolins. However, no additional housing was provided by the local authority or industrialists. As a consequence, the residents of St Wendolins felt a humanitarian need to provide accommodation for many of these workers and rapidly integrated them into the community. Indeed, it was at the request of the Port Natal Administration Board in the mid-1960s that such accommodation was provided by the St Wendolins community.

5.

GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATION AND REMOVALS

In 1966 the Marianhill monastery was proclaimed for White, Indian and Coloured occupation in terms of the Group Areas Act. Part of the area was also set aside for industrial development. The residents of St Wendolins were told by the government authorities that they would have to leave.

Subsequently in June 1970, much of the above area was incorporated into the Pinetown municipality and holders of title deeds in the area became ratepayers of Pinetown. It was at this point that the Port Natal Administration Board excluded certain inhabitants from the right to reside in the St Wendolins area. Inhabitants who could not prove residence prior to 1970 were informed that they had to leave the area. However, it was only late in the 1970s that the Board acted upon this. Hundreds of residents were forced to move from the area around Klaarwater Station.

In 1979, however, all residents of St Wendolins were served with notices to vacate the area by 1 January, 1980.

6.

COMMUNITY RESISTANCE

The residents of St Wendolins and surrounding areas have always been opposed to removal from their ancestral lands. When served with notices to vacate in 1979, residents decided at a public meeting to form the St Wendolins Welfare Committee and to resist removal from the area in every possible way.

In January 1980 some houses were demolished. The community protested against the inadequate compensation being offered to residents and demanded that all demolitions and removals be stopped until the question of compensation was resolved. This demand was acceded to by the Board on 8 January, 1980.

The Welfare Committee continued to resist the removal of residents by telephonic and written protests to the relevant authorities, representations to members of Parliament and appeals for public support. On 22 November, 1980 the Welfare Committee submitted a statement to the Minister of Co-operation and Development protesting against forced removals.

On 16 April, 1981 a petition consisting of 1 300 signatures of household heads was submitted by the Welfare Committee to the Minister of Co-operation and Development. The

petition emphasises the desire of the community to remain in St Wendolins and the strong opposition of residents to removals from St Wendolins and surrounding areas. The petition points out that there has been little positive response to the community's pleas from the authorities.

7.

SUPPORT FOR DEPROCLAMATION

The residents of St Wendolins and surrounding areas have a strong and profound attachment to their ancestral lands and homes, and have repeatedly demonstrated their unequivocal opposition to removals and any other form of disruption of their community. The residents, therefore, request the Group Areas Board to deproclaim the area in question for the reasons outlined below.

8.

LARGER AREA SHOULD BE DEPROCLAIMED

On the basis of our representativeness in the area we wish to point out to the Board that the residents of the area do not accept the exclusion of what is now called Savannah Park from the area known as St Wendolins. The residents of the area have instructed the Welfare Committee to bring this to the attention of the Board. The Savannah Park area has always been and continues to be an integral part of St Wendolins. Accordingly, the Welfare Committee requests that the Board deproclaims both the St Wendolins and Savannah Park areas.

9.

WISHES OF THE COMMUNITY

The wishes of the people of St Wendolins and surrounding areas must always be the most important consideration when the future of the people is being considered by any authority. Only bitterness, anger and antagonism can result if the wishes of the people are ignored.

Both before and after the formation of the St Wendolins Welfare Committee, residents have demonstrated their opposition to removal to other areas and demanded the right to continue to live in the area of their birth. Until now, little regard has been shown for the wishes of the residents, as is evident in the many forced removals that have taken place until now. It is hoped that the Board will be sympathetic to the wish of the people to remain in St Wendolins.

10.

CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMUNITY

Adequate and meaningful consultation with the authentic representatives of the community is essential if problems are going to be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties and harmonious relations are to be maintained between different communities.

11.

AN ESTABLISHED AND STABLE COMMUNITY

Most of the residents have deep and historic roots in the area many having lived there all their lives and some can remember their parents and grandparents living there as long as they can remember. Over the decades the community has achieved a high degree

of unity, stability and cohesiveness which has enabled the community to survive many hardships and problems.

The community is a closely-knit one, among whom there are many practising Christians. There is a well attended church and attendant religious organisations.

Many families have several generations buried in the graveyard and are strongly opposed to the prospect of deserting ancestral graves and the very real possibility of exhumation and violation of the bodies.

12.

COMMUNITY FACILITIES

The community has a long-established school with approximately two thousand children enrolled. There are three well organised creches serving the St Wendolins community. In addition, there are several long established burial societies which enjoy broad membership thus fulfilling an essential need. Many of these basic facilities are not available in many of the new townships, and those that are established cannot adequately meet the demands presently being made on them. The further influx of persons from resettled areas will overextend such facilities to intolerable levels.

13.

STRONG COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS

There are numerous religious organisations in St Wendolins. Several sports clubs operate in the area and the residents identify strongly with these recreational organisations. Women's organisations play an important role in solidifying the community, developing many essential skills in needlework, cooking and handicraft amongst the women in the area.

The St Wendolins Welfare Committee has developed into a strong organisation representing the interests of the community and has helped strengthen the identity and cohesiveness of the community.

All these organisations will be destroyed and their positive contributions lost to the community if the people of St Wendolins are moved to other areas.

14.

SOCIAL SUPPORT AND STABILITY

The maintenance of the existing stability and cohesiveness of the community is critical for the network of informal support given to the aged, the pensioners, widows and orphans. People share each other's problems and joys. All this will be destroyed by removals.

The crime rate is low in the area, due to the strong moral pressure exerted both formally and informally by the well established traditions of the community. The residents of St Wendolins are understandably and justifiably anxious that removal to places like KwaDabeka and KwaNdingezi will significantly raise the crime rate in the community.

The residents have maintained a reasonable standard of health, a good example being the complete absence of any incidents of cholera in the area.

The longer travelling time of working parents and the new alien social environment will mean that children will be left unattended for longer periods resulting in a higher incidence of delinquency.

15.

ADEQUATE HOUSING

The housing at St Wendolins, although not ideal, is spacious enough to accommodate comfortably the extended families of the residents. The existence of an extended family structure accommodated in one house serves a critically important function in maintaining the stability of home life. Many houses have fertile gardens which supplement the diet of the household and make survival in harsh economic conditions easier.

Residents are anxious that removal to the much smaller housing units at KwaDabeka and KwaNdingezi will have a detrimental effect on family life by destroying the family unit and its cohesiveness. They are concerned that the uprooting of the community will have an especially detrimental effect on the women and children of the family.

Rentals in St Wendolins for spacious homes are significantly lower than rentals for smaller homes in the areas to which they would be moved.

The Welfare Committee is confident that if the community is allowed to remain in St Wendolins, appropriate housing for all economic groups can be developed with the co-operation of the relevant housing authorities.

The aged, pensioners, grantees and a significant number of unmarried mothers would probably not qualify for housing in the townships and would be faced with an uncertain and problematic future.

16.

DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

A tremendous burden will be placed on the household economy of most families if they are moved. The rents will be very much higher in the new townships, without the financial strength of an extended family.

Removals to the proposed areas would significantly raise the transport costs of wage earners. In addition, commuters will spend more time travelling to and from work.

Removal to the new townships would result in the loss of Section 10 rights of workers, with a greater financial strain on workers.

17.

LOSS OF SECTION 10 RIGHTS

To further compound the financial strain, workers, if moved to the proposed areas, would lose their Section 10 rights in terms of the Urban Areas Act, thus transforming them into contract workers. In effect, this would be turning them into foreigners.

SUPPORT OF THE INDIAN COMMUNITY

There is clear evidence that the Indian community in the Durban - Pinetown area generally and the Indian community in the areas adjacent to St Wendolins do not support the removal of the residents of St Wendolins and surrounding areas. The Indian community has a long history of opposition to the Group Areas Act and will not support the destructive effects of this Act, with which the community is only too familiar.

In addition, the St Wendolins community enjoys the support of a large number of church, social, community, trade union and political organisations.

CONCLUSION

The people of St Wendolins are totally opposed to removal to any other area. In support of this we include 903 affidavits and statements from affected residents. Accordingly, the St Wendolins Welfare Committee requests that both the St Wendolins and Savannah Park areas be deproclaimed as Indian areas and the present occupants be allowed to remain as occupants.

The St Wendolins Welfare Committee will lead further evidence at the scheduled Group Areas Board hearing on 18 June 1982.

Signed at Durban this 10th day of June 1982.

Address:

P. O. Box 1125
Pinetown
3600

(Signed)

H. B. Dlamini
CHAIRMAN

Who declares that he
is authorised hereto.

Appendix 2. St Wendolins community survey

The following data is drawn from the results of the surveys conducted by the St Wendolins Welfare Committee in early 1982, the results of which were submitted to the Group Areas Board Hearing in July 1982. 581 households were interviewed, amounting to a 41,5% sample of the total number of households in the community.

1. ATTITUDES TO REMOVAL

1. 98,1% are opposed to being removed.

2. Reasons for wanting to remain:

Quality of life at St Wendolins	30,6%
Lower rents at St Wendolins	16,7%
Better work opportunities from St Wendolins	13%
Lower cost of living at St Wendolins	12,6%
Problems of townships	9,6%
Established services at St Wendolins	8,3%
History of community	3,5%
Legal status, with Section 10 at St Wendolins	3,1%
Title to land at St Wendolins	1,9%
General financial reasons	0,7%

3. Support for St Wendolins Welfare Committee

89,6% supported it.

10,4% do not.

2. HOUSEHOLD AND POPULATION DETAILS

- 23,2% of the households are multiple (extended and/or compound).
- Length of time at St Wendolins:

YEARS	PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS
0 - 2	10,3
3 - 5	13,2
6 - 10	19,2
11+	57,3

2. 73,1% of the population is younger than 30 years.

3. Male : female ratio is 48 : 52.

4. Education

70% of population have some formal education.
Over 75% of scholars attend local schools.

3. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

1. 54,7% of the population are economically active.

2. Employment

Over 70% of workers work in, nearby Pinetown and New Germany.
73,1% of workers are unskilled or semi-skilled.
Average monthly transport costs for workers from St Wendolins is R10,55.

Average monthly transport costs for workers from KwaNdengezi (relocation township) is R28,24.

4. INCOME DETAILS

1. Wage earners income:

Average income per worker is R171,96 per month.
23,2% of workers earned less than R100 per month.
85,9% of workers earned less than R250 per month.

2. Household head's income:

Average income of household head is R146,62 per month.
26,4% of household heads earned less than R50 per month.
33,3% of household heads earned less than R100 per month.
18 household heads earned more than R350 per month.

3. Household income:

Average household income is R294,55 per month.
11% of households had incomes of less than R100 per month.
41,1% of households had incomes of less than R200 per month.

4. Family income:⁺

Average family income is R224,44 per month.
16,5% of families had incomes of less than R50 per month.
53,5% of families had incomes of less than R200 per month.

The economic viability of extended families living as households permits a higher level of living. (Survey results, 4)

The implication of this is that relocation into a township system, which breaks up extended households, will lead to a decline in household standards of living.

⁺ 'Family' here refers to nuclear family units within an extended household.

3. KWAPITELA

Kwapitela is an african freehold farm situated in the foothills of the Drakensberg, some 8 km from Himeville and about 3 km from the Sani Pass Hotel. It is approximately 323 ha in area. The land is well-watered, with a river running through one end of the property, well-grassed and relatively free of erosion - one of the african-owned farms where accusations of ecological damage are least justified. A qualified land evaluator who visited the farm in 1981 assessed the land as worth about R200 an acre and noted that it was of superior quality to a number of the white farms in the neighbourhood. (AFRA Report no. 14, November 1981)

In July 1981 almost all the tenants living at Kwapitela - 69 households - were removed to the closer settlement of Compensation. The landowners - 4 households, all related to each other - have not yet been expropriated and they and a few other families are still living at Kwapitela in a state of acute uncertainty. The landowners have been shown alternative, compensatory land by the local commissioner; three have agreed to be moved, one has not. One official source has admitted to a lawyer that the farm will not be expropriated for another ten years because there is not the money available for this. The landowners have not been told this and they believe their relocation is imminent.

The community of Kwapitela as a whole put up very little resistance to being removed. The following case study looks at the conditions that prevailed there and describes the process of its removal.⁺

1. General Conditions

HISTORY

The farm was bought by Pitela Hlophe, grandfather of the present owners, on the 23rd August 1900, at a public auction in Pietermaritzburg. By the 22nd of December 1920, the full purchase price of £542 2s 1d had been paid off. In 1904 the farm was subdivided into two parts, Part A, amounting to approximately one third of the original farm, and Part B. Pitela Hlophe then ceded Part A to his brother, Godhleni Hlophe, who took over the responsibility of paying off his share of the land. (Title Deed for Part A : 5356/43.) Part B remained the property of P. Hlophe. (Deed of Grant 9819, registered in 1921.) On his death P. Hlophe willed that Part B be divided among his three heirs.

The actual subdivision of this land was not carried out at the time and this has complicated relationships among the heirs and their descendants ever since. Finally, in 1982 the local commissioner intervened to settle the estate and to confer title on each of the heirs. Although some observers have interpreted this as a preliminary to expropriation, the commissioner has denied that this is the intention behind the settlement.

⁺ This case study is based on various AFRA reports and the results of 2 surveys undertaken in the community by AFRA in 1980 and 1981.



POPULATION

In 1981, the year the tenants were moved, there were 76 households living on the farm, the great majority of them tenants of the Hlophes. AFRA interviewed 63 of these households in mid 1980 and found their average size to be 7.4 people, 466 people altogether. The total population (76 households) was, therefore, probably a little over 550 people.

Detailed information on household structure was not collected. The 63 households interviewed had, between them, 79 pre-school and 126 school-going children, as well as 31 members who were 60 years or older. Most households were based on an extended system, new houses being added to the family plot as junior sons married and started families of their own.

LENGTH OF TENURE

Out of 60 tenant households interviewed by AFRA in 1980, 52 (87%) had been resident on Kwapitela for more than 5 years, over half of them for twenty years or more. 7 of the 60 households (12%) said they had lived there for over 50 years. The community was thus a long-established and stable one, with strong ties to the land. Because of its isolation from centres of industrial employment, Kwapitela had not experienced the same pressures from a steady influx of new tenants, as have other more favourably located black spots (Matiwane's Kop, for instance). Its isolation has also meant however that it was very vulnerable to other sorts of pressures when it came to be removed - pressures to conform to the authorities' plan for it.

IMPROVEMENTS

Before its destruction in July 1981 Kwapitela consisted of a mixture of concrete block and wattle and daub houses and huts, scattered in several clusters across the farm, with grazing land and fields in between. The total number of buildings owned by the 63 households in the AFRA survey amounted to 199, i.e. about 3 separate structures per household. Housing was generally of good quality and sturdily built, many of the rooms painted or wallpapered inside. Most households had fenced in their residential plots (and many their fields) in addition to building chicken runs and enclosures for their stock. Most people had built their own pit latrines as well. Each household was asked to assess the value of their buildings and improvements. The total value they arrived at was R53 769, or just over R850 per household. (This did not include the value of their agricultural land.)

The community had also built a stone church which served as a primary school during the week. The school had 120 pupils, ranging between Sub A and Std 4 and 3 teachers. Teaching conditions were poor, with all the children collected in a single, undivided room. In 1978/79 funds were raised in the community to erect a new school building, with two classrooms, but all donations stopped when people heard they were to be removed. The building programme that was already under way had, therefore, to be abandoned.

In other respects Kwapitela was poorly served, a typical rural community. There were no clinics or shops and people depended on the facilities available at Himeville which they reached either by bus (there was a daily bus to Himeville and Underberg) or on foot. The community's water supply came from the river and a number of springs on the farm. For fuel people depended mainly on wood which they gathered free from a forest on a neighbouring farm. Neither water nor fuel were considered problems since the supply was plentiful and the women regarded the time-consuming chores of collecting these essentials as part of the normal routine of living.

EMPLOYMENT

Like other rural communities the people of Kwapitela were dependent on wage employment off the farm for their survival. Most workers were unskilled and their wages were low. The most positive aspect about the employment pattern at Kwapitela was that the majority of workers were employed locally and thus able to live at home. Out of a total of 104 people working in the 63 households surveyed by AFRA, less than half (45) worked outside the district of Underberg. Most of those who had to move out of the district for work worked in the Durban/Pietermaritzburg area; a few migrated as far away as Johannesburg. The remaining 59 were employed in the Himeville/Underberg area, mainly as farm workers on local white farms or as waiters and domestic workers at the nearby Sani Pass Hotel. They commuted to work daily, generally on foot.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture played an important part in the community, both economically and socially. Each household had, on average, about one hectare of arable land to cultivate (in addition to their residential plots), as well as access to commonage for grazing their stock. For their land (residential included) tenants paid an annual rent that ranged between R10 and R12,25. As in other black spots households were not self-supporting on their land but all except one of those interviewed by AFRA had either stock or fields and generally both: their access to land made an important contribution to household income. (The one exception was an old age pensioner, living on his own, who had neither stock nor a field to cultivate. He had only moved to Kwapitela 3 years previously, apparently from another threatened black spot.) Food production within the community supplemented low wages and boosted the health and general wellbeing of its members to acceptable levels.

Agricultural produce: Only 2 households out of the 63 interviewed by AFRA reported that they did not grow any produce - the old age pensioner mentioned above and another recent arrival in the community. The main crops grown were maize, beans and potatoes; many households grew all three. A small number of households grew other vegetables as well - cabbages, turnips, onions, madumbe, gourds.

Livestock: There were greater discrepancies between households when it came to ownership of stock but most people kept some animals, though not always cattle. Only 3 out of the 63 households interviewed by AFRA kept neither livestock nor poultry. The total numbers of stock owned by the surveyed households in mid 1980 were as follows:

Cattle	134
Goats	8
Horses	8
Pigs	14
Poultry	676

24 households reported that they had no cattle and answers were not recorded for 2, leaving 37 cattle-owning families with an average of 3,6 head each. There was no limit placed on the number of cattle a family could keep and the largest herd in the survey numbered 10. It appears, however, that by the time of the AFRA survey people had already started selling stock in anticipation that they were to be removed. During 1979 the community sold 45 head of cattle for an average price of R100 per beast. By July 1980 they had sold a further 19. This amounted to almost 50% of the total number of cattle then left on the farm.

Most households produced agricultural goods exclusively or mainly for their own consumption. However 6 households claimed to sell surplus produce outside of the community, mainly to people living on neighbouring farms, and another 24 claimed to sell a surplus within Kwapitela itself.

The AFRA report on the findings that emerged from its survey summed up the position at Kwapitela thus:

Nobody can describe Kwapitela as idyllic - incomes are low, jobs hard to find, the infrastructure of transport, supermarkets, schools etc. that urban people can take for granted is lacking in this as in other rural areas. But it is a settled rural community. It has an established way of life that has been built up over many years. Because Kwapitela is black freehold land residents have greater independence and control over their own lives than they would in a township or 'closer settlement' situation. Most important of all, they have an assured access to agricultural land and have built up a lifestyle that centres around that.

It concluded:

A comparison with Compensation, the proposed resettlement site, makes it apparent how much Kwapitela residents stand to lose by the move. (Unpublished AFRA Report, 'Kwapitela', 1980, 5-6)

2. The removal

OFFICIAL DEALINGS WITH THE COMMUNITY

As early as 1969 the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal informed lawyers acting on behalf of Ezekiel Hlophe, one of the landowners, that

Owing to its situation, the abovementioned property is a black spot which in terms of Departmental policy will have to be eliminated in due course. (Letter in AFRA files)

In September 1979 the commissioner from Underberg and a couple of other government officials visited Kwapitela to inform residents that the farm would be bought up by the government and they would be moved shortly. The officials apparently also told the people that as they were to be moved soon, they should not plough and plant crops that season; if they did so, it would be at their own risk and they would not be compensated for any losses incurred. Many families did not plant as a result. This was to have important repercussions on morale within the community, many people missing two planting seasons before they were finally removed and becoming more alienated and restless at Kwapitela as a result.

Shortly after the commissioner's visit in September 1979, houses at Kwapitela were numbered by government officials. Residents had no further contact with officials until mid-August in 1980, when another government agent visited them. He informed those present - mainly women - that a date had been arranged for later that month when they were to be taken to see the area to which they would be removed - Compensation, some 60 to 70 km from Kwapitela, over dirt roads. A number of people duly visited the site and it seems that their overall impression was a negative one. Ezekiel Hlophe, the landowner, commented:

But I don't like that place because there is no ploughing and no place for the cattle. I think it would be better if they can move them to the place where they can do ploughing and where their cattle can live. (Letter in AFRA files.)

Nevertheless, despite their reservations about Compensation, at a meeting arranged by the commissioner at the end of August 1980 the majority of people present agreed to move; they also indicated that they wanted to move at once, rather than delay it any longer.

When Ezekiel Hlophe complained about the poor living conditions at Compensation he was told that the matter did not concern him since only the tenants were being moved at that stage.

Subsequently the commissioner organised a further meeting, in November 1980. By that stage some people had planted for the summer season and were no longer as willing to move as they had been two months before. Reports on this meeting conflict but it appears that people asked that they should not be moved till after the harvest and that the commissioner accepted this, instructing them to contact him when they were ready. At least one person interpreted this to AFRA to mean that they were safe; that all they had to do to ensure that they were not removed, was not contact the commissioner. His jubilation was as premature as it was naive for in late June 1981 the commissioner returned to announce that removals of the tenants would begin the following month on the 2nd of July.

In answer to a series of questions in Parliament tabled by the PFP MP, Graham McIntosh, the Minister of Cooperation and Development maintained that tenants were informed about the compensation assessments made on their properties and had had an opportunity to object but that none of them had done so. (Hansard, Question 441, 7.10.81) In correspondence with lawyers acting on behalf of certain members of the community, his Department subsequently maintained that compensation was discussed 'at length' at at least two meetings held before the people were removed, the one in November 1980 and the other in June 1981. Those removed tell a different story. In a household survey undertaken by AFRA in August 1981, once the community had already been removed to Compensation, 42 respondents reported that they had not received any official notification of assessment before they were removed, 1, a woman, did not know whether her husband had received one or not, 1 person's reply was not clear and only 6 people said that they had known what compensation to expect when they were paid out.

COMMUNITY RESPONSE : VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY?

The official response to questions that have been raised about the removals has been to insist that the people moved voluntarily. 'They asked if they could move and they chose the date to move', the Press Liaison Officer for the Department of Cooperation and Development told reporters of the Natal Witness. (16.07.81) To the extent that most people agreed to go when told that they were to be removed and that no force was required to get them to load themselves and their belongings onto the waiting GG trucks in July 1981, the move could be classed as voluntary. To say that people asked to be moved is completely false, however. People perceived that they had no choice in the matter and most felt that acquiescence was the most prudent course; throughout the process of their relocation the people of Kwapitela have displayed a stoicism and a fatalism that may to some extent be interpreted as a measure of their strength and ability to endure but is also a measure of their sense of impotence in the face of the manifest power of the authorities.

AFRA attended two general meetings held at Kwapitela in late 1980 to discuss the community's response to their imminent removal. The one was fairly well-attended but dominated by women since many of the men were away at work; the other was poorly attended, by about 20 people only. They clearly represented the core of residents most anxious to try to prevent being moved if at all possible. At the first meeting the matter of agreement by the community was thoroughly discussed. The most succinct summary of why people had agreed to move was given by one woman who said:

We did not like to go away because we were born here; it was only that we heard that the government wanted it and we submitted to that. (Notes on the meeting, in AFRA files.)

Another woman said they had agreed to go because they were not allowed to plough.

It was apparent from both meetings that no community organisation existed that was strong enough or well-supported enough to rally people together and allow for any serious negotiations between residents and officials. An AFRA report on the meetings noted

The fact that most people do not want to be moved, if they had a free choice, does not mean that the community is organised or strong enough to resist moving. There were a number of people present at the meeting who did not speak at all and are obviously extremely sceptical of the community's readiness to confront the magistrate ... These people most probably see submission to the government's will as the safest option. (Notes on the meetings, AFRA files.)

A number of factors can be isolated as contributing towards this lack of organisation and mood of acquiescence:

- 1) Isolation: Kwapitela, as already described, was a very small and isolated rural community, completely cut off from the mainstream of political activity and organisation within urban and industrial South Africa. There were no telephones in the community, very few people had cars and the main mode of transport was to walk or travel by bus. The people had few links with other threatened communities. Although most of them knew about the removal of people from The Swamp to Compensation (The Swamp was located about 20 km away), it was not an event that had impinged on them in any way. The example of resistance offered by the people of Matiwane's Kop and St Wendolins had not filtered through to the community and the only information they had about the experience of other communities that had been threatened with removal was that all had eventually been moved.
- 2) Intimidation: The community's isolation and sense of insecurity were reinforced by direct warnings from officials and local security police that they should not have any dealings with outside groups who, as one member of the community reported it, 'are likely to deceive them.'
- 3) Rift between tenants and landowners: The potential conflict that exists in the landlord/tenant situation found on black spots, one that is rooted in their unequal relationship to each other and to the land, had acquired substance at Kwapitela by the time of the removal; this served to alienate many tenants from the place and from the one landowner who was most actively trying to put a halt to the removals. The conflict within the landowning family over the inheritance of the property spilled over onto the tenants when several members of the landowning family all began to demand that rent be paid to each of them. During the ensuing squabbles, many tenants fell into arrears on their rent and were then threatened with legal action as a consequence. The removal of the tenants was separated from that of the landowners - it was in fact carried through before the landowners had been expropriated - and a number of tenants came to see their removal as a means of escaping from the landlords.
- 4) Absence of men from community meetings: Although the majority of workers worked locally, a substantial number, mainly men, were migrant workers and thus unable to attend community meetings. Even those who worked locally found it difficult to attend the meetings organised by the commissioner since these took place during working hours. This meant that most of the people who attended the various meetings held to discuss the removal were women. Kwapitela was a rural and strongly traditionalist community in which the role of women was clearly defined as a domestic and subordinate one. Few women felt they could take an active part in community affairs in the absence of their husbands and thus apparent 'decisions' were reached often by default, the women withholding comment. The commissioner's verdict, that the community was willing to move, was in fact based on a series of meetings that were not representative. A number of women commented afterwards

that they were waiting for their husbands to return home over the Christmas holiday period for an opportunity to discuss the issues relating to being moved more fully.

THE REMOVAL

The removal of Kwapitela has been described in AFRA Report no. 14, issued in November 1981. The removal was spread over two days, the government employing a fleet of about 80 GG trucks and a huge crew of workers to shift all the people and their goods. Of interest was that the workers, all of them african, were not local people and did not speak Zulu so any communication between them and the people they were moving was ruled out.

