FORCED REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA

NATAL

This book was presented by

ASL

1993

to the Library of the University of
Cape Town

Volume 4 of the Surplus People Project report
PART ONE INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Natal/KwaZulu and relocation

1. Economic features of KwaZulu
2. Constitutional developments in KwaZulu
3. KwaZulu's response to relocation

APPENDIX 1. Extract, parliamentary debate 7.05.82
APPENDIX 2. Press release, KwaZulu Minister of the Interior

1.2 Land tenure in Natal before Union

1. The Natal reserves
2. The Mission reserves
3. The Zululand reserves
4. African freehold land
5. White and unalienated (State) land

1.3 Land tenure in Natal 1910 – 1960

1. Land legislation 1910 – 1936
3. Developments between 1936 – 1960
4. White-owned land

APPENDIX 1. MAHLULU article, 11.01.55

PART TWO RELOCATION IN NATAL: CATEGORIES AND REGIONS

2.1 Introduction

1. Categories and numbers
2. Historical overview, 1960 – 1982

2.2 Relocation sites: a summary

1. Relocation townships
2. Relocation closer settlements
3. Potential/proposed relocation sites
4. Unofficial relocation sites
2.3 Farm evictions

1. Introduction
2. The abolition of labour tenancy
3. Farm evictions since 1976

Appendix 1. Swellendam by four evictions, 1978/80
Appendix 2. Papas Sibihi, case study of an eviction
Appendix 3. Case study of an eviction in the Vryheid district
Appendix 4. Natal Witness report, 2.05.82

2.4 Black spots

1. Problems of definition and calculation
2. Total number of black spots in Natal
3. Conditions

Appendix 1. Natal Witness, 3.05.82
Appendix 2. Memorandum from Lesotho, threatened black spot
Appendix 3. Memorandum from a former landowner

2.5 Consolidation

1. Numbers of people and areas affected
2. Summary of consolidation plans 1955 - 1975
3. The financial cost of consolidation
4. Opposition to consolidation
5. The van der Walt Commission and after
6. The Ingwavuma land deal

Appendix 1. Reserve areas to be expropriated, 1975
Appendix 2. Natal Witness report, 20.05.82
Appendix 3. Natal Witness report, 20.05.82
Appendix 4. Notes on Grootville

2.6 Urban relocation

1. Background to urban relocation in Natal
2. Deproclamation and removal of townships
3. Location of townships inside KwaZulu
4. Urban relocation in Natal: a summary

Appendix 1. Towns in KwaZulu, 1968 - 1982
Appendix 2. Natal Witness report, 20.05.81
Appendix 3. Letter of appeal, Shakasville

2.7 Influx control

1. Introduction
2. Influx control in the Durban region
3. Repatriation

Appendix 1. The new influx control bill: a synopsis

2.8 Informal settlements

1. Introduction
2. Informal settlements in the Durban region
3. Malakasi
4. Richmond Farm
5. Informal settlements in Natal: a summary

Appendix 1. The housing backlog, Durban townships
Appendix 2. Notice of eviction, Malakasi
Appendix 3. Daily News report, 3.08.82
Appendix 4. Foehren: slim or exciting experiment?
Appendix 5. Richmond Farm undertaking

2.9 Group areas removals

1. Introduction
2. Forcemoovers of the Group Areas Act in Natal
3. Group areas removals in Durban
4. Group areas removals in the rest of Natal

Appendix 1. Oato Manor
Appendix 2. The effects of the Group Areas Act in Pietermaritzburg

2.10 Infrastructure/development projects

1. Introduction
2. Industrial and township development
3. Agricultural and rural development projects
4. Conservation and forestry projects
5. Dams
6. Roads

Appendix 1. Clairwood
Appendix 2. Nkuhume Game Reserve

2.11 Strategic removals

1. Introduction
2. Removals from the missile range
3. Clearing land on the north-eastern borders

2.12 Betterment

1. Introduction
2. Betterment in KwaZulu

Appendix 1. Ngwanezani - betterment village

2.13 Regional overview

1. North Eastern Natal
2. Northern Natal
3. North Western Natal
4. The North Coast
5. The Midlands
6. The Drakensberg
7. Lower Nkole
8. Greater Durban
9. Southern Natal
10. Griqualand East

PART THREE: CASE STUDIES OF RELOCATION SITES

1. Sahlombe

1. Introduction
2. Origins and background
3. Conditions
4. Demographic features
### Tables

#### GENERAL

| 1. | Natal Mission reserves  | 20 |
| 3. | Distribution of freehold land among Mission churches, 1910  | 27 |
| 4. | Land scheduled in Natal, 1913  | 30 |
| 5. | Allocation of reserve land, Natal 1913 – 1936  | 32 |
| 6. | Population density on various categories of african land, 1916  | 35 |
| 11. | Acquisition of quota and compensatory land (for black spots) in Natal, 1936 – 1980  | 101 |
| 12. | Land purchases required to implement 1975 consolidation proposals for KwaZulu  | 148 |
| 14. | Families moved in terms of the Group Areas Act by 1981, by province and race classification (excluding africans)  | 217 |
| 15. | Traders affected by the Group Areas Act, by province and race classification  | 218 |
| 17. | Area under betterment planning in Natal reserves, 1954 – 1965  | 271 |
| 18. | Compensation paid out for relocation as a result of betterment planning, KwaZulu, 1972 – 1979  | 273 |
| 19. | Unemployment rates in five relocation areas, Natal  | 529 |
| 20. | Comparison of economic activity and skill level of workers in areas surveyed by SPT, Natal  | 554 |

#### CASE STUDIES

**J.1 Sakhume**

| 1. | Previous employment by industry, skill and residential status  | 311 |
| 2. | Total population by sex and residential status  | 314 |
| 3. | Distribution of permanent resident population of working age  | 315 |
| 4. | Economic status of the total population, by residential status  | 317 |
| 5. | Fulltime employment, by industry, sex and residential status  | 318 |
| 6. | Skill level of workers by sex and residential status  | 319 |
| 7. | Educational standards by sex and residential status  | 321 |

**J.2 Nkhezani**

| 1. | Origins of households  | 339 |
| 2. | Length of time at previous place  | 336 |
| 3. | Manner of arrival of households  | 336 |
| 4. | Employment of workers before removal  | 337 |
| 5. | Total population by sex, age and residential status  | 340 |
| 6. | Household type and household size  | 341 |
| 7. | Household heads by age and sex  | 341 |
| 8. | Education by sex and residential status  | 342 |
| 9. | Education in the 7+ age group, by sex  | 342 |
| 10. | Economic status and sex of the population  | 343 |

#### 3.1 Mababane

| 1. | Length of time at previous place  | 356 |
| 2. | Total population by sex and residential status  | 360 |
| 3. | Malesility rate among the permanent and commuter population of working age  | 360 |
| 4. | Comparative distribution of children and adults in the permanent/commuter and total populations  | 361 |
| 5. | Household heads by age and sex  | 361 |
| 6. | Education of the population 7 years and older, by sex and residential status  | 362 |
| 7. | Economic status of the population, by sex and residential status  | 362 |
| 8. | Economic status of the permanent population, by sex and residential status  | 363 |
| 9. | Employment, by industry, residential status and sex  | 364 |
| 10. | Unemployment  | 364 |

#### 3.4 Compensation

| 1. | Population by sex and residential status  | 380 |
| 2. | Malestility rate in the permanent population of working age  | 381 |
| 3. | Household type  | 382 |
| 4. | Distribution of workers in male- and female-headed households  | 382 |
| 5. | Economic activity  | 383 |
| 6. | Not economically active population of working age, by sex and residential status  | 383 |
| 7. | Distribution of workers according to sex and residential status  | 384 |
| 8. | Employment by industry, sex and residential status  | 385 |
| 9. | Education, by standard and age category  | 387 |
| 10. | Education levels of commuters and migrants  | 387 |

#### 3.5 Imizamo bentwo

| 1. | Length of time at previous place  | 395 |
| 2. | Total population, by age, sex and residential status  | 397 |
| 3. | Education in the 7+ age group, by sex and residential status  | 398 |
| 4. | Economic activity by sex and residential status  | 399 |
| 5. | Employment by sex, industry and residential status  | 400 |
| 6. | Occupation level by sex and residential status  | 400 |

#### 3.7 Phoenix

| 1. | Length of time people lived at previous place  | 426 |
| 2. | Population distribution by age, sex and residential status  | 429 |
| 3. | Household heads, by age and sex  | 429 |
| 4. | Education levels of the population 7 years and older, by sex and residential status  | 430 |
| 5. | Employment by occupation, sex and residential status  | 432 |
| 6. | Employment by industry, sex and residential status  | 432 |
| 7. | Unemployment by residential status  | 432 |

#### 4.1 Matikane’s Kup

| 1. | Length of residence of households  | 444 |
| 2. | Average diet at Matikane’s Kop, Sakhume, Mababane and Compensation  | 446 |
| 3. | Distribution of population, by sex and residential status  | 448 |
| 4. | Distribution of population by age, sex and residential status  | 449 |
5. Household type 449
6. Education by sex and residential status 450
7. Economic status of the total population, by sex and residential status 451
8. Unemployment rates 452
9. Occupation level of workers, by sex and residential status 452
10. Employment by industry, sex and residential status 452

Major summaries of places/information
1. Relocation townships 60
2. Relocation closer settlements 62
3. Potential/proposed relocation sites 67
4. Coal deposits on black spots in 8 districts of Northern Natal 104
7. Reserve areas threatened with removal, 1975 164
8. Townships moved 176
9. Townships under threat 177
10. Townships where reprieve promised 179
12. Major informal settlements, Greater Durban 209
13. Major informal settlements, rest of Natal 210
14. The housing backlog, Durban townships, 1981 212
15. Group Areas proclamations, Durban 227
16. Group Areas proclamations, rest of Natal 232
17. Group Areas proclamations, Pietermaritzburg, 1960 236

Maps
1. Areas accessible to roads, railways, electricity, Natal 5
2. African reserves, colony of Natal and Zululand, 1904 22
3. Land ownership, colony of Natal, 1910 26
4. ‘Die beswarring van die Platteland’, Natal 1959 44
5. Consolidation proposals, Tomlinson Commission, 1955 140
6. The 1972 consolidation proposals for Natal 144
7. The 1975 consolidation proposals for Natal 146
8. Proposed land deal, Ingwavuma and Sindalangentsha 160
9. Informal settlements in the Durban area 200
10. Land occupation, Durban, 1950 222
11. Group Areas, Durban, 1983 226
12. Proposed conservation area, Zongolanga 246
13. Past and threatened removals: Game reserves and dams, Natal 250
15. Sub-regions for the purposes of the Report 278
16. Removals in North Eastern Natal 280
17. Removals in Northern and North Western Natal 286
18. Removals on the North Coast 288
19. Removals in the Natal Midlands and Drakensberg 292
20. Removals in the Lower Tugela area 294
21. Removals in the Greater Durban area 296
22. Removals in Eastern Natal 300
23. Removals in Griqualand East 304
24. SPP case studies, Natal: relocated sites 307

Photographs
1. Farm evicctees' goods, Kondewani 1981 390
2. Farm evicctees, Kondewani 1981 393
3. Toilet blocks for future relocation sites, near Fakobeni 393
4. Relocating KwaZulu households at Compensation, July 1981 393
5. Farm evicctees, Kondewani 1981 393
6. Demolishing houses, KwaZulu, July 1981 393
7. Partially demolished house, KwaZulu, July 1981 393
8. Old man, St Wendolins 393
9. Eviction 393
10. Relocating KwaZulu households at Compensation, July 1981 393
11. Chesterville 393
12. Durban hotels 393
13. Section of KwaZulu, Stanger 393
14. Stang, Stanger 393
15. Otea Manor 393
16. Relocating KwaZulu household, Compensation, July 1981 393
17. Removal of KwaZulu to Compensation, July 1981 393
18. Bulver Trust Farm 393
19. Former labour tenant, Shalumbe 393
20. Khayelitsha 393
21. Woman making beer, Shalumbe 393
22. Compensation, July 1981 393
23. Removal of KwaZulu to Compensation, July 1981 393
24. KwaZulu Newtown 413
25. Kondewani 420
26. Phoenix 434
27. Stonecoal erupts landowner in front of numbered front door 438
28. Mathews's Kop 440
29. Man in front of his house, St Wendolins 478
30. KwaZulu before its removal 480
31. Community meeting, KwaZulu, 1980 488
32. Family graveyard, Stonecoal, 1980 493
33. Demolished shop, Stonecoal, 1980 496
34. Community meeting, Umhlelele, 1981 523
35. Roadside stall, Reserve Four, 1981 543
36. Speaker at meeting, Umhlelele, 1981 544
37. Community meeting, Umhlelele, 1981 544
GLOSSARY

CATEGORIES OF RELLOCATION

Re-location

Removal

Resettlement

All three terms are commonly used to describe both the overall policy and the processes involved in the removal, state-sponsored removals of people almost all of them from the areas to which they have characterised by the apartheid system. SPF has favoured using either 'relocation' or the more descriptive 'removal' or 'forced removal' in preference to 'resettlement' since the latter implies a voluntary or imposed nature of transfers to the people who are moved and disguises the coerced nature of these population movements.

Consolidation

This is the official term used to describe the policy developed by the central government in the 1970s to reduce the number of separate, isolated pieces of land making up each of the bantustans (see below); it is part of the process of turning these areas into independent 'national states'.

Betterment planning

This refers to the schemes introduced by the central government that since the 1950s and 1960s in an attempt to improve land use and thus improve and rationalise reserve agriculture. Under betterment, tribal areas are divided into residential and agricultural land and the people living on the land moved into rural villages.

See below.

Influx control

This refers to the network of legislation and regulations which controls African access to the urban-industrial centres situated in what is claimed to be white South Africa: it severely limits the numbers of African people allowed to live and work there to those deemed to qualify in terms of section 10 of the Urban Areas Act of 1953, as amended.

Urban relocation

This refers to the deproclamation of African townships falling within prescribed (see below) urban areas, and their removal, to newly created townships within the boundaries of the bantustans. Physical removal does not always occur, as the boundaries of the bantustans can also be redrawn in order to encompass already existing townships within its boundaries.

CATEGORIES OF RURAL LAND

Reserve

Bantustan

Homeland

National state

These are the terms that have been officially applied to the African areas by the central government at various stages of South African history. 'Reserve' dates from the pre-apartheid period; the last three terms represent attempts to adjust the evolution of the policy of apartheid and refer to the various ethnic political constructions that have been created on the basis of the former reserves: Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, Soweto, Qwa-Qwa, Bophuthatswana, Bantustan, Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda. 'National state' is the most recent term to have been coined. SPF has chosen not to use either 'homeland' or 'national state' because of their unacceptable ideological bias. They present an image of these territories as economically viable, politically separate entities that are the only true and traditional 'homelands' of the African people of South Africa, themselves divided along ethnic lines, and thus serve to justify the apartheid policy. Where possible, we have referred to the various territories by name directly (e.g. Transkei, Ciskei etc.); otherwise, depending on the context, we have used 'reserve' or 'bantustan'.

SCHEDULED LAND

Land set aside in terms of the Native Land Act of 1913 for occupation and ownership by african. The schedule to the Act was based on the existing african reserves and locations and amounted to about 8,95 million ha.

Additional land set aside for African occupation and ownership, to be added to the scheduled areas, in terms of the Native Land and Land Act of 1936. The total amount to be released in South Africa in 1936 amounted to about 6,1 million ha. Some of this was land that was already occupied or owned by Africans; the balance had to be acquired by the South African Native Trust (SADT, later SAPF, then SAND) which was established at this time.

The total amount of land to be added to the scheduled areas in terms of the 1936 land legislation was apportioned between the four provinces on a quota basis that amount represented the maximum area that could be occupied or owned by Africans in each province. The total area of African land (scheduled and released) was then fixed at a little below 136 of the total area in South Africa.

Land purchased by the state in terms of the 1936 land legislation and administered by the SAPF/SAND.

This is an official term that is generally used to refer to African freehold land which was acquired before the 1913 Act and which lies outside the scheduled or released areas. It is one of the categories of land threatened with removal because it falls within what is considered the white area.

In the SPF report we have used this term to refer to all African freehold land that is considered a threat of removal, including land falling within scheduled or released areas that are to be moved in terms of the consolidation policy.

BLACK SPOT

In an official term that is generally used to refer to African freehold land which was acquired before the 1913 Act and which lies outside the scheduled or released areas. It is one of the categories of land threatened with removal because it falls within what is considered the white area.

In the SPF report we have used this term to refer to all African freehold land that is considered a threat of removal, including land falling within scheduled or released areas that are to be moved in terms of the consolidation policy.

SQUA LEAD

Land lying within the new areas set aside in terms of the Native Land Act of 1913.

TRUST LAND

Land which has been or is to be expropriated from the bantustans in terms of the consolidation policy of the government.

EXCISED LAND

Land which has been or is to be added to the various bantustans, in compensation for the areas to be expropriated in terms of the consolidation policy of the government, so as to meet the quota of land set in 1936

CATEGORIES OF URBAN RESIDENTIAL AREAS

Prescribed areas

These are areas that have been proclaimed solely for occupation by members of a particular race group, either whites, coloured, Indian, in terms of the Group Areas Act of 1950. The Act also affects trading rights and inter racial property transactions.

Townships

Residential areas set aside for African, Indian or coloured occupation, usually situated adjacent to or within commuting distance of a white urban area on which they are economically dependent. Conditions in these areas vary, but generally formal housing is provided for rent, or sold sometimes for sale. These areas are generally better off with regard to services and facilities than are the closer settlements described below.

Group areas

These are areas that have been proclaimed solely for occupation by members of a particular race group, either whites, coloured, Indian, in terms of the Group Areas Act of 1950. The Act also affects trading rights and inter racial property transactions.

Group areas

These are areas that have been proclaimed solely for occupation by members of a particular race group, either whites, coloured, Indian, in terms of the Group Areas Act of 1950. The Act also affects trading rights and inter racial property transactions.
Informal settlements

Areas of settlement which are not planned or approved by the local authorities or the State. Housing is erected by the occupants of the land themselves, generally out of unorthodox building materials. The areas are often densely populated and generally poorly serviced.

The process by which the legal procedure for establishing an authorized African township is reversed. This is a necessary preliminary step before such a township can be relocated.

Proclamation (of a township)

The official term used to describe a type of settlement established for African people on reserves or Trust land that is for residential purposes only - no agricultural land is attached - and far more rudimentary in the type of facilities it has than the Bantu. People who are removed off black spots and white farms are generally relocated to these settlements. They are provided with temporary accommodation and are expected to build their own permanent houses. Facilities vary but generally (not always) include pit latrines and a communal water supply point.

Closer settlement

The area of urban African settlement established for African people on reserves or Trust land that is for residential purposes only - no agricultural land is attached - and far more rudimentary in the type of facilities it has than the Bantu. People who are removed off black spots and white farms are generally relocated to these settlements. They are provided with temporary accommodation and are expected to build their own permanent houses. Facilities vary but generally (not always) include pit latrines and a communal water supply point.

Bantu.

This is another example of a language being manipulated by the government to promote the ideology of apartheid. In this report the term "black" is used to include all those who are disenfranchised and are not classified as white; it thus includes all the people who are officially classified as Bantu/Black, Coloured or Indian. However since the apartheid legislation affects these different sections of the black population differently in certain important respects, it is often necessary to distinguish between people along the official lines, and in those instances in which we have used the terms "African", "Indian", or "Coloured", we have deliberately not capitalized the first letter in "African" or "Indian" because we do not wish to legitimize the ideology of ethnic divisions and racial implicit in their usage.

Labour tenants

These are African families living on white-owned farms who supply their labour to the landowner for part of the year (1 - 9 months) as a form of rent, in return for the use of some of the land for themselves. Historically the most widespread form of labour in the northern parts of the country, the labour tenant system was finally abolished by the government entirely in 1979.

The term 'rent' or 'cash tenant' has been used in the report to refer specifically to those African families living on white-owned farming land who have commonly been referred to as 'squatters', because they are not labour tenants or full-time farm workers, but who do pay a cash rental for the land. The term has been used to distinguish them from labour tenants. The government has over the years noted to eliminate this class of people.

This is another ideologically loaded term. It is used in the report to refer to people living illegally on land without the permission of the landowner. The official use of the term is far broader and looser and it may be used to describe any black person whose presence on a particular piece of land is not approved of by the authorities, regardless of the nature of the agreement between the occupant and the landowner. It has been used to describe people living on white-owned land, on black-owned land, both within and without the Bantustans, on tribal land and on State land.

The term has been used in the report to refer to workers who work outside of their place of residence but who are able to travel to and from work on a daily or weekly basis, i.e. as distict from migrant workers (who only return home monthly or annually) or people working in the place where they live. We have not restricted the use of the term to workers travelling between Bantustan settlements and non-Bantustan centres of employment only, which is the official usage.

CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE

black

In terms of the Population Registration Act of 1950, everybody in South Africa was classified according to their "race", as defined by the Act, the four major classifications being established as 'White', 'Native' (subsequently Bantu, subsequently Black), 'Coloured' and 'Indian'. This is another example of a language being manipulated by the government to promote the ideology of apartheid. In this report the term "black" is used to include all those who are disenfranchised and are not classified as white; it thus includes all the people who are officially classified as Bantu/Black, Coloured or Indian. However since the apartheid legislation affects these different sections of the black population differently in certain important respects, it is often necessary to distinguish between people along the official lines, and in those instances in which we have used the terms "African", "Indian", or "Coloured", we have deliberately not capitalized the first letter in "African" or "Indian" because we do not wish to legitimize the ideology of ethnic divisions and racial implicit in their usage.

Indian

Labour tenants

These are African families living on white-owned farms who supply their labour to the landowner for part of the year (1 - 9 months) as a form of rent, in return for the use of some of the land for themselves. Historically the most widespread form of labour in the northern parts of the country, the labour tenant system was finally abolished by the government entirely in 1979.

The term 'rent' or 'cash tenant' has been used in the report to refer specifically to those African families living on white-owned farming land who have commonly been referred to as 'squatters', because they are not labour tenants or full-time farm workers, but who do pay a cash rental for the land. The term has been used to distinguish them from labour tenants. The government has over the years noted to eliminate this class of people.

This is another ideologically loaded term. It is used in the report to refer to people living illegally on land without the permission of the landowner. The official use of the term is far broader and looser and it may be used to describe any black person whose presence on a particular piece of land is not approved of by the authorities, regardless of the nature of the agreement between the occupant and the landowner. It has been used to describe people living on white-owned land, on black-owned land, both within and without the Bantustans, on tribal land and on State land.

The term has been used in the report to refer to workers who work outside of their place of residence but who are able to travel to and from work on a daily or weekly basis, i.e. as distict from migrant workers (who only return home monthly or annually) or people working in the place where they live. We have not restricted the use of the term to workers travelling between Bantustan settlements and non-Bantustan centres of employment only, which is the official usage.

rent/cash tenants

Squatters

Computers

Adj.

adjacent

app.
appears/apparently

BAA.B.
Administration Board

bs
black spot/s

c.
circle

C & D
Cooperation and Development

comp.
compensatory

deprocl.
deproclaimed

esth.
establ.
established

g.s.
Group Areas

gg
Government

hh
household/s

incl.
including

km
kilometres

Kmb
Kmbula

maj.
majority

perm.
permanent

pop.
population

prim.
primary

sec.
secondary

sim.
similar

temp.
temporary

weekly

ABBREVIATIONS

AFRA

African Cooperative Action Trust

ANC

African National Congress

BDA

Bantu Administration and Development

BSE

Bureau for Economic Research, Cooperation and Development

Bantu Trust Corporation

CA

Coloured Affairs Department

CRFC

Corporation for Economic Development

CWA

Cuto_main Residents' Association

NCS

Community Research Unit

DRA

Drazenberg Administration Board

Durbane

Durban City Council

DUR

Durban and District Housing Co-ordination Committee

ESAC

Durban Housing Action Committee

Government

Kwamululu Development Corporation

Metal Agricultural Union

National Council of Women

National Industrial Council

New Republic Party

Old Federal Party

Port Natal Administration Board

Public Utility Transport Corporation

Phoenix Working Committee

South African Agricultural Union

South African Development Trust/South African Native Trust

South African Defence Force

South African Indian Council

South African Industrial Co-operative Corporation

South African Institute of Race Relations

South African Police

South African Sugar Association

Surplus Peoples Project
GENERAL PREFACE TO THE S.P.P. REPORT

Within days of announcing a reprise for the Crossroads community outside Cape Town, in April 1975, the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr P.C.J. Koornhof, confirmed that 650 African families would be removed off tribal and african freehold land in the Tugela Basin in Natal, to make way for the building of the Woodstock Dam. The latter removal received an obscene response in the press and was forgotten in the wave of euphoria which marked the Crossroads Settlement. In April 1979 Total Strategy (against the Total Cowlaght) won at its peak and had decisions appeared from a number of Departments serving, in this case, to highlight contradictions in the apartheid system.

While Crossroads had been the focus of national and international attention from the churches, liberal organisations and those in opposition generally, it was by no means the only community under threat of removal. Matters which helped Crossroads into the limelight included firstly, the fierce resistance of the people to be moved; secondly, its proximity to a metropolitan area (and therefore press, concerned public, welfare organisations and university resources) and thirdly, the recent demolitions of all other squatter communities in Cape Town.

The idea of establishing the Surplus People Project, as a national research project on relocation, took root at this time in response to these events. Some people who had been involved in the Crossroads support group were unconvincing of the desirability of the Koornhof deal there and felt the need to focus on forced removals throughout the country, particularly in the rural areas where access was difficult, resulting in relocation unknown to outsiders. It was felt that an update of The Discarded People by Constanze Desmond was due, looking particularly at what had happened during the 1970s since the publication of Desmond's study. At the same time Gerhard Harz was compiling African Population Relocation in South Africa, for the South African Institute of Race Relations; this raised the general issues of relocation and suggested further areas of work. After consultation with various community workers and academics, it was decided to hold a seminar of interested people to see if a national project on investigating relocation and raising the issues in public could be launched. The first meeting was held in February 1980. It was attended by 24 participants, most of whom became the core of the project which adopted the name Surplus People Project (SPP).

The objects of the project were established then as follows:

1. To co-ordinate and initiate research projects into population relocation in South Africa, and anything which has a bearing on such relocation
2. To work in conjunction with other groups and individuals who are engaged in similar work
3. To publish the results of the research in any manner that is decided by the management committee
4. To engage in any activity which is deemed by the management committee to be necessary to the adequate fulfilment of the above objects.

Initially the project was intended to last one year, but this became inadequate and while funds were raised for that period, they were stretched to cover three years. Sincere thanks are expressed to the Interchurch Co-ordination Committee for Development Projects in the Netherlands for its financial and moral support.

The Surplus People Project derives its name from obvious sources. As a result of increased capitalisation of industry, agriculture and mining relatively fewer unskilled workers are demanded by the economy. The changing nature of capitalist development in South Africa has resulted in an increased demand for skilled workers, hence an attempt on the part of the ruling class to consolidate an urban black population with a stake in the system, and the determination to rid white South Africa of the unproductive, unemployed, disabled and youth. From surveys and field work it has become clear that there are thousands of people who will never gain access to employment in urban areas and unless they are prepared to work for R1,00 per day on white owned farms, where there may still be some work, they have been made redundant permanently. These surplus people will never enter the wage labour market under the present economic system.

However, during the course of the project, it has also become clearer to those involved in it that relocation has not been used only against these surplus to the economy's needs. Large numbers of skilled workers and employed people generally have been relocated under the group areas and urban relocation policies, for instance, while the removals linked to the consolidation planning of the 1970s have had a major political component to them. The original conceptualisation of what the project was investigating, as reflected in its name, has been broadened as a result.

The Surplus People Project was created as a voluntary group with a part-time national co-ordinator and a small steering or management committee for administrative matters. The strengths and weaknesses of a voluntary group were continually present. The experience from so varied a membership, based in Cape Town, Grahamstown, Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Johannesburg but with other participants from the length and breadth of the country, was very valuable. There was a healthy mixture of theoreticians and practitioners with each learning from the other. For the first time many of the accused in field work were community workers, priests and health workers were introduced to theoretical material which helped explain what they had observed for years. But the difficulties of voluntary work lie in the co-ordination of work and the responsibility of members to the group when it comes to working to deadlines. Some dropped out of the group and others joined. Those left to the end have had the major task of collating all work and avoiding the masses of material collected.

The State intervened at various stages: Guy Berger, an early participant, was jailed (under the Terrorism Act) for other activity; Cedric de Beer and Auret van Heerden were detained for over ten months and released without being charged. A number of other participants were detained for shorter periods in connection with other alleged activities. Field workers were harassed at various times.

It became clear that while a national understanding was essential, the whole country could not be covered in the same detail. Some areas were more accessible, both in terms of proximity to metropolitan areas and the level of political repression e.g. KwaZulu. Other areas exhibited less relocation on a mass basis e.g. Transkei. In the case of the Transkei it was decided that the Eastern Cape group could not deal in depth with more than the Ciskei where mass removals have taken place on a very large scale and some of the worst conditions in the country occur. Relocation in the Transkei is therefore dealt with only as a chapter in their regional report. The national 5-volume report attempts to be comprehensive but it cannot claim to be uniformly reliable. It is, however, the most up to date and the most comprehensive account yet published.

While it is always difficult to offer the right proportion of thanks to organisations and individuals, two organisations deserve special mention: the APHSA (Association for Rural Advancement) in Pietermaritzburg for making the services of Cheryl Walker available at all times for research and fieldwork (which accounts for the Natal volume being so much
To pull all the strands of so large a study together has proved an extremely difficult task and the concluding chapter merely highlights the major issues that emerge in the course of the report. More work still needs to be done on comparing conditions in relocation areas with those prevailing in non-relocation areas, particularly rural areas, and in analysing the factors influencing the nature and degree of resistance to removals by threatened communities. Since so much relocation is still pending in Natal, this is not an academic issue and cannot be accommodated by academic research only. One of the strengths of the Natal region of SF is that, largely because of the involvement of APRA, there has been ongoing contact with a number of the communities discussed in the report and the information collected over the past three years has been disseminated quite widely through Natal/KwaZulu.

In producing this volume, the Natal region of SF has been helped by a large number of individuals and institutions. In addition to the institutions mentioned in the 'General Preface to the SF Report', the following individuals deserve special thanks: Audrey Thorne, for her skill, patience and support in typing both this volume and Volume One; John Aritchison and Robin Mackie for all their help with the printing; Ruth Higgo, Bill Guest, Christopher Herrett and Louise Ferr for their contributions to Parts Three and Four; Martin Dunn, Lindive Maskeli, Joanne Nyaka and all those who helped with the Phoenix survey for their contribution as fieldworkers; Rose Doyle as well as all those students at the Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Natal, Durban, for their help in drawing the maps, and Johan Maree.

While this volume is the outcome of a collective effort on the part of the SF participants in Natal, we would like to acknowledge the special contribution of Jenny Price, Jenny Kirk, Judith Skier and Cheryl Walker in seeing it through to completion.
PART ONE INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1. NATAL/KWAZULU AND RELOCATION

1. Introduction

There are a number of features of Natal/KwaZulu which set it apart from the rest of South Africa and have ensured that the process of removal has been somewhat different here from what it has been in the other provinces. Despite the existence of important local variations within it, this region does form a readily distinguishable and separate entity within Southern Africa as a whole - geographically, economically, politically. In any economic or ecological analysis of the region it is impossible to separate out KwaZulu from the rest of Natal. It is totally merged into the regional economy, albeit in a periphery/metropole relationship. This region is one of the most densely populated areas in the country, containing approximately 20% of the total population but only 7% of the total land; KwaZulu on its own is even more densely populated having in 1970 a population density of 171 per square mile. (Horrell, 1971, 39)

Relative to its size Natal/KwaZulu contains a large amount of high-potential agricultural land, and a higher percentage of the country's water resources (25% of the total runoff) than the other provinces, but its extremely broken topography acts as a constraint on agricultural production.

Politically the region differs in some crucial aspects from the other provinces. As far as relocation is concerned, the most significant feature is that in Natal, unlike the other provinces, there is only one bantustan to deal with and, as bantustans go, it is a relatively powerful one. KwaZulu is one of the largest of the bantustans; it is by far the most populous. It occupies some 36% of the land mass of Natal but contains over 55% of the total population in the region - 3,487,667 people out of a total for the region of 5,722,221 according to the 1980 census. (Bethlehem Commission, vol. 1, 69). The Commission also notes that these official figures probably underestimate the population by as much as 400,000, most of whom would be black.) The Zulu ethnic group, as defined by the central government, is the largest single grouping in South Africa; in Natal (including KwaZulu) over 77% of the total population is African and over 90% of all Africans are Zulu speaking. (Bethlehem Commission, vol. 1, 70.) One
result of this Dulu-speaking preponderance in the region is that there has been very little scope for the kind of ethnic manipulation by the State that is found in the Transvaal - the Inqempuma land deal being an outstanding exception. Here Pretoria has been assiduously attempting to create a pro-Dulu nationalism among people it formerly had classified as Dulu, in order to justify its proposal to hand the district over to Swaziland. In most cases, however, outside of the workings of the Group Areas Act (which has affected mainly Indians and is discussed below), the people being relocated in Natal are classified as Dulu citizens and moved into land that either is or is destined to become part of Emfulu.

Sheer numbers alone, therefore, would make Emfulu a significant force in the region. In addition, however, Emfulu has presented Pretoria with the most recalcitrant line against consolidation and against 'independence' of all the bantustans. Although accepting the concepts of apartheid to the extent of becoming a 'self-governing national state', Emfulu has publicly and repeatedly refused to accept full political independence on the Pretoria model; it has presented itself instead as an opposition movement - even a liberation movement - that is using the system to undermine the system. This brings a degree of ambiguity and fluidity to regional politics that is lacking in the other provinces and has had important repercussions on the nature of removals and especially resistance to removals in Natal/Emfulu, as is discussed more fully in subsequent sections of this report. Although ultimately dependent on Pretoria and fully enmeshed in the administration of apartheid, the Emfulu authority has achieved a certain degree of autonomy and is committed, for its own political credibility, to maintaining at least the appearance of that.

Pretoria faces other political problems in the Natal region as well. Despite recent moves into the white electorate, the National Party does not command a majority following among the white population. Natal is the only province where the provincial council is controlled by an opposition party, in this case the conservative and, outside of Natal, very weak New Republic Party. In drawing up its consolidation plans for the region, Pretoria clearly sees its main opposition from white interests, mainly farmers, as opposed to handing agricultural land over to Emfulu. This has made implementation of these plans more difficult. At the same time, a potentially powerful alliance is being forged in Natal between Emfulu and more liberal white groups, particularly in the sugar industry and the business world. These groups see in the Bantu administration their main hope for the continued security of themselves and the profitability of their investments. The sugar industry is the dominant industry in Natal and has been particularly influential in trying to draw up a regional political alternative to the present system, based on recognition of Emfulu as a legitimate and key institution and committed to the maintenance of what is labelled 'the free enterprise system'. The most recent expression of this alliance between Emfulu and liberal capital has been in the establishment of the Bantu Economic Commission, whose report was published in early 1982.

Apart from these political considerations, there are other special features of the region which have had a bearing on the nature of removals. Emfulu, as historically constructed, is the most fragmented of all the bantustans. In 1975 it consisted officially of 68 major pieces and 157 small pieces scattered throughout the province. (Thorington-Smith et al, 1975, vol. 1: 6. In fact, if all the African freehold holdings had been included in this count, the de facto number of pieces of African land, if not of Emfulu, would have been even higher, as the section on black spots in this report makes clear.) By comparison Nqutywane, the next most fragmented bantustan, consisted, before consolidation, of a mere 19 pieces. Emfulu is a consolidationist's nightmare, even on paper. The best that Nationalist planners have been able to suggest publicly thus far (we do not know yet what the von der Walt Commission has proposed) is that it be reduced to ten pieces; and in trying to work

towards that, Pretoria has encountered serious opposition from both whites and blacks in Natal.

At the same time, until very recently, a very large percentage of African people in Natal have had access to agricultural land outside the scheduled or released reserve lands: either as labour tenants, rent tenants and squatters on State or private white land, or as homesteaders and their tenants on black freehold farms. These people, living under conditions of apartheid theory, have been a major target of State relocation drives, but eliminating them has proved logistically a very large and difficult task. We estimate that today, despite the massive relocation of people over the past twenty years, over half of all the African freehold areas have still not been eradicaded, while the African population in what is supposedly the white farming areas still greatly exceeds the white population. In Natal, more than in any other province, the fact of an overwhelming African majority in the population is becoming increasingly difficult for the State both to deny and to control spatially. The goal of 'no more Black South Africans', towards which much of the relocation policies of the past have been directed, is more elusive here than anywhere else in the country, with the single exception perhaps of the Witwatersrand.

There is another feature of Natal that has played an important part in shaping relocation policies: its strategic location. The region has a small but strategically very sensitive common border with Mozambique and Swaziland in the north, as well as a long and from the military point of view, exposed coastline stretching south from Mozambique. These northern areas are populated entirely by Africans and clearing these border areas of their potentially troublesome residents has been an important category of relocation over the last two decades. The Inqempuma land deal with Swaziland has served to focus attention on this aspect recently; an awareness of the history of removals for military and strategic reasons in this part of the province is an essential part of the background to this.

Thus far one has written as if only the people affected by forced removals in Natal have been affected by rural and the only relocation sites located within Emfulu. This of course is not the full picture of relocation in the region. Urban removals under the Group Areas Act have amounted to a major category of relocation in Natal as well. This Act has affected mainly the very substantial Indian community in Natal; it is discussed in Part Two.

2. Economic features of Kwazulu

Kwazulu, despite its relatively more favourable irrigation and agricultural potential, reveals all the features of underdevelopment that characterise the black rural areas of South Africa in general: widespread, often grinding poverty; lack of infrastructural and industrial development; a high rate of male migrant labour; a high degree of bandswomanship among the supposedly subsistence sector; an overall low level of economic activity; poor health and welfare services. It has no basis for independent economic development but is totally dependent on the metropolitan/industrial centres that are located beyond its boundaries.

It is not intended to go into these features here; they are well known and well-documented in numerous studies of the region. The statistics of underdevelopment have most recently been very comprehensively summarised in the report of the Bantu Economic Commission. From the point of view of this study on relocation in the region, the following features of Emfulu's economy are considered particularly pertinent:

1. The already existing demographic imbalance, which has been and will be further
acccelerated by relocation into the area. It is estimated that almost 50% of the population of KwaZulu is in the age group 0-11, and furthermore, because of the high level of dependency on migrant labour in the region, the de facto adult population approaches an average ratio of two females to every male. (Butheleni Commission, vol. 1, 10) The degree of imbalance varies from region to region and also within different adult age groupings.

2. Lack of industrial potential: Apart from some coal-mining potential in the Kwanza district, the region as a whole has very little industrial or mining potential. There used to be a number of privately-owned African farms in the Newcastle/Dundee districts which had significant deposits of coal on them; there are still some in the Klip River district. Most of these have already been expropriated and their people removed and those remaining are under imminent threat. As is described in Part Two, the mineral wealth of these lands has been exploited by white-owned mining companies and not the original owners.

KwaZulu has an exceptionally rugged terrain and its topography alone — no accident of history — ensures that industrial and infrastructural development will be confined to certain corridors which remain under white control. (See map opposite.) The two major harbours in the Natal/KwaZulu region, Durban and Richards Bay, are in white Natal and Pretoria has made it clear that that is where control over them will remain. Industrial decentralization in Natal/KwaZulu has not proved successful. It is estimated that at the few industrial growth points inside KwaZulu, over R182 million has been spent to establish 44 factories which, in 1981, employed a total of 6,122 people, 5,322 of them at Isithwane, a subsidiary amount compared to the number of people needing jobs in the region. (Some 30,000 new jobseekers come onto the labour market in KwaZulu every year. Figures supplied by Dr Larte, Economics Dept, University of Natal.)

The most recent decentralization concessions announced by Pretoria in April 1982 hold out no possibility of significant industrial development within KwaZulu and it is clear that KwaZulu will continue to be dependent on migrant labour for the foreseeable future.

3. The degree of dependence on outside employment: In 1976 56% of the economically active population of KwaZulu was employed outside its boundaries and nearly 78% of the Gross Domestic Product for the region came from the export of labour. It is estimated further that 80% of the earnings of all its economically active people (working both within and without the boundaries of KwaZulu) is spent outside KwaZulu. Migrant remittances to dependents left behind in KwaZulu amount to 13.9% of the rural output (of the region as a whole) and 15.9% of the subsistence output which confirms the point already made, that the people living inside KwaZulu depend for their survival on remittances coming from outside. (Above statistics drawn from Butheleni Commission, vol. 2, 155-162)

4. Rural landlessness and environmental degradation: The number of landless rural households in KwaZulu has been estimated at between 30 and 40% of the population. At the same time, the destruction of the environment as a result of overpopulation, overstocking, deforestation and lack of capital for development is proceeding at a terrifying rate and in some parts of KwaZulu, notably the Umgungu and Umgqu example, appears to be irreversible. In addition to a massive programme of rural reconstruction, the area needs to shed the enormous number of surplus people who are chained to it by government policies if it is ever to become more than a cheap labour reserve and a dumping ground for those who are surplus to the needs of the South African economy as presently structured.

3. Constitutional developments in KwaZulu

As the next chapter on the history of land tenure in the Natal region makes clear, KwaZulu is historically a very recent political creation and its boundaries bear little relationship to the pattern of African land ownership and occupation before the coming of the white settlers in the early 19th century. Its creation marks the most recent
phase in a long history of struggle between white and black over control of the land, its resources and the labour to work them. The present structure of government in KwaZulu has its roots in the institutions created by the Natives' Authority Act of 1913. This provided for the establishment of ethnically based tribal, regional and territorial authorities, with limited powers of local government, in the various reserves in South Africa; this Act thereby created tribal and traditional institutions of government, such as chiefdomship, into the administration of the homeland. In 1959, eight 'national units', including that of the Zulu, were decolonized under the Promotion of Self-Government Act, and the bantustan/homeland/ independent national states are in South African politics was launched. In 1968 and 1969 new territorial authorities, with enlarged powers, were established in most of the bantustans. At first developments in the Zulu bantustan lagged behind the others because of initial opposition to the scheme. By 1970, however, the government had successfully overcome this opposition and a territorial authority, with Chief Gakenke Buthelezi as Chief Executive Officer, was created. KwaZulu was thereby officially established and the concept of a separate Zulu region within both Natal and South Africa, the only official home of all the Zulu-speaking people in South Africa, was thus imposed on Natal. The next phase in the elevation of KwaZulu into a tool of apartheid administration came with the establishment of a Legislative Assembly in 1972. (Proclamation 169, 1972) As in the other bantustans, chiefs were given a dominant role in the new Assembly. This Assembly was constituted as follows:

1. A personal representative of the Paramount Chief (Goodwill Zwelithini);
2. Three chiefs appointed by each regional authority - 66 in total;
3. One chief from each tribal authority deemed to be a regional authority (i.e. where no regional authority yet existed);
4. 55 elected members.

In addition an Executive Council was established, made up of a Chief Executive Councillor, who had to be a chief (Chief Buthelezi), and five other members of the Assembly, at least two of whom had to be chiefs. The Departments under the control of the Executive Council were: Authority Affairs and Finance, Education and Culture, Community Affairs, Works, Agriculture, and Justice. (Horrell, 1973, 54)

Entry into the next phase of constitutional development, that of becoming a self-governing territory, was delayed in KwaZulu until 1977, mainly because of a dispute between Pretoria and the KwaZulu Executive Council over the means of identification of voters for the election, and also because of problems associated with the demarcation of electoral divisions: lack of progress with consolidation in the area meant that the boundaries of the territory were not yet finally fixed. The Executive Council was opposed to the use of reference books as a means of identifying voters, since it regarded these as a symbol of oppression. It was decided to use citizenship cards instead but the processing and allocation of these took some time.

In the meantime, the ruling group in the Assembly had launched a political party, Inkatha YikwaZulu, in 1975, and used the delay to entrench Inkatha's position within the bantustan. In 1973 and again in 1975 there were several attempts to set up an opposition party within KwaZulu, but these failed to secure a power base for themselves. In 1974 Mr Jeffrey Mntetume, later a Minister of Justice in the KwaZulu Cabinet, proposed a notion in the Legislative Assembly which asked the central government to empower the KwaZulu government to control or forbid the formation of political parties until after independence. Although not accepted by Pretoria, the motion was passed by the KwaZulu Assembly. Once Inkatha had been formally constituted it completely dominated the Assembly. It described itself as a 'national cultural liberation movement' and members were asked to refrain from making public criticisms of its advancement within the KwaZulu civil service was also dependent on one's allegiance to the organization.

Inkatha membership grew rapidly and by 1977 it claimed to have some 120,000 members. (Salva Survey, 1977, 36) Today it is virtually impossible to operate within KwaZulu without the approval of the party, whether in the arena of politics, community development, business, employment or even research without coming into contact with Inkatha and being called upon to account for oneself to it.

On the 1st February 1977 KwaZulu declared a self-governing territory and elections were announced for February 1978. At these elections Inkatha was the only party to put up candidates. About 50% of those who were entitled to vote had registered as voters by then and the overall percentage poll was 31.7%. There were some allegations about intimidatory tactics by Inkatha during the election but these were repudiated by Chief Buthelezi.

With the introduction of this new stage in the constitutional development of KwaZulu, the Executive Council was transformed into a Cabinet consisting of the Chief Minister (Chief Buthelezi) and six other ministers and most matters outside of the crucial areas of Defence and Foreign Affairs were, in theory, delegated to their departments. In practice Pretoria retains control both by the total dependence of KwaZulu on the central Treasury for its financing (some 75% of KwaZulu's revenue comes from Pretoria) and by the practice of seconding white civil servants from Pretoria to head the various ministerial departments at Ulundi (the capital of KwaZulu). Furthermore, all acts of the Legislative Assembly require the signature of the South African State President who may return the proposed legislation to the Assembly for 'further consideration' if it is considered unsatisfactory by Pretoria.

Thus by 1982, although KwaZulu has stopped short of taking independence along the lines of the Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, it has acquired a measure of autonomy, both constitutional and political. It is as far gone as the bantustan system is an ambiguous one. Some of the ambiguity and complexities of its position is brought out in the next section which looks briefly at the response of the KwaZulu government to the relocation policies inflicted on this region by the central government.

4. KwaZulu's response to relocation

The question of relocation is politically a very delicate one for KwaZulu. KwaZulu spokesmen have consistently maintained a public image of resolve and principled opposition to removals in any form. They deny reports which suggest that a majuba vivenda is being worked out on this question between them and the central government, with a vigour which points to the sensitivity of the issue and their fear of being regarded as collaborators in the apartheid system. At this level they have been prominent propagandists against removals. However, if one probes behind the rhetoric and tries to assess what steps KwaZulu has been taking to oppose or to mobilize opposition to removals on the ground, then a far more contradictory picture emerges.

PUBLIC ATTACKS ON REMOVALS

Public statements by KwaZulu representatives attacking removals abound. In 1973, when Pretoria had outlined its then new consolidation plans for the bantustans, Chief Buthelezi commented: 'We have said before that we are not prepared to cooperate with the removal of people. We don't want to be a party to the misery of our people.' (SALVA Survey, 30.04.73) In the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in 1981 Pretoria's methods of removing people were likened to 'the cattle trucks of Nazi Germany.' (SALVA Survey, 7.05.81) Later that month Dr O. Balono, Secretary-General of Inkatha,
pinpointed relocation as possibly the major issue causing resentment amongst blacks: 'Already some people are saying they would go into the bush rather than move. That means they will be prepared to take up arms to protect their land.' (Sunday Tribune, 24.05.81.)

CLAIMS OF LACK OF CONSULTATION, POWELESSNESS:

At the same time KwaZulu also defended itself from the criticism that it has not effectively opposed forced removals, by arguing that (a) it is not informed of what is going to take place by Pretoria and removals have proceeded without its prior knowledge, and (b) it does not have jurisdiction over the areas moved and hence is powerless to prevent removals: that areas into which further questionnaires were asked in Parliament and the fact that all four areas had been excised and that their people would be relocated at some stage was confirmed. (Hansard, F 463, 23.04.82.)

In confirming the excision Dr Koorhof said it was a consequence of both a resolution in Parliament (referring to a parliamentary debate on the consolidation of KwaZulu in 1975) and 'an agreement reached in this regard between the Department of Cooperative Development and the Government of KwaZulu.' He also said that after this agreement had been signed, representations were received 'that the areas concerned should not be excised.' (He did not explain where these representations had come from but certainly the Tribal Councils for Reserve Four had been protesting before their excision, in late 1978.) KwaZulu immediately denied cooperation: such was their indignation that Dr Koorhof felt it necessary to issue a statement which partly but not entirely exonerated KwaZulu from complicity in the matter.

The impression might have been created that the Government of KwaZulu supports the excision of these areas ... and the resettlement of the Basotho communities involved and that the Government of KwaZulu agreed upon such steps. In view of the fact that Parliament ... certain firm decisions in connection with the consolidation of KwaZulu, Dr Minister Bethlehem informed me that he had no alternative ... other than to sign this agreement ... because he felt he could not shirk responsibility for his people once the decision by Parliament in Cape Town had been taken.

Chief Minister Bethlehem and Dr Malloos in particular, are, as in the past strongly against any excisions from KwaZulu and the resettlement of communities. Any conclusion that Chief Minister Bethlehem or his Government might be in favour of resettlement schemes is therefore not correct. (Statement, 05.05.82.)

When questioned about his statement the following day in Parliament, Dr Koorhof said the agreement to which he referred had been signed in April and August 1979 - i.e. months before the areas were excised. He would not be drawn when Graham Mclntosh, an opposition ZCT Member of Parliament, stated that KwaZulu was having signed an agreement, but appealed to Dr McIntosh to discuss the matter with him privately, 'to prevent a wedge being driven which could create serious problems in the future'. (Hansard, col. 781, 05.05.82. See Appendix 1.)

In trying to make sense of this incident, one should note the following points:

1. Two agreements were signed, according to Dr Koorhof and KwaZulu has not in fact denied their existence - the one in April and the other in August 1979. There is further, unpublished evidence to show that Pretoria was discussing the excision of Reserve Four, at least, in very specific detail with Umzimbi in 1978. Similarly, the exclusion of the Sobomsa Bay area had been on Pretoria's agenda for several years before it was finally carried through. Despite this, KwaZulu still claimed

1) MILITARY REMOVALS IN NORTH EASTERN NATAL, 1974

The details of these removals are described more fully in Part Two. Here what is of reference is that the KwaZulu administration was involved in the planning and implementation of the relocation of these people at the receiving end. While the actual removal of 400 people who were living in the demarcated 'danger zone' of the proposed missile range was carried out by the army and the Department of Samtu Administration, the KwaZulu Department of Community Affairs and of Agriculture were responsible for the allocation of sites and the provision of facilities for the relocated people. Furthermore, in this case the army into which the people were being moved was not a Trust land but indisparably part of KwaZulu. Sobomas, west of Sobomas Bay. It is not clear to what extent the KwaZulu Cabinet was actively involved in this; the available evidence suggests that it was largely the white civil servants, the permanent secretaries of departments seconded to Umzimbi by Pretoria, who directed KwaZulu's participation. Nevertheless, unless it was prepared to admit that it did not or could not at least monitor, if not control, the activities of its own departments, the KwaZulu Cabinet must have known about what was happening and apparently acquiesced to the relocation of people into its area of administration. It does not appear that it protested publicly about what was happening, and these and subsequent removals by the military in the area passed largely unrecorded.
Ignorance of Pretoria's intentions, and moreover, only responded to the expropriation publicly months after it had been gazetted and then only on a piecemeal basis as each of the areas involved was disclosed.

2. In this case Umkulu cannot claim that it had no jurisdiction over the territory at stake, since all four areas were indisputably part of KwaZulu, either as scheduled or released land. In terms of the National States Constitution Act of 1977 the central government cannot amend the boundaries of the 'national states' without consulting with the Executive Council of the area concerned and this was complied with in this case.

3. Despite their opposition to the proposed and then enacted expropriations, KwaZulu did not try to mobilise effective opposition to what was happening within the affected areas; its protests were confined mainly to public statements which condemned what had happened and also defended its own role in it. It did express its opposition to Pretoria's plans in meetings between its Department of Interior and the Department of Cooperation and Development, in the course of 1981 (after the proclamation), but did not take steps to see that all the people in the affected areas even knew what was happening. The public demonstrations against the expropriation of Sodwana Bay and Reserve Four came from outside KwaZulu; the threat to Driefontein and the Paulsgrotterberg land remained obscure for over a year. The first that Driefontein knew about the expropriation was in February 1982 - 13 months later - when the local white magistrate came to inform the councillors that the area would no longer be administered from Umkulu, but from Pietermaritzburg, through him.