The outward appearance of those being removed was impassive - they 'submitted stoically to the demolition of their houses, loading what they could salvage from the rubble and the dust onto the waiting trucks - windows, thatch, sheets of tin roofing, doors and poles and fencing.' (AFRA Report no. 14, 1981)

At Compensation the newcomers appeared more dazed than anything else. As each family arrived, it was allocated a site with a tin latrine, the standard one-room 'fletcraft' - a temporary tin hut, some not even fully erected as their occupants arrived - and one or two tents. It was winter, dry and dusty and bitterly cold at night. People's first concern was to store their belongings and secure their own shelter as best they could. (Ibid.)

Most households were supplied with rations of mealie meal, soup powder, powdered milk and salt, in quantities large enough to last them for about two weeks - a marked increase over the amount of rations reported in other instances of relocation where supplies, if available at all, were designed to last for three days only. A supply of fuel was also laid on but instead of this being free, which people expected, they had to buy it - their first experience of paying for a basic necessity that formerly had cost them nothing except their labour.

COMPENSATION PAID

According to the Minister of Cooperation and Development, a total of R35 606 was paid out as compensation to the tenants moved from Kwapitela (Hansard, Question 390, 2.04.82); the highest amount paid to any one household was R1 457, the lowest amount was R50 and the average amount was R429,86 (Hansard, Question 441, 7.10.81) - about half what the community had estimated their improvements to be worth, on average, in the AFRA survey of October 1980. As already mentioned, most people have maintained that they had no idea of what amount to expect when paid; nor did they know that they could challenge the amount they were paid if not satisfied. One recipient described the procedure as follows:

There was not much said. They would just shout one's name as per folio number and summon him to the temporary office. On arrival you were just given a certain amount of money and there was no further discussion. (Unpubl. AFRA report, 'Preliminary results : Survey of Kwapitela residents moved to Compensation', 1981, 3)

People were paid in cash and there have been allegations that supervision of the payout clerks was insufficient and certain procedures adopted were irregular - for instance that some people signed or thumbprinted for their money before they received the cash. None of those allegations have been followed up in any way. The dominant attitude among those who were compensated appeared to be a sense of gratitude that they had been paid anything at all, coupled to a fear that by complaining they might place in jeopardy the money they had received. Subsequently five households did request legal help in securing compensation for damages caused to their goods in transit. After a protracted period they were finally paid out the full amounts requested.

ATTITUDES AFTER THEIR RELOCATION

AFRA conducted a survey among the former Kwapitela tenants in August 1981, about six weeks after they had been moved. People's responses to questions about their attitudes towards their new place indicated much the same ambivalent spirit of resignation that they had displayed at Kwapitela. 65% of the 54 households surveyed said they were not glad to be at Compensation, 15% said they were and 20% were noncommittal, framing their replies with such revealing statements as : 'We have no way to like it or not', or 'Because there is no alternative, we have accepted this place.' Despite the majority of people who did not like Compensation, 57% said it was as they expected. Explained one woman:

I expected the place not to be good for I have seen and heard of other removals. I had no hope.

The conditions awaiting the people at Compensation have already been described in the case study in Part Two. Only 2 of the Kwapitela households reported that they had no problems, with a further 10 unwilling to commit themselves. The remaining 42 households reported a wide range of problems, the 4 major complaints being fuel (23 times), no land (20 times), the general expensiveness of life in a situation 'where a person has to pay for everything' (13 times) and no room for stock (10 times). (A number of households had refused to sell their stock when they left Kwapitela. Some had found grazing to rent elsewhere; others brought their animals with them and have been hiring grazing from the landowner from The Swamp whose compensatory land adjoins the closer settlement: a very unsatisfactory arrangement since the grazing is poor and the land not properly fenced.)

15 out of the 54 respondents interviewed by AFRA in August 1981 felt there were positive aspects to Compensation, these being better transport compared to that at Kwapitela (6 times), the school (5 times), and their greater proximity to medical care and shops (3 times). The school, as mentioned in the chapter on Compensation in Part Two, is the one substantial improvement to have been built in the closer settlement. It has made it possible for more children to attend primary school than did at Kwapitela - but it is a facility that could just as easily have been provided at Himeville.

THE SITUATION IN 1982

The removal to Compensation has forced major changes in the lifestyle of the former Kwapitela tenants. A year after their removal, most households have managed to start building new houses, but to date most of them have only managed to build single structures and several are still living in the fletcraft huts. Rebuilding has been slower and more expensive than anticipated and it seems doubtful that most people will be able to reproduce the size and the quality of the housing they had before. Most of the workers in the community appear to have retained their previous jobs but those who used to work in the Himeville/Underberg area have been turned into migrant workers, returning home once a week or once a month instead of daily. People complain heavily about the high cost of living and their landlessness which are regarded as major disadvantages in their new situation. However many have expressed relief at being independent of their former landlords : their attitude towards Compensation appears to have been softened by that.

In several trips back to the community since July 1981, an AFRA fieldworker has picked up a growing concern within the community about the increased level of drinking since the removal. It appears that a number of people have resorted to opening shebeens as a means of making extra money and that the incidence of drunkenness in the community has risen alarmingly. This suggests that the adjustment to the removal and the closer settlement way of life has been more traumatic than the stoical exterior of the people seems to indicate.



4. STEINCOALSPRUIT

1. History of ownership

PURCHASE

In 1874 a group of 42 Christian africans purchased a section of the farm Steincoalspruit from the widow of Dirk van Rooyen, who had owned it since 1852. The farm lies about midway between Elandslaagte and Wasbank, on the southern side of the Biggarsberg mountains and within the Klip River district. Subdivision A (or Section I as it is now called) comprised 2 037 acres and the purchase price was £150. Transfer was effected on 7th April 1874. (Title Deed no. 149) The remainder of the farm, 6 114 acres in extent, was purchased by a group of 9 Christian africans in 1877, transfer being effected on the 31st October 1877. (Title Deed no. 573) Just over a hundred years later such land as still vested in the hands of descendants of the original owners was expropriated in order to implement the South African government's policy of black spot removals and bantustan consolidation. A further reason could be the potentially useful coal deposits that underlie this land. This could explain the timing of the removals, in the context of the energy crisis and the ensuing exploitation and re-exploitation of Natal's coal resources.

ORIGINS OF OWNERS

The original purchase of Steincoalspruit was part of that process whereby missionaries encouraged Christian africans to buy land on the open market, described in Part One. The owners of Steincoalspruit came originally from the Rev. Wilhelm Illing's mission station at Ladysmith. Illing, described by Norman Etherington as 'a queer, independent fellow who flitted about from society to society' (Etherington, 1978, 107), had originally studied at the Berlin Missionary Society, came to South Africa with a group of Hermannsburg missionaries, was briefly connected with Bishop Colenso's mission in 1860, and then became a missionary for the Reverend Cachet's Dutch Reformed Church at Ladysmith. Although Cachet's plans to found a permanent Dutch Reformed mission in Natal failed, Illing remained in Ladysmith, supported by the tithes of his black congregation. By 1879 the population of his station numbered 868, of whom just over half were of Nguni origin. (Ibid, 107 - 108)

Among those who gathered at his station were former slaves of Boer farmers in the Orange Free State and the Cape, and it is from these that the majority of the original purchasers of Steincoalspruit were drawn. Many of them adopted the names of their original captors, and only later did they or their descendants revert to their original names. Names such as Israel Witteboy Potgieter, Elias Beginsel Schoeman and Nicodemus Bester appear among the 42 who bought Section A.

In all but a few cases, the history of these ex-slaves has been lost. The memory of the remarkable Abraham Limberg, however, remains very much alive among his descendants. Limberg was a Tswana who originally lived at Jericho near Pretoria in the Transvaal. In the turbulent years of wars, raids and counter-raids that characterised the middle years of the 19th century in South Africa, he and his elder sister were carried off by Boers to live the formative years of their lives in the Orange Free State. At the age of about 18, Limberg decided to escape, and, armed with a spear, moved down the Van Reenen's Pass into Natal where he settled at Illing's station in Ladysmith. There he became a

builder by trade and worked to save money to buy his own land. By his own account to the Natal Native Affairs Commission in 1907, he had adopted 'European customs' and had, in addition to his trade as a builder in Ladysmith, become 'a considerable fruit grower' on his portion of Steincoalspruit. By 1913 he also owned erfs in Bergville and Ladysmith. He died in 1920. A little is known, too, of the origins of Stoffel Botha, whose african name was Christoffel Ndhlovu, through an affidavit lodged on 20th September 1926 with his title deed (no. 117 of 1887) in the Deeds Office in Pietermaritzburg. There it is recorded that he was at one time a slave in the Cape and settled in Natal after he had been liberated. He died in 1906. A further affidavit lodged with title deed no. 116 of 1887, records that Adam Jacob's african name was Adam Nkow (also spelt Nkau) but there is no information about his history.

SECTION A (NOW LISTED AS SECTION I)

This, the first purchase of a section of Steincoalspruit in 1874, was made in the form of a syndicate, which was one of the most common ways in which africans bought land in Natal at that time. Transfer of the land was made on 7th April 1874 to Abraham Limberg, William Africa and Lucas Jacob, acting on their own behalf, and in trust for thirty-nine others. The land was divided into 600 shares and each of the 42 purchasers held shares in proportion to their contribution to the purchase price. The biggest shareholder was William Africa with 40 shares. Africa was a wealthy Christian who owned 1 600 acres of land in his own right in addition to shares in several other farms. (Etherington, 1978, 118)

As shares were sold or ceded to heirs, it became difficult to administer the property and reconcile the different interests involved. In 1897, after the death of Lucas Jacob, one of the trustees, a kind of constitution for the Syndicate was drawn up. It was decided that the registered owners of shares in the property would hold a General Meeting when necessary. The legal firm, Walton and Tatham, of Ladysmith was appointed as secretary to the Trust and it was their task to convene these meetings. Such meetings could be asked for by any of the Trustees or by a signed request from at least six proprietors holding a minimum of 50 shares collectively. Each shareholder had one vote and resolutions of the General Meeting would become effective and binding when passed by a majority of the shareholders (i.e. more than half of all the votes of the shareholders). None of the shares of the Syndicate could be divided. The General Meeting was empowered 'to deal in any and every way with the said land' and in particular was empowered to lease or sell or 'otherwise deal with or utilise' minerals on the property, or such rights as were necessary for the complete working of such mineral rights. The General Meeting, with the consent of three-quarters of the votes of the shareholders, could sell the land as a whole or any subdivision of it 'to any person or persons' or could partition it, or portions of it, among the shareholders. (These resolutions were lodged with Title Deed no. 149/1874 in the Deeds Office, Pietermaritzburg, on 28th July 1898.)

Additional rules were devised at a meeting of the Syndicate on 16th November 1914. Provision was made for the annual election, by majority vote, of a Committee of Management consisting of 6 persons from among the proprietors and including the Trustees, with vested powers

to govern all matters concerning the working of the farm and the general welfare and good government of the lands and the occupiers thereof.

One of the Trustees would chair the Committee and would have a deliberative and a casting vote. Roads, fountains, springs, and natural streams were declared open to the use of all shareholders. Probably because of the provisions of the Land Act of 1913, it was declared that no shareholder had the right to sell any of his shares 'to a person of European descent'. The transfer of any share would be subject to the approval of the Committee of Management. All shareholders were given the right to place one 'native

hut' on the land for the purpose of securing labour. The Committee would decide whether any additional huts could be placed on the land for labour purposes. Rent-tenants on the Syndicate land were absolutely forbidden. Any revenue from tenants would accrue to the funds of the Syndicate and would be lodged in their Standard Bank account at Ladysmith. Finally, the Committee was empowered to adjudicate in any disputes over cattle. The shares of the Syndicate were arranged in such a way that each shareholder had land to cultivate and access to common pasture. (The new regulations were lodged with Title Deed no. 149/1874 in the Deeds Office on 9th August 1915.)

THE REMAINDER OF STEINCOALSPRUIT

The remainder of Steincoalspruit, bought in 1877 by 9 Christian africans, was subsequently divided among them and each received transfer of their portions on 25th March 1887. Of these, Abraham Limberg and Lucas Jacob also held shares in Section A which comprised the Syndicate farm. The remainder was divided as follows:

- Sub B (now Sub 2) consisting of about 560 acres at a cost of £280 4s 9d to Adam Jacob (also known as Adam Nkow or Nkau). Title Deed no. 116/1887
- Sub C (now lot 349 of Wasbank Township) consisting of 960 acres at a cost of £480 12s 6d to Stoffel Botha (also known as Christoffel Ndhlovu). Title Deed no. 117/1887
- Sub D (now Sub 4) consisting of about 575 acres at a cost of £288 to Isaac Wildschut. Title Deed no. 118/1887
- Sub E (now lot 293 of Wasbank Township) consisting of 1 008 acres at a cost of £504 to Johannes Zwartboy de Waal (also known as Johannes Umbarto or Mbata). Title Deed no. 119/1887
- Sub F (now Sub 6) consisting of about 385 acres at a cost of £192 15s 0d to Phillip Hoffman. Title Deed no. 120/1887
- Sub G (now Sub 7) consisting of 646 acres and 8 perches at a cost of £323 to Abraham Limberg (also known as Abraham Limberg Kazi) Title Deed no. 121/1887
- Sub H (now Lot 345 of Wasbank Township) consisting of about 638 acres at a cost of £319 3s 0d to Timotheus Slagveldt. Title Deed no. 122/1887
- Sub I (now lot 292 of Wasbank Township) consisting of about 622 acres at a cost of £311 12s 6d to Theophilus Dapper. Title Deed no. 123/1887
- Sub J (now Sub 10) consisting of about 716 acres at a cost of £358 to the estate of the late Lucas Jacob. Title Deed no. 124/1887

Of these, Subs B, D, I and J have, either in whole or in part, passed into white or indian hands. Sub B was sold by Adam Jacob's heirs to Hendrik J. de Vos in 1925, who in turn sold it to the Natal Steam Coal Company in 1946. When the Natal Steam Coal Company closed down in 1970, the land was sold to James Anderson who still occupies the farm. The partitioning of Sub D began in 1889 when Isaac Wildschut sold 200 acres to Walter Dymock. Today the land is owned by the Labuschagne family. Sub I was subdivided with a portion passing into the hands of I. C. Asmal. The remainder was purchased by the Natal Steam Coal Company in 1942 and in 1971 was sold to a white, Willem Jacobus Erasmus. Sub J was sold to Jacobus Xulu in 1891 and subsequently partitioned among his descendants. Sub A of J (about 516 acres in extent) was bought by Sagaiya Pillay in 1944 and is still held by indians today. The remaining portions of Sub J were expropriated by the government from various members of the Xulu family in October 1978 and January 1979. Stephen Vere, a man classified as of coloured descent and a shareholder in the Syndicate, bought Sub F; the existing title holder is his descendant and still occupies the land. A portion of Sub F, consisting of about 154 acres, passed

into the hands of Elizabeth van Wyk (born Skeef) and this was expropriated by the South African government in March 1979.

2. Development in early 20th century

Steincoalspruit was one of the few african farms in the Klip River district that was designated for possible release as a black area by the Local Committee appointed to investigate increasing the area of the african reserves after the passage of the 1913 Act. It was not included in the schedule to the 1936 Act, however, and, along with the neighbouring african-owned farms of Doone, Lyell, Meran, Boschhoek and Ruigtefontein, became designated a black spot.

On 8th March 1938, H. C. Lugg, Chief Native Commissioner in Natal, reported on black-owned properties in the Newcastle, Dundee and Helpmekaar districts with a view to the implementation of the 1936 Land Act. As most of the land in released areas was already owned by blacks he recommended that an additional 74 000 acres of land be purchased to the north of Dundee, so that land could be offered in exchange for the 32 000 acres of black-owned land situated outside the released areas and to make provision for such factors as the natural increase in the black population and

for accommodating a large number of landless Natives living in Urban Areas and on farms adjacent to some of the coal mines where they are residing under most undesirable conditions, and should be removed. (Natal Archives, C.N.C. (15) N 2/10/2 X (CNC 22/683))

One of the points stressed by Lugg in his report was the fact that black-owned land outside the released areas was 'grossly overstocked' and overcrowded with tenants. With regard to this latter point, it is interesting to note the opinions expressed by the Native Commissioner at Ladysmith on the effects of the 1913 Land Act in the Klip River district. In his view, the 'exacting conditions' under which labour tenants were permitted to occupy privately owned 'white' land in Natal was a fundamental reason for the preference of many blacks to settle on black-owned land as labour or rent tenants. Every inmate of a black homestead on a white farm, male and female, was required to give six months farm labour 'at a wage ranging from nothing to 10/- per month.' Given the fact that there were no 'native released or accepted areas' in the district, the few black-owned farms inevitably became considerably overcrowded. (Natal Archives, C.N.C. (21), N 2/9/2 D 10)

Steincoalspruit was no exception. Although the Constitution of the Syndicate controlled the number of tenants on the Syndicate farm, and forbade rent-tenants, and some land-owners, like the Kazis of Section G, did not allow tenants to settle on their land, preferring to allow their labour tenants to be housed on their share of the Syndicate farm, others permitted both labour and rent-tenants to settle on their land. Some areas, especially Subdivision C of the Ndhlovus, became very densely populated, particularly with rent-tenants who worked on the neighbouring coal mine of the Natal Steam Coal Company. In trying to seek solutions to this problem in 1938, Lugg pointed out that any proposal for the removal of africans occupying the block of farms consisting of Boschhoek, Lyell, Meran, Steincoalspruit and Doone 'would probably meet with considerable opposition' and 'coercion should be resorted to only as a last resort.' Africans should be induced voluntarily to abandon their present holdings through making 'the terms of exchange and compensation on a generous scale.' He further pointed out that

Most of the Native-owned land constituting 'black spots' is fertile and enables the owners to derive a considerable income from the squatters. On the other hand the land recommended for their accommodation is isolated and in many instances of poor fertility. (Natal Archives, C.N.C. (15), N 2/10/2 X (CNC 22/683))

He also pointed to the fact that the black-owned farm 'Vreda' in the Newcastle district was said to have valuable coal deposits.

OPPOSITION FROM ELANDSLAAGTE FARMERS' ASSOCIATION

As already described, the white Elandslaagte Farmers' Association (which was formed in 1919 and which had farmers in the neighbourhood of Steincoalspruit among its members) was opposed both to the acquisition of white-owned land by the Native Trust and to the continued existence of black spots. In 1933 when it was proposed to sell Lot 2 of Subdivision F of Steincoalspruit to an african, the legal firm Walton and Tatham argued that

The land lies within what is recognised as a large native settlement, but which has not been declared a native area, and consequently the property can only be knocked down to a European purchaser unless special permission to sell to a native could be obtained. As the property is only a small one, and surrounded by others owned by natives, we do not think it would in any case prove sufficiently attractive to interest a European purchaser... (Natal Archives, C.N.C. (25), N 2/9/6 (21) CNC 21/126))

The Elandslaagte Farmers' Association strongly opposed this, arguing that

This association has always been opposed to the sale of land in the midst of a European area. The present locations are a menace to European farmers and we have agitated for years to try and get the land exchanged for land in a native area. As far as the farm Steincoalspruit is concerned a big percentage of the land has gradually been reverting back to European ownership and we are hoping that it will not be long before all this land will fall into European possession. (Ibid.)

As a result of this opposition, the proposed sale was blocked. This kind of pressure has been maintained consistently by the Elandslaagte Farmers' Association to the present day. Archie Blyth records in his unpublished typescript history of the Association:

As yet, nothing has been done to remove the Black Spots from our area. We have met Mr Volker, our MP, and also Bantu Affairs Officials but to no avail, yet more European farm land is being bought by the Bantu Trust. (A. Blyth, Continuation of History of the Elandslaagte Farmers' Association, 1975)

3. The removals threat

TENANTS REMOVED

In 1977 the landowners of Steincoalspruit were informed that they were to be removed and their land expropriated in terms of Section 13 (2) of the Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936. While white opposition to black spots and the desire to implement the blueprint for territorial segregation undoubtedly played a part, the actual timing of the move perhaps owes more to the realisation of the value of the coal deposits underlying the black-owned sections of Steincoalspruit.

In response to a letter of objection to these proposals from representatives of the land-owners, Dr F. Hartzenberg, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Development, wrote to Mr F.B. Kazi (who acted as spokesman for the people of Steincoalspruit) on the 12th October 1977. In this letter he stated that the tenants and landowners who owned less than 42 acres would be offered accommodation in Ekuvukeni Bantu Township which was situated about

55 kilometres from Ladysmith. Those owning more than 42 acres would receive compensatory land in a new area purchased from white farmers where no people had hitherto been relocated. In their letter the landowners had objected to Ekuvukeni because of the factional violence in the area. In reply, Dr Hartzenberg described Ekuvukeni as 'a quiet, peaceful community' and stated blandly that the owners of compensatory land would 'be able to exercise the necessary control and prevent unrest and faction fights.' He anticipated no problems and believed 'that the people concerned will be able to carry on as in the past.' (See Appendix 1) The true picture of Ekuvukeni is one of an arid closer settlement, with little water and firewood, located in an area suffering from endemic faction fighting. It is one of the largest closer settlements in Natal, with a population currently estimated at about 20 000 people. Unemployment is high and the general state of facilities very poor.

Late in 1977 and in 1978 the labour tenants and rent-tenants of Steincoalspruit were removed to Ekuvukeni. A total number of 11 188 were resettled in 1978. (Hansard, Question 537, 22.04.80) Apparently the tenants put up little resistance to the move, but, according to one landowner, 'only the 10% who are brewing beer are happy at Ekuvukeni.'

LANDOWNERS' RESPONSE

Not realising that they could refuse the government's order to be removed, the landowners (some 100 households) initially agreed to removal subject to certain conditions. A group of five were elected from among their numbers to act as spokesmen for the landowners and Mr F. B. Kazi was appointed general secretary. In a letter to the then Minister of Bantu Development, M. C. Botha, Mr Kazi stipulated two conditions to their agreement to being removed:

- 1) it was to be to an area free of faction fighting;
- 2) the new land must have an adequate water supply.

After the landowners were served with expropriation orders on 16th June 1978, and a General Meeting of the Syndicate was held, further conditions were added:

- 3) The landowners must be given the opportunity to examine the compensatory land to ascertain whether or not it constituted a fair exchange;
- 4) There must be adequate compensation in cash for the value of the coal on their land.

Upon receipt of the expropriation notices, Mr Kazi, on behalf of the landowners, responded within the requisite sixty days informing the Minister of Agriculture that the amounts of compensation offered were rejected, particularly because of dissatisfaction with the evaluation of the coal deposits. However the Secretary for Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure argued that from

expert advice on the mineral rights ... it appears that the coal deposit is of such poor quality that it has practically no economic value. The value of the coal is thus purely nominal and was included in the land value. The offers represent the land value plus rights to minerals and improvements, if any. (See Appendix 2)

COAL RESOURCES

This conclusion is open to dispute. When the first systematic survey of the coal resources of Natal was made in 1880, Fred North, the government-appointed geologist, reported positively on the potential of Steincoalspruit. (Natal Government Gazette, 24.05.1881) In the latter years of the 19th century and early 20th century, several companies worked the coal seams on Steincoalspruit: Ramsay Colliery (Subdivision B),

the Central, Victoria Navigation and Wessel's Nek Collieries (Subdivision G) and the Natal Steam Coal Company (Subdivisions E and C). With the exception of the Natal Steam Coal Company, these collieries were relatively shortlived. However, according to W. J. Wybergh

It would appear that the reasons for closing were seldom or never the actual exhaustion of the coal, but either the encountering of broken ground and coal of low volatile contents, or the inability to compete with mines more favourably circumstanced in respect of width of seams, proximity to railway, etc. (W.J. Wybergh, The Inland Coalfields of Natal. Department of Mines and Industries. Geological Survey. Memoir no. 19. The Coal Resources of Union of South Africa, Vol. II (Pretoria, 1925, 19)

Changing technology, not merely with regard to the development of more sophisticated machinery but also with regard to the ability to exploit different types of coal, have brought the coal resources of Natal into fresh perspective, and it is not uncommon for old mines to be re-opened.

The fact that the coal resources of Steincoalspruit are potentially valuable is indicated by the approaches made by the Platberg Colliery (based at Elandslaagte) to the Kazis (Section G) and the Ndhlovus (Section C) to negotiate a contract for the right to explore and exploit the coal resources on their land. Each was offered R600 to cover one year's exploration, and, should the results prove positive, R200 per hectare for the right to exploit the coal. This occurred just before the land was expropriated; the colliery withdrew the offer after the government had expropriated the land. A neighbouring white farmer, the owner of Subdivision B of Steincoalspruit and himself an experienced ex-miner, having worked for the Natal Steam Coal Company from 1948 - 1970, is currently negotiating with a colliery for the sale of the mineral rights on his farm. He has estimated that his neighbours, the Ndhlovus, have at least a million tons of good coal underlying their land. The Natal Steam Coal Company tapped these resources from time to time through their Inkunzi shaft on Subdivision C. This was done by means of a mineral lease concluded in 1926 for an initial period of fifteen years which was subsequently renewed.

The leasing of mineral rights which allowed the landowners to remain on their land was the most common means by which the coal was exploited. For instance, the Ramsay Colliery leased the mineral rights from Adam Jacob Nkai on Subdivision B and in February 1918, F. S. Hatton, manager of the Natal Steam Coal Company, negotiated with Daniel Nkai for the right to mine any coal left by the Ramsay Colliery for the sum of £50. Arthur Rogers Jenkins of Durban negotiated a mining lease from the Kazis of Subdivision G for thirty years from 1st April 1906.

Only in one case were mineral rights sold outright. On 23rd April 1896 Johannes Mbata sold, for £300, to James Ramsay

all mines beds or seams of coal as well opened as unopened lying or being in or under the lands ... together with the right and power to mine, work, get and carry away all coal

from the whole of Subdivision E and Subdivision A of Subdivision D of Steincoalspruit and Subdivision F of the neighbouring farm Ruigtefontein. Thus the mineral rights came to belong exclusively to the Natal Steam Coal Company. This company was eventually taken over by the Johannesburg-based firm Brick and Clay who presumably now own the mineral rights, even though the mine of the Natal Steam Coal Company was closed in 1970. It would appear, then, that the Mbatas and the Bhengus who married into the Mbata family cannot claim compensation for the mineral rights on their land. However, there is a large mine dump on Subdivision E. The value of mine dumps has been recognised in recent years and one farmer in the Elandslaagte area sold the dump on his farm for

R250 000. According to an expert on mine dumps there is some good coal in the dump of the old Natal Steam Coal Company. Perhaps a case for some form of compensation could be made here.