4. In protesting against the interpretation that he had supported the expropriation, Chief Buthelezi appealed to KwaZulu's powerlessness in the matter: he had had 'no alternative' but to agree, once the central government had made its decision. Nevertheless, Umkulu, through its MPs and through Inkatha, continues to encourage communities threatened with removal to make their representations against being moved through it. This has been true in the exivised areas as well as other threatened places. This is not a matter of meetings held on threatened black spots in the Ladysmith district in the course of 1980/81, for instance, speakers for Inkatha have urged that the 'proper channel' for protest is through Umkulu and through Inkatha.

The emphasis seems to be on exposure of Sodwana Bay and Reserve Four cases from outside KwaZulu; the threat to Driefontein and the Paulsgrotterberg land remained obscure for over a year. The first that Driefontein knew about the expropriation was in February 1982 - 13 months later - when the local white magistrate came to inform the councillors that the area would no longer be administered from Umkulu, but from Pietermaritzburg, through him.

5. In issuing his statement on the 6th May, 1982, explaining KwaZulu's position, Dr Koornhof was, in effect, protecting KwaZulu's credibility as an opposition force, by publicly acknowledging its behalf that it had been forced into signing the various agreements. When he was questioned on the statement the following day, he avoided taking a stand on whether KwaZulu had in fact denied making the agreement, as alleged by the FFP spokesmen, or not. It is intriguing that he should have felt it necessary to shield KwaZulu in this way and, in so doing, make himself vulnerable to charges of evasion and deceit. It seems that having achieved what he wanted - the expropriations - he was prepared to appease KwaZulu for reasons that are not at this stage apparent.

This incident exposes certain fundamental weaknesses in the opposition strategy adopted by KwaZulu. If one accepts that its opposition to removals goes beyond mere public posturing, then it was clearly out-manoeuvred, caught in the trap of its own admitted impotence in relation to Pretoria. But then, having failed to prevent the expropriations, it did not engage in serious negotiations, it also failed to speak out publicly until months after they had taken place, and then only once they had become public issues. More significant, it failed to mobilise popular opposition in the threatened areas.

In very marked contrast, however, has been the KwaZulu response to the Ingwavuma land deal that Pretoria has been negotiating with Swaziland. At the time of writing the final outcome of this deal is not clear; the events and issues surrounding it are discussed in Part Two. What is of interest here is how vociferously and actively KwaZulu has opposed this threat to its territorial integrity. The entire Legislative Assembly has travelled to the area to hold mass rallies at which popular opposition to the expropriation of land and its handing over to Swaziland has been mobilised. KwaZulu is even prepared to go to the Supreme Court to challenge the legitimacy of Pretoria's action in taking back administrative control over the area from Umkulu. (See also Wisdom, 24.06.82) In this instance KwaZulu has displayed considerable enterprise in resisting Pretoria's plans.

3) BLACK SPOT REMOVALS AND STEERING COMMITTEES

While the expropriation issues in Sodwana Bay etc. were slowly unfolding in 1981, developments were also taking place on the issue of black spot removals and Umkulu's role in that. Black spot removals are particularly controversial in Natal. Here too KwaZulu's position has been ambiguous, at times riddled with contradiction: publicly strongly opposed to these removals, actively encouraging certain prominent black spot leaders to rely on it to take up their struggle against being moved and drawing support from these people for its stand, yet caught up in secret negotiations with Pretoria in which vital concessions are made which are detrimental to that struggle. Furthermore, only when these concessions have been exposed to the press and the public can the KwaZulu authorities come out strongly against them.

The idea of steering committees was accepted in principle at a meeting between the central government represented by the Deputy Minister of Cooperation and Development, (Venter), and KwaZulu, represented by the Minister of the Interior, Ms/packages. The meeting had been occasioned by the fuss surrounding the expropriation of Sodwana Bay, which had just got into the press. KwaZulu used this opportunity to make representations on behalf of Sodwana Bay and Reserve Four, and also on behalf of the threatened black spots near Ladysmith, KwaZulu's 'Emp and Zonco's Emp. The Pretoria representative appealed that they should not be moved and their already expropriated title deeds returned to the landowners. Smoothly sidestepping the title deed issue, the Pretoria representatives proposed that steering committees be established to advise on problems associated with the relocation of black spots. These committees would consist of representatives of Pretoria, Umkulu and 'the people', this last group defined quite ambiguously as people working within the structure created by Pretoria - chiefs and their councillors, members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, local magistrates.

At the time KwaZulu delegates expressed fears that their involvement might be seen as acceptance of the idea of removals; they did not oppose the establishment of mechanism, however, and their objections vacillated between opposition to removals on principle and opposition to the inadequate facilities provided to people once they had been moved. In September 1981 Pretoria's purpose in creating steering committees was publicly revealed when Dr Koornhof announced in Parliament that the KwaZulu authorities had agreed in principle to the formation of steering committees, 'to advise the two Governments on particular problems and implications concerning the resettlement of each of the particular black spots'. (Hansard, Question 3, 2.09.81) In enlarging on this two days later and referring specifically to Reserve Four, he said these steering committees would be formed 'for the purpose of negotiation, consultation and identification of problems in connection with, amongst others, the proposed resettlement of the residents of Reserve Four'. (Hansard, col. 386, 4.09.81) In other words, their function would be to administer relocation. In November Dr Koornhof told the Transvaal Congress of the National Party that KwaZulu's 'rigid opposition' to the removal of black spots in Natal. He was reported as saying 'although there has been strong opposition in the past from
the named government (KwaZulu), certain procedures had been decided upon as a result of discussions (with KwaZulu) which would be followed in future with the removal of black spots in Natal.' (Daily News, 5.11.81)

Once this had been made public, KwaZulu was quick to distance itself from the steering committees. In a press release issued on the 24.11.81, the KwaZulu Cabinet stressed that it would have nothing to do with removals and that it would oppose all removals with all means at its disposal. (See Appendix 2) It accused Dr Koornhof of trying to sow distrust by falsely claiming that KwaZulu had agreed to a system of removals; 'It is admitted that discussions have taken place regarding removal of people but these discussions have always been on the basis that the people should not be removed.' (Press release, 3) Since then no more has been heard about steering committees; there have been no reports, however, that the idea has been abandoned.

Once again it seems that KwaZulu has been out-manoeuvred and that here too its opposition to removals has been shaped more out of concern at protecting its public image as an opponent of the central government than out of an actual commitment to halt removals. The standing of Ukhahlalele and Phoenix is still high among many locally powerful threatened landowners in the Ladysmith district; it is hoped that in the future this will promote, rather than confuse, the strongly felt but not always directed resistance to being moved that is widespread in these communities.

4) KWAZULU REMOVALS

Mbabane

Mbabane is the name of a large informal settlement of over five thousand families which grew up on the edge of Ulundi township, outside Durban, on land that is part of KwaZulu. The history of the settlement and its removal, which started in 1981, is described more fully in Part Two. Here what is in relevance is that it is the KwaZulu authorities who have been responsible for the removals; because Mbabane is in the way of the planned expansion of Ulundi which is also under the authority of KwaZulu. Although KwaZulu has denied strenuously that the removals are in any way forced, it is at great pains to explain that there is no similarity between its removal of people, from Mbabane to the relocation site at Folwani, and removals carried out by the central government, the basis of its argument is not clear.

There are definite disadvantages to moving to Folwani for the people of Mbabane. It is further out from job opportunities in Durban than Mbabane, and people fear the factional violence that is found in the surrounding Umkhumbulu district. Moreover, people are expected to build their own houses, at a cost of approximately R1 000 for a five-roomed house. For these reasons people at Mbabane have expressed an unwillingness to move. This reluctance does not correspond with KwaZulu's claims that nobody is being forced to move.

KwaZulu, like the central government, is unable to accommodate the proliferation of informal settlements in the greater Durban area within its own housing strategy. In administering this area it has been forced to accept problems created by the central government's housing policy for urban africans, which has been shaped by the policy of influx control. There is a basic lack of formal housing for africans in metropolitan Durban which KwaZulu is now obliged to deal with. Saddled with the responsibility for administering and controlling this part of greater Durban and faced with a critical shortage of formal housing, KwaZulu has chosen to deal with the problem - at least in Mbabane - by removing those in the way of Ulundi township development further out into the rural periphery, and obliging those moved to build their own houses. It has in this instance adopted similar methods of controlling access to the metropolitan centre as that used by the central government and its agents, the administration boards.
Appendix 1. Extract, parliamentary debate 7.05.82

701  FRIDAY, 7 MAY 1982  702

arising out of the hon. the Minister’s reply, is he aware how many Cabinet Ministers were present here in the House last Friday to answer questions?

Mr. SPEAKER: Order!

*The PRIME MINISTER: Is Ken Andrew also a Cabinet Minister now? [Interjections.]

Mr. SPEAKER: Order!

KwaZulu: agreement

*11. Mr. G. B. D. McIntosh asked the Minister of Co-operation and Development:

(1) What (a) was the nature and (b) was the term of, and (b) what areas of land were covered in, the agreement to which he referred in his reply to Question No. 465 on 23 April 1982;

(2) who signed the agreement on the behalf of (i) his Department and (ii) the Government of KwaZulu and (b) when was it signed?

*THE MINISTER OF CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT:

(1) to (2) The information furnished in reply to Question No. 465 has been discussed with the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and I have issued a statement in this regard and have therefore nothing more to add.

Mr. Speaker, I nevertheless want you to say that we are dealing here with the same thing as in the previous question. I therefore ask the hon. member to come and discuss this matter with me, because I have here the agreement signed in April and August 1979. However, an attempt is being made here to make trouble, which will harm relations seriously. If the hon. member would take the trouble to come and get the particulars, I should very much like to make it available to him in order to prevent a wedge being driven in which could create serious problems in this country. I therefore want to ask the hon. member to come and discuss this matter with me that I can inform him and show him what the position is.

Mr. B. R. BAMFORD: Mr. Speaker, on a point of order: Would you be prepared to give a ruling as to whether an hon. Minister is permitted to go beyond the giving of an answer to a question? [Interjections.]

Mr. Speaker: It is for the hon. Minister to decide whether he wishes to do so or not.

Mr. G. B. D. McIntosh: Mr. Speaker, arising out of the hon. the Minister’s reply, let me say that I am fully aware of the statement that was issued yesterday by the hon. Minister. But may I ask him why he thinks that asking a question about such an agreement—it is something the KwaZulu Government says they has not agreed to, while the hon. the Minister says they have—is regarded as driving a wedge?

Mr. Speaker: Order!

The MINISTER: Let the hon. member come and discuss the matter with me. Then I can give the hon. member the answer.

Mr. B. R. BAMFORD: What are you ashamed of?

Mr. Speaker: Order!

THE MINISTER: I am ashamed of nothing.

Mr. Speaker: Order!

Mr. B. R. BAMFORD: You look ashamed.

Mr. Speaker: Order!

*The MINISTER: We are still going to let you have it over this matter.

Oshakati: charge against driver of vehicle

*12. Mr. R. R. Huley asked the Minister of Defence:

(1) Whether any (a) complaint has been lodged and (b) charge has been laid against the driver of vehicle No. R468716 as a result of an incident on the outskirts of Oshakati on 16 March 1982; if so, with what result;

Appendix 2. Press release, KwaZulu Minister of the Interior

The following press release was issued by the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior, Dr Mdlalose, in response to a statement by Dr Koomhof that certain procedures for the removal of black spots had been agreed upon with KwaZulu.

The Cabinet of KwaZulu has noted with grave concern the contents of the following item which appeared in the Natal Mercury on 5 November 1981:

*Removal of 'black spots' with KwaZulu decided:

Certain procedures have been worked out with the KwaZulu Government about the removal of black spots in Natal, Dr Piet Koomhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development, said.

He held this up as an indication of the progress the Government was making with the homeland governments on the controversial issue of black spot removals.

Though he did not say so, it is known that the KwaZulu Government has virtually refused in the past even to discuss the issue.

Yesterday, Dr Koomhof said that there had been discussions at ministerial level with the KwaZulu Minister of Internal Affairs, Dr I.P. Mdlalose.

Although there has been strong opposition in the past from the KwaZulu Government, a certain procedure has been decided on as a result of these discussions on future black spot removals," he said.

The Cabinet, wishes to state that the information led to the reader of the Natal Mercury is devoid of all truth and that the Cabinet can only conclude that it was a deliberate attempt to sow distrust and to bring the name of the KwaZulu Government into dispute with its people. If the statement of Dr Koomhof is correct, it can only disturb the harmonious relations which at present exist between him and the KwaZulu Cabinet.

The factual position is and always has been that the KwaZulu Government is totally opposed to any removal of its people to areas determined by the Republic Government. The KwaZulu Government will oppose such removals with all the means at its disposal. It is admitted that discussions have taken place regarding removal of people but these discussions have always been on the basis that the people should not be removed.

The Minister of the Interior had discussions with the Deputy Minister of Development and Land Matters, Mr J.J.O. Ventot, on 20 February and 27 May 1981 and at those discussions repeated requests were made that the people of Tshiambe’s Kop, Jonono’s Kop, Driefontein Block and Reserve no. 4 should not be removed. After the discussion on 20 February 1981 the KwaZulu Cabinet agreed to the formation of a Steering Committee, on which senior officials of KwaZulu will serve, to investigate the development of the area in the Ladysmith district provided that such participation by the KwaZulu Government in no way is interpreted as acceptance of the removal of residents of Tshiambe’s Kop and that the expropriation notices already issued be withdrawn.

It was further decided at the meeting with the Deputy Minister on 27 May 1981 that other steering committees would be established to include all other areas in KwaZulu
where similar problems exist.

Subsequent to this decision a proposal was submitted to the Cabinet by the Deputy Minister requesting removal of KwaZulu residents and the proposal was rejected by the Cabinet as it did not comply with the original decision of the Cabinet. Now the Minister of Co-operation and Development can now state that "a certain procedure has been decided upon as a result of discussions on future black spot removals" is beyond the comprehension of the Cabinet and is rejected.

(signed)

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

2. LAND TENURE IN NATAL BEFORE UNION

Outside of Group Areas removals, there have been two major thrusts of the relocation policies applied to Natal/KwaZulu over the last twenty years - (1) to locate as many Africans as possible within the areas demarcated as 'KwaZulu' and (2) to reduce the number of those areas into a more coherent geopolitical whole, by eliminating black spots, consolidating the numerous scattered pieces and most recently, with the Ingwavuma proposals, actually handing a piece over to a foreign, neighbouring state (Swaziland). KwaZulu, as already mentioned, is itself a very recent political creation and its shape bears little relationship to the pattern of African land occupation in this region in the early 19th century.

It consists of a core of land reserved for African occupation by the 19th century colonial and settler administrations in Natal to which other State and freehold (black and white) land has been added -- and subtracted -- during the course of the 20th century.

The following two chapters set out briefly the history of the various categories of land which have been drawn into or excluded from KwaZulu. They are intended to provide a background to the main body of this report. What they show very clearly is that current relocation policies as well as the policy of creating black areas as labour reserves and population holding grounds have their antecedents in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

This chapter looks at land tenure before 1910. The categories of land considered are:

1) the Natal reserves
2) the Mission reserves
3) the Zululand reserves
4) African freehold and mission station lands
5) State and white lands

It is followed by a chapter looking at historical developments in these areas after Union, in the period before the main focus of this study, i.e. before about 1960.

1. The Natal reserves

When de facto British Control was assumed over the colony of Natal in 1843, one of the most urgent problems was the distribution of land. On the one hand there were at least 100 000 apparently 'refugee' Africans, who had been dislocated by the Shaka wars and subsequent turmoil and who had now returned to their traditional lands, in addition to another perhaps 10 000 'aboriginal' blacks who had remained in Natal. On the other hand there was a land-hungry white population which included land speculators, restless Trekfarmers, and commercial farmers who were trying to produce for the local and export markets.

British Commissioner Henry Cloete had accepted the distinction between 'aboriginal' and 'refugee' Africans in 1843, and reported:

... a distinction should be made between those in the country, who continued to occupy lands as their own and have thus a claim to those lands as their own, and such other Kafirs who are but late deserters from the Zulu country, and have fled into this colony within the last two or three years... and who are now settled down on any spot which they happened to have found unoccupied.

(quoted in Walsh, 1971, 3)
Clove suggested the establishment of locations (or reserves) and this was acted upon by the 1846/47 Commission for Locating the Natives. This Commission recommended the establishment of seven locations: Zwartkop, Umbali, Durvot, Ianada, Imapofana, Umsal fundraising and 'one on the Tugela'.

Although the 1848 Lands Commission and the 1852 Native Affairs Commission attempted to reduce the size of these reserves, a certain amount of land was in fact added to them so that by 1864, when the legal position of the reserves was finally defined, there were then in Natal 42 reserves totalling about 836 509 ha and a further 21 mission reserves totalling about 70 764 ha (Brookes and Webb, 1965, 60. On the mission reserves see below.)

Both the legal position and the permanence of these locations were not secured until 1864, when the Natal Native Trust was established and ownership of this land vested in it. In 1847 the locations Commission, which was composed of officials and missionaries, had recommended that a trust be formed on a tribal basis, 'the Government reserving to itself the right to convert these lands or portions of them, into freehold grants for Africans whose improved condition of life rendered such action desirable.' (Brookes, 1974, 163) They regarded such a trust as a legal approximation to the traditional African land tenure system, in which it was believed that the 'land was owned by a trust of which the chief-in-council was the sole member.' (Brookes, 1974, 161)

Following the 1847 Commission, the original intention of officials (particularly those in the Native Affairs Department) was that each tribe should receive titles, vested in trustees, one of whom would be the chief, with the power to divide the land, even units for individual land holding. This policy was implemented in the Ummini Trust established in May 1858 for the Nguni people who had been moved by the colonial administration from their original home on the Njiff, next to Durban, to the Umbali area to the south - one of the most arid forced removals in Natal.

The official point of view can be readily comprehended. The idea of tribal titles supported and encouraged with their native policy which was based on using traditional structures to govern the African population. Individual title would have undermined this. Also, it was argued, the locations were not suitable for 'minute subdivision' and individual tenure was alien to traditional African society.

The location system was, however, strongly critiqued by many colonists. The colonists considered that the locations were too expensive, thus causing a labour shortage (because Africans were able to subsist independently of wage labour), and also posed a security threat. When the question of tenure was raised, colonists, ironically, came out in opposition to the segregationist policy. In their opinion, the extensive locations and official native policy discouraged beneficial contact with 'civilised' people, and encouraged traditionalism and tribalism. Tribal titles would have the effect of entrenching this. They therefore adopted an assimilationist policy, but they did not really mean assimilation in the sense of eliminating cultural differences between white and black; rather, they wished to entrench a new difference: that between a class of masters and a class of servile labourers. (Walsh, 1971, 40/1) Individual tenure was supported because it would open up the reserves for white purchase and facilitate the cheap labour supply. Tribal titles were unsatisfactory, not only because they lacked the obvious advantages of freehold and reinforced the political power of traditional authorities, but also because the Trustees would tend to be independent of legislative control and foreclose all powers to reallocate reserve land.

Thus, the segregation/integration issue, as manifested in the land tenure debate, should be seen as peripheral to the central issue - control over native policy. So party really wanted complete segregation and to party really wanted thorough-going assimilation; each wanted to satisfy their material interests. For one party - the colonists - this meant gaining access to and control over African productive capacity and labour-power. For the other - the colonial administration - it meant establishing efficient and economic control on a tribal basis. To an extent these interests overlapped, but the distinctions were manifest in different ways on land tenure.

The outcome was in fact a compromise. In the Natal Native Trust (Letters Patent 27th April 1864) all the reserves were alienated to the Trust, which consisted of the Natal Executive Council sitting in the capacity of Trustees. Land tenure was on neither a tribal nor an individual basis. The Trustees were empowered to grant, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the same lands, in such wise as they should deem fit, for the support, advantage or well-being of the said Natives, or for purposes connected therewith. (Quoted in Walsh, 1971, 184) The Trust was thus able to control both the people and the land.

The jurisdiction of the Trust extended over an area of slightly more than two million acres. At the time that it was started, and subsequently, there was no mention of or action taken in alienating land to individuals, or other groups, and communal tenure was enforced. Much of the allocated land was of inferior quality - generally very hilly and agriculturally less viable than the lands retained for the white colonists. Magistrate Peppercombe, in the early 1850s, described most of the land of the Imapofana Location (present-day Mzimba) as 'as worthless as the sands of Arabia.' (Quoted in Walsh, 1971, 177)

At the same time, although the Trust was not restricted in acquiring more land, between 1846 and 1913 hardly any more land was added to these locations or the mission reserves.

These lands were the only areas where Africans had any legal claim (apart from a small number of individually purchased farms, described below) and, trapped within fixed boundaries, their population grew rapidly. Added to the natural increase in the population was a continual influx of families evicted off private white and State lands as well as refugees moving in or returning from across the Tugela River. Already from the 1870s Africans were complaining bitterly about the shortage of land; the degradation of the environment in the reserves due to overpopulation, and lack of development was clearly evident by the late 19th century. In 1896/7 the Natal Native Commission criticized the Trust for its lack of replanting, fencing, and the continuous opening of new courses and roads, no attempt had been made to improve the land estate controlled by the Trust in order to make it more habitable or carry a larger population... ' (Brookes, 1974, 164)

In contrast to the overcrowding in the reserves, the white settlers in Natal held vast acres of land. In the 1870s there were some 8 000 whites living on just under 2,5 million hectares. Even in the first decades of the 20th century, the average size of white farms was 800 to 1 200 ha and 1 600 to 2 000 ha was common. (Marks, 1970, 120) In 1907, after the delimitation of the 20uland reserves, the ratio of the rural population to land acreage was 1:184 for whites and 1:8 for blacks. (Marks, 1970, 121)

2. The Mission reserves

In a slightly different category from the Natal reserves proper, were the Mission reserves. These were areas of African occupation that were set aside under the authority of various mission societies, of which there were a number. The 19th century Natal has been described as one of the most heavily evangelized areas in Africa at the time. These reserves about 500 acres would generally be allocated to 'cottage' for the specific use of the relevant missionary society (often the most productive) and a further six to eight thousand acres set aside as the reserve. This land was held in trust by a board consisting of the Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary of the Mission and...
the Secretary for Native Affairs. The land was to be used by the local African people and could, with the permission of the Lieutenant Governor, be alienated to individuals. (Wells, 1971, 47) The first mission reserves were demarcated in 1856 and by 1864 there were 21 of them, totalling 70 764 ha. (Brookes and Webb, 1965, 60). Later boundary adjustments brought the total to 19. Generally within these areas a fairly prosperous Akholweni group emerged (see Etherington, 1978) taking advantage of the benefits that contact with a missionary offered. Missionaries, especially Americans, and their converts, tended to be strongly in favour of individual land tenure, and various experiments with it were attempted at Groutville. The advantages of individual land tenure were seen to be the incentive for agricultural improvement. And it held out, the security of tenure, and the diminution of chiefly control. (Marks, 1970, 61). For a list of the reserves see Table 1 below.)

Colonists and officials were particularly strongly opposed to mission reserves and attempted to get them placed within the Natal Native Trust. In the 1860s they put an end to individual land tenure in these areas and with the 1901 Mission Reserves Act, brought them under their direct control. By means of this Act the Trust took over the administration of these reserves although the mission stations were allowed to remain.

Shula Macrae (1970, 77/8) quotes the aims of the Act, as articulated by Leuchars, Minister for Native Affairs in Natal in 1903, as to check and if possible stop the movement in this colony amongst the natives which was growing very quickly ... of throwing off white control and achieving for itself and its supporters independence and self-government.

Table 1 NATAI MISSION RESERVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESERVE</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>DENOMINATION</th>
<th>ACREAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Emily's Homestead</td>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>5 476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dobie Mountains</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>5 632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>St Michael's</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>6 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Groutville</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>9 066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Louw Tugela</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>5 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Inculubini</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>8 196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Iridea</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>12 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Isimangaliso</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>11 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Imsane</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>11 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ingbane</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>5 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Umsudhu</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>5 599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Amisani</td>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>8 077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Innes</td>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>7 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Isibani</td>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>7 521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Isicathu</td>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>5 939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Isimangaliso</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>6 915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Isindi</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>6 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Isitshwana</td>
<td>American Board</td>
<td>12 922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Nkeleni</td>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>5 664</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Akholweni - literally 'the believers', i.e. Christian converts.

3. The Zululand reserves

Historically the area north of the Tugela River and south of Xoli Bay consisted of two separate, though interdependent political entities, Zululand proper and Thungainland.

ZULULAND

In the mid 19th century the region north of the Tugela and west of the Buffalo rivers was indisputably part of the Zulu kingdom. However, in the second half of the 19th century successive Zulu kings faced a growing problem of encroachment onto their land by white settlers-farmers from the Transvaal (the South African Republic) who were marking out farms for themselves in the north-west, in the present-day Utrecht district. Finally, after the Transvaal had been annexed by Britain in 1877, the Natal Government agreed to appoint a Boundary Commission to investigate Zulu complaints and appeals for support in this matter. Acting on the Commission's report shortly before the outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu War - and thereby contributing to the rupture between the Zulus and the British - the British Government upheld the Zulu claim to the territory but recommended that Boer ownership of land they already occupied should be recognized, albeit under Zulu sovereignty. It was a settlement that amounted to a de facto, if not De jure, alienation of Zulu land; an alienation which became formalized in 1887 when the Zulu kingdom defeated and dismembered and the Transvaal once more independent, the district of Utrecht was incorporated into the South African Republic of the Transvaal Boers.

The encroachment of white settlers into Zululand did not stop at Utrecht. Political instability within the former Zulu kingdom, after its defeat at the hands of the British in 1879, gave the land-hungry Boers an opportunity to carve out more land for themselves to the south and east. In 1884 a group of about 100 Boers agreed to help Dinisulu, heir to the defeated Cetshwayo, in an attack on Zikhuthu, one of the Zulu chiefs who the British had set up as an independent ruler (and thus rival to Dinisulu) within the former Zulu kingdom. The Boers duly took part in an attack on Zikhuthu and then demanded their fee - 500 farms, a vast tract of land measuring about 4 000 square miles in extent. Intervention by the British succeeded in cooling down their claim a little, but not much, and thus the area that today encompasses the districts of Umzumbe, uMkhanyakude and uMzinyathi passed out of Zulu control and into white ownership. On this land the Boers set up the New Republic which, after a few years, was incorporated into the South African Republic in 1887, along with Utrecht.

The Northern Districts, as they were known, were subsequently returned to Natal in 1903, after the Anglo-Boer War, but were not restored to the Zulu people. They remained firmly in the hands of the descendants of the Boers. Today, this area, unlike the rest of Natal, is still dominated by Afrikaans-speaking whites, many of them holding extremely right-wing views and hostile to even moderate black aspirations for land and improved conditions of living. The Zulu people, whose land this once was, were not necessarily removed from these districts. Many continued to live on the white farms as labour tenants or rent-paying tenants, gradually brought under the increased control of both individual farmers and the State. Their status on their land has thus been fundamentally altered - their security of tenure now depends on the goodwill of their white landlord.

Because of the failure of the settlement imposed on the Zulu kingdom by the British after the war in 1879, Britain finally annexed this territory in 1887. From then on pressures mounted within Natal for settler control over the area so that they could exploit its resources. Sugar farmers wanted the fertile coastal lands. Cattle farmers wanted the rich grazing lands in certain parts of the interior (notably the Ngweu and
There was some gold at Randfontein and coal at Middelburg. Some settlers wanted to expel all the ‘surplus’ African population in the colony to north of the Vaal – an idea dating back to Volcker’s policy in Natal in the 1940s. Officials wanted Natal to gain prestige in the current partition of Africa and, more important, to be in control of the region before the Zulu king, Dinisile, returned from his term of imprisonment in St Helena (1888–1897).

In 1897 Britain agreed to hand over control of Zululand to Natal, and from the start it seems to have been accepted by both Britain and Natal that Zululand would be opened to white settlement. The 1902/04 Delimitations Commission, appointed by the Natal government, set aside 1,973,019 hectares in 21 reserves, and the remaining 1,057,444 hectares were open to purchase. (Brookes and Webb, 1965, 186) The Natal government never implemented the Commission’s proposal that anyone could buy in the purchase areas – which included almost all of the sugar-growing areas, and most of the good cattle-grazing areas (32,000 ha at Mzandla, nearly 11,000 ha at Nquthu (Marks, 1970, 128). Rather, they allowed only whites to buy land. After the land settlement in the 1913 Land Act and the passage of the 1920 Native Affairs Act, Africans could only buy land outside the reserves with the permission of the Governor-General; this was only granted for 405 ha at Amathole (the ‘Amathole lot’). (Brookes and Webb, 1965, 187)

Thus a considerable portion of historical Zululand was lost by the Zulu people in the 19th century, and in the 20th century only three fifths of what remained was reserved exclusively for Africans. On the rest – some 1.05 million hectares – Africans could only squat or become labour tenants. To a great extent, the desires of white farming merchants and prospecting interests had been fulfilled: ‘to indiscriminately throw open the whole of the lands suitable for European occupation, irrespective of the interests of the Natives occupying these territories’. (Commissioners Swaenend and Beachcroft, of the 1902/04 Delimitations Commission, quoted by Marks, 1970, 127)

**ZINGANIA**

The northern reaches of present-day Emzulu – in the Ingwavuma and Umzimbini districts – were not, historically, part of the original kingdom of Zululand and this still has a bearing on political developments in the area today. The northern boundaries of the Zulu kingdom were not clearly demarcated in the 19th century; according to Jeff Goy ‘to the north lay the Swazi kingdom and in the north east the direct authority of the Zulu king shaded into the tribute areas of the Thonga chieftains’. (Goy, 1979, 21) A cluster of small, independent tribes loosely grouped together as the Thonga, inhabited the region between the Lubombo mountains in the west and the sea; their territory included the southern reaches of present-day Mozambique as well. In the west the Thonga territory blundered into land controlled by the Swazis, in the south into land controlled by the Zulus. Although the Thongas paid tribute to their powerful southern neighbours, they did not form part of the Zulu kingdom and were thus not defeated by the British in 1879. However, in 1887 when Britain annexed Zululand, it incorporated the northern reaches of Thonga territory into the area it was annexing and thus brought them under British administration. Subsequently the Thonga in the Kosi Bay area asked for British protection and in 1895 their lands were proclaimed a British protectorate. When Zululand was handed over to the Natal settler government in 1897, Thongoland was included with it. This whole area thus came under the control of the white settlers in Natal and was subjected to the determinations of the Zululand Delimitations Commission. In this way the boundaries of the present scheduled reserves in this area were established in 1904 and a west corridor of land, loosely described as the Wakahathini Plate and already settled by the indigenous African people, became designated as State land, its inhabitants as squatters.

This territory covers the present-day district of Ingwavuma, the area which the central
government is currently offering to Basmiland. It is justifying its action by referring to the non-Dula people of the area (overlooking its own classification of them as Dula a little while before). Its commitment to ethnicity is not only opportunistic, it is also historically false. Only the Sengema Dula people living in the Lubombo area, on the eastern border of Eswatini with Basmiland, have kinship and historical ties to Basmiland. The people in the north, in whose territory East Ray Falls have never been part of a Duma nation.

4. African freehold land

The origins of African freehold land date back to the mid 19th century when a small but vigorous and predominantly Christian pastoralism was in the process of emerging in Natal and other parts of the country. This process has been described by Bandy (1973) and, for Natal in particular, Wright (1972), Etherington (1975, 1976) and Slater (1973, 1975). At this time in response to expanding market opportunities in colonial Natal, under pressure to find cash to meet taxes and consumer needs and partially shielded from hostile white settlers by a colonial administration that was anxious not to jeopardize security in the colony, an increasing number of African households began producing an agricultural surplus for sale on the open market. For a brief couple of decades this group flourished and grew into a recognizable, prosperous pastoralism and it was from this new class of African farmers and entrepreneurs that the first African landowners came.

According to the available evidence, much of the agricultural activity of this group was based on non-tribal land - mission, white-owned or Crown (State) - where the producers either rented from the owners or simply occupied as squatters. However, by the 1860s some prosperous producers, the richer ones, often with missionary backing or support, were buying land in the property market as well. According to Etherington (1975, 46), 'the first Rhodes purchases were motivated not by a desperate search for food, but by an opportunistic desire for good land held on secure tenure and located, if possible, near ready markets.' He does not pinpoint the exact date for the first purchase but describes this process as well under way by the early 1860s. Already in 1851 Blundell, just outside Pietermaritzburg, had been acquired by an ex-Methodist missionary on behalf of his mission community. This land was subsequently sub-divided and sold off to his followers. In 1861 a group of men from the Endali Mission Reserve (near present-day Richards) approached their District Chairman for help in buying some land in the Upper Mambulu river valley. (Unfortunately Etherington does not specify the name of the property.) They were followed by a group of 30 to 40 men from Blandala who banded together into a trust to buy more land - first the farm Driefontein, outside Ladysmith, in 1867 and then the adjoining farms of Kleinfontein and Doornspruit today the nucleus of the large Driefontein complex of farms and under imminent threat of removal.

By 1870 Africans owned 12 357 acres in Natal, compared to 35 786 acres owned by various churches and 5 025 836 acres owned by whites (Christopher, 1969, 215) - a minimum 0.24% of the total freehold land then allocated in the Natal colony, but the beginning of a radically different form of land tenure within African society and the basis on which a tiny class of African landowners was emerging. As the pastoralism continued to grow in the east couple of decades, so too the amount of freehold land in African ownership increased. Between 1870 and 1880 the acreage increased five-fold, to 62 012 acres (1.14% of the total freehold in the colony) and by 1890 a total of 206 719 acres was in African ownership. (Christopher, 1969, 276)

Most of this land was inland, where land was cheaper than on the coast, and concentrated mainly in the northern districts where very little land had been set aside as reserves. The 2 counties with the largest amount of African freehold were the Pietermaritzburg county (which took in the southern Drakensberg as well) and the Klip River county in the north. By 1900 there was a total of 64 199 acres of African freehold in the Pietermaritzburg county, much of it along the upper Umkomaas river valley (where a large number of released black spots still remain today), and a total of 8 452 acres in the Klip River county, grouped around three major blocks - the north-east of Newcastle, the west of Wasbank (including Remhoogte, Hermon, Meetkoms and Bienvoie) and the north of Ladysmith (the Driaftfontein area). (Christopher, 1969, 255)

However, although the amount of land in African ownership continued to increase after 1890, to 395 113 acres by 1900 and 397 704 acres by 1910, from the 1890s the pace of purchases began to slacken and then fall off, with foreclosures on sales of African-owned lands to white beginning to equal new purchases. This relative decline in African land ownership coincides with the decline in the fortunes of the African pastoralism, of which it was a part. Bandy and others have described this process as a product of the political powerlessness of the pastoral in relation to the white settlers in Natal and of the voracious labour needs of the new mines. The opening of the gold and diamond mines in the last quarter of the 19th century gave an enormous boost to white commercial agriculture, previously stagnant, and unleashed a heavy demand for cheap labour by both the mines and farms of white South Africa. In response to these new opportunities, the various white colonial governments of Southern Africa began laying the foundations of the modern migrant labour system: restricting black access to land outside of the reserves, controlling mobility and forcing blacks into wage labour by a series of tax and land laws. The process of proletarianization of the bulk of the African population was further speeded up by a series of natural disasters, including cattle disease, from which many African producers and subsistence farmers, lacking political leverage and access to capital, failed to recover. By 1910 the pastoralism was, as a class, in a state of collapse.

In Natal the white settlers finally achieved responsible government in 1893 and immediately began to use their new political clout to restrict Africans' access to land and channel them into labouring for them instead. In the 1890s the mission reserves were closed to individual ownership and in 1903 the Lands Department was instructed to refuse all African bids at sales of Crown land. By the time Natal joined the Union in 1910 the African acquisition of freehold land had been checked and the economic basis of the pastoralism smashed.

Nevertheless, a small but significant amount of land remained in African hands, land which continued to nurture an embattled but relatively powerful strain of African society in Natal in the 20th century and into the era of bantustans and homeland governments.

In 1905 there were 5 565 registered African landowners in Natal and 1 in Zululand, owning an average of about 250 acres each. In addition there were by 1910 134 450 acres of land owned by various churches and settled by African tenants. These mission stations were in a separate category from the mission reserves. They consisted of individual farms acquired by various mission societies - often with the financial help of their convertors - parts of which were then leased back to individual members of the congregation.

Although little is known about the society that was emerging on these lands, it seems clear that this group formed something of an elite within the wider African society, linked to each other by a complex network of marriage alliances, a common, staunchly mission-Christian culture, often highly educated and independent of traditional tribal structures and institutions. A number of prominent Natal African nationalists of the 20th century were drawn from this group, including Sibonile Xaba, from Blandala/Driefontein and Chief Isuthu from Groutville.
on the freehold lands a new kind of landlord/tenant relationship was developing within African society. It seems that already by the early 20th century African landowners were taking on rent-paying tenants in lieu of producing agricultural goods for an elusive market. There were two inter-related factors at work - the inability of black farmers to compete on the market as described above, and the growing pressure on land within the reserves which was driving more and more landless people to look for alternatives elsewhere. African freehold land was one of the last remaining areas where access to land was not mediated by government officials or appointees. This role of catchment for people dispossessed of land elsewhere, which is one of the most significant characteristics of contemporary black spots, had already started in the early 20th century. By 1916, when figures were available, probably about two thirds of the population on black freehold farms were tenants, and their families (see below). The extreme sub-division of land which characterises many black spots today was not yet a feature, however, and agriculture, for subsistence but also to a diminishing extent for sale, was likely to have been the main economic activity.

Table 2  BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP IN NATAL 1860 - 1910
Source : Christopher, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>12 397</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35 796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>62 012</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>66 629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>206 719</td>
<td>2 510</td>
<td>105 930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>395 113</td>
<td>18 426</td>
<td>129 992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>397 754</td>
<td>34 972</td>
<td>134 450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Including 409 acres in the Klip River District.
++ Including 469 acres near Pietermaritzburg, i.e. Impolweni area.
++ Church of Scotland, near Pietermaritzburg, i.e. Impolweni area.

Table 3  DISTRIBUTION OF FREEHOLD LAND AMONG MISSION CHURCHES, 1910
Source : Christopher, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hermanusberg (Lutheran)</td>
<td>33 986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marischal (BCC)</td>
<td>32 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other BCC</td>
<td>10 011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglicans</td>
<td>14 688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin M.B. (Lutheran)</td>
<td>11 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish M.B. (Lutheran)</td>
<td>8 110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Church of Scotland</td>
<td>6 097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of Scotland</td>
<td>5 890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian M.B. (Lutheran)</td>
<td>3 533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (includes American Mission Board and 6 smaller churches)</td>
<td>8 634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. White and unalienated (state) land

By the 19th century many Africans squatted on Crown or privately-owned lands. Squatting was then (as now) the official term used by whites to describe blacks who were living on white-owned land but not in the employ of the landowner. In fact although some of these people occupied the land without the agreement of the legal landowner, most of them were
cash-paying tenants of the landowner and not squatters at all. They were there out of necessity, because of the shortage of land in the reserves, but the white reaction to them was mixed. For absentee land speculators or farmers who were not using all of their lands, these tenants could provide a useful source of income. But for commercial farmers, who wanted to use all of their land or who wanted labour or who wanted to reduce competition from African farmers, the cash tenant was a threat to their interests. As white agricultural legislators became stronger in the Natal economy and in the legislature, from the 1860s, increasing pressures were put on the tenants, primarily legislative, to get them evicted. Often the justification used for eviction was the great increase in the number of African-owned cattle on the land. But in fact white-owned cattle herds were increasing more rapidly at this time. (De Kiewiet, 1937, 193) These evictions caused considerable anger and bitterness amongst Africans, and in 1875 Shepstone refused to support an anti-squatting bill in the legislature out of fear that it might precipitate a serious revolt. (De Kiewiet, 1937, 191) Evictions of Africans off white-owned land increased sharply after the Anglo-Boer war, when numbers of colonists settled in the Natal Midlands and engaged in dairy and cattle farming. In 1905, for example, about 2,500 Africans were evicted from white-owned farms in Natal. (De Kiewiet, 1937, 120)

Despite these evictions, substantial numbers of Africans remained both on State and private white lands. There were in 1911 37,000 Africans living on State lands alone, according to government statisticians. (Marks, 1970, 125. Many of those would have been on the Wathathini Plots.) According to the chairman of the Resettlement Commission, reporting in 1916 in a dissenting minute to the main report of the Commission, over half of the total African population in Natal were then living on white-owned or State land - 440,000 altogether. (Report of the Resettlement Commission, 1916, 41.) He noted:

Large numbers reside on what are known as the 'thorn farms' - indicating the harder areas where the mimon flourishes.

They are not occupied by Europeans, or only partially so, but are used for winter grazing, and for obtaining a supply of labourers for farming purposes.

These thorn farms, mainly located in the Western/Greytown area, would be the scene of extensive evictions fifty years later.

Although there were advantages for this group of Africans in squatting - chiefly, access to land outside the overcrowded reserves - there were disadvantages too. Rents were often high; 42 per cent per annum on State land in the early 20th century, as much as 67 per cent on privately-owned land. Such rents were often higher than the value of what the land could produce. (Marks, 1970, 121, 125)

There was also no security of tenure. Cash tenancy gradually diminished in Natal, with the spread of white settlement and of capitalist agriculture. Pressure was applied on Africans living on white land to convert from cash to labour tenancy and thus provide white farmers with much-needed labour. Under the labour tenant system each household provided labour to the landowner for a period at first averaging three months a year, later stepped up to six months a year, in return for the right to use a portion of the land for its own agricultural production and subsistence. Although African cash tenancy on white land had continued in Natal right up until the present day, by the early 20th century labour tenancy had become the major form of African access to white land outside the reserves. It remained the major form of farm labour in Natal until the massive evictions of the late 1950s and early 1960s.

3. LAND TENURE IN NATAL 1910 - 1960

1. Land legislation 1910-1936

In 1910 Natal became part of the newly created Union of South Africa. In this section the major features of legislation affecting African access to land in Natal after Union are outlined; the information should be read against the background provided by the brief historical overview of the evolution of South Africa's reserve policy in Volume One.

THE NATIVES LAND ACT (1913)

In terms of the Natives Land Act of 1913, about 10,5 million morgen (6,98 million ha) of land were scheduled as 'Native Reserves' throughout South Africa, with provision being made for the addition of more land, to be 'released' for this purpose in the future. Henceforth Africans were no longer allowed to acquire land outside what had been scheduled and, as the 'apparent but equal' pundits were quick to point out, whites could not acquire land within the scheduled areas. The main purpose behind this Act was to preserve a limited rural subsistence base for Africans outside of the urban-industrial centres, which would then subsidise the migrant labour system without being able to support an economically independent black peasantry.

The schedule accompanying the Act was based on the existing reserves and locations established during the colonial period; it amounted to a mere 7% of the total land surface in South Africa. In Natal about 3,050,000 morgen (2,610,800 ha - 15% of the total area of the province) were scheduled in this way, somewhat less than the land set aside in the Cape but considerably more than what was made available in the Transvaal and Orange Free State (where little land had been set aside as reserves in the 19th century).

It appears from the available secondary material that most of the existing African freehold land was not included in the schedule for Natal. Some of it was. According to Nata (1962, 22) the schedule consisted of 'the existing African reserves and locations in the Union as well as of land privately owned by Africans'; the extent of this last category of land is not, however, specified. Brookes and Hurwitz, writing in 1951, distinguish very definitely between 'Scheduled land': 'Additional Scheduled land' (which included some 'Native individually owned' and 'Native tribally owned' land); 'Released land' (in terms of the 1936 Land Act), and 'Native-owned lands' (most of which was released as well).

The following Table gives a breakdown of the land scheduled as reserves in Natal in 1913.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schedule of Land</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled land</td>
<td>3,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional scheduled land</td>
<td>2,610,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released land</td>
<td>3,050,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Available figures do not tally exactly. The Resettlement Commission (1916) records 3,049,627 morgen of native reserves, locations, mission lands and reserves; Brookes and Hurwitz (1951) record 3,061,199 morgen of scheduled and 24,265 morgen of additional scheduled land; in 1970 the Minister of AAD said in Parliament there were 3,041,245 morgen of scheduled land in Natal.
### Table 4: Land Schedules in Natal, 1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schedule Land</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Morgen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Metal locations</td>
<td>2,267.632</td>
<td>3,061.399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mission reserves</td>
<td>146.571</td>
<td>(2,615.365 hectares)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Zululand reserves</td>
<td>3,887.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,301.203</strong></td>
<td><strong>(2,615.365 hectares)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Additional scheduled land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Crown Forest land</td>
<td>7,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Native individually-owned</td>
<td>2,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Native tribally-owned</td>
<td>971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mission-owned</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Trader-owned</td>
<td>2,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other</td>
<td>9,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,242</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE BEAMONT COMMISSION AND LOCAL COMMITTEES

In order to meet its obligations to increase the area of the reserves as scheduled in 1936, the government appointed the Native Land Commission (the Beamont Commission, named after its Chairman) to investigate and make recommendations concerning the additional land that should be added to that core. Its recommendations, finally tabled in 1936, suggested an additional 8,365,774 morgen (approximately 7,211,074 ha) to be added to what had already been scheduled. This was met with strong opposition from local white interest groups who, in a manner foreshadowing current consolidation squabbling, supported segregation but did not want to give up any of their own land to make it possible. As a result, the Commission’s recommendations were ignored and five Local Committees appointed to review and make amendments to its proposals instead.

The recommendations of these committees scaled down the Beamont recommendations to 7,521,273 morgen (approximately 6,483,811 hectares). First made available in 1938, these proposals were adopted in principle by the Senate government in 1921. (Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 43) Although no legislation was passed to formalize the addition of these lands to the reserves until 1936, in practice these recommended areas were opened up to African acquisition (through purchase or lease), where they were not already so owned or occupied. 183,870 morgen (approximately 158,508 hectares) was reportedly acquired by Africans in Natal in this way between 1933 and 1936, according to the Minister of Bantu Administration in 1939. (Quoted in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 46)

### 1936 Native Trust and Land Act

The 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, finally passed by Parliament in 1936, is one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the history of 20th century South Africa. It mounted on the living of all African people, giving added shape and content to the recurrent policy and establishing new controls over Africans living on white-owned land.

Drawing on the system of Trust tenure developed in colonial Natal, this Act created a legal body to be known as the South African Native Trust (SANT) (later the South African Bantu Trust and now the South African Development Trust) in which ownership of the African reserves in South Africa was vested. According to the Act, this Trust was to be administered 'for the settlement, support, benefit and material and moral welfare of the natives of the Union.' (Quoted in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 51)

The various Trusts established in Natal before 1910, to administer the Natal and Zululand reserves were, with the exception of the Umsini Trust, absorbed into this new body.

The 1936 Land Act also marked out the geographical dimensions of the reserves and created a new category of reserved land, that of released land - land released from the prohibition placed on African acquisition of land outside the scheduled reserves of 1913, i.e. land legally opened up for African occupation, either through the Trust or through individual or group purchase. In so doing the Act formally legalized the position of the new land bought by Africans in the recommended areas since 1921 and recognized certain other areas already owned or occupied by Africans for inclusion in the reserves. In an attached schedule to the Act, a list of 47 released lands was set out which, according to the Minister of Native Affairs at the time, corresponded 'substantially' to what had been proposed in 1916 by the Local Committees. (Quoted in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 45)

### Quota Land

In addition to adding more land to the scheduled reserves, the Act drew a severe limit to the amount of extra land that was to be made available. It put forward a total of 7,452,070 morgen (6,521,070 ha), apportioned between the four provinces on a quota basis, as the maximum amount of land that the South African government could acquire for Africans in South Africa over and above what had already been scheduled in 1936. The SANT was empowered to buy whatever land was needed to add to the newly recognized released areas so as to meet that total. This figure was in fact a reduction on what the 1910 Local committees had recommended. Since 1916 white pressure groups had successfully whitewashed down the various proposals for more land for the reserves from 8,365,774 morgen (beamonts) to 7,521,273 morgen (1910 committees) to 7,521,273 morgen (1936 quota). Until 1979 successive governments in South Africa were adamant that the 1936 quota represented the final allotment of land for Africans and that they would not go beyond it. When added to the 1931 schedule the new figure brought the total amount of land reserved for Africans to only 136 of the land mass in South Africa.

Natal’s share of the quota was set at 526,000 morgen, well below the 5,026,000 morgen and 1,616,000 morgen allocated to the Transvaal and Cape respectively. Once again the available figures do not correspond exactly, but according to the Chief Native Commissioner of Natal in 1935, 268,718 morgen (314,265 hectares - Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 46) were scheduled. The remaining 237,293 morgen (211,733 hectares) had still to be identified and bought by the SANT. (Macro, 11:03:59)

Although the released areas were all specified in the 1936 schedule, (drawing on
the 1918 recommendations), not all of these lands had been formally acquired by them. Again, the figures are conflicting, Brookes and Hurwitz, writing in 1957, refer to 3) 066. morgen of released land that had yet to be bought, over and above the outstanding quota of land allocated to Natal. (1957, 21) Addressing the last Congress in 1959, the Chief Native Commissioner said 374 800 morgen out of the total quota of 526 000 morgen still remained to be acquired, i.e. 77 518 morgen more than the 237 282 morgen of quota land set in 1936. (RAUER, 2.10.59) Most of the released land that was acquired in Natal by 1936 consisted of land already owned or bought by Africans since 1913. Again according to the Chief Commissioner of Natal in 1959, in 1936 Africans owned 136 600 morgen of the 288 715 morgen of land that was released. (RAUER, 2.10.59) Once the outstanding amount of released land still to be acquired has been taken into account as well, these figures mean that only a relatively small amount of land could have been vested in the Trust itself in 1936 – some 47 000 morgen. (See Table 5.)

None of the figures correspond very well which makes them particularly difficult to grasp; the following table sets out the main features of the allocation of reserved land in Natal between 1913 and 1936.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CATEGORY OF LAND</th>
<th>MORGEN</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) 1913</td>
<td>Scheduled reserves</td>
<td>1) 3 061 399</td>
<td>Minister of BAG, 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2) 3 041 245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) 1936</td>
<td>'Acquired by Africans'</td>
<td>1913 - 1936</td>
<td>Minister of BAG, 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>owned/bought by Africans</td>
<td>136 600</td>
<td>Chief Native Commissioner, 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>occupied by Africans in recommended areas</td>
<td>47 270</td>
<td>Calculated from above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) 1936</td>
<td>Released land</td>
<td>288 718</td>
<td>Chief Native Commissioner, 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>owned/bought by Africans</td>
<td>136 600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>occupied by Africans in recommended areas</td>
<td>47 270</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to be acquired by Trust/ Africans</td>
<td>104 848</td>
<td>Calculated from above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) 1936</td>
<td>Outstanding quota</td>
<td>237 282</td>
<td>Chief Native Commissioner, 1959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL RESERVE AREA ALLOCATED | 1) 3 611 641 |
| (a) + (c) + (d) | 3 567 245 |
| TOTAL LAND STILL TO BE ACQUIRED IN 1936 | 104 848 |
| RELEASED | 237 282 |


The information on African freehold land in Natal between 1910 and 1936 is sparse. Such secondary source material as there is is often contradictory and confusing and to unravel the important issue of what the attitude of white agriculture was to these properties, before the Second World War, would be a major study. The following section is thus incomplete. It looks briefly at the main features of the legislation that was shaping the future of this land during this period and includes, where possible, such data as to area and population as has been found.

During this time the role of the African reserves as reservoirs of cheap labour was being developed. Their basic outline was being slowly but systematically marked out, traditional tribal structures bent into more refined instruments of control. It was clear that private title to land among blacks ran counter to this general scheme of things and that a significant proportion of the existing 'Native-owned lands' did not fit inside the approved boundaries of the 'Native territories'. Yet while the status of their freehold areas became ambiguous and their long-term security more vulnerable, their continued existence was not seriously threatened during this period. The translation of land policy into legislative and administrative reality was a slow and cumbersome process, hampered by political differences within the white ruling group. At the same time, local Native administrators were reluctant to tamper with the existing African freehold rights, partly because they feared that this would lead to unrest and partly because of the size of the population living on them which would have to be accommodated elsewhere if moved. Too small to constitute an urgent problem but too large to be easily eliminated, the African freehold farms were regarded by officials as an entrenched feature of Natal — an anomaly that could and should be controlled and limited but one that did not seriously weaken the system of reserves that had already been set up.