INVOLVEMENT OF KWAZULU

Determined to secure adequate compensation for their mineral rights, the landowners of Steincoalspruit decided in about March 1979 to involve the KwaZulu government in their negotiations. A deputation went to Ulundi and was received by Mr Mdlalose, the Minister of the Interior. At his invitation they prepared a memorandum for him to submit to Pretoria. On 22nd November 1979 the landowners of Steincoalspruit held a meeting which was attended by the Commissioner at Ladysmith, Mr Stander. At this meeting Mr Kazi reiterated the landowners' standpoint. A month later a General Meeting of the proprietors of Steincoalspruit was held, with the local KwaZulu M.P. attending as advisor. The meeting decided unanimously that they would not leave Steincoalspruit until they were 'paid cash for the coal'. Moreover, given the fact that among the farms already allocated to KwaZulu, there were none that served as suitable compensation for Steincoalspruit, the meeting expressed the wish that the landowners be left until the consolidation commission had completed its recommendations, and better farms might emerge. These decisions were conveyed to the Commissioner at Ladysmith for submission to Pretoria. (See Appendix 3.)

In July 1980, the KwaZulu Secretary for the Interior informed Mr Kazi of the result of his representations to the South African government. The request not to be moved was refused because 'the farm Steincoalspruit constitutes a Black spot i.e. an isolated portion of farm land owned by Blacks in the white area of Ladysmith District.' Nothing was said about compensation for mineral rights although it was pointed out that compensatory land had been allocated and the Chief Commissioner of Natal would show this to the landowners. (See Appendix 4.) And there the matter has stood. The landowners to date have not been shown the compensatory land. Although it appears that a few shareholders in Section I (the Syndicate farm) have been bought out by Pretoria, most landowners are still on the land. There has been no indication from Pretoria about when it intends to pay compensation and when it intends to move people - or where. Once more its tactics of delay, the withholding of information and a total indifference to the plight of the landowners are on display - and the effects are visible in the community, in the form of insecurity, confusion and a fear of probing the future too sharply, which inhibits organisation.

THE POSITION TODAY

The position of landowners today is that they do not want to move at all. They are trying to fight a rearguard action to get their land restored to them; representatives have secured legal advice. In 1982 the Nationalist M.P. for the area, Mr Volker, made a widely-publicised speech in Parliament in which he indicated that where black farmers were using their land productively, black spot removals should not be enforced. (Hansard, col. 494, 21.04.82) The landowners have tried to investigate this possibility with him; so far the results have not been encouraging. - Mr Volker's attitude appears to be that the landowners must leave Steincoalspruit, although he has not committed himself to a position on their coal rights.

The story of Steincoalspruit is another tragic case study of the government's policy of relocation. It is not simply a question of people being deprived of adequate compensation for valuable mineral rights. It entails also the disintegration of what was once a viable and flourishing community. The mining community of the Natal Steam Coal Company, which was a presence at Steincoalspruit from the 1890s through to 1970, was undoubtedly an important element in the economic life of the black inhabitants. When the mine of the Natal Steam Coal Company closed in 1970, the inhabitants of Steincoalspruit lost the

advantages of local employment opportunities, and the weekly visits of doctors from Ladysmith to the mine 'hospital'. However, the people of Steincoalspruit had also created their own infrastructure. A brick and thatch church for Presbyterian services as well as a primary school were built for the community on the Syndicate farm and, at the time of the removal of the tenants, materials had been gathered for the construction of a high school. When the Rev. Illing finally switched his allegiance to the Anglican church, a beautiful stone church and adjacent school rooms were built on Subdivision C.

However, when the tenants were removed in 1977-78, shops in the valley were no longer economically viable and had to close. Today only the walls of Bhengu's general dealer shop remain, with rusting Coca Cola signs. The Anglican church is in ruins. The high school was never built and cows wander in and out of the primary school. The remaining landowners however still attend Sunday services in the Presbyterian church on the Syndicate farm. The remaining school children are taken by bus daily to Ekuveni. This is the only form of public transport available to the inhabitants, few of whom own cars.

Despite the disintegration of the community around them, many of the landowners still live in very favourable circumstances. The land is good - it is, now, under-utilised because farming is particularly difficult under present conditions. Their houses are large, well-constructed and well-established, with trees and gardens (flower and vegetable). Water is plentiful. If the landowners could be allowed to remain on their land and dispose of their mineral rights in the most economically advantageous way, they could well, with the capital and with extension service support, farm their land efficiently.

Mr Kazi has described to fieldworkers how, as a young student, he became aware of his great-grandfather's foresight in creating a secure land base for his family. This made it possible for him (Limberg's great-grandson) to go to college when many of his peers, the sons of tenants of white farmers, were precluded from this privilege because they had to meet the labour requirements of their fathers' landlords. As a mark of his gratitude Mr Kazi determined that the Kazi family should erect a suitable monument on his great-grandfather's grave. In the early 1960s this aim was realised and a large marble tombstone was erected on Abraham Limberg's grave in the neat family cemetery sheltered by orange and pomegranate trees (probably planted by the first Limberg) near the Kazi house. The tombstone is a symbol of the family's ties to the land and their faith in their future upon it. Now that future is in jeopardy and the tombstone may end up as a monument to how relocation has destroyed a community.

Appendix 1. Letter from Dr. Hartzenberg, October 1977



Republiek van Suid-Afrika · Republic of South Africa

Verwysingsnommer:
Reference Number:

5/5

Ministerie van Bantoe-administrasie en -ontwikkeling en van Bantoe-onderwys
Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development and of Bantu Education

RS/

Postbus 384
P.O. Box 384
Pretoria
0001Mr F B Kazi
C/o Asmals
P O WESSELSNEK
2910

Dear Sir

REMOVALS AT LADYSMITH

With further reference to your letter dated 27 August 1977, I wish to inform you that the tenants and the landowners, who own less than 42 acres, are to be offered accommodation at Ekuvukeni Bantu Township. The owners who own more than 42 acres will receive compensatory land in a new area which has been purchased from white farmers and where no people have up to now been settled. Ekuvukeni is a quiet, peaceful community and the owners of the compensatory land will, as is the case with their present properties, be able to exercise the necessary control and prevent unrest and faction fights.

No problems are accordingly foreseen and it is anticipated that the people concerned will be able to carry on as in the past.

Yours faithfully

DR F HARTZENBERG M P
DEPUTY MINISTER OF BANTU DEVELOPMENT

Appendix 2. Letter, Secretary for Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure, 22.01.79

REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICADEPARTEMENT VAN LANDBOUKREDIET EN GRONDBESIT
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND LAND TENUREPoyntoncentrum, Kerkstraat 124,
Poynton Centre, 124 Church Street,Telefoonadres LANGRO
Telegraphic Address

Private Bag X118, PRETORIA. 0001.

Telefoon 482781 of 484009
Telephone orRig briewe aan SECRETARIS en vermeld:
Address letters to SECRETARY and quote:

No. AS 222-00024

Navors:
Enquides:
Mr., Mv., Me. Kilian/JE
Mr., Mrs., Miss 294
Bylyn
Eks. nstionBy Ed., Prof., Dr., Ds., Mv., Me., Me.,
The Hon., Prof., Dr., Rev., Mr., Mrs., Miss,The Secretary for Plural Relations
and Development
P.O. Box 384
PRETORIA
0001

22-01-1979

REMOVAL OF BLACK SPORTS : STEIN COAL SPRUIT NO. 1171
COUNTY OF KLIP RIVERYour minute No. D168/1370/41 of the 27th September 1978,
refers.

I have to inform you that this Department obtained expert advice on the mineral rights from which it appears that the coal deposit is of such poor quality that it has practically no economic value. The value of the coal is thus purely nominal and was included in the land value. The offers represent the land value plus rights to minerals and improvements, if any.

Kindly advise the Commissioner accordingly.

SECRETARY FOR AGRICULTURAL
CREDIT AND LAND TENURE

Appendix 3. Letter, Secretary of Steincoalspruit proprietors, 28.12.79

P.O. Box 53,
WASBANK.
28th, December 1979.

The Commissioner
LADYSMITH.

Dear Sir,

Re: RESETTLEMENT STEENKOOLESPRUIT.

On the 22nd December 1979 a General Meeting of Proprietors of Steenkoolspruit was held to decide on the letter from the Secretary for Co-operation and Development with regards to cash payment for coal.

Mr. S.E. Sithebe, Hon. Member of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was also invited to advise us on this matter.

It was unanimously decided that:

1. As Steenkoolspruit has coal, we are not prepared to leave until we are paid cash for the coal.
2. Of the farms set aside for KwaZulu Government we see no farms that can be a suitable compensation for Steenkoolspruit. We, therefore, wish to be left until the commission appointed by the Hon. The Minister of Co-Operation and Development completes its recommendation. We feel there will be better farms thereafter.

This matter has now been referred to the KwaZulu Government.

Yours humbly,
F.B. Kazi

F.B. Kazi
GENERAL SECRETARY.

UHULUMENI WAKWAZULU

ZB6

KWAZULU GOVERNMENT SERVICE



KWAZULU-REGERINGSDIENS

Ikhele Lacingo:
Telegraphic Address: "UMPHAKATHI"
Telephese Adress:

Intombi: 8/5/16
Ref No.: 8/4/41
Verw. No.:

Enq.: 211 x 135
T.C. Memela

IHOVISI LIKA
OFFICE OF THE
KANTOOR VAN DIE

Secretary for the Interior
Private Bag X02
ULUNDI
3838

24-07-1980

Mr. F.B. Kazi
P.O. Box 53
WASBANK
2920

Dear Mr. Kazi

REMOVAL FROM STEENKOOLESPRUIT.

Your complaint was referred to the then Secretary for Co-operation and Development, Pretoria, for comments.

I now wish to advise you that the Secretary (now Director General) for Co-operation and Development has advised as follows :-

- "1. The request from Mr. F.B. Kazi, not to be moved from Steincoalspruit, cannot be considered favourably and is refused.
2. You are aware of the fact that the farm Steincoalspruit constitutes a Black spot i.e. an isolated portion of farm land owned by Blacks in the white area of Ladysmith District. In accordance with Government policy Mr. F.B. Kazi and other land owners cannot remain at Steincoalspruit.
3. Compensatory land has been allocated and will be shown to the land owners by the Chief Commissioner, Natal."

Yours faithfully

F.B. Kazi
SECRETARY FOR INTERIOR

5. UMBULWANE

1. Background

Umbulwane is a black freehold area falling within the municipal Townlands of Ladysmith in Northern Natal. By 1980, according to the residents, there were a total of 610 adults and 300 children living there. Their houses, mostly small wattle and daub structures, are scattered in clusters across a bleak, flat plain on the outskirts of the town. There are 41 landowning families - mainly african, but there are some indian and coloured owners as well. The rest of the population are tenants of the landowners. Most of the tenants are african but there are people classified as coloured living there too - Zulu-speaking and integrated into the community, but classified as a separate group by officialdom.

Umbulwane is one of fourteen black spots under threat of removal in the Ladysmith area. Both landowners and tenants are eventually to be removed, but at present it is the tenants who are coming under fire. In August 1980 municipal and DAB officials arrived unannounced and started demolishing tenant houses but, as a result of subsequent organisation within the community and adverse press publicity about the actions of the officials, coinciding with a general slowing-down of the removal programme, the immediate pressure slackened and today, two years later, the community is still maintaining a tenuous existence there. The threat remains a real one however, although it is not clear when or how the local authorities will next act.

Umbulwane is of interest both as a case study of how a small and, on the face of it, very weak community has managed to resist being moved for over two years and as a case study of the growth of informal settlement and the workings of influx control in a medium-sized Natal town.

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNITY

Although it is no longer recognised by the authorities, landowners claim that Umbulwane is the oldest black residential area in Ladysmith. The land was bought by their grandparents in the late 19th century, long before municipal townships were built for the african population of the town, and grew into an informal, semi-rural township. It appears that at first the land fell outside the municipal boundaries, but at some stage in the early 20th century it was incorporated and as a result landowners became rate-payers. Later, the municipal townships of Steadville, Jabavu City Location and White City Location were built on land lying between Umbulwane and the town and numbers of tenants moved into them from Umbulwane. Large numbers of families remained on as tenants however, presumably because life at Umbulwane was cheaper than in the official townships and permitted a more rural lifestyle, with grazing land for stock and space for small fields and gardens. Until the township of Ezakheni was built in 1972 (25 km from the town) the supply of formal township houses was also completely insufficient to meet all of Ladysmith's needs.

HISTORY OF PREVIOUS REMOVALS

Umbulwane was not listed as a black spot in the list compiled by the SAIRR in the 1950s. At some stage, however, it was zoned for industrial purposes by the local authorities and since then landowners, while not yet expropriated, have been living there on borrowed time. The plan is eventually to relocate the landowners along ethnic lines - the africans to Ezakheni, the coloureds to the coloured Group Area township of Limit Hill and the indians to one of the indian townships. Shortage of accommodation in all these townships has delayed this process, however, and the priority has been to control the far more numerous tenants.

In the 1970s, once Ezakheni had been built, there were several phases of tenant removals; what procedure was adopted to remove them (to Ezakheni) is not known. In July 1977 the Natal Witness reported that a large number of squatters had been taken to Ezakheni 'several years ago' but others had entered Umbulwane since then and the local town council, magistrate and DAB were arranging to remove them to Ezakheni as well. (Natal Witness, 1.07.77) According to a Memorandum from the people of Umbulwane, dated the 1st December 1980:

When they built all these locations, they used to take the tenants from Umbulwane and resettle them there. When they took tenants to the locations, the landowners always used to get new tenants. The last lot of tenants they took to Ezakheni and, as usual, the landowners got new ones in 1979. (See Appendix 1.)

The total number of people moved thus is not known but those moved in 1977 amounted to several hundred at least. (Natal Witness, 1.07.77) One indian landowner (who does not live at Umbulwane permanently) has reported that he used to have about 150 people living on his land, all of whom were moved to Ezakheni in the 1970s. According to him these people are struggling to cope with the increased cost of living at Ezakheni, where rents are 4 or 5 times higher than what they had been paying their landlords at Umbulwane (R2,50 a month in his case) and transport costs are an added burden. He also says that after his tenants were removed he was warned not to take on more tenants and although the loss of rent has made it more difficult for him to pay his annual rates, he has obeyed. (Unpublished AFRA fieldtrip report)

Not all tenant households were moved in this way; some of the present residents have been living as tenants at Umbulwane for 30 years or more. In addition, in the course of 1979/80 small numbers of new tenants moved on to the property and started erecting new houses. These people have been the chief targets of official action against the community since then.

ORIGINS OF TENANTS

The official housing policy for the Ladysmith area for the past 15 years has been (as in other urban areas) to force africans out of the urban area and relocate them in KwaZulu in the relocation areas of Ezakheni, Ekuvukeni and Limehill. Steadville, the only official township left within the municipal area, (with a population of a little over 8 000) has been under threat of removal for years. All housing has been frozen and although there has been some talk of granting it 99 year leasehold status, this has not yet materialised. Thus, despite Umbulwane's long history, officials have refused to recognise it as an african residential area. They have classified the tenants as squatters and illegal residents and have attempted to justify their action against them in terms of that classification. In an interview with the Sunday Times in December 1980 Mr Pieter Hurter, the town clerk of Ladysmith, said:

Our concern is that squatters have moved into Umbulwane. It is illegal for squatters to live there, even though the land is privately owned.

In addition, in terms of the law plans must be submitted for the erection of any dwelling. No plans have been submitted by the squatters of Umbulwane. (Sunday Times, 14.12.80)

According to him, more than 50% of the people were not from the Ladysmith district. (Sunday Tribune, 16.11.80)

The Department of Cooperation and Development adopted a similar approach when, in reply to representations made by the community in late 1980, the Administrative Secretary of the Department stated, on behalf of the Deputy Minister:

Those families that have settled at Umbulwane illegally and without permission, will be required to return to their places of origin or arrange for accommodation themselves with their relevant Chiefs in KwaZulu. (See Appendix 2.)

Umbulwane represents a breach in the system of influx control and in trying to plug it, officials have resorted to all the standard clichés used against peri-urban informal settlement throughout South Africa - the tenants have no claim to living at Umbulwane or to being in the district of Klip River, they belong to KwaZulu, they have places to return to there. In fact, most of the people living at Umbulwane are long-term residents of the Ladysmith district, many work in the town, and almost all the tenants who have moved to Umbulwane in recent years have moved there precisely because they have lost their previous place of residence, as a result of the implementation of the State's relocation and influx control policies in the district. In a letter to the Natal Witness in November 1980 two members of the Umbulwane committee put it thus:

To clarify the point regarding the origin of the many people at Umbulwane: it is totally incorrect to say they come from other towns. They all come from the Klip River complex and from local farms. They are all employed in Ladysmith. (Natal Witness, 27.11.80)

During the course of 1980 and 1981 AFRA interviewed 13 tenant households about their length of tenure at Umbulwane and their origins. The results confirmed the points made in the letter quoted above. Four of the 13 households had lived at Umbulwane for many years - one since 1927, one since 1931 and two for 23 years. Another tenant, a young man, was a close relative of one of the landowners and had previously lived in her house. In early 1980 he had married and had built a separate house for himself and his wife in the vicinity of his former home - and thus became an illegal resident. The head of another household who had erected a flimsy shack on the property of one of the indian landowners, in 1979, was in fact in the employ of his landlord and had been for many years. He and his family had at one stage lived on their landlord's property in Ladysmith itself but had been forced to leave there, it would seem when Group Areas zoning was first applied to Ladysmith (which was in 1962). Unable to find accommodation in any of the townships, they had moved to an informal settlement across the river from Umbulwane and had lived there until 1979, when the authorities started clearing the area. Their employer had then suggested they move onto his land at Umbulwane which suggestion they had gladly accepted.

Four of the remaining 7 households interviewed were victims of eviction or relocation in the Klip River or neighbouring districts, and had moved to Umbulwane during or after 1979 either because they had nowhere else to go or because they felt they could not afford to live at Ezakheni. 3 of the 4 had been living and working on white farms but had then been evicted. A fourth, a widow, had formerly lived at Roosboom. When Roosboom was removed in 1976 she felt she could not afford either to build or to rent a house at Ezakheni so she had moved to Driefontein and built a house there. Later her house had burnt down. She already had a job in Ladysmith and so, in early 1979, she decided to rebuild at Umbulwane. A fifth tenant had also moved to Umbulwane to be closer to his job, after a building contractor had hired him in early 1980.

The remaining two households moved to Umbulwane after getting married, to establish their own homes. In the case of one of the couples, before they had married, the man had been living in the single hostel at Steadville, while his wife had been a domestic worker living on her employer's premises. When they were married they applied for a house of their own at Steadville and in the meantime they lived in the township as lodgers. Eventually, however, despairing of ever getting a municipal house of their own, the couple moved to Umbulwane in August 1979.

2. Conditions

LACK OF FACILITIES

Umbulwane is a poor and very poorly-serviced community. There is no school - children go to Steadville - and only one small shop. Although the landowners are rate-payers, their properties are totally unserved by the municipality. There is no reticulated water supply, no municipal sanitation system and no refuse collection. Residents draw their water from a couple of wells and dig their own latrines. Roads consist of little more than rough tracks and in wet weather frequently become impassable. There is no electricity and no bus service into the community; people have to walk to Steadville or to Ladysmith centre, several kilometres away.

The quality of housing varies. There are a few large, brick houses in the area while a couple of tenants live in very makeshift structures. Most people, however, live in modest wattle and daub houses which do not, as the authorities have frequently pointed out, conform to municipal building standards but provide cheap and adequate shelter and are adapted to individual household needs and tastes in a way that the mass-produced 4-room township housing can never be. The houses cover a large area but are spread very thinly for the most part; prior to the evictions of the 1970s, the people must have been far more densely settled.

RATES

The lack of services is a major grievance among landowners who have been paying rates for many years and have received nothing from the municipality in return. Defaulters or those who fall in arrears on their payments have had their properties confiscated and auctioned off. In July 1981 the Natal Witness carried a small news report on the auctioning of 4 or 5 properties from Umbulwane by the Town Council in order 'to recover outstanding rates.' (Natal Witness, 1.07.81) Rates paid vary but were reportedly in the region of R100 - R150 in the late 1970s. One landowner whose property was valued at R6 600 (R2 600 for the land and R4 000 for the buildings) paid R115,92 in March 1979. (Copy of Assessment in AFRA files.) According to another landowner, her rates were generally over R100 per annum but in 1981, after some press publicity had focused attention on the community, her assessment dropped to only R58.

REQUEST FOR SERVICES REFUSED

In an undated memorandum drawn up by the Umbulwane rate-payers and sent to the Chief Commissioner of Natal in late 1980 the landowners expressed their frustration thus:

- 1.3 No one has been interested in us in any way besides the rates; we have never been helped in getting clean water or any help except in collecting rates, and now breaking down the houses. Some, we are told, are too big, some have no plan and all sorts of things, and we get lost as to what is really expected of us.
- 1.4 We feel our fathers are not interested in anything except our payments. We are told we live very unhygienic, but no one

comes to help. (Copy in AFRA files.)

In a subsequent letter addressed, inter alia, to the Town Clerk of Ladysmith, the committee pointed out that they were regular rate-payers and made a request for 'our services, ash services, waterworks services as well as roads construction' to be improved. The response from the Town Clerk was curt and to the point. Completely ignoring the question of rates, he stated:

As far as your request for services are concerned, I regret that it is not possible to supply services to the area, as this area is not zoned for residential purposes. (Letter dated 1980-12-02.)

The area has, as already noted, been zoned for industrial purposes by the municipality. Observers have, however, pointed out that there is already a very large area of serviced but unoccupied land that is zoned for industrial purposes lying to the north of Umbulwane. The likelihood of more land being needed at this stage is very remote. Umbulwane is another example of infrastructural development being used against, rather than for, voteless people.

The lack of services is clearly seen by officials as one way of forcing the unwanted residents to move out by themselves; it also becomes another convenient justification for removing the people, since the area can be described as a slum and a health hazard. 'They have to go because they are a health hazard to the borough and they have no services' the Town Clerk said in an interview with the Sunday Tribune. (16.11.80) In June 1981 he repeated this point in an interview with the Natal Witness.

We do not want to cause any hardship but we just cannot allow an area like this to grow. We have to control it. (Natal Witness, 29.06.81)

The municipality has made it clear that it does not want to instal any services that may be seen to legitimise the community or indicate permanence. However, during the course of 1982 the outbreak of cholera in many parts of Natal did force them to review their position slightly and consider making some improvements to the water supply. Although no cholera was reported at Umbulwane, the danger of it getting established there and then spreading to the town was clearly seen to be a real one. Residents at Umbulwane have pointed out that piping could be laid on from a water point a few kilometres away and this could bring water to a couple of central tap points within the community. The Town Council dislikes the idea of laying water pipes, because of the permanence that that suggests, and in 1982 were reportedly investigating the possibility of bringing water in by tanker - a far more expensive undertaking in the long run. By September 1982 no progress had been made on this. In the meantime, the council continues to collect rates and to expropriate the property of defaulters.

EMPLOYMENT

No detailed survey on employment in the area has been conducted but according to residents, most workers are employed locally, in Ladysmith. Many of the men appear to work for the South African Railways which has a large yard at Ladysmith, and some for the municipality. Some of the women are employed in a textile factory; others are shop assistants or domestic workers. Umbulwane is completely integrated into the economy of the town; in the words of one spokesman for the area: 'We work for the Corporation, we work for the people who are destroying our homes.' (Unpublished AFRA fieldtrip Report.)

In late 1980 residents complained that officials were refusing to register school-leavers from Umbulwane as workseekers at the Ladysmith labour bureau; they regarded this as another form of pressure upon them. This, however, was denied by the Minister of Cooperation and Development in the House of Assembly in February 1981. In response to a question he stated that 43 workseekers had applied for registration from Umbulwane and all had been accepted. (Hansard, Question 6, 13.02.81)

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is no longer practised on any scale in the community. Until 1958 it was legal to keep stock but in that year, according to the undated memorandum of the rate-payers (already cited) this was forbidden.

In 1958 we were told that grazing and dipping will be discontinued; the stock we had up to now is grazing on the land we thought was our fathers', having at intervals an official from the Government to come and count and treat them for any outbreak in the place of dipping them.

However, some of the landowners still keep a few cows and there are a couple of pigs, donkeys and some poultry in the community as well.

Some of the landowners plough and plant mealies every year as well - there is at least one tractor in the community - and a number have fruit trees and small vegetable gardens. In general, however, little cultivation is undertaken and much of the land lies fallow. One can isolate several reasons for this. The general insecurity is a major factor, coupled with the fact that most of the present tenants are newcomers to the area. The land is of poor quality. Most people do not have ploughing animals and are generally too poor to afford the necessary equipment to cultivate the land adequately. Furthermore, most of the adults are working during the day.

Umbulwane is thus linked in to an urban economy and is a part of Ladysmith - a disregarded, despised but nevertheless definite suburb of the town - and not a separate, rural community. The people who live there, and particularly the landowners and longstanding tenants, appreciate the peri-urban lifestyle, the space and the lack of institutionalised township life. Nevertheless, they would like to see the place upgraded as a residential area and would be unlikely to object to the introduction of more stringent housing and health controls, if needed services and security accompanied them.

COMMUNITY ORGANISATION

The growth of community organisation in response to the crisis of the demolitions is described in the next section. Umbulwane, at the time of the demolitions, was a depressed community. The successive waves of evictions of tenants during the 1970s had reduced the community, had undermined its cohesiveness and depleted its resources. Some of the new tenants who had moved there in the aftermath had moved there only as a last resort; they were demoralised, marginalised, with little stake in the world around them. Nevertheless, the place had then and has now certain things going for it. There is no serious crime or violence. All the residents know each other. There is an intimacy of scale and an ease of personal interaction that is not possible in a large, impersonal and new township such as Ezakheni. It is close to people's places of work and, in the resident landowners and established tenants, there is still a sense of continuity with the past.

Umbulwane is our grandfather's place. We have been living here over fifty years at this place. We want to stay at Umbulwane, only we beg that our Municipality will improve the place for us and make it healthier. (Memorandum dated December 1st, 1980, Appendix 1.)

Furthermore, there is not a marked social and economic divide between landowners and tenants, the material disadvantages of the community as a whole allowing for a degree of egalitarianism not found in some other wealthier black spots. (This analysis excludes the non-resident, mainly Indian, landowners.)

The only community organisation that appears to have existed at Umbulwane at the time of the demolitions in August 1980 was a loose and largely inactive landowners / rate-payers committee. Nevertheless a core of a viable community still existed, centred on the long-

term residents. It was this core that rallied to meet the threat posed by the demolitions and, in the process, drew other scattered and disparate members of the community closer together into a more cohesive and stronger unit.