Thus, in a dissenting Minute attached to the Native Lands Commission Report of 1916, the Chairman of the Commission, W. H. Beaufort, argued:

The conditions in Natal ... are, and have been, totally different to those in the other Provinces ... In Natal, since it became a British possession, the Natives have always had, and largely exercised, the right to purchase land outside their defined locations, and they regard any infringement of this right as a breach of the terms of the Proclamation issued by Her Late Majesty Queen Victoria at the time the country was annexed by Great Britain — the Natives in Natal now privately own about 359 000 acres, on which are residing some 37 000 Natives. These lands are, in certain areas, so intermixed with lands owned by Europeans that any line of demarcation can only be arbitrarily made, and may result in serious hardship or injustice to both European and Native owners. (41 of the Report)

THE EFFECT OF THE 1913 NATIVES LAND ACT

The passage of the Native Land Act in 1913 was a significant event in the history of African access to land in general and to freehold land in particular. Although the Act did not itself establish the concept of 'black spots' (this developing later), it did legislate the principle of territorial segregation with respect to white and African land ownership in South Africa and laid down the basis for the present grossly inequitable allocation of land between white and black. By providing that only certain strictly defined areas would henceforth be open to African ownership and
occupation, and by placing the power to determine and regulate these areas in the hands of the all-white Parliament, it put a stop to the previous very limited purchase of freehold land on the open market by Africans and furthermore made isolated African properties that had already been bought, vulnerable to the charge that they were displaced, in white territory.

Christopher, in his thesis on land settlement in colonial Natal, has argued that the 1911 Land Act actually protected African freehold land from further encroachment by whites: 'There can be little doubt that the passage of the 1911 Union Native Land Act which from Native-owned lands saved many of them from steady encroachment by European purchasers'. (1969, 136-7) Because of the political and economic powerlessness of the peasantry in Natal, as elsewhere, the extent of freehold property among them had peaked by the beginning of the 20th century and was thereafter hovering on the edge of decline. But while in the short term the Land Act may have prevented further direct alienation of African-owned land to whites, it could not provide any long-term guarantee against indirect alienation of this land, at a later stage, through the intervention of the State - nor was it intended to do so.

As already mentioned, very little of the existing freehold land was scheduled in 1913. The figures compiled by Brooke and Hurwitz show a total of 3,263 morgen of freehold land as scheduled - somewhat less than 9,000 acres and only a tiny fraction of the 397,754 acres known to have been in African ownership in 1910. (Christopher, 1969, 136)

After 1921 the block to African acquisition of land outside the scheduled areas was partly lifted, once the Resettlement Commission and then the Local Committees of 1913 had reported. However, few Africans had the resources to buy more land by this time and most of the freehold land released in 1936 was, as already argued, land that had already been bought but not scheduled in 1913. Furthermore, the new lands that were acquired were not in clearly defined and strictly limited areas (bordering on previously scheduled land) and thus tied to the concept of segregated and controlled land for Africans. A further outcome of the 1913 Land Act was that the classes of freehold land were created - those included in the reserves, with their prospects for security of tenure reasonably assured (but in the light of the consolidation maneuvering of the 1970s, not entrenched) and those not included, their status and future prospects uncertain: future black spots. The Resettlement Commission in fact recommended that the 'existing rights' of both 'European-occupied' land falling within a 'Native area' and 'Native-oriented' land within a 'Baronies' area should be protected within a 'reserve' until the Government desires to exercise its rights of expropriation or the owner desires to sell'. (6 of the Report)

From the Report of the Resettlement Commission a few details on conditions on the freehold areas emerge. According to its calculations, there were then 374,889 acres of 'Native-owned farms' in Natal, 359,708 of that total in Natal proper (the former colony of Natal) and the remaining 15,181 acres across the Tugela river in Zululand. (Most of this land was to be found in the Mzambezi district around KwaMashu and in the farm Mhlabane.) If these figures are accurate, then they indicate a decrease in the area owned by Africans since 1910, when the total freehold land held by Africans in Natal (excluding Zululand) stood at 397,754 acres. (Christopher, 1969, 136)

This provides further evidence of the decline in African freehold after its peak at the end of the 19th century. However, since the figures supplied by the various sources consulted fluctuate so considerably in so many respects, the apparent decline may reflect discrepancies in the manner of calculation rather than an actual alienation of African land between 1910 and 1916.

The total population on the freehold lands in about 1916 was, according to the Report, 39,350 - 37,690 in Natal and 1,360 in Zululand. Assuming that there were by that time between 1,500 and 2,000 landowners in Natal (Christopher lists 1,545 landowners in 1909), with a further 9,000 to 10,000 dependents, then the bulk of the population - between three-quarters and two-thirds - must have been made up of tenants and their families. This indicates that little of the land could have been available for extensive cultivation and that sub-division of the land into small rented holdings was already well-advanced. However, it was still a considerably lower ratio of tenants to landowners than exists on many black spots today. Other figures supplied by the Report reinforce the view that the pressure on the soil in the freehold properties, while not nearly as acute as it is today, was already strong. According to these figures, the freehold farms were more densely populated than the reserves, although not as crowded as the mission lands.

### Table 1: Population Density on Various Categories of African Land, 1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population per Morgen</th>
<th>Population per Unit Occupated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>50,08</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Land</td>
<td>88,3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native-Owned</td>
<td>67,11</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crown Land</td>
<td>32,89</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unoccupied</td>
<td>25,74</td>
<td>11,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied by White</td>
<td>21,03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The Effect of the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act

The 1936 Act sharpened the division between the two classes of freehold property (those included within the reserve areas and those not) and hastened the advent of the category of black spots which would have to be removed. As already described, it formalised the existing position with regard to freehold areas recommended for addition to the reserves in 1910 by adopting a further schedule of land to be released. According to the Chief Native Commissioner for Natal in 1929, a total of 136,600 morgen of freehold land was released in 1936. (Kapp, 2:10-50) This would have included the Drakensberg block of farms north of Umdethwa, some freehold farms to the east of Newcastle and many freehold farms in the Mpumalanga district. In addition to recognising approved freehold lands as part of the African territories, the 1936 Act also allowed for some additional land to be bought by individuals within released areas after 1936. Individual tenure was not encouraged by the authorities, however, since it was regarded as destructive of the tribal system of local government on which reserve policy rested. Also, few Africans had the capital with which to buy land by the mid-20th century. Compared to the scale of land purchase by Africans in the 19th century in Natal, therefore, African purchases of land after 1936 was extremely limited: a total of only 15,592 morgen (1332 hectares) by 1959 (Chief Commissioner for Natal, NPAM, 2:10-50), increasing very slightly during the 1950s to a total of 15,093 morgen (13,040 hectares) bought since 1936, by 1969. (Minister of AAD, quoted in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 46)

### Remarkation of Black Spots in 1936

Although most of the existing freehold lands were thus incorporated into the reserves in 1936, a substantial amount of land was excluded, land that became known as black spots. Once again figures do not tally exactly but a comparison of those potato to a figure of some 9,400 morgen (42,226 hectares) or privately owned land that was not released that time. Brooke and Hurwitz refer to 49,400 morgen of land spread...
over 22 magisterial districts as 'land owned by Natives outside released areas'. Almost half this land, they said, was in 'the triangle of Natal proper north of the Dugala River, where locations were never laid out' (1957, 23), i.e. in the Klip River, Dundee and Newcastle districts. In 1959 the Chief Native Commissioner for Natal spoke of 46 390 morgen of freehold land that was not released in 1936 (Johannesburg, 2, 10-91); in 1969 the Minister of Bantu Affairs said there had been 49 216 morgen of black spots in Natal in 1948. (House of Assembly Debates, 1969, col. 324 – 326)

The freehold land that was not released in 1936 was placed in an increasingly vulnerable position. Generally it was land that did not have a common border with other scheduled or released lands - isolated African holdings, surrounded by white farmers who were, for the most part, hostile to their African neighbours. The future status of these farms and African areas no longer under investigation. They had not been legitimised in 1936 and henceforth, although removals would not start in earnest for another twenty-five years in Natal, their little deeds no longer offered these African landowners any guarantee of security of tenure. The 1936 Land Act in fact made provision for the expropriation of African land falling outside the boundaries of the reserves, by the Minister of Agriculture.

In this way the concept of black spots, already discernible in the 1913 legislation, hardened and acquired substance. However, the 1936 Land Act was not the final delimitation of what was and what was not a black spot, as later developments made clear. In the 1960s and 1970s, when the former reserves were being dressed up as homelands and then black national states, some released areas became earmarked for exclusion from the areas allocated for African ownership and occupation in terms of consolidation planning, and freehold farms within these areas reverted to the status of black spot once again. The official term for scheduled or released areas that were to be expropriated was a 'badly situated area' or opposed to a 'black spot' (which was applied to land which had never been scheduled or released), but in fact many government spokesmen were inconsistent in their use of terms or concepts and applied 'black spot' or 'badly situated area' indiscriminately. In this report, as is discussed in more detail in Part Two, the term 'black spot' is applied to any freehold area (whether scheduled, released or not) which is threatened with removal or has been removed.

As far as the threatened landowners and tenants are concerned, the distinction between 'black spot' and 'badly situated area' is not a material one. Whatever they are called, they are still threatened with expropriation, removal and dispossession of their land. Their continued existence on their land - these treasured little deeds - is sanctioned not by law but by the consent of a government that they can not participate in, a position first formalised by the Land Act of 1913 and entrenched in 1936.

The following table sets out information on the extent of African freehold land in Natal between 1910 and 1961. It shows how inconsistent the figures with which one is working, are. This raises serious questions about the reliability of current official claims to have 'not' the Natal quota or compensated adequately for land they have expropriated. The figures do not agree on whether or not there was an overall decrease in the extent of African freehold between 1910 and 1951 or not. According to the Brooke and Harwitz figure there was a slight decrease of about 14 000 morgen (just under 12 000 hectares); according to the Chief Native Commissioner's figures, there was an actual increase between 1910 and 1936 and, if the figures for land purchased after 1936 is added to this, a further increase by 1959.

3. Developments between 1936-1960

During this time the National Party came to power (in 1948) and the role of the reserves as political units to house, control and administer the vast bulk of South Africa's 'white' (Tswana in Wilt, 1962, 1) began to take shape. The first step in this process was the passage of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951; this was followed by the promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act in 1959 which introduced the concept of 'bantustans', to be based on the existing reserves.
ACQUISITION OF QUOTA LAND

The acquisition of quota land by the SANP proceeded very slowly in the two decades following on from the 1936 Land Act. In 1959 the Chief Native Commissioner for Natal reported that 134,000 morgen (2,604,000 hectares) of land had still to be acquired to meet the Natal quota of 326,000 morgen. [SANP, 2:10-59] Since 1936, then when 342,130 morgen of the quota was still outstanding, only 27,330 morgen (2,394 hectares) had been acquired, of which, according to the Commissioner, 12,530 morgen had been bought by individual Africans, and not the SANP. It was only in the 1960s that the SANP began to acquire land on a larger scale. Since it has been State policy to relocate people onto trust land, i.e. land controlled by it, through the SANP/NAU, the sluggishness of the land purchasing programme in the 1940s and 1950s prevented any large-scale relocation being initiated in this time.

The acquisition of quota land also became entangled with the question of providing compensatory land for black spots that were now threatened with eventual removal. It appears that when the original quota of extra land for the reserves was set in 1936, the amount did not include compensatory land for any black spot that might be forced to move. The long-term policy with regard to the black spots was not clear. After 1948, however, the National Party was determined to eliminate these properties, because they contradicted its back-to-basics policy. In order to clear them, it had to find alternative sites on which to accommodate what was then a considerable group of people. (One estimate, probably conservative, put the total black spot population in Natal in 1964 as 67,100) [SANP, 5:1964] In addition, the State was also responsible for providing land for land compensation for the larger African landowners (having 20 morgen - 17 hectares or more) upon expropriation.

Tomlinson, in his 1955 Report on the ‘Social-Economic Development of the Natal areas’, in which he assessed the amount of land that had been allocated to the reserves, pointed to the problem that the black spots posed. Noting that his total, which included scheduled, released, outstanding quota and black spot land, was larger than was generally assumed, he wrote in the same report that the quota for the reserves was first set in 1936, as reported:

The main reason for this is that land acquired by Natives before the passing of the Act of 1936, does not fall within the interpretation of quota land. In other words there is a misconception on the part of the general public as to what the eventual position would be as to what the eventual position would be when approving the quota. It appears that after Tomlinson the State accepted that compensatory land for expropriated black spots would have to come from outside the existing quotas. In 1961, in a memorandum submitted to the NAU, the Secretary for NAU reported:

When a “black spot” is cleared up and compensatory land is made available within a scheduled Native area, or released area, the existing quota is affected to the extent of the compensatory land which has been made available in such an area. To restore the balance it is therefore still necessary in terms of section ten of the Native Trust and Land Act, 1936, to acquire land of the same extent adjoining the areas. [SANP, 5:40-41]

This explains why figures supplied by officials during and after the 1950s about the extent of quota land acquired or still to be acquired add up to a higher total than the original 26 million morgen of quota land set in 1936.

Thus, in the 1950s, the search for compensatory land for threatened or expropriated black spots became absorbed into the SANP’s search for quota land. The impression gained from contemporary documents and the pages of SANP is that this search often overshadowed the SANP’s original brief, which was to acquire the area allocated to the reserves and, supposedly, to administer this land for the benefit of its inhabitants rather than to remove people.

OPPOSITION FROM WHITE FARMERS TO THE QUOTA

The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 provided an immediate check on attempts by the SANP to acquire quota land – the wardiverted central government funds and attention away from the reserves. Once the war was over, the SANP then had to contend with strong opposition from organized white agriculture in Natal which, as a body, vehemently argued against any more land available for African farmers. The National Party, which came to power in 1948, drew much of its support from white farmers and their objections were treated sympathetically. By 1953 a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ had been reached between the SANP and the NAU whereby the SANP agreed not to buy up any further land without consulting with and obtaining the support of the local farmers’ associations in the districts concerned. (Chief Native Commissioner, [SANP, 11:0-59])

The attitude of farmers in the 1950s was in many respects the same as that adopted by the early white settlers towards the colonial locations a hundred years before. In the 1940s and 1950s farmers were complaining bitterly about a labour shortage. They blamed this partly on unequal competition from the mines and secondary industry and partly on the reserve system which allowed Africans a subsistence base that was independent of the white farms and beyond farmers’ control - a subsistence base that beffitted mining and industrial interests at their expense. Making more land available to the reserves, beyond which had already been scheduled or released, would, they felt, only exacerbate their problems.

Farmers were also concerned about the deteriorating condition of the environment in the remaining reserves. Obtrusive to the history of successful economic experimentation by the African peasantry some seventy years before and overlooking the years of State neglect of the reserves, they blamed this entirely on poor farming techniques and innate inability amongst the reserve population. This position was summarised by the Chairman of the KwaNdebele Farmers’ Association in 1954, speaking at a meeting called to protest against attempts by the SANP to buy up some farms in their district.

The Native is not a farmer and never will be a farmer. He would ruin every bit of land that was placed at his disposal, and it was the height of folly and irresponsibility to hand over the district to Natives. [SANP, 5:11-54]

Farmers also attacked the continued existence of non-released African freehold farms and pressed for their removal. The evidence in the pages of SANP during the 1950s (and later) indicates that most farmers saw no benefits for themselves in having black neighbours. Despite the labour shortage they were experiencing, they did not regard these freehold farms as providing a convenient labour pool. A few people, mainly women and children, did work on neighbouring white farms as seasonal or seasonal, casual, farm hands, but most of the residents on black spots then, as now, looked to the urban-industrial centres for wage employment. Their land provided them with sufficient independence to resist farmers’ efforts to recruit them; in this way they were in an analogous position to the people living in the reserves proper.

However, although farmers were agitating for the removal of black spots, few were willing to make land on which they could be relocated, available. The huge squatter population which lives on the Native farms must be removed with all its belongings,
The balance should be taken to townships created for Natives at a railhead, so that they could work in industries. Those who remained must be controlled, and if they did not succeed, they must quit. (RANMUTU, 31.1.56)

Another solution that was being put forward at this time was to send all the 'surplus' population that the SANP wanted to accommodate on trust farms to reserve or State land in 'Builand' (across the Vaal). The Makhatini Plate was mentioned on several occasions - then, as now, this large tract of State-controlled land was regarded as a convenient trade-off for any number of schemes to expedite and reduce overcrowded land.

RANMUTU carried several reports on farmers' protests about the activities of the SANP, for instance in the Klipdriegte, Kipl River area in 1949/50 (see below) and the Nyanga area in 1950. (RANMUTU, 28.11.58) It also reprinted several commentaries and reports in which officials endeavoured to placate farmers' opposition and appealed for their cooperation - from the Chief Native Commissioner of Natal in 1955 (RANMUTU, 11.03.55, see Appendix 1) and in 1959 (RANMUTU, 2.10.59), and from the Secretary of the National Union of Farmers in 1955. (RANMUTU, 14.04.61) This last memorandum, entitled 'Compensatory land Required to Clear Black Spots', was also reprinted in Rand Daily Mail, the official journal of the Department of Native Affairs, and circulated to local farmers' associations. In it the Secretary set out at some length the history of the quota allocated to the various provinces in 1936 and the question of black spot removals and urged:

'It is here that the cooperation of the farmers' associations and unions is sought. "Black spots" cannot be cleared up if compensatory land is not offered.'

Opposition in the Klip River district, 1949/55

These themes were well illustrated in a confrontation between the SANP and farmers in the Klip River and Klipdriegte districts in 1954/55. Earlier the SANP had, despite local white opposition, acquired a farm adjoining the Drakensberg Block of farms which it was intending to use as a relocation site for people from the black spot of Klipdriegte, near Beaufort. In late 1955 it was announced that the SANP wanted to buy up a further 54,000 acres of white farmland in the eastern part of the Klip River district, in the direction of Hlymaakar. This announcement drew much outcry from the three local farmers' associations (Klipdriegte, Beaufort and Ladysmith), supported by the Ladysmith Town Council, that the SANP eventually backed down. In October 1955 the NCU renewed its efforts to reacquire farms to relocate the black population. In December 1955 the Minister of Native Affairs' report of the North-Eastern Frontier, which was the subject of much discussion, stated that the SANP had been unable to relocate the black people to the areas which were designated as 'suitable for black people'.

As a result of the Native Affairs Commission's report, the Minister had decided that until such time as farmers in the area asked for the removal of 'black spots' and provided compensation grounds, nothing would be done about acquiring further land for Native Settlement in this area. (RANMUTU, 21.10.55)

Earlier, when the Chief Commissioner for Natal had pointed out that in terms of the 1936 Land Act there was an obligation to provide more land for the reserves, the Chairman of the Ladysmith Joint Bodies Association (which represented all the local Farmers' Associations plus the Town Council) replied: 'Builand is their territory and it is no injustice to send them there'. (RANMUTU, 8.04.55)

As a result of the farmers' objections, no trust land was acquired in this area until the late 1960s and the relocation of black spots in the Ladysmith/Dundee area did not get under way until the late 1960s. The land finally bought up by the SANP was in the same general area as had been proposed in the 1950s. Reversely, in 1955 the Chairman of the Ladysmith Joint Bodies Association described this land as 'suitable and unsuitable for closer settlement. Location will not in as fast as it is populated; it is as it is vulnerable'. (RANMUTU, 8.04.55) This is the land where today several of the major relocation closer settlements in Natal are situated, including Buulaweni, Ihlenville and Ulwazi.

Opposition to the SANP's attempts to buy up more land meant that the population pressure in the already released and scheduled areas intensified. In 1957 Brooke and Harris commented:

"What is ... important, however, is that since 1951 (virtually since 1954) there has been no appreciable increase of land provision for Natives in Natal proper. It must be added that between 1936 and 1955 there has been considerable buying of Trust Farms which were not included in the location and mission reserve figures, but apart from this recent and relatively not very extensive development the provision of land for Natives in Natal proper has been stationary for ninety years. If ever there were too much land for the population, that state of affairs must have ceased many decades ago, and today ... all these areas are overcrowded, and some grossly overcrowded. (1957, 10-11)"

One official response to the environmental crisis that reserve policies over the previous hundred years had produced, was to try to control people's access to land and land usage within the reserve territories. Betterment planning began to be applied in the Natal reserves in the 1950s and by 1959 12.26 of the total reserve area had been planned. (See Du Toit, 17 - 27) The inadequacy of betterment planning as a solution to the problems it was meant to address as well as the process of implementation of betterment planning in Natal are looked at in greater detail in Part Two.

Black spot removals

There was no serious programme of removal of black spots before the National Party came to power in 1948, although, according to the Deputy Chairman of the Bantu Affairs Commission in 1958 (Prominent), three black spots were cleared in South Africa under the United Party government. (Address, 30.05.68) He did not specify the names or location or the reasons for these removals.

After 1948 the National Party's intention was to eradicate all the black spots as soon as they could but they were hampered in the 1950s by the shortage of land on which to relocate this group of people. Not until the farmers' opposition to providing more land for the SANP had eased - which was not until the labour shortage they were experiencing started to ease in the 1960s - could the Government get on with large scale removals in Natal. During the 1950s however the Department of Bantu Affairs did embark on a major survey to investigate the extent of black spots in the province. In the SANHER file in Durban there is an undated list of black spots which the SANHER researcher obtained from unidentified officials sources in about 1954-55. This list is very detailed; it is divided according to magisterial districts and gives not only property names and numbers but also details about sub-divisions, the various land-owners and the areas of land they owned. It seems that this survey - and the list - was a preliminary step in planning a programme for the removal of these properties. According to the list there were 156 black spots spread over 22 magisterial districts. (This list has been used to compile the summary of African freehold properties in Natal contained in Part Two.)

* Whether similar investigations were carried out in the other provinces is not known.
A few black spots were moved in the 1950s but details on these are sparse. The first black spot cleared in Natal appears to have been a farm called The Patch, in the Port Shepstone district, in or before 1953. Nothing is known of the history of this place or where its people relocated. A start was also made with the removal of the community of Khamakolive, near Busters (outside Ladysmith) to the farm adjoining Driefontein that had been bought by the SAR in the early 1950s. These removals were very protracted. The people of Khamakolive put up a lengthy struggle (described in a Liberal Party publication, Black Spots, ed) and it was not till 1963 that all of them had been moved to a place called Vulandendo and Khamakolive eliminated. Twelve black spots were also moved in the Mt Cashel and Hambatile districts in East Griqualand before 1961, but details on where to and how are not known. (Dept of BAA, memorandum, 1961 and fieldwork)

4. White-owned land

LABOUR TENANCY IN NATAL IN THE 1950s

K. Hurwitz, writing in 1957 (Agriculture in Natal 1960 – 1950) distinguished three main agricultural regions in Natal, each of which had developed its own labour system by that time:

a) The predominantly sugar-cane belt along the coastal areas north and south of Durban. Here farmers were relying increasingly on migrant, contract workers, many of them coming from outside Natal/DeniZulu (from Pondoland in the south and Mozambique in the north). Workers were housed in compounds for the duration of their contracts and sent home at the end of that period.

b) A fairly intensively-cultivated area of land in the southern half of Natal, stretching from Port Shepstone to the Natal Midlands, where farmers went in for extensive stock farming and cereals production and labour tenure was deeply entrenched as the most common form of labour. It is in this area that has witnessed the most profound changes in its labour system in the years since Hurwitz was writing and where farm evictions have taken place on a massive scale in the late 1960s and 1970s.

c) The inland regions of central and northern Natal where farmers went in for extensive stock farming and cereals production and labour tenure was deeply entrenched as the most common form of labour. It is in this area that has witnessed the most profound changes in its labour system in the years since Hurwitz was writing and where farm evictions have taken place on a massive scale in the late 1960s and 1970s.

In addition to people living on white-owned land in some form of employment relationship to the landowner, there were still, by the late 1950s, substantial numbers of cash tenants on white-owned land in Natal, particularly in the northern labour-tenancy regions. It is difficult to give figures for this group since the official statistics do not generally distinguish between labour tenants and squatters but lump them all together. Squatter farming had been under attack in Natal since the 19th century – in 1960 the NAU described it as a system that ‘cannot be condemned too much’ (NAU, 18.01.60) – and the numbers of rent-paying tenants had been reduced considerably by the mid 1950s. In 1962 the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal reported to NAU that there were 290 000 ‘surplus’ Africans on white farms, about 100 000 of them in the northern part of the province, and that ‘most’ of them were labour (not cash) tenants. (NAU, 16.02.62)

As described previously, the roots of the labour-tenant system stretch back into the 19th century. Under this system, African families living on white-owned land supplied the landowner with their labour for part of the year, at a non-existent or nominal wage (commonly 20 shillings per working month by the 1950s), in return for the right to graze some stock and cultivate some land on the owner’s farm – labour serving as a form of rent. During the period when they were not working for the landowner, many tenants supplemented their meagre cash incomes by becoming short-term migrant workers in industry or on the mines.

In Natal the system evolved over several generations into what was commonly known as the ‘four-month system’. Wherein in the early 20th century in other parts of the country labour tenants generally spent only 3 months of the year working for the landowner, in Natal by the time of the 1932 Report of the Native Economic Commission six months was already the norm. (OG 32/1932, 51) There were, however, many regional variations to the general pattern. In some areas the whole family worked the same six-month period; in others their labour obligation was staggered throughout the year.

In the dry, thornveld country, particularly round Ezenze and Muden, the companion institution of ‘labour farms’ had developed along with labour-tenancy – small, private labour reserves; white-owned farms used solely by their owners to house and provide some agricultural land for their labour tenants who then spent six months of the year working away from their homes on the commercial farms of their landlords. As time went by these labour farms came under increasing attack from soil conservationists and more progressive farmers for being neglected, overpopulated and overstocked. In February 1960 NAUZULU carried an article reporting on the ‘can of iniquity’ in the Umgeni district and the alarming condition of the thornveld farms. One farm was quoted as saying this was the only area in Natal where the squatters and tenants controlled the farmers, instead of the other way round. (NAUZULU, 19.02.60)

The amount of land available to labour tenants for their own use varied considerably from district to district and farm to farm but generally each family would have at least one field of perhaps 2 acres to plough as well as access to common grazing land. During the 20th century landowners started putting restrictions on the number of animals tenants could keep but even in the late 1960s tenant herds of 50 cattle or more were not uncommon.

The labour-tenant system was deeply entrenched in central and northern Natal until the late 1960s. It was a labour-exploitative system but in a situation where access to both land and the cities was severely restricted for African people, it offered certain advantages to which most labour tenants clung. Chief among these was the scope it offered them to keep cattle and to plough. In 1960, after legislation had been introduced by the union government to curb the number of labour tenants, there were 42 000 registered labour tenants in Natal. Assuming an average of 7 members per household, that would mean a total of a little under 300 000 people in a tenant relationship on white farms and since many labour tenant contracts were known not to be registered, the actual population would have been far more. (Dep. Minister, Hansard 1960, col. 2957)

STEPS TO CONTROL LABOUR TENANCY

Starting in the 1920s and 1930s, gathering momentum in the 1950s and 1960s, labour tenancy came under increasing attack, as the State, with the support of the South African Agricultural Union (but not with blanket support from all farmers nor with the unqualified support of the NAU), sought first to control and limit and then to eliminate labour tenancy on South African farms.
In 1956 the government amended the 1936 Trust and Land Act so as to tighten control over labour tenancy. The new legislation provided for the registration of all labour tenant contracts established Native Labour Tenant Control Boards to administer this and prohibited farmers from taking on any more purely rent-paying tenants ('squatters') after the 31st August 1956. In 1959 the government appointed an Inter-Departmental Committee of Enquiry into the labour tenant system. This Committee, reporting in 1961, called for the abolition of labour tenancy within 7 years.

The main grounds for opposing labour tenancy were economic: that by the mid 20th century it was a wasteful, uneconomic and inefficient system which was no longer appropriate in a modern, capitalist economy. The increasing capitalisation and mechanisation of white agriculture during this time fuelled the arguments of the opponents of labour tenancy. In the late 1950s fears were also being voiced about the political and security risks of what the Du Toit Commission described in 1959 as 'die bewarring van die Warteland' (the blackening of the countryside). This Commission produced a report which described how an exodus of whites from the countryside was being accompanied by a growth in the black population on white-owned farms.

Witnesses stated that many farms previously occupied by Whites were now occupied by non-White foremen. The homesteads of the White farmers, managers and shower-croppers are now either uninhabited, abandoned and neglected, or else are occupied by the non-White and his family. Evidence of this development is particularly strong in the southern and south-eastern parts of the Free State and certain parts of Natal. (Quoted in Davenport and Hunt, 1974, 60)

The report contained a map, reproduced on the opposite page, which highlighted this trend in the Voskoppies, Bergville and Klip River districts in Natal. (Note the map failed to make clear, however, was that a large proportion of the farms occupied by Natives in the Bergville/Klip River area were in fact owned by them.)

The response of Natal Farmers

In the early 1950s, before the government had started imposing serious restrictions on labour tenancy, the NAU was unqualified in its support for the policy of changing over to a system of full-time agricultural labour. In 1949 its Annual Congress passed the following resolution: 'This Congress subscribes to the principle of full-time employment with appropriate annual leave on full pay' (NAUHT, 21.04.53). This position was endorsed in subsequent articles and editorials in the NAHMT in the early 1950s. However, as local farmers began to balk at the increasingly bureaucratic state controls being imposed on their employment of labour after 1956, the NAU retreated to a more equivocal position. While still endorsing the principle of full-time labour as an ideal, it began to appeal for what it termed an 'evolutionary' as opposed to a 'revolutionary' changeover.

Its main concern, reflecting the view of constituent farmers' associations, was that too abrupt a changeover would further disrupt an already insecure labour supply. In the late 1950s NAUHT carried a number of reports on problems farmers were experiencing with restless workers. At issue were usual attempts to register labour tenant contracts and impose reference books (the FAMPI) in the rural areas, both of which were resisted by rural Africans. Labour tenants were reported to be leaving farms in numbers substantial enough to cause concern about the labour shortage; they were going either to the reserves or to the towns rather than submit to what they interpreted as an attempt to tie them to the particular farm on which they were living and to reduce their own agricultural activities. (See for instance NAUHT, 11.07.57, 17.10.58, 14.11.58) A further concern of farmers was the cost to them individually in changing over to a full-time waged-labour system. Many
farmers stated that they did not have the cash to pay their workers for twelve months of the year.

In a memorandum submitted to the Inter-Departmental Committee of Enquiry into labour tenancy, in 1960, the NRU outlined its position as follows:

- the NRU "has repeatedly confirmed the desirability of a change to full-time employment of native labour, as an ideal" but "there exists among the farmers in Natal a very decided difference of opinion" about what is the best labour system;
- any speedy change-over to a full-time labour system would mean "an immediate addition in cash expenditure and probably a reduction in the labour force" without necessarily making more land available for agriculture since most full-time workers still retained access to land anyway;
- reducing the numbers living on white farms would mean that the redundant workers and their families would have to be accommodated elsewhere; a "fair percentage" could probably be absorbed on other white farms but the rest would become the responsibility of the Department of Native Administration and Development.

Rather than introduce new legislation, the government should enforce the already existing legislation "aimed at establishment of the labour force and division of labour between town and country."（NAAMAL, 16-01-60）

**FARM EVICTIONS IN THE 1950s**

Although State attempts to control and reduce labour tenancy were opposed by many farmers and organised agriculture in Natal during this time, some individual farmers were evicting workers and/or tenants in sufficiently large numbers to prompt the State to establish several small relocation sites on which to accommodate them. Material on this is scant - thus, as now, farm evictions were not an issue to be reported in the daily press. The Bhamangazi district, however, was one such area which appears to have experienced an increased wave of farm evictions in the late 1950s (and early 1960s) since at least three relocation sites were established there for ex-farm-dwellers at about this time: Nyunganisipho, Shungolema and Shakhoseni (all to be used as relocation camps in later years as well). (Fieldwork) Further fieldwork in other settlements on Trust land may uncover more that started as relocation points for evicted farmworkers or tenants during (or even before) this period.

The reasons for these evictions must, in the absence of more research, remain speculative. Individual farm evictions have a very long history in Natal, stretching back to the first days of white farming in the 19th century. African workers and residents on white farms have never enjoyed an assured security of tenure but have always been dependent on the goodwill of their employer/landlord. It is likely that some of those evicted in the Bhamangazi district in the 1950s fell into the category of old/disabled/unsatisfactory workers who were no longer wanted or needed by the farmer and simply told to leave. Cash tenancy was also under attack and some of those evicted may have been what were officially classified as squatters, whose lands were wanted by the individual farmer for his own use. It is possible, too, that these evictions were part of an early phase in mechanisation and rationalisation of land-use and labour in the district, involving some of the more progressive farmers who were making the changeover to a full-time and smaller labour force.

Compared to the later phase of farm removals, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the number of households officially relocated at this time was very small. Relocation guidelines were not developed beyond those already in operation in betterment planning, and the sites into which the people were moved appear to have been modelled on betterment lines. Although other facilities were virtually non-existent, some grazing and millet land was made available for each household. Betterment-type controls were placed over the agricultural land - the sites were planned so as to divide residential from agricultural land, stock numbers were limited and stockowners charged a small grazing fee annually. In this respect the people who were relocated to these settlements in the 1950s were advantaged compared to the households who were moved in later, who were not allowed to bring stock and not allocated agricultural land. These advantages have, it appears, elevated these early evictees to something of an elite within the settlements today - land, as the preceding pages have made clear, is a precious and wasting asset in the African rural areas.
Appendix 1. Naunui article, 11.03.55

LAND FOR NATIVE SETTLEMENT

FROM THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF NATIVE COMMISSIONER

On November 5th, 1954, NAUNUI reported a special general meeting of the Elan- Noura Farmers' Association. As a result of this meeting, the Joint Bodies Committee met at the Reserve.

A report of the proceedings appeared in NAUNUI on December 3rd. The following is a quotation from the report:

"The meeting passed a resolution protesting against the acquisition of any other land for settling Natives outside the Released Areas, as proposed by the Department of Native Affairs. This resolution has caused the Department of Native Affairs considerable concern. If implemented, it would effectively prevent existing schemes for the rehabilitation of some 1,000,000 acres of Native Reserve, and the elimination of 'black spots' in the Department. Therefore the Secretary of the Department of Native Affairs has decided to offer the Town of the Elanba Farmers' Association an overall picture of the situation in the vicinity of his Reserve.

The Native Trust and Land Act of 1956 empowered the S.A. Native Affairs Board to acquire land for Native settlement to the extent of 30,000 acres in each Province. It has been decided to offer the Town of the Elanba Farmers' Association an option to acquire the land in the vicinity of his Reserve.

The offer of land in the vicinity of the Elanba Farmers' Association's Reserve is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Acquired Area</th>
<th>Name of Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>25,000 acres</td>
<td>Repealed Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>25,000 acres</td>
<td>Repealed Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free</td>
<td>25,000 acres</td>
<td>Repealed Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>25,000 acres</td>
<td>Repealed Area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The full extent of Repealed Areas in Natal is 59,618.80 acres (i.e., 25,000 acres minus the area of the existing Reserve). The Repealed Areas in Transvaal and Orange Free are 59,618.80 acres in extent. The Native Trust and Land Act also empowers the Trust to purchase land adjacent to the Repealed Areas, as well as land adjacent to the Repealed Areas, and to make payments to the owners of the land adjacent to the Repealed Areas.

In order to acquire land for Native settlement, the Native Affairs Board must be consulted. The Native Affairs Board must be consulted before any land can be acquired for Native settlement.

The Native Affairs Board has been consulted by the Native Affairs Board, and has been notified of the intention to acquire land for Native settlement.

Readers comments on the N.A.B. proposal are invited. Let NAUNUI be the forum of rural public opinion.

The full extent of Repealed Areas in Natal is 59,618.80 acres in extent. The figure of 5,900,000 acres is arrived at, by the average of 44 acres per family. 44,444 acres must, therefore, be divided by the number of families, which is approximately 44 acres per family. 44,444 acres must, therefore, be divided by the number of families, which is approximately 44 acres per family. It is hoped that the facts which now follow will prove that this method of division is accurate and will be well-founded.

On the farm of Mr. Oliver, in the Bergville district, there are two tracts of land, adjacent to the North and East, which are 59,618.80 acres in extent. These tracts were at some time occupied by the Traps of the Bergville and the Bergville farmers.

A milk scheme is now in its fourth year, when the number of milk sold in the market has been increasing steadily. A market is being developed among the people who are accustomed to milk, and is in close association with the dairy industry. The dairy industry is in a healthy condition, and the number of milk sold in the market has been increasing steadily.

The farming year July 1953 to June 1954 was a poor one in that there was a severe drought. The crops were not adequate to support the milk cattle. The milk production decreased, and the number of milk sold in the market decreased.

On the other hand, the milk production increased, and the number of milk sold in the market increased. The milk production increased, and the number of milk sold in the market increased.

The people in the Bergville district have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk. The people in the Bergville district have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk. The people in the Bergville district have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk. Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk. Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily. The number of milk sold in the market has been increasing steadily.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk. Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily. The number of milk sold in the market has been increasing steadily.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk. Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily. The number of milk sold in the market has been increasing steadily.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk. Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily.

Visitors from other districts have been able to sell their milk, and have been able to sell their milk.

The milk scheme is now in its fourth year, and has continued to increase steadily.
PART TWO: RELOCATION IN NATAL: CATEGORIES AND REGIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

The era of massive forced removals in Natal opened in the early 1960s; during the past two decades the State has relocated forcibly - the coercion taking both direct and indirect forms - well over a million people in this province, if all the categories of removal (both overt and hidden) are considered. Part Two examines this process - its overall dimensions and its constituent parts. This introductory chapter sets out the main categories of relocation in the province and the estimated figures for the total number of people affected, and provides a brief historical overview of the process of removals in Natal since 1960. The following chapter summarises the information SFP has collected on relocation areas and subsequent chapters examine each of the various categories of relocation in more detail. Part Two ends with a regional overview in which the main features of relocation in each of ten geographical sub-regions in the province are summarised.

1. Categories and numbers

MAJOR CATEGORIES OF RELOCATION

The major categories of relocation in Natal, in the order in which they are discussed in the ensuing chapters, have been:

1) Eviction of farm workers and tenants from farms in the white countryside,
2) The removal of black spots, both African freehold and missionary properties,
3) Removals relating to the consolidation of the reserve areas,
4) Urban relocation,
5) Influx control and repatriation,
6) The destruction of informal settlements,
7) Group Areas removals,
8) Removals relating to infrastructural, other development and conservation schemes,
9) Removals for strategic reasons,
10) Removals caused by the implementation of betterment planning within KwaZulu.

Although these categories are discussed separately, they should not be seen as isolated and discrete phenomena. While some removals have had a more overtly political and ideological purpose — for instance those relating to consolidation — and others a more overtly economic rationale — for instance those stemming from the abolition of labour tenancy — they nevertheless all intersect as supports in the structure of the apartheid state. The massive population removals in Natal (and the other provinces) and the acute suffering and dislocation to people’s lives that they have necessitated, have been integral to the overall strategy adopted by the white ruling class to retain and enhance its ultimate political domination and economic control. Forced removals have formed part of a process of systematic dispossession of the black majority — dispossession not only of their land and access to the wealth of the country, but of their citizenship as well. The various categories of removals listed have facilitated this process by the following means:

1. The expulsion of ‘non-productive’ and ‘superfluous’ blacks from the urban, and white rural areas into the rural periphery, through the enforcement of influx control, the elimination and control of informal settlements, the location of black townships inside the boundaries of KwaZulu, the repatriation of foreigners, the removal of black spots and the abolition of labour tenancy and squatting in the white farming areas.
2. Increased control over the distribution of the labour force and the bargaining power of workers by the maintenance of the migrant labour system and, where possible, the transformation of those black workers living in the urban areas into migrant workers living inside KwaZulu. This has been achieved by relocating or incorporating urban black townships into KwaZulu and ensuring that all new township development takes place inside KwaZulu as well.
3. The legitimisation of the ethnically based bantustan/kwaland/national state of KwaZulu by the consolidation of the scattered reserves of Natal into a more coherent geo-political entity, the ‘black spots’ and ‘badly situated’ reserve areas and the enforced imposition of KwaZulu citizenship on the black residents of Natal.
4. The promotion of a limited degree of development in border regions and, more recently, within KwaZulu, to create the economic basis for a small governing class, and, through betterment planning, enable as many people as possible to be accommodated within the limited boundaries of KwaZulu.
5. The division of the working class along ethnic and racial lines, through the manipulation of citizenship, the enforcement of group areas legislation and the development of racially stratified, highly controlled townships for the different sections of the black population.
6. Increased population control in strategically sensitive areas through the establishment of conservation, forestry and military areas.

As the pressures on the State have mounted over the past two decades, particularly those coming from the opposition forces ranged against it, it has been forced to refine and rework its tactics: the programmes of population removals has gone through different phases as a result. However, while the evidence suggests a slowing down in the pace of removals in Natal in recent years, there are no indications that the State has abandoned its long-term intentions to force as much of the African population as possible into KwaZulu, from which only those needed by the dominant economy will be allowed temporary escape.

**TOTAL NUMBERS OF PEOPLE AFFECTED**

Estimates for the total numbers of people removed in Natal since 1948 or threatened with removal in terms of current policy are set out for several of the categories listed above in Table 6. The detailed information from which these figures have been calculated is contained in the chapters dealing with each of the various categories. These figures show something of the magnitude of the social engineering that has taken place in the past and threatens in the future, although by themselves they say little about the enormous costs — financial, political and social — to our society.

**Table 6. ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF REMOVALS, NATAL 1948-1982**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>搬到</th>
<th>人数</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARK EVCTIONS</td>
<td>300 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK SPOTS</td>
<td>105 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSOLIDATION</td>
<td>10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBAN RELOCATION*</td>
<td>17 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFRASTRUCTURAL</td>
<td>15 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC</td>
<td>3 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-TOTAL</td>
<td>450 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP AREAS</td>
<td>295 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>745 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Orban african freehold areas moved in Newcastle, Charlestown and Vryheid counted under black spots. These figures do not include the far larger group of people excluded from the prescribed area of Durban by boundary adjustments incorporated into KwaZulu at Kwanzulu (with 340 000 people) in 1977. A similar fate threatens Clermont (Pinetown) and Lenontville (Durban) as well.

7 Creation of Farm Renovetment Boards may see renewed State Action.
245 000 189 african freehold; 13 missions
300 000 Reduction of 45 scheduled and reserved reserve areas to 20.
61 000 Cedarpine, Chestertown (2pm), Colenso, Dambuzaar, Emergency Camp, Dundie, Glencoe, Graytown, Hone, Ladysmith, Kool River, Pfullersburg, Under-water (Pinetown), Stanger, Umzimkulu, Vryheid, Newlands Emergency Camp, Winterme, Emergency Camp.
7 Sedima Bay, Imanda Dam, Nywane Dam, Umfulozi Dam, Mkomazi Dam.
7 Ingwavuma ?
It should be stressed that these figures are estimates and, furthermore, do not cover all aspects of relocation in the province. It has proved impossible to try to quantify reasonably accurately the numbers of people affected by 1) betterment planning (which, as suggested in the chapter dealing with it, may well exceed one million people), 2) the enforcement of influx control and 3) the elimination of informal settlements, except where such removals have overlapped with one of the other categories listed – as in the case of those African informal settlements which were affected by group area proclamations in Durban in the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, and which have consequently been included in the figure for group area removals.

What these figures show is that, in the categories listed, about three quarters of a million people have been removed to date, about three quarters of them African and the remainder Indian (predominantly) and coloured, with a tiny number of whites affected as well. As the chapter describes, not all the African people who have been relocated have ended up in KwaZulu. Nevertheless, combining the total number of African, influx control, and removals etc. and then comparing that figure of between one and two million people with the total population for KwaZulu – calculated as 3 877 987 in 1980 – it becomes apparent that it would not be too far fetched to state that perhaps as many as 50% of the population of KwaZulu have suffered the trauma of removal. Furthermore, well over half a million people more – over 10% of the total population of the province – are living under threat of removal in just three categories – the three where projections of this sort can be made. The total number of people who are likely to be moved in the future as a result of farm evictions and infrastructural development cannot be accurately predicted at this stage, but, as the chapters dealing with these categories indicate, is likely to be substantial.

These figures are estimates but, if anything, they err on the conservative side. They have been compiled from a large range of statistical sources, both official and unofficial, balanced against extensive fieldwork over the past two years. The cross-checking of library research work against fieldwork has been essential since there are many problems associated with official statistics which make them inadequate as a final source.

One of these problems is that official data on vital issues is often either lacking or not publicly available. The extent of population removals in this country has been deliberately hidden from the public and suppression of statistical data has been one of the means of achieving this. The tendency for the responsible Minister not to answer parliamentary questions concerning removals has become more and more marked in recent years and, in terms of the curious laws on Cooperation and Development Amendment Act of 1962, this trend is bound to become even stronger in the future. Clause 1 of that Act provides for the preservation of secrecy in connection with matters dealt with by the Commission of Cooperation and Development, and foremost among those matters, as the parliamentary debate made very clear, is the question of the consolidation of the bantustans.

Another problem is that the official data that is available is often widely inconsistent or simply inaccurate. For instance, Dr Koornhof told the House of Assembly in 1980 that a black spot known as The Swamp, near Xinxini, had been moved in 1976 with 125 people. (Hearings, Question 537, 22.04.80) In fact, it was not moved until 1978 and the population was closer to 700. Official terms are not consistently applied, with 'black spot' and 'squatter' being two particularly loosely applied and confusing terms – for some officials any area they wish to move to is labelled a black spot and any person they wish to remove is labelled a squatter, regardless of the actual legal standing of either place or person. This can lead to double-counting – a place that is classified as a black spot in one instance and a badly situated area in another being recorded under both the black spot and the consolidation categories, for example – unless one is familiar with the areas being discussed.

A more fundamental problem in trying to quantify forced population removals is that because of shifts in government policy over the years, the boundaries of what is and what is not the white area in Natal have not remained constant and thus the areas to be removed have not remained constant either. The ultimate shape of KwaZulu has been an extremely controversial and inflammatory issue in Natal throughout the 1970s and Pretoria has not yet revealed its final boundaries: this obviously affects the estimates of those currently under threat of removal (the figures supplied in Table 8 for black spot removals and consolidation being based on the 1975 consolidation plans for the region) and also makes it very difficult to reconstruct developments between one year and the next. Some black-owned farms currently under threat of removal because of consolidation planning were previously incorporated into KwaZulu as released areas and have only recently become black spots, under threat of removal. Conversely, a small number of freehold properties that were formerly classified as black spots in the 1950s and 1960s may have now, with the advent of the consolidation era, been offered a reprieve of sorts and may end up within a redrawn KwaZulu.

2. Historical overview, 1960-1982

The priorities in the removal programmes in the 1960s were:

1. The removal of black spots, which finally went under way in earnest in the early 1960s, starting with the relocation of Mantsheetjies just outside Vryheid: this was moved to Mondlo, established in 1963 as Natal's first "rural village."

2. Enforcement of group area proclamations in the major urban centres – Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle, Vryheid, Ladysmith and others.

During this time the previously rigid hostility of white farmers to the acquisition of quota land by the SAD began to ease and major land purchases were made by the Trust in the Elip River, Dundee, Xinxini and Ipopo districts, most of this land earmarked for relocation purposes. The focus of attention in the black spot removal programme was in Northern Natal. Many of the African freehold properties expropriated and removed during this time were located in the coal-mining belt stretching from Newcastle to Wastair. Conditions in the early relocation sites were appalling. At Mondlo, the people moved from Mantsheetjies were provided with tents and nothing else – no sanitation, no permanent water supply (water had to be brought in by tankers), no schools or shops – and within a few months a major typhoid epidemic broke out. In the mid 1960s the Department of NAD developed a set of guidelines on relocation and relocation sites which laid down extremely basic minimum standards. Linbhili was established in 1963 as Natal's first 'closer settlement' in terms of these new guidelines, but the facilities and conditions prevailing there showed little improvement over those provided at Mondlo five years previously. The removal of a number of black spots into the Linbhili area...
in 1968 received extensive publicity, throughout South Africa, largely through the efforts of a small, committed group of church leaders and other concerned people. This served to alert various pressure groups to relocation as a major, political issue. The negative publicity the government received, both locally and internationally, undoubtedly affected its approach to subsequent removals. During the 1970s it paid greater attention to providing a minimum infrastructure in relocation sites, particularly in the more accessible areas, and to promoting a more positive public image of removals as voluntary and part of a process of State-building and/or development.

While constitutional development in the Zulu bantustan proceeded very sluggishly, preparations for its establishment were being debated in government circles. In the early 1960s Pretoria set up a committee to look into the future of the State land in Natal; this committee reported in 1967 on obtaining the bulk of the outstanding quota land in Natal from the Makhatini Plateau. More attention was paid to implementing betterment plans in the Natal reserves, despite strong local opposition to it in certain areas. In 1968 Pretoria established the industrial growth points of Zulluwa, the first border area to be created inside the Zulu bantustan. At the same time it also announced an ambitious programme for the development of townships within the Zulu bantustan. Established African townships in urban areas throughout Natal came under threat of removals as a result; the first de-proclamations of urban townships, preparatory to their relocation into bantustan areas, were made at Durban, Ladysmith and Darnhausen at the end of the decade.

During the 1960s extensive but poorly documented removals took place in the northern coastal regions where a large reafforestation programme was being developed on land formally owned by the State. The 1960s ended with the abolition of labour tenancy in the province. The massive evictions of farm workers and tenants that took place in the first half of the 1970s but the cumulative effects of this action were felt throughout the 1970s. A large number of closer settlements were established in Northern Natal to soak up the flood of displaced people from the white countryside.

**The 1970s**

In 1970 a new political dimension was added to the situation in Natal with the establishment of the Zulu Territorial Authority and the passage of the Homeland Citizenship Act. During the 1970s planners in Pretoria were preoccupied with the result; the first de-proclamations of urban townships, preparatory to their relocation into bantustan areas, were made at Durban, Ladysmith and Darnhausen at the end of the decade. A large number of closer settlements were established in Northern Natal to soak up the flood of displaced people from the white countryside.

**The Situation in 1982**

The appointment of the van der Walt Commission to re-examine consolidation has introduced a new fluidity into the situation in Natal with regard to removals. In recent years there has been a discernible thinning in the pace of large-scale removals. A number of removals of both urban townships and black spots, which were described as 'significant' by officials in 1978/79, have not been carried through to date. Both financial and political pressures have contributed to this apparent slowdown. The ever-increasing cost of the war in Namibia, coupled with the falling price of gold, has meant that there is less money available for grandiose removal schemes than in the early 1970s, while the wider spectrum of opposition in Natal to consolidation, as well as the level of resistance in a number of threatened communities, has forced Pretoria to become more cautious in its approach.

There is no evidence to suggest that Pretoria had had a change of heart on relocation, however. Answers given by the Minister of Cooperation and Development to questions tabled in Parliament in the course of 1981/82 have repeatedly affirmed that the removal of various threatened communities will still be carried out; the secrecy clause in the Cooperation and Development Amendment Act of 1982 will make it possible for all information on these removals to be suppressed. Preparations for a large influx of relocated people are being made at the relocation site of Minnekhlo, 60 km north of Ermelo. Influx control is to be tightened more ruthlessly in terms of the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, first published at the end of the 1982 parliamentary session; this Bill also raises the spectre of a further round of State-sponsored evictions of people off white farms in the near future. The current attempt to curtail the Ingwavuma district and hand it over to Swaziland in a further indication of Pretoria's determination to push ahead with its programme of exclusion for the African people of Natal by whatever means it can devise.

The combination of pressures has, however, made the possibility of reprieves for a number of well placed threatened communities more promising (38 Wendolines, near Durban, for instance). This, in turn, may benefit the organization of opposition to removals in other less advantaged communities.

**Note:** For a visual comparison of the shape of the African areas in Natal/Zulu bantustan in 1965 and in 1982 readers are referred to maps no. 28 and no. 29 at the back of this report.
2. RELOCATION SITES: A SUMMARY

These lists refer to areas into which Africans have been moved; details on Indian and coloured group area townships are contained in Chapter 9. The summary is divided into four parts:

1. Relocation townships
2. Relocation closer settlements
3. Potential/proposed relocation sites
4. Unofficial relocation sites.

Although we have tried to make the lists as comprehensive as possible, there are gaps in our information which need to be filled by further fieldwork and research.

1. Relocation townships

General Circular no. 22, 1967, from the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, set out the guidelines to be applied in (its words) "settling of non-productive Bantu resident in European areas, in the homelands". This distinguished between four types of relocation settlements:

a) 'Self-contained Bantu town', to rehouse former municipal townships and provide accommodation for workers and their families in border industries;

b) Towns with 'rudimentary services', 'usually situated deeper into the homelands' than type a); to provide accommodation mainly for the families of migrant workers;

c) 'More densely populated residential areas', with a rudimentary layout, where people must provide their own housing, to accommodate those moved off farms and black spots;

d) 'Controlled squatters' on Trust land, to absorb squatters from farms, black spots etc. quickly and from where they can be removed to types a), b) or c) as necessary. (HR26, 1980, Appendix 5)

In Natal there are at present at least 12 relocation townships conforming to types a) and b) above, with a few more planned. (Here one is referring only to townships established primarily as relocation areas, and not to those other townships established to house existing communities in their area; for a fuller list of townships in KwaZulu, see p. 180.) Facilities provided in these townships, while varying between types a) and b), and extremely basic, are far superior to those found in the closer settlements of types c) and d).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME &amp; NEAREST TOWN</th>
<th>DATE ESTABLISHED</th>
<th>FROM WHICH</th>
<th>FACILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hlabonyoni; Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>1970; 18 000</td>
<td>Biminz mission; N. Natal labour tenant farms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under threat of removal</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mkhazini; Ladysmith</td>
<td>1972; 50 000</td>
<td>Klip River hq; Ladysmith townships; some farms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gamalalela; Port Shepstone</td>
<td>1975; 10 km</td>
<td>Margate townships; 2 N. Natal areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nkhambakazi; Pieston</td>
<td>Early 1970s; 6 km</td>
<td>Marishall, St. Wendolino.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nkhashazi; Durban</td>
<td>1956; 65 075 hq; 181 281 pop; Durban hostel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Nkandengezi; Pieston</td>
<td>1977; 3 500 hq; Tenants from Clermont, Klaarmakers; pop; 40 000 threat of Chheetahville</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ndadeni; Newcastle</td>
<td>Early 1960s; 15 km</td>
<td>52 000 pop; Newcastle/Dundee officially; est. 92 000 townships.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME &amp; NEAREST TOWN</th>
<th>DATE ESTABLISHED</th>
<th>FROM WHICH</th>
<th>FACILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Nkomlingi; Newcastle</td>
<td>1968; 5 317 hq</td>
<td>In area which is too small for industrial development.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Nkumbula; Durban</td>
<td>1973; 60 000</td>
<td>Newcastle, Klaarmakers; pop; Claxton; Newcastle 25 km</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Nkomini; Newcastle</td>
<td>Early 1960s officially</td>
<td>44 000 pop; N. Natal Farms; Claxton; Newcastle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Nkomazi</td>
<td>Early 1960s; 17 km</td>
<td>Est. 5 000</td>
<td>Retcourt townships; some farms &amp; mission land.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Relocation closer settlements

The relocation areas listed here conform broadly to types b) and c) described above. They are the classic dumping-ground type of relocation area, known officially as closer settlements because the people moved into them are, with a few exceptions, allotted residential sites only (generally about 25 metres square). Despite the complete absence of any semblance of an urban or township infrastructure, and the distances from urban and metropolitan centres, there is no scope for the people placed in these settlements to try to make a living from subsistence agriculture. When people are relocated to these places they are usually (but, again not always) provided with temporary accommodation (tents or tent frames) and expected to build their own permanent dwellings. The government is on record as saying that schools, clinics, clean water and even shops are always supplied "free" in relocation areas - most recently when Dr Konzofoi assured Parliament in April 1962 that various black spots in Natal would not be removed until after "the necessary housing facilities, water-retention, sanitation, school and clinic facilities, shops, roads and other services have been provided". (Hannard, Question 450, 22.04.82.) As the following summary makes clear, these bland assurances do not necessarily match the actual situation that may purport to describe.

SIP is aware that this list is incomplete; to provide a comprehensive list of relocation areas would be a near-impossible task and would probably amount to compiling...
a blanket list of African rural settlements in Natal/Kwazulu. There are numerous settlements, scattered throughout the province, which have absorbed large numbers of people displaced as a result of government relocation policies but which were not originally established, whether officially or unofficially, as relocation settlements. Such places include: Ngqonese (Haputa); the Khundwini district near Lake St Lucia; KwaNdukuza near Methane/Logha, Estcourt.

There are also examples of relocation settlements which, on closer inspection, turn out to consist of not one but two or three small, scattered settlements, geographically separate and each with its own local name yet officially a single place with a single name. One example of this is 'Qodeni', which name covers at least three places: Kusimphi, Sibhenhlu and Subsai. Although these three places are listed separately on this list, there may be other instances of composite relocation sites which we have missed and listed as single settlements.

In addition to these problems, IFP was unable to trace or visit a number of very small, obscure settlements that local people mentioned to us in passing but could not positivelY as relocation points. Most of these sounded like quite old communities, probably located on Trust land, and some at least may have been betterment communities. Places mentioned include: Kwenchakwa, Sagu, Baluva (Bahamango); Kwanugeni, KwaNdukuza, Khulanhle, Vulahele (Qwutu); Telakana, Ophumana, Pimlanga (Pampiettersburg); Makuseni, Nombela (Pozkla). It should be noted that closer settlements known to have been established in terms of betterment planning in Kwazulu have not been included in this list unless a substantial number of outsiders have been relocated there as well. While betterment is recognized as a category of relocation in this report, it has special features that require a particular treatment. (For more details on betterment in Kwazulu, see p. 271-274).

Despite these limitations, this summary can be regarded as a guide to the major official relocation closer settlements in the Natal region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME &amp; NEAREST TOWN</th>
<th>DATE ESTABLISHED</th>
<th>PRESENT POPULATION</th>
<th>FACILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Asyanakwali | 1968 | 20 000 | Lady Smith, Mashabuke Bv. Incl. Orienke, Mbigafontini, Stein- 
| Pomeroi | & Hagelau | congoruit tenants. |
| c. 35 km | | | |
| 2. Bulwer Trust Farm | G. Stanger | 1968 | Farms in Hlomsholm area. |
| 26 km | 69 hh | 1968 | Farms in Lower 
| | | Tugela district. |
| Under threat | described | as 'Full'. |
| from proposed dam on Tugela | Siver. | 135/6/4 f/; pit latrines; people build own shelter; |
| | & 1982 | 4 boreholes, and 6 taps nearest school, shop, clinic. |
| | | c. 0.5 km by boat stops |
| | | several by from Bulwer single fare to Stanger 30 cents; |
| | | wood is free from surrounding hills. |

| 35 km | (1978); Gigak- 
| | teha, by, tenants 
| | only (1981). |

4. Ekuwulani; | 1972 | est. 50 hh | Platfontein, Stein- 
| Lady Smith | | congoruit tenants. |
| c. 50 km | | |

5. Makhekeheeni; | 1960a | est. 50 hh | Farms in Hlomsholm area. |
| Hlomsholm | 25 km | 1960 | Farms in Lower 
| | & Bahamango area. |
| Under threat | of further | influx since 
| | removal, though possible reprise |

6. Pokwani/Bologodi | 1981 | c. 300 hh | Malakusi squat- 
| | ter camp by |
| | | KZ 69. |
| (as re- | location centre) |
| nearest | |
| In KZ. | | |

7. Fereyland | 1970a | Uninside h. | Sites with a tap & bun- 
| | quaters on | ket toilets; people to 
| | Uninside State | build own shelter; res- 
| | land. | gents of original |
| | | residents who see their |
| | | property returned. |

8. Quenali | 1970 | est. 50 hh | Platfontein, small prim. |
| (Qodeni) | | school. More field- 
| | | work necessarily. |
| Kwenchakwa | 60 km | | |

9. Hatfala; | 1940 | c. 30 hh | App. From 
| Bulwer | | coloured farm 
<p>| 25 km. | near Ecope. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE ESTABLISHED</th>
<th>PRESENT POPULATION</th>
<th>FROM WHERE</th>
<th>FACILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First hh 1974; pre 1970 but maj. c. 20 km</td>
<td>Neighbouring farms - labour tenants.</td>
<td>1974 influx not supplied - labour tenants.</td>
<td>High, sec. &amp; prim. schools; large plots but no stock or agric. land.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Inanda Newtown; Durban 33 km

- 1980 TENANTS 4 600: 15 000 (30 000)
- Site & service scheme being developed by Dura West Properties & go. pit latrines; water points; garbage removal; people build their own houses; worksheets encouraged to upgrade; temp. school; mobile clinics; buses to Durban. (proposed as town 64, 04.11.92. See Table for detailed case study.)
- People living in tents early 1982 but they have since built houses. Latrines provided; water close by.

12. Khayelitsha; Pimville 30 km

- 1981/2 Officially occupied 1962
- 'Cultural servants'; people from Harding hostels.

13. Limeshill; Pomary, c. 35 km

- Be in Banbadu area, incl. Lyell, Kovan & Maria Batekhi Mission.
- At first: tents; c. 1/4 acre plots; water & sewerage systems; no hospital; latrines; no clinic. New plans: housing in 3 phases, mainly 1-2 storey 3 bed houses; 14 house social housing; clinics for 2000 people; 2 schools; 3 shops. See Desmond, 1970. 1976.

14. Lookdown; Bethulie 19 km

- c. 1975 TENANTS ON NEIGHBOURING MISSION LAND.
- People relocated into general area & not into closer settl. area; meet regularly; no latrines; very scarce land; water very scarce. See p. 366 for details.

15. Khumalo; Umzimkulu 55 km

- State lands south of Swaziland. 
- People relocated into general area & not into closer settl. area; meet regularly; no latrines; very scarce land; water very scarce. See p. 366 for details.

16. Kwezani; Bethulie 30 km

- 1975 Neighbouring white farms; relieved be.
- High, sec. & prim. schools; now fieldwork necessary.
### North & Earliest T.O.M. from Which FACILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T.O.M.</th>
<th>DATE ESTABL.</th>
<th>PRESENT POPULATION</th>
<th>FROM WHICH</th>
<th>FACILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23. Ntabanana (1)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>est. 10,000 Reserve 6, to make way for Richards Bay Farms.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not closer settlement from December 6 scattered across comp. land; betterment planning to be enforced; water serious problem - rivers &amp; trucks supplying tanks; lack of agric. land; various fiscure &amp; pit latrines for 400; N prim. schools &amp; struggle to get act. successful 1968; see p.334 for more details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Ntabanana (2)</td>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>est. 600</td>
<td>Emanzini 30 km</td>
<td>Southern part of Reserve 4, Richards Bay (which existed in 1977).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Mtingwini</td>
<td>Late 1960s</td>
<td>est. several thousand.</td>
<td></td>
<td>White farms in Waven area; many from Thamalakane, 50 km. In Emabezitha, because of farm worker violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Sisumebili</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>54.5 ha</td>
<td>Emahasup 40 km</td>
<td>Kranskop townlands, Farms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Olivierboek</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Nugaga Location &amp; flood prone areas to be flooded by Woodstock Dam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Pulman Farm</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>500 - 600 ha</td>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>Temp. emergency camp; people told not to build on land; this still holds; no water main, first arrived 1969; reservoir &amp; some tanks installed; plots very small (10 x 20 metres); see Dewey, 1970.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Potential/proposed relocation sites

The following list contains names of places/areas which have been mentioned as potential new relocation points (i.e., over and above the expansion of existing settlements) by State officials in recent years or are likely to be developed as such. It is essential that developments at these areas continue to be monitored.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T.O.M.</th>
<th>DATE ESTABLISHMENT</th>
<th>PRESENT POPULATION</th>
<th>FROM WHICH</th>
<th>FACILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30. Sahlumba</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>est. 5,000 Farms in Wavena &amp; surrounding districts.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rudimentary settlements, without grid plan; tents but no toilets when first moved in; water still from Nugaga River &amp; streams (when running); some land among original inhabitants mainly; a few scattered shops; mobile clinics; Mainroad no road access. See p.308-323 for detailed case study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Ritwali</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alva and Amakhosi Mission (2 miles away).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Vaalkop</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Longland b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Vegekaleni</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>500 ha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Boschkop/Intshiculu b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Wlondoni</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emanzini/Seater b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Wavena Emergency Camp</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>Wavena townlands, Farms.</td>
<td>Site &amp; service; no regular water supply at first; first public building a barrell.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Potential/proposed relocation sites

The following list contains names of places/areas which have been mentioned as potential new relocation points (i.e., over and above the expansion of existing settlements) by State officials in recent years or are likely to be developed as such. It is essential that developments at these areas continue to be monitored.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T.O.M.</th>
<th>DATE ESTABLISHMENT</th>
<th>PRESENT POPULATION</th>
<th>FROM WHICH</th>
<th>FACILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38. Pulman Farm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Comp. land already acquired by SADRE, to compensate for reserve moved in 1968.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Esmatini</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Site &amp; service; no regular water supply at first; first public building a barrell.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Purpose

- **1. Boshelo:** Growth of Hillduke (see Reserve.)
- **2. Ngezwenza:**
- **3. Mhlanga:**

(References: J. P. S. Jackman, 1979; J. P. S. Jackman, 1979)
4. Unofficial relocation sites

An already mentioned, a comprehensive account of relocation points, both official and unofficial, would amount to a list of virtually every rural settlement in Natal/KwaZulu. In all districts, everywhere one goes, one encounters displaced people evicted from farms and black spots and townships, endorees out of urban areas, forced to move for dams and railways and roads - people who either do not qualify for a site in an official relocation settlement or are trying to avoid the isolated, controlled, non-agricultural type of life imposed on those forced to live in such settlements. It is impossible to compile a satisfactory list of places because of the magnitude of the task and problems with classifying areas systematically. The following paragraphs point to some major unofficial relocation settlements.

In their search for alternatives to places such as Linshill and Nkodeni, many displaced people have moved onto black spots that have not yet been moved and from where they face a further threat of removal. Nearly all black spots, and particularly those fairly close to towns with employment opportunities (for instance in the Ladysmith district), have experienced an enormous influx of people in the last twenty years as a result of forced removal elsewhere. In addition some freehold areas that fell within KwaZulu have become major relocation centres of this type. An important example is Makanbopha, a freehold farm between Nkodeni and Olwenzwe near Newcastle, with a population now estimated at 62,000, no planned sanitation and a serious water problem. Many people have moved there from white farms in Northern Natal and former black spots.

Other displaced people have trekked into the reserves proper and sought a place in an existing community from the local chief or induna (at times paying high fees for permission to settle). The Ingwa district, notorious for its overcrowding and accompanying factional violence, is a very good example of this kind of informal relocation, with thousands of mainly ex-warfarmers crowding into an already overcropped and strained environment in the last decade.

Still other displaced people have moved onto empty Trust farms and established new, informal relocation settlements. Examples of this are Kondeni no. 5, next to the official relocation site at Nkodeni and Bekuthetho next to Nkodeni. Kondeni no. 5 was established in the 1960s by families being evicted off white farms. They claim they were authorized to settle there by officially; they are now described as illegal squatters, however, and threatened with a further removal. The population is estimated at 2,000. There is no protected water supply. Fruits are larger than at Nkodeni proper and some of the older households have stock (up to a maximum of 5 head of cattle, hence the name Nkodeni no. 5). Bekuthetho's population has been put as high as 10,000. It started in about 1977 and is settled mainly by people from farms and black spots in Northern Natal.

There are also numerous informal settlements on the edges of major towns and metropolitan areas throughout Natal into which a large proportion of the population has moved as a result of being evicted from elsewhere - black spots, depopulated townships, white farms etc. Examples are Mshwepi, outside Port Shepstone, released area 33 in the Nkodeni district; Meneni adjacent to Umzimvubu, Durban and Shushushuphe, Durban. These are described more fully in Chapter 8.
3. FARM EVICTIONS

1. Introduction

Evictions of black workers and tenants off white-owned land has, as already pointed out, been a feature of the growth and increasing capitalisation of agriculture in Natal since the mid-19th century. In the last twenty-five years this process has intensified enormously. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people have been driven off land on which they had been living, often for generations, and forced to move or be forcibly relocated elsewhere - in state-controlled relocation camps, on Trust land, in fomaba, or on nearby black spots, even on other white farms. It has been a complicated, confused process - a major social upheaval in the rural areas and an important but poorly documented category of removals.

There have been two definite though overlapping periods in the history of recent farm evictions in Natal:

1. From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s when the major category of farm evictions was that of labour tenants and squatters in control and Northern Natal; the latter half of this period saw massive state-sponsored evictions during which several hundred thousand people were either evicted or chose themselves to leave the white farms on which they were living.

2. From the mid-1970s to the present when, labour tenancy largely eliminated or controlled, evictions have been on a smaller scale than before and mainly the result of action taken by individual private employers against their workers, not of direct state intervention (although the latter has operated in certain cases).

2. The abolition of labour tenancy

STATE ACTION IN THE 1960s

The steps taken by the State to control labour tenancy in the 1950s and the evictions that resulted from that have already been described. In the 1960s the State moved more determinedly to eradicate the system entirely. By that stage the trend towards greater mechanisation was well advanced in South African agriculture, and, nationally, the labour shortage of which farmers had complained so bitterly in the preceding decades was abating. Throughout the country there were many pockets of backward, undercapitalised farms which had not shared in these developments and which still relied heavily on labour tenancy; this was certainly true of Natal. They were, however, less and less of a force within the agricultural industry. In 1966 Pravman, then Deputy Chairman of the Natal Affairs Commission, described labour tenancy as a system that was 'out of step with present trends in the field of employment, which demands the maximum utilisation of manpower.' (23.09.66)

In 1964 the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act was further amended to empower the Minister of Bantu Administration to abolish entirely or to limit the system of labour tenancy in any one district of the country, by proclamation. Using these new powers (but acting only on the instigation of local farmers and in consultation with the provincial Agricultural Unions, according to the Minister) the government steadily declared districts after district to be non-labour tenant areas. Initially attention was focused on the Orange Free State and the Transvaal where, it appears, white farmers were less embedded in the system than in Natal. The first districts to be proclaimed were Delmas, Groblersdal and Warmbad, in June 1966. At the time the Minister denied that the abolition of labour tenancy would lead to massive evictions:

'The first thing that is going to happen when those labour tenants are that they may all become full-time servants. They can still remain on these farms as in the past but they will now be there as ordinary full-time servants. The man must not suggest that because we are abolishing the system we are going to load all the existing labour tenants on to a wagon and carry them off somewhere. We are not doing away with these people; it is the system that is being abolished. These people can still stay on under the new system.' (Nancom, col. 5097, 19.7.66)

These reassurances soon proved to be false. In 1967 the government was reported to be considering introducing legislation to limit the number of African families allowed to live on white farms. (M exile, 19.6.67)

By the end of 1968 the Minister announced that labour tenancy had been abolished in 66 districts and some 11,507 people relocated off white farms as a result. (Desmond, 1970, 16) At the same time he announced that the end of 1970 had been set as a target date for the complete abolition of the labour tenant system. In January 1969 the Natal Ministry reported that by then labour tenancy had been abolished in all of Natal and the Transvaal and all of the Orange Free State. (7.01.69) Each tenant and squatter on white farms was also being acted against strongly, and between January 1964 and September 1969 a total of 34,325 'squatters' were moved off farms throughout South Africa. (Nancom, col. 616, 10.12.70)

ATTITUDE OF NATAL FARMERS AND THE NAU

In Natal opposition to the elimination of labour tenancy came from both farmers and tenants. Many farmers argued that they could not afford to pay the necessary wages to a full time labour force; they also feared that they would lose their workers if they tried to force them to change over to full-time employment. While nationally the farm labour shortage had eased by the 1960s, in Natal many farmers were still complaining of problems in this regard. At the 1966 NAU Congress, speakers from the floor cited both the threat of a labour shortage and the burden of employing a full time labour force as reasons why labour tenancy should not be abolished too quickly. 'The tenant system was still in operation because it was the only one many farmers could afford', commented the President of the NAU. (M exile Witness, 16.09.66)

At the same time there is evidence where that relocation farms workers who had already been evicted was a serious problem, since the acquisition of Trust land by the SANZ was only just beginning to pick up momentum and very few relocation sites had yet been developed. In February 1962 the Chief Sanu Affairs Commissioner of Natal stated that land was urgently needed to fulfill Natal's quota obligation in terms of the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act and to relocate 250,000 surplus africans in the white farming areas. (SANZ, 6.02.62) Two months later he urged farmers who were intending to evict farm workers to contact the Department of NATU First, since the 'flood' of Africans who were being driven off white farms without alternative accommodation was creating problems. (SANZ, 27.04.62)

As a result of these constraints the NAU continued to lobby within the SANC and with
the central government against too rapid a phasing out of labour tenancy. In 1965 it re-iterated its previous stand that nothing should be done to upset the labour tenant system unnecessarily since the areas where it was still practised werefortunate enough not to be experiencing a labour shortage. (NAUNIA, 31.12.65) In 1968, when the government announced its intention to eliminate labour tenancy by the end of 1970, the NAU sent a delegation to the Minister of BAD to try to persuade him to delay the final date. At that stage, before labour tenancy had been fully tackled in Natal, the Department of BAND was not very sympathetic and all the delegation wrung from the Minister was the concession that while the target would not be abandoned, the situation could be reviewed if this became necessary. (NAUNIA, 19.04.68)

Because of this opposition from within the province, progress towards the elimination of labour tenancy in Natal lagged far behind the other provinces. In 1970 the NAU estimated that there were then about 400,000 labour tenants (workers and their families) on Natal farms. (NAUNIA, 9.01.70) By the beginning of 1969 only three Natal districts had been deproclaimed: Bergville, Kranzburg and, in late 1969, Weenen. While the abolition of labour tenancy proceeded fairly smoothly in the first two districts, at least on paper, the attempt to enforce a full-time labour system in the Weenen district in 1969/70 turned the district upside down. It revealed clearly how entrenched in some rural areas the system still was and compelled Pretoria to reconsider its plans for the total abolition of labour tenancy by 1971.

**EVictions in Weenen 1967 - 1972**

**Clearing the Townlands, 1967/68**

Before labour tenancy was abolished in the Weenen district, some 5,000 blacks who were living as cash tenants on the Weenen Townlands+ had already experienced the trauma of eviction and relocation. Blacks had been living on the Weenen Townlands for generations, from the time when the municipality was first proclaimed in 1839. In the 19th century an unofficial system of collective labour tenancy developed, whereby 'the natives living on the Town Lands of Weenen have been required and have given labour to the Europeans in that village in lieu of rent'. (Letter from the Secretary for Native Affairs to the Weenen Magistrate, 5.03.02, File SN A 1/1/293, Natal Archives) By the 1960s, however, it seems that this system had been transformed into a straight cash tenancy one, with households paying the municipality an annual rent of R6 each in return for the right to live on and cultivate a piece of land. Most households depended on migrant workers to bring in a cash income.

The eviction of these tenants started in 1967 and continued through 1968 and 1969. It seems that it was part of the national drive against cash tenancy and squatting by blacks in white areas. According to a former resident, a chief now living in the relocation area of Ekonisa (near Nkandla), he and his people became illegal squatters because the Weenen Municipality was declared a prescribed area and all blacks living within its boundaries had to move. He reports that about 3,000 people were cleared off the townlands altogether. Although people had not wanted to move, they put up little resistance and the evictions were relatively peaceful. (Fieldwork)

About 600 of these evictees were transported by GG truck to the Nkandla district, 160 km away, where they were left at a relocation site called Ekonisa. Conditions there were very elementary - small sites, temporary tents, no latrines and no protected water supply. The one advantage it offered compared to most other relocation sites of that time was that residents were allowed to keep cattle, up to a maximum of 5 head per household. (For a fuller account see Desmond, 1970, 53)

+ A huge extent of commonage owned by the municipality and adjoining the village centre.
Those who were not taken to Nkonisa were eventually moved either into a hastily erected "Emergency Camp" set up a few kilometres from the town of Weenen, or into the transit camps established in 1969 across the Tugela to accommodate evicted labour tenants from the district. Conditions at the Weenen Emergency Camp were initially appalling - according to Desmond, "it made Limehill look like a holiday camp." (Desmond, 1970, 67) Intended initially as a temporary transit camp only, the Emergency Camp has never been replaced by anything else and is still in existence today.

Although most of the people living on the Weenen Townlands were removed by 1970, a few individuals who were employed by the municipality were allowed to continue living there with their families. In 1979, however, notice was served on these few remaining households (then numbering 5) as well. By then all the municipal workers in this group had either died or were too old to continue working for the Weenen municipality. No longer of any use to the town, they were to be evicted so that the land on which they lived - no more than a few hectares - could be used for grazing purposes instead. The case is well documented in the AFRA files. Despite attempts by the threatened households and some outside support groups to win a reprieve for this small group of mainly widows, pensioners and children, they were eventually all forced to leave the land.

Abolition of labour tenancy 1969 - 1972

While those evicted off the Weenen Townlands put up little resistance to their relocation, those threatened soon afterwards by the abolition of labour tenancy proved far more difficult to remove. Weenen was the third district in Natal to be deplored and the first where State planning ran into serious local resistance. The backwardness of white agriculture in the area, the prevalence of labour farms with very large tenant populations who had been living on the land for generations and the large numbers of labour tenants in general, all combined to make the abolition of labour tenancy an explosive issue. According to the State, the local Farmers' Association asked for the area to be deplored; either the Weenen Association did not represent the majority of farmers in the area or it underestimated the degree of resistance it would encounter from labour tenants themselves.

The proclamation abolishing labour tenancy was gazetted in late 1968 but only came into practical effect in July 1969 when tenants came to the end of their normal six-month labour commitment and were then faced with the choice of either remaining in full-time employment on the farm or being evicted. Some tenants did opt for full-time employment; the majority, it would appear, refused and were then subject to eviction and, if they refused to leave the land, to arrest and forcible removal. Several former tenants have indicated to DEP that had farm wages been increased sufficiently to make good the loss of earnings from industry or the mines, they might have been prepared to make the shift to full-time agricultural labour. Most farmers, however, either stuck to the former derisory wages (R2 a month) or offered only a paltry increase. (Amounts of R6 to R12 a month are quoted in Mail, 1976)

Contemporary newspaper reports estimated that between ten and twenty thousand former tenants (families included) were moved off farms in the Weenen district over a period of about three crisis-ridden years, starting in July 1969. For most of 1969, 1970 and 1971 the district was in turmoil. "Concern over farm labour policy" (Natal Mercury, 16.07.69), "Africans" homes and families are forced out" (The Star, 9.10.69), "Shortage of farm labour in Weenen" (Natal Mercury, 31.01.70), "Tractors demolish kraals -

* In January 1969 the Natal Mercury reported that some farms in the Weenen/Estcourt area had as many as 1 500 people (tenants and their families) living on them. Public and official concern about the poor condition of the land on the labour farms in this area has already been described in Part One.
300 homeless" (Rand Daily Mail, 9.11.70) — newspaper headlines tell the story mos-

tically. Large numbers of tenants positively resisted eviction and had to be forced out
by bat burnings, bulldozers, arrests and prosecution. A press statement issued by the
Nantu Affairs Commission in October 1970 listed convictions for 291 kwaal heads
(2 466 souls) who were squatting illegally on their former lands. A feature of these
evictions, which former tenants still remember with particular bitterness, was the
forced stock sales. The authorities impounded stock belonging to tenants whose evic-
tion notice had expired and those being relocated by the State were forbidden to take
their cattle with them. White farmers flouted the forced sales from miles around —
from as far afield as the Orange Free State according to some witnesses — and bought up
thousands of head of cattle and goats, often at a third or a quarter of their actual
value.

Originally the government intended to relocate the bulk of the evicted tenants at Mm-
deni, near Newcastle, far to the north of their Weenen homes. These plans were
thwarted, however, by the resistance of the tenants, many of whom had their possessions
and loaded trunks and packages filled only with stones onto the removal trucks. As
soon as they had been unloaded at Mdenda, they found their own way back to the Weenen
district, many returning to square on their former land. (Yieldwork) Many others
crowded into the neighbouring Umngeni district of Ewakulu. Some appear to have gone to
the Nsudla region to join those already relocated from the Weenen townlands. Finally,
the majority of Weenen tenants were relocated in hastily constructed transit camps
pegged out on a strip of land acquired by the SADT on the north bank of the Mzulwa
on the edge of the Weenen district. In this way the settlements of Sahlwe, Nkoms, Nk-
uswaphu and Mshakaza came into existence.

Conditions in these camps were extremely poor. Facilities were as rudimentary as those
described for Nkulosha — temporary tent, no protected water supply, no latrines for
many — with the further disadvantage that people were not allowed to keep stock. Al-
though (like the Weenen Emergency Camp) these relocation sites were intended only to be
a temporary solution to the crisis, officials were unable to come up with any
alternatives for the thousands living in these unsettled places who were still in existence
today. They are among the most deprived and impoverished of all the relocation areas
in Natal. (For a detailed account of Sahlwe, see case study, Part Three.)

FREEZE ON LABOUR TENANT CONTRACTS

The upheaval in Weenen made the EAU more anxious than ever to restrain the government
from pressuring ahead with its plans to abolish labour tenancy entirely by the end of
1970. In January 1970 RASHU published an editorial which alarmed what it described
as the unrealistic and impossible views of the Department of Bantu Administration:

This Union accepts the ideal of full-time employment of farm labour.

In moving towards this goal it has, though, to deal with facts not
theories. In so doing it diverges from some views held by the
Department of Bantu Administration and Development in Pretoria —
views which, to the man on the land, have an air of unreality about
them. (RASHU, 9.11.70)

The editorial went on to reject the deadline of the end of 1970 as impossible — 'not
because the farmers don't want this, but because the Department cannot deal with the
consequences of such a policy.' In citing the reasons for the breakdown of the policy
it listed, firstly, the unwillingness of many farm workers to work full-time and
secondly, the problem of relocating the surplus tenants and their families. It was
also criticised the inefficiency of the influx control system which failed to control the
migration of farm workers off the farms.

So until full time employment is desired by employees, or movement of
dis仕事を控制したため、多くの農民は労働用ニーズをいただく。

To de crease from Pretoria that they shall do so is to ignore the facts.
(RASHU, 9.07.70)

The argument was the remaining fear of an inadequacy farm labour supply; this fear had been given substance in the Weenen area where farmers were complaining bitterly of the disruption to their labour supply caused by the very evictions in which so many of them had taken part. So serious did the position become that, according to a journalist who covered the events, by 1972 Weenen farmers were trying to get the government to re-instate the labour tenant system in their area. (Natu, 11.76, 2)

In response to these pressures, the government agreed to water down its proposals for
the complete abolition of labour tenure; instead a freeze on labour tenant contracts
was announced. After consulting with the Agricultural Unions, the Minister of Bantu
promulgated Proclamation 26 of 1972 that declared that from the 1st August 1970 no new labour tenant contracts could be entered into or be registered throughout South Africa. With this announcement, restrictions on labour tenure were introduced into the remaining districts in Natal. In August RASHU listed them as follows: Bahamonga, Camplerdown, Duneshwar, Dundee, Estcourt, Graytown, Howick, Ixopo, Ladysmith, Ngcobo, Newcastle, Paulpietersburg, Pietermaritzburg, Port Shepstone, Richmond, Stanger, Umzinto, Utrecht and Vryheid. (RASHU, 8.08.70) (Howick had already been deprovincialised, some time after Weenen; date not known.)

The freeze meant that farmers could keep tenants whose contracts were already regist-
stered. It appeared, however, that many labour tenant had never had their contracts
registered and would not have been protected by this amendment. (Thus the SPP
survey undertaken at Sahlwe and Ndhlala, among labour tenants, revealed that only
26% of tenants at the former and about 70% at the latter had registered con-
tracts when these were undertaken.) Furthermore, in terms of earlier amendments to
the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act, no labour tenant contract was valid for
longer than 3 years. In early 1974 farmers started expressing concern about the implications
as the three year limit approached. Once again the EAU organized a delegation to the
Nantu Affairs Commissioner as a result of which farmers were told that contracts
entered into before 1970 would be allowed to continue for an unspecified period.

(RASHU, 16.08.74)

It is clear that these concessions did not protect most labour tenants. Large numbers
were evicted during this period in all the districts mentioned above. It seems that
the authorities continued to apply pressure on farmers to reduce the numbers of tenants
living on the land by means of the land register their workers. An example is the
Duneshwar district who was removed to Ndhlala (Outzen), in about 1975 along with
several other households from his farm, told SPP that they had been evicted after their
farmer refused to submit to instructions from the local commissioner to register his
workers. (See Ndhlala case study, Chapter 3, Part 3.) During the early 1970s
registration of workers remained a constant grievance of farmers and their dis satisfac-
the with these bureaucratic controls was frequently voiced in the pages of RASHU.

In 1974 the function of registering labour was taken over by the newly created Bantu
Administration Boards. In an editorial on the 21st June 1974 RASHU came out strongly
in favour of a 'measure of control' (of the labour force) 'but no little interference
as possible' and criticised the system of labour bureaux 'which doesn't work and never
will' as well as the 'plentitude of legislation which has been applied in fits and starts
by some authorities and not by others — legislation in many cases totally ignored by
the Bantu.'

In addition to the pressures from the authorities, it appears that by the mid 1970s
many farmers in Natal were ready to make or had already made the change to the more
capital-intensive farm of agriculture anyway. By 1977 the EAU could tell the State
that overall there was no labour shortage in Rural and farmers had no need of surplus urban labour, this in response to an approach from the State to see if there was a need for such surplus labour to be directed into agriculture. (NARMS, June 1977)

During this time, the mid 1970s, a number of relocation close settlements were established on Trust land to deal with the huge numbers of surplus workers being moved off the Tomato Farms. The tenants from the Lowveld/MPololokong area were moved into a place called Mbilanyoni, established in about 1970 some 20 km east of Mpumalanga. These from the Utshura/Vryheid area tended to be moved either into the already established township of Mondile, 20 km south of Vryheid, or to the new settlement of Nkhubeni, established in 1975/76 near Mvule. Pieliswe undertaken by TEP in Northern Natal in 1960/61 revealed that large numbers of ex-farm workers from this area had apparently made their own way to the State lands of the Maskathini Plate to the east during this time as well. Langedum farm workers were officially moved into the relocation area stretching from Reshizeni (established 1972) to Limpet, but many chose to avoid official relocation and moved instead into neighbouring black spots where they faced a further eviction at a later stage. Mkubango tenants were relocated on a string of closer settlements in the Denny Dalton region, including the already established settlements of Nkonkonzani, Khungulwana and Kupungasho. Dambenhuer tenants were sent to closer settlements in the Nkandla district centered on Qupini, e.g. Malembho which was established in 1971.

The exact number of people moved thus will probably never be known. Official figures show a marked drop in the number of labour tenant contracts registered in Natal during this time - from 20 040 in 1971 to 6 350 in 1973 (NARMS, 30.06.74) - but since many tenants continued to be unregistered, the figures are misleading. Certainly many of the 400 000 farmers referred to by the HAD in 1970 were pushed off land which they claimed as their own, forced to sell their cattle to eager white farmers at originally low prices and relocated in the bleak rudimentary camps mentioned above. Perhaps as many as 100 000 people were affected altogether.

RESISTANCE BY LABOUR TENANTS

The elimination of labour tenancy in Natal during this period was not achieved without resistance. Both tenants and, as already indicated, some farmers themselves emerged tenaciously to the only system of labour and land tenure that they knew. Generally these being evicted regarded the land as theirs. Many housewives had lived on white farms for generations; they could point to family graves that dated back well into the 19th century and prove their prior claim to the land. This claim was a particularly strong one in those parts of Northern Natal that had been lost by the Zulu kingdom to the Boer settlers in the late 19th century: Kolmanskop, Mbabane, Vryheid and Lowenburg. At some stage title to the land may have passed to the white settlers, but the tenants' ties of settlement, cultivation and family history were far more binding to them than a mere title deed, a piece of paper that many could not even read.

Thus many tenants refused to accept their eviction notices and had to be driven off by police and farmers who came with dogs and guns and fire, burned down huts, impounded cattle and arrested the people still living on the land. A group of former labour tenants in the Dambenhuer district, now living at Malembho, near Qupini, have described how they were first arrested and later removed by 50 trucks that arrived to fetch them accompanied by 'soldiers, police and their dogs.' (Report from Qupini settelment - See Appendix 1 to the Malembho case study, Part Three.) In this case, the tenants finally submitted to the removal trucks when they arrived. In other instances, tenants attempted to outwit the trucks, as in the case of those tenants in the Weenen district who went through the motions of being relocated but returned to their former homes as soon as they had been left at Mbilanyoni.

Such resistance as there was, however, was localized, often individual and spontaneous, responding to the crisis as it hit. There were - and are - no farm worker organizations that could take up the struggle on a wider basis, to lobby on behalf of the workers being evicted and to press the government to work within a united group. Local tenant opposition could succeed in delaying the moves into a united group. Local tenant opposition could succeed in delaying the moves and press them to a halt. The government's machinery of eviction could be stalled for a few years.

It could even, on occasions in the case of the group who refused to move, take the whole community as a hostage to the government's desire to clear the land. In the end, the government's desire for the land was too strong, and the tenants were removed from the land during this period, as a result, the majority of labour tenants moved from their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the late 1970s government planners, only in their offices with their files, period end by the lat
Less well documented but possibly as significant were the isolated northern farming districts around Lowveld. Few journalists or researchers have studied this area seriously, so the evidence is sketchy. In September 1979, however, in an article dealing mainly with the exodus of white farmers from this border district, the *Daily News* reporter reported that there were 23 ‘labour’ farms out of a total of 180 in the district. (*Daily News*, 13.09.79) In fieldtrips to the Ladismith, Dundee, Basutoland, Paulsdrift, Lowveld and Bela-Bela areas in the course of 1980 and 1981, SFP was told by many different individuals that some individual farmers in these districts still had labour tenant agreements with their workers.

The government’s response to the evidence of continued labour tenancy that emerged in the press in 1979 was to issue Proclamation no. 2699, (Government Gazette 6663) on the 21st September 1979, this re-interrogated that no new labour tenant contracts could be entered into from that date and set the 30th August 1980 as the final date for the automatic expiry of my registered contracts still in existence. As a result of this proclamation, a wave of fresh evictions as the 1980 deadline approached and local authorities became more zealous in their enforcement of the labour control regulations.

It is clear that there are still pockets of labour tenancy, still a gap between intent at the centre and administration at the periphery, but these remnants are gradually being tidied up. Sometimes, the changes to the labour system have been purely cosmetic. In the Lowveld area, for instance, there are reports that farmers have transformed the formal ‘labour’ contract by converting the tenant family’s obligation from a six-month one to a 12-month one, but without improving or even initiating wages, or without converting the tenants’ obligation to work from a family one to an individual one. Still, in essence, a feudal relationship, but now a more conscionable one for the worker than before. (Fieldwork. A similar phenomenon was operating in the Delmas and Ladismith districts in the mid 1970s, as described in the Mainwaring case study in Part Three.) Overall, however, the labour tenant system has by now been replaced by a full-time wage system in Natal. With this, one major phase in the history of land and labour relationships in the Natal countryside has been brought to an end and another one opened. Thousands and thousands of farm people have been transformed into a landless rural proletariat as a result.

3. Farm evictions since 1976

**SCALE OF EVICTIONS**

Theapering off of labour tenancy has not meant the ending of farm evictions. These are still continuing, though on a lesser scale and for somewhat different reasons than in the early 1970s. During the past five years, evictions have come, more and more, to be the result of State-sponsored action but of private action - with State backing - of individual farmers and farming companies against full-time workers, workers who for a variety of reasons are no longer wanted on the land. The massive, State-sponsored evictions of the early 1970s are a thing of the past. Now it is a more gradual, less dramatic whittling down of the numbers of black people living and working on white farms. A family here, perhaps five or six there - but cumulatively, amounting to thousands of people. In 1980/81, APRA collected details on about 200 farm eviction cases coming mainly from the central triangle of Wembe, Greytown, Post River; that figure represented the mere tip of the iceberg. Further north, clinic staff at Sibonweni (the relocation camp south of Vryheid) estimated in April 1980 that about 60 farm families had moved in since the beginning of that year. In the Kambula district of Kongom an agricultural officer has estimated that about 20 families a month entered the area during 1980/81 looking for places to live, having been evicted off farms in the Vryheid/Lowveld area. (APRA Fieldstrip Reports)

It has proved impossible to quantify those evictions with any degree of precision. One report, in the *Daily News*, gave a figure of 29 000 blacks ‘ordered to leave white farms in Natal’ during the course of 1978, but did not quote its sources. (*Daily News*, 13.09.79) All that could be stated with confidence is that evictions are happening throughout the province and thousands of households are being affected each year.

What makes this process even more complex is that, according to Charles Siskins, the African population living in the white countryside is in fact not decreasing in absolute terms, suggesting that along with evictions there is a parallel process of re-infiltration of certain white farming districts by Africans. (Siskins, 1981a) This process is likely to be confined to the more isolated border areas - both those bordering on South Africa’s external boundaries and those bordering on the internal boundaries with the various bantustans. The degree and spread of this movement by people back onto the land from which so many of them have been recently evicted, has not been established for the Natal region. It is an area requiring further fieldwork.

**REASONS FOR CONTINUED EVICTIONS**

As far as evictions are concerned, several processes appear to be at work in the present period; these are outlined below. What follows is, however, a very general overview. A great deal more work still needs to be done to correlate and refine broad trends in Natal agriculture in relation to what is actually happening in particular districts and different branches of farming. (For some individual case studies, see appendices.)

Firstly, the trend towards increasing mechanisation of agriculture continues to encourage farmers to reduce their formerly large labour force and rely more on a small nucleus of permanent workers, supplemented by seasonal or casual labour at peak labour periods. Secondly, it appears that overall farm ownership is being concentrated in fewer hands and as previously separate farms become joined into a single management block, their combined labour force is streamlined and reduced. Thirdly, linked to this, many farmers are wanting to extend the area under cultivation or grazing on their farms and to limit the amount of land set aside for their workers’ own agricultural use. Farmers may, as a consequence, either give redundant workers notice directly or they may limit their workers’ access to land and thus bring workers themselves to decide to leave the farm - the disadvantages of farm life coming to outweigh the advantages more strongly. Several tenants now living in desperately overcrowded and rundown informal settlements on black-owned land in the Stanger district (Kwaheuwini, St stripes etc.) have described to SFP how they too must live in the same conditions and work on white farms in the district but no longer can cultivate the land. In the Stanger district, for example, one ever decreases redundant workers notice directly or they may limit their workers’ access to land and thus bring workers themselves to decide to leave the farm - the disadvantages of farm life coming to outweigh the advantages more strongly. Several tenants now living in desperately overcrowded and rundown informal settlements on black-owned land in the Stanger district (Kwaheuwini, St stripes etc.) have described to SFP how they too must live in the same conditions and work on white farms in the district but no longer can cultivate the land. 

Many evictions seem to occur when farm ownership changes hands. Partially this relates to the factors above; partly to a fourth factor which is that farmers are less inclined today than before to shoulder the welfare and control tasks imposed on them by a large labour force and, particularly, by the extended families of the labour force, many members of which are not working on the land. Farmers complain bitterly that they are not only employer, they are doctor, ambulance driver, policeman and Father Christmas as well. In shedding these other roles, however, they are shedding people who have been tied in a particular relationship to the land, have served the needs of white agriculture over several generations, have only recently become redundant to its needs and
overcome, can make little claim on the State to provide them with viable alternatives; somewhere to live and to work.

The fifth factor at work is not new but has been true of conditions on South African farms from the beginning - the omnipotent position of the farmer, as employer and landowner, in relation to the families living and working on his land. Many current evictions are the result of what in an urban-industrial context would be described as victimisation of the worker by the employer. Farm workers are a completely unprotected category of workers. They are not, to date, covered by the Industrial Conciliation Legislation and in a dispute between employer and employees all power rests in the hands of the employer, the farmer. Provided he gives a worker a legitimate notice - one month - he may legally evict him for any reason that he likes; and if, as often happens, he does not give a legitimate notice period he is likely to get away with it anyway. AMWA has on record numerous cases of workers injured during work hours who were given notice because they were no longer fit to work; of elderly people who have spent a life-time working and living on the land being given notice because they were too frail to work and their children unwilling to work for the farmer in their place; or workers who have complained about poor working conditions being dismissed for being 'agitators' and troublemakers.

Not all evictions are the result of private action by individual farmers. The State has continued to intervene in cases where labour tenancy or cash tenancy is still blatantly practised, as in the example already described at the farm Mme (in the Wesfontein district, in 1979). In February 1960 the Natal Witness reported that 'in a bid to control the number of Blacks living on Natal farms', the DAB had approached the Chief Commissioner of Natal to request that the previously established Labour control boards be 'activated'. (Natal Witness, 16.02.50) A member of the DAB who was then also vice-chairman of the DAB (Mr. Schmidt) was quoted in the report as describing these committees as 'the only machinery ... by which surplus workers can be moved.'

Finally, there are also those farm workers who choose to leave the farms - who, weighing up the crudely limited options, decide that an balance they will be better off in KwaZulu or as a tenant on a black spot or in a squatter settlement on the edge of town. It is a private and individual choice - a form of voluntary removal, coerced and controlled by many hidden pressures and forces. What percentage of the total numbers presently leaving the farms is made up by this group is not known; it seems that it is a minority and that because of the very limited options available to ex-farm workers, most cling tenaciously to their places on the farms.

RELOCATION

The earlier period saw large-scale relocation by the State - the agent of eviction - into closer settlements, sintswas on Trust land. Today, since evictions are generally private, relatively few families are being relocated officially by the State. The local private company or a tenant on a black spot or in a squatter settlement on the edge of town. It is a private and individual choice - a form of voluntary removal, coerced and controlled by many hidden pressures and forces. What percentage of the total numbers presently leaving the farms is made up by this group is not known; it seems that it is a minority and that because of the very limited options available to ex-farm workers, most cling tenaciously to their places on the farms.

Many families do eventually end up in relocation camps but that is often only as a last resort. The largest single objection to these places is that people are not allowed to keep stock there. Rather than accept that, evicted farm workers go to enormous lengths to find a private solution to what is in fact a political problem. They may try to appeal to the existing farmer to change his mind, often paying arbitrarily fixed 'fines' of cattle, or submitting to locked gates to achieve this. (See Appendix 2.) They may simply squat and hope, passively, to wear the farmer down in his changing his mind or at least ignoring them - a precarious strategy at best. They may approach neighboring farmers for a place (inwam) and a few may succeed. Farmers can speak to will report a steady stream of supplicants for a job, a place - but in hand, at the back door.

Other evictees are crowding into neighbouring areas of KwaZulu, often hiring the local imibiza for a site on which to build, or renting a house on a black spot where they face the threat of a further removal at any time. In doing so, they place further strain on communities whose resources are already strained or depleted. In the black spot of Matjane's Kop near Indlamuthi, for instance, 14 out of the 70 migrant households in the sample interviewed by SFP in 1980/81 had arrived there since 1976, most from white farms. At Trust Beads, a small black spot near Hurburg, about 10 households that have moved there within the last year or two from white farms in the district have been served with summonses to appear in the local Magistrate's court in August 1982, to account for their presence. (Fieldwork) These are but two examples out of many that SFP could supply; nearly every freehold area visited in Natal over the last two years is providing accommodation to evicted farm workers and their families.

RESISTANCE

As in the past, resistance to relocation by farm workers is fragmented, localized and very individualistic. There are still no worker organizations straddling farm boundaries. Meetings, access to farms by outsiders, communication and resource organization are all enormously difficult undertakings. The KwaZulu government has not attempted to tackle the problems of farm workers who, as it points out, do not come under its jurisdiction anyway. Farm workers are generally dismissed as individuals now, making organized action even more difficult than in the past when large numbers of people in a single district faced the same or similar problems at the same time. Workers who have not been given notice are generally too intimidated to support those who have; they know how vulnerable they are.

Because of the unprotected status of farm workers in terms of the law, legal action against farmers by threatened workers is extremely difficult to pursue. Most farm workers do not have access to legal advice, anyway: they are excluded by virtue of their poverty, their isolation and their lack of education. In cases where threatened workers have sought outside legal help the outcome is generally unfavourable. Provided a legal notice period is served (one month in terms of common law), the farmer has a right to evict whom he chooses off his land and in such a case, all that court action can achieve is to buy time for the evictees in which he/she can try to make alternative arrangements.

 Continuing squatters and individual acts of sabotage against individual farmers' property are probably the two most common signs of overt opposition by evicted workers.

This is described in some of the appendices. Another form of passive resistance encountered by SFP in the course of its fieldwork is for families relocated to closer settlements by the authorities to simply leave the site once they have been relocated there and disappear to some more promising locality. At the relocation centre of Umqomboni one enterpriseing local resident with a large truck has developed what is reported to be a thriving business - transporting families brought into Umqomboni by 90 truck out of it to a destination of their own choosing. (Fieldwork)

See Note at end of Chapter.
Often, however, there is no destination. In July 1981, for instance, AFRA was approached on behalf of a family who had been summarily evicted off a farm in the Hector Pieterson area and were simply camping on the side of the road. (AFRA files)
Eventually a religious Minister intervened and a place was found for this family in Mhlomela Township.
In the plight of the evicted farmworkers and their families, wider issues of exploitation and of powerlessness are exemplified. An eviction notice means more than simply the loss of a job, earning as that may be; it also means the loss of a home, of access to land, of security, of a way of life—perhaps of life itself.
The individual farm worker receiving that notice is a victim of processes of political and economic change over which he has no control. Without influx control, many people living on white farms would have moved to the cities long ago. They have been chained to the rural areas. Now, no longer needed by the white farms, they are being pushed out even further into the periphery.

Note: The Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill (1962) proposes the establishment of Farm tenement boards with powers to control and reduce the numbers of blacks living on white farms. This suggests a new determination by the authorities to crack down on the numbers of blacks in the white rural areas.

Appendix 1. Statements by four evictees, 1979/80

The following statements were made by four farm workers/dwellers under threat of eviction in the Wessen District in 1979/80. They were made to staff at the Church Agricultural Project (CAP).

1. STATEMENT OF N.M.

My husband works in Johannesburg so I went to him on —- and he agreed that I could move into his farm 9 years ago. My three children lived with me and the agreement was that they would work for him. The boy worked for 6 months and then the two girls worked for the other 6 months. The boy who is now 21 years old was paid R10 for the six months stint. The two girls received R6 for their entire 6 month period i.e. R1 per month per girl. The one girl is 12 years old and the other 10 years old.

The boy was working and had done about 4 months when he came home with a notice addressed to my husband to leave the farm.

On the 8th I appeared in court and was given 90 days half suspended. The following is a copy of her dismissal letter:

[Handwritten text in Afrikaans]

2. STATEMENT OF N.M., 8.04.80

We were given three months notice but now it has passed. We had to go in March but we still haven't found a place. We were told to go to Rundu or Tsumeb. We spoke to the induna near Retcourt and he said he would discuss it with the chief. This place is called Thamahlile, but it's very crowded. We saw that there's no room there for animals. We still haven't got anywhere to go. If we don't leave soon we'll be arrested and our animals impounded.

3. STATEMENT OF N.S., 1.04.80

I was born at —- and so was my father and my grandfather too. We have always lived there. My wife's name is Isolho. I have eight children, the oldest being about 20, the youngest still a baby. My oldest son worked on the farm. He earned R10 a month. He has been working since he was about 15. I worked in Johannesburg for a long time. I was a builder. I earned R20 a week. I came back two months ago because we

* Freehold area, under threat as 'badly situated'.
were given notice to leave our home. We were given three months notice but now it has expired. I have no animals because long ago we were told to get rid of all our animals. The police arrested my wife when I was still in Johannesburg. She had to take her baby with her. She was sentenced to three months labour for squatting but was released for 840 Rand immediately. The magistrate said she and her family must leave the farm quickly, by the end of March, but we have nowhere to go. The white man said we would be arrested if we didn’t leave by the end of the month. Today is the first of April and perhaps the police will come today to arrest us.

4. STATEMENT OF N.J. 1:04:30

I have always lived at —, and my father and my grandfather. I have 6 children. The oldest is about 18, the youngest about 5. My husband deserted us a long time ago. One of my children worked on the farm — a boy. He’s about 16. He earns R12 a month. The farmer gave us three months notice. We didn’t get a letter. This was before Christmas, but we had nowhere to go. So I was arrested with two other women. I was in jail for 6 days. There were 4 of us there altogether from —. I paid R35 to get out, and am still working on the farm. We expect to be arrested again at any moment.

Appendix 2. Papene Sibisi, case study of an eviction

The following case study is reproduced from APFA Report No. 10, April 1981.