3. The removals threat

CHRONOLOGY OF THE DEMOLITIONS, JUNE - NOVEMBER 1980

As already stated, the immediate threat over the past two years has been to the tenants, whom the authorities claim are illegal squatters in the area. The following account of the tactics adopted by the authorities between June and November 1980, to try to pressure them to leave Umbulwane, is taken from AFRA Report no. 7 (December 1980) supplemented by unpublished reports on AFRA fieldtrips to the area at the time.

1. The first warning of pending action against the community came in June / July 1980 when officials arrived at Umbulwane unannounced and started numbering all the african-occupied structures. They did not tell residents what the numbers were for. People were alarmed but did not know how to respond. 'They are just putting numbers everywhere, we don't know what they mean', said one resident.

2. At about 8 a.m., on either the 18th or 19th August (the Ladysmith Town Council and Umbulwane residents subsequently disagreed on the date) several carloads of officials (the cars had Administration Board registration plates), about six SAP vans with police in camouflage dress (described as 'soldier' uniforms by local observers) plus a municipal front-end loader arrived, also unannounced. With minimal discussion with those present, they proceeded to demolish, selectively, tenants' houses. They did not demolish completely. Where a household had more than one separate structure, they would leave at least one standing. Where there was only one building, they would only destroy part of the building, leaving one or two rooms standing among the rubble. Some 42 houses were partially or totally destroyed in this way. (Sunday Tribune, 16.11.80, quoting the Town Clerk.)

The Town Clerk later agreed that no notices were served before the demolitions (Sunday Times, 14.12.80) but claimed only unoccupied (and illegal) structures were demolished. (Sunday Tribune, 16.11.80) The evidence of the owners of the houses and of the partly-demolished buildings themselves completely contradicted this. As residents pointed out: if only unoccupied buildings were being destroyed, why were they not demolished completely instead of only partially? AFRA collected statements from several tenants whose houses were destroyed which described briefly what had happened to them. Three of these are quoted here.

1. My six-room house was broken down on the 19th August while I was at work. My wife was out collecting firewood, there was our three-year old baby inside who was taken outside and ran away. I found my house broken down. All the doorframes and windows were broken, my tools were broken and they left me with only one room. They came back later, just to level everything. I did not receive a word of notice.
2. I was present. I was sitting in the yard with the children when they came. A white man was pointing out all the houses. They asked who the owner of the house was. They just said they were going to break them down. I tried to stop them. I explained that it was my son's house. They didn't mind - they called the bulldozer and started breaking it down. They did not give any reason. After breaking that one, they moved to the small one, where I keep all my tools and the grinding machine. They said I must take all the stuff out. I called Ndlovu to help me; we took it out and then they started to break the house.

3. They first broke the house. I was not here. I was looking after my boss's house. There was nobody at home - my wife was at work and my mother was out visiting. They took stuff out and then broke the houses with a machine. They knocked the whole house down. No furniture was damaged, but when I got back, one bed and three sheets of tin were missing. My cousin came and told me the house was broken so I came back. They came and gave me notice afterwards.

3. Having finished their task, the police issued undated notices to the landowners (where the landowners were not present, they pinned the notices to their doors) and left. These notices ordered the landowners to see to the final demolition of their tenants' houses themselves, within 28 days. (See Appendix 4.) The police apparently also warned people verbally that they would be returning to finish the job after 28 days themselves if the houses were still standing, and that the tenants must have left the area by then. No alternative accommodation was offered then or at any later stage. Said the Town Clerk later:

I am only involved in the removal of the illegal structures and the health hazard ... the people do not fall under my jurisdiction. I am not putting out people - just demolishing unoccupied illegal structures. (Sunday Tribune, 16.11.80)

4. Officials returned during the course of October, painted new numbers on some of the tenants' houses (in red, as opposed to the white used before) and issued several more types of notices. Some of these were verbal, some dated the 21st October 1980 emanated from the Town Council and ordered buildings to be demolished by the 21st November 1980 and some, dated the 29th October, emanated from the DAB and instructed landowners to 'get the permission by form of a licence' to have tenants or 'let them vacate your premises within three months.' (See Appendix 4.) When one of the landowners and a member of the Umbulwane Residents' Committee (which became active at this time) went to the local DAB office to find out what was happening, she was referred to the municipal offices. She was told there that only the families of landowners could be registered as tenants and the rest would have to go. She was also told that housing those who were to leave was not the responsibility of the municipality.

5. Until about October 1980, no news of what was happening at Umbulwane travelled further than the nearby township of Steadville where some of the victims of the demolitions had taken shelter. During October a number of individuals connected to church and welfare groups in Ladysmith began to hear disturbing reports about the developments from contacts in Steadville. Eventually, in early November, contact was established between the community and potential support groups outside of it. In the course of November and December 1980 most of the Natal newspapers and some of the Johannesburg papers carried stories on the demolitions. At the same time, the community began to rally to meet the crisis. The combination of the potentially stronger opposition within the community, the adverse press publicity (with the further threat that any confrontation that might develop between residents and police would be reported upon) and the time of the year seemed to persuade the local authorities to retreat from their former hardline position. The authorities continued to inspect the area periodically but the demolitions stopped in October 1980 and no action was taken once the various notice periods had expired.

THE COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE

Although the general mood after the first demolitions was one of anger and of bitterness at the treatment they had suffered, initially most residents felt intimidated by the obvious power of the authorities and helpless about how to defend their position.

People were ignorant about the law, isolated from other communities that had been through similar experiences and confused about what the intention of the authorities were (and they, for their part, refused to inform them). Many of the new tenants had already been through the trauma of eviction and removal and their only previous experience was of eventual submission to the inevitability of the authorities' power.

From the start, however, some prominent landowners saw that the threat to the tenants was a threat to themselves. With encouragement from community leaders in Steadville, they took the initiative in trying to prevent further demolitions and evictions. In about September they organised a memorandum appealing to the Chief Commissioner to 'have the notices and breaking down of our homes and tenants' houses be stopped' and requesting further 'that we be consulted in time if there is anything that affects us.'

We feel at the moment that we are just like animals for which the owner decides and acts without asking their opinion ... With God's help to you Your Honourable, we pray that the meeting you have today be the act and guidance of God. (Memorandum from Umbulwane Rate Payers to the Chief Commissioner of Natal, 2)

It appears that out of this activity a Residents' Committee emerged which came to be accepted as representative of the community. Of interest is that tenants and landowners were both involved in this committee from the start - the Chairman was himself a tenant, although one of long standing. Although in general meetings were dominated by men, most of the women sitting as a group silently, to one side, two women served on the Committee and played a key role in its proceedings. (The one was a widow and landowner, the other was the wife of a landowner who was also a Committee member.) To what extent the Committee was an elected body is not clear, but it did have the support of the community in general, as demonstrated by the well-attended meetings at this time. Later, as the immediate threat to their existence appeared to recede, people grew less interested in meetings, attendance fell away and the committee experienced problems within itself as well, as its purpose appeared to diminish.

During the course of November a series of general meetings were held at Umbulwane, attended by between 50 and 150 people, at which various options open to the community were discussed and decisions about action taken. There was no community hall and all meetings took place outside, under a large gum tree. At one of the first meetings it was agreed to draw up a second memorandum setting out the history of the community and the request of the people (at that stage 'demand' would have been too strong a term) to be allowed to continue living there; this was to be sent to the Minister of Cooperation and Development, the Chief Commissioner of Natal, the Town Council and the local DAB offices. In the meantime, the committee undertook a census of the population, in preparation for the memorandum, and sent preliminary letters to the various officials. These announced that the memorandum was coming, objected to the demolitions and appealed for services to be supplied.

The Committee also responded to remarks made by the Ladysmith Town Clerk in interviews with various journalists who investigated the demolitions in November and December, by writing to the newspapers concerned to state their side of the story. Only one of the newspapers printed their letter (the Natal Witness, on the 27th November 1980) but seeing that in print and, subsequently, getting replies to their memorandum were important morale-boosters. The experience helped to break down the mystique surrounding the institutions of press and politics within the community and nurtured an awareness of themselves as actors, not simply victims, in the process of determining their future.

During this time the committee also opened a savings account in its name. Community funds were channelled into this account which was regarded as a reserve fund, to be drawn upon if an emergency arose.

THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE ORGANISATIONS

In developing these responses, the community benefitted from contact with outside groups. The initial contact with community leaders in neighbouring Steadville was important in encouraging people to articulate their opposition and not simply to submit passively to the demolitions. Contact with sympathetic whites in Ladysmith was more tenuous and confined to a few individuals. Through them, however, contact was made with other groups outside of Ladysmith who were opposed to removals and this also played a part in boosting community organisation.

The contribution of outside groups was both inspirational and technical: assistance with addresses, with reproducing documents etc. The contact helped break down the sense of isolation and opened the way for the press to visit the area. Later, it led to individuals from Umbulwane attending a number of meetings and workshops organised outside of Umbulwane, where removals were looked at in general and people from other threatened communities were present as well. In this way community leaders were exposed to new ideas about how to deal with their situation and developed a broader perspective on what was happening; they also contributed their own experience for other communities to draw on.

The support coming from outside was, however, limited. It helped foster a sense of purpose within the community, within the committee in particular, but could not provide the leadership that came to articulate that nor the spirit that was necessary to sustain the momentum of organisation. Had Umbulwane been located in a metropolitan area it would probably have received far more active outside support which may, in the long run, have inhibited the uncertain but clear growth of a more self-reliant attitude among its leaders.

THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE

The 'Memorandum from the people of Umbulwane in the Townlands of Ladysmith' was sent off on the 1st of December 1980. It is reproduced in full in Appendix One. On the 2nd of December the Ladysmith Town Council responded not to the memorandum but to the preliminary letter, as already described - the buildings demolished were illegal structures and did not comply with building regulations, and services could not be supplied since the area was not zoned for residential purposes. It does not seem that the DAB, either locally or at the Chief Commissioner's offices in Pietermaritzburg, replied at all. The Department of Cooperation and Development did reply, at some length, but not until the end of March 1981. In the meantime, however, the attention focused on Umbulwane, limited as it was, succeeded in making the Department adopt a more cautious approach, at least in public, than that displayed by the Town Council.

In February 1981 a series of questions were asked in Parliament concerning the future of Umbulwane. On both the 11th and 13th of February Dr Koornhof acknowledged in reply to two sets of very similar questions that he had received representations from Umbulwane (the reply on the 11th of February referring to Matiwane's Kop as well) to the effect that the proposed resettlement projects be reconsidered and that the residents be allowed to remain on the properties concerned. He said that the matter was still receiving attention and 'further negotiations will take place'. (Hansard, Question 26, 11.02.81) However, in response to a further set of questions also tabled on the 13th February, he denied that the people were to be resettled 'at present'.

If the people are eventually resettled they will be removed depending on merit to appropriate accommodation at Ezakheni or to such accommodation as may be arranged by the people with the chiefs concerned. (Hansard, Question 5, 13.02.81)

No 'negotiations' concerning the memorandum took place with the people who had written it although Dr Koornhof did later report that officials had visited Umbulwane during the course of February 1981, to number the houses 'for identification and control purposes.' (Hansard, Question 162, 22.09.81) In the reply that was finally sent to the people of Umbulwane on the 26th March 1981 the Minister (in the form of the Administrative Secretary, speaking for the Deputy Minister) declined to intervene in what was presented as a dispute with the Local Authority.

The reply, which is reproduced as Appendix 2, is a revealing one from a number of points of view. It attempted to drive a very clear wedge within the community between legal and illegal residents, classing landowners and 'approximately 105 squatter families' in the former group and an unspecified number of families 'that have settled at Umbulwane illegally and without permission' in the latter group. The letter did not explain on what basis a distinction was being drawn between tenants, nor did it identify who the groups were - it was the first time the figure of 105 had been mentioned by officials. It qualified a previous and much-publicised statement that the Minister had made, in July 1980, that there would be 'no more forced removals' in South Africa (quoted in, *inter alia*, the *Daily News*, 17.07.80) by stating that this 'did not imply that the country's legislation regarding illegal squatting' could be disregarded. Generally it evaded the basic issues raised in the memorandum - the destruction of a long-established community, the lack of consultation by the authorities, the lack of alternative housing for threatened people, the positive aspects to life in Umbulwane and its contribution to the economic well-being of Ladysmith - by taking refuge in legalistic and bureaucratic formulae. It concluded:

In the circumstances my Deputy Minister is not in a position to intervene in so far as the matters raised are concerned.

This letter was discussed at a further general meeting and in June the community sent back their reply, reproduced as Appendix 3. What is remarkable about this letter, compared to the memorandum, is the articulateness and the confidence with which the committee rejected the government's comments - 'We feel that the Government did not answer any of our points properly' - and restated their own position. This was not expressed as an appeal but as a statement of fact: 'It is incorrect that Umbulwane is not owned by Blacks.', 'We do not believe that we can only live in KwaZulu.' 'We know we can ask for rights in South Africa.' The letter pointed out that 'the Government is separating the people of Umbulwane by saying some people are illegal and that the Government cannot help them', and rejected Ezakheni as a suitable alternative place to live because of the high cost of living there and the violence. It repeated:

We do not want to leave Umbulwane where there is peace.

The reply from the Department to this letter was received a few months later. It reaffirmed the intention to move Umbulwane eventually, but indicated that this would not be immediate. It also extolled the advantages of Ezakheni and called on the committee to help explain to the community the advantages of moving.

DEVELOPMENTS IN 1982

The future of Umbulwane, at the time of writing, is still uncertain. In April 1982, in reply to a Parliamentary question, Dr Koornhof confirmed the intention to move Umbulwane (and a number of other specified communities) 'after consultation and in collaboration with the communities concerned as well as the Government of KwaZulu; the actual removals would only take place once the necessary housing facilities, water-reticulation, sanitation, school and clinic facilities, shops, roads and other services had been provided and made available.' (*Natal Mercury*, 27.04.82) In commending his Department for the services it was going to supply, Dr Koornhof described 'the resettlement projects' as 'an effort to improve the general standard of life of the communities

concerned.' He did not, however, explain why it was necessary to remove people in order to provide the very services which the Umbulwane community had been requesting in the area where they already lived. He also did not specify when the removals would be implemented, nor did he explain whether all the residents of Umbulwane were to be relocated to the planned areas, or only those who qualified as legal.

In Ladysmith itself there are reportedly differences of opinion between the Town Council and the local DAB about the future of african housing within the urban area. Although directed mainly at Steadville, the outcome of the disagreement could have repercussions for Umbulwane. In this instance some officials within the DAB are apparently prepared to consider the possibility of allowing a permanent african population to remain in Ladysmith but the Town Council is strongly opposed to this. If this is so, it probably means that the Town Council would like to eliminate Umbulwane entirely, and soon, but are being held back by constraints emanating from within the Department of Cooperation and Development.

In Umbulwane the most significant recent development has been the decision made by some of the tenants to start rebuilding the houses that were demolished in August 1980. The question of whether to proceed with rebuilding or not had been a major topic of discussion and concern throughout 1981. People desperately wanted to restore their houses - in many instances large families had been left with only a single room in which to live - but were extremely nervous about doing so, fearing a further round of demolitions or eviction orders from the authorities in response.

Finally, encouraged by the apparent success of the community's representations to the authorities and the low key attitude of the officials towards them, a few individuals did start to rebuild towards the end of 1981. When nothing happened to them a few others followed suit. For a while there was no response from the local authorities but in mid 1982 warnings were issued to people to discontinue. The Committee responded by writing a letter explaining that the building did not represent a new influx of people and requesting permission to continue. To date no follow-up on this has been reported and the restored buildings have not been pulled down: a tangible sign of people's commitment to a future in the area.

Umbulwane has been able to take advantage of the general slowdown in the pace of removals in Natal. It is still extremely vulnerable, however. It does not have any significant support within the white community of the Klip River district. Its continued existence contradicts stated government policy. Although the level of community organisation within it has been greatly enhanced by the successes to date, there are major weaknesses in that still. Community participation tends to flag once the immediate crisis recedes and has never been unanimous while the committee is heavily dependent on certain key individuals and is not fully accountable to the community at large. Even if a permanent reprieve were to be offered to Umbulwane, it will still face major problems to do with the provision, the financing and the control of the much needed services, and the nature of its future development as a residential area. Nevertheless, in struggling to deal with the threat of demolition and removal, the community as a whole has learnt some valuable lessons and gained a degree of confidence that can only be of benefit to it in the future. It has also started to look beyond its immediate horizons, as its reply to the Minister of Cooperation and Development in June 1981 made clear:

We do not believe that we can only live in KwaZulu. We know that we owned a lot of large pieces of land all over Natal (that do not fall in KwaZulu) and this had been occupied a hundred years or more before the Whites came to Natal and took land for themselves.

We know we can ask for rights in South Africa. We can ask for jobs, pensions, justice and more in South Africa.

Appendix 1. Memorandum from the people of Umbulwane, 1980

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PEOPLE OF UMBULWANE, IN THE TOWNLANDS OF LADYSMITH

December 1st 1980.

May it please Your Worship, to receive this memorandum from the people of Umbulwane:

History

Most people used to stay in town and in 1885 we moved from town to this place, Umbulwane. When we came here first life was very hard. There were no roads. We used to walk to and from work. In 1932 we first saw the roads, but there were no cars, only donkey carts and horses at that time.

We started paying rates. There was no school for the children at Umbulwane. At that time the children used to go to the churches for school. In 1934 each family at Umbulwane paid £5 to help build a school. The school was built at Steadville which was the only location at that time and named after Mr Stead who was the Superintendent. The school was opened in 1937. Children from Umbulwane still attend school there.

After Steadville they built Jabavu Location, which was followed by White City Location. When they built all these Locations, they used to take the tenants from Umbulwane and resettle them there. When they took tenants to the locations, the landowners always used to get new tenants. The last lot of tenants they took to Ezakheni and, as usual, the landowners got new ones in 1979.

Breaking down our houses

If it was wrong to have tenants, the landowners should have been notified first. In the middle of the year people came to write numbers on each and every house but they did not tell us what the numbers are for. On the 19th August 1980 we saw the Municipality and the Drakensberg Administration Board as well as police, all armed with guns, and a bulldozer. They started to break down houses. Most of the owners of these houses were not at home but at work or fetching wood. When they came from work they found their houses broken down. Some were left with only one small room.

We don't want to leave this place because we all stay in peace. The problem is where must the tenants go? Also, they all work in Ladysmith and don't want to lose their jobs. The Municipality says this place is supposed to have floods but we never have any floods. Since we have been at Umbulwane there has been no danger of floods.

No help from our Corporation

The worst part of it is that we don't get any help from our Corporation. The landowners pay rates but they do not give us water, toilets, ashes, roads. We see to that ourselves. We are only good for the Corporation when we pay rates every year.

What we want

Umbulwane is our grandfathers' place. We have been living here over fifty years at this place. We want to stay at Umbulwane, only we beg that our Municipality will improve the place for us and make it healthier.

Most people paying rates are widows and pensioners who need the rents paid by their tenants. Widows help educate and feed their children with their tenants' rents.

Without their tenants they cannot live. Most people have no stock but those who have it use to make our living better. We use the milk to feed our families. Those who have milk help the others with a little milk.

What is worse is that people from Umbulwane find it hard to get work now. They don't want to register us but we must pay rates. Where must we work? How can we live without work?

Conclusion

This Umbulwane was bought by the white people, Indians Coloureds and Africans a long time ago. We have 41 landowners. With tenants we are 610 adults and 300 children. Many tenants work in Ladysmith which is only six miles from Umbulwane. Umbulwane is as big as a big farm.

Umbulwane has improved this town by working in this town. Up to now and before we had Locations and hostels, the workers have always stayed at Umbulwane. Dr Koornhof said no people must be forced to leave their homes, in the Daily News on the 17th July 1980, and that is what we want.

From: The Umbulwane Committee, on behalf of the landowners and tenants,
Umbulwane,
P. O. Box 327
LADYSMITH
3370



Appendix 2. Reply, Dept. of Cooperation and Development,



Republiek van Suid-Afrika - Republic of South Africa

DSO 1229
 Beroyingsnummer:
 Reference Number: 5/2 Natal

Ministerie van Samewerking en Ontwikkeling
 Ministry of Co-operation and Development

/AB

Hendrik Verwoerdgebou
 Hendrik Verwoerd Buildings
 Kaapstad
 Cape Town

The Secretary
 The Umbulwane Committee
 Umbulwane
 P O Box 327
 LADYSMITH
 3370

26 -03- 1981

Dear Sir

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PEOPLE OF UMBULWANE

With further reference to your memorandum dated 1 December 1980, I am directed by Dr the Honourable G de V Morrison, Deputy Minister of Co-operation to inform you that the points raised in your memorandum have been thoroughly investigated.

The so-called Umbulwane area is situated within the municipal boundaries of Ladysmith and is of necessity subject to the building and health byelaws of that local authority. It has not been set aside as an urban Black residential area and it is not the intention that it should be set aside as such. It follows therefore that my Deputy Minister is not in a position to intervene as far as the implementation of the Local Authority's byelaws is concerned.

As you are no doubt aware, the majority of the residents of Umbulwane were resettled at e'Zakheni prior to 1977. Those of the remaining standowners as well as approximately 105 squatter families that qualify for housing at e'Zakheni will all eventually be resettled there as and when sufficient development funds become available for this purpose. These families will be negotiated with prior to their resettlement either at e'Zakheni or at such other accommodation as may be arranged by themselves with their relevant Chiefs in KwaZulu.

Those families that have settled at Umbulwane illegally and without permission, will be required to return to their places of origin or arrange for accommodation themselves with their relevant Chiefs in KwaZulu.

2/....

-2-

It should be mentioned that the Honourable the Minister's statement that "no people must be forced to leave their homes" did not imply that the Country's legislation regarding illegal squatting as well as other legislation could be disregarded. Illegal squatting is an offence in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act No 52 of 1951. Likewise, it is an offence in terms of the same Act for an owner or lessee of land to erect, cause to be erected or permit the erection of any building or structure intended for occupation by persons, on his land or the leased land, as the case may be, and to permit the occupation of such building or structure unless a plan or description thereof has been approved by the relevant local authority.

In the circumstances my Deputy Minister is not in a position to intervene in so far as the matters raised are concerned.

Yours faithfully

ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY:
 MINISTRY

Appendix 3. Reply, Umbulwane Committee, 10.06.81

P. O. Box 327,
Ladysmith, 3370
18th June, 1981.

The Minister of Co-operation and Development,
Pretoria.

Dear Sir,

re Umbulwane

With reference to your letter dated 26/3/81, I am directed by the Umbulwane committee and the residents of Umbulwane to reply to the Honourable Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development with these points.

Umbulwane has not been set aside as an urban Black residential area, but it is incorrect that Umbulwane is not owned by Blacks. As we explained in our memorandum it was bought by our grandfathers more than 70 years ago. Perhaps the Government is unaware that Umbulwane has been paying rates to the local authority up to now but getting nothing from the Town Council in return. We have no services at all.

The Government states that illegal people must go back to their places of origin yet people were expelled from white farms and most of those farms were taken by the Government. Some of these people were aiming to settle in Steadville which is the urban Black settlement, but due to the fact that there was no housing, people became tenants of Umbulwane.

We do not believe that we can only live in KwaZulu. We know that we owned a lot of large pieces of land all over Natal (that do not fall in KwaZulu) and this had been occupied a hundred years or more before the Whites came to Natal and took land for themselves.

We know we can ask for rights in South Africa. We can ask for jobs, pensions, justice and more in South Africa. In other words we do not want to blame the Minister. Maybe he was not informed that we have been paying rates for so long without any services, that we have title deeds and that the Government is separating the people of Umbulwane by saying some people are illegal and that the Government cannot help them. We know they want to take this place and that is why we wrote and asked for help from the Honourable the Minister.

The Government states that those who are said to be legal will be settled at Ezakheni. It sounds as if those people will be looked after at Ezakheni. The fact that it is too far, that buses are so expensive, that there is a crime problem with violence and tribal fights that the people of Umbulwane do not now face, that rents are expensive and most are unable to pay all these things, is not being considered.

The Government said people must not be forced to leave their homes. We do not want to leave Umbulwane where there is peace. We would like to inform the Government about the local authorities who apply injustice to the people of Umbulwane who keep on paying rates but get nothing from the town council. The unhealthy situation is caused by them. We feel the Government did not answer any of our points properly. It is important that this be made clear.

Yours Faithfully,

Secretary : Umbulwane Community, Ladysmith.

Appendix 4. Eviction/demolition notices.

NOTICE/KENNISGEWING

Administration Board
DRAKENSBERG
Administrasieraad
3105

Address Box 165,
Adres Ladysmith
Tel. 215 9189

Mr/Mrs/Miss
Mr/Mev/Mej ESTHER MOLEFE
Address/Adres Umbulwane

Time/Tyd 01h30 Date/Datum 29/06/80

On inspection it has come to my notice that you may
Ondersoek het aan die lig gebring dat u moontlik

accommodate 8 families without
the proper permission from the
local labour council.

As this is a contravention of
angesien hierdie 'n oortreding is kragtens

sect 9(5) of Act 25/45

In respect of which legal proceedings may be instituted, you are
In opsigte waarvan geregtelike stappe geneem mag word, word u

hereby requested to contact get the permission by
hiermee versoek om in verbanding te tree met

you of a licence or by the waste
again promised within 3 months
between and
tussen en

for date of notice

Form 42 70

Authorized Officer/Gemagtigde Beampte

OFFICES OF THE BOROUGH ENGINEER

LADYSMITH

Letter to... not... home

Dear Sir,

REPAIRS TO HOUSE ON LOT NO. *1114 Sub 2*You are hereby authorised to *Amo fisch* *check* rebuild/repair your house on the abovementioned property.

Yours faithfully

J.H. Eva
BOROUGH ENGINEER

BOROUGH OF LADYSMITH

BOROUGH ENGINEER'S DEPARTMENT

TO *Amant Hlatshwayo* DATE *21/10/80*

You are hereby advised that the building/buildings being erected by you on

Lot *1114/4* are illegal, in that plans have not been submitted to or approved by the Council of Ladysmith as provided for in

Clause 26 of Section III of Chapter XI of the Council's By-laws.

Under the provisions of Section 164 (2) of the Local Government Ordinance No 21

of 1942 you are hereby required to demolish the said building/buildings on

or before the *21/11/80*

Failure to comply with this order, within the period stipulated, will result in the immediate demolition of the building/buildings by the Council.