Papene Sibisi is one of the 188 cases APFA has on file, of farmworkers who have been evicted off white-owned farms in the past couple of years. He appears twice in our file — first in late 1979 and again in January 1980. Both times the same farmer and the same farm are involved — eviction, re-lease and eviction again.

His story illustrates most of the themes touched upon in previous APFA reports of farm evictions: the elimination of labour tenancy as an extended form of agricultural labour, the marginalisation of a significant section of the rural African population as a result, the tenacity with which these people have clung to their stock and their land, the lack of rights of agricultural workers. But Sibisi is more than a unit in a statistic, exemplifying a general trend. For him there has been nothing typical about his eviction at all; it has been a very lonely and private crisis, intensely suffered. His life, his very existence in the world, is a struggle to stay alive, to provide for his family, to escape from the changes that are coming upon the world.

His Background

Sibisi first approached us in August 1979, an elderly, proud man of perhaps 65, one of a group of farmworkers from several Western farms who had been given notice to leave the land on which they were living. We gathered together some sparse details about his life. The farm in which he lived had been a labour farm, a large tract of rugged thornveld near the Tugela River. Successive landowners had used it to house their labour tenants and raise their cattle but had never lived on it themselves. Sibisi was born on the farm during the 1st World War, the son of a labour tenant whose way of life he inherited and in turn passed on to his own children. He spent most of adult life working away from the farm, as a migrant worker in Johannesburg, then Kimberley and finally Virginia in the Orange Free State. His family, however, remained on the farm and his children worked a six month stint for the landowner every year — without pay — to earn the family’s right to live there, graze their cattle and plough some land.

In the early 1970s Sibisi returned home to stay. Labour tenancy had been outlawed in the Western district in 1969; henceforth only full-time farmworkers were legal. His 4 eldest sons were reluctant to switch to full-time work, however, and were restless for the more lucrative and attractive jobs of the city so Sibisi himself took over as the family’s worker representative. His job was to oversee the grazing of the farmer’s cattle for which, like his children before him, he received no pay. What made this apparently very one-sided arrangement worthwhile was that over the years the family had established a substantial herd of animals which they could graze on the farm. Sibisi regarded himself as first and foremost a stockowner. In 1979 he had 15 head of cattle and 69 sheep and goats legally on the farm plus some 25 unregistered heifers as well — an unusually large herd for a farmworker in the 1970s. With the produce and income from his stock plus the remittances sent home by his sons, the household survived.
Eviction 1979  
Abruptly, on the 6th August 1979, this apparently stable existence was turned upside down when Sibisi was given notice to be off the farm, with all his belongings, his family and his stock, within 30 days. He claims that what provoked the farmer was a quarrel they had had, but without reason: Sibisi had asked for payment of one bag of mealie meal a month, the farmer (a very prominent, wealthy Weenen farmer) had angrily refused. The farmer may have had other reasons for dismissing Sibisi — but since he is not obliged to supply them when giving notice, and since he would not discuss the matter with anyone, not even Sibisi's lawyers, these never became known.

The eviction notice threatened the entire basis of Sibisi's life. He had a large family — 13 people living permanently at home (himself, his wife, several children, 2 daughters-in-law and their children) — plus the 4 diligent ones who returned home once a year. The farm was the only home they knew; both Sibisi's father and grandfather were buried there. The family were frightened by the lawlessness and overcrowding of the neighbouring Weenen district of KwaZulu and even more horrified by the thought of being moved to Mkhweni, the nearest official resettlement camp, some 100 km away and without land, jobs or kin. Most disturbing of all was the fate of their stock.

Sibisi knew he would not be allowed to take that with him to Mkhweni; he also knew that even if he could persuade a chief to make a place for him in Weenen, erasing there was non-existent. It was impossible for him to conceive of a life without land and space and cattle. He was too old to start from scratch again.

So, when all appeals to the landowner had failed the family simply sat tight at their homestead. The sequence of events that followed was as grim as it was predictable. On September 14th 1979 Sibisi was arrested for illegal squatting and fined R90 or 90 days. Shortly thereafter his wife and 2 of his children were arrested and fined R20 each. The family paid their fines and continued to 'count' — where else could they go, they said? In November they suffered an even more crippling blow when 15 cattle and all their sheep and goats were impounded by the farmer as 'stray'. The animals were in the Weenen pound for 4 days; the final bill to release them came to R357,65, of which R350 went to the farmer for alleged damages. Sibisi borrowed the money from a local agricultural project, bailed out his cattle, and returned home.

Replies  
Then suddenly, as arbitrarily as he had given notice, the farmer changed his mind and agreed to let the family stay. Again we have only Sibisi's version of what happened. He says he had invoked the aid of a witchdoctor; he had also agreed to "give" the farmer an ox and arranged for a younger son and daughter to work on the farm. The total cost of reprieve to the family was in the region of R1 000 — R707,65 in court and pound fines, plus the value of the ox and the expense of numerous trips to lawyers, relief agencies, the witchdoctor. But the homestead appeared safe.

Eviction 1981  
For a year life continued much as before. Sibisi's teenage son earned R20 a month on the farm; the daughter worked in the farmer's kitchen. In January 1981, however, the family was flung back on the treadmill of crisis once more. Sibisi received another eviction notice — a second scrap of paper, a second ultimatum to leave the land. According to Sibisi the reason this time was that his daughter was sick and failed to report for work one morning. When he went round to the farmhouse to explain, the farmer simply reached for a notepad. "I'm tired of your family" was his only explanation for the notice he handed over.

The weary, futile cycle of attempted negotiations and appeal was launched upon once more. Sibisi put on his city clothes and travelled to Pietermaritzburg to seek legal help. The lawyer spelled out what he did not want to hear — that the farmer was within his rights, and that there was nothing the law could do for him because it did not represent his interest. He tried to get a place on another farm and spent several days trekking from place to place but without luck. He again consulted a witchdoctor; it had worked before, perhaps it would this time. Throughout he steadfastly refused to sell his cattle. "I cannot see money in the bank like I can my cattle; I cannot get any pleasure from money like I can from my cattle".

On the 13th February 1981, the lay his notice expired, the farmer impounded all his stock. They were in the pound for 11 days while Sibisi struggled to find alternative grazing for them. The final bill this time was for R3 992,04 — ten of Sibisi's cattle and 30 of his goats had to be sold to raise the money. During this time the farmer also knocked down the 7 huts that made up the Sibisi homestead, finally forcing them to move away from their — his — land.

Sibisi and his family are now capped precariously at a church building on a neighbouring farm. They found grazing for their severely reduced herd at R2 a beast a month; they have won another, less scary reprieve of a sort. We know there is absolutely no security in their future at all; they no longer look to any future, only to each day as it is salvaged from the refuse dump of our society.
Appendix 3. Case study of an eviction in the Vryheid district

The following case study is drawn from the APRA files. It concerns a farm worker in the Vryheid district.

CASE OF MR K.W.

1. Of K.W.'s seven sons, two, P. and A., worked for the farmer for no pay or rations. On 22.02.81 the farmer accused P. of having thrown sand into the water pump engine. He allegedly assaulted P., punching and kicking him. The farmer also demanded one head of cattle from K.W. for damage to the pump. This has not been paid and the farmer has dropped this demand. On 23.02 K.W. took his son to Vryheid to lay a charge against the farmer. He was told that he should go to the police at Gluckstadt which he did later that day. There he was told that there were no grounds for a charge of assault because there were no witnesses. Subsequently P.W. left the farm for Johannesburg.

2. K.W.'s other son, A.W. drove a tractor for the farmer. On 26.02.81 he had an accident while bringing a load of wood from a plantation. The farmer then presented K.W. with a demand for R621 for repairs. K.W. refused to pay this although he could have afforded to. He said that his son had never asked to drive the tractor and never pretended to be a qualified tractor driver. The farmer knew that he had no licence so if he put an inexperienced driver on a tractor that was his fault. The farmer repeated the demand for R621 threatening K.W. with eviction if it were not paid. Subsequently A.W. also left the farm and went to Johannesburg.

3. On 5.03.81 K.W. went to the Labour Office of the Department of the Interior of the KwaZulu Government in Ulundi. He made a sworn statement about the assault on P.W. and the demand for money for the tractor. In this statement he said that he had agreed to pay the farmer one head of cattle for the pump damage (see para 1) but later he denied this. The Labour Office sent a letter about this case to the Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg and to the Commissioner in Vryheid.

4. K.W. got a letter from Vryheid summoning him to the Commissioner's office. There he was asked why he had taken the matter to Ulundi when it had already been referred to the police in Gluckstadt. He was also questioned about the case.

5. A letter dated 28.04.81 was sent from the Commissioner in Vryheid to the Labour Office in Ulundi to the effect that the Commissioner has no authority to intervene on the assault charge since the police were involved and re-stated the objection of the absence of witnesses. The letter suggested that K.W. pay the farmer the R621 for the tractor. The letter also claimed that K.W. had contradicted some points in his sworn statement, referring to the point about whether compensation for damages to the pump had been agreed upon or not (see para 3 above).

6. On 25.05.81 the farmer gave K.W. a 'Trekpas': "Hiermet opdrag een K.W. om die plant — te verlaat met al sy bestrigings en familie voor die laaste 64 van Junie 1981. By wie en kleinvee moet verwyder word binne 14 dae.

(2 weeks) vanaf 28 Mei 1981. Nu die laasgenoemde datum sal hy en sy familie as ongeawa op die plees beantwoord word.

7. K.W. has 99 head of cattle, 28 goats and 8 fields on the farm. He thinks that he will be able to stay at Denny Dalton's when evicted but will not be allowed to take any livestock with him. This seems to be his greatest concern at the moment. He says that he would be prepared to reduce his holding of cattle if it meant that he could stay on the farm, but he will not pay for the damage to the tractor under any circumstances.

8. K.W. took the eviction notice to the Department of the Interior, Ulundi. On 10.06.81 an official from there wrote to the Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg asking him to use his influence to get an extension granted.

* He was probably referring to the relocation areas of Khumulwane or Umngazi lodge.
MP probes squatter eviction

THE adequacy of Black housing in Howick is to be investigated by Mr. Ralph Hardingham, NRP MP for Muir River.

Mr Hardingham was reporting in The Natal Witness that 27 of the 31 dwellings on a Howick farm had been evicted, and he would raise the question of Black housing in Howick with the Department of Co-operation and Development "at the earliest possible opportunity".

Three of the more elderly "squatters" were removed in Table Mountain and one by the Department of Co-operation and Development vehicles on Monday.

The two official Black accommodation areas at Howick - Mpopomeni and Howkow Township - are full, sources have said.

Mpopomeni has a waiting list of 1,200 people and additional building is being planned for later this year.

Last week I tabled questions in regard to Mpopomeni and was told it was envisaged that the township would be completed by 1969 and give accommodation to 35,000 people. Mr Hardingham said.

He said he wondered whether this would be adequate.

In regard to the elderly people involved he is always concerned about the comfort and circumstances of those affected by removals. I will make the necessary inquiries," Mr Hardingham said.

By last week many of the 27 "squatters" had demolished their houses and moved rather than face eviction. Some of the dwellers had spent most of their lives on the farm, one source said.

Mr Dorn Schutte, nominated National Party MP for Natal, said the matter "looks very much a social problem - the houses are living there illegally.

He added, however, that he was prepared to listen to any representations made to him by people concerned.

Mr Graham Mcintosh, FPP Member of Parliament for Pietermaritzburg North, said yesterday the experience of which the eviction stories were embarrassing in Howick "is sadly repeated almost every week in many parts of Natal and South Africa. They are caught in a tangle of circumstances which are exaggerated by the point of being intolerable by National Party policies," Mr McIntosh said.

He believed the Government should facilitate the "relocation" process rather than increase the pressure on the already overcrowded Black areas.

"The squatter is more housing in urban areas," he said.

4. BLACK SPOT REMOVALS

The removal of black spots has become one of the most publicised categories of relocation in Natal, partly because of the scale of the removals involved, partly because of the level of opposition displayed by a number of affected communities (Charlestown, Hlatikulu, Grovetown, Hatzenberg's Kop, St Wendel's), and partly because of the hostility often displayed by the residents of the land, which carries a stronger emotive appeal in the press and tends to legitimise such opposition in the white public's mind more readily than in the case of removals of non-black areas.

Eliminating the African freehold farms that have dotted the Natal countryside so widely has proved a larger task than the Nationalist government anticipated when it set out to reverse the bantustan of the plateau in the 1950s. Over 70,000 people have been moved off black spots to date, nevertheless, on our calculations, the programmes of clearing these black freehold farms have not yet reached the halfway mark and nearly a quarter of a million people are still living under threat of removal in these areas at present. Despite the relatively greater publicity surrounding black spot removals, most of the threatened communities are remote rural places where outsiders never visit, whose names have never been published in the press or other reports.

This chapter on black spot removals is divided into the following sections:

1. Problems of definition and calculation
2. Total numbers of black spots in Natal
3. Conditions
5. Summary of African relocation black spots 1948 - 1962

1. Problems of definition and calculation

Since both the definition and the classification of black spots have varied over time, as State policy towards the African reserves has evolved from the "bantustan" era of the past to the "national states" era of the present, any researcher trying to pinpoint exactly how many black spots there were in 1948, how many of these have been moved and how many still remain to be moved, faces insurmountable problems and inconsistencies. In 1969 the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said: 'By black spots is meant land which is owned by Bantu and does not include small proclaimed Bantu reserves.' (Hansard, vol. 25, col. 326) However, some State officials use the term very loosely to describe - condemn - any black-occupied area that they want to move, whether freehold or not, and are not concerned with clarity or consistency. The list of black spots that Knapman supplied in Parliament in answer to questions in April 1960 included both scheduled reserves - Reserve no. 6, Impangeni - and State lands - St Lucia. (Hansard, Question 537, 22.04.60)

In this report the criteria used for determining whether a place should be classed as a black spot or not have been those of ownership and locality of the land. 'Black spot' covers both African freehold land as described by the Minister of Bantu Administration in 1969 (the origins of which were described in Part One), and land owned by a church or
mission station but leased to individual Africans - land which, it is sometimes, falls within what the State has defined as the white area. This definition of black land was formerly released for incorporation into KwaZulu but has subsequently been erected or encroached upon by ex-indent to be consolidated boundaries (e.g. the Driefontein block of farms north of Ladysmith). It excludes tribal and reserve land, even where these have been described as black spots by officials (e.g. the Nkeleni Mission Reserve outside Richmond).

The reason why this report maintains a distinction between freehold and tribal land is that it is useful to limit the usage of the term black spot. Obviously the term is a political one and not some pure concept that one is wanting to defend against corrupt usage. Nevertheless, there are differences between freehold and tribal land - differences in legal status and differences in social organization on and around the land - which are significant and which need to be taken into account when analysing the process of relocation and developing strategies for opposing it. The method of appropriation, the structures of authority, the relationships among landowners and between landowners and tenants are some of the aspects in which freehold properties are marked off from those in the reserves.

Even when one limits 'black spot' to freehold and mission properties in this way, there are still problems in trying to establish categorically how many of these properties there ever were and how many there are left, under threat, today. As already pointed out, because of the shifts in State policy towards the reserves, the boundaries of what is and what is not the white area have not remained fixed over time and thus the list of properties classified as black spots has not remained fixed either. Apart from problems in the changing status of land, much of the information that one requires is not available. When asked in 1981 what the total number of black spots and people remaining to be moved there was, the Minister of Cooperation and Development replied: 'The particulars and information required are not being maintained and kept up to date ... and can unfortunately not be readily ascertained...'. (Hansard, Question 188, 26.02.81) In 1982 he repeated that the details on freehold properties still to be removed was 'not readily available' and 'cannot be ascertained without performing a large volume of work.' (Hansard, Question 391, 2.04.82) Having said that, Dr Koornhof then went on to say that there were approximately 75 black areas scheduled to become White areas across the country, but did not elaborate on this figure. He is clearly not referring to individual properties - we have calculated a total of 35 black spots in Natal alone. It is probable that he is referring to major blocks of land only, putting scheduled, released and freehold areas all together.

Even where official information is available, there are problems with its quality and its accuracy. If one tabulates all the answers supplied by various official sources at different times about how many black spots there are in Natal, the result is a set of contradictory, erratically fluctuating figures. 76 in 1955 (Toulson Report); 210 in 1961 (Bantu); 252 in 1962 (Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Hansard, Question 23, 23.03.62) - the figures increase in this seven year period despite the fact that the removal of black spots in Natal was already under way. Then, during the course of 1964, parliament was presented with 2 different sets of figures within the space of one month. In March 1964 the Senate was told by the Minister of Transport, on behalf of the Minister of B&D, that there were 193 black spots in Natal; in April 1964 the House of Assembly was told, this time by the Minister of B&D himself, that there were 318. (Senate Debates, col. 2657, 17.03.64 and House of Assembly Debates, col. 4584, 24.04.64)

Since the 1960s officials have tended to talk in terms of the overall area of land cleared or still to be cleared rather than the numbers of individual properties affected - but have, as pointed out, often confused freehold and reserve land. Where individual
properties have been listed, there have been enough inaccuracies in the details supplied on particular places to raise doubts about the reliability of the information as a whole. The Deurp recorded as moved in 1976 instead of 1978, State land at 31 Lucia described as a black spot, removals in the Utrecht district listed under the Underberg district - these are three examples of inaccuracies in the list of black spots that were removed between 1970 and 1975 which Dr Koornhof presented to Parliament in 1980.

Because of these problems with official data, we have tried to verify information in the field as far as possible. However our fieldwork too has had its limitations. Some black spots are very isolated and hard to find; informants living on them are often busy about details of time and scale; we have not had the resources to visit all places personally, and some properties that were cleared a long time back have been extremely difficult to trace. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that our figures represent the most accurate tally that has been made to date.

2. Total number of black spots in Natal

According to our calculations, the total number of freehold black spots that there have been in Natal since 1948 is 334, to which should be added a further 29 mission properties i.e. 363 black spots altogether. This total adds to the core of black spots as defined in the late 1950s other freehold and church properties that find themselves similarly isolated and threatened as a result of consolidation planning today. It also includes information on the Mount Currie and Matatiele districts, formerly falling within the Cape Province but after 1976, when the Transkei was made independent by Pretoria, added to Natal. It is thus a more comprehensive figure than most other estimates of the past. Detailed lists of all these properties are provided in sections 5 and 6 below; a summary of the information is set out in Table 9.

Table 9. TOTAL NUMBER OF BLACK SPOTS IN NATAL, 1948 - 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>FREEHOLD</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Removed</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Under threat</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Part removed, part under threat</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Likely to be / have been consolidated</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Status not known</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>334</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td><strong>363</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures show clearly that in terms of numbers still to be moved, the black spot removal programme is less than half way. We do not have accurate figures for the actual area of land still to be expropriated and cleared, but the available evidence shows that from this perspective, too, the programme is less than half way. After 1936 there were some 42 226 ha of African freehold land expropriated from the reserves, i.e. neither scheduled nor released (see p. 35 above). In February 1981 Dr Koornhof stated that there were still 25 896 ha of black spot land to be cleared in Natal (Hannard, Question 108, 26.02.81) - 60% of the post-1936 figure. Had his definition of black spot been as rigorous and as comprehensive as ours - including missions and released freehold land now threatened by consolidation - the proportion of land still to be cleared would have been shown to still be higher. Nevertheless, even on the official figures, it is clear that despite the massive removals of the past, black spot removals in Natal are far from being completed.

SOURCES

The major sources from which these figures have been compiled have been the following:

1. An undated document of the South African Institute of Race Relations (Durban), compiled in the mid 1950s, called 'Preliminary Report on African Removals - Natal'. This extremely useful document listed details on freehold black spots that the Institute’s researcher had managed to acquire from official sources at the time.


3. For the Mount Currie and Matatiele districts, an undated memorandum called ‘Acquisition of land by the South African Native Trust and Abolition of Bantu Property Rights in land in Bantu Areas’ c. 1961. This was a report of the Department of Bantu Affairs that was sent round to various Farmers’ Associations urging their cooperation in the process of buying up outstanding quota land. It contained a list of black spots moved in the Transkei and Cape Province, including Mount Currie and Matatiele, by that time.

4. The 1 : 250 000 and 1 : 50 000 topo-sedentary map series for Natal.


6. Various newspaper cuttings, memoranda, reports and other documents in the files of the South African Institute of Race Relations, Durban (mainly for the 1960s period) and of AFRA, Plettenbergurh (for the period 1979 to the present). These include data compiled from official sources.

*The information on the freehold properties is considered reasonably comprehensive; that on the mission properties is, as explained in section 6 below, still very incomplete. For a map of Natal’s black spots see map no. 28 at the end of this report.*
3. Conditions

OVERPOPULATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

There is a tendency on the part of opponents of removals to romanticize conditions on black spots. They are not, by and large, idyllic pastoral communities. Most are grappling with major problems of underdevelopment. Their biggest problems stem from overpopulation and the lack of capital with which to develop their land, either to practice largescale farming or to accommodate denser settlement and more intensive methods of agriculture.

The cycle of underdevelopment displayed in most black spots is similar to that found in other black communities and its origins can be traced to the same causes. Like the homesteads themselves, black spots have fixed boundaries with a growing population that is trapped by legislation, specifically influx control and the stringent limitations on black ownership and occupation of land, within those boundaries. Added to the pressures being put on the land by natural increase among the original families has been the enormous influx of new tenants in recent years, many of them victims of relocation off white farms or other black spots. Compounding these problems has been the complete neglect of these areas by agricultural extension services of any sort and the demoralising insecurity under which the owners and occupants live.

By the 1960s the process of sub-division and fragmentation of landholdings on Natal's black spots was in most cases well advanced. Reliable population figures for black spots are extremely hard to come by and the available information for this period needs to be treated cautiously, as a guide rather than an accurate statistical representation of the situation. Nevertheless, according to the Minister of BAP in 1964 there were 2,478 landowners and 45,144 tenants living on black spots in Natal. (Hansard, Question V, 24.04.64), giving a ratio of landowners to tenants of 1 to 18. (Although the Minister of Agriculture at the time, his figures must refer to the heads of households, rather than to the total population.) These figures indicate a substantial increase in the proportion of tenants among the total black spot population compared to the situation reported by the Beaufort Commission in 1916, when the ratio had been in the region of 1 to 3.

Elion Kugadi, himself a former landowner, has described the reason for the influx of tenants into floodhold areas and the effects thus:

I have my house and my fields, I plough the land and I keep a few cattle. Then along comes an evicted farm worker. The farmer has given him a trekpass, his animals are in the pound, he has nowhere to go so he comes to me: 'Please, brother, if you can just give me an acre at the corner of your farm.' Out of sympathy I do that. Instead of looking for an alternative farmer to take him on, this man goes to Johannesburg to work ... This continues until you find yourself on this 50 acre farm with 20 tenants, each paying you R6 a year. You are not making any money out of them, they have deprived you of your land. You can't make a living so in turn you also go to Johannesburg to work. (Kugadi, 1981, 3-4. See Appendix 3, Chapter 2, Part 3.)

Black spots have become the victims of State relocation policies in two ways - both as targets for removal themselves and as informal dumping grounds. As farm evictions and black spot removals escalated in the 1960s and 1970s, the number of displaced people moving on to black spots as tenants increased further. The process has not been uniform. Properties closest to industrial centres and job opportunities have proved the most attractive and have experienced the heaviest influx of tenants in recent years. The huge informal settlements that have developed on African and Indian freehold land in the Inanda and Stanger districts, in close proximity to Durban, are extreme manifestations of this but the pattern is repeated on a lesser scale throughout the province. The more remote the isolated black spots have tended to be bypassed and the pressure that the pressure on the land has not been as acute as a result. This contrast is well illustrated by two threatened black spots in the Ladysmith district: parts of Matlane's Kop, 25 km from Ladysmith, resemble a fairly dense settled informal township, whereas Dulestania, 50 km from Ladysmith, retains a stranger rural character and has a more markedly agricultural base.

However, no black spot has escaped the problems of in-migration and a rapidly expanding population. The mounting pressure on the land has led to a massive decline in agricultural production in these areas over the years. While there are individuals who still make an independent living out of the land, they are very few: most black spot households look to the wage economy of the urban - industrial centres for their survival. This is clearly borne out by the SPP surveys, written up in Parts Three and Four.

MIDRAND LABOUR

Many black spots are, therefore, already performing a labour reservoir function for industry. This fact undermines the argument advanced by some theorists that their removal by the State should be analyzed simply in terms of labour control and allocation - that black spots are removed and their population relocated to conveniently placed closer settlements from which, deprived of an agricultural base, they can be drawn upon as migrant or commuter workers. In many cases the relocation sites are further out from job centres than the black spots that have been or are about to be moved, for instance in the Stanger District where the relocation area of Bulker Trust Farm is further from Stanger and further from Durban than any of the numerous threatened floodhold areas in the district.

Interestingly too, SPP fieldwork over the past two years indicates that relatively few black spot residents are employed as farm workers by neighbouring white farmers. In the Matlane's Kop household survey only 4,6% of the full-time workers were employed in agriculture in 1980/81. In the Bankhuma survey, only 2,65% of workers were employed in agriculture before they were removed from their former homes of Boxborn, in 1976. The more rural and further from urban centres a black spot is, the higher the percentage of agricultural workers is likely to be but nevertheless, in the Compensation survey only 19% of workers were employed as farm workers before the removal of the community from The Swamp. In an ANSA survey carried out at Kwegwetla in 1980, few of the workers in the community were working as farm workers. Women and children undoubtedly are employed in agriculture on a usual or seasonal basis, but the significance of agricultural work as a source of earnings in black spot communities is not great.

SHACK-PAINING

Hostile opponents of black spots often accuse the landowners of deliberately choosing chok-farming in preference to agriculture because it is easier and more lucrative. In the densely settled informal settlements that have grown up in the peri-urban areas around the cities this is often undoubtedly the case. In the rural areas, however, rents have remained virtually static throughout the 20th century and are extremely low, ranging between R10 and 225 per annum. This amount generally covers access to ploughing land and communal grazing land, in addition to a residential site. Given their own lack of capital, many landowners probably do find rent-farming easier than farming. Many landowners are themselves migrant workers, unable to work the land, and therefore willing to rent out their land to others. The return is, however, very little and the accusation of rent-gouging generally not justified.
a valuable asset it is — and given security and technical and financial support, would be strongly placed to improve their farming techniques and husband their land more productively. Those who have no interest in the land are those who, but for influx control, would have migrated to the cities long ago.

Despite the decline in agricultural activity in the floodplain areas during the course of the 20th century, agriculture still plays a very important, if subsidiary, part in the overall economic and social life of these communities. This was strongly borne out by the survey. The lessening of the interest in farming has not been uniform, of being moved off a black spot into a closer settlement. Despite this, the nature of the problem is the same: the community spirit and greater social conscience is likely to facilitate relocation, rather than to augment the reserves as such.

Although many farmers were still extremely suspicious of the land-buying activities of the Bantu, the MAU began to respond more favorably. The amount of outstanding quota land to be acquired by the Bantu, virtually static between 1936 and the early 1960s, dropped sharply as a result of large land purchases in the mid 1960s and again in the early 1970s. This land provided the basis on which the relocation of black spots and, later, of African townships, could proceed: on it closer settlements and relocation townships were built.

QUOTA PURCHASES IN THE 1960S

In early 1961 the Department of Bantu circulated a memorandum appealing to farmers to assist (the Department) in moving 'black spots' by making land available to the Department for the resettling of displaced people. (Bantu, 14.04.61) The following month MAU reported that 'in the interests of the farmer' the MAU was to meet with its affiliated Farmers' Associations to formulate a 'definite overall plan for the sale of white-owned farms to the Native Trust'. (MAU, 12.05.61) Subsequently it met with the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal (Mr A.D. Turton) to clarify the intentions of the Bantu in this regard.

At that stage the outstanding quota for Natal was put at 650 000 acres (263 042 ha). Mr Turton was at pains to reassure farmers that the bulk of this land was to come from the State land in north-eastern Natal, from the Makhatshana Plateau:

Where land is sought in European areas in Natal proper it will be for
the purpose of eliminating 'black spots'; to facilitate the application of conservation farming methods, or to round off awkward areas of land. This will add up to about 100,000 acres, and will be land bought for Bantu use, whilst in turn other land at present occupied by Bantu in the white areas will be made available to whites. Over all, these adjustments will not encroach to any extent on the European-owned farmlands of Natal. (KARUIZWA, 26.05.61)

He also summarised briefly the land needed by the SAPF in the various districts of Natal; this assessment makes interesting reading compared to the proposals put forward during the consolidation era of the 1970s - 'very little' in Harding, 'very little' in Mbabane, 'may be a bit' at Mtunzini and Eshowe, possibly 'a little for labour purposes' at Estcourt.

Arising out of these negotiations, the NAI and the SAPF agreed to a system whereby black purchases of land would be made by the Trust, on a district basis, in concentration with local Farmers’ Associations. In June 1962 agreement was reached on the land to be acquired in the Ladysmith and Dundee districts (see Appendix 1). The following month the NAI met with the Bantu Affairs Commission and the Minister of Bantu and agreed that the first priority of the SAPF was to eliminate black spots, the second to 'reorganise' the released areas. (KARUIZWA, 4.07.62)

In April 1964 the Minister of Bantu announced in the House of Assembly that a total of 55 462 borgen (47 697 ha) had been purchased or approved for purchase in the Newcastle, Vryheid, Klip River, Dundee, Xpelândia and Ixopo districts (House of Assembly Debates, vol. 10, col. 4854-5) - most of it land earmarked for relocation purposes. Problems were being encountered in the Estcourt district where the attempt to buy up land, part of which was intended for the establishment of a township to serve the small border industrial area of Estcourt, conflicted with the long-standing ambition of white farmers in the area to remove all three of the Drakensberg reserves. (Locations no. 1 and no. 2 and the Upper Umguba Location at Jerseyville.) This issue, which is discussed in the next chapter on consolidation, has still not been fully resolved, although land has been acquired by the Trust and the township of Webeni built on it.

By early 1971 the amount of quota land still outstanding in Natal had dropped to approximately 17 600 ha, to which a further 43,000 ha of compensatory land for black spots still to be moved, had to be added. (NAURU, 5.02.71) By 1973 the figure stood at 56 700 ha (Deputy-Minister of Bantu, quoted in NARU, 23.11.73) - although it is not specified, it is likely this figure included compensatory land for black spots as well. Thereafter land purchase proceeded steadily and finally, in early 1981 it was announced that the original 1936 quota had been met, in Natal - the first province where this had happened. In answer to a series of questions tabled in Parliament, Dr Koornhof reported that the SAPF had acquired a total of 442 790 ha of land in Natal and that the amount of quota land still to be acquired in Natal was nil. He did state, however, that a further 25 896 ha of land still to be acquired in Natal 'as compensatory land for black spots still to be resettled.' (Hansard, Q. 345, 26.02.81)

Unfortunately, Dr Koornhof's figures do not tally with figures derived from other sources concerning the total area of land due to be added to the African areas of Natal in terms of the 1936 legislation. According to Moorcroft-Smith et al. (1978, 6), the total amount of quota land allocated for Natal in 1936 was 450 534 ha - 7 444 ha more than the figure given by Dr Koornhof in 1981 as representing the fulfilment of the 1936 obligation in Natal. It is a discrepancy serious enough to warrant further investigation.

The following table sets out the history of land purchases by the SAPF / SAPF between 1936 and the end of 1980, as recorded in the figures supplied by various officials at

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Land Acquired by SAPF</th>
<th>Quota Land Outstanding</th>
<th>Compensatory Land Outstanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>247 295</td>
<td>203 239</td>
<td>42 326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>47 697</td>
<td>262 042</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>46 672</td>
<td>137 600</td>
<td>41 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>56 700</td>
<td>15 924</td>
<td>16 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>434 611 total</td>
<td>10 014</td>
<td>11 021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>442 790 total</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>25 896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite Dr Koornhof’s claim to have met the 1936 quota, the process of buying up land in Natal by the SAPF is still not complete. Apart from the land still required as compensation for black spots yet to be moved, the original quota has, since 1980, been superseded to some extent by the new land formulae being worked out to meet the requirements of consolidation in the various bantustans / national states. National Party leaders were adamant that consolidation would not involve any extra land being allocated to the bantustans beyond what was proposed in 1936. In 1980, however, government spokesmen indicated that more land may be forthcoming if necessary in order to 'satisfy the most important development needs' of the bantustans, provided that it would be 'utilized productively and on an economical basis.' (Dr Koornhof, quoted in the Rand Daily Mail, 31.10.80.) This is discussed more fully in the following chapter.

CHRONOLOGY OF REMOVALS

As already stated, the elimination of black spots and the enforcement of Group Areas proclamations were the two main categories of relocation in Natal in the 1960s. However, despite the acquisition of Trust land in the early 1960s, black spot removal proceeded sluggishly in the first half of the 1960s. During this time a couple of black-owned properties were bought out in Southern Natal (Lot PP 218, Bulwer and ED 7999, Ixopo).

The main focus of attention was in Northern Natal where Besterpruit (Vryheid), Eshowe, Isibelt, Esterville, Makhubele, Swanevlei (near Newcastle), and Thulamuleni (near Ladysmith) were moved by 1963 and a start made with the removal of the urban fringes of areas of Laingsburg and Middendorp in Covenir (both in Newcastle).

The NAI was not satisfied with progress and in August 1965 it was described as being 'very perturbed by the unnecessary delays in the elimination of black spots' (NAURU, 27.06.65), a complaint that was repeated the following year by the President of the NAI.

* Hectares calculated from original morgen.
in his address to its annual Congress. (Natal Mercury, 23-09-66) In 1967 the RAI sent a
deputation to the Minister of RAd to discuss the delays. In his reply, the Minister
did not quote a problem as the reason behind the delays but added "an indication that
more money would be probably available for removals the following year." (Natal Mercury, 24-01-68)
The following year black spot removals in Natal shot into prominence with the removal of
ten black spots in the Umzimkulu/Dundee area in Limoilu. These removals were bitterly
opposed by the people affected and generated considerable publicity and international
condemnation. In 1969 the Minister of RAd reported that a total of 26 black spots had
been removed in Natal by then, "6 each in the Alfred Xuma, Richmond, Pietermaritzburg
and Polana (Ulumve) districts, 2 each in the Elip River, Port Shepstone and Utrecht
districts, 3 in the Vryheid district, 6 in the Newcastle district and 8 in the Dundee
In the 1970s the programme of black spot removals became enmeshed in the consolidation
proposals for KwaZulu and underwent some modifications, in content and in implementation,
as a result. A small number of properties previously classified as black spots - for
instance, Middelton (Entsou), Umtali (Hluphakazi) and a number of properties in the
Isipingo district - became earmarked for inclusion in the proposed consolidated boundaries for
KwaZulu. A far larger number of freedhold properties previously considered part of
KwaZulu became earmarked for expropriation from the bantustan, however, and were faced with
the threat of removal as a result, notably the Driefontein block of farms outside Luy
Smith and an extensive cluster of freedhold properties, many of them very small, in the
western foothills of Xemilele and Umbelung district.
During the 1970s black spot removals continued at a steady pace in Natal, the Minister of
Cooperation and Development reporting that a total of 64 423 people were cleared off
black spots in the province between 1970 and the end of 1973. (Hansard, Question 200,
23-04-80. However, as already noted there are inaccuracies in some of his figures.)
By the end of the decade, however, the pace of removals slackened off markedly. So
black spots were removed in Natal in 1979 nor in 1980 and only 1, the small farm, Elp
pitela, near Ermville, with a population of 69 households, in 1981. (On Ermptela see
the case study in Part Four.)

THE POSITION IN 1982

In early 1982 a number of newspaper carried prominent reports suggesting that the
government's black spot removal programme "appears to have ground to a temporary halt" and that 'there are strong indications the authorities might change their mind.' (Natal Witness, 23-04-82) These reports were based on developments in Lebowa, where the
government announced it had abandoned its previous intentions of relocating the people
in the Matok - Sangaope area and on speeches made in the House of Assembly by van der
Walt, Chairman of the Commission for Cooperation and Development, and the EP for Elip
River, Natal, Mr V. Volker. In his speech, van der Walt stated that

"For an account of the process of removal and the response to it by the people living
in one of these communities, that of Roosboom near Ladysmith, see the Backman case
study in Part Three.

in the light of the new government policy of economic development it was
necessary to review whether it was necessary to remove some of the black
spots. (Natal Witness, 23-04-82)"

Earlier, Volker had displayed as appeared to be a new and more pragmatic approach
towards black spots when he had said that 'black farmers who farmed economically in
white areas should be helped to keep farming' by granting them loans, rather than forcing

them to resettle elsewhere.' (Natal Mercury, 22-04-82)
The dangers in accepting these remarks at face-value were illustrated very soon after-
wards, however. Less than a week after newspapers had reported as hopefully on the
change in policy, Dr Koornhof confirmed that a number of specific black spots in Natal
were to be removed: including all the African freedhold properties in Volker's own
government of the Elip River. All these places have been under threat for a long time
and have not yet been moved, and it is still possible that if sufficient pressure can be
brought to bear against their removal, from both the threatened communities and outside
support groups, they may yet be left alone (at least for the time being). Nevertheless,
developments in these places make it clear that at this stage the government is still
determined to move them.

Thus Matiweke's Koppie, one of the threatened communities, has already been expropriated
by the State (in 1978) and despite various appeals, Prudentia has consistently refused to
reinstatement the landowners with their title deeds. Landowners and tenants (over
12 000 of them) are thus living on land to which they no longer have any legal claim -
they are there entirely at the discretion of the State. Jonoono's Kop, adjoining
Matuiteze's Kop, has also been expropriated. Earlier in 1982 the local magistrate told
the tenants they need no longer pay rent to their landlords since the land now belongs to
the State: clearly a preliminary to removal. The magistrate's announcement, predictably,
caucused a furor in the community, prompting a decentralising sense of insecurity and
getting landowners against tenants. In addition, the Driefontein block of farms lying
in the south of Matiweke's Kop, with a population put officially at 70 980 in 1981
(Hansard, Question 200, 26-06-81) was excised from Ermville, by proclamation, in January
1981; its residents were informed in early 1980 that they were to be removed 'after
further consultation' and that the necessary housing facilities, sanitation, water
resettlement, school and clinic facilities and other infrastructure had been provided
on the compensatory land earmarked for their relocation, in the Elip River district.
(Hansard, Question 465, 23-04-82)

Unfortunately the enormous cost of removals has forced a slowdown in recent years. In
anyhow, too, opposition in Natal to both consolidation and removals, as well as the
threat of arson resistance in a number of communities earmarked for removal has forced
Prudentia to become more cautious in its approach and will continue to demand careful
handling by the State. (For an account of resistance to being moved in two communities,
see the Matiweke's Kop and St Mundolins cases studies in Part Four.) However, despite
these reservations, the government evidence suggests that far from stopping further
removals, the central government is still determined to push ahead with a programme
that necessarily involves the forced relocation of thousands of blacks in Natal (and
elsewhere). Strategic adjustments in the programs when absolutely unavoidable, even
replies in certain well publicised cases, perhaps; a halt in further removals at this
case appears unlikely.

BLACK SPOT REMOVALS AND COAL

Although political factors have played an important part in generating the black spot
removal policy, the choice of where to start in no massive a programme has been largely
determined by economic factors, more specifically coal mining interests in Northern
Natal. The focus of attention has been on black spots in the northern districts. All
the black spots in the districts of Dumaquasi, Dundee, Hluphakazi, Newcastle, Utrecht
and Vryheid have been moved - 40 properties in all - while the major target at present
is the Elip River district where 4 properties have been removed. The further 17 that are
under imminent threat. The available evidence suggests very strongly that coal-mining
interests has benefited considerably from the expropriation and removal of black spots
in Northern Natal. This is an issue that needs further follow-up and research.
Of special importance would be an investigation into the amount of compensation paid to the expropriated landowners and the manner in which coal companies have acquired mining rights in these properties.

A preliminary investigation into the coal deposits found on the 66 black spots (removed and under threat) in the eight northern districts of Dannhauser, Dundee, Hebelmekaar, Klip River, Newcastle, Eshowe, Utrecht and Vryheid has shown that at least 30 of them have coal deposits, each of it of a high quality, 5 of the 66 do not have any coal deposits on them while the position on the remaining 31 requires further investigation. Furthermore, of the 40 properties already removed in the Dannhauser, Dundee, Hebelmekaar, Newcastle, Utrecht and Vryheid districts, 22 have significant coal deposits, 12 are being mined at present, while another 4 have been mined in the past.

The available information is set out in the following summary of coal deposits found on black spots in these northern districts. The letters in the column headed 'Coal Seam' refer to the various types of coal seams found in the area. According to our information there are 6 such seams in the area, abbreviated as EAGDC in the summary. The abbreviations indicate the presence of the following seams:

- K: Klang Coal Seam; export-quality metallurgical coal which is however difficult to mine except where it is at the surface.
- A: Alfred Coal Seam; suitable for use in local power stations.
- G: Gus Coal Seam; also suitable for use in local power stations.
- D: Dundel Coal Seam; also suitable for use in local power stations.
- C: Coking Coal Seam; export-quality metallurgical coal.
- T: Torgus Coal Seam; non-economical and seldom mined.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Black Spot</th>
<th>Moved</th>
<th>EAGDC (in metres)</th>
<th>Coal Mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dannhauser</td>
<td>1. Gardens</td>
<td>1970/73</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Gnase Valley</td>
<td>1970/73</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Loch Lomond</td>
<td>1970/73</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Koppie Alleen</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Jubilee</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. West Heucelton</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. East Heucelton</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Siwangu</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Wykenham</td>
<td>1963a</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Maagalle</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Cardwell</td>
<td>1960a</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Not named</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Black Spot</th>
<th>Moved</th>
<th>EAGDC (in metres)</th>
<th>Coal Mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northfield</td>
<td>1. Lonpak</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EAGDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Hebelmekaar</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>AGDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Bochheuk</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EAGDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Lyali</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EAGDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Meran</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>AGDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Williams</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>AGDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Moolpruit</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EAGDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Kuistefontein</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EAGDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Van Rooyen</td>
<td>1960a</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>EAGDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Rasmar 6492</td>
<td>1960a</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Rasmar 6504</td>
<td>1960a</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Italian</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Black Spot</th>
<th>Moved</th>
<th>EAGDC (in metres)</th>
<th>Coal Mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfield</td>
<td>1. Gitwel</td>
<td>Incorporated into ES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Ntshadzhe</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Ntshadzhe Part 2</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Muli</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Tioms</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Black Spot</th>
<th>Moved</th>
<th>EAGDC (in metres)</th>
<th>Coal Mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Klip River</td>
<td>1. Lunzania</td>
<td>Under threat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Mortsane</td>
<td>Under threat</td>
<td>EAGDC</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Matinana's Kop</td>
<td>Under threat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Jenno's Kop</td>
<td>Under threat</td>
<td>EAGDC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many defunct mines

Northfield Colliery, Sibbeneni Colliery and defunct mines.

Defunct Natal Hethum Colliery.

Defunct Natal Steam Colliery.

Many defunct mines.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>MOVED</th>
<th>COALemann</th>
<th>DEPTH</th>
<th>COAL MINER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHITE STAR</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAGGOT</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**District:** (continued)


Defunct Collierie on property. Flaxberg Colliery was interested in prospecting prior to appraisal in 1978. It is present there is a dispute re value of coal. No plans for commercial coal mining.

6. Roodepoort: 1976

7. Gobabis: 1976

8. Welkom: 1976


10. Trebaker: 1976 HAGDCT 100

Natal Steam Colliery. Kimball Tee Colliery and Newcastle Pietermaritzburg Colliery, adjacent; drilling in areas.

11. Doorn: 1970s Yes A6GDCB 0

12. Beren: c 1963 Yes (thin) 300 A6GDCB


15. Driefontein: Under threat


17. Doornhoek: Under threat

18. Barford: Under threat

19. Roosval/Waterkruin: Under threat

20. Rooiport: Under threat


22. Vaalrand: Under threat

23. Hobland: Under threat

24. Musbank: 1974 Yes G6DCB 0

Defunct Natal Methan Colliery

25. Umbalsane: Under threat

NEWCASTLE

1. Balwater: 1960s


3. Vreda: 1972 C HAGDCT

Natal Navigation Colliery

4. Thohoseni: 1960s

**Statist:** BLACK SPO (continued)

5. Avondale: 1960s

6. Groenvlei: 1960s HAGDCT 300

7. ? 1980

**Note:** Coal deposits on property not known. but prospectors have visited the property and there is active mining in the vicinity.

**BLACK SPO REMOVALS AND THE SUGAR INDUSTRY**

An analogous development to that relating to coal-mining in the north has taken place in the black spots removal programmes in Southern Natal, although on a far smaller scale. A number of the black spots in the Umzinto, Port Shepstone and Ixopo districts that had high agricultural potential have been bought by sugar and timber companies which presumably formed a powerful lobby for their removal. Thus out of the 30 removed, at least 5 have been bought by white (mostly sugar) farmers (Bergvliet in Campedown, Ballarat and Roselands in Port Shepstone, The Cape and Headlands in Umzinto) and another 5 in the Ixopo district were acquired by a single timber company. (These properties are identified by lot numbers only as S 72 5222, RF 7892, DA 7895, DA 8146 and 22 6831). Another 3 black spots that have not yet been moved are under pressure from the sugar industry. (The Rock, Valesriver, Fairview).


The list of properties starting on p.106 summarises the information that we have been able to compile on all the African freehold properties that can be classified as black spots since 1946. The properties are listed according to Magisterial district. The symbols in the left hand margin indicate the current status of the property as follows:

- Removed
- Status known
- Consolidated or likely to be consolidated into KwaZulu
- Tenants only removed
- Part of the community removed.

The summary of Mission black spots follows from p. 128.
1. SUMMARY OF FREEHOLD BLACK SPOT REMOVED: 1948 - 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>NAME OF PROPERTY</th>
<th>SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>BURYSTON</td>
<td>1. Roodewacht 5441 (Acton Homes)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Under threat; houses have been numbered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2. Klippensteinfontein '239 (Boshom)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Under threat; houses numbered c. 1971; title deeds reportedly taken by 25/7/77. 20 hacs landowners in a syndicate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3. Hartbees of Venterslaagte 1921 (Boshom)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>As above.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>4. Lot 2 4977 (Bethany)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>4 &amp; 5 under threat; houses not numbered. Go attempt to take title deeds in 1979 apparently fell through.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>5. Lot 3 4976 (Bethany)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Under threat. Numbered 1981; local committees intervened &amp; numbers removed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>6. Woodford Lot 4 5026</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Under threat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>8. Roehouw C of Oppermannswal 12 (Malota's Farm)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Under threat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>9. Greenspace 1296 (Malota's Farm)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Under threat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>10. Witkoppo no. 7083</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Under threat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>11. Howe 5453</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Under threat; houses numbered but numbers removed, as no. 6 above.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>14. Bulwer 5034</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Not traced yet; probably on CPS border and likely not moved.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Rockdale 8953 and Growfield 8954, released freehold land adjacent to Upper Ingula Location, were affected by the building of the Woodstock Dam and landowners and tenants moved to compensatory land in nearby Olivershook area, 1967/68. These properties were not black spots as such, since they fell within reserve land.