J.H. Eva
for / BOROUGH ENGINEER

6. RESERVE FOUR

Reserve Four, lying along the coast to the north of Richards Bay, is threatened with removal in terms of the 1975 consolidation plan for KwaZulu. Unlike the previous case studies, it is not a freehold area; it was, until Parliament amended its legal status in 1979 and again in 1981, a scheduled reserve (in terms of the 1913 Land Act) that had been incorporated into KwaZulu when the KwaZulu Territorial Authority was established in 1970. Its legal status is thus significantly different from that of the previous case studies, but the political and developmental problems it faces are, in their broad outline, similar to those found in other rural communities in Natal (and South Africa).

The threat to Reserve Four is a very real one. Although there is no official indication of when the government intends to remove its people, the land has already been descheduled and excised from KwaZulu. Pending the removal of the people, the area has been designated a 'black area' for administrative purposes (in terms of Section 25 of the Black Administration Act of 1927) but its status in terms of the Group Areas Act has been proclaimed as white. Its people are thus living on the land entirely at the discretion of the government.

1. Background

The reserve stretches northwards along the coast between Richards Bay and the St Lucia estuary, hidden from view from the main north coast highway by extensive forest plantations. It covers an area of 23 471 788 ha and is divided into two chief's wards, the Sokhulu ward in the north and the Mbonambi ward in the south. The total population was put officially at approximately 3 000 families in September 1981 (Hansard, Question 3, 4.09.81); compared to most other regions of KwaZulu, it is not at all densely populated.

HISTORY

The Sokhulu and Mbonambi people have been settled in the area now known as Reserve Four since long before Zululand was annexed by Natal in 1897. The present Chief of the Sokhulu people is the 9th in an unbroken succession of chiefs stretching back at least to Shaka's time; all his predecessors are buried in the chiefs' graveyard.

The Sokhulu people originated in this place - during the reign of Shaka, the Sokhulu people were already here. There were no white people here then. When they came, they found us here. (Interview with Chief, unpublished AFRA fieldtrip report, April 1981)

With the annexation of Zululand to Natal, their former dominion over their land was brought to an end. The present boundaries of the reserve were established by the Zululand Land Commission of 1902/04, whose purpose was to open up parts of Zululand for white settlement. According to one of the present Sokhulu Councillors, the boundaries fixed at this time entailed a significant loss of land:

These traditional lands called the reserves do not have their traditional boundaries. Most of the land was taken by the Government and sold as farms to white farmers or proclaimed as State land ... For example, the

traditional boundary of the Sokhulu ward was Mavuya River in the West, Msunduze River in the North, the Indian Ocean in the East and Nhlabane in the South. Now Mavuya is about 7 km from the present boundary. The original Msunduze course was changed and is now about 2 km North of the present boundary. (Letter to AFRA, 14.07.82)

Subsequently, in 1909, ownership of Reserve Four and the 21 other Zululand reserves that had been demarcated in 1902/04⁺ was vested in the Zululand Native Trust by means of a Deed of Grant. (Deed of Grant no. 7638, 6.04.09) This further restricted the peoples' claim to their land. In terms of the Deed the lands were to be held in trust 'for occupation by the Natives of Zululand and for their support, advantage and well being', but the individual reserves were not reserved exclusively or in perpetuity for the particular tribes residing in them. Clauses 3(c) and 3(d) of the Deed of Grant specifically empowered the Trustees to exercise 'the removal of Natives from the land' and 'the removal of Natives from one part of the land to another'. However the Trustees could not alienate or dispose of the land without the consent of the Secretary of State or authority from a special act of Parliament (in Great Britain).

The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 shifted control of Reserve Four away from the settler government in Natal. In 1912 the Zululand Trust, along with other similar Native Trusts, came under the administration of the Minister of Native Affairs and in 1936 it was absorbed into the SANT (later the SADT), which thereupon became the registered owner of Reserve Four and the other Natal and Zululand Reserves. In the meantime Reserve Four was scheduled as an african area in 1913, in terms of the Natives Land Act.

From the late 1950s the reserve was drawn into the bantustan system of government whose basis had been established by means of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951. Tribal Authorities were established first in the Mbonambi ward, in 1959 (Government Notice 295, 27.02.59) and then the Sokhulu ward, in 1968 (Government Notice 1135, 28.06.68). In 1968 these two Tribal Authorities along with six other nearby Tribal Authorities were grouped together into the Amangwe Regional Authority. (Government Notices 1468 and 2163, 1968) When the KwaZulu Territorial Authority was established in 1970, the Amangwe Regional Authority was included in its area of jurisdiction (Procl. R762, 22.05.70) and in 1972, when the KwaZulu legislative Assembly was established by means of Proclamation R70, (30.03.72) it became an 'area' of the Assembly. In this way both the Sokhulu and the Mbonambi wards of Reserve Four were incorporated into KwaZulu.

CONDITIONS

In the context of Natal, Reserve Four is an underdeveloped area. The contrast between it and the booming development point of Richards Bay to the south, where in recent years the State has been spending millions upon millions of rands on infrastructural development, is a telling one. Access roads, particularly in the Sokhulu area, are very poor, many being no more than sandy tracks through the plantations. Most households in Reserve Four depend on wage labour to supply the major part of their income, numbers of them being employed in the docks and industries of Richards Bay. While some of these workers manage to commute on a daily basis, the poor roads and inadequate transport services see to it that many of them are weekly or monthly migrants. There is no high school in the area, although there are a number of primary schools - four in the Sokhulu ward. (It is not known how many there are in Mbonambi.) There are no

⁺ The Reserves are numbered no. 1 to no. 21; however Reserve no. 7 is divided into 7a and 7b, making a total of 22 designated areas.

permanent clinics in the reserve either, although mobile clinics do visit both the Sokhulu and the Mbonambi wards twice a month. Shops are few, small and their goods expensive; in the Sokhulu ward there are 5 local shops and 1 bottle store.

Nevertheless, compared to most other parts of KwaZulu, the area is well-favoured, with valuable agricultural and mineral resources. As the following brief account makes clear, its potential is large - a potential earmarked by the planners in Pretoria for white control.

AGRICULTURE

The government has described Reserve Four as 'badly situated' but in fact it is climatically and agriculturally one of the most favoured areas of KwaZulu and of Natal. It lies within the sub-tropical coastal belt, in a high rainfall area. Its mean annual rainfall is between 1 200 mm and 1 400 mm (Thorington-Smith *et al.*, 1978, vol. 2, map 11) and its growing season is one of the longest in Natal, being over 200 days per annum. (Ibid, map 18) Although much of the soil is sandy and not especially fertile, there is a very fertile stretch on the south bank of the St Lucia estuary which is highly suitable for intensive cultivation, including that of sugar cane.

Much of the reserve is suitable for plantations and large parts have been planted, mainly under eucalyptus trees. Some of this is owned by local individuals who sell their wood to nearby sawmills and the rest is owned by the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, which leases the land from the Tribal Authorities. The annual income to the Sokhulu Tribal Authority from their lease is R2 600, which money is paid into the Tribal Fund and is used to improve local facilities, particularly the schools. (Fieldwork)

The land is well-grassed and erosion free; a first-time visitor might be excused for thinking she was not in KwaZulu. Homesteads are widely spaced. Most are sturdy, well-established, the materials used including wattle and daub, wood and reed, and bricks. Many of the homesteads are fenced with wire or wooden poles, and surrounded by family plantations. Neither fuel nor water are problems although the latter, in springs and streams, is unprotected.

Agriculture plays a very important part in the domestic economy of the area, making a substantial contribution to the general well-being of the people. Although much of the agriculture practised is at a subsistence level, there are people who make an independent living out of the land. In some cases a fairly extensive form of agriculture is practised. For those living close to the coast, fishing makes a further valuable contribution to household subsistence as well.

People grow a variety of sub-tropical fruits - avocado pears, bananas, pawpaws etc. In the south, family roadside stalls line the main road into Richards Bay and some of the women claim to make a reasonable living out of selling their surplus produce at their front doors. There are private and communal vegetable gardens - according to the Sokhulu Chief, 'we plant bananas, madumbe, potatoes, sweet potatoes, cabbage, tomatoes, onions - all in abundance.' (Interview with Sokhulu Chief, unpublished AFRA fieldtrip report, April 1981) In the Sokhulu ward a number of interested farmers have also recently come together to form a Cassava Farmers' Association, and are experimenting with this crop, with technical assistance from the University of Zululand.

In a letter to the Natal Mercury condemning the proposed removal of the reserve, a former (white) resident of the area neighbouring on Reserve Four described the agricultural achievements of the people thus:

The Sokhulu and Mbonambi people ... have a commendable record of self-help. Encouraged by the evident success of their white neighbours, and indeed in some cases assisted by these neighbours, the tribesmen have established

numerous eucalyptus timber lots and small plantations throughout the area. Furthermore, they successfully grow orchard and garden crops such as avocados, bananas, pineapples, pawpaws etc. as well as sweet potatoes and madumbes. Much of this has been achieved with the meagre cash input from the wage savings of the migrant male workers. I doubt if there is significant poverty in this reserve, and certainly the people are aware of the economic progress they have achieved, and of their potential for further development. (Letter to the Natal Mercury, 4.11.81)

In an interview with an AFRA fieldworker the Sokhulu Chief has noted the value of their agricultural activity thus:

People from Chief Mthetwa's ward come here to get food; even people from as far as Hlabisa and Nongoma come here. This land supplies different wards with food. Even during the drought, we had food and others brought their cattle here to graze. (Interview with Sokhulu Chief, unpublished AFRA fieldtrip report, April 1981)

He went on to add:

We are very concerned when we are told that we are to be removed.
We prefer to die here.

MINERAL WEALTH

In addition to its agricultural wealth, Reserve Four also has very extensive mineral wealth - wealth controlled not by the people of the area, however, but by the SADT, which is the registered owner of the land. The minerals are found in the coastal sand dunes and include rutile, zircon, titanium oxide slag, low manganese iron and titaniferous magnetite.* They are being mined by a company known as Richards Bay Minerals (RBM), which signed a 25-year lease with the SADT in 1976. In 1980, according to the Financial Mail (13.11.81), sales by RBM topped R60 million, about one third up on the 1979 figure. The Financial Mail report described the mining operation as the world's second largest producer of zircon and third largest producer of titanium. It stated that the area has known reserves of 700 million M.t of mineral deposits, expected to last for 30 years, but described RBM as 'secretive' about its long-term plans:

Company GM Roy MacPherson told FM he could divulge no information on the group's expansion plans unless he had the prior approval of the board. He also declined to provide any information on the company's export markets, saying this could be 'prejudicial to the company's interests'. (Financial Mail, 13.11.81)

RBM is owned by South African, Canadian and American interests. According to the Financial Mail report quoted above, its shareholders are the:

Quebec Iron and Titanium Corporation of Canada
Union Corporation of South Africa
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)
S.A. Mutual Life Assurance Society
Southern Life Association.

* According to the Financial Mail (13.11.81): 'Titania slag is used in the manufacture of white pigment which in turn is used in the paint, rubber, plastic, paper and ceramics industries. Low manganese iron is used in the manufacture of ductile iron castings ... Rutile is used in the pigment industry, in the production of welding electrodes, and in the manufacture of titanium metal vital to the aerospace industry. Zircon is used for manufacturing processes - steel foundries, steel refractories, glass refractories and ceramics.'

In 1975 the Zululand Observer reported that Quebec Iron and Titanium Corporation was then owned two thirds by the Kennecott Copper Corporation and one third by Gulf and Western Industries, both of the United States of America. (17.10.75) It said that the Quebec and Union Corporations had been invited by IDC to join it on feasibility studies in 1974 and that as a result of their findings, these 3 groups had established two new companies to undertake jointly the mining operations - one company known as Tisand (Pty) Ltd (controlled by the Union Corporation and IDC) for the mining and separation activities, and the other company known as Richards Bay Iron and Titanium (Pty) Ltd (owned by Quebec Iron and Titanium) for the smelter operation. It would appear that these two companies today operate under the name of RBM.

At the time that mining started in the area some questions were raised about the ecological damage that it would cause to the indigenous dune forests - the mining is carried out by a suction dredger that 'eats its way through the dunes day and night' at a rate of between one and three metres a day. (Natal Mercury supplement, 14.06.77). The mining companies (some of whom had apparently previously come under fire from conservationists in Australia, where a similar procedure was being used to mine titanium) have assured conservationists that the land being mined will be rehabilitated. In terms of its lease RBM is obliged to plant the denuded areas under trees and has apparently done so - although it is questionable whether exotic eucalyptus trees can be regarded as a full replacement for indigenous dune forest. However, it appears that no questions were raised about the mining being carried out in a scheduled reserve; the few press reports dealing with the establishment of the mine do not touch at all on the issue of compensation for the two tribes whose land is the source of such wealth.

In terms of the lease signed between the SADT and Tisand (Pty) Ltd in 1976, the mining company undertook to pay a royalty calculated at 10% of its annual profit or R15 per ton of mineral concentrate (whichever was the higher), but not less than R50 000 in any one year, to the SADT. What this royalty amounts to at present is not known - but with RBM's sales topping R60 million in 1980, it is clearly way beyond R50 000 and must run into the millions. In 1977 the Natal Mercury reported that the mine would be producing 787 000 tons of processed minerals annually, valued then at R100 million. (14.06.77) What the SADT does with this income is not known either but it appears that very little, if any of it, is spent directly for the benefit of the people of Reserve Four. The money is presumably paid into the SADT's central funds in Pretoria; it is not inconceivable that it is being used to help finance the government's consolidation programme and could, therefore, actually end up being used to remove the people of Reserve Four from their land.

The question of mineral rights and ownership of the land raises fundamental questions about the legal status of the african reserves. In terms of the 1936 Development Land and Trust Act, all scheduled and released areas in South Africa are vested in the SADT. The legal position of the people living on that land is substantially that of tenants of the Trust. They have no claim to title to the land and thus no particular claim to the assets of that land. They may, in fact, be removed from the land by proclamation (in terms of Section 5 of the Black Administration Act); although they are entitled to compensation for any improvements they have made, they are not entitled to any compensation for the value of the land itself.

While the SADT is legally bound to administer the land on behalf of and for the benefit of the african people, its responsibility in this regard is of a general nature, i.e. it is not bound to use the resources of a particular area specifically for the benefit of the people living in that area, but may use them as part of its general revenue. Thus the people of Reserve Four have no legal claim to the mineral wealth in their land and, as they have discovered, no legal claim to the land itself.

CONDITIONS IN NTAMBANANA, PROPOSED RELOCATION AREA

The advantages enjoyed by the people living at Reserve Four become even more apparent when their present situation is compared to the conditions prevailing at Ntambanana, their proposed relocation site. Ntambanana is the name given to a large wedge of Trust land jutting into an area of KwaZulu that lies about 30 km to the west of Empangeni. It was bought up by the SADT in the early 1970s, in anticipation of the removal of people out of the Richards Bay area. Climatically, and thus agriculturally, it bears no resemblance to Reserve Four. It is dry, rugged country, suited for extensive cattle ranching, perhaps, but totally unsuited for dense settlement and crop cultivation. Its annual rainfall is substantially lower than that of Reserve Four - about 800 mm, on average (Thorrington-Smith *et al.*, 1978, vol. 2, Map 11) - and drought is a recurring problem. In 1981 a farmer who had 'battled for 28 years to make a living there' and eventually left the area 'penniless', described it in these terms:

I know what it is like to farm in Ntambanana. It's impossible. It is dry, thorn country with not one permanent running stream in the whole area. The soil is shallow, unfertile clay and the main river, the Enseleni, consists mostly of polluted pools unfit for humans or animals. (Natal Witness, 28.11.81)

A number of relocation areas have already been laid out at Ntambanana. About 6 000 people from Reserve Six were relocated into the northern section in 1976; they have been struggling with inadequate water and other problems since then. Approximately 10 km away, several hundred people from a small part of Reserve Four that has already been excised and cleared (in 1977; see below) are housed in a closer settlement adjoining the Ntambanana Police Station. In addition, on the opposite side of the police station, there is a huge unoccupied fletcraft settlement that stretches over several hillsides. It was erected in 1978/79, presumably in preparation for removals that were regarded as imminent at that stage, but has been standing empty ever since: an eerie reminder of what is to come.

It seems that this ghost tintown was initially established for the people from Reserve Four, but the delay in their removal plus the hostility that they have shown to the area and the negative publicity that has surrounded the proposed removal may have produced a change of plan. It has been suggested that the government now intends to move the people from Reserve Four not into the closer settlement itself, but into the area to the north of it. Nevertheless, regardless of where in Ntambanana the government intends to place them, it is indisputable that the proposed relocation area does not compare at all with what the people of Reserve Four already enjoy.

We are to be moved to a place which is dry. We're not used to it; we won't be able to cultivate it. It is stony. We've already developed this place. That place where we are to be moved - there is nothing there, only bush and stones. During the dry season there is no water and grass there. When we went there to see it, we saw monkeys. Baboon are also there. Now it is said we must go and live there, leaving our lovely place where we have no complaints. (Interview with Sokhulu Chief, unpublished AFRA fieldtrip Report, April 1981)

2. The de-scheduling of Reserve Four

THE 1973 AND 1975 CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS

The first threat to Reserve Four came in 1973, when it was isolated as one of the african areas to become white in terms of the government's revised consolidation proposals for KwaZulu, a recommendation that was repeated in the 1975 set of proposals. Both sets of proposals were approved by Parliament, although the merits of each of the proposed excisions and additions were not debated individually.

A number of factors appear to have come together to isolate Reserve Four as one of the areas to be excised - its proximity to the growth point of Richards Bay, its general situation along a coastline regarded by the government and the military as strategically sensitive, and its favourable agricultural prospects. Of these, its relationship to Richards Bay was probably the most important factor.

Work on the Richards Bay harbour started in 1973 and clearly the consolidation plans for the surrounding reserves were designed in relation to the massive development plans for the region: a development that the government had already insisted would remain in the white area. Reserve Four was one of three reserves ringing Richards Bay. The other two were Reserve Six, lying immediately to the west of the bay, and Reserve Ten, lying to the south. Reserve Six fell squarely in the way of the development of a town at Richards Bay and it was also proposed for excision in the 1973 and 1975 proposals; its removal was seen as a priority and was rushed through in early 1976, as described elsewhere in this report. (See p. 241) Reserve Ten, however, was retained as the site for the new township of Esikhawini, whose construction as a labour reservoir for Richards Bay was announced in early 1975. (Zululand Observer, 24.01.75) It appears that while the planners wanted to keep a part of KwaZulu next to the growth point as its labour supply, they did not want to hem in the planned 'industrial giant' with pieces of KwaZulu on either side.

Strategic considerations reinforced this view. As described previously in this report, there has long been a general military interest in controlling occupation and use of the northern coastline, since this is regarded as a particularly sensitive area strategically. Reserve Four's proximity to Richards Bay probably further enflamed military fears about it as a potential shelter for subversives. It is one of seven areas that have been proposed for excision in the coastal plains stretching north from Richards Bay to Mkuze and Sodwana Bay.⁺ If carried through in their entirety, the effect of these removals will be to bring the whole of the northern coastline between Richards Bay and Sodwana Bay as well as the land to the north and west of Lake St Lucia under direct white control. Thus far only the proposals with regard to Reserve Six (removed in 1976) and Reserve Four and the Sodwana Bay area (excised from KwaZulu in 1981) have been implemented; so clearly the removal of these areas is considered the most pressing.

In addition, the extremely high agricultural potential of the area into which Reserve Four falls, as a timber area and, particularly in the north, a sugarcane-growing area, must have served to seal the decision to excise it. It seems unlikely that the mineral wealth

⁺ The seven areas are: Reserve Six, Reserve Four, the Nkundusi ward of Reserve 3, part of Reserve 12, Reserve 1 (Nibela), Reserve 2 (Mhlelezi) and the Sodwana Bay triangle.

of the reserve played a direct part in the decision, since this was being exploited already; however, it is possible that it highlighted the general development potential of the area for government planners.

REMOVAL OF SMALL PORTION, 1977

In 1977 the first phase in the removal of Reserve Four was set in motion when a small portion of land in the south (described as an inlet on the removed Reserve Six) was excised from the schedule to the 1913 Land Act by Proclamation no. 228, and its people subsequently removed to Ntambanana.

Details on this removal are not known. The area involved was a little over 40 ha in extent, the people removed numbered a few hundred. It appears that the land on which they were living was taken over by the State because of the construction of the Richards Bay airport in the vicinity. According to a memorandum of the Department of Plural Relations, dated 31st August 1978, the necessary approval for the excision of land from the 1913 Schedule was obtained from Parliament (in terms of Section 3 of the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act). What land was added to the scheduled areas of Natal in return for this excised area is not, however, known. According to residents in Reserve Four, the people who were moved to Ntambanana are struggling to make a living there and a number of residents of this area who wanted to avoid being relocated to such a place moved by themselves further up into Reserve Four in 1977/78.

PRELIMINARIES TO EXCISION FROM 1913 SCHEDULE

Pressure on the rest of Reserve Four began to mount from 1978. In August 1978 the Department of Plural Relations sent the Department of the Chief Minister, KwaZulu, a memorandum outlining the proposed excision of the reserve and requesting KwaZulu's help in organising a meeting with the Chiefs of the reserve to discuss their relocation to Ntambanana. At this stage what was being discussed was not excision from KwaZulu as such, but excision from the schedule of land reserved for african occupation in terms of the 1913 Land Act - i.e. the de-scheduling of the area so that it could revert to white occupation and ownership.

Although the Department did not commit itself to an actual date for the removal, it anticipated that this would start towards the end of the year. It stated that the necessary recommendation that the reserve be de-scheduled was to go before Parliament 'in due course' - in itself not a prerequisite for the removal of people since the government has all-embracing powers to remove african people, whether living on scheduled land or not. More to the point, the memorandum stated that evaluators were planning to visit Reserve Four in October/November of that year to assess the compensation due to the people for their improvements, while the construction of the relocation site at Ntambanana was 'proceeding satisfactorily' - a reference, it would seem, to the flat-craft settlement then being erected near the Ntambanana Police Station. (Memorandum, Secretary for Plural Relations and Development to the Secretary, Department of the Chief Minister and Finance, Ulundi, 31.08.78) Their assessment of the ease and the speed of the removal of the reserve was soon proved to be unduly optimistic.

It does not appear that any evaluators did visit Reserve Four, either at this time or later - or if they did, the residents of Reserve Four were not informed and do not know what the results of their assessments are. However, a meeting between a Pretoria official and at least one of the Chiefs, at Sokhulu, did take place in October 1978 - whether by the arrangement of Ulundi or not, is not known. At this and all subsequent dealings with officials, the Sokhulu people made their objections to being removed very clear. In February 1979 the Department of Plural Relations notified the KwaZulu Secretary for the Interior that the meeting had taken place but gave no details on the discussion or their proposed follow-up to it. (Letter dated 6.02.79) However, according

to the Sokhulu Tribal Council, the official told them that Chief Buthelezi had agreed to their removal.

The Council refused to be drawn by this ploy, saying they would need to get confirmation of such an agreement first. (Fieldwork) Subsequently the Councillors went by themselves to Ntambanana, to see the area at first hand and rejected it outright - a place of 'bush and stone'. On the 5th November 1978 they appealed to the KwaZulu Minister for the Interior to help them resist the removal; their objections to being moved were duly passed on to the Department of Plural Relations. (Letter, Chief in Tribal Council, to the Minister for the Interior, Ulundi, 23.07.79)

PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL 1979

In early 1979 Prime Minister P.W. Botha announced the establishment of the van der Walt Commission to re-examine the question of consolidation. Although heralding a new era of uncertainty about the final outcome of consolidation in Natal, the announcement did not materially affect Reserve Four - the government had already made up its mind on this and three other areas: the Sodwana Bay triangle, the released freehold area of Driefontein at Ladysmith and the released area east of Paulpietersburg, all earmarked for excision from KwaZulu since 1975. Thus in May 1979 the Department of Plural Relations tabled a memorandum in Parliament recommending that the two scheduled areas (Reserve Four and Sodwana Bay) be de-scheduled and the two released areas (Driefontein and Paulpietersburg) be designated as 'Black areas' for the purpose of Section 25 of the Black Administration Act. (House of Assembly, Minutes of Proceedings, 28.05.79)

The matter was then referred to the Select Committee on Plural Relations and Development which produced a series of recommendations that mirrored those drafted by the Department. (S.C. 73 - 79) These were presented to the House of Assembly on the 14th June 1979 and, predictably, approved, with only the opposition Progressive Federal Party objecting. From the House of Assembly the recommendations were forwarded to the Senate for its approval. It has not been finally established whether a proclamation actually de-scheduling the reserve was subsequently gazetted or not; however the formality of Parliamentary review as stipulated in the 1936 Development and Trust Act had thus been met by mid-1979.

These preliminary steps in the removal of Reserve Four passed by virtually unnoticed in the press. The people living in the reserve were not informed of what had happened, although Ulundi had been kept informed of Pretoria's intentions.

COMPENSATORY LAND FOR THE 1913 SCHEDULE

In terms of the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act, the total area of land scheduled as reserves in 1913 in each of the four provinces cannot be reduced; thus, if a scheduled area is excised, then compensatory land of equivalent agricultural and pastoral value has to be added to the schedule in return. It would appear that the form of this requirement has been met with regard to Reserve Four but what requires further investigation is the degree to which land 'of equivalent agricultural and pastoral value' has been added to the schedule. (The issue of compensatory land in this instance concerns the schedule, not the people who may be removed - their claim to compensation is for their improvements only, and not the land. As has happened in the case of Reserve Four, the people to be removed need not necessarily be allocated the compensatory land that is added to the schedule.)

In finding compensatory land for Reserve Four, Pretoria made a revealing switch in plans between 1978 and 1979. In August 1978, in its discussion with Ulundi, the Department of Plural Relations indicated that the compensatory land was to be found on the Makhatini Flats in the Ingwavuma district, north of Reserve 15. (Schedule attached to

Memorandum, Department of Plural Relations and Development to the Secretary, Department of the Chief Minister and Finance, Ulundi, 31.08.78) However, by the time its proposals were tabled in Parliament, in May 1979, it had changed its mind. Instead of land in the Ingwavuma district, it earmarked Trust land in the Nkandla district as the required compensation to the schedule, and this was duly approved. The significance of the change was not apparent at the time but, in retrospect, it was clearly occasioned by Pretoria's intention to hand the Ingwavuma district over to Swaziland: a step which would make the Makhathini Flats unsuitable for compensation purposes since that would involve a further reduction to the schedule at a later stage. Although this proposed land deal did not surface as a major political issue until 1982, it was reported on as early as June 1979 as one of the proposals being promoted within government circles by the van der Walt Commission. (Rand Daily Mail, 25.06.79)

The fact that as late as August 1978 the Ingwavuma State lands were being considered for incorporation into the Natal schedule indicates that the subsequent attempt to hand that area over to Swaziland was part of a more recent initiative to force the pace of building Pretoria's 'constellation of States', one which only took off in late 1978 / early 1979 and which the establishment of the van der Walt consolidation commission was intended to promote. The fact that Pretoria could switch around the compensatory area for Reserve Four so readily, and so abruptly, shows how secondary the issues of planning and development in the bantustans are in its overall plan for this constellation.

The compensatory land eventually added to the Natal schedule consists of 20 098 ha of land stretching from the village of Nkandla in the east and to Qudeni in the west - 3 374 ha less than the 23 472 ha of land at Reserve Four. The Act does not stipulate that land of exactly the same area has to be added to the schedule although the broad intention is to keep the area of the scheduled reserves roughly constant. It does, however, stipulate that it should be land of equivalent value. It is not clear how such a comparison can be made between the coastal, sub-tropical Reserve Four and the high, upland region of Nkandla. Nor is it clear whether the assessment must be based on present agricultural potential or the likely future condition of the land. The designated land at Nkandla is Trust land that has been used since 1967 as a relocation area and that has been earmarked as a target area for future relocation on a large scale. Already it contains the relocation sites of Nkonisa, Ntingwe and, near Qudeni, Mzimhlophe, Gubazi and Singabantu. In September 1981 Dr Koornhof reported on the planned relocation of people into this area thus:

The Qudeni resettlement Area consists of Units A, B and C. Units A and B have not yet been developed. Unit C is in the process of being developed. (Hansard, Question 212, 14.09.81)

He reported further that at that stage the total population of Unit C was just under 6 000 people. While there are at present large open areas in the Trust land, some of which are planted under forest and some under formlum, the population density is bound to increase enormously as a result of this planned influx of people, and an increasing strain on resources and consequent deterioration in the quality of the land can be expected to follow.

A further question relating to the comparable value of the two areas is whether the mineral resources of Reserve Four have been taken into account or not. The extent of these resources has been described already - put in 1981 as 700 million M.t of known reserves, valued at hundreds of millions of rand. (Financial Mail, 13.11.81) As already noted, these reserves are legally owned by the SADT. However, they are part of the overall wealth of Reserve Four, which could be utilised for the benefit of both the people who live there (but who have been deprived of title and security) and the african population of Natal in general, the promotion of whose welfare is supposedly the primary concern of the SADT.

The final question relating to the compensatory land cannot be answered in terms of the existing laws but is extremely pertinent nonetheless. It was made by the Sokhulu people in July 1979 when they reiterated their objections to being moved:

Although it is said that there will be another compensatory land in the Makhathini Flats, the Tribe does not see how it will benefit by that land, which is totally strange to it, while residing on the Ntambanana farms, a distance of about 300 kilometres. (Letter, Chief in Tribal Council, Sokhulu, to the Minister for the Interior, Ulundi, 23.07.79)

Of note is that although this letter was written two months after the government's intention to compensate the schedule with land in the Nkandla district (and not the Makhathini Flats) had been published, the tribe had not yet been informed of the change. This simply underscores their point, that in this process their interests have been totally disregarded by the government.

KWAZULU'S POSITION ON THE DE-SCHEDULING

In objecting to the excision of these areas from the 1913 Schedule, members of the PFP referred to the objections of the KwaZulu government to this step. Dealing with the recommendation concerning Reserve Four specifically, Mr Swart of the PFP stated:

The exchange is disapproved of by the KwaZulu Government and we do not believe that it is in the interests of the situation at the present time, or at any time, for this land to be treated in this way and for people to be removed. (Hansard, col. 8744, 14.06.79)

Two years later, in May 1982, Dr Koornhof was to claim that 'agreements' were reached between Pretoria and Ulundi in April and again in August 1979 concerning the excision of the four areas from KwaZulu. It is not altogether clear what these 'agreements' were about, especially since the immediate issue at stake in mid 1979 was the de-scheduling of land, not its excision from KwaZulu. At the time when Dr Koornhof made this statement, Chief Buthelezi denied vehemently that any agreement indicating approval of removals had been reached; it appears that what was agreed upon were the administrative procedures to be followed in the areas pending their final removal. In a statement issued in June 1982 to try to clarify the issue and appease Chief Buthelezi, Dr Koornhof explained:

In view of the fact that Parliament ... adopted certain firm decisions in connection with the consolidation of KwaZulu, Chief Buthelezi informed me that he had no alternative ... other than to sign this agreement ... because he felt he could not shirk responsibility for his people once the decision by Parliament in Cape Town had been taken. (Press Statement, 6.05.82. For a discussion on the significance of this incident in relation to KwaZulu's position on removals in general, see Part One.)

What does emerge from this murky and confusing incident is that KwaZulu was informed of Pretoria's intentions before Reserve Four was de-scheduled and before it was excised from KwaZulu, but that it did register its objections to any removal of people that would follow. To what extent it passed this knowledge on to the people of Reserve Four and tried to mobilise their own strong objections to the removal into an effective political force is less clear.

Dr Koornhof also claimed in 1982 that representations that the affected areas should not be excised (from KwaZulu) were received from residents after the above agreement had been signed. (Hansard, Question 465, 23.04.82) Once again he appears to be confusing the excision from KwaZulu with the earlier excision from the 1913 Schedule. However,

certainly in the case of Reserve Four, people's strenuous objections to being moved - the ultimate purpose behind all the legal manoeuvrings on the part of the government - were registered with the Department of Plural Relations before April 1979. Further representations against being moved were lodged with the KwaZulu Department of the Interior in July 1979 as well.

3. Excision fom Kwazulu, 1981

PROCLAMATION R 19, JANUARY 1981

The next step in the government's plan to remove Reserve Four came on the 23rd January 1981 in the form of a proclamation in the Government Gazette, Proclamation R 19. Although it was not apparent from a simple reading of the proclamation, what this did was to amend the schedule to the various proclamations defining the area of jurisdiction of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and thus to excise from KwaZulu all of the four areas that had already been isolated in 1979: Reserve Four, the Sodwana Bay triangle, the Driefontein farms and the Paulpietersburg block. Direct authority for the administration of those areas thereafter reverted to Pretoria, although in practice the change did not appear to have immediate effects on the ground - teachers' salaries continued to be paid by KwaZulu etc.

The news that their land had been excised from KwaZulu was conveyed to the people of Reserve Four by the local magistrate towards the end of February 1981. At the meeting at Sokhulu, a general tribal meeting held on the 20th of February, the people repeated their objections to being moved. The magistrate reportedly told them that all he knew about the matter was what was contained in the Proclamation. (Fieldwork)

This excision of Reserve Four from KwaZulu brought its eventual removal one step closer. However, achieving this goal was taking considerably longer than the Department of Plural Relations had expected when it started drawing up its plans in 1978. Pretoria has not given any indication of why it took eighteen months for this sequel to the de-scheduling of the area to be achieved. During the course of 1980 its general consolidation programme for Natal and the rest of the country was becoming increasingly bogged down in political and financial problems - in September 1980 P.W. Botha 'admitted' that traditional consolidation was no longer possible (Daily News, 2.09.80) - and this must have slowed it down. Local opposition was probably stronger and more resilient than anticipated as well; in Reserve Four both Chiefs have stood firm against removal from the beginning. The fact that Reserve Four and the other three areas were finally excised, however, showed that Pretoria had not finally abandoned the 1975 proposals despite the appointment of the van der Walt Commission and signs of a more pragmatic approach.

DENIAL OF SUPPORT FOR REMOVALS BY KWAZULU

The excision of these four areas passed by unremarked for several months, with no immediate response from Ulundi whose area of jurisdiction had thus been affected. Only in May 1981 did the matter get into the press, when Dr Koornhof announced at the NAU Congress that removals were to begin soon in all four of the excised areas. (Natal Witness, 14.05.79) The ensuing controversy focused initially on Sodwana Bay in isolation from the other three areas; it concerned both the morality of moving people to make way for a white pleasure resort and the degree to which KwaZulu had been informed of and/or condoned the removal. The dispute, which is looked at in more detail in Part One (pp 9-12) and Part Two (p. 247) simmered on throughout 1981 and into 1982, until eclipsed by the Ingwavuma land deal during May 1982. One effect was undoubtedly to delay further the implementation of the intended removals.

In response to Dr Koornhof's announcement at the NAU Congress and subsequent press coverage, Chief Buthelezi denied publicly that he had had any knowledge of the excision of Sodwana Bay - 'It is possible that the Minister responsible, Dr Mdlaose, may have been notified but I have no knowledge of the move' (Sunday Times, 17.05.81) - and promised to investigate. Later that month Dr Mdlaose met with the Deputy Minister of Land and Development and urged that the removals in these areas (as well as various black spots) be abandoned. One of the Chiefs from Reserve Four, from the Mbonambi ward, was present and put in a plea for his area as well. The Deputy Minister side-stepped the question of a reversal of the removals - there would be legal problems with that, he said - and suggested instead that steering committees be formed to deal with each particular case. The KwaZulu representatives accepted the idea of steering committees but subsequently, when their purpose was spelled out as an advisory one, to make the process of removals function more smoothly, they distanced themselves from them, claiming that they had understood the purpose of the proposed committees to be a developmental one. (Press release issued by the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior, 24.11.81. See Appendix 2, chapter one, Part One.)

Then in April 1982, as already mentioned, Dr Koornhof claimed that the excision of Reserve Four and the other areas from KwaZulu had been agreed to by KwaZulu, in April and in August 1979. (Hansard, Question 465, 23.04.82) This led to a heated denial by Chief Buthelezi, in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, and resulted in Dr Koornhof issuing his press statement on the 6th of May 1982. This, as already pointed out, exonerated KwaZulu from the accusation that it supported the removals but did not exonerate it from the accusation that it had signed an agreement and that it had been informed of what was going on. Subsequently, when the PFP MP, Graham McIntosh, pressed the Minister for details on the nature of this agreement, pointing out that KwaZulu denied having made one, Dr Koornhof appealed to him not to stir up trouble and to come and discuss the matter with him personally instead, 'to prevent a wedge being driven which could create serious problems in the country.' (Hansard, Question 7.05.82)

KwaZulu has used Dr Koornhof's press statement as evidence of its complete uninvolvedness in the whole matter. In July 1982 a Sokhulu Councillor wrote to the Minister of the Interior at Ulundi to seek clarity on the issue. The reply, received from the Secretary for the Interior, stated that Chief Buthelezi had explained in the legislature that no agreement had been reached and the Minister of Cooperation and Development had then issued a statement 'indicating that KwaZulu never 'agreed' to have any land excised...'

CONFIRMATION THAT REMOVALS WILL TAKE PLACE

The government has not wavered in its intention to remove Reserve Four (and the other areas) eventually. In September 1981, in answer to a series of questions in Parliament, Dr Koornhof confirmed that the area had been excised 'because the people resident in Reserve Four are ultimately to be resettled elsewhere', but evaded a question on whether the people were being moved voluntarily or not. (Hansard, Question 3, 4.09.81) Without acknowledging any of the objections to being moved that had been lodged with his Department since 1978, he replied that that would be a matter for the steering committee that would be established to handle the removal of Reserve Four to decide:

That can be established after the steering committee, on which they will also be represented, has been formed. Then it will be possible to determine how the people themselves feel about the removal. (Ibid.)

When questioned further about why the removal of Reserve Four was to take place, he was even more evasive:

As this matter is in a delicate stage of negotiation with the KwaZulu Government, it is not considered wise to reply to it at this stage.
(Hansard, Question 7, 23.09.81)

In November 1981 the threat to Reserve Four featured in a number of stories in Natal newspapers. Towards the end of that month the Daily News carried a prominent story reporting that 'a temporary halt' had been called to the removals. It quoted 'a spokesman' for the Department of Cooperation and Development who attributed the delay to opposition by the people of Reserve Four.

The people were shown the area to which it was planned to move them and we are aware they do not like it. It is our policy to try to reach consensus before moving people. (Daily News, 24.11.81)

Two days later the delay was denied by another spokesman who reported that 'the plans to remove the people from Reserve Four will go ahead.' (Natal Mercury, 26.11.81) In April 1982 the intention to remove Reserve Four and the three other areas was confirmed once again by Dr Koornhof when he made his controversial statement about KwaZulu's agreement to the excision of these areas. (Hansard, Question 465, 23.04.82) However his reply did indicate indirectly that the removals would not be immediate and that opposition from within the communities was a factor they were having to consider:

The Black communities concerned will be resettled after further consultation on the compensatory land earmarked in the districts of Babanango, Ubombo, Lower Umfolosi and Klip River and after the necessary housing facilities, sanitation, water reticulation, school and clinic facilities and other infrastructure have been provided. A survey must still be conducted to determine the exact number of people involved. (Ibid.)

THE POSITION IN 1982

Four years after the Department of Plural Relations predicted that the removal of Reserve Four would start by the end of 1978, the people are still on their land. Although their legal position has deteriorated significantly in the intervening period, their political bargaining position has improved; if it had not, they would have been moved already.

Escalating costs and significant opposition to consolidation within Natal are succeeding in curtailing Pretoria's general removals programme; KwaZulu's legal victory in the Ingwavuma land deal has acted as another temporary brake. More significant, anger at the prospect of being moved is general in Reserve Four and their opposition has been repeatedly and articulately voiced by Chiefs and Councillors. Reserve Four has acquired a reputation for militancy locally which may stand it in good stead.


Pretoria is clearly wary of risking a major confrontation and would prefer to remove Reserve Four by gentler forms of persuasion. Thus far the established leaders have stood impressively firm against all talk of removal but one can expect that the pressures on them to abandon their stance will mount. As in other rural communities, the people of Reserve Four are vulnerable to the corrosive effect of rumour and intimidation and divisions do exist, most notably at this stage between the two Chiefs' wards which thus far have not been responding to the threat they both face as a single body. Local leaders are aware of the problems and there are indications that steps are being taken to counter them.

That the people of Reserve Four do not want to leave their land and that they will suffer serious loss if they are forced to move, is indisputable. In September 1982 at a general meeting attended by about 200 people, the Sokhulu people reiterated their opposition:

We the people of Reserve Four, Sokhulu Tribe have today, the 26th September 1982, passed a resolution unanimously that we don't want to be moved from this traditional place of our ancestors. (Resolution of the meeting, 26.09.82)

'If you take a fish out of its water and put it in the sun, it will die', the Chief has commented - and that, he says with knowledge, is what will happen to them if moved to Ntambanana.





CONCLUSION

This volume of the Surplus People Project has set out to document the process of population relocation in Natal over the past twenty years, and to provide some historical background to that. This final chapter is an attempt to summarise and synthesise the major findings and working conclusions to have emerged from this undertaking.

DISLOCATION AND EXCLUSION

We have called the policy of forced removals 'relocation' in the report, but it could be described more graphically as a process of dislocation. The community and individual case studies contained in Parts Two and Three, particularly when read together, reveal clearly the profound dislocation suffered by individuals, families and communities as a result of the enforcement of mass removals in Natal. This dislocation reveals itself concretely in several ways - in the high incidence of violence experienced in major relocation townships such as Ezakheni and Newlands East and the faction fighting found in rural relocation target points in the Msinga district and along the South Coast; in the alienation, apathy and despair articulated by so many of the respondents in the relocation areas surveyed by SPP; in the very real material losses and psychological trauma suffered by rural households who had some land and some stock in their previous places and have been thrust into closer settlements where 'a person has to pay for everything' - where they have neither land nor cattle and few prospects for local employment; in the ecological devastation surrounding many rural relocation areas where the land is being denuded of its vegetation to supply fuel and building materials to those relocated there; in the deliberate destruction of good or adequate housing at a time when the housing crisis in Natal/KwaZulu is so acute.

Not visible in the same way, but at work and containing within it profoundly disturbing implications for the future, is the dislocation being inflicted on the wider society. More and more people are being pushed across the borders separating KwaZulu from the rest of Natal and, thereby, being excluded from direct access to and full participation in the economic and political structures of our society. Relocation policies mesh in with the system of influx control and the citizenship laws to underpin the Nationalist strategy of 'no more black South Africans' and to polarise the country into a white-controlled, affluent metropole and a black, impoverished periphery. The individuals and communities relocated in KwaZulu are being excluded not simply from certain geographical areas, but from access to jobs and the wealth of our society, and from a position from which they can bargain effectively for that. They are being dispossessed not simply of their land but of their citizenship and their rightful claim to political rights in South Africa.

In the process, KwaZulu is being dressed up as a separate political entity, complete with its own petty bureaucracy, its vested interest groups and its own ethnic identity. Although it has refused to take independence, it has gone a long way down the road to self-government. Yet, as this and other, more detailed, specialist reports make clear, it has no basis for an independent economy and no prospects of ever being able to meet the basic needs of the people who have been chained to it. The areas designated as KwaZulu urgently need to shed people before the devastation to the environment caused by overpopulation and underdevelopment becomes irreversible; they do not need more people to be squeezed into them.

COMPLEXITY

The overall violence done to the people of Natal as a result of the relocation policies of the past twenty or thirty years in this province is unquestionable. The massive programme of population relocation can be accurately described in general terms as a

basic support of the apartheid system, and a system of dispossession and exclusion. The way in which particular aspects of relocation have been developed and implemented in the province and the issues to flow from that are less easy to encapsulate, however; the more we have probed what is happening on the ground, the more complex the issues have become. Monolithic views of 'the State' and the primacy of economic determinants cannot account satisfactorily for all these complexities, except at a high level of abstraction and generality.

There are significant regional variations in the types of removals and the manner in which they are carried out across the province, reflecting differences in local history and political economy. Relocation areas are not all equally deprived or depressed but can be ranked according to who is being relocated into them, the economic function they are intended to perform, and where they are located - this point is developed below. There are important points of differences within the white ruling class over aspects of relocation; these differences can at present be seen most clearly in the debate over the consolidation of KwaZulu, in which liberal business groups and conservative farmers are both opposed to the central government's plans, although for very different reasons. KwaZulu itself is the most vociferously critical of Pretoria of the various bantustans and a major force to be reckoned with in the rural areas of Natal. It cannot be simply dismissed as an insignificant puppet state. Yet its response to relocation, as discussed in the report, has been a contradictory, ambiguous one - publicly very critical and uncooperative, yet in practice often very lackadaisical in its support for and mobilisation of effective community organisation.

There is also a significant gap between the way in which policies are formulated at the centre and the way they are actually enforced or administered at a local level. One example of this is found in the history of how labour tenancy was abolished in the province - a process that is still not finally complete in some of the more backward agricultural areas of Natal. The role of local authorities in determining the timing, the manner and the effectiveness of the translation of policy into reality cannot be fully realised if one looks at relocation only at a macro-level, yet it can be a key one.

LIMITATIONS AND USEFULNESS OF CATEGORY APPROACH

One of the major weaknesses in analysing relocation strictly in terms of categories is that the relationships and linkages between the categories is often distorted or obscured. For instance, group areas removals are generally treated as a completely distinct set of removals that have affected indian and coloured people only; yet, as the chapter on group areas removals in Part Two shows clearly, in Durban group areas legislation has affected the black population as a whole and, in relation to african people, has been used as an adjunct to urban relocation and influx control strategies as well. Nevertheless, the various categories of relocation, as isolated and described in Part Two, have not been generated by exactly the same interests and pressures from within the ruling group; the thrust behind relocation has not been a single one. There have been different, though overlapping stages in relocation policies since the 1940s and population removals have been used as a means to achieving a variety of particular, if ultimately complementary, ends. The category approach does make it easier to draw out these strands.

Thus, the removal of some three and a half thousand people out of the missile range area in the 1970s was carried out for directly military/security reasons; the abolition of labour tenancy in the same period was a product of both economic imperatives - the increased capitalisation of commercial agriculture - and, to a lesser though not insignificant extent, security fears relating to the large black population living in the white countryside. White farmers have been agitating for the removal of black spots since the 1940s and earlier - even in the period when they were experiencing a chronic labour shortage - because they wanted that land and because they could not tolerate blacks as neighbours. The choice of which black spots to move first was governed by largely

material (coal-mining) interests. Black spot removals have now been absorbed into the consolidation programme but they were an issue long before KwaZulu had been conceptualised as a self-governing territory. Consolidation of the bantustans itself has a large political component - the bantustan policy has evolved to the point it has as a means of deflecting the increasingly militant demands of the black majority for political rights. As with black spot removals, however, the decisions about which areas to excise and which to add to KwaZulu have been shaped by a combination of material and strategic interests - the case study on Reserve Four, in Part Four, illustrates this clearly.

A popular characterisation of relocation areas by opponents of apartheid is that of 'dumping grounds': areas where those who are redundant to the economic needs of white South Africa - the old, the sick, the unemployed, the women and the children (the 'superfluous appendages') can be dumped, out of sight and out of reach of any claim on the welfare and other resources of the country. This description captures the way in which those being relocated are regarded by officials - objects, disposable units - and accounts for the intention behind some of the removals but not for all. Thus most of those being evicted off white farms and being ordered out of the urban areas fall into the category of superfluous appendages - surplus people - but many productive workers have been relocated as well, particularly in the categories of urban relocation and group areas removals. In these two instances, relocation has allowed for greater control over workers but it has also been developed as part of a general programme of political dispossession and control of black people.

SCALE OF PREVIOUS REMOVALS

Most of the figures previously available have underestimated the magnitude of forced population removals in Natal. We have calculated that three quarters of a million people have already been removed in Natal as a result of farm evictions, group areas removals, black spot removals, urban relocation, military removals and the implementation of various infrastructural and development projects. This figure does not include the hundreds of thousands of people known to have been affected by betterment planning, influx control and the elimination of informal settlements, whom we have been unable to count with any degree of precision. We have, however, postulated that if all the removals to have taken place to date could ever be totalled up, the final figure could well represent up to 50% of the total population of KwaZulu. (p. 54)

The two largest categories of actual removals, outside of the under-researched category of betterment planning, have been those of farm evictions and group areas removals, each having affected in the region of 300 000 people. Although farm evictions are an ongoing (though poorly publicised) fact of life in the rural areas, the implementation of group areas segregation has been largely completed in Natal. If one includes as a form of urban relocation the incorporation of the people living in the township of Kwa-Mashu into KwaZulu (by the redrawing of boundary lines, in 1977) then this becomes the third largest category of removals in Natal to date. In the process over 200 000 urban africans have been excluded from prescribed areas and section 10 rights in the province. Black spot removals, though the oldest and in many ways the most publicised type of removals, only rank fourth in terms of numbers removed thus far (a little over 100 000 people); the bulk of these removals have yet to be implemented.

The enormous scale of past removals makes it apparent that even were forced population removals to be abandoned immediately, Pretoria would already have succeeded in imposing massive changes in the distribution of the population and the allocation of land between black and white within Natal. The process of dispossession is already well advanced; the problems of reconstruction in the areas into which these people have been relocated will remain long after the policies which have created them have been superseded. If the money budgeted for future relocation could be diverted to such a programme of reconstruction, then a start in redressing the results of dispossession could be made.

Ultimately, however, the dispossession itself can only be redressed by the incorporation of the dispossessed into full citizenship in a common society.

SCALE OF THREATENED REMOVALS

We have calculated that, on the basis of currently available information, roughly the same number of people as have already been moved are living under threat of removal at the present time. Despite the massive removals of the past, Pretoria's relocation programme is only halfway towards completion. This programme has been coming under heavy pressure, both financial and political, and there are likely to be modifications to it in the future as a result. Nevertheless, the evidence reviewed in this report does not support the optimistic viewpoint of some observers that Pretoria is finally softening its approach and likely to call a halt to relocation. Instead there are ominous signs that attempts to push through further, large-scale removals can be expected in the near future.

Relocation sites at Qudeni, Compensation and near Ezakheni are being expanded or developed; influx control in the Durban area is being tightened up more ruthlessly. There are unknown thousands of people threatened by major dam-building programmes in the Lower Tugela, Lower Umfolosi, Inanda and Mpendle districts. These dams are being planned so secretly that all that the local people know about their fate is based on rumour and speculation. There is also the threat of a renewed drive being launched by the Department of Cooperation and Development against the large numbers of african people living on white farms: one of the implications of the controversial 'Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill' currently under review.

In several pious speeches about 'no more forced removals', Dr Koornhof has not offered a reprieve to a single rural community threatened with removal. Instead he has reiterated on several occasions during the course of 1981 and 1982 the intention of his Department to move, inter alia, Reserve Four, the Driefontein area, Matiwane's Kop, Umbulwane, Thembalihle, the Sodwana Bay area, Jonono's Kop and Steinkoalspruit, despite the fact that all these communities have objected repeatedly to being moved.

Whether the Department will succeed remains to be seen. However, at this stage the only category of relocation where there is any prospect of a change or modification in the actual, stated policy is that of urban relocation. Those small african townships still left in the white area that are currently threatened with deproclamation and relocation into KwaZulu may be allowed to remain - Shakaville, Sibongile, Steadville etc. These townships represent a small percentage of the total number of people under threat of removal, and can be accommodated fairly easily as exceptions to the rule. Their populations are fixed by limited housing to present levels and are small in comparison to the numbers of urban residents already incorporated into KwaZulu. Furthermore, the shift in policy does not affect those areas about to be incorporated into KwaZulu in the future, without any physical removal of people or new building of houses required, by the expedient of further manipulations to the KwaZulu border, e.g. at Clermont, near Pinetown. Reprieves are not assured in all cases anyway.

At present most of these people known to be living under the threat of removal are the victims of consolidation planning: over half a million people, if both reserve and freehold areas are counted together. Pretoria has stated that it intends to have completed its consolidation programme for KwaZulu by 1986. Given the very real financial constraints and the stiff opposition to consolidation it faces on so many fronts in Natal, it seems highly unlikely that it can complete so ambitious a programme as that contained in the 1975 proposals by then. Either it will fail to meet that deadline, or it will have to scale down or amend its plans quite radically.

Already modifications to the 1975 plan have emerged. The attempt to excise the Ingwavuma district and hand it over to Swaziland represents such a modification: a new and more sophisticated refinement of relocation strategies, analogous to the incorporation

of urban townships into KwaZulu by boundary revisions. Although the attempt has been checked, there is no guarantee that it will not be repeated in the future. As described in the chapter on consolidation, a similar threat hangs over the Sindlangentsha district of KwaZulu, on the Transvaal side of the Pongola river, as well.