BULWARK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>NAME OF PROPERTY</th>
<th>SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>1. Lot 2 6413</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Not expropriated yet (June 1982) &amp; under threat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>2. Alverna 4477 Lot A (Boswagga)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Under threat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>3. Lot GR 17 17953 (Marwares)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Not expropriated yet (June 1982) &amp; under threat; Adjacent 4.16.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAMPHORN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>NAME OF PROPERTY</th>
<th>SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>6. Lot 3 45607 (Nuy's Valley and Misté)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Not expropriated yet (June 1982) &amp; under threat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>7. Lot FP 215 8478</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Bought from Swam family by whites in 1953 but expropriation not listed in Remands; was next to no. 6. Original Grant dated 1914.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>8. Lot 1 3636 (Dronkvlei/Donkervlei)</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969. (Remarz, 1969)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HANNAHSHOGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>NAME OF PROPERTY</th>
<th>SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>1. Carnone 7239</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>27 - 291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>3. Loch Leondor 7777</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>Moved 1970, 900 pop. (Remarz, 1960) / moved 1972, c. 5 000 pop.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>6. West Hesselson 7512</td>
<td>SAIBR list</td>
<td>32 &amp; 33 moved c. 1963. 34 moved later. These along the first block to be moved; being bought out directly by Durban Navigation Collieries, after being declared bl. Observers have seen the threats made as an attempt to soften resistance from other bl. Landowners moved to comp. land near Monadesi (e.g., Rivermead for E. Hesselson) and tenants to Olimwana what was once still in flatcruft. 27 landowners in syndicate at E. Hesselson &amp; c. 200 tenants; no figures for 33 &amp; 34. No resistance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Name of Property</td>
<td>Source of Classification</td>
<td>Current Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>Lot 1 Cardwell 4340</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969 (Hansard, 1969).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56.</td>
<td>Hansard 1980</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moved 1977, 107 pop. (Hansard, 1980). This property is not named by Dr Koornhof in his reply in Parliament and has not been identified by fieldwork.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57.</td>
<td>Longlands 8803</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved but not listed in Hansard. Under threat to Vulindlela in 1966, at time of Limshill removals; as expropriated in 1970. Approx. 1,000 pop. and substantial stone ruins today.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59.</td>
<td>Boschbank 1372 (Hastilucu)</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved 1968 to Verglegen, near Limshill; some resistance. Land bought 1870 by Kuseni tribe with 170 original owners. 60 claims tribe authorized sale 1960; this disputed by tribe. House fell today used by army for manoeuvres.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.</td>
<td>Leopold 2398 (Talahphi)</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>42 - 45 moved Jan. 1968, to Limshill; approx. 200 pop. (SAIHR) Other estimates put Maran pop. alone at 1,500, however.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61.</td>
<td>Navan 2427</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969 (Hansard).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62.</td>
<td>Williamsengak</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.</td>
<td>Winelands</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64.</td>
<td>Baartfontein 1171 (Kaneel- kop; Subdivision A Asse- gailmak Native bands)</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved 1972; 1,156 pop. (Hansard, 1980) to Eikenkruin.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65.</td>
<td>Van Rooyen 4252</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969 (Hansard).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67.</td>
<td>Rosmoor 1 of 6504</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969 (Hansard).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68.</td>
<td>Italau</td>
<td>Hansard 1980</td>
<td>Moved 1976, pop. 186 (Hansard). Hansard lists it under Klipriver; not identifiable in that district &amp; map. was in Dundee. (Fieldwork)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72.</td>
<td>Lot 1 Cardwell 4340</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969 (Hansard, 1969).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73.</td>
<td>Hansard 1980</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moved 1977, 107 pop. (Hansard, 1980). This property is not named by Dr Koornhof in his reply in Parliament and has not been identified by fieldwork.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74.</td>
<td>Longlands 8803</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved but not listed in Hansard. Under threat to Vulindlela in 1966, at time of Limshill removals; as expropriated in 1970. Approx. 1,000 pop. and substantial stone ruins today.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75.</td>
<td>Menteith 3328</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969 (Hansard, 1969).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76.</td>
<td>Boschbank 1372 (Hastilucu)</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved 1968 to Verglegen, near Limshill; some resistance. Land bought 1870 by Kuseni tribe with 170 original owners. 60 claims tribe authorized sale 1960; this disputed by tribe. House fell today used by army for manoeuvres.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.</td>
<td>Leopold 2398 (Talahphi)</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>42 - 45 moved Jan. 1968, to Limshill; approx. 200 pop. (SAIHR) Other estimates put Maran pop. alone at 1,500, however.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78.</td>
<td>Navan 2427</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969 (Hansard).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79.</td>
<td>Williamsengak</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80.</td>
<td>Winelands</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81.</td>
<td>Baartfontein 1171 (Kaneelkop; Subdivision A Assegailmak Native bands)</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved 1972; 1,156 pop. (Hansard, 1980) to Eikenkruin.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.</td>
<td>Van Rooyen 4252</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969 (Hansard).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84.</td>
<td>Rosmoor 1 of 6504</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969 (Hansard).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85.</td>
<td>Italau</td>
<td>Hansard 1980</td>
<td>Moved 1976, pop. 186 (Hansard). Hansard lists it under Klipriver; not identifiable in that district &amp; map. was in Dundee. (Fieldwork)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Likely to have been incorporated into adjacent EE. SAIHR list describes it as held in trust for landowner by the Minister of Native Affairs.
- Probable consolidation into EE in terms 1975 plans.
- Adjacent properties, not yet moved, no numbers on houses & threat not immediate. Ref. 50 ha. (Fieldwork)
- Under threat; released area 'badly situated' in terms of consolidation. Houses numbered 1979 but local GG denies nos. are official. Koornhof confirmed proposed removal (Hansard 26.02.01) and put pop. at 5,000. 56 landowners. (Fieldtrip) Opposition to move.
- Under threat. As no. 56 released freehold land threatened by consolidation.
- 58 to 64 not yet moved and do not fall within area to be consolidated but do not appear to be under immediate threat. Uncertainty re future of Klip and white areas in Herald district in terms of GG consolidation plans holds out some possibility of reprieve but nobody in these areas knows what the future is likely to be. In the meantime, these areas appear to be administered by KE (Fieldtrip).
- Local GG 65 - 66 not on SAIHR list but on local GG list of 61, 1981. (Fieldtrip) Position similar to 56 - 64 above.
- Not located on map or traced in field.
- 69 - 72 all on local GG list of 61, 1981 but position not established clearly on fieldtrips.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>NAME OF PROPERTY</th>
<th>SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73.</td>
<td>HARDEMAN</td>
<td>1. Ettel 1244</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>Incorporated into E2 late 1960s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Niegadzeg, Part 2 of B 7938 (Boggedaig)</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>Expropriated in 1971 and moved 1970; 150 pop. (Hansard) to Asyakraal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. 8 of Ngi 12177</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>Expropriated in 1968 and moved by 1969. (Hansard) To Asyakraal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.</td>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>5. From 5058 (Trost)</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>78-81 under threat; all on Mokunasi River and numbered c. 10 years ago; be moved to Blatt Reserve. Opposition to ground insufficient water and not yet moved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78.</td>
<td>UMUYAND</td>
<td>1. Harvian Part A 11106</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>Not clear if expropriated and moved, or not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. 5 56 7999</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>83-91 fall within area to be consolidated into E2 in terms of 1975 plans; administered by E2. (Fieldstrip)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. 5 77 8157</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>Bought by timber company 1969 &amp; apparently moved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Lot A 8164</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>Bought by timber company 1969 &amp; apparently moved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11. Lot B 8972</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>Bought by timber company 1969 &amp; apparently moved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.</td>
<td>UMUYAND</td>
<td>12. Cleveland 9362</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>Bought by timber company 1969 &amp; apparently moved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84.</td>
<td>UMUYAND</td>
<td>15. DA 8146</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>Bought by timber company 1969 &amp; apparently moved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86.</td>
<td>UMUYAND</td>
<td>17. S 31 9284</td>
<td>SAIBH list</td>
<td>Bought by timber company 1969 &amp; apparently moved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Many of these properties are very small. Consolidation
114

(continued)

Plains are very uncertain, with speculation that the 1975 place may be abandoned and large area declared black. White farmers are lobbying against this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>NAME OF PROPERTY</th>
<th>SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KLIPFONN (captive)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111.</td>
<td>Lusiandia 1345</td>
<td>SAIFER list</td>
<td>Under threat. Houses not numbered. Koornhof confirmed to be moved. (Hansard, 26-02-81) and pub. pop. at 1:930. Abnormal landowners in a syndicate; now 27. Opposition to removal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114.</td>
<td>Jonnoo's Kop</td>
<td>SAIFER list</td>
<td>Under threat; land expropriated. Koornhof confirmed to be moved, p. 1 707. (Hansard, 26-02-81) Houses numbered &amp; some opposition, with adjoining Matisane's Kop. 1982 tenants instructed by govt not to pay rent to landlords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116.</td>
<td>Rooboom 1102</td>
<td>SAIFER list</td>
<td>Moved to Esmekeni 1977 - 79, pp. 7 193, 5 353 (Hansard, 1980) 100 households remaining in site. Hansard 1980 claims 'Klippoort' moved at same time but is always a white farm. (Fieldwork)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117.</td>
<td>Good Hope</td>
<td>Fieldwork</td>
<td>Welcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118.</td>
<td>Hitkuil 1067</td>
<td>SAIFER list</td>
<td>Moved to Esmekeni 1977 - 79, pp. 2 856. (Hansard, 1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119.</td>
<td>Drome 5566</td>
<td>SAIFER list</td>
<td>Moved by 1980 and as adjacent Steincoelangruit probably to Esmekeni at some time. (Fieldwork)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120.</td>
<td>Khumalo/esters</td>
<td>SAIFER list</td>
<td>Bought 1978 by a syndicate; moved to Valandondo c. 1963; Valandondo subsequently moved again 1972. (See 130.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122.</td>
<td>Nkonyama 5342/Droogval</td>
<td>Fieldwork</td>
<td>Under threat in terms of consolidation planning. New houses to be abandoned but not officially.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Klipfonn (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>NAME OF PROPERTY</th>
<th>SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>131.</td>
<td>Driefontein 1079</td>
<td></td>
<td>131 - 137 under threat in terms of consolidation planning. Freedhold, formerly released land but January 1981 released from PA. People only informed February 1982. Houses numbered at Pametum. Burford &amp; Waterstem and section still known as Kirkstilloch, even though must of this land moved in 1973. See 125 above. Koornhof confirmed removals to place a pub. pop. for whole complex at 59 900 in 26-02-81 11, 122 &amp; 133 bought by Trust in 1987; other farms bought by Trust to be used later. In addition to these listed properties, there are areas within them known as Pametum, Batman/skyline and Waterstem which residents regard as distinct communities. 20 people moved from Burford 1972/73, probably with 139 below. (Hansard, 1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132.</td>
<td>Kleinfontein 1072</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hansard 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133.</td>
<td>Doorsheek 1223</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moved 1982 to Esmekeni. 1 080 pop. (Hansard, 1980) Was a relocation area next to Driefontein, created for people from Baster. (128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134.</td>
<td>Burford 2946</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hansard 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135.</td>
<td>Boornewater 1101</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moved 1982 to Esmekeni, pop. 2 116. (Hansard, 1980) Same position as 136 and local people regarded as 136 and 139 as one place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136.</td>
<td>Adamstock 1076</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hansard 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137.</td>
<td>Riverdale 4224</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moved 1974 - 76, pop. 1 160 (Hansard, 1980)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fieldwork** Under threat; pop. c. 800. (Fieldstrip) Falls within municipal area of Ladysmith and landowners pay rates. No services. August 1980 houses of tenants demolished as illegal, by BAA. Opposition to removal. Previous removal of tenants to Esmekeni.

**Klipope** Ladysmith area has been given priority as an area to be developed by the state and threat to the places listed above should be seen as imminent. Local Farmers Associations have been lobbying for removals. There is coal mining and prospecting in northern part of the district, around Steinlangruit and Jonnoo's Kop. At the same time, there is organised opposition to removal in threatened communities.

**MNNOMO**

142. 1. Mfanisile | Fieldwork | Under threat although some locals believe may be incorporated into consolidated area. House not numbered. Pop. est. at 200 hh. (Fieldwork) |

**MOUNT CREST AND MATABILE**

MOUNT CARRIE AND RATATALE (continued)

- 146. 4. Potkardwhok
   - Memo 1961 Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)

- 147. 5. Splojemanok
   - Memo 1961 Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)

- 148. 6. Teurulfatime A55
   - Memo 1961 Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)

- 149. 7. Vagelviel
   - Memo 1961 Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)

- 150. 8. Blystefatime
   - Memo 1961 Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)

- 151. 9. Swartboolok
   - Memo 1961 Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)

- 152. 10. Amanrind
   - Memo 1961 Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)

- 153. 11. Landi
   - Memo 1961 Moved by 1961. (Memo 1961)

- 154. 12. Tampaniifatime
   - Memo 1961 Moved before 1961. (Fieldwork)

- 155. 13. Pootkviel
   - Memo 1961 Moved before 1961. (Fieldwork)

- 156. 14. Knaatkiok

- 157. 15. Willary
   - Fieldwork Was under threat; subsequently added to Transkei. (Fieldwork)

158. 16. Polgon
   - Fieldwork Was under threat; subsequently added to Transkei. (Fieldwork)

159. 17. Sinnon
   - Fieldwork

Note: Before 1976 Mount Carrie and Ratatale were in the Cape Province and hence within these districts would not have been included in earlier calculations of the 1976 in Natal. After the

160. 1. Growle A and Z 2260
   - SABRE list

- 161. 2. F.P. 149 (98027)
   - Hanaard 1985

- 162. 3. Westland 5348
   - Memo 1971 120 pop. (Hanaard, 1985). Seems that this refers to farm 5802 which adjoins farm (see 114 below) on the Kumsai River and was moved to make way for the Vergelfaan forest reserve. (Fieldwork). 5802 was released land but freehold.

- 163. 4. The Ridge 11247
   - 1975 plan 162 - 169 are a block of adjacent farms under threat in terms of 1975 consolidation plans. As with 161 and 170 - 179, these are freehold but released areas. Local people do not appear to regard these as lannacht and houses have not been numbered. There is a chief at Hlatame who has jurisdiction over this grouping of farms according to the Steemag group as well.

- 164. 5. Otley 5484
   - 1975 plan

- 165. 6. Hlatime 5350
   - 1975 plan

- 166. 7. 5407
   - 1975 plan

- 167. 8. FF 178 9494
   - 1975 plan

- 168. 9. 11248
   - 1975 plan

- 169. 10. 6893
   - 1975 plan

Note: Many of these properties are very small (as in the Isopo...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>RANK OF PROPERTY</th>
<th>SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td>NEWCASTLE</td>
<td>1. Balmain</td>
<td>SAIRR list</td>
<td>Moved by 1969.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229</td>
<td>- 4. Lennoxton</td>
<td>Fieldwork</td>
<td></td>
<td>Freshhold areas within Newcastle municipal boundaries; moved between 1965-1970 to Nadenemi; pop. estimated at 75 000 to 20 000. (Fieldwork) Lennoxton now an Indian Group Area; Fairleigh is a coloured Group Area. No organised resistance to removal although people did not want to move. Pressures such as closing school, cutting off water applied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>- 5. Fairleigh</td>
<td>Fieldwork</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moved, probably in 1960s, to Nadenemi and Osisiemi. Pop. not known. Kent Namundian. (Fieldwork)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231</td>
<td>- 7. Amandale</td>
<td>Fieldwork</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moved, probably in 1960s to Nadenemi and Osisiemi. Not located on map and possibly in Dammhauer or Dunietz district. (Fieldwork)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Within the area released for incorporation into EZ, south-east of Newcastle, are a number of freshhold farms that are not currently under threat.

| 222 | NEW HANOVER | 1. Appelsloos 1293 | SAIRR list | Not yet moved and possibly will be incorporated into adjacent EZ in terms of 1975 consolidation plans. |
| 223 | - 2. Heat of lot 1 Broughton | 925 | SAIRR list | Appears not yet moved; more fieldwork required. |
| 224 | - 3. Camelleboek Part A 1300 | SAIRR list | Appears not yet moved; more fieldwork required. |
| 225 | - 4. Trustee/Part B of Part B of Camelleboek | 1300 | SAIRR list | Under threat; Dept of C & D confirmed to be moved but alternative site not yet available. (Kabili Witness: 20.03.82) Pressure of new tenants from authorities to leave. |
| 226 | - 5. Albert Palace Village | SAIRR list | Coloured and African owners & residents; appears africano moved. (Fieldwork) |

**Notes:** Within the area released for incorporation into EZ, south-east of Newcastle, are a number of freshhold farms that are not currently under threat.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>DISTRICT NAME OF PROPERTY</th>
<th>SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>256</td>
<td>1. Prospect</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Under threat but a small group of tenants moved to Bulver Trust farm 1980, through 1984 and landowners in police. (Fieldwork) Pop. at 15 landowners, 300 total pop. (Official 1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247</td>
<td>2. Lot 99 Deapdale</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>244-247: appear from Hansards that none have been moved yet, but fieldwork required to confirm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>248</td>
<td>3. Lot 10 Shootershill</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Under threat. (Fieldwork)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>249</td>
<td>4. Lot 1A/1B/6/13</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Under threat. House numbers. (Fieldwork)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>5. Trevalla Lot 54, 56</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Moved 1972; pop. 29. (Hansard, 1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252</td>
<td>7. Shakeshekaal/Mokhono</td>
<td>SAIHR list</td>
<td>Under threat in terms of 1973 consolidation plans but opposition, including intervention of KZ administration in 1979 led to suspension of immediate threat; no definite promise of reparation; however, township pop. c. 500 ha on plots sold off by commercial and communal farms since 1956. See Hansard 1980 landowners. Large influx of tenants into these communities; total pop. est. at 20,000. Living conditions very poor; cholera outbreak 1981/82. MAB has numbered tenant huts and local residents feel threat of removal as real, with dates of 1982/83 being suggested by then and Bulver Trust Farm or Langaspuit as likely relocation place. (Fieldwork)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNRESOLVED**

- 255. 1. The Cape 10564  
  SAIHR list  
  Moved 1974; pop. 287. (Hansard, 1980) Land bought by a sugar company and used for labour. |
- 256. 2. Headlands Sub 10317  
  SAIHR list  
  Moved 1973; pop. 287. (Hansard, 1980) Headlands planted under sugar by same sugar co. as bought The Cape and some farmers resident now working on it. |
- 257. 3. Sub C The Rock 10490  
  SAIHR list  
  Moved 1972; pop. 67. Hansard 1980 but some people still living there, under threat, house numbers. Sugar company apparently wanting land. Landowners already compensated. (Fieldwork) |

**OVERVIEW**

- 274. 1. Lamto 9620  
  SAIHR list  
  Moved 1969 to Roberts Farm, Kugwane, to make way for Vargellen Forest Reserve. Bag on it. People from Upper Kwenzi moved, this could include both 279 and 161. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>District Name of Property</th>
<th>Source of Classification</th>
<th>Current Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>275</td>
<td>Z. 9590</td>
<td>UNDERBERG (continued)</td>
<td>Appears was moved with 274 and with no. 161 above. (Fieldwork) This was released but frehold land as 281 to 289.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>276</td>
<td>The Uplands 5771</td>
<td>SAIRS list</td>
<td>No trace of it now and appears was moved although not listed in any hundreds. Near Steynkraal/Upperlands (see under Kyndell) and local people not familiar with it now. (Fieldwork)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>277</td>
<td>The Swamp 5741</td>
<td>SAIRS list</td>
<td>Moved to Compensation 1979; c. 700 pop. Howard that moved 1976, 125 pop. incorrect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>278</td>
<td>Hogdought 5220</td>
<td>SAIRS list</td>
<td>Appears was moved but details lacking. (Fieldwork)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>279</td>
<td>Kempsells FF 334 A and 334 B 9319</td>
<td>SAIRS list</td>
<td>Tenants moved to Compensation July 1981; c. 67 pop. landowner families still to be reappropriated and moved pending settlement of estate of deceased original purchaser. Farm bought by P. Hofse 1902 at public auction; survey, sub-divided into A and B 1904.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280</td>
<td>Colville FF 313 9213</td>
<td>SAIRS list</td>
<td>Under threat March 1982, apparently imminent. (Fieldwork) 261 to 269 under threat in terms of 1975 consolidation plans; all released but frehold land. No ciphers on houses and people do not appear to regard threat as imminent although some loose rumours circulating. Many of these properties are very small and appears a few families own most of the properties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281</td>
<td>FF 190 9152</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td>261 to 269 under threat in terms of 1975 consolidation plans; all released but frehold land. No ciphers on houses and people do not appear to regard threat as imminent although some loose rumours circulating. Many of these properties are very small and appears a few families own most of the properties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>282</td>
<td>6004</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>283</td>
<td>6467</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>284</td>
<td>TJN 17664</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>285</td>
<td>7177</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>286</td>
<td>7177</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287</td>
<td>7178</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288</td>
<td>7720</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>289</td>
<td>11796</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290</td>
<td>The Kloof 11970</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>291</td>
<td>9073</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292</td>
<td>Rainhills 10797</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>293</td>
<td>FF 323</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>294</td>
<td>5624</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>295</td>
<td>5625</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>296</td>
<td>11934</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297</td>
<td>11424</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>298</td>
<td>3962/5962 (Two cadastral maps 1977 and 1978 disagree)</td>
<td>Current Position 290 to 318 are also threatened with removal in terms of consolidation plans. A very preliminary fieldwork indicates threat not recognized locally. Precise details on all these properties for lending released but frehold land but some may be Trust, on further investigations Rainhills and Stoffelton/Kyndell freehold and some appear to describe wider area than simply the surveyed farms of that name. Adjacent, in Hluhluwe magisterial district are number of what appear to be Trust farms, also released and threatened by 1975 plans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299</td>
<td>8931</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>5967</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>7814/7914</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>302</td>
<td>12212</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>303</td>
<td>11453</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304</td>
<td>10705</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305</td>
<td>7072</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>306</td>
<td>7646</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
<td>8964</td>
<td>1975 plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Hunsrad 1980 lists under Underberg as 'Utrecht' with pop. of 4 242, moved in 1976. No property by this name has been traced in the Underberg district and it seems that this was used in the Hunsrad district and it seems that this must be 'Utrecht', it refers to the magisterial district of that name. See 361 below. 281 to 318 fall within the same block of released land as that listed for Kyndell 170 to 24 and the consolidation threat they face is the same.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>NAME OF PROPERTY</th>
<th>SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 327.</td>
<td><strong>VRYGLAN (continued)</strong></td>
<td>6. Orangewaa</td>
<td>SAIH list</td>
<td>Not traced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 328.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Amotama</td>
<td>SAIH list</td>
<td>Palls within released area but some tenants have been moved, 1900/1: as squatters; others threatened with eviction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 329.</td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Amoti</td>
<td>SAIH list</td>
<td>Released area but harassment of tenants as 328.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 330.</td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Cottonlands</td>
<td>SAIH list</td>
<td>Palls outside released area but position not known.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Position in this area very complex and more research is necessary to untangle land ownership and occupation. Very dense informal settlements on released, freedhold and reserved lands have come under strong pressure from the local and central authorities. See report on Island site and service scheme (Oaks studies) for more information.

**VRYHEID**

| - 331. | 1. Voorslag, part of Nasserwa | SAIH list | Moved by 1969. (Hansard, 1969) |
| - 333. | 3. Smanapraap/Seestepspruit | Hansard 1969 | Moved to Kondle & some to Vryheid township c. 1963 under very poor conditions. Had been within municipal area of Vryheid. Lots sold to Africans from 1904. 2 500 – 3 000 pop. moved. |

**VOLKSWAG**


**2. SUMMARY OF FREEDOM PROPERTIES REMOVED 1948 – 1962**

**BENONILE**

- Lot 2F 218; Drumvlei
- Uitkoot; Bergville; Hanoversdal

**CAMPERDOWN**

- Gardene; Crane Valley; Lock Leond; Koppie Alleen;

**DASHAUN**

- Jubilee; West Hesselton; East Hesselton; Siwangu;

**DUURRAN**

- Wytsaan; Waagelie; Cardwell; name not known
- Longlands; Mentteit; Boonhoek; Ippel; Merne;
- Williamsaploo; Moodsaap; Nigttiefontein; van Hooyen; Reenori A; Reenori 1; Italum
- Chateau Estates

**DURHAM**

- Lot 2E 631; 372 5222; S DP 7891; S DA 7185;
- 80 7589; 80 7746; 80 8146

**EKSOHE**

- Steincoelepruit; tenanted; Roobson; Good Hope;
- Welcome; Trekkers; Douwes; Rietkru; Khumalo Valley;
- Kirkintilloch; Vlandendam; Hobbland; Mambank 1076;
- Umbuhwele tenants

**HELMHAAAR**

- Niedegad 1; Niedegad 2; Nell’s Troea
- Lot 2E 631; 372 5222; S DP 7891; S DA 7185;
- 80 7589; 80 7746; 80 8146

**IKOPO**

- Steincoleprüit tenants; Roobson; Good Hope;
- Welcome; Trekkers; Douws; Rietkru; Khumalo Valley;
- Kirkintilloch; Velandendam; Hobbland; Mambank 1076;
- Umbuhwele tenants

**KLEINPHLE**

- Niedegad 1; Niedegad 2; Nell’s Troea
- Lot 2E 631; 372 5222; S DP 7891; S DA 7185;
- 80 7589; 80 7746; 80 8146

**KONIS**

- Steincoleprüit tenants; Roobson; Good Hope;
- Welcome; Trekkers; Douws; Rietkru; Khumalo Valley;
- Kirkintilloch; Velandendam; Hobbland; Mambank 1076;
- Umbuhwele tenants

**KULIKO**

- Steincoleprüit tenants; Roobson; Good Hope;
- Welcome; Trekkers; Douws; Rietkru; Khumalo Valley;
- Kirkintilloch; Velandendam; Hobbland; Mambank 1076;
- Umbuhwele tenants
5. STATUS NOT KNOWN (June 1982)

Further fieldwork necessary.

BERSVILLE 1 Bulwer 5034
HARDING 1 Harehaun
EEHOPO 5 Umnyam; Lot DW Sub S; Lot FB; Lot EY; Lots 1 - 5
UNZINTO 3 Shatoni; B of C 65734; AB 28834
VENGAN 9 Amatikwe; Iranda Farm; Orangetown; Cottonlands; Redcliffe

4. PREHOLD PROPERTIES LIKELY TO BE / HAVE BEEN CONSOLIDATED (JUNE 1982)

ERSHAW 1 Amanda
KINGSTON 1 Middleton
HILTON 1 Utval
EEHOPO 10 Ungodi; Lot AD 8564; Umlabizana; Millside; Mtlock; Lot BW 8973; Cleveland; Lot DN 9361; Ungodi; Lot GL 1241
MOUNT CURRIE 2 Polygone; Simpson
KENDALE 1 Crowle
NEW HANOVER 1 Applebosch
PITTOOMKING 9 Slangbruin; Wilgeboezem
PORT SHEPSTONE 1 Riverside
UNZINTO 4 Halseley; 5583; Powell; The Goat
VENGAN 3 Groenberg; Amatikwe; Amatol
TOTAL 27

INTRODUCTION

The information on mission-owned black spots is far spottier than that on African freehold properties and the following summary is not, therefore, regarded as comprehensive. This is a subject requiring further investigation, not simply for its academic interest but because in many instances the churches on whose land these communities are established need to be sensitised to their social responsibilities towards them.

The black spots listed here refer to rent-paying, agriculturally-based African communities that have developed on mission-owned properties that do not fall inside scheduled or released areas. They have many features in common with the freehold properties previously listed, but title is vested in the mission, not the occupants of the land. These properties were previously acquired by the churches in one of two ways:

1) The various churches or mission societies bought these properties, generally in the 19th century, on behalf of their African congregations – often with money raised by these congregations – in order to establish mission communities;

2) Individual Rulé kings or chiefs allowed various churches or mission societies to establish missions on tribal land in the 19th century, so that they could establish schools etc. to benefit their people. Subsequently the Colonial or Union Governments deeded these properties to the churches and not to the African residents who, in many cases, had been living there since before the churches arrived.

Mission black spots need to be distinguished from mission reserves, the origins of which have already been described in Part One – unlike the mission reserves they were not scheduled in 1913. They also need to be distinguished from church farms, i.e. from church-owned properties which are run as farms along commercial lines – although in some instances, e.g. Embangweni, no. 336 below, the distinction may be blurred. The status of Africans living on these commercial farms is that of farm workers, not tenants, and the purpose of the farms is to produce an income for church or mission funds. There appear to be many more of these kinds of properties than there are mission black spots. The Hermannsburg Mission Society, a Lutheran society and historically the major Church landowner in Natal, owns 36 farms scattered throughout the province, although concentrated mainly in the northern districts of Vryheid and Ngataha. (9 other farms once owned by the society have been sold.) Of these 36 it appears that only a few still support mission communities, although for more fieldwork and research would be necessary to confirm and detail this. The Roman Catholic Church too appears to have a large number of commercial farms across Natal.

It appears that a number of commercial farms have been or are being developed by various churches out of land that formerly housed established mission communities. In some instances farm workers and tenants of this land have been given the choice of either becoming farm workers for the mission or of being evicted. In other instances the mission has simply encroached on the land set aside for its congregation until all or some of the tenant households have left of their own volition. As tenants, residents on missions which the authorities have declared black spots are even more vulnerable than their counterparts on African freehold farms. The church is the legal landowner and, in terms of the law, all negotiations about expropriation and compensation take place between the government and the church and not between the government and the church and the occupants of the land. These properties are not included in the publication.

There are instances where the affected church has fought for the rights and future of its mission community. There are, however, also cases where the church has completely ignored its responsibilities towards its congregation – who have contributed to the development of the property – and treated expropriation purely as a business transaction, willingly co-operating with the authorities and diverting compensation not to the people who have thus been deprived of their land but into central revenue funds. In our fieldwork we have come across several instances where churches have taken the initiative in evicting their tenants (so that they can farm the land for their own profit) and have sheltered behind the justification that in terms of government policy they have had no alternative. There are also cases where the church has been ignorant of the implications of expropriation and compensation and allowed removals to go through by default.

1. MISSION BLACK SPOTS 1948 – 1982

In the following summary the properties are grouped not according to district, but according to the denomination of the mission involved. The numbers on the extreme left follow on from the cumulative numbering system used in the previous summary on African freehold properties. It should be stressed again that these figures are not complete; the properties listed here are ones SPP has come across in the course of fieldwork. Only further research can show how incomplete they are.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>CURRENT POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>335</td>
<td>Moved to Hilolwini c. 1970; about 30 population.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 336 | Under threat but consolidation uncertain in area.
| 337 | Under threat; to make way for expansion. 334 ha, 6 000 acres. 40 wheat farmers to be removed. 60 workers to be removed. Local community opposes to removal. School to be closed and moved to Ilimani. |
The following abbreviations are used to distinguish the different Lutheran Mission Stations:

- M.S. - Mission Society
- N.M.S. - Norwegian Mission Society
- H.M.S. - Herman Moller Mission Society
- B.N.S. - Berlin Mission Society

The document lists properties and their current positions, along with notes on land usage and church activities. Here are some key points:

- Under general threat but not seen as much. Local: Set 500 ha in several sections. Residents claim they paid for land originally; some cases re ownership in early 20th cent by church. Sent 100 p.a. with stock (2 beasts max) or 85 p.a. Very inadequate water in some sections and attempts by community organizations to deal with this have ended with these efforts.

- Moved to Bolltax Farm c. 1969. Properties owned by both mission and Indian and African landholders (hence listed under freehold but c. 250 people in all affected. See also Appendix 2, Group Areas.

- Likely to be consolidated this status adjacent reserves not finalized. Approx. 200 ha. Sent 100 p.a. (fields) or 65 p.a. (no fields). Prev. covered much larger area but large pieces apparently sold off. It is claimed that some of original missionaries acquired private title to parts. H.M.S. has leased over adam. to black Lutheran church.

- Sold to white farmer c. 1980 & closed down. Small pop. had to move.

- Under threat. Houses apparently numbered 1970s & people worried would be moved to Paulsibrugs area.

- Under threat; 50 - 60 ha. H.M.S. farms same of land appear it wants to farm all commercially (cotton) & strong rumours locally that either new/already farm workers. Sent 85 p.a. Stock limited to 7 cattle max. andields to 2 ha per hh.

- Status not known.


- Removed c. 1968/69 with Limeburn removals. c. 300 pop.

The document provides detailed information on the status and history of various properties under the different Lutheran Mission Stations. It highlights the challenges faced by the missions in securing land rights and maintaining local communities.
LADYSMITH AND DUNDEE AGREE
ON COMPENSATORY LAND FOR
'BLACK SPOTS'

The plan of the Natal Agricultural Union to work in close
liaison with the Minister of Bantu Administration and
Development in settling the land requirements of the Native
Trust, district by district, in block deals, got under way last
week when agreement was reached among farmers at both
Ladysmith and Dundee as to what European land to offer in
exchange for the elimination of "black spots" in those districts.

A spirit of reasonableness prevailed at the meetings and the
president of the N.A.U., Mr. G. A. van Ruyven, congratulated
the representatives of the farmers present on the "wise and
desirable decisions taken".

At Ladysmith representatives of
seven associations agreed to the
sale of one European-owned farm,
with portions of another farm,
in return for the elimination of certain
"black spots" surveyed by the
Department of Bantu Administra-
tion, totalling 23,600 acres. The
sale of these properties was agreed
to on condition:

- That they be used solely for
the removal of "black spots";
- That the transactions and
terms of sale be kept secret in order
to enable the farmers who have
acquired their land to make alter-
native arrangements at the earliest
opportunity;
- That permanent boundaries
be established in the Klein
River district between European
and Bantu occupied land;
- That proper farming prac-
tices and soil conservation prac-
tices be applied regardless of
whether the farms are to be farmed
by Black farmers or otherwise;
- That an effective buffer zone
be created around the Bantu areas.

At Dundee the agreement offered
eleven European-owned farms as
compensatory land for the removal of
15,000 acres of "black spots".

The following stipulations were made:
- That these farms be utilized
for the elimination of "black spots" and
that no further purchase of land for Bantu
settlement is to be made in the Dundee district;
- That the main farms in the
district be moved to this
new land;
- That the farmers be able to
acquire land in the same
area as the old farms.
Appendix 2. Memorandum from Lusitania syndicate, a threatened black spot

MEMORANDUM OF LUSITANIA SYNDICATE

FEBRUARY 1952

INTRODUCTION: Lusitania is a black-owned farm on a white district - a "Black-spot" in the centre of white farming as described by the new said government. It is some 8 km from Dundieleigh and 13 km near Collin-Paau (on the border of the Orange Free State and Natal) in the district of Elly-River, the magisterial district of Ladysmith, Natal.

The land is approximately 165 ha in area, well watered, with the Sundays River running through one end of this property on the East, as well as a stream in the centre of our comanage which enters the Sundays River which we use for our stock to drink, as well as irrigation for our homes. It is also well grassed and relatively free from soil erosion. This property has a lot of water-fountains here and there all over the land and on the mountain-side. This water we use for our food and drinking consumption and it is very clean water. We are a very peaceful rural community. There is also a big natural forest on the mountain-side with all different indigenous trees of many kinds; wild animals, big and small, enjoy their life here i.e. Buck, birds, snakes, snails etc.

All kinds of fruit trees grow very well at this place, e.g. oranges, lemons, mandarins, peaches, pears, apricots, oranges, grapes, guavas, etc., and we use these for our family consumption and supply our nearest fruit-shops and supermarkets, as well as some farmers near us come and buy these fruits. There is a main road from Ladysmith to Newcastle on the boundary of our comanage and family freehold lands. This road goes through our place. It is easy for us to go to Ladysmith, Newcastle and Durnoon with the value of this road.

HISTORY: The farm was bought from Mr Chinesieril in 1902 by 20 (twenty) landowners shortly after the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, at a Public Auction at Ladysmith, Elly River District, and was surveyed amongst the twenty. It was then subdivided into a comanage on the mountain-side, and family freehold lands on the eastern side. On these freehold lands each of the twenty landowners has his own Title Deed. The comanage is approximately 300 ha, and the twenty each have equal shares in this comanage. Lusitania has its General Title Deed of which the landowners are the rightful heirs, with approximately 40 ha to each holder.

The first buyers were Nhahaha, Mvuso and Mntingane Mhlabeni. The Syndicate had a Chief Trustee and two other Trustees. Up to now this place is still under 3 Trustees and their 6 Committee members.

The last of our fathers died in December 1972, Rev. Elia Hadebe. On the death of our fathers, some willed to their sons, and a few sold their shakas, now bringing the total number to twenty-eight landowners. We also have tenants at this place, approximately eighty households, with an additional eleven at the comanage. This brings the total to one hundred and nine kulas and families at this farm, who will suffer if removed.

HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: In 1954 the Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal invited us to a meeting, where we were called a "Black-spot" which in terms of Departmental policy will have to be eliminated due course. In the very same year the Government
Officials visited Lusitania to inform us we were to be counted and the Deeds of Transfer should be made straight, to the heirs amongst everybody at Lusitania. Since then we have heard nothing from the Officials but we know the plan is to remove us, along with Matatane's Kopa etc. We discussed this and agree that we do not want to be moved.

TREASURE'S LAND— Tenants have an average quarter ha residential plot for growing their crops. No tenants are self-supporting on their land, but their agricultural lands add to income derived from wage employment. Their standard of living is high.

IMPROVEMENTS— There is mixture of concrete block, wattle and daub huts and stone houses. There is a school building, concrete dipping tanks and domesticated wattle and Gum trees as well as Palm tree etc. All households have put in other improvements i.e. fencing, toilets, cotton kramas, fruit trees. As well we have subdivided our commonage for grazing. It has been fenced very well, with the graveyard on the same commonage. The value of improvements runs to many thousands of rands.

PRODUCE— All of us grow some produce, the main crop being maize, plus kaffir-corn, potatoes, beans etc. We make a good living from our land; some of us do not have to work in town.

LIVESTOCK— There is no limit to the number of cattle. Tenants' cattle varies from 1 to 5 head of cattle, plus goats, horses, pigs and as many poultry as he is able to keep. Total numbers of stock are as follows: cattle 270, 6 horses, 352 goats, 16 sheep, 16 pigs and approximately 800 poultry. Our stock is usually sold to local camps, stock brokers and speculators at reasonable prices.

EMPLOYMENT— Most people who are working are working in town while some are working outside the district. Many are farm labourers or farmers, domestic servants, commercial workers etc. Many of the men and girls work casual or seasonal employment on neighbouring farms.

SCHOOLS— There is a school (Lower and Higher Primary) up to Standard 5 with 7 teachers and 380 to 400 children. The community is already building and has raised some funds for another continuation (HS) Building for Standard 7, 8, and 9 as they wished. They have donated money every season to raise school-funds. We have our church and must to build a clinic.

COMMUNITY— We are all well to do here and the place is healthy, with daily transport from Lusitania to Bloemfontein. We have lived here for almost 60 years, with our tenants, without quarrels and friction. You could hardly see a Police van coming in for cases at Lusitania. There are no shebeens and we are peacefully settled. We are friendly with the farmers surrounding us. We are their Fire Brigades, casual workers and seasonal workers. During harvesting season and in destroying unregarded wattle forests we are useful to them and they are useful to us. The owners do not stay on most of the white farms surrounding Lusitania, except for one or two. In most cases these farms are used for their stock grazing, and cultivation for crops and hays in feeding their stocks. There are rich farmers surrounding us, who do not want us to be removed from this place.

We pray we should not be removed from our Lusitania Syndicate.

Lusitania Committee
c/o Lusitania H.P. School
P. O. Box 860
LADYSMITH
1370

Appendix 3. Memorandum from a former landowner

The following memorandum was written in February 1981 by a former landowner at the black spot of Britfontein in the Dundee district. (Doc. 48 above.) He was relocated to the closer settlement of Ben-ekeni and subsequently tried to buy a piece of land in the threatened Britfontein area west of Ladysmith. (Docs. 131 - 137 above.) At the time that he wrote this memorandum he did not know that Britfontein had been excised from Bantu land.

MEMORANDUM

I was born and stayed at Britfontein 1914. It was a freehold property. In 1945 we became under Health Commission of Natal Ordinance No. 20 of 1914 we were notified that Britfontein is declared as Public Health Area of Natal from then on we were paying rates for 20 years without services. Any of those who failed to pay these rates, their properties were taken from them, others lost their livestock for failing to pay their rates. In 1963 were taken out of the Health Commission Area of Natal Ordinance 30 of 1963. We became a regulated Area so that we must be affected by Act 38 of 1977 as a Black spot.

2. In 1960 there was an inquiry which informed us that we are a black spot, we should remove from Britfontein. Our properties were expropriated by the government in 1968. My property was transferred to the State in 1969 and I did not get my compensation until I fought that through Attorneys and I got it after four years. We were removed to Shandami, we were sold that we are not allowed to plough the land there. We cannot rear any livestock in exception of a dog, cat and fowls. They did not build houses for us, each family was offered a plot of 20 by 20 yards where one can build himself a house. Before we could build, we were offered tin houses which were approximately 42 by 30 ft, they did not mind how many in each family and how much goods they possessed. This was very hard for me to bear especially at this stage because I was living on farming and on livestock. I thought of looking for another place which would help as my old place, because I was used to live on farming.

3. I got a farm although it was not big as the one I had before and not the same as that one and it has no transport to town. Now I am in difficulty of getting the transfer of this farm. This is not from the person who sold to me this property. This difficulty I am having seems to be made by the authorities who are responsible for the removals of the Black spots because the person who sold me this property is not saying anything against the transfer of the property to me.

(Signed)
5. CONSOLIDATION

The consolidation of KwaZulu has been one of the most contentious issues in Natal politics during the 1970s and into the 1980s; it is far from being resolved at the time of writing. At issue is the government's attempt to consolidate the numerous scattered bantustans and pieces of land that presently make up KwaZulu into a more coherent geographic and political unit, and, thereby, to lend credibility to the bantustan as a separate political unit. Completion of the process of consolidation of the bantustans has not been a prerequisite for their taking of independence, but consolidation itself is part of the process of shaping "national states" out of the reserves; it is thus part of the process of withdrawal of South African citizenship from African South Africans.

Political credibility has not, however, been the only issue at stake. The actual shape of the consolidated bantustans and the decisions about what land to leave in and what to leave out have been governed by other, material and strategic interests as well — for instance, in Natal, to keep white control over the Drakensberg water catchment area and white control over the northern coastline. Only two scheduled areas have been moved in terms of consolidation planning to date: Reserve Six, moved in 1976 to make way for the development of Richards Bay town; and a small portion of Reserve Four, moved in 1977/78 to make way for Richards Bay airport — their excision from KwaZulu, the priority accorded to their removal and the actual timing of the moves all determined by the interests of the developers of Richards Bay.

At the time of writing the policy is in a state of flux, if not of crisis. Despite numerous reiterations of commitment to the policy, Pretoria has still not been able to produce an enforceable plan for Natal and its intentions for the future are not clear. Under the circumstances it becomes very difficult to provide a comprehensive overview of consolidation. This chapter looks at the available material under the following headings:

1. Numbers of people and areas affected
2. Summary of consolidation plans 1955 - 1975
3. The financial cost of consolidation
4. Opposition to consolidation
5. The van der Walt Commission and after
6. The Ingwavuma land deal.

1. Numbers of people and areas affected

Few, if any, people are confident about stating exactly how many pieces of KwaZulu there are today because of the constant adjustments being made to its boundaries by means of SADF purchases, black spot removals and the excision and addition of land under its sphere of jurisdiction. However, in 1976 the official planners for KwaMzimba stated that the bantustan consisted of 40 relatively large and 157 very small pieces (Thornton-Smith et al., 1975, vol. 1, 6) — these figures give an indication of the immensity and of the absurdity of the task undertaken by the consolidation planners. KwaZulu is the most fragmented of all the bantustans and any attempt to reduce the number of its separate pieces to the point where it can be claimed to be a single and distinct entity will have to involve massive land swaps between 'KwaZulu' and 'Natal' and, with that, massive relocation and dislocation of people, almost all of them black.

NUMBERS AFFECTED BY THE 1975 PROPOSALS

In the absence of the van der Walt Commission's report on consolidation, the most concrete set of guidelines to government thinking that we have at the time of writing is that approved by Parliament in 1975. These proposals the political caricature of a ten piece KwaZulu devoid of any of the major economic assets of the province. (See map on p. 146). In 1975 demographers at the University of Natal estimated that at that stage these plans threatened 300 000 African people with removal; they stressed, however, that they were working with limited information. (Daily News, 28.06.79) Today SPP estimates that the implementation of the 1975 consolidation proposals would involve the relocation of about 300 000 African people off reserve land alone. This figure does not include the 245 000 people under threat on black spots — so, together, these two aspects of consolidation threaten over half a million people in Natal. The details of the plan are discussed below; a summary of the reserve areas threatened with removal and estimates of the population in each is set out in Appendix One. (For details on the black spots, see the previous chapter.)

Yet although some significant changes to the boundaries of KwaZulu have been made in terms of consolidation planning since 1975, to date relatively little of the removals envisaged at that time have been carried out: at most 10 000 people in Reserve Six (in 1976) and a small portion of Reserve Four (in 1978). A further estimated 150 000 people are living under a particularly serious threat of relocation since their land has already been excised from KwaZulu — over 70 000 people in the Pietermaritzburg area, 20 000 in the area of Reserve Four and about 700 people near Sobantu Bay; the Minister of Cooperation and Development has refused to commit himself to a timetable for their removal.

At this stage it seems highly unlikely that so enormous and costly a process of demographic manipulation as is contained in the 1975 plan can succeed as hoped, although the threat to the large numbers of people living in the four excised areas mentioned above is a very real one. Pretoria itself has had second thoughts and, as described below, has been struggling since 1979 to produce a revised blueprint — the proposed Ingwavuma land deal whereby some 96 000 people would be incorporated into Blountland, representing one of the options that it would like to pursue. The situation is probably more fluid now than at any stage in the past; thus any estimate of the numbers of people currently threatened with removal by the consolidation of KwaZulu must be provisional.

2. Summary of consolidation plans, 1955-1975

TOBLINSON COMMISSION

The term 'consolidation' has been used in various contexts for a long time. As far back as 1955, the Toblinson Commission recommended that consideration be given to consolidating the 'bantu areas';

Save for a few blocks like the Transkei and Venda, the Bantu areas are so scattered that they form no foundation for community growth ... this fragmentation can result in nothing else than a supplementary growth attached to the European community. The fragmentation pattern also results in scattering and consequent incoherence between historically and ethnically related Bantu, and this means that cohesive forces in the social and psychological sphere are paralyzed. (1955 6/55, 180-181)
Tomlinson went on to recommend that the 'bantu areas' be consolidated into 7 blocks - a Zululand block, a Venda-Tsonga block, a Pedi block, a Swazi block, a Bush block, a south-eastern Nguni block and a South Sotho block. He also envisaged incorporating the three British Protectorates of Bechuanaland (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho) and Swaziland into his scheme. He did not draw precise boundaries but demarcated what he termed 'heartlands' as the basis on which these ethnic units should be constructed. Their dimensions are shown on the accompanying map: of note is that these proposals pointed to the incorporation of the Ingwavuma area into an enlarged Bantu land and were also considerably more generous in their allocation of land to blacks than anything proposed by government officials since. In making these recommendations, Tomlinson did not commit himself to any political blueprint beyond stating that in these areas, 'on the basis of the Bantu Authorities Act',

the Bantu themselves shall exercise administrative functions to an ever-increasing extent, suited to the normal process of development and according to the demands of the time. (UG 61/55, 207)

The Tomlinson recommendations were far more radical than anything the government was prepared to consider at that stage. Although the then Prime Minister, Dr H.F. Verwoerd, conceded in 1959 that it was possible that the newly created 'homelands' could achieve independence at some future date, the State was not contemplating either independence or major land adjustments for them with any seriousness. In 1962 the Minister of BAP stated in Parliament

'It is the policy of the Government to consolidate the Bantu areas as far as possible. In this process white spots will also be eliminated.'

He went on to add, however, that it was impossible to give details 'at this stage' (House of Assembly Debates, col. 3076, 23.3.62) - such details did not begin to emerge until the end of the 1960s.

In Natal each land purchases as were made in the early 1960s had little to do with establishing a block fragmented homeland for the Bantu people. They were undertaken in terms of the 1936 quota and geared towards eliminating black spots. Both activities were related to consolidation - the 1936 Development Land and Trust Act stipulated that quota land could only be acquired in areas adjacent to existing scheduled and released land, and the removal of black spots meant that isolated black farms were being cleared off the map. However, the existence of isolated pockets of scheduled or released land was not seen as a serious problem since the possibility of their ever forming part of an independent state was remote. Such areas which were later to be described as 'badly situated' - Reserve 6 near Richards Bay, the KwaZulu reserve near Louwberg, the Grootville farms, for instance - were not yet threatened by the activities of the SAIP.

PLANS FOR THE MAHATHINI PLANTS

In the early 1960s the NAU was lobbying strongly for the State land on the Mahathini Plats to be used to fill the outstanding quota of land allotted to the African reserves in Natal in 1936. Since the State lands in Zululand have featured so prominently in the various plans advanced by Pretoria for the consolidation of KwaZulu and, more recently, for the excision of Ingwavuma, it is worth looking at developments in these regions since the 1960s in some detail: this land has long been used as Pretoria's consolidation joker card, to be used to make up whatever suit is needed at the time.

The origins of the State land in Zululand have been described in Part One. The important aspect to note about this land is that although it is classified as State land, it has always formed a continuity with the scheduled reserves that surround it and has been settled by African people since long before whites first came to Natal. Then the borders of the Zululand reserves were demarcated by the settler government in 1909, the
people living outside these borders became technically squatters on their own tribal land. As a former Commissioner in the area has made clear, these people were only informed of this much later, in 1935. (See Appendix Two.)

The story has been quick to use accusations of squatting as a justification for removing those who are in the way of its own plans for the area. Thus Wessels, Deputy Minister of Development and Land Affairs, in May 1951, referring to people living in the area of Sobomsas Bay:

...it should be noted that the people occupying State land not included in KwaZulu territory were squatters who had no claim to the land. In the interests of orderly development, it seemed to remain that people could not be allowed to settle on land haphazardly. (SUNDAY MAIL, 21.05.61)

An official in the area has calculated the present population of the Makhatini Flats as about 40 000 people. The implication that these people are lawless new arrivals is as false as it is cynical. However, in legal terms these people do not have any claim to the land and hence have been totally disregarded in the pleas of plans drawn up for the area since the 1960s.

In 1961 the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal confirmed that the bulk of the outstanding quota land in the province was to come from the Bululand 'brown lands' which are already occupied by Natives. (SUNDAY MAIL, 26.06.61)

That same year, at least partly in response to the NAI lobby, the government appointed an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the potential of the Flats and to make recommendations about future development. In early 1962 a lead article headlined 'NAI decides on consolidation of land in Bululand'. The report urged that land ownership in Bululand be rationalized, 'by the adjustment of boundaries and the allocation of State-owned land, so as to meet the needs of farms and nature preservation, settlement of Bantu and for occupation of Europeans in Natal.' (SUNDAY MAIL, 22.02.62)

Specific recommendations are spelled out in the copy of the article reproduced in Appendix Three. These envisaged making over reserve land in the Xhosa and Zulu districts to whites and in this way they foreshadowed the communal or communal type of recommendations that were to be made in 1972.

Although the Rationalist government accepted the concept that the State lands should be used to meet at least some of its land obligation to Natal's African population, it was not decided on how much and which land to hand over; in the last 20 years it has changed its mind on numerous occasions. It seems that it has long earmarked the northern coastal portion (Round Lake St Lucia) for State purposes: forestry and, from the late 1960s, military requirements.

The task here has been to move people out of this land, using the justification that they are squatters. (See p. 262). Plans for the northern portion of State land have, however, been subject to numerous revisions.

In the early 1960s the State had ambitious plans for developing the Makhatini Flats as a major sugar-producing area under white settlement. In about 1962 work started on a huge dam on the Pongola River near Josini — known variously as the Josini, J.G. Strijdom, and now the Pongolaport Dam. (Some have labelled it merely 'the white elephant'.) It was envisaged then that the dam would bring a vast area of the Makhatini Flats under irrigation — some 64 000 bongom initially, rising to about 70 000 bongom in the next few years. This was to support a white settler community of 3 500. (SABR Natal report, KE 120/1966) From the start, however, the scheme ran into problems, with both conservationists and many soil scientists and agriculturists critical of it. There were technical problems in the construction of the dam and the whole matter was further complicated by the discovery that the dam, when full, would flood into part of the Swazi.
(See accompanying map.)

Public reaction, outside of the National Party, was negative. The KANU estimated that these proposals would cost R50 million to implement, would lead to the removal of 360,000 blacks and involve the buying out of 300 white farms. (JANUARY 15.09.72 and 21.06.72) Its constituent Farmers’ Associations voted 32 to 4 against them and its President, Donald Sinclair, declared:

We are not prepared to give additional land to the Bantu because the land they have at present is not being used to its fullest potential.

(DAILY NEWS, 7.09.72)

In Stanger white sugarcane farmers objected to the proposed incorporation of 16 of their farms into KwaZulu and argued that Indian cane-growers’ land should be incorporated instead, since this already had a substantial African tenant population. (DAILY NEWS, 8.09.72) Not surprisingly, the Natal Indian Cane-growers’ Association objected both to this suggestion and to the proposed expropriation of Indian land in the Umdoni and Umzinto districts, arguing that there was too little land available for Indian ownership anyway. (DAILY NEWS, 8.09.72)

In January 1973 Chief Cethsheni also publicly condemned the proposals. He laid claim to Richards Bay (its development as a major harbour by then already in the pipeline) and to all the State land in Zululand which he described as “automatically” part of KwaZulu. He also said that whites would be welcome to stay on in a consolidated KwaZulu, on their own land, provided that they obeyed the laws of the land. (DAILY NEWS, 17.01.73)

THE 1973 PROPOSALS

Concessions were made to some of the critics and in April 1973 revised and ‘final’ consolidation proposals were tabled in Parliament. These were approved by the House of Assembly on the 4th June 1973, the United Party and Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party objecting. What they proposed was that KwaZulu be reduced to ten pieces instead of six; in broad outlines they foreshadowed the later proposals of 1975. The major departures from the 1972 proposals were:

1. The Drakensberg Locations no. 1 and no. 2 were to be retained, consolidated into one block by the addition of the white farm land that separated them, and only the Upper Tugela Location was to be moved into that added farmland.

2. The Dundee district was to remain white, and the piece of KwaZulu near Newcastle to remain an isolated piece of KwaZulu territory.

3. The Harding corridor was to remain white.

4. All of the Hakathini Plate were to be incorporated into KwaZulu while the reserves to the south of House were to become white.
This was the age of grand apartheid. Speaking in support of these proposals the Minister of B.A.D., M.C. Botha, stated:

There are many whites who will be uprooted from land on which they have lived for a long time. And there are even more Bantu who will have to leave long-established dwelling places. "Hundreds of millions of rands are necessary for the land purchases which will be given free to the Bantu. Services will also be needed. All these gifts which the Government gives to the Bantu." (**Daily News**, 5.05.73)

Once again the recommendations were sharply criticised in Natal. Chief Botha of the Sotho rejection the plans as soon as they were published, stating that his administration would not be associated with the removal of 100,000 people. (**Sunday Tribune**, 29.04.72). The figure was the official estimate for the number of blacks who would have to be moved; it appears to have been a gross underestimate.) In May the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly passed a counter-resolution which called unanimously for the incorporation into Kwazulu of the following towns: Ezakazi, Nongomgco, Pomeroy, Nyomoyo, Kwamini, Melmoth, Khamba, Mphangeni, Ingwavuma, Umlilo, Mntamini, Singiddlulo, Amathalulu, Richards Bay, Mthubatu, Kosi Bay and, 'amid laughter', Stanger. (**Sund Daily Mail**, 8.05.73) In June, Barney Bladin, then the Executive Councillor for Community Affairs in Kwazulu, was even more outspoken in his rejection of the proposals. Speaking at the Bergville Agricultural Show he declared that only 'the barrel of a gun' would make people move from the Upper Tugela and Drakenstein locations. Whites, he said, seemed determined to dispossess us of everything that constitutes wealth in order to keep us in semi-slavery conditions. (**Daily News**, 6.06.73)

The major criticisms of Natal farmers centred on the proposal to consolidate the three Drakenstein locations into a single block. In December 1973 the **Natal Mercury** carried a story on the objections of farmers in the Natal Midlands to the proposal; one farmer claimed that the land earmarked for consolidation between Drakenstein 1 and 2 locations was the best grazing land for sheep and cattle in Natal. (13.12.73) In January 1974 Farmers' Associations in the Bergville/Weenen area put forward an alternative proposal, suggesting that land be acquired for the relocation ofPath 1 Drakenstein reserve along the Tugela River in the Weenen district. Their proposals were rejected by the Minister of B.A.D. because the land in question was 'not suitable for intensive settlement and unacceptable to Africans' (**Natal Mercury**, 5.01.74); subsequently, however, the Deputy Minister of B.A.D. promised that the farmers' objections would be considered. (**Daily News**, 18.01.74)

**THE 1975 PROPOSALS**

In March 1975 revised consolidation proposals for all the bantustans were published and, predictably, approved by a Parliamentary majority. The Natal plan retained the broad outlines of the 1973 proposals but involved minor adjustments in the detail. It also envisaged a ten-piece Kwazulu, the boundaries carefully drawn to exclude all the major industrial areas of the province and to keep to the limits of land area laid down by the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act. In the debate that followed the Minister of B.A.D., M.C. Botha, pledged that once the 1936 quota had been met, no more land would be made available to the bantustans; he also described consolidation heroically as 'one of the most urgent tasks ever tackled to ensure peaceful cooperation of peoples in South Africa.' (**Daily News**, 21.05.75)

The proposed exclaves and additions to Kwazulu envisaged in the 1975 proposals are illustrated in the accompanying map; details of the particular areas involved are contained in Appendix I. Broadly they followed the 1973 plan. The three Drakenstein locations were still shown as consolidated into a single reserve (to the indignation of Bergville and Batcort farmers); the Mthathini Flats were included in
Kwazulu; Reserve Four, the Paulpietersburg area and the House reserve were expropriated, as were a number of small but densely populated reserves in Southern Natal. Several blocks of released freehold land were excised as well, including the Driefontein area near Ladysmith, Grovetville and a string of properties in the Kpendla/Underberg districts. (Details on the freehold areas are contained in the summary of black spots in the previous chapter.)

According to Butler et al. (1977, 93) the proposals meant that 300 000 ha of african land would become white and a total of 463 000 ha of land would be added to Kwazulu, giving Kwazulu a net gain of 163 000 ha of land. These figures do not tally with more detailed figures supplied by Orrington-Smith et al. (1978, vol. 1, 7) and the interpretation of a general ‘gain’ of land for Kwazulu appears to be based on a serious oversight, in that neither the debt still owed to Kwazulu in terms of the 1936 Land Act quota nor compensatory land due for the removal of black spots have been acknowledged as separate items. According to Orrington-Smith the total area of Kwazulu in 1975 stood at 2 737 667 ha; the total area after implementation of the 1975 consolidation plan would be 3 316 000 ha. These figures mark a ‘gain’ to Kwazulu of 42 633 ha, approximately the same amount of land still needed at that time to compensate for black spots that had yet to be removed and thus no gain at all. (See Table 11, p.101 and Table 12 below. As already pointed out in Part One, compensatory land for black spots was not included in the original quota for Natal; furthermore, black spots do not form part of Kwazulu and this african-owned land would not, therefore, have been included in the figure for the total of the bantustan in 1975.)

Orrington-Smith et al’s detailed breakdown of the land purchases involved is set out in Table 12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF LAND</th>
<th>HA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unaccounted quota</td>
<td>52 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensatory land for black spots</td>
<td>43 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Nally situated' reserves</td>
<td>317 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>415 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kwazulu gained no significant economic assets out of the proposed exchange and stood to lose some of its most productive agricultural areas - Grovetville, Reserve Four and the Iifa mission reserve, described in 1972 as 'some of the finest (Zulu) agricultural land in Natal'. (Pretoria News, 17.06.72) The major consequence to flow from the 1975 consolidation proposals for the bantustan could only be massive relocation and dislocation of people and communities.

3. The financial cost of consolidation

The 1975 proposals have formed the basis for subsequent negotiation and discussion about the shape of the bantustan. As already indicated in Part One, in trying to implement these proposals in Natal/Kwazulu Pretoria has encountered serious obstacles - obstacles at the physical level (the sheer logistics of trying to reduce the extremely fragmented african areas of Natal to ten pieces), the economic level (the enormous costs of such a programme) and the political level (widespread opposition to the proposals within Natal and growing disagreement within the ranks of the National Party).

The cost of the envisaged programmes can only be described as prohibitive. Initially it was estimated that the implementation of consolidation country-wide would involve the removal of about 200 000 people and the purchase of about 1 million ha of land (mostly from white farmers) at a cost of about R300 million. (National Mercury, 1.09.76) These figures were soon replaced by much bigger ones.

In 1976 EBHR stated that the plans would involve the removal of about 175 000 families or one million people (EBHR, 1976, 23); the SABRE survey for 1976 stated that 2 million ha of land would be needed to be bought, at a cost of R477 million, and that the removal of the 175 000 families affected would cost R380 million. In 1977 the then Minister of Flurial Releations (Connie Mulder) stated that 777 000 ha of quota land and 1 million ha of compensatory land were still needed to be bought to complete the consolidation programmes and that the cost of purchase alone would be between R404 million and R500 million. (SABRE survey 1976, 268) In September 1979 the chairman of the van der Walt Commission estimated the overall cost of consolidation to be R3 000 million (Rand Daily Mail, 24.09.79); the following year he was reported as saying it would cost a staggering R6 000 million. (National Mercury, 5.09.80)

In the light of these figures, the allocation of funds for consolidation were absurdly small. Already in October 1979, M.C. Bothe had to announce that there would be delays in the purchasing of white farms for consolidation purposes, because of an unforeseen depletion of funds.

It is however trusted that the financial position will improve in the near future and the outstanding offers will be made as soon as funds have been made available. (National Mercury, 17.10.79)

Clearly the financial position did not improve. In 1980 EBHR carried a story on the financing of consolidation in which it was claimed that for the government to complete the consolidation programme by 1985, it should have been spending R100 million per annum on it since 1975 in order to complete the programme at all. It is stated that the government has been spending a minimum of R50 million per annum. (Daily News, 18.08.80) Its actual allocation of funds for the purchase of land has consistently fallen far short of that in the very best year (1975/76) it fell short of the stated minimum by R1 million, as the following table illustrates.

Table 13 ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR PURCHASE OF LAND FOR CONSOLIDATION PURPOSES, SOUTH AFRICA 1974/75 - 1980/81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FUNDS ALLOCATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>R25,6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>R59 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>R31,6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>R47,4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>R40,4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>R47,4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>R67 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the 1970s progressed, the declining price of gold put a strain on the Treasury. Even more important was the ever-increasing cost of the war being fought against SWAPO in Namibia and Angola - a cost which has continued to escalate into the 1980s and shows no sign of abating. With money in increasing short supply, the programmes of consolidation land purchases and population removals fell further and further behind projected deadlines and this, coupled with the intense opposition to consolidation emanating from a wide range of political groups, finally forced Pretoria to embark on a re-assessment of its plans, in 1979. Speaking in Parliament in April 1982, the chairman of the commission entrusted with the task of reviewing the 1975 proposals, Hannie van der Walt,
admitted 'that the progress we are making with our policy is not rapid enough.'
(Handard, col. 4977, 21.04.82)
Consuming indirectly on the financial pressures they had been encountering, he stated:

The hard reality is that money is required for South Africa's priorities with regard to this matter. Talk is cheap but money buys the necessary. Therefore we shall have to find some way of obtaining the money required for taking steps of this nature. 
(Handard, col. 4978, 21.04.82)

Yet despite the inadequacy of the funds allocated to the consolidation programmes, the amount still represents a very substantial slice of the total allocation of funds by the central government to the bantustans. According to a report in the Rand Daily Mail in March 1980 a total of R99 million had been allocated for the consolidation of the non-independent bantustans for the 1981 tax year - about 20% of the total allocation for these areas of R43 650 000. 
(Rand Daily Mail, 27.03.80. It appears that this figure refers to the total cost of consolidation planning, not simply to the cost of purchasing land.)

4. Opposition to consolidation

Opposition to the 1975 consolidation proposals in Natal has been widespread: a remarkable range of political groupings agree that they are unacceptable. They disagree however on their reasons for believing this, and the alternatives they propose in place of these.

The position and significance of the most important of these groupings is outlined below.

AFFIRMED COMMUNITIES

In 1981 Dr Koornhof stated that one of the major obstacles to consolidation was 'the unwillingness of the Zulu people to move.'
(Natal Witness, 14.05.81)
Opposition to being relocated within threatened communities is general, but the level of political effectiveness of organised resistance varies enormously. In general it would seem that organisations within threatened communities is poor, the people handicapped by isolation, ignorance, insecurity and the absence of progressive and democratic leadership. Tribal chiefs and councillors dominate organisations; the chiefs are not strictly accountable to the community and, as individuals in the employ of the State, dangerously susceptible to pressures of various kinds from the authorities. An example of this was found at Reserve Six where, it has been alluded, the chief was encouraged to agree to the move to Khambanana by being given one of the farmhouses left standing in the relocation area for his own use. (Fieldwork)

However, several instances have been reported where Pretoria has been forced to give way, at least temporarily, because of the opposition of the local people against being moved. In the Upper Daghla Location residents reportedly backed up their demand that those people affected by the construction of the Woodstock Dam from 1979 should not be moved to compensatory land outside the district by sabotaging earthmoving and other dam-building equipment. The removal of these people was seen as the first phase in the planned removal of the entire reserve; eventually, the community won a major victory when the State agreed to compensate for the land flooded by the dam by buying up adjoining white farms instead. (See p. 251)

In Reserve Four thechiefs have led the struggle to keep this area as part of KwaNkulunkulu and the local people appear to have acquired an inhibitory reputation for militancy with the local authorities. (See case study, Part Four.) In Grovtville local people succeeded in staving off the threat of removal in 1972 and in 1979 when the threatened removal appeared imminent once again, enlisted the support of KwaNkulunkulu a reprieve was announced as a result. (See Appendix 4.)

KwaNkulunkulu

KwaNkulunkulu's contradictory position on relocation has already been discussed in detail in Part One. It has repeatedly stated its objections to the various consolidation proposals put forward by the planners at Pretoria since 1972, but it has not objected to the idea of consolidation of the bantustan itself. Rather, it has called for more land to be added to it e.g. by calling for the various Zululand towns to be incorporated into KwaNkulunkulu in 1977; and by laying claim to the game reserves and the Makhashti Plateau as 'naturally' part of KwaNkulunkulu. Chief Buthelezi is anxious to build a more powerful base for himself and to build up KwaNkulunkulu as an autonomous unit within a greater South Africa. He has however stated that even if he were offered 'meaningful' consolidation, he still would not accept independence:

KwaNkulunkulu will never seek independence. A lot of people misunderstand us when we talk about Natal as one region. It simply means Natal is the home of all the people who live there. There might well be a new political dispensation involving a new area, but this will be within the framework of a single South Africa. 
(Jerry Ncw, 17.01.80)

KwaNkulunkulu's objections to consolidation have been two-fold: 1) not enough land has been offered it while much land as has been offered excludes all the major areas of economic development and sources of wealth within Natal, and 2) it will not be party to the massive relocation of people envisaged in the government's plans. In objecting to such removals it has publicly elevated to the point of principle a refusal to be seen to have anything to do with consolidation. Speaking in May 1981 Chief Buthelezi stated:

We have refused to have anything to do with even the consolidation committees because we do not want to give the impression that we acquiesce in any way to being moved around by the South African government. 
(Rand Daily Mail, 22.05.81)

However, as already discussed in Part One, KwaNkulunkulu has not managed to keep an consistently aloof from relocation as it maintains. Furthermore, this lack of cooperation has extended to the point where it has failed to provide a clear lead to certain areas faced with eviction from within its own boundaries, until it has become politically embarrassing for it to be seen to be acquiescing. Two major examples of this are Sodwana Bay and Reserve Four, which are described more fully in other parts of this Report.

In other instances KwaNkulunkulu has shown greater interest and initiative in opposing relocation, e.g. Grovtville and, most recently and spectacularly, Ingwavuma (discussed below). What needs further analysis is why it selects certain areas as worthy of involvement and appears to ignore others. It seems the role of local Inkatha members and KwaNkulunkulu MPG is important - where they are active, the community is in a stronger position to resist support from Umubu. Linked to this is the type of relationship that exists between local tribal authorities and Chiefs or Councils with the Umubu hierarchy and, more particularly, with Chief Buthelezi himself. Where this is amicable, support from Umubu is likely to follow; where there is strain, it is not. The political significance of the proposed removal is important too; the attempted exicution of Ingwavuma, where land was being offered to the Beazie struck a far deeper blow to KwaNkulunkulu's and Inkatha's political credibility than the exicution of Reserve Four and was seized upon by Umubu as an issue to confront with a vigour that has been totally lacking in the case of Reserve Four.

KwaNkulunkulu's alternative to consolidation has been recently crystallised in the Buthelezi Commission, whose findings on consolidation are described briefly below. Although KwaNkulunkulu has stressed that the Buthelezi Commission was an independent enquiry and that
it does not agree in all respects with the recommendations of the Commission, it has adopted the broad findings of the Commission as representing its counter-proposals for the Natal/Kwazulu region.

The history of consistent hostility by Natal farmers to making more land available for blacks in the province has been outlined in Part One and in the previous chapter. When the 1975 proposals were first made available, the NATU objected on the grounds that too much good land was being given over to African occupation. 'They make Natal look like a moth-eaten doughnut!' the President of the NATU, Donald Sinclair, commented. (Natal Mercury, 17.4.75) Subsequently the NATU adopted a more conciliatory approach to the proposals. As the years passed with little progress being made towards buying up the necessary white farms, and as rumours began to circulate of yet more radical exchanges of land between white and black areas, the NATU came to take its stand on the 1975 proposals as the maximum that it would be prepared to accept. At its 1980 Congress it passed several resolutions to this effect:

Congress requests that the 1975 consolidation proposals with smaller practical adjustments be accepted as speedily as possible; and Congress rejects further consolidation which exceeds the 1975 proposals. (Natal Mercury, September 1981)

In lobbying for these resolutions, the NATU, acting often in conjunction with the SAAU, has organised several deputations to meet the Prime Minister, the Minister of Co-operation and Development, and the Chairman of the Commission for Cooperation and Development, Dr Koornhof. In May 1981 it organised a special Congress to focus on consolidation and invited Dr Koornhof to address the meeting. Dr Koornhof's tone was conciliatory but essentially non-comittal.

My Department has always been prepared to consider sound reasoning based on facts and local considerations.

And later:

I am glad to be in a position to report that most of the administrative and financial constraints of recent years have been overcome and that no reason can at this stage be foreseen why purposeful effort cannot be made towards the implementation of the proposals. (Natal Mercury, June 1981)

The NATU has isolated several major objections to consolidation and the way in which the policy has been implemented - or not implemented. The continual uncertainty about boundaries and the damaging effect that that has had on agriculture has been a central concern. Many of the white farms earmarked for purchase and addition to KwaZulu in 1975 have not been formally bought by the SADT (because of financial problems); the owners of the land have been obliged to continue farming without any guarantee of how long they will be able to stay on their land or that they will receive a worthwhile return on such long-term capital expenditure as they may wish to undertake. This has been a major source of discontent in the Highveld area where 13 of the 21 white farms earmarked for addition to KwaZulu in 1975 had been bought by May 1982, but the remaining 8 were still 'in limbo'. (Natal Mercury, May 1982.)

A further grievance relates to the manner in which farmers are paid for their land, which has been 40% in cash and 60% in Government Shares (RSA Registered Stock), redeemable 25 years after the date of issue. (Natal Mercury, April 1982) It seems that this method of payment was devised by Pretoria as a way of circumventing its shortage of cash. Farmers have complained bitterly that they suffer considerable financial loss in the process and are harried in buying farms to replace those that have been expropriated. In February 1981 it was reported that in future farmers would be paid in cash for their land (Natal Mercury, 18.2.81) but by April 1982 this change in policy had still not been put into effect. It was reported at this time that the SADT was planning a further meeting with the Prime Minister to convey farmers' 'extreme dissatisfaction';

Landowners should not be placed in a weaker financial position as a result of the implementation of the consolidation policy. (Natal Mercury, April 1982)

In confronting the issues of consolidation, the NATU Executive has battled to try to appear non-partisan in what is essentially a party political issue. There is a deep-seated fear that to attack consolidation as a policy will split the Union between its Nationalist and non-Nationalist supporters. Speaking at the 1980 NATU Congress about the NATU's contribution to the van (er) Walt Commission, Donald Sinclair explained:

The Natal Agricultural Union has been accused of playing a minor rather than a leading role in these investigations; this may be true although your representatives... supported these recommendations which had been made by our affiliates. Since the whole exercise is undoubtedly a political one which calls for support for or opposition to a particular philosophy, it did restrict the sphere in which the Union could operate... If we had taken any particular stand on this consolidation business, it would have split the NATU down the middle, and that would have been a sad day for Natal farmers. (Natal Mercury, October 1980)

On the other hand, there is also the long-standing fear that not to become involved in the issue will lead to proposals being adopted by the central government that are yet more damaging to the interests of commercial agriculture. In trying to steer a middle course, the NATU has been driven into some contested positions. At the 1981 special Congress on consolidation, a resolution proposed by one of 22 delegates that stated that 'Congress does not believe that it is practical or economically feasible to consolidate KwaZulu into a viable and separate state within the boundaries of Natal, even by the provision of more land' was rejected by the majority of delegates because of its political content. 'Farmers should express their views but should confine them to the economic effects,' said the NATU President. Instead of the offending resolution, the Congress adopted a second resolution that stated simply that it rejected further consolidation which exceeds the 1975 proposals. (Natal Mercury, June 1981)

Consolidation has not only created tensions between Nationalist and non-Nationalist supporters within the NATU. It has also created tensions between constituent Farmers' Associations which have been lobbying the central government to protect their own particular local interests when finalising its plans. At the 1981 Congress on consolidation, one delegate described how 'uncertainty over the consolidation proposals was creating hostility between farming districts in Natal'. The Natal Mercury reported:

Natal farmers were slipping off to Pretoria for secret talks aimed at persuading the Government that their districts were too valuable for consolidation and at suggesting alternative areas. The 'clock and dagger' approach of some farming districts was described as 'traitorous' by inceased delegates at the special Natal Agricultural Union congress in Durban yesterday. (Natal Mercury, 15.9.81)

The two districts most affected by this have been the Bergville and Harding districts. It appears that Bergville farmers have been lobbying for the removal of the Upper Nqutu and the Drakensberg Location, right out of their area, into Southern Natal, into the Harding district - to the indignation of Harding farmers.

SOUTH AFRICAN SUGAR ASSOCIATION (SASA)

The position of SASA has been very simple; valuable cane land should be kept in white hands, for fear of endangering the R1 billion sugar industry. This was the gist of a
confidential report submitted by SANA to the van der Walt Commission in 1979, which was leaked during a by-election in the sugar-growing area of KwaZulu - an area then rumoured to have been earmarked for incorporation into KwaZulu. (Financial Mail, 10.11.79) In February 1980 the Managing Director of D.G. Smith, a major sugar-milling company, stated in reference to the van der Walt Commission of Enquiry:

I am confident that the authorities are well aware that the wealth of Natal is closely bound up with that of the sugar industry and that the decisions finally handed down will be inimical to the interests of an industry which is important, not only to Natal, but to the wider economic significance as a significant export earner. (Natal Mercury, 5.02.80)

Clearly, however, the sugar industry has had serious reservations about the nature of the decisions still to be 'finally handed down', for in April 1980 it commissioned the Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis at the University of Pretoria, under the direction of Professor J. Lombard, to see whether there are alternative solutions to the problems. The Government of the Republic hopes to solve the problem of KwaZulu/('Natal'. (Univ. Pretoria, nd, 5) In announcing this the Chairman of SANA said:

We want to emphasise that the Sugar Association is strictly a non-political body. We are looking at the situation of consolidation purely as an economic point of view. Consolidation would be detrimental to the stability of the sugar industry and because it is the major industry of Natal, it would therefore be bad for the province as a whole. (Natal Mercury, 28.04.80)

The proposals put forward by the Lombard Report in August 1980 envisaged a 'regional approach to the problem of political accommodation' based on three 'geo-political areas', which were identified as KwaZulu, the white-owned area along the main transport corridors and the Durban metropolitan area, and three layers of authorities - the inclusive Natal/KwaZulu Layer, the regional layer consisting of the 3 areas identified above and the local government layer.

The functions of the Natal/KwaZulu authority would be confined by the constitution to affairs truly common to the region, and not particularly to any one of the constituent areas or any particular group of local authorities. (Univ. Pretoria, nd, 5)

The Report was released just before the central government was due to meet to discuss the van der Walt Commission's findings. This was clearly timed to put pressure on Pretoria and it has been suggested it did succeed in helping to delay the release of the van der Walt proposals and the Cabinet's position on them. (Natal Witness, 15.08.80) Publicly, however, the National Party rejected the proposals out of hand as involving 'power-sharing' - it could only lead to the 'total domination of Natal by KwaZulu' according to one Nationalist MP. (Natal Witness, 15.04.81) Some responses were even more violent. A few days after the release of his report, Professor Lombard was the target of a right-wing terrorist attack, when his offices at the University of Pretoria were bombed.

The sugar industry also played an influential role in the Natal Commission, whose establishment was announced in May 1980 and which started working in October 1980. Tony Ardington, of the South African Cane Growers' Association, and Chris Saunders, head of the Tongaat Group, were both Commissioners.

THE KUTHULELI COMMISSION

The Kuthuleli Commission was established on the initiative of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly to 'explore the possibility of finding a way, within the overall framework of the Republic of South Africa, of developing a regional constitutional arrangement (for Natal) which might provide an alternative to the programmes to which the white political parties have become committed'. (Kuthuleli Commission, 1982, vol. 1) Its aim was of enquiry was thus far wider than that of consolidation alone. However, Pretoria's efforts to pursue the goal of consolidating KwaZulu as a separate 'national state' was a major incentive towards its appointment. In discussing the background to its appointment, the Commission noted:

The proceedings of the Eastern Regional Committee of the Consolidation Commission ceased disquiet, especially amongst businessmen who were convinced of the singleness of the economy of KwaZulu/Natal. (vol. 1, 70)

The Commission represents an embodiment of the political alliance that has been developing within Natal since the early 1970s between KwaZulu and liberal business interests in the province. Included among the 45 people who served as Commissioners were representatives of the Natal Chamber of Industries, the Institute of Banking in South Africa, the Durban Chamber of Commerce, the Associated Chambers of Commerce of South Africa, the South African Chamber of Commerce, the Inyanda Chamber of Commerce, the South African Institute of Civil Engineers and the Chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, Brian Oppenheimer, as well as the two representatives from the sugar industry already mentioned. Representing KwaZulu were Dr. Dhlomo, Secretary General of Inkatha, his wife (head of KwaZulu Nursing Services) and Sibhekile Zula, a member of the Central Committee of Inkatha; representatives of the XHC and the KwaZulu Planning, Coordinating and Advisory Committee were also present. In addition, there were nine academics serving on the Commission (including the Chairman of the Commission, Professor G.P.I. Schreiner, Vice-Principal of the University of Natal) and representatives from the Natal Law Society, the Natal African Teachers' Union, the Natal Teachers' Society and the SAA. The political spectrum formally represented ranged from the IFP, through the Indian Reform Party of South Africa and the coloured Labour Party to the ANC; the Commission noted that it had tried but failed to get representatives from both the National Party and the AEC to serve on it.

The Kuthuleli Commission's findings were finally released in early 1982. The Commission rejected the division of Natal/KwaZulu into two separate States as not being 'in the interests of the people of the area KwaZulu/Natal as a whole' and proposed instead a system of regional government based on a 'consociational model'. This would involve initially a coming together of the Natal Provincial Administration and the KwaZulu authorities into a joint executive for the region, with representatives of the Indian and coloured communities drawn into that as well. Although this executive would be constructed on ethnic lines, the Commission did express the hope that over time a system of political groupings and alliances would emerge which would not be based on ethnic considerations but on common material or other interests. In making these recommendations the Commission thus fully accepted the credentials of the KwaZulu government as the authentic representative of the African people of Natal; it did not call for new elections or a regional convention at which a new political dispensation could be worked out free from the legacy of separate development.

As far as consolidation specifically is concerned, the Kuthuleli Commission rejected the 1975 proposals as a viable solution to the political and economic problems of the region. It noted the massive relocation of people that the 1975 proposals would necessitate - estimated at between 300,000 and 500,000, the vast majority of whom would be Black South Africans' (vol. 1, 78) - and recommended that 'all enforced removals' be stopped. (Ibid) One of its major concerns was the economic implications of consolidation. It recorded evidence it had received about this to the effect that the region cannot afford to allow any further land to be used below its maximum productivity. It was also put to the Commission that the sugar industry would be seriously affected by some land transfer proposals, because of the essential link between sugar mills, transport
costs and changes of productivity, even if the transferred land was still used for sugar farming. The enormous costs involved in the relocation of people would be far better spent by applying it to agricultural improvement in the poorer areas. (Ibid)

It was also noted that the 1975 proposals 'leave a KwaZulu which has little or none of the major infrastructure on which the region depends for its economic success' and that 'any development of industry and commerce in KwaZulu would necessarily be that much more expensive because the infrastructure system would need extension if it were to serve significantly in that area'. (vol. I, 80)

The release of the Commission's findings in early March 1980 was widely reported upon, in Natal and the other provinces. The Government rejected the constitutional and political sections of the Report on the grounds that they advocated a single political unit for Natal and 'run counter to the policy according to which the Government believed race relations should be regulated in South Africa'. (Sen Horwood, quoted in Natal Witness, 10.03.81) Nevertheless, as with the Lombard Report, it was obliged to take note of the Report privately as embodying the viewpoint of the influential liberal business establishment in Natal.

5. The van der Walt Commission and after

DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE NATIONAL PARTY

As the magnitude of implementing the 1975 consolidation proposals became more apparent, pragmatists within the National Party began to see second thoughts and divisions appeared between the reformists and the hardliners within the Party. Influential individuals within the Government began to ask questions about the economic viability (and, ultimately, the political stability) of the proposed bantustans. In May 1977 the Chairman of the ERC suggested that whites should be allowed to stay inside the consolidated bantustans in the interests of their economic development: the Transvaal Congress of the National Party rejected this idea. (SAIRR Survey, 1977, 317) In 1978 Professor Botha, a member of both the Prime Minister's Planning Advisory Council and the Transvaal Head Committee of the National Party, proposed that several major border towns (Richards Bay, Pietermaritzburg, King William's Town) be incorporated into the bantustans but this was rejected by the government. (SAIRR Survey, 1979, 268)

Important differences also began to emerge publicly concerning the amount of land to be allocated to the bantustans. In 1976 the Minister and Deputy Minister of Plural Relations (Connie Mulder and Perdie Hartshagen respectively) reiterated that the government would not go beyond the 1936 quota but P.W. Botha himself was reported in September 1978 as saying that the 1936 quota was not a 'holy cow'. (Sand Daily Mail, 31.10.80)

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

Finally, in February 1979, P.W. Botha announced that 'an exhaustive investigation' into consolidation was necessary a) to determine how the process could be speeded up and b) to reconsider whether the existing proposals could achieve the desired 'freedom of all the peoples of South Africa'. (PREMIER, May 1981) This investigation was to be undertaken by the Commission for Cooperation and Development, under its Chairman,ennie van der Walt: hence the name, the van der Walt Commission.

In making this announcement, Botha also spelled out the guidelines that had been set for the Commission. These marked a tentative shift away from the former rigid adherence to the 1936 quota and the ascendency of the reformists within the National Party; while the land purchases required in terms of the 1936 Act, as embodied in the 1975 proposals, should be speeded up, consolidation henceforth needed to be considered not only from the 'geographic' point of view but also from the point of view of 'the consolidation of nations' and the 'economic consolidation of states'. (Ibid)

The appointment of the van der Walt Commission has sparked off a fresh round of speculation, rumour and intense politicking behind the scenes. The proposals of the Eastern Regional Committee, established as a sub-committee within the van der Walt Commission to consider consolidation in the eastern Transvaal and Natal (Kangwane and KwaZulu), have not been published, although there have been a series of leaks and denials in the 2 years that it has been in operation. It is clear that the Cabinet has not found the recommendations made to date acceptable and has delayed publication of the report; it has, however, failed to work out an acceptable formula in its place.

PROGRESS OF THE COMMISSION

The story of the van der Walt Commission's report for KwaZulu has been a story of delayed deadlines:

December 1979: Inaugural meeting of the Eastern Regional Committee;
March 1980: Announcement that the van der Walt Commission would not complete its enquiry by the end of March as planned;
April 1980: Report that the Commission would report to the Cabinet at the beginning of June;
August 1980: The Cabinet considered the Commission's proposals and referred them to two Cabinet Committees for review;
September 1980: van der Walt was reported as urging the Cabinet to publish his report; (Natal Witness, 4.09.80) Koornhof appealed for patience; (Natal Mercury, 5.09.80) and later told the NAC that he could not say when the report would be finally available; (DAILY NEWS, October 1980)

April 1981: Political state of Natal stated that the Eastern Regional Committee had not reached agreement or made any final recommendations; (Sunday Tribune, 5.04.81)

November 1981: Koornhof announced that the final consolidation recommendations would be completed by the end of June 1982;
July 1982: It was reported that van der Walt had handed over to the Cabinet his Commission's recommendations which, it was stressed, were not final; the proposals for Giilestone, Verda and possibly Kangwane would go before Parliament in 1983 but the recommendations for the other bantustans, including KwaZulu, would not be published until 1984. (Daily News, 20.07.82)

It appears that initially the van der Walt Commission favoured a radical redivision of land into separate bantustans in the country - KwaZulu to be reduced to three or four pieces, Bophuthatswana to be reduced from seven pieces to one. Thus in Natal there have been various times in the past three years when rumours that the South Coast and the towns of Durban, Eshowe, Pietermaritzburg and umzumbe will be handed over to KwaZulu - rumours which have excited indignation and strong counter-appeals from the white communities concerned.

The van der Walt Commission also developed the strategy of handing bantustan areas bordering on to neighbouring black states over to the States concerned, a strategy which clearly did find favour with the Cabinet. In June 1979 the Sand Daily Mail reported that the Commission was considering a radical form of consolidation which would involve Lesotho and Swaziland: Qwa Qwa was to be linked to Lesotho and Swaziland given access to the sea via the district of Ingwavuma. (25.06.79) This was the first public reference to the proposal to excise Ingwavuma from KwaZulu and it passed largely
unnoticed at the time. These proposals were repeated in a further report on the Commission in the Rand Daily Mail in September 1979, at that time Nkatele was reported to have expressed ‘astonishment’ at the suggestion concerning Ingwavuma.

(Rand Daily Mail, 24.09.79)

CRITERIA FOR GOING BEYOND THE 1936 QUOTA

Mounting costs, the growing opposition to consolidation already described within Natal, and the concern by pragmatists within the National Party at the economic consequences of consolidation forced further refinement to the tentative proposals enunciated by P.W. Botha in early 1979. In October 1980 Dr Kooshoef described consolidation of the bantustans as a process that would be ‘in addition to rather than instead of alternative forms of economic assistance’ and could, within certain definite limits, go beyond the quota of land allocated for African occupation in 1936. The conditions governing such an increase in land allocation were described as follows:

- Preference would be given to the fulfilment of the 1975 proposals;
- Land transferred from the white area to black areas must be ‘utilised productively and on an economic basis’;
- Such transfers would only take place after it had been established they would satisfy the ‘most important development needs’ of the bantustans;
- White landowners should be allowed to remain on their land if incorporated into the bantustans. (Rand Daily Mail, 31.10.80)

In November 1980 he described the state of consolidation planning as ‘a completely new ball game’ and said there might be changes to the van der Walt proposals. (Sunday Observer, November 1980) In May 1981 he was more outspoken. In urging farmers at the Natal Congress to ignore ‘secret talks’ he said:

We have stated categorically that the van der Walt Commission proposals will be drastically changed. (Sunday Observer, 15.05.81)

van der Walt himself began to modify his position. In January 1981 he admitted that ‘geographical consolidation’ was no longer possible:

We have to accept that we can’t have 10 or 20 separate economies here. We may have managed it 40 years ago, but today we would have to think in terms of more than 3 million hectares of mainly agricultural ground which would have to be added to the independent and national states at a cost of about R6 000 million over the next ten years. (Sunday Tribune, 1.02.81)

What the final outcome will be remains to be seen. It appears that the central government is still determined to push through a form of consolidation, using the 1975 proposals as its starting point. In January 1981 it excised the four areas of Reserve Four, Paulsberg, Driefontein and Sodwana Bay, despite the fact that the van der Walt proposals had not yet been published and it has stated repeatedly that the removal of those areas is a priority. Most maps of KwaZulu already present the 1975 proposals as reality, despite the fact that very few of the removals required to make it so have yet taken place: ‘consolidation at that level literally a cleaning up of the map.’ (APLA Special Report no. 1, 1981, 4) A major planning report on KwaZulu (Horrowitz-Smith et al’s ‘Towards a plan for KwaZulu’) has been developed on the basis of the 1975 proposals and its two-piece KwaZulu. In 1982 Pretoria announced that it intended to complete the process of consolidation country-wide within four years, by 1986, and that the total cost would be in the region of R1 000 million. In view of its past record, this seems an overly optimistic prophecy to make, but it does indicate that it is preparing to launch a further drive against ‘badly situated areas’. In Natal the communities most immediately at risk are those in the four areas mentioned above.

Particularly ominous at this stage is a clause contained in the laws on Cooperation and Development Amendment Act which was passed in early 1982. This empowers the government to prohibit publication of documents of the Commission for Cooperation and Development, by proclamation in the Government Gazette. Althoughennie van der Walt has denied that this clause will muzzle the press (Rand Daily Mail, 24.07.82), government speakers in the Parliament debates on the Bill made it very clear that they are anxious to limit public discussion on consolidation and to control what Val Volker, the Nationalist MP for Klip River, described as ‘an over-emphasis on the public’s right to know.’ (Hansard, col. 5633, 28.04.82)

Also ominous is the attempted expropriation of the Ingwavuma district which developed into a major controversy in mid-1982. This involved the proposed expropriation of the Ingwavuma district and its population of a little over 96 000 people from KwaZulu and the incorporation of the district into Swaziland. At the same time similar attempts were launched in KwaNgcowa (involving the incorporation of the entire bantustan into Swaziland) and, it is suggested below, are being considered for the trans-Kongola district of KwaZulu in the Transvaal, known as Sindiangantsha. These developments mark yet a further refinement of the consolidation strategy in the post-1975 era.

6. The Ingwavuma land deal

The Ingwavuma land deal has been reported extensively on the press and various journals and it is not proposed to repeat all the details here. Readers are referred to the DSS/SSS Information Publication no. 7 (August 1982) on ‘The Land Dispute: Incorporating Swaziland?’ for an analysis and comprehensive chronology of developments in both Ingwavuma and Ingwavuma to the end of July 1982. This section looks briefly at the origins of the Ingwavuma dispute, the development of the situation in the course of 1982 and the effects of the dispute between KwaZulu and Pretoria on the region; it also looks at the possibility that a similar deal has been envisaged by Pretoria for the trans-Kongola district of KwaZulu.

ORIGINS OF THE INGWAVUMA LAND DEAL

Although Swaziland has justified its claim to the Ingwavuma district on historical and ethnic grounds, the validity of such arguments is confined to the western part of the district: the Thame tribal area between the Kongola river and the sea, inhabited by the Thonga people, has never formed part of a greater Swaziland. (See accompanying map) In the Ngomhlanzulu area kinship and historical links with Swaziland do exist and Swaziland has long regarded a pro-Swazi nationalism in the area. Reports indicate that the Ngomhlanzulu people themselves are divided in their loyalties. In 1974, rivalry between pro-KwaZulu and pro-Swazi factions led to the flight of ‘thousands’ of Swazi loyalists across the border into Swaziland. (Natal Mercury, 21.03.81) Much of the support for Swaziland appears to come from the ruling group within the tribe and until recently the local chief resisted having a KwaZulu Regional Authority constituted in his territory.

Pretoria’s interest in the area appears to date from late 1978 or early 1979 and can be seen as part of the process of trying to revive and refine the consolidation programme that was initiated by the appointment of the van der Walt Commission of Enquiry. As late as August 1978 the Department of Floral Relations was still planning to use the Plate Land in the centre of the Ingwavuma district (the northern reaches of the Mkhahanthini Plata) as compensatory land for Reserve Four which was due to be expropriated from the 1913 Land Act schedule for Natal.

By May 1979 it had abandoned this idea in favour of using land in the Ehlanzila district as compensation for Reserve Four. Clearly, the Ingwavuma land deal had taken on substance in government circles in the
As already mentioned the van der Walt Commission was reported in June and again in September 1979 to have proposed the incorporation of Ingwavuma into South Africa, but these reports provoked little response at the time.

In August 1981 the matter came to the fore when newspapers reported on talks which had been going on between the South African and Swaziland governments for some time on the question of 'boundary adjustments'. *(Daily News*, 19.08.81) These proposed adjustments amounted to the fact that Pretoria was considering ceding not only the Ingwavuma district of KwaZulu but the entire Kzamane to the Swazis. While Pretoria and Khabaza were working towards this objective in obvious harmony — for Pretoria this is a new and more sophisticated variation of well-established section of ethnic control — neither Kzamane nor KwaZulu had been consulted and the response of both to the news was vehemently hostile. Buthelezi immediately warned Pretoria that 'it was playing with fire' and threatened to take the matter to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). *(Daily News*, 19.08.81) For a discussion on the Kzamane situation, see volume 5. He followed this up by releasing details on KwaZulu's own development plan for the area, based on the Tinley/Van Riet Report, which called ***inter alia*** for the establishment of controlled 'resource areas' along all the strategic international boundaries, including the Senzi one. *(In this plan, see p. 247)*

While the Kzamane issue continued to receive attention — with agreement on the Senzi takeover being described by a 'top source' as 'imminent' in the *Daily News* on the 2nd of March 1982 — that of Ingwavuma receded into the background until early May 1982. Then it exploded into the news again when Chief Buthelezi released details of a plan to replace land taken over by Pretoria — that in exchange for agreeing to Swaziland taking over the Ingwavuma district, KwaZulu would be given 300,000 ha of land, including both the Infoloci and Khlubule Game Reserves (long claimed by Ulundi) and the State land in the Ucembo district (already promised to KwaZulu in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans, anyway, as described above).

KwaZulu rejected the offer and in so doing and in publicising the deal, it succeeded in provoking a storm within White Natal as well. Both the EP-controlled Provincial Council and the powerful Natal Parks Board expressed their indignation and strong opposition to the proposals. Even the Nationalist-appointed Administrator in Natal, Stoffel Botha, was disapproving of both the proposals and the unilateral way they had been conceived. Paced with stiff opposition from not only KwaZulu but white Natal as well, Pretoria appeared to back down from its position and announced on May 16th that it no longer intended to pursue the matter.

However, on the 14th June Dr Koornhof — looking 'pale and strained' *(Daily News*, 15.06.82) — announced to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly that the land deal would go through, and on June 25th a proclamation exclaiming the Ingwavuma district from KwaZulu in terms of the National States Constitution Act (of 1977) was gazetted. Two days later a further proclamation exclaiming the district in terms of the Black Administration Act was gazetted, in an attempt to foil legal objections to the validity of the first proclamation raised by a KwaZulu legal team. Their objections to the first proclamation were based on the grounds that Pretoria had not consulted with Ulundi over the proposed alteration to its boundaries, as laid down in the National States Constitution Act.

**KwaZulu's Response**

Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha have led a campaign of resistance to the exclaim that has resulted in the disputed area being restored to KwaZulu and has boosted their credibility within Natal enormously. After a series of court actions they eventually succeeded in getting the second proclamation exclaiming the district declared finally invalid by the Appeal Court on the 30th September 1982. *(This was not the end of the saga since the*
validity of the first proclamation, deemed to have been exceeded by the second, and still to be judged. However, in view of the course of the previous legal argument, the outcome looks promising for KwaZulu. The return date for the application concerning the first proclamation was set as the 15th October 1982. Their popular campaign has been characterised by a strongly Zulu-nationalist fervour which has been described in the KWAZULU publication already cited as 'one of the most serious aspects of this land grab.'

The depressing prospect is that apartheid policies are going to win whichever way the dispute turns out. If Ingwavuma is saved, it will vindicate Buthelisi and Inkatha and their particular brand of ethnic politics. If Ingwavuma goes to Swaziland, KwaZulu will be hurt, and national pride will be roused, again an ethnic reaction. The government will have been able to threaten and perhaps discipline two of its dissident creations (KwaZulu and KwaManganje) while never once leaving the arena of ethnic politics. (Ibid, 20)

It has already been noted how vigorously KwaZulu has defended its territorial integrity in respect of Ingwavuma, compared to its feeble response to the exaction of Reserve Four, Driefontein and the areas at Sodwana Bay and Paulpietersburg. It seems that the explanation for this lies precisely in this phenomenon of ethnic politics - KwaZulu regarding the incorporation of land formerly controlled by it into Swaziland as far more outrageous, politically threatening and politically easier to exploit than the incorporation of its land into the white area within South Africa.

It has been suggested that Pretoria hoped that the Ingwavuma land deal would, among other things, serve to put pressure on KwaZulu for its recalcitrant stand against taking independence. If that is so, the plan has misfired: Chief Buthelisi's personal standing and Inkatha's position have been considerably strengthened within Natal/KwaZulu as a result of their courtroom victories.

The final outcome of the land deal is not yet clear. Swaziland has not yet announced how it will deal with the land; although Pretoria has had to retreat temporarily in Ingwavuma, there is no guarantee that it has abandoned its intentions altogether. In its conception the Ingwavuma land deal constitutes a further refinement to Pretoria's strategy to turn as many black South Africans as possible into foreigners - in this case by manipulating a fully independent black state and member of the OAU.

THE SWAZILAND-BUTHELISI DISPUTE

This district occupies an ambiguous position in KwaZulu and its present status has not been finally established. It consists of 68 200 ha of released land (Horrell, 1973, 30), lying across the Pongola River in the First Relief district of the Transvaal. It is bordered by Natal in the south and Swaziland in the north and has a population estimated at perhaps 100 000. In the early 1970s it was considered part of the Swazi bantustan but the consolidation plans of 1971 called for it to be excised. However, it was also being shown as an area of KwaZulu and is included as such in the 1970 and subsequent schedules of land falling under the jurisdiction of KwaZulu. However, the 1979 consolidation proposals do not show it as part of KwaZulu and it rarely features on maps of KwaZulu. In September 1982 a local official described its present status as ambiguous - 'The land is South Africa's, but the people are KwaZulu's.' Thus Health Services fall under the control of State Health but education is controlled by KwaZulu.

There has been no mention in any of the reports on the Ingwavuma land deal about the fate of this area but the likelihood that it is a candidate for incorporation into Swaziland as well is very real. Incorporation into Swaziland would be a far more effective way for Pretoria not simply to relocate but to excise the people from white
Appendix I. Reserve areas to be exercised, 1975

The following summary lists reserve areas (i.e. non-Freshhold) threatened with eviction from Kwazulu in terms of the 1975 proposals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>ESTIMATED POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Tugela location, Saggville</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>80 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part, Drakensberg Location no. 2, Retcourt</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>50 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part, Drakensberg Location no. 1, Retcourt</td>
<td>Released</td>
<td>1 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms east of Paulpieterburg</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>1 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location no. 3, Bulwer</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>4 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location no. 4, Bulwer</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>7 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambi Reserve, Louwburg</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms south east of Greytown</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms north west of Malamoth</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve no. 2 (Milecastle), House</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>4 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location no. 3, Iepo</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mataleni Mission reserve, Richmond</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve no. 17, Enhobea</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monzakwalli’s Location, Port Shepstone</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms west of Port Shepstone</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part, Location 5, Port Shepstone</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ithfa Mission and Farms</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chahafongwen Lodge, Dorban</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms north west of Durban</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>40 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tugela Reserve 79a, Gingindlovu</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>1 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part, Reserve 17, Embangeni</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>1 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part, Reserve 5, Embangeni</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Four</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part, Reserve 15, Kliklouwe</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>5 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part, Reserve 3, St Lucia</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>3 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve 1, (Ibeka)</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>15 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part, Reserve 14, Sodwana Bay</td>
<td>Scheduled</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above areas within Natal, with a total population estimated at roughly 300 000, there is the Simlangalantsha district of KwaZulu in the Transwaal, or the north bank of the Pongola, with a population estimated as from 100 000 people upwards.

Appendix 2. Natal Mercury report, 18.05.82

INGWAVUMA, that beautiful, fascinating area in the north-eastern corner of Zululand, was in the news last week.

There is apparently some proposal that it should be handed over to the Government of Swaziland.

It is bounded in the west by the Transvaal and Swaziland, in the north by Mozambique and in the east by the Indian Ocean. Among its many attractions are the Nduka Game Reserve, the Pongola River with its many pans, as well as Kosi Bay and Lake Mlilwane. Some 80 square miles of lake and marshy land are separated from the ocean by a narrow strip of bush-covered sand dunes.

The news item has brought memories of the worst day in my official life.

Some four years before World War II, I was asked by my Government to sail the Tongas of Tongaland (now also known as Maphaladwa) that portion of the ingwuvuma district lying between the Lemonro and the ocean which was Crown land destined for occupation by Whites, and that they would have to pay rent.

Disrestr

These happy, docile, hard-working Tongas were in great distress, no less than my own because I knew by what treachery they had been deprived of their land, together with their only lifeline, the Pongola River.

They said they had never been told of the loss of their land, and asked when it had happened. I said in the year 1904 at the hands of a Natal Government commission.

They asked why they had not been told of this. I had no answer, as I knew that they had never been told until I, on that disastrous day, came to inform them.

Tongaland was never part of Zululand, and the Tongas were never at war with Britain as were the Zulus, who were conquered in 1879.

The Tongas, nervous of Portuguese and of German colonial aspirations, sought British protection. The event was thus a loss of their land.

Tongaland was never part of Zululand, and the Tongas were never at war with Britain as were the Zulus, who were conquered in 1879.

The Tongas, nervous of Portuguese and of German colonial aspirations, sought British protection. The event was thus a loss of their land.

By A. J. TURTON, former Chief Native Commissioner of Natal

The Tongas did not complain. They could not be expected to, as they were never told of the shocking theft, and they continued in peaceful occupation.

When the Land Act of 1913 confirmed that the land was Crown land for eventual occupation by Whites, there was again no complaint from the Tongas as they were very much told of the loss of their land.

They continued in occupation, as Whites were reluctant to settle there largely on account of the heat, low rainfall and malaria.

By no stretch of imagination could the Zululand Commission any legal or moral right to confiscate land from a tribe whose only fault was its refusal to agree to annexation to the Colony of Natal. Parliament in 1913, in confirming the confiscation, was almost certainly never informed of the true state of affairs. At least I like to think so.

No whites

As at today whites have not yet moved in and, it is to be hoped, they never will.

At Ulundi last week the Tonga chief rejected any idea of occupation into their land, and declared his support for KwaZulu.

The Tongas have had no contact with Swaziland, and they differ in language and customs from the Swazi.

In fact, they controlled the southern portion of Mozambique until in 1875.

President M. M. of France, in his capacity as arbitrator, signed the Tonga territory in 1893 and allotted the northern portion to Portugal.

They apparently saw no change in this when they entered into negotiations with the British.

It may be of interest to know that the Tonga women and girls speak only of Tonga but understand of KwaZulu, the origin of this most unusual custom is apparent—unknown.

Conversely, the men and boys speak only Zulu but understand of Tonga.
N.A.U. DECIDES ON CONSOLIDATION OF LAND IN ZULULAND

The allocation of adequate land to meet the needs of game and nature preservation, settlement of Bantu (particularly in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936) and for occupation of Europeans in Natal has been given considerable attention for many years by the Natal Agricultural Union. In the context of this overall policy the Union has recommended the rationalisation of land ownership in Zululand by the adjustment of boundaries and the allocation of State-owned land in accordance with the above needs.

Following the 1962 Conference of the Natal Agricultural Union in Zululand, the Ministers of Lands, Bantu Administration and Development, Water Affairs, to discuss the specific problems of Zululand. At this meeting the Minister of Lands promised the appointment of an Inter-Departmental Committee of Enquiry to investigate the whole matter, but he pointed out that prior to the functioning of this committee a complete and full survey of the Maklahalal Place would have to be undertaken.

All Natal Agricultural Union affiliations in Zululand were asked to finalize any recommendations they might wish to submit to this Committee. A considerable amount of work was done under the auspices of the Zululand Public and Development Association.

THE PROPOSALS

After receipt of the terms of reference of the Committee a meeting of the Natal Agricultural Union was held at Riverton on 20th January, 1962. The majority at this meeting declared that they would support any proposal submitted by the Committee. The Land Tenure Committee of the Natal Agricultural Union (NAU) and the Development Association—(a) All Bantu-owned land in Zululand should remain in white ownership. This is of particular importance if it is borne in mind that there are approximately 16 per cent. of the total area of Zululand in white ownership.

(b) It is desirable to have an unbroken strip of white-owned land from the Tugela to the Umtata Rivers.

(c) The centres of white-owned land connecting the districts of Zululand, Nkandla, Nqutu, Kamzikeli, Nongoma and Mnyandeni should be widened.

(d) The Game Reserve, Nature Reserves and Places of Public Resort (Umfolozi and Mlilwane in particular) consisting of land which is now or will be given access by means of corridors of white-owned land should be widened.

(e) The present Forest strip between Bantu Reserves 6 and 16 in particular, as well as other Government Forest areas, remain as Bantu-owned land.

(f) All main lines of communication, both road and rail should be straddled by white-owned land, and adequate roads and branch lines be provided to these communications from the Bantu areas.

(g) Any plan of rationalisation of land ownership should have as its object the displacement of as few persons as possible.

A SAY FOR ALL

In view of the difference of opinion expressed at this meeting it was decided that it left to the individual localities to submit their views to the Inter-Departmental Committee thus ensuring that all points of view would be taken into consideration.

GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES

At its meeting on 25th January, 1962, the Executive of the Natal Agricultural Union decided to support the proposals of the Land Tenure Committee, which will be referred to the Inter-Departmental Committee with the view to the future of State Land in Natal and the extent to which it can be utilised in order to achieve the following objectives:

1. The possibility of making available compensatory land in exchange for Reserves Nos. 1, 2, 13, 15 and 16 (por tion).

2. The possible changing of the boundaries of the future Bantu Reserves Nos. 3 (portion), 9, 4 (portion) and 10 for other land.

3. The proposal of a through route through the southern portion of Bantu Reserve No. 3 to ensure access to Kwambonambi River.

(Continued on page 6)

NAUŁU

Natal Agricultural Union

Zululand Consolidation

(Continued from page 1)

(d) Making available to the Bantu Trust as much as possible of the approximately 300,000 morgen of land which, according to the Act, is still to be obtained by the Native Trust in Natal (quota land).

N.A.U. POLICY

The decision of the Natal Agricultural Union in regard to the allocation of land in Zululand is in accordance with the policy of the Union decided on at its 1961 Conference.

The cornerstone of this policy are—

1. The farmers of Natal accept the commitment of the 1936 Act — 600,000 acres are still required in Natal and Zululand.

2. Urgent measures be taken to remove "black spots" and compensatory land be found for that purpose by liaison between the N.A.U., Natal Native Affairs Committee and the Department of Native Affairs in consultation with Farmers' Associations in various parts of the province.

3. That block buying of land be part of a planned programme.

4. That as much land as possible be ceded from the Crown Lands of Zululand to meet the 1936 commitment, provided that the interests of European farmers in Zululand be guarded.

5. That immediate steps be taken to safeguard the water catchment areas; necessary by obtaining compensatory land in other areas on which to move the local population.

6. That all land purchased by the Native Trust be disposed of in consultation with the N.A.U.

7. That this Congress requests the Minister of Native Affairs, and Development, to suspend the acquisition for Native settlement of European-owned or State land in Zululand until the denominational of European areas is settled.

The Natal Agricultural Union feels that if the consolidation of European-owned land in Zululand is to take place the recommendations offer the least disruption to the lives and economical life of the people of the territory of all races. The exchange of only some 40,000 to 60,000 acres of Native Reserve — the exchange of the total of 147,000 acres to be exchanged as Bantu land to exchanging 14,000 Bantu Acres and not 300,000 as some reports have it, is required to carry out this plan.
Appendix 4. Notes on Grovitlvoice

HISTORY
This area of 90,000 acres came into existence as Mission land in 1848, under control of the Congregational Church. The mission was established around a core of five families. In 1856 the minister in charge began to sell freehold plots to his converts and to non-Christians.

In the 1860s sugar became a commercially viable crop, and with the encouragement of the church people turned over their land to the cultivation of sugar, and soon after a mill was established on the mission. Today, about 2/3 of the reserve is held in freehold title in the hands of 150 landowners.

In 1956 the government established a scheme at Grovitlvoice whereby plots of 10 acres of Trust land were leased to landless individuals for the sole cultivation of sugar cane. In 1970 thirty residential plots were set up — these are government tenants with small gardens. There has been a subsequent large influx of people evicted from Indian owned land. The population of the area is put as anywhere between 5,000 and 9,000 people.

A Cane Growers Association was established by Albert Luthuli in 1935 to promote the interests of Grovitlvoice farmers by means of a block quota for Grovitlvoice farmers. Today the Grovitlvoice Sugar Cane Association has 500 affiliated members.

The mill no longer belongs to the mission reserve, as it has been taken over by one of the sugar companies. In 1978 Grovitlvoice farmers delivered 23,000 tons of cane to the mill.

REMOVALS HISTORY
In the mid 1960s plans to clear the area for a proposed airport were put forward. The community responded by holding a church service to honour the minister who was a founder of the community. For reasons unclear to the community the plan was dropped.