Pretoria's final consolidation plan for the region is being kept secret. Its release has been repeatedly delayed and it will now not be released before 1984; the delays are indicative of the difficulties Pretoria has encountered, first in drawing up and then in imposing its blueprint for the region. That it is still using the 1975 plan as a guideline, however, is made clear by the excision of Reserve Four, the Sodwana Bay triangle, the Paulpietersburg area and the Driefontein block from KwaZulu in 1981. The removal of these four areas, which appears to enjoy high priority, will affect in the region of 150 000 people.

SECRECY AND INADEQUATE STATISTICS

Perhaps more shocking than the scale of removals is the degree to which the government has successfully concealed its programme of population relocation and control from the public. Compared to other parts of the country, black and white areas are intimately intertwined in Natal. Many threatened and relocated communities are fairly close to major transport arteries and surprisingly accessible to outsiders who are prepared to take the time and initiative to visit them. Nevertheless, most of the places mentioned in this report have never been visited by journalists, politicians or community workers and their names and stories have not been recorded. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the true magnitude of the forced removals in Natal (and the other provinces) has been played down and obscured as well. The government has achieved this both by controlling physical access to relocation areas and by manipulating and suppressing information. It has been aided in this by the support, tacit or overt, of the white public which submits docilely to authoritarianism in government and manipulation of the media.

In compiling this report we have struggled with inadequate, inaccurate, contradictory or non-existent official statistics, data and maps. Most of the maps available to the general public are blatantly misleading. They show KwaZulu not as it really is but as it is projected by the 1975 consolidation proposals - a mere ten pieces instead of the extremely messy, fragmented (and troublesome) jigsaw puzzle of reality. Much of the information needed to plot what is being planned is deliberately withheld from the public. The trend is towards greater secrecy on the part of government ministers and officials (as demonstrated by clause 2 of the Cooperation and Development Amendment Act of 1982) and many of the questions concerning relocation that were put to them by opposition party members in the 1982 parliamentary session were evaded on the grounds of the complexities of researching the subject, the delicacy of the issue or national security.

The official figures that are available are often unreliable and many of the promises made and assurances given by government officials and Cabinet Ministers concerning removals have been demonstrated to be false - for instance that relocation areas are always planned and serviced with water, sanitation, schools and clinics in advance. A particularly disturbing aspect about official figures are the discrepancies that exist in such basic items as the total area of scheduled land in Natal and the amount of land purchased by the SADT - both quota land and compensatory land for black spots and 'badly situated' areas. Thus Dr Koornhof has claimed, in 1981, that the outstanding quota has been met in Natal, the first province where this has happened. Yet his figure of the total area of land purchased by the SADT to meet the quota obligation in Natal is 7 744 ha less than the total area of quota land quoted for Natal by Thorrington-Smith et al. in 1978. (See p. 100) This may seem a small amount of land to quibble about, yet given the population pressure on the land inside KwaZulu it cannot be dismissed as insignificant. Furthermore, the discrepancy raises fundamental questions about the competence of the officials entrusted with the responsibility for seeing that the land commitments on which

so much of the segregation and apartheid policies of successive governments have been based, are met. It is extremely difficult for independent research bodies to monitor the land purchases of the SADT on paper and virtually impossible on the ground. In such a situation major mistakes may be made and never be discovered or rectified.

State secrecy extends not only to its dealings with the press and the public in general but to the threatened people as well. People who are to be removed are generally the last to be notified by officials of what is to happen to them; the question of genuine consultation does not come into it at all. In some instances this is simply a by-product of racist attitudes among white officials towards blacks - they are seen only as objects, so many units, who are not endowed with feelings and opinions. In other instances, however, it is clearly a deliberate strategy to delay organisation and undermine morale within the affected community. Rumour and the insecurity that that engenders have been found to be potent sources of disorganisation and fragmentation in areas threatened with removal. Major examples of this kind of secrecy in relation to relocation at present are found in the way the Mvumase, Inanda and Mpendle dams are being planned.

LACK OF SECURITY : DOUBLE REMOVALS

The mass removals of the past twenty or thirty years have underscored a basic fact : no black person can be assured of security of tenure anywhere in South Africa under the present system of government. The Black Administration Act gives the State President discretionary powers to move any black person regardless of what category of land he or she is living on - scheduled, released, freehold, urban or rural.

Included in the figures for past and threatened removals are several thousands of people who have been or are to be moved more than once, because of shifts in the policy or bureaucratic bunglings. Thus Vukondondo was established as a relocation area in 1963 but moved to Ezakheni in 1972 because a dam was to be built on its site. Many people in the Nkundusi ward of Reserve 3 near Lake St Lucia who are currently living under threat of removal because of consolidation planning, have already been moved more than once as different stages of forest plantation programmes were implemented in the St Lucia area in the 1960s and 1970s. Bilanyoni, established in 1970 and having a population of some 20 000 people, is also threatened by the 1975 consolidation plans. Bulwer Trust Farm, established in about 1980 is threatened by the construction of the Mvumase Dam which was already being planned by the Department of Water Affairs in the late 1970s.

Land has been manipulated and played with as if it were simply weights on a scale, to be taken off and added to according to the item to be balanced on the other side. The Makhathini Flats : excluded from the Zululand reserves in 1909; to be developed as a white irrigation scheme in the 1960s; to be split between KwaZulu and white Natal in 1972; to be allocated to KwaZulu in 1973 and 1975; the northern part to be used to compensate for the excision of Reserve Four in 1978; that same region promised to Swaziland in 1979. The triangle of land north of Sodwana Bay : earmarked for excision from KwaZulu in 1973, excised in 1981; promised to KwaZulu as compensation for the potential loss of land in Ingwavuma in 1982.

The examples could be duplicated many times over. They expose as a cynically constructed myth the argument that KwaZulu represents the traditional home of the Zulu people. KwaZulu, as the background chapters in Part One make clear, is a very recent political construction, the latest in a long series of land settlements imposed on the black population of the region by successive white governments. Its proposed boundaries bear scant relationship to the pattern of black settlement prevailing even in the colonial period, in the late 19th century.

CONDITIONS IN RELOCATION AREAS

The following section draws largely on the surveys carried out by SPP in those relocation sites that have been written up as case studies in Part Three. The results of these surveys bear out many of the points made above. However, relocation has not led to a displacement of people into official relocation sites only. Very large numbers of evicted and removed black people have moved into unofficial relocation areas - black spots and informal settlements - in an attempt to avoid the limitations of the official sites (chiefly landlessness, isolation and the township style of living). In addition, as pointed out in the report, KwaZulu itself can be seen as little more than one large relocation site and to focus attention only on the official relocation areas can obscure the general crisis of landlessness, unemployment and social fragmentation in the black rural areas. In material terms, relocation areas in general do not differ substantially from other bantustan communities. This perspective needs to be borne in mind in the following discussion.

Pressure on the State over the past 15 years, beginning with the Limehill scandal in 1968/69, has made Pretoria more sensitive to negative publicity about relocation. This has manifested itself in two ways:

- 1) It has been forced to pay greater attention to the provision of basic (very basic) facilities in relocation sites - latrines, water points and temporary fletcraft huts are now fairly standard issue.
- 2) It has also been forced to pay a great deal more attention to public relations. In recent years Dr Koornhof and others have been at pains to project a positive image of removals as part of a process of nation-building and development, and to deny that removals are forced.

The case studies presented in Part Three expose the falseness and the cynicism of many of the claims made about relocation areas by the government. The extremely limited options and powerlessness of rural blacks in particular means that the demands they articulate are often skewed. If the only available choice is between prosecution and moving or between no house and a house in a relocation area, many people will 'choose' the latter. Even so, the overwhelming majority of respondents in the surveyed relocation areas made it clear that they had moved there unwillingly and under coercion. The form of the coercion experienced by people being relocated may be direct (army trucks collecting people in the missile range area in the early 1970s; 'soldiers' with guns and dogs arriving to shift labour tenants from Dannhauser to Mzimhlophe in 1976) but it may also be indirect (labour tenants having nowhere else to go in the Weenen district in 1969/70; the ban on building improvements in Roosboom after 1965; the intimidation of tenants at Kwapitela in 1979/80). The trend is increasingly in this direction - indirect manipulation of people - to back up the official claims that removals are voluntary. In this regard local officials have often revealed themselves as very adept at exploiting divisions within communities, e.g. those between landowners and tenants (Kwapitela, Jonono's Kop) and between old residents and newcomers (Richmond Farm).

Furthermore, while conditions in relocation areas may have improved overall in the last decade, these places are not the model, well-planned and flourishing communities they are made out to be. The basic infrastructure that Dr Koornhof has claimed is always supplied at relocation points has been shown to have been lacking in several recent instances of relocation. In general, the more isolated the area and the less the publicity focused upon it, the greater the likelihood is that officials will skimp on even the bare minimum of facilities that are claimed to be standard. Two examples of this are 1) Mbazwana, near Sodwana Bay, where initially no preparations were made for water or sanitation services before people started being trucked in out of the missile range area in 1979, and 2) Mzimhlophe, where no official water supply has yet been laid on even though people have been relocated there since 1975. In addition, the water supply

installed originally at, inter alia, Ezakheni, Nondweni and Ekuvukeni, has proved to be completely inadequate to meet the needs of the people. The general paucity of the higher-level services such as schools, clinics and shops in relocation areas is summarised in the introductory chapter to Part Two.

However, the issues at stake in relocation sites are not simply to do with the provision or number of taps and of clinics. The fundamental process of exclusion and the dispossession of people's rights, described earlier, cannot be compensated for by the provision of a tap in the street or a bottlestore on the corner. Furthermore, what sets relocation sites apart from more established communities and makes them such difficult places to live in, is not only the lack of facilities - in some aspects the facilities may be better in particular relocation areas than in threatened communities - but the social fragmentation and heightened level of stress they demonstrate. Overall, people's views of the situation in all the surveyed areas was extremely negative. 'We are starving', 'We have no hope', 'It is too expensive', 'Nobody can help us' were the types of comments repeated endlessly. In the more isolated rural areas people were especially pessimistic about the future, and the prospects for community organisation were particularly bleak. The social problems - violence, alienation, apathy - described in various forms in all the relocation areas surveyed can be attributed very largely to the demoralising, disorganising effect of relocation on those flung so carelessly into situations over which they have minimal control. These effects were perhaps most extreme in the case of rural people moved from situations where they had had some land before into closer settlements, but were not confined to them.

Opportunities for local employment in relocation areas are minimal and residents are heavily dependent for their survival on migrant or, for the more favoured areas, commuter labour to the cities and industries of white South Africa. The survey results show clearly that the availability of local or commuter employment in general and for women in particular makes an important contribution to the well-being of individual households. However any household with members in wage employment, whether as migrants or as commuters, is a relatively privileged one; a significant minority of households depend on pensions, informal activity and charity to bring in their only cash income. Unemployment is alarmingly high. Excluding the group areas township of Phoenix (where the overall rate of unemployment in the sample was 4,5%) the combined rate of unemployment in the 5 african relocation areas surveyed (Sahlumbe, Ezakheni, Mzimhlophe, Compensation and Inanda Newtown) worked out at 18% - 13% for males and an extremely high 31% for females. (See Table 19 below.) Adding to the problem of unemployment, large numbers of potential workers, particularly in the younger age groups, were found to have given up looking for employment altogether and are classified as not economically active. (See Table 20 below.)

Table 19. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN FIVE RELOCATION AREAS, NATAL.

	UNEMPLOYED			EMPLOYED		
	M	F	T	M	F	T
Sahlumbe	24	5	29	193	19	212
Ezakheni	19	31	50	107	80	187
Mzimhlophe	6	9	15	118	64	182
Compensation	9	16	25	74	22	98 ⁺
Inanda Newtown	19	11	30	97	44	141
TOTALS	77	72	149	589	229	820 ⁺
COMBINED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE	13	31	18			

⁺ Includes 2 individuals whose sex was not stated.

The dependency on migrant labour in the rural relocation areas has distorted the population structure by creating an unnatural preponderance of women and children and this puts further strain on family and community life. Migrant labour is a basic fact of life in the black rural areas, and is not confined to official relocation sites only. What makes the statistics more shocking however is that people have been deliberately moved en masse into these conditions - the relocation sites are the creations, so we are told, of official development and urbanisation strategies.

In the case of those people relocated off farms or black spots, the loss of land and of stock is a major blow, affecting both their economic and their psychological well-being negatively. Access to land was the single most urgently desired improvement for the residents of the rural relocation areas. The loss of land has greatly increased their dependency on migrant labour and, in a situation of high unemployment and low wages, undermined household subsistence levels. The vital significance of land to rural households, even when members are employed, is brought out in the case study on the black spot of Matiwane's Kop. A comparison of the average household diet found at Matiwane's Kop with those found in the closer settlements of Sahlumbe, Mzimhlophe and Compensation showed the consumption of both protein foods and greens to be significantly higher at Matiwane's Kop. (See p. 446.) Furthermore, among the three closer settlements themselves, the size of the plots available to occupants has made a noticeable difference in terms of overall household subsistence levels as well. Thus at Mzimhlophe, where residents are able (for the time being) to graze stock (illegally) on adjoining Trust land, and where sites are large enough for small stands of maize and other crops to be cultivated, household diet is healthier and more varied, on average, than in the other two areas.

A comparison of the survey results brings out very clearly the marked differences that exist between relocation areas in terms not only of facilities but of economic opportunities and the nature of residents' participation in the labour market. In comparing them one is working on a scale of relative deprivation and dispossession in which the group areas township of Phoenix is indisputably at the top and the closer settlement of Sahlumbe, the oldest of the areas surveyed and one established to house ex labour tenants, is at the bottom.

The disparities between relocation sites reflects the stratification that is being actively encouraged by the State between urban and rural, firstly, and coloured/indian and african secondly. The physical location and the facilities provided at relocation sites are stratified according to the function the site is meant to serve - commuter townships are the most favoured - and the type of people being relocated. Evicted farm workers and tenants on the most isolated black spots, who in general are the least skilled and the most disadvantaged in looking for wage employment, are treated with the greatest amount of indifference and relocated to the most isolated areas : the classic dumping grounds.

The following Table summarises the comparative results of the surveys for each of the relocation areas under the following headings : distribution of the population in terms of migrancy levels, economic activity and skill level of workers. The equivalent results in the survey undertaken in the threatened area of Matiwane's Kop are included for additional comparative purposes.

Table 20. COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND SKILL LEVEL OF WORKERS IN AREAS SURVEYED BY SPP, NATAL. (%)

	DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION			ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF POPULATION			SKILL LEVEL OF EMPLOYED						
	Permanent	Commuter	Migrant	Not economically active	Employed	Unemployed	Unskilled and Farm	Semi-skilled	Skilled	Service	Sales + Clerical	Professional + Business	Not stated
1. PHOENIX	74	26	-	66	32	2	18	25	16	13	22	2	4
2. INANDA	70	30	-	65	29	6	16	25	18	30	9	1	1
3. EZAKHENI	69	18	10 ⁺	61	29	8	91	2	1	1	1	2	2
4. MZIMHLOPHE	74	8	16	68	26	4 ⁺	96	negligible					3
5. COMPENSATION	84	1	12 ⁺	76	19	5	78	1	0	6	3	3	9
6. SAHLUMBE	76	2	20 ⁺	75	22	3	91,5	3,5	1	0,5	0,5	3	-
7. MATIWANE'S KOP	73	10	17	72	24	4	73,5	8	2	0,5	3	13	-

RESISTANCE

The detailed case studies in Parts Three and Four make it clear that opposition to being moved is widespread within threatened communities but the level of active organised resistance varies enormously. There are major difficulties standing in the way of strong community action, particularly within the rural areas. These have been isolated in the various case studies : intimidation by the authorities, ignorance of the laws and the wider political context on the part of those to be moved, their isolation from other communities and from the media or outside support groups, the lack of progressive leadership and of democratic local organisations in most threatened areas, the divisions within the communities and the very real powerlessness of the people in relation to discriminatory and oppressive legal and political structures.

In general the level of organisation in the rural areas is very poor. The established leadership is rarely accountable to the community and vulnerable to manipulation and corruption by the authorities. The role of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government in local organisation has been seen to be problematical. Where Inkatha is involved - and in many areas it is not - the tendency is to encourage communities to rely on Ulundi to negotiate on their behalf rather than to encourage mobilisation of people at a grass-roots level. The smaller and more isolated the community, the poorer the organisation is likely to be and the smaller the chances are that active opposition to being removed will be voiced. The contrast between the St Wendolins and Kwapitela case studies brings out this point. This broad correlation between size and urban links on the one hand and effective organisation on the other can be seen at work in relocation areas as well; the level and sophistication of political organisation in Phoenix (the rent protests of 1980/81, the lack of support for the SAIC elections) and Ezakheni (the bus

⁺ Residence of balance not stated.

boycott of 1979) being far higher than in Sahlumbe and Compensation, for instance. The correlation is not a mechanical one, however; the detailed case studies point to the complexities of community organisation and the range of local variables that affect it.

Yet despite the limitations to community organisation that do exist, the strength of popular opposition to removals has been and will be an important factor in shaping the strategies of the State on relocation. In cases where opposition has been organised and active, communities have forced particular concessions and reprieves from the authorities : the granting of local compensation land to those affected by the Woodstock Dam near Bergville; the possibility of a reprieve from the Group Areas Board in St Wendolins; the halt to the demolition of houses at Umbulwane. From a broader perspective, the general opposition to relocation has contributed to the delay in the implementation of various planned removals in Natal in recent years. Pretoria is less willing to risk a violent confrontation with those it wishes to remove now than it was in the more confident days of the 1960s. Dr Koornhof himself admitted to this when he stated at the NAU Congress in 1981 that the major obstacle to the completion of consolidation in Natal was 'the unwillingness of the Zulu people to be moved'. (Natal Witness, 14.05.81)

The forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of black people over the last few decades has been a versatile tool. It has been one of several developed by a repressive, unrepresentative minority government as a means of retaining its grip on power and maximising the exploitation of the wealth of the country by the ruling group. Up to a point the policy of relocation has worked frighteningly effectively but there are increasing signs of pressure and strain within it as well. This is particularly evident in Natal where the central government is having to contend with opposition to its plans from a very wide spectrum of interest groups.

The patchwork nature of KwaZulu, though facilitating the process of exclusion of blacks to some extent, also means that the black areas of Natal are in close proximity to the white-controlled, urban-industrial centres. The informal settlements ringing Durban, which the authorities have been unable to eliminate or reduce despite strenuous efforts over the past two and a half decades, are a visible sign of that : both a product of influx control and relocation policies, and a source of pressure upon those policies, a point of re-entry for the excluded into the white heartland. In Natal the reality of an overwhelming majority of blacks is becoming increasingly difficult for Pretoria to deny and to control spatially.

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INDEX OF PLACE NAMES

Note: Properties for which we have the property no. only are filed under district, thus Mpendle (properties) 117

Acton Homes 108
 Albert Falls 118, 232
 Alderney 108
 Alfred (district) see also Harding (district) 102, 298, 299
 Allandale 237
 Alva Mission 67, 131
 Alwinrein 116
 Amakhasi Mission 67, 131
 Amanda 111, 289
 Amanzimtoti 232
 Amaotana 124, 195
 Amaoti 124, 195, 392, 394, 395, 404, 405, 408
 Amatikhulu 23, 147, 289
 Amatikwe 123
 Annandale 107, 118, 180
 Annex Riverlands 115
 Apologie 107, 124
 Appelsbosch 118, 180, 290
 Asynkraal see also Limehill 62, 112, 285
 Austerville 228
 Avoca 255, 298

Babanango (district) 21, 46, 75, 76, 78, 100, 178, 283, 284, 356, 369, 417, 421, 542
 Babanango (town) 147, 220, 229, 285
 Balderskraal 106, 114
 Ballaraat 107, 119
 Bambayi 394
 Bangazi Pan 249, 262, 263, 265
 Barclay Site 210, 283
 Bartman 112
 Baumannville 170, 176, 199, 298
 Bayhead 201, 221, 224, 240
 Bazini 283
 Beersheba 108, 373
 Bekumthetho 69, 195, 196, 210, 283
 Bell Street Hostel 176
 Bellair 221, 223, 227
 Bergville (district) 45, 72, 108, 153, 291, 293
 Bergville (properties) 108
 Bergville (town) 233
 Bergvliet 107, 109
 Besters see also Khumalosville 67, 106, 114
 Besterspruit 55, 101, 107, 124, 229, 285
 Bhakithemba 197, 201, 203, 209
 Bhokuzulu see also Vryheid (township) 178, 284
 Bhobhoyi 69, 177, 196, 210, 299, 301, 303
 Bilanyoni 60, 76, 129, 131, 283, 284, 417, 419-422, 550
 Bivane Mission 60, 129, 421
 Blaauwbosch 69, 195, 196, 210, 285

Block AK (Durban) 223, 228
 Block AL (Durban) 223
 Block G (Durban) 228
 Bluff 18, 199, 201, 228
 Blydefontein 116
 Bombalo 67, 281
 Bongweni 179, 258-259, 305
 Boschhoek see also Hlatikulu 25, 67, 105, 110, 500
 Botanic Gardens 223, 228
 Braemar 231, 301
 Briardene 227
 Brooklands 253, 293
 Broughton 118, 291
 Bruntville see also Mooi River (township) 178, 291
 Bucklands 117
 Bulwer (Bergville) 108
 Bulwer (district) see also Pholela 101, 102, 108, 109, 164, 232, 291, 293
 Bulwer (properties) 118, 119
 Bulwer Trust Farm 62, 97, 120, 178, 180, 210, 240, 252, 295, 297, 355, 550
 Bulwerton 106, 118
 Burford 106, 115
 Burlington Halt 228
 Bushside 122

Camelhoek 118, 291
 Camperdown (district) 75, 107, 109, 231, 298, 301
 Campsdrift 240
 Cape Vidal 265
 Cardwill 104, 110
 Cato Manor 175, 197, 198, 199, 201, 205, 219, 221, 228, 234, 235
 Cato Ridge 231, 302
 Cedarville (town) 233
 Cedarville (township) 172, 177, 305
 Charlestown 61, 91, 101, 124, 287
 Charlottedale 120
 Chateau Estates 110, 298
 Chatsworth 224, 225, 228, 234, 254, 255, 297, 298, 424, 425
 Chesterville 60, 61, 170, 172, 173, 174, 177, 178, 187, 189, 199, 212, 298
 Clairwood 201, 209, 240, 256, 257, 298, 425
 Cleland 236
 Clermont 60, 176, 178, 180, 201, 202, 209, 298, 548
 Cleveland 112
 Cliffdale 231, 233, 299, 303
 Colenso 172, 232
 Colville 122
 Compensation 63, 97, 99, 122, 291, 340, 342, 365, 373-388, 398, 446, 448, 487, 491, 493, 494, 495, 548, 552, 553, 554, 555
 Cool Air 290
 Cornfields 111

Coronation 275
 Cottonlands 124
 Craigieburn 210, 218, 303
 Cranbrook 120
 Crane Valley 104, 109
 Criemen see also Trekboer 63, 114, 333, 441, 453
 Crowfield 108
 Crowle 116

Dalmeny Farm 208
 Dalton 232
 Dannhauser (district) 75, 76, 78, 103, 104, 109-110, 118, 285, 287, 356, 551
 Dannhauser (township) 56, 172, 177, 287
 Dannhauser Emergency Camp 177
 Danskraal 332
 Dassenhoek 180, 202, 209
 Deepdale 120
 Delmas 71
 Dendethu 252
 Dilingile 111
 Dingaanstadt 275
 Donkerspruit 305
 Donkervlei 109
 Donnybrook 301
 Doone 106, 114, 500
 Doornhoek 24, 106, 115
 Drakensberg Location 1 100, 143, 147, 153, 164, 293, 301
 Drakensberg Location 2 106, 143, 147, 153, 164, 293, 301
 Driefontein (Ladysmith) 9, 10, 24, 25, 35, 40, 93, 102, 103, 106, 114, 115, 139, 148, 158, 245, 287, 419, 441, 442, 537, 548, 549
 Driefontein (Stanger) 120
 Dronkvlei 109
 Droogwal see also Ndonyan 114
 Duikerfontein 228
 Dumbé (township) see also Paulpietersburg 284
 Dumbé Mission 131, 178
 Dundee (district) 4, 36, 40, 55, 75, 78, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 110, 118, 285, 287, 442, 500
 Dundee (town) 232, 283, 287, 356
 Dundee (township) see also Sibongile Township 172, 173, 174, 175
 Dunveria 237
 Durban (city) 4, 69, 198, 221, 228, 232, 425, 426, 427, 467, 546
 Durban (district) 110, 196, 199, 202, 297, 424

Earthcote of Venterslaagte 108
 East Griqualand see also Mount Currie, Matatiele 42
 East Hesselton 101, 104, 109, 240
 Ebrington 66, 293
 Ebuta 305
 Edendale 24, 25, 290
 Eensgewonden 67, 283, 421
 Effingham Heights 228
 Ekuvukeni 41, 63, 110, 114, 137, 182, 285, 442, 511
 Elandslaagte 39, 40, 453
 Emakhosini 46, 63, 76, 283, 284, 417-419
 Emangweni Mission 130, 293
 Ematendeni see Inanda Newtown
 Embiane Dam 253
 Emmaus 209
 Empangeni 147, 164, 210, 289

Enhlalakahle see also Greytown Township 178, 291
 Enqabeni 111
 Eshowe (district) 100, 111, 154, 164, 181, 287
 Eshowe (town) 147, 157, 229, 233, 284, 290
 Esikhawini 176, 535
 Esivubu 62
 Estcourt (district) 75, 100, 111, 291, 293
 Estcourt (town) 232
 Estcourt (township) 172, 177
 Etete 120, 195, 295
 Eureka 111
 Evansdale Mission 131
 Ezakheni 60, 67, 97, 114, 115, 129, 177, 181, 251, 285, 287, 332-353, 364, 365, 398, 442, 446, 448, 450, 510, 511, 519, 520, 545, 548, 550, 552, 554

Fairleigh 101, 118, 172, 218, 230, 287
 Fairview 107, 119
 Fascadale 301
 Flint Farm 68, 177, 178, 285
 Folweni 12, 63, 202, 204-205, 299
 Frankland 63, 299
 Fredville 109
 Free State 108, 373

Gamalakhe 60, 172, 177, 181, 299, 303
 Gardens 104, 109
 Georgedale 109, 210, 303
 Georgenau 130
 Gezinsila 180, 289
 Gingindlovu 147, 164, 233, 290
 Gledhow 120, 295
 Glen Farm 117
 Glencoe (district) 285
 Glencoe (town) 232, 283, 287
 Glencoe (township) see also Themba-lihle 68, 172, 173, 174, 175
 Glenwood 228
 Gluckstadt 284
 Goedertrouw Dam 253
 Gologodo see Folweni
 Gombe 131, 293
 Good Hope (Ladysmith) 106, 114, 333
 Good Hope Estates 298
 Grangetown 124
 Greenhill 117
 Greenpoint 108
 Greenwood Park 224, 425
 Greytown (district) 28, 68, 75, 78, 164, 291, 356, 368
 Greytown (town) 233, 291
 Greytown (township) see also Enhlalakahle 68, 172, 173, 174
 Greyville 425
 Groblersdal 71
 Groenberg 123
 Groenvlei 107, 123
 Groutville see also Etete, Gledhow, Ntshaweni etc. 20, 25, 91, 120, 141, 148, 150, 151, 168, 197, 295
 Gubazi see also Qudeni 62, 63, 283, 354, 538
 Gulliga 121

Halfdale 63, 291
 Hambanathi 174, 179, 298
 Hammarsdale 109, 210, 231, 240, 302
 Hanbrook 108
 Happy Valley 199, 201
 Harding (district) see also Alfred (district) 100, 111, 153, 301, 302
 Harding (properties) 111
 Harding (town) 231, 233, 303
 Harding (township) 172
 Hathorns Hill 237
 Hatting 111
 Headlands 107, 120
 Helmsley 121
 Helpmekaar (district) 103, 104, 105, 112, 287, 500
 Highflats (district) 152, 301, 302
 Hilder 293
 Hillary 221, 223, 227
 Hillside 112
 Hilton 237
 Himeville 373
 Hlaba 109
 Hlabisa (district) 23, 274, 279, 282
 Hlatikhulu see also Boschhoek 67, 91, 110
 Hlatimbe 116
 Hlawukana 120
 Hlobane 220, 229, 284, 285
 Hlokozi 112
 Hlomula 242
 Hluhluwe 164, 180
 Hluhluwe Game Reserve 161, 248, 267, 281, 282
 Hlungulwana 46, 64, 76, 283, 284, 417
 Hobsland see also Vulandondo 106, 115
 Hogback 122
 Hollingwood 119, 236
 Hopewell 119, 291
 Horseshoe 111
 Howe 108
 Howick (district) 75
 Howick (town) see also Zenzele Township 232, 291
 Ifafa Beach 233
 Ifafa Mission Reserve 148, 164, 301
 Illovo 299
 Imbali 176, 182
 Imfume 109
 Impendle see Mpendle
 Impofang 18, 19
 Impolweni Mission 27, 130, 291
 Inanda (black spot) 123
 Inanda (district) see also Verulam 18, 97, 188, 196, 197, 198, 201, 209, 297, 394, 426, 548
 Inanda Dam 239, 253, 298
 Inanda Newtown 64, 176, 188, 189, 202, 297, 389-416, 450, 552, 554
 Indaleni Mission Reserve see Ndalen Mission Reserve
 Ingula 108
 Ingwavuma 2, 3, 10, 17, 23, 24, 139, 141, 147, 157, 159, 161, 162, 247, 248, 249, 261, 262, 267, 268, 279, 281, 282, 418, 537, 538, 548, 550
 Inhlazuka Mission 131
 Inhlazukaview 119
 Inkanyezi 177, 293
 Inyane 130
 Isihlengeni 130, 284
 Isipingo 228
 Isithebe 4, 56, 181, 287

Itala Nature Reserve 248, 285
 Italanu 105, 110
 Itendele 111
 Ixopo (district) 55, 75, 100, 101, 107, 112-114, 164, 298, 299, 301, 302
 Ixopo (properties) 107, 112, 113

Jabavu City Location 510
 Janyana 111
 Jonono's Kop 11, 103, 105, 114, 441, 455, 457, 548, 550
 Josini (district) 282
 Josini (town) 180
 Josini Dam see also Pongolapoort Dam 143
 Jubilee 104, 109

Kaka's Location 305
 Kambi Reserve 107, 119, 141, 164, 284
 Keate's Drift 68, 178, 290
 Khumalo's Kraal 130, 284
 Khumalosville see also Besters 40, 42, 67, 101, 114, 251, 333, 441, 453
 Kilkenny 117
 Kingsley 123
 Kirkintilloch 106, 114, 115
 Klaarwater 60, 172, 178, 240, 298, 465, 466
 Klaas 111
 Kleinfontein 24, 106, 115
 Klipplaatsfontein 108
 Klippoor 114
 Klip River (district) see also Lady-smith (district) 4, 25, 27, 36, 40, 45, 55, 60, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 110, 114-115, 133, 285, 287, 441, 442, 452, 453, 497, 512, 542
 Klipspruit 107, 123
 Kokstad (town) 232
 Koppie Alleen 104, 109
 Kosi Bay 21, 23, 24, 147, 239, 242, 267, 279, 281
 Kraaikop 116
 Kranskop (district) 72, 290
 Kranskop (town) 66, 232, 291
 Kruisfontein 120
 KwaDabeka 60, 131, 176, 178, 182, 212, 297, 465, 468, 469, 470, 472
 KwaDlangezwa 289
 KwaKagwaza 129, 284
 KwaMakhutha 69, 180, 210, 212
 KwaMaziqizana 64, 299, 301
 KwaMashu 57, 60, 170, 175, 176, 177, 187, 188, 201, 212, 234, 240, 297, 298
 KwaMbono 64, 172, 177, 180, 299, 303
 KwaMhlongo 62, 283
 KwaMkhize 62, 293
 KwaMondi 130
 KwaMsane 180
 KwaNdengezi 60, 131, 176, 178, 209, 297, 465, 468, 469, 470, 472
 Kwahobamba 62
 Kwapitela 63, 97, 98, 102, 122, 373, 374, 380, 388, 487-495, 551, 554
 KwaVulamehlo see Compensation
 KwaVuzanyawo 120
 Kwezi-Bomvu Dam 253
 Kwezi 180

La Lucia 228
 Ladysmith (district) see also Klip River District 9, 10, 11, 12, 40, 69, 75, 76, 78, 114, 341, 356, 375, 453, 510
 Ladysmith (town) 232, 285, 332, 333, 334, 335, 343, 512, 521
 Ladysmith (township) see also Steadville, Jabavu City Location, White City Location 56, 172, 173, 177, 287
 Lake Ngobezeleni 244
 Lamontville 174, 176, 179, 187, 189, 199, 212, 234, 298
 Langespruit 68, 295
 Langkloof 108
 Larence 121, 249
 Lennoxton 101, 118, 172, 218, 230, 287
 Limehill see also Asynkraal, Uitval, Vaalkop 41, 55, 64, 67, 69, 102, 110, 114, 130, 131, 132, 182, 262, 285, 312, 511
 Lincolnmeade 237
 Lion's River 290
 Lloyds 120
 Location 3 and 4 (Donnybrook) 302
 Location 5 (Ixopo) 164, 302
 Location 5 (Port Shepstone) 301
 Loch Lomond 104, 109
 Loch Sloy 182
 Longlands 67, 105, 110
 Loskop 64, 291
 Louwsburg (district) see also Ngotshe 76, 78, 79, 119, 283, 284, 285, 356, 368
 Louwsburg (town) 220, 229, 285
 Lower Tugela (district) see also Stanger 62, 295, 548
 Lower Umfolosi 287, 542, 548
 Lubombo 24
 Lundi 116
 Luneburg see also Zandelingpost 284
 Lusitania 97, 105, 114, 135-6, 441
 Luvisi 68, 283
 Lyell 64, 105, 110, 500
 Mabibi 249, 281
 Madadeni 60, 74, 76, 77, 109, 118, 177, 180, 218, 285, 422
 Magabeni 180, 210, 303
 Mahlabathini 181, 283
 Maitland 116
 Makhathini Flats 23, 28, 40, 56, 64, 68, 76, 99, 141, 142, 143, 147, 151, 242, 244, 262, 263, 273, 281, 282, 537, 538, 539, 550
 Malangeni Mission 301
 Mali 105, 112
 Malota's Kreal 108
 Malukazi 12, 13, 53, 196, 197, 201, 202, 203, 205, 209, 213, 303, 397
 Malvern 221
 Manderston 109
 Mandlazi 66
 Mangusi 242, 267, 282
 Mapumulo (district) 295
 Maputa see also Mangusi 242, 267
 Margate (town) 303
 Margate (township) 172, 177, 196
 Maria Ratschitz Mission 64, 132
 Mariannhill 131, 466
 Mariannridge 297, 466
 Mariathal Mission 132
 Marwaqa 108
 Maryvale 119
 Mashunka 67, 74, 290, 308
 Masinenga 177

Katatiele (district) 42, 94, 95, 115-116, 303, 305
 Katatiele (town) 305
 Katatiele (township) 174, 179
 Mati 62
 Matiwane's Kop 11, 81, 91, 97, 98, 99, 103, 105, 114, 375, 441-463, 519, 548, 553, 554
 Mayville 224, 227, 425
 Mbazwana 8, 64, 263, 264, 265, 266, 281, 551
 Mbizaneni Dam 253
 Mbozana 210, 297
 Melkhout 209
 Melkspruit 305
 Melmoth (district) 34, 78, 115, 284, 417
 Melmoth (town) 147, 229, 233
 Melville 120
 Memorial 120
 Menteith 105, 110
 Meran 25, 64, 105, 110, 500
 Merebank 224, 228, 297
 Merebank Emergency Camp 256
 Merlewood 301
 Mfanifile 34, 115, 284
 Mfule Mission 130, 284
 Mgaga 69
 Mhlelezi see Reserve 2
 Middleton 102, 111
 Milton 106, 118
 Minitown 224
 Mistake Farm 210
 Mkuze 142, 148, 267, 279, 281
 Mondlo 55, 60, 76, 124, 178, 181, 283, 421
 Montclair 227
 Montrose 181
 Mooi Plaats 107, 119, 284
 Mooi River (district) 78, 290
 Mooi River (town) 232, 291
 Mooi River (township) see also Bruntville 172
 Moospruit 105, 110
 Mosi Swamps 247, 267
 Motala Farm 209, 232
 Mount Currie (district) 42, 94, 95, 115-116, 303, 305
 Mount Nebo 111
 Moyeni 64, 291
 Mpendle (district) 35, 40, 55, 100, 116-117, 118, 121, 148, 253, 273, 291, 293, 548
 Mpendle (properties) 116, 117, 249
 Mphophomeni 61, 172, 177, 178, 181, 290, 291
 Mpumalanga 61, 109, 182, 210, 240, 299
 Mpungamhlophe 46, 65, 76, 171, 181, 283
 Msinga 4, 19, 69, 74, 274, 282, 290, 308, 545
 Msusamphi 67, 74, 290, 308, 331
 Mtonjaneni 21, 34, 283, 417
 Mtubatuba 147, 181, 229, 233, 279, 282, 283
 Mtunzini 100, 147, 287
 Muden 43, 77, 356
 Murchison 177, 196, 210, 299, 303
 Mvulazi 283
 Mvumase Dam 240, 252, 290, 295, 297, 550
 Mvunyane 62
 Mysieland 65, 299
 Mzimhlophe see also Qudeni 57, 62, 65, 75, 99, 283, 284, 340, 342, 354-372, 446, 448, 538, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554

Nazareth Mission 130
 Nchanga 109
 Ncotshane 181
 Ndoleni Mission Reserve 24, 93,
 164, 171, 181, 301, 302
 Ndonyane 105, 114, 441
 Ndumu Game Reserve 247, 258, 267,
 281
 New Farm 123, 201, 209, 298, 425
 New Politique 66, 119, 130, 290
 New Scotland Road 130, 236
 Newcastle (district) 4, 35, 36,
 55, 75, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106-
 107, 118, 285, 287, 442, 500
 Newcastle (town) 230, 232, 422
 Newcastle (township) 177, 287
 New Hanover (district) 118, 290,
 291
 New Hanover (town) 232
 Newlands 297
 Newlands (Richmond) 119, 301
 Newlands East 209, 228, 297, 423,
 428, 435-437, 545
 Ngotshe see also Louwsburg District
 21, 75, 104, 107, 119, 283
 Ngoye 181
 Ngwanase 62, 267, 282
 Ngwelezana 181, 289
 Ngwenweni 275, 276
 Nhlankhleni 62
 Nhlokohloko 290
 Nhlozi 249
 Nhlungwane 394, 406
 Nibela see also Reserve 1 164,
 248
 Nietgedag 62, 105, 112
 Nkandla (district) 23, 74, 159,
 273, 275, 283, 538
 Nkandla (town) 147
 Nkindini Mission 131
 Nkobongo 120
 Nkombe 131
 Nkonisa 73, 283, 354, 538
 Nkukwini 120
 Nkundusi see also Reserve 3 62,
 249
 Nkwalini 147, 181
 Nomnyatuli's Location 164, 301
 Nomoya 67, 74, 290, 308
 Nondweni 23, 65, 69, 76, 78, 81,
 181, 283, 355, 421
 Nondweni no. 5 69, 211, 283
 Nongoboza 111
 Nongoma (district) 4, 78, 271,
 273, 283, 284
 Nongoma (town) 147
 Nooitgedacht 108
 Northdale 237, 290
 Nqutu (district) 4, 21, 23, 177,
 178, 273, 283
 Nseleni 176, 181
 Ntambanana 66, 68, 150, 241,
 289, 534, 536
 Nthandeni 181
 Ntingwe 66, 283, 354, 363, 538
 Ntlangweni 242
 Ntshaweni 79, 120, 195, 295
 Ntunjambili 66, 181, 290
 Ntuzuma 61, 176, 178, 181, 188,
 205, 206, 208, 212, 297
 Nyalazi 249
 Nyanyeni 195, 211

Ockerts Kraal 119, 236
 Okuku 240
 Oliviershoek 66, 108, 293
 Ongeluksnek 305
 Ophansi 282
 Ophuzana 62

Ordinance Road Hostel 176
 Osizweni 61, 109, 110, 118, 124,
 177, 218, 284, 285, 287, 422
 Otley 116
 Overport 425

Pakkies 115, 305
 Park Rynie 231, 233, 303
 Parlock 209
 Paulpietersburg (district) 9,
 10, 75, 76, 78, 139, 148, 158,
 164, 245, 283, 421, 549
 Paulpietersburg (town) 220, 229,
 285
 Paulpietersburg (township) see also
 Dumbé (township) 172, 173, 174
 Peacetown 115
 Peak Farm 117
 Pentrich 236, 240
 Pevensy 373
 Phizangu see also Piesang Rivier
 196, 395
 Phoenix 123, 201, 209, 224, 225,
 228, 240, 256, 298, 423-434, 552,
 553, 554
 Pholela (district) see also Bulwer
 (district) 102, 273
 Piensrand 62
 Piesang Rivier see also Phizangu
 392
 Pietermaritzburg (district) 25,
 75, 102, 119, 290, 291, 302
 Pietermaritzburg (town) 230,
 232, 236, 291
 Pieters 181
 Pinetown 119, 232, 297, 466, 467
 Platt Estates 68, 112, 181, 299
 Pofaddershoek 116
 Polltax Farm 66, 119, 130, 290
 Polygon 116
 Pomeroy 147
 Pongolapoort Dam see also Josini Dam
 142, 251
 Poortkraal 116
 Port Shepstone (district) 42,
 75, 102, 107, 119, 164, 181, 298,
 299, 301, 302
 Port Shepstone (town) see also
 Nomnyatuli's Location 231,
 232, 303
 Powell 121
 Prospect 120
 Prospect Hall 227, 228

Qacha's Nek 305
 Qudeni see also Mzimhlophe, Sing-
 abantu, Gubazi 62, 68, 76,
 275, 283, 421, 548
 Queensburgh 201, 224, 232

Raemar 105, 110
 Raisethorpe 236
 Rantjiesvlakte 115
 Red Hill 290
 Redcliffe 123
 Reichenau 132, 373
 Reserve 1 see also Nibela 262,
 264, 265, 267, 281, 282
 Reserve 2 262, 282
 Reserve 3 see also Nkundusi 249,
 282, 550
 Reserve 4 9, 10, 11, 13, 68,
 138, 139, 143, 148, 150, 151, 158,
 159, 164, 245, 289, 355, 419, 529-
 543, 548, 549

Reserve 5 289
 Reserve 6 66, 91, 138, 139, 141,
 150, 241, 289, 535
 Reserve 7 274
 Reserve 7a 289, 290
 Reserve 10 535
 Reserve 12 143, 282
 Reserve 13 143, 262
 Reserve 14 244, 249, 262, 263,
 265, 266, 282
 Reserve 15 142, 282
 Reserve 16 142, 262, 263
 Reserve 17 289
 Reservoir Hills 425
 Richards Bay 4, 9, 138, 147, 176,
 229, 233, 240, 241, 279, 284, 287,
 290, 530, 535, 536
 Richmond (district) 75, 102, 119,
 298, 301, 302
 Richmond (town) 231, 233, 303
 Richmond Farm 196, 201, 202, 205-
 208, 209, 216, 551
 Riebokspruit 108
 Rietbult 131, 293
 Rietkuil 106, 114, 333
 Rietvallei 181
 Riverlands 115
 Riversdale 106, 115
 Riverside (Durban) 221, 224, 227,
 228
 Riverside (Port Shepstone) 113
 Roberts Farm 66, 121, 293
 Roodekrans 123
 Roodepoort 106, 115
 Rooihoek C of Oppermankraal 108
 Rooival 106, 115
 Rookdale 108, 251
 Roosboom 97, 106, 114, 333, 335,
 337-338, 339, 375, 441, 453, 551
 Roselands 107, 119
 Rosenstein Mission 131, 251
 Rossburgh 227
 Ruigtefontein 63, 105, 110, 137,
 500
 Rutland 117

Sahlumbe 67, 74, 75, 99, 248, 290,
 308-330, 340, 342, 343, 365, 398,
 446, 448, 552, 553, 554, 555
 St Chad's Mission 129
 St Francis Xavier Mission 132, 199,
 298
 St Lucia 91, 94, 142, 164, 243,
 247, 248, 261, 267, 281, 550
 St Wendolins 13, 57, 60, 91, 99,
 103, 119, 201, 218, 298, 465-486,
 554, 555
 Sakamkanya 120
 Sans Souci 120
 Santombi 121
 Savannah Park 466, 467, 470, 472,
 476, 477
 Schaapkopje 124
 Sea Cow Lake 201, 221, 425
 Sea View 221, 223, 227
 Sebastapol 120, 295
 Sezela 299
 Sgoje 62
 Shakaskraal 120, 233
 Shakaville 173, 178, 184-185,
 295, 297, 548
 Shallcross 210, 224, 228
 Shayamoya see also Unzinto (town-
 ship) 178, 303
 Shootershill 120
 Sibongile (township) see also
 Dundee (township) 68, 177,
 287, 548

Simdlangentsha 162, 164, 204,
 549
 Simpson 116
 Singabantu see also Qudeni 62,
 67, 283, 354, 538
 Sitofela 122, 123
 Siwangu 101, 104, 109, 240
 Slangspruit 119
 Sobantu 172, 174, 179, 291
 Sodwana Bay 8, 9, 10, 11, 139,
 142, 151, 158, 164, 239, 243, 244,
 245, 247, 248, 265, 266, 281, 419,
 535, 537, 540, 548, 549
 Somtseu Road Hostel 176
 South Coast Junction 199, 224
 Sparks Estate 228
 Spienskop 116
 Springfield 221
 Springfield Emergency Camp 224
 Springfield Flats 424
 Stainbank Nature Reserve 254
 Stanger see also Lower Tugela
 75, 97, 120, 145, 147, 172, 174,
 175, 184, 233, 295, 375
 Stanger (properties) 295
 Steadville see also Ladysmith (town-
 ship) 174, 175, 287, 333, 335,
 336, 446, 510, 511, 517, 521, 548
 Steincoalspruit 25, 63, 98, 106,
 114, 441, 453, 497-509, 548
 Stendahl Mission 131, 291
 Stephendale 123
 Stepmore 117, 122
 Stockville 233
 Stoffelton 122, 123
 Sundumbili 181, 211, 289
 Swartboekop 116
 Sweetwaters 236
 Sydenham 224, 425, 435
 Sydenham Heights 428

Tampaansfontein 116
 Tarr's Valley 109
 Telaphi 110
 The Cape 107, 120
 The Crescent 117
 The Glen 117
 The Goat 121
 The Gorge 117
 The Kloof 122
 The Paddock 231
 The Patch 42, 119, 302
 The Ridge 116
 The Rock 107, 120
 The Swamp 54, 63, 94, 97, 122,
 373-375, 376, 377, 379, 381, 382,
 383, 385, 386, 387, 388, 493, 495
 The Uplands 122
 Thembalihle (black spot) 66, 83,
 111, 548
 Thembalihle (township) see also
 Glencoe Township 178, 287
 Thembeni 120
 Thethwane 117
 Thokozeni 106, 118
 Thongaland 21, 23, 242, 243,
 247, 281
 Thornwood 210
 Tin Town 424
 Tolekela 62
 Tongaat 232
 Treasure Beach 228
 Trekboer see also Orieimen 106,
 114
 Treurfontein 116
 Trevalis 120
 Tridale 111
 Trosa 62, 105, 112

Trust Feeds 81, 118, 291
 Tugela Estates 308
 Tunis Farm 122

Ubombo (district) 23, 142, 161, 248, 279, 282
 Ubombo (town) 147
 Uitval see also Limehill 41, 67, 102, 105, 112, 131, 285, 287
 Uitzoek 109
 Umahafongwe Mission Reserve 164, 302
 Umbelline 111
 Umbulwane 13, 106, 115, 197, 333, 356, 441, 456, 510-527, 548, 555
 Umbumbulu 12, 63, 109, 188, 203, 205, 298, 299
 Umfolosi Dam 253, 285
 Umfolosi Game Reserve 161, 248, 267, 281
 Umfolosi, Lower see Lower Umfolosi
 Umgodi 112
 Umhlabatyan 112
 Umhlatuzana 199, 224
 Umkomaas 25, 231, 233, 303
 Umkomanzi Drift 121, 210, 218, 303
 Umkumbaan see Cato Manor
 Umlalazi 290
 Umlazi 12, 18, 132, 176, 181, 187, 188, 199, 201, 203, 204, 212, 234, 240, 297
 Umlazi Glebe 172, 177, 298
 Umnyesa 112
 Umtwalume 3476 121
 Umvoti (district) 290
 Umvoti (location) 18
 Umzimkulu 305
 Umzinto (district) 75, 107, 120-121, 180, 298, 299, 302, 303
 Umzinto (properties) 121
 Umzinto (town) 231, 233, 303
 Umzinto (township) see also Shayamoya
 Township 172
 Umzinyathi 18
 Underberg (district) 94, 102, 121-123, 148, 291, 293, 299, 373
 Underberg (properties) 122, 123, 249
 Ungigimini 111
 Upper Mzimkhulu 24
 Upper Tugela Location 66, 100, 143, 147, 150, 153, 164, 251, 293, 301
 Utrecht (district) 21, 56, 75, 76, 94, 102, 103, 104, 107, 123, 283, 284
 Utrecht (town) 220, 229
 Utrecht (township) 172, 177, 284

Vaalkop see also Limehill 67, 110, 285
 Valschrivier 107, 109
 Van Rooyen 105, 110
 Vergelegen 67, 110, 249, 285
 Vergelegen Forest Reserve 116, 117, 121, 293
 Verulam (district) see also Inanda 123-124
 Verulam (town) 232
 Vinks River 119, 301
 Vogelvlei 116
 Volksrust 124
 Voorslag 107, 124
 Vreda 106, 118
 Vryheid (district) 21, 75, 76, 79, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107, 124, 275, 283, 284
 Vryheid (town) 218, 220, 229, 232, 285, 356

Vryheid (township) see also
 Bhokuzulu 124, 172, 173
 Vulamehlo 62, 283
 Vulandondo 42, 67, 106, 114, 115, 171, 181, 251, 285, 287, 333, 550
 Vulindlela 273, 290



Waagalles 104, 110
 Waaihoek 182
 Walbedacht 210
 Walkershoek Dam 251, 287
 Wangu 67, 289, 290
 Wartburg 232
 Wasbank 25, 55, 102, 106, 115
 Watershed 115
 Watersmeet 106, 115
 Waterval 305
 Weenen (district) 28, 43, 45, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 83, 290, 291, 309, 310, 354, 551
 Weenen (town) 67, 72, 73, 232, 291, 308, 313
 Weenen Emergency Camp 67, 73, 172, 178, 290, 291
 Weenen Nature Reserve 248, 291
 Welcome 106, 114, 333
 Wembezi 61, 100, 172, 177, 182, 291, 293
 Wentworth 221, 228, 297, 435
 West Hesselton 101, 104, 109, 240
 Westlynn 117
 White City Location 510
 Wilgefontein see also Willowfontain 119
 Willeary 116
 Williamsgeuk 105, 110
 Willowfontain see also Wilgefontein 211, 291
 Winterskloof 237
 Winterton Emergency Camp 172, 178, 293
 Wittekop 108
 Woodford 108
 Woodlands (Durban) 227
 Woodlands (Pietermaritzburg) 237
 Woodlands Lodge 121, 210, 218, 302
 Woodstock Dam 108, 131, 150, 238, 239, 251, 293, 555
 Woody Glen 181
 Wykenam 104, 110

Zandbult 182
 Zeekoegat 465, 466
 Zedelingspost Mission see also
 Lunenburg 131
 Zenzele Township see also Howick (township) 172, 177, 178, 291
 Zwartkop (location) 18


Resettlement Areas

AFRICAN AREAS OF NATAL 1982 SHOWING RESETTLEMENT SITES

1. Mbazwana
2. Bilanyoni
3. Madadeni
4. Osizweni
5. Mondlo
6. Nondweni
7. Mpungamhlophe
8. Hlungulwana
9. Enakhosini
10. Ntambanana
11. Wangu
12. Nkonisa
13. Ntingwe
14. Mzimhlophe
15. Ntunjambili
16. Limehill complex
17. Ekuvukeni
18. Ezakheni
19. Sahlumbe; Msusamphi; Nomoya
20. Weenen Emergency Camp
21. Oliviershoek
22. Wembezi
23. Gamalakhe
24. Frankland
25. Bulwer Trust Farm
26. Phoenix
27. Inanda Newtown
28. KwaNdengezi
29. KwaDabeka
30. Polltax Farm
31. Halfdale
32. Moyeni
33. Mphophomeni
34. Ioskop
35. Compensation
36. Roberts Farm
37. Polweni
38. Ntuzuma
39. KwaMashu
40. Chatsworth
41. Umlazi
42. Mpumalanga
43. Winterton Emergency Camp
44. KwaMbono
45. Vulandondo
46. KwaMaqikizana
47. Myselnd



AFRICAN AREAS OF NATAL 1965 SHOWING BLACK SPOTS



SPP JUNE 1982