In 1972 the community was again threatened with removal. A general meeting was called and a memorandum drawn up and submitted to Pretoria. The document apparently drew attention to the fact that the area had been occupied for a long time, that it had been developed agriculturally by the community, the fact that the community was attached to the graves of its ancestors, and the nearby burial site of Shaka. No reply or acknowledgement was received from Pretoria, but the threat was dropped.

Early in 1973 a house to house census was conducted by BAL officials. This was regarded by the community as a preparation for removals. The community felt that the government was using illegal shack dwellers as a pretext for getting rid of landowners as well.

Two members of the KwaZulu government were invited to meet with the people and the outcome of this meeting was the proposal that Grovitlvoice should remain in KwaZulu.

In March 1973 Dr Fruhmich announced in Parliament that Grovitlvoice would have to be moved to Ilvanepaal near Nqumulo — a smaller area of land and more difficult to cultivate. Newspaper reports indicated that a delegation consisting of Grovitlvoice members and Dr Millalose were to meet Koorhof. According to a research report on the area the

chief automatically appointed a number of delegates and since it was felt that these men did not properly represent the interests of the farmers, the delegation foundered on general mistrust of the motivation behind it.

According to news reports the decision to make representations to Koorhof was taken by the KwaZulu cabinet.

Ruthesele told the press that KwaZulu did not approve of the movement of people and, bound by a 1972 decision of the Legislative Assembly, could not participate in the shunting around of people. KwaZulu, he maintained, felt very strongly about the fact that sugar cane was the only cash crop among the African people. Dr Millalose stated in a news report that this land is worth ‘at least R200’.

On the 24th March 1979 Ruthesele conveyed to the press that he had met with Koorhof and that Koorhof had said that if the people of Grovitlvoice did not want to move they must be left alone. But no promises had been given that the people would not be moved against their will according to Dr Millalose. The delegation of Grovitlvoice members and Dr Millalose had not yet met with Koorhof and Ruthesele said that the Minister had indicated he would be happy to see them.

The NDP MP for Umkhwama called for action to improve living conditions for Grovitlvoice residents. His party did not approve of the development of ‘feeder areas’ for sugar cane growing.

The removal was frozen due to the direct intervention of Ruthesele and it is now thought likely that Grovitlvoice will be consolidated into KwaZulu.

Acknowledgements: Newspapers
6. URBAN RELOCATION

The categories of urban relocation, influx control and removals in terms of legislation designed to evaluate or control informal settlement - the categories dealt with in the three ensuing chapters - are interlinked. All three have been used to limit and control African access to the towns and cities of South Africa, so as to exclude the "unproductive" (the wives and families of workers, the aged, the unemployed) and to bind African people to one or other of the bantustan/national states. The Group Areas Act, used mainly against coloured and Indian people, has also been used against Africans living in urban areas outside of proclaimed townships, to force them to move either into segregated townships or out of the prescribed area altogether. Further research is needed to draw out the interrelationships and points of difference between these various categories and the way they have been applied in Natal; they are treated here descriptively rather than analytically, as separate sub-categories within the broad context of urban political geography in Natal.

1. Background to urban relocation in Natal

GENERAL CIRCULAR No. 25, 1967

The policy of urban relocation - the depopulation of African townships falling within prescribed (urban) areas and the removal of their residents to newly created townships (described euphemistically as towns) in the bantustans - got under way systematically from the late 1960s. Previously certain removals of African people out of the central city area of Durban had taken place between 1959 and 1962; three hostels in central Durban, with a combined population of 8,240, some tenants at the township of Chesterville as well as the small township of Beaumountville were all moved out to the newly established township of Kwamashu. These removals predated the establishment of KwaZulu, however - Kwamashu still fell within the metropolitan area of Durban - and appear to have related to an earlier phase of urban segregation rather than to urban relocation as it developed subsequently.

General Circular no. 25 of 1967 presented urban relocation as one of the methods for ensuring that 'the Bantu are only temporarily resident in the European areas of the Republic, for as long as they offer their labour there' when it listed the four types of relocation settlements to be developed in the bantustans. The first of these types - 'self-contained Bantu towns in the homelands' - was described as

- Mainly developed in accordance with Government policy as substitutes for the municipal Bantu residential areas of European towns or cities situated near the boundaries of the homelands, or to provide accommodation for Bantu (and their families) employed in industries located in the border areas.

(Quoted in Maré, 1980, Appendix 5, 76)

Workers moved to these substitute residential areas would either commute daily from the bantustans to their places of work or live in single hostels in the towns where they were working and return home weekly or monthly. In 1971 the Deputy Minister of R.A.D said it was feasible for workers to commute up to 113 km daily between points - i.e. 226 km round trip. (Quoted in Horrell, 1973, 139) Subsequently the criteria were slightly softened and the standard guideline that came to be adopted was that there was a bantustan within 80 km of a town, the African township of that town should be relocated across the boundary.

In Natal, because of the fragmentation of the African reserve across the province, most major townships are situated well within 80 km of KwaZulu. In 1969 a Ph. D. student at the University of Potchefstroom noted that

Whereas the patchwork nature of Bantu areas in Natal is a stumbling block on the way to political development, it is, with an eye to township creation, an advantage because it is located relatively close to white development areas. (Quoted in Maré, 1980, 27)

This 'advantage' has been used since about 1960 in three ways that relate to urban relocation:

1. Various townships in Natal have either been depopulated and removed to new townships established inside KwaZulu, or placed under threat of such removal - the classic type of urban relocation as described above. This form of relocation, although not officially abandoned, appears to have lumbered to a halt in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

2. The boundaries of KwaZulu have been or are to be manipulated so as to incorporate townships formerly falling within the white area into KwaZulu without involving any physical removal of people - a variation of urban relocation that has affected many more people in Natal than has the first type.

3. As outlined in General Circular no. 25, new townships planned to serve the metropolitan areas of Natal have been established on land that either is or is to become part of KwaZulu. As with the strategy of incorporating already existing townships into the boundaries of KwaZulu, this process does not involve the depopulation and removal of townships as such, but achieves the same end: Natal's urban African population is located inside KwaZulu, their status in the province's urban-industrial centres reduced to that of commuters, not permanent urban residents.

2. Deproclamation and removal of townships

TOWNSHIPS REMOVED

In 1968 the Minister of R.A.D presented Parliament with impressive statistics for 40 towns that had been planned for KwaZulu, to house an eventual population of 851,700 people. (SAHHR Natal, 43/1969) Of these only 15, with a total population of 164,712, had been established by 1968, and at least three hardly qualified as townships - Wibamini, a mission community (subsequently threatened with removal), Xupumangsho, a relocation closer settlement in the Belumanzi district and Vulandovo, a relocation closer settlement near Ladysmith that was subsequently removed. Since then there has been marked growth in the urban population of KwaZulu but of the 40 actual and projected townships in 1968 only about half could be considered formal townships in 1982. The remainder are either closer settlements (without formal township housing) or have never been developed. (See Appendix 1 for an updated summary of the 1969 statistics.)

At about this time, and in keeping with the plan to provide urban housing in the bantustan only, housing programmes were frozen - i.e. no new houses were to be built - in a large number of the already established townships in white Natal. This was presumably
in anticipation of their deproclamation and eventual removal. Townships affected in this area included those at Coleman, Dundie, Glencairn, Greatton, Ladysmith, Mool River, Paulpietersburg, Umnitzo, Vryheid and the Pietermaritzburg township of Shabangu.

Compared to the number of townships earmarked for removal, the actual process of elimination and relocation did not proceed particularly rapidly in Natal in the 1970s. More research, particularly on the role of local municipalities and the Administration Boards in this regard, is required. It is possible that given the scale of black spot and farm removals taking place in the early 1970s in Natal, there was not sufficient money to build as many of the ‘substitute’ townships in KwaZulu as required. Much of the township development’ taking place in KwaZulu at this time was of the cheaper settlement variety, as already pointed out, and much of the housing that was being built in the relocation townships that were established (Blignyoni, Ekhweni, Ndadeni, Osinini, etc.) was being used to house former black spot residents or, in some cases, ex-labour

tenants.

STP has managed to trace six townships definitively deproclaimed and relocated during this period: Utrecht, to Osinini in about 1963; Estcourt, to Wasini in the late 1960s and early 1970s; Dalaisi Site, an Emergency Camp in Durban, in 1970; Newport, de-proclaimed in 1971 and shifted out to Mwadzini, along with the African freehold areas of Fairleigh and Lannnox; Margate, to Muselakhoe in the mid 1970s and Harding, to Muselakhoe in 1980/81. In addition the township of Dhausenauer was deproclaimed in 1969 and it seems probably was removed - there is some confusion over this, however, as there is still an Emergency Camp at Dhausenauer, established in 1964.

The above list refers to completed relocations; sections of the Ladysmith township were moved to Ekhweni in the early 1970s and Zenzela township at Howick is in the process of being relocated to Mqaphomele as well. (This latter removal is expected to be completed in the near future. For an account of an individual act of defiance to the removal of Zenzela see Appendix 2.) Combining the official and estimated population figures for these various townships one reaches a total of between 15 and 16 thousand people removed from deproclaimed townships in Natal since 1968.

TOWNSHIPS UNDER THREAT

Because of the relatively small number of completed urban removals in this period, there are still a large number of townships under threat. Since the announcement of the 99 year leasehold scheme (discussed below) a small number of townships previously under threat have apparently been reclassified, but there are still an estimated 61 000 people, living in 14 townships and 3 Emergency Camps, under threat of relocation if the official statements of intent in this regard are to be taken seriously. The 14 townships that STP has been able to identify are those at Cederville, Colenso, Dundie, Chesterville in Durban, Glencoe, Greyton, Ladysmith, Mool River, Paulpietersburg, Klnaanster in Pinetown, Stanger, Umnitzo, Vryheid and the remainder of Zenzela township at Howick.

The three emergency camps - all established as temporary transit camps in the 1960s are those of Dhausenauer, Weenen and Winterton.

* For details on these and the other townships mentioned see the summaries below.

* The Weenen Emergency Camp has been classified as a relocation site earlier in this report since people were definitely removed from an established settlement into it. The Winterton and Dhausenauer Camps have not been classified as such. It appears the Winterton Camp was established to house local workers living in shacks, back yards etc.; no details on the Dhausenauer Camp are known.

There is considerable confusion over the status of these various townships but it seems, at the time of writing, that officially they are all still under threat of removal. In 1981 in a response to a question asked in Parliament by Koumaf who confirmed that the townships of Vryheid, Paulpietersburg, Dundie, Glencoe, Ladysmith and Chesterville were to be removed, ‘it is in the interest of the state and in the best interests of the communities concerned’ and ‘as and when alternative accommodation becomes available pending a final decision on their removal’ (Hansard, Question 21.1, 10.08.81) The proposed removal of Chesterville was reconfirmed in early August 1982. (Suid-Afrika, 5.08.82) In September 1981 the Chief Commissioner for Natal stated that the township of Shabangu at Stanger was to be removed ‘as soon as possible after the outstanding housing loans ... have been redeemed.’ (Letter to MFMA., 17.09.81). In April 1982 it was announced that the removal was being ‘re-investigated’ (Hansard, Question 5, 21.04.82) but in May 1982 officials told the community that they would be removed after all. (Fieldwork) According to information gathered by STP the course of fieldwork, the intention to remove the townships of Klaserante at Pinetown and Shabangu at Umnitzo has not been altered.

It seems that in all the above townships, except those at Greyton and Paulpietersburg, the freeze on housing that was first introduced in 1966 is still in force - although the DLI was reported to be making quite extensive improvements to the public facilities available in several of the townships in 1965/66. Because the housing position is still frozen the existing housing stock has become desperately overcrowded and run down. This has had a demoralising effect on many residents and, coupled with the general uncertainty about the future, has encouraged some residents either to move to a more secure situation inside KwaZulu or to accept their pending removal as the lesser of two evils. The Township of Shabangu at Stanger, for instance, was built in 1944 and consisted of 189 houses, most of them two-roomed, without internal running water or flush sanitation. On a fieldtrip to the area in July 1981 STP was told by community leaders who are fighting the threatened removal that ‘improvements are promised but never made.’

Yet despite the present neglect of these areas, the position with regard to their longterm future appears to be more fluid now than it was in the early 1970s. Considerable confusion and uncertainty about their future is apparent among the residents of these townships, and the official viewpoint too appears to be vacillatory.

THE INTRODUCTION OF 99 YEAR LEASEHOLD

To some extent this can be interpreted against the background of policy shifts at a national level. Since the late 1970s the State has been forced to retreat from its previous rigid commitment to the viewpoint that all Africans in urban areas were to be regarded as temporary sojourners who eventually would be relocated within the homelands. It has now embarked on a more expedient policy of differentiation, by which a very small class of urban residents are to be recognised as permanent, with certain privileges in relation to jobs, housing and mobility and cut off from the greater majority of African people whose exclusion is to be more rigorously policed and controlled. The first signs of this came in 1978 with the announcement that a system of 99 year leasehold tenure for qualified people in selected urban areas was to be introduced. The proposed Orderly Removal and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, introduced in the 1982 parliamentary session, takes this a further step forward. This Bill introduces the category of ‘permanent urban residents’ in place of those formerly classified as ‘permanent residents’ in terms of Section 10(1) of the Urban Areas Act and extends to this tiny, regulated group, the privileges described above.*

* For a brief synopsis of this Bill in relation to urban areas, see Appendix 1 to the chapter on influx control.
At the time it was made, the announcement of 99 year leasehold appeared to hold out the promise of a reprieve to qualified residents in certain of the threatened townships in Natal. Paulpietersburg township, Steadville township at Ladysmith, Sobantu township in Pietermaritzburg, Hambanathi township at Tongaat, Lenontville in Durban and the township at Mbashe have been mentioned at various times since 1978 as places where this form of leasehold tenure is to be introduced. However, despite various promises, no such tenure has been introduced at Paulpietersburg, Greytown or Ladysmith as yet and, as described above, Dr Koornhof has confirmed that all three are among the townships to be relocated at some stage.

It appears now that the number of townships that will benefit from the 99 year leasehold scheme in Natal is small. In October 1981 the Natal Mercury quoted the chairman of the DAB as saying that the board "would soon be in a position to sell modern houses" on the 99 year leasehold scheme in only three areas - at Sobantu, Hambanathi and Greytown. (17-10-81) Of the townships still falling under the jurisdiction of the DAB only Hambanathi, at Tongaat, and Lenontville, in Durban, appear to be candidates for the scheme. Even in those areas thus singled out there have been numerous delays in the implementation of the scheme which have angered and frustrated residents. By October 1981 no 99 year leases had been registered in any of the townships run by the two Administration Boards in Natal. (Natal Mercury, 1-10-81) In August 1982 the DAB announced that because of "unexpected legal hitches" and snags in purchasing land, 99 year leases would not be in operation in either Hambanathi or Lenontville for at least two years. (Natal Mercury, 7-9-82)

OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELAY IN REMOVALS

Although more research is required on this it appears that there has been mainly local factors that have served to delay the process of urban relocation in this province and that the ultimate intention in Pretoria is still to remove as many of the townships remaining outside KwaZulu as possible. Four such delaying factors are listed below.

1. Consolidation: Uncertainty about the final boundaries of KwaZulu has been mentioned by officials at both a local and more senior level as a reason for delaying the relocation of townships: the implication being that no suitable relocation point for these areas can be fixed until the boundaries of KwaZulu are finalised.

2. Finance: In a memorandum published by the Department of Community Development with the budget in 1981 it was calculated that it would take R41 million a year to wipe out the backlogs in black housing (outside the hewtenature) within the next ten years. (Natal Witness, 13-8-81) In the debate on his department's budget the Minister for Community Development said "it was impossible for the State to finance the housing backlog" of 15 000 units for whites, coloureds and indians and 150 000 units for africans. (Natal Mercury, 15-9-81) At the same time KwaZulu does not have the financial resources needed to cope with the enormous backlog of housing in the townships already administered by it - 'conservatively estimated' at 100 000 units in April 1982. (Natal Mercury, 23-4-82)

In addition to the lack of funds available to finance new township development, in general, a major factor advanced for delaying the removal of the townships of, inter alia, Dunedee, Glencoe, Chesterville and Stanger has been that the original loans advanced by the State towards the establishment of these townships have yet to be repaid. Local community councils have been informed on several occasions that only once has this happened will their townships be abolished. This is still some time away - 1992 has been advanced as the earliest date by which this can be anticipated to happen.

3. Local authorities: The available evidence suggests that both Administration

Boards in Natal (the DAB and the FIBA) appear cautious sympathetically to the appeals from local township leaders that their communities be allowed to stay. Several municipalities too, notably at Dunedee, Glencoe and Stanger, have come out in support of the retention of their local townships. This does not signify a willingness to expand the townships beyond their present boundaries, only to allow those qualified to be there to remain. It appears that in the case of Steadville township at Ladysmith there is a difference of opinion between the DAB on the one hand, which is in favour of retaining the township within the municipal area of Ladysmith, and the local Town Council on the other, which wants the area cleared and the people relocated to Sakhzeni 25 km away.

4. Resistance from communities: Opposition to their proposed removal has been voiced in most of the threatened townships but has tended to take a very low-key form and it is not clear what effect this has had on official policy. This opposition has been directed mainly along official lines, through existing Community Councils or Advisory Boards in the townships and mediated either by the Administration Boards or by Umhlanga. One of the more publicised campaigns has been that at Shakasville, Stanger, where a key factor in the campaign has been the township's historical sitting, at 'the birthplace of the Zulu nation', the former home of Shaka. (See Appendix 1.) Residents have repeatedly reiterated their objections to being moved, most recently to officials in May 1982.

In many areas, as already described, the overcrowded and dispirited living conditions that have been allowed to develop have acted as a form of indirect pressure on residents to move by themselves and this has made the task of mobilising popular opposition more difficult.

The interplay of these factors, taken in the context of the State's new strategy of con- centrating to a very limited urban middle class, may mean that some of the communities presently under threat will not be moved particularly those whose local opposition is strong and there is outside attention as well. However, even if all the threatened townships win a reprieve, this will not represent any major breakthrough in policy. The numbers of people involved are small compared to the rest of the african population who, as described below and in the subsequent chapter, are being forced to make permanent settle- ment, are not being permitted to settle in the urban areas except in townships located in KwaZulu.

3. Location of townships inside KwaZulu

This, as already mentioned, has been achieved in two ways - 1) by extending the boundaries of KwaZulu to incorporate already established townships that (formerly fall in prescribed areas and 2) by locating all new township development inside KwaZulu.

INCORPORATION THROUGH BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS

This was first demonstrated most dramatically, when the township of Kwambonambi in Durban was incorporated into KwaZulu in April 1977. Without any physical removal of people, the boundary of KwaZulu was extended to include Kwambonambi, former residents of Durban, with Section 10 rights, were excised from the prescribed area and turned into 'commuters', and the total urban population of KwaZulu was increased by about one third. (See implications of the loss of Section 10 rights are discussed in the chapter on influx control.) Kwambonambi had been established as a relocation township on the edge of Durban in the late 1950's; both squatters, many from the Moses Majabu area in central Durban, and people moved from former townships and freehold areas in the city were relocated there. At the time of its incorporation into KwaZulu its population was set officially at 145 000 but unofficial estimates put it as high as 200 000.
Numerically this form of urban relocation has proved far more significant in Natal than the depopulation and physical removal of townships. It has been announced that a similar process is to be applied to the township of Clarmont near Pinetown, with a population of 60,000 (Natal Mercury, 6.06.82) although the Chief Commissioner for Natal has stated that this is not imminent. (Natal Mercury, 7.06.82). It is also likely that the small Durban township of Lennoxville will be exiled in this way. Lennoxville is one of two townships left in the prescribed area of Durban (the other is Chesterville) and the only ones not yet officially earmarked for removal. Dr Koorhof has denied in Parliament that the State intends to remove it (Hansard, Question 21, 1.10.81); it appears that the 99 year leasehold scheme is eventually to be implemented there. Several observers have speculated that the reason why Lennoxville has been left unscathed is that it can conveniently be incorporated into the Umzinsi area of KwaZulu at some stage in the future.

The excision of KwaMashu in 1977 has its parallels with the attempted excision of the Ingwavuma district in 1982. In the latter case the basic principle of exclusion of people without removal was being tried for the first time and the boundary being amended was an international one.

TOWNSHIP DEVELOPMENT INSIDE KWAZULU

All the new township development for African's, that has taken place in the metropolitan areas of Natal in the 1970s has been inside KwaZulu: the puchark of Natal/KwaZulu being carefully used to ensure that the urban African population qualifying for Section 10 rights in Natal is kept as small as to be insignificant. In the Durban/Pinetown new area the townships of Ntuzuma, Emmaboka and KwaMhlangeni and, most recently the site and service scheme at Inanda Newtown (described in detail in the case study in Part Three) are all being developed on land to be handed over to KwaZulu. The new townships built to serve the expanding industrial centre and harbour of Richards Bay - KwaKhweni and Ikwezi - are built inside KwaZulu. Similarly at Pietermaritzburg, the township of Izonzi has been built on SAPD land that is to be handed over to KwaZulu.

One of the major implications of the location of Natal's urban African population inside KwaZulu is that the provision of the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill relating to "permanent urban residents" will barely apply in the province since few African enjoy Section 10 rights in Natal as it is.

4. Urban relocation in Natal: a summary

The following summaries set out the information on urban relocation in Natal as follows:

1. Townships moved
2. Townships under threat
3. Townships where reprise promised.

1. TOWNSHIPS MOVED (chronological order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWNSHIP</th>
<th>DATE MOVED</th>
<th>EST. POP.</th>
<th>MOVED TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bhamacorville, Durban</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>120 hh KwaMashu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degpcol. 1962</td>
<td></td>
<td>KwaMashu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Renewals started late 1950s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Durban hostels (1)</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>KwaMashu hostels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Ball Street 1959 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Ordinaries 1959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Sinwene Rd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. TOWNSHIPS MOVED (chronological order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWNSHIP</th>
<th>DATE MOVED</th>
<th>EST. POP.</th>
<th>MOVED TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chesterville</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>KwaMashu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulwetha</td>
<td>c. 1968</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Omzimweni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indamith</td>
<td>Degpcol. 1961</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>KwaMashu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bembwayi</td>
<td>Late 1950s/early 1970s</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Remained in hostels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several thousand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unzali Glen, Durban</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>KwaMashu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>Masadbini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaMashu, Durban</td>
<td>Not physically moved but incorporated KZ 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degpcol. 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>277 hh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margate</td>
<td>Degpcol. c. 1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66 nh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaMashu</td>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hostels remained</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. TOWNSHIPS UNDER THREAT (Townships in alphabetical order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWNSHIP</th>
<th>EST. POP.</th>
<th>PROPOSED REMOVAL TO</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkanyezi</td>
<td>1,000 - 1,200</td>
<td>KwaMashu</td>
<td>Housing Freeze; Transfer of land confirmed to be removed, 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shingolile, Dukuza</td>
<td>7,977</td>
<td>Eqhu/Flint</td>
<td>Degpcol. 1967; housing frozen. Threat surfaced 1977 and predicted would be removed by 1980/81. 30 yr leasehold refused, later verbal promise would be offered. Community Council opposed to removal. Dr Koorhof confirmed to be removed, 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Does not include freesthold areas of Fairleigh and Lennoxville, moved between 1961 and 1970 and classified as black spots.
### TOWNSHIPS WHERE REHAB PROMISED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWNSHIP</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Lennertville, Darben</td>
<td>99 yr leasehold. Threat of incorporation into E2 still remains.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bangware, Tokweta</td>
<td>Housing never frozen; DAB upgrading area.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Matlaiele</td>
<td>Housing unconfirmed; DAB upgrading area. 99 yr leasehold promised.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nambazuthi, Komquat</td>
<td>December 1980 Minister C &amp; D said would remain and 99 yr leasehold to be instituted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**3. TOWNSHIPS WHERE REHAB PROMISED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOWNSHIP</th>
<th>PROPOSED REHAB</th>
<th>REMOVAL TO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Chesterville, Durban</td>
<td>Museum</td>
<td>Built 1962; housing frozen 1972 with 165 houses. Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed 1982. JWAB in August 1982 said not to be moved for 10 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Thembalihle, Glencoe</td>
<td>Mabula/Flint Farm</td>
<td>Deprec. 1967; housing frozen. In similar position to nearby Shongolile township, Dundee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Zenuile, Nowick</td>
<td>Being removed to Kqheqhozeni</td>
<td>Housing frozen 1980 promised 99 yr leasehold and reprieve anticipated but not yet assured. Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed, 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Stofnville, Ladysmith</td>
<td>Kaphakeni</td>
<td>Housing frozen; DAB built library 1980/81. Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Bruntville, Mood River</td>
<td>Moodlo/Chabalwe</td>
<td>Housing frozen, then unconfirmed &amp; 99 yr lease promised (Natal Natives, 31-03-80). Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed, 1981, however.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Duma, Paulpietersburg</td>
<td>Mamel.</td>
<td>Housing frozen, then unconfirmed &amp; 99 yr lease promised (Natal Natives, 31-03-80). Dr Koornhof confirmed to be removed, 1981, however.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Clermont, Finetown</td>
<td>To be incorporated into E2 when boundary redrawn. Date of transfer not finalised - Chief Commissioner, August 1982.</td>
<td>Freehold plus township &amp; some informal settlement. (Demolitions in 1978).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Shobasho, Umtata</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>Housing frozen and to be removed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1. Towns in Kwazulu 1968-1982

The following summary sets out the list of planned/established townships for Kwazulu that was provided by the Minister of Bantu in Parliament in 1968, and describes the current status of those areas.

**Sources:** SABS NR 45/1968: Hansard, col. 354, 24.07.70 and fieldwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Amacanda, KwaMakhu</td>
<td>4 985</td>
<td>7 658</td>
<td>Relocation township.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Nqunganile, Hambuza</td>
<td>5 500</td>
<td>5 500</td>
<td>Relocation close settlement, established 1959.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Mthethwa, Nkluze</td>
<td>5 700</td>
<td>5 700</td>
<td>See no. 7 above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Newlands, Xhosa</td>
<td>6 026</td>
<td>6 026</td>
<td>Township of University of Durban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Newville, Malawu</td>
<td>6 400</td>
<td>6 400</td>
<td>Does not appear this ever established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Nqutu, Nkluze</td>
<td>6 400</td>
<td>6 400</td>
<td>Relocation close settlement, established 1970s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Nqutu, Xhosa</td>
<td>6 400</td>
<td>6 400</td>
<td>Township.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Ntshana, Mpolose</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>Relocation township.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Pieter, Indawo</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>Never established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Platt Estate, Ixopo</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>Township and KZ capital of Umlazi establ. late 1970s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. In Reserve, Mhlabathini</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>Relocation township of Xhosa establ. mid 1970s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. In Reserve, Port Shepstone</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>Does not appear ever established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. In Reserve 21, Nkluze</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>8 798</td>
<td>Not identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Sizathuli, Camperdown</td>
<td>4 336</td>
<td>4 336</td>
<td>Dormitory township for KZ growth point of Isithanda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Sundawana, Nkluze</td>
<td>121 598</td>
<td>121 598</td>
<td>Townships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Umbrella, Nkluze</td>
<td>121 598</td>
<td>121 598</td>
<td>Relocation close settlement, removed 1972.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Umbamba, Mpolose</td>
<td>1 584</td>
<td>1 584</td>
<td>Relocation close settlement, removed 1972.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:*
- Never established. A ho by this name apparently removed in the 1960s.
- Neatly consolidated into KZ now. Level of development not known - is a school and teachers' college.
- Township of KwaMabuwa establ. 1977, pop. of c. 1 400 on in 1981. People living in local informal settlement moved into it.
- Construction of Jozi Jand has led to establ. of a construction town also an army base.
- Does not appear this ever establised.
- Townships establ. in 1950s to house SALCOUR workers at Umbundu, now c. 762 ha.

'I stay where
my roots are'

by Thandi Moses

MR Velaphi Mkhize — whose house at Zemele, near Howick, was
demolished by the Drakensberg Administration Board (DAB) over a
year ago — is still refusing to budge from the land his family has occu-
pied for generations.

At the moment he is barely surviving in a crude
construction made out of two
old car hampers and a piece
of corrugated iron (see pic-
ture on left). But he is deter-
mined not to move and said
he would rather die or
spend the rest of his life
in jail than leave the place
of his birth.

Early last year the DAB
moved in and served evic-
tion orders on all the resi-
dents of Zemele because it
had been declared a "black
spot" in a white area. They
were all offered alternative
accommodation at Mopopho-
meni — a township in which
they were to be resettled.

Mr Mkhize, who had been
living in his self-built home
for more than 39 years, re-
fused a township house on
the grounds that he would
not be able to pay the rent,
as he was unemployed. He
said he was an asthmatic
and had been certified
medically unfit to work. It
was only his farming activ-
ities that had kept him alive
since February 1979, when
he stopped working.

In the middle of last year
he was locked out of his
home by the DAB officials
and a week later they demol-
ished his house.

Undeterred Mr Mkhize,
who was intent on staying at
his old site, pitched a tent
and stayed there with his
dog. A few days later, he
says, the DAB officials
pulled his tent down. He
claims his dog was killed at
the same time.

In October, he told Echo,
he was incarcerated for
squatting on the property
from which he had been
evicted, and he remained in
jail for three months. On his
release in December he had
to start from scratch as his
few possessions had van-
ished.

It was then that he con-
structed his house using
"home" which has sheltered
him throughout the dry win-
ter.

Mr Mkhize told Echo that
he could not understand why
blacks are always moved
from one place to another —
"the other" normally being a
harvest tract of land with no
job opportunities.

Evicted

Mr G. Rix, the DAB Town-
ships Superintendent, con-
firmed that Mr Velaphi Mkh-
ize was one of those
evicted from Zemele early
last year. He also confirmed
that his house had been de-
molished because he had re-
fused to move. Mr Rix said,
however, that he did not
know why Mr Mkhize had
been arrested.

He added that Mr Mkhize
had been offered alternative
accommodation despite his
fact that he owed the DAB
rent for eight months. "It's
unfortunate that Mr Mkhize
turned down our offer," he
said.
Appendix 3. Letter of appeal, Shakaville

The following letter was drawn up by members of the Shakaville Advisory Board and sent via the offices of the Kwazulu Minister of the Interior in August 1981.

To the Hon. Deputy Minister
Dept of Cooperation & Development
PRETORIA.

Dear Sir,

Subject: Shakaville Residents Objection to Their Removal.

Some time in July 1981 a copy of a Memorandum was given to members of the Shakaville Advisory Board. In this Memorandum an impression was created that residents of Shakaville were willing to be removed from their homes. As a result a public meeting was held on the 29th July 1981. The residents of Shakaville expressed their strong opposition to the removal of this township.

The following were the main points stressed at this meeting:

1. Shakaville in Stanger (or Dohuma as is known by the Zulus) is the birthplace of the Zulu Nation.
   The Mighty King Shaka lived here and so were his subjects who surrounded their King. The ruins of their homes and kraals which were built here were still noticeable at this Shakaville Township when it was first established in this area.

2. King Shaka’s Tomb Stone which is so highly valued by all Zulus cannot be left surrounded by non-Zulus. This would be tantamount to the destruction of the birthplace of the Zulus. King Shaka is the Founder of the Zulu Nation.

3. Eshowe River - is where the King washed and the Tshabekane was so named because it is where he relaxed and also this served as a fortress. After this stone the present Tshabekane School was named.

4. A well or Spring from which his drinking water was fetched is still in existence even now at Eshowe.

5. Memorial School.
   The present school is a token of appreciation from the white sector to the Zulu Nation for having sacrificed their lives and for having died for the country during the last world war (1939-1945). The graves of some local soldiers are standing at the local cemetery — and some of them still live with us in the township. It seems to us ridiculous that the Republican Government should destroy the living sign of appreciation by the White Sector, of Zulu participation in the last world war.

6. This location was established in 1946 and in 1947 residents were promised that its borders would extend to the Dohember Road and to College Road. Although these areas are now occupied by other racial groups the Zulus in Shakaville have not complained. It is now monstrous and surprising to note that Zulus are being driven off from Shakaville.

7. The spirit of cooperation between the Zulus and the Whites in Stanger is remarkable. Friendship is evident in the streets. Even all the local White Schools have Shaka’s Shield as the background of their badge. The monuments used on vehicles of the Borough of Stanger is Shaka’s Tomb Stone. Despite all these there is a sign of resentment by the Zulus. Why must this be destroyed?

8. Ownership.
   The Evangelists and lay preachers of different denominations, i.e. the Lutheran Church, Methodist, Apostolic Faith and Anglican, requested on behalf of the people of Stanger for the establishment of this location. Negotiations started as early as 1940 with the Borough of Stanger. With painstaking efforts these men of God persisted until the site was shown them in 1942.

   In 1946 when they first occupied these houses they were given a promise and assured that the houses would become their own after having been paid for over a period of 25 years.

   We the undersigned members of the Shakaville Advisory Board are in complete agreement with the sentiments of the Residents as expressed at the meeting of the 29th July 1981.

   We therefore plead with you, Hon. Sir, to place our request before the Republican Government to the effect that the Residents of Shakaville would like to continue living in Shakaville indefinitely.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed by 4 members of the Advisory Board.)
7. INFLUX CONTROL

1. Introduction

Gerry Muré, in his book *African population relocation in South Africa*, describes relocation through the operation of influx control as 'a process which increasingly functions to keep people out of the urban industrial production areas, rather than to allocate labour between production areas.' (Muré, 1980, 16)

He goes on to describe influx control as 'the single most important instrument in the control of the African population, more particularly the African working class population.' (Ibid) That this is so, and that the State has no intention of relaxing this form of control, has been heavily underscored by the publication of the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill in June 1982. This Bill aims to widen the gap between a small core of relatively privileged urban insiders, Africans who qualify for permanent urban residence by virtue of birth and lengthy continued residence, and the great mass of outsiders whose right to seek work in the urban areas will be more heavily circumscribed and controlled than before. In keeping with this approach, the Department of Cooperation and Development has nearly doubled the funds allocated in its annual budget for the maintenance of influx control - from R1 600 000 in 1981 to over R6 million in 1982. (Main Daily Mail, 20.03.82)

The related activities of 'residential control' and repatriation of foreign citizens have similarly received financial boosts between 1981 and 1982, from R1 million to R2 500 000 and R8 million to R2 600 000 to R2 500 000 respectively. (Ibid. On repatriation, see below)

There are 2 aspects to influx control - 1) the prevention of rural outsiders from entering the urban areas through the operation of the labour bureaux system and the pass laws, and 2) the expulsion of people from within the urban areas, either those considered to be 'illegal' there or those residents who are seen as 'undesirable' in terms of Section 29 of the Urban Areas Act. This latter aspect clearly falls within the definition of relocation since it involves the physical removal of people from one area to another. The former aspect can also be seen as a hidden form of relocation: although not physically removed from the urban areas, people are being prevented from moving there themselves and are penned into or directed towards rural ghettos which they can only leave legally on an approved (and temporary) work contract. In many bantustan areas the chances of ever being legally recruited in this way are becoming more and more slight.‡ Were it not for the operation of influx control, many of the hundreds of thousands of redundant farm workers and retired residents of black spots would migrate to the urban-industrial centres; to where the jobs and wealth of the society lie. Instead they are being forcibly displaced into impoverished bantustans by one of the most vicious and far-reaching systems of population control devised by any contemporary political system.

In Natal both aspects of influx control can be seen at work. What has given a particular twist to their application in this region is the fact that large parts of Kambula shut onto the major metropolitan areas of the province. While this has made it easy to exclude large numbers of rural Africans from qualifying for permanent urban residence and the privileges attached to that - by the simple expedient of drawing the boundaries of Kambula so as to incorporate the townships in which they live - it has also given Africans in Natal a semi-legal springboard for illegal entry into the urban areas. The proliferation of informal settlements in the peri-urban regions of Kambula adjoining metropolitan Durban represents an indirect attack on the system of influx control. Recognizing this, State officials have tried to limit and control these settlements, harrying and attempting to push their residents back into the more remote rural areas. (See the Inanda case study in Part Three for details on this.) Despite the evictions, the demolition of houses, and the prosecutions, the aggregate numbers in these settlements are not decreasing. Here the pressures on the system of influx control are becoming increasingly apparent.

The following section looks at influx control as it is applied in the Durban region. Details and statistics on the operation of influx control in the rest of Natal are hard to come by; a full treatment of this (very important) subject would require a far deeper and more narrowly focused investigation than the SPP was able to undertake.

2. Influx control in the Durban region

*OPERATION OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT SYSTEM*

In Durban the process of exclusion and the stratification of Africans into a hierarchy of increasingly less privileged groups in relation to residence rights and employment opportunities is clearly marked. Most privileged is a small (and threatened) group of insiders, those with Section 10 rights, living within the prescribed area of the city. As one moves out from there, through the formal townships located outside the prescribed area to the informal settlements on the edges of the city, one encounters increasing restrictions on people’s access to employment opportunities within the city. Urban boundaries have been manipulated in such a way that most of the African township population now lives in Kambula and are classified as instruments: they do not qualify for any of the privileges being proposed for ‘permanent urban Africans’ in the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill. Celmzi township was built on land already within Kambula while Kemahlo, developed as a relocation township in the late 1950s, was incorporated into Kambula in 1977 when the Kemahlo boundary was redrawn to extend around it. In this way, by a few strokes of a pen, approaching 200 000 people ceased to qualify as urban insiders. Durban now has only two small townships left within the prescribed area - Lamontville and Chesterville. Both are under threat of relocation - Chesterville by actual physical removal and Lamontville by boundary revisions as in the case of Kemahlo. In the meantime, both are controlled by the MMB

‡ For a recent account of the workings of the labour bureaux and recruiting system in bantustan areas, see the unpublished paper by M. Gilmour and R. Greener: 'Labour Bureaucracies and African Rural Areas: A Field Research Report.'

* All the information in this section has been gathered from Black Bash Advice office workers and the SADD Fieldworker in Durban during the course of 1981/82. SPP is very grateful for their help.
and a Community Council, and residents are given certain privileges in that they are allowed to seek work in Durban directly without having to wait at the labour bureau for a job to be offered.

The townships of Ewembe, Ulansli and Nkumavu, although inside Umbumbulu, have also been given certain privileges. Until recently residents were allowed to seek work directly as well. However in the last year this has been tightened up. In mid 1981 it was announced that Ewembe and Ulansli residents would no longer be allowed to seek work by themselves but that since his resident he would have to queue at the labour bureau in their respective townships. This provoked a tremendous outcry - the Umbumbulu labour bureau was stoned and eventually threats that the labour bureau would be burnt down resulted in the PHAB offering a compromise: Ulansli and Ewembe house-owners or renters would be allowed to seek work, but loggers would have to queue at the labour bureau. In June 1982 the PHAB attempted to go back on the compromise by claiming it was a 'gentleman's agreement' that had been reached with the mayor of Ewembe and Ulansli, and that it was no longer operative. Once again this provoked a violent reaction from within the townships with the PHAB offices at both townships being stoned. After being warned by the mayor of Ewembe that if this decision were enforced there would be 'big trouble', the PHAB backed down.

The procedure for seeking work is still more difficult and cumbersome than for Chesterville and Lamontville residents. Residents of these townships do not get issued with work seekers' permits as with Chesterville and Lamontville; they are given a form which is valid for a year which the prospective employer has to fill in. The township manager also has to fill in and certify that the owner of the form is a resident of the township. Once the person has found a job, he/she has to return to the labour bureau with a completed form. Only then is he/she given a work seeker's permit which has to be taken back to the employer to be filled in all over again. The process is a lengthy one and many employers do not realize the procedure involved; there is often impatience before it has been completed and may employ somebody else with Section 10 rights instead.

Black Sash Advice Office workers have confirmed that many people lose potential jobs in this way.

Work seekers living in informal settlements in the Inanda district are required to go to the various labour bureaus to seek work further out from the city centre. Only those who have lived in the Durban area since before 1960 are allowed to seek work at the central labour bureau in Ordinance Road, Durban. Judging by various cases reported by Black Sash Advice Office workers, they are not given jobs freely there. A special dispensation has been granted to residents at Inanda Newtown in that they are allowed to go to the nearby Ewembe labour bureau as well as the Vernum one. However, in the allocation of jobs by the Ewembe bureau they are considered last, after Ewembe work seekers.

Those living in the south of Durban, in the umbumbulu area, are obliged to seek work in the Isipingo/Manzimonti area. Recently the Black Sash Advice Office in Durban had a case of a young man of 21 who had been living with his mother for most of his life in Ulansli. When he tried to apply for a reference book in Ulansli he was told that since his mother had come from Umbumbulu, he had to get a reference book from there. Having done so, he found a job as a gardener in the centre of Durban and lived at the Glebelands Hostel in Ulansli. A year later his employer found him a job at a factory in Jacobs. He went to the Jacobs Labour Bureau for the necessary authorities and was told that since his reference book came from Umbumbulu, he was only eligible for a job in Isipingo or Manzimonti. Even with a letter from his prospective employer he was not allowed to take up the job. When the Advice Office telephoned the Labour Bureau at Jacobs, the person working there expressed surprise that he had been offered that job. "We like young men to work as gardeners for a few years before they go into the factories."

The procedure of allocating jobs between the various labour bureaux also favours the inner areas. There are labour bureaux at the industrial area of Jacobs (for Lamontville), Ordinance Road (for Chesterville), Ulansli, Isipingo and Jacobs. Employers report their vacancies to Ordinance Road and Jacobs; vacancies which are not filled are sent to Ulansli or Ewembe and from there out to Vernum and Isipingo. This procedure shows up a definite attempt to provide the Chesterville and Lamontville residents with a choice. Residents of Inanda Newtown get only what is rejected by everybody else.

While controls over work seekers have been tightened in recent years, so too have the controls imposed on the employers' freedom to employ whom they choose. Before 1980 employers were obliged to register vacancies with the bureaux for three days; thereafter, if there were no applicants, they could make appointments from elsewhere. In 1980 that three day period was extended to a week. At the same time the fine for employing an illegal worker (somebody not sanctioned by a labour bureau) was increased to R500 in 1980 and, if the proposed Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons bill is enacted, it will rise dramatically to a minimum of 65 000 or 12 months imprisonment or both.

ENFORCEMENT

The available figures for Durban show a big gap between arrests for offences in terms of the peace laws and influx control, and actual endorsements out of the city. In 1980 a total of 7 251 africans were arrested by the South African police and other officials for such offences - 1 785 of them females and 5 466 of them male. (Hansard, Question 2134 and 25, 05.02 and 26.02.81) However, only 379 individuals were removal from Durban 'to a Black State' in the second half of 1981. (Hansard, Question 735, 21.04.82) As already described, most africans in the durban area are already located outside the prescribed area of the city, in 'A Black State', by virtue of the fact that the major residential areas for them have been built inside Umbumbulu. It would appear that because of this, endorsement out of the city is not as important a method of influx control in this region as it is in other regions such as the Western Cape for instance.

As already mentioned, not only illegal entrants face the threat of prosecution and endorsement out of the city. For those living in Lamontville and Chesterville, the privileged ones, there is still the threat of being charged under section 29 of the influx act. The 1982 annual report of the Natal Coastal region of the Black Sash has referred to this provision thus:

'This section, which has been described by a Supreme Court judge as 'unprecedented in western jurisprudence', provides for the arrest, without warrant, of any Black in the urban area who is suspected of being 'idle or undesirable' and for his imprisonment for up to 72 hours before being brought before a commissioner. Supposedly designed to rid the white areas of unemployed criminals, it can in fact result in someone with no criminal record at all being sent off to a Work Colony for two years. (Black Sash Report, 1982, 3)

A work seeker is allowed three work seeker permits, each valid for 30 days, before he can be charged under section 29. There are reports that officials at the labour bureau do not warn new work seekers about the provisions of section 29. If a work seeker applies for a third permit, the issuing clerk will write 'section 29' in the corner and if that individual tries to apply for another permit after that, he can be apprehended at once and charged in terms of section 29. There are numerous reports of summary trials, with those found guilty being sentenced to work on Free State
3. Repatriation

Repatriation refers to the removal of foreign citizens back to their country of origin. Although on a small scale in Natal compared to other categories of relocation, it has grown in significance in recent years. The main groups of people affected are:

1) Transkeians
2) Mozambicans.

Transkeians have become foreigners in Natal since Pretoria imposed its particular brand of independence on the former bantustan in 1976 and thereby severed all legal claims of those living in the Transkei to their South African citizenships: influx control at its most radical. Since 1976 Transkeians’ chances of getting employment in Natal have steadily deteriorated. Formerly recruited in large numbers to work in the sugar cane fields in the south, Transkeian agricultural workers are now being replaced by local workers from KwaZulu. Access to urban employment is becoming even more restricted. In Durban any Transkeian who has entered South Africa after 1976 is automatically refused registration by the labour bureau. Those who have had jobs in the Durban area since before that date and subsequently lose them will not be allowed to take new jobs but are obliged to return to Transkei.

In Northern Natal a similar process is being applied to Mozambicans who for generations have been living and working in the coastal regions. In the mid 1960s Zululand farmers were reported to be anxious to step up the level of recruitment from Mozambique because of labour shortages in the sugar industry. (Natal Mercury, 26.02.65) Now this same group of people is being cast aside. In 1984 SFP was told by a local priest at Mthubatu on the north coast that he knew of at least 50 men who had been repatriated to Mozambique (transported to the border and left there) in the previous 18 months; the tempo of this process was increasing. No exemptions were being allowed, even for individuals who had been living in South Africa for many years, had local families and had lost all ties with their birthplace. All that could be won was a temporary reprieve for a maximum period of 18 months: the applicant had to complete a form (PMO125: 'Application for suspension of repatriation of foreign black') and pay a fee of R50 for this concession.

Repatriation has led to many families being split or threatened with dissolution. Several examples of this were cited to SFP. One concerned a man of 62 years, who had lived in the Mthubatu area for 21 years without ever returning to Mozambique and had a common-law Zulu wife and two children. He had been ordered to leave but was trying to challenge his threatened repatriation on the grounds of his marriage. Another case concerned some children whose father was from Mozambique and whose mother was Zulu. They had been refused entrance to KwaZulu schools in the Mthubatu district because of their father’s nationality and eventually were obliged to go to Mozambique to continue their education.

SFP was also told that many men threatened with repatriation were resorting to costly bribes and attempts to buy KwaZulu citizenship, paying hundreds of rand in the process.

Appendix 1. The new influx control bill: a synopsis

The following summary of the provisions in the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill that deal with influx control in the urban areas was prepared by Sheena Duncan, National President of the Black South and issued in July 1982. SFP is grateful to the Black South for permission to use it.

THE ORDERLY MOVEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF BLACK PERSONS BILL

This is not the law yet. It still has to be passed by Parliament but it will probably be law by the middle of 1983. If it is passed by Parliament it will make influx control much more efficient. It will be almost impossible for people who do not have a permit to stay in town.

Black people will be able to visit a town during the day time without needing a permit to be there. As long as they have their Reference Book or homeland Travel Document they will not be arrested.

But they are not allowed to work in town unless they are permitted. If they are found at work without being registered both they and their employers can be fined or sent to prison.

Black people who are found anywhere in town — either in the streets, or in a house in a black township, or in a house in a white suburb — between ten o’clock at night and five o’clock the following morning will be arrested if they do not have a permit to be there.

Who will be allowed to stay in town at night between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m.?

1. Permanent Urban Residents. Permanent Urban Resident is the new 'qualification'. These people will be like the people who have Section 10 qualifications now. They will be able to work wherever they want to work (except that the Coloured Labour Preference policy will still make it much more difficult for black people in the Western Cape). A Permanent Urban Resident must have 'approved accommodation' otherwise he loses his exemption.

They will be able to rent or buy a house. They will be able to have their wives and children and aged parents to stay with them.

1. (a) Section 10 disappears altogether but people who have Section 10 qualifications now will be Permanent Urban Residents under this new law.

1. (b) A person who owns a house in a black township under 29 year leasehold will be a Permanent Urban Resident provided he is a South African citizen or a citizen of an independent homeland.

1. (c) People who are South African citizens who have been legally living in a town for ten full years can apply to be Permanent Urban Residents. Because this says South African citizens only it means that people from Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda cannot apply after they have been in a town for ten years.

(We think that contract workers will also not be allowed to apply.)
We are not sure about this yet and we hope we are wrong but the Government's policy is to prevent migrant workers from getting urban qualifications.

1.6 People who were born in town who are South African citizens or citizens of independent homelands will also be Permanent Urban Residents if both their parents are Permanent Urban Residents. This is very difficult for those children whose parents never married. Often they do not know where their father is so they will not be able to prove that he is a Permanent Urban Resident.

7. Dependents of Permanent Urban Residents will also be allowed to stay in town between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. A dependent is a wife or unmarried child, or parent or grandparent who is too old or sick to work, or a disabled adult child who cannot work.

If the Permanent Urban Resident dies his dependants will be allowed to stay in the town until they become Permanent Urban Residents themselves. They will become Permanent Urban Residents if they were born in town and both mother and father were Permanent Urban Residents, or if they inherit the father's house or if they are South African citizens and have lived in the town for ten full years.

3. Visitors can stay in town between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. if they get a permit to stay. This permit will only be given to them if they have approved accommodation. No one can have a visitor's permit for more than a total of 14 days in any one year.

4. Black people who are in hospital or a medical institution or who are staying in a hotel will be allowed to be in town between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. until they are discharged from the hospital or leave the hotel.

5. People who live in a rural area and work on night shift can be in town between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. if they have a permit to be in the job.

6. People who are registered to look for work or who are registered in work will be safe from arrest between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. if they also have a permit to stay in town at night. A person might be given a permit to work but be refused to stay in town at night if the Designated Officer thinks he can travel to his home outside the urban area each evening.

(Designated Officer is the new word for Labour Officer, or Influx Control Officer etc.)

What are the penalties?

If a black person who is not a Permanent Urban Resident and who is not permitted to stay in town is arrested between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. he can be fined R500 or sent to prison for 6 months.

Any person who allows a black person who is not permitted to stay in his house between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. can be fined R500 or sent to prison for 6 months. This is the same for black and white householders.

A black person who looks for work in town or takes a job in town without a permit can be fined R500 or sent to prison for 6 months.

An employer who gives a job to a black person who is not a Permanent Urban Resident or who is not permitted to work can be fined R5000 or sent to prison for 12 months.

Inspectors can come into any house or place of employment at any time to look for 'illegal' people.

People who settle on any land such as the people of Crossroads or the Nyanga Site can be removed by the police without trial if the Minister of Cooperation and Development thinks that they are trying to campaign to have the laws changed. If the Minister orders such a removal by notice in the Government Gazette the people can be moved to any place decided on by the Director General. If such an order is made the people cannot go to court to try to prevent the removal.

There are other things in this Bill dealing with people on the white owned farms but there is not much change in their condition.

The Minister can still impose a curfew at night to prevent black people from being outside in public places anywhere in town except in a black township.

Aid Centres will stay the same.

People will still have to produce a pass or a certificate showing that they can stay in town when it is demanded by a policeman.

The pass laws will still be in force and will be much worse than they are now for everybody except those people who are Permanent Urban Residents.
8. INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

1. Introduction

The proliferation of informal settlements in Natal/KwaZulu over the past thirty or forty years has been a development with profound sociological and political implications. Despite the State's attempts to eradicate or control them, the number of settlements and the numbers of people living in them have continued to grow. Informal settlements are found on the edges of all the cities and many of the towns in Natal; many of the townships that have been built inside KwaZulu have satellite informal settlements on their boundaries as well (e.g. Blumenau between Hlalane and Cullinan, Bhekweni on the edge of Hlonolo, Nyanyeni near Grahamstown). Some have been in existence for a long time while others are fairly recent developments.

CHARACTERISTICS

It is easier to describe than to define rigorously what an informal settlement is, since the distinction between formal and informal becomes blurred in many rural communities where housing is not controlled by minimum building standards. The question of illegality is clearly important: the State regards informal settlements as illegal and describes all who live in them as squatters.* However most black spots, in themselves long-established and officially recognised albeit threatened, have large and growing tenant populations that are regarded as illegal squatters by the authorities and one could therefore class them all as informal settlements if illegality was the only criterion. A number of communities commonly regarded as informal settlements have in fact developed on African freehold land (for instance Amatshini and Amawkwa in the Inanda district, Umtamvuna near Grahamstown). However, what is significant about them in addition to their illegality is their scale: the size and density of their populations.

Informal settlements, then, are characterised by a number of interwoven attributes: lack of official authorisation, informal housing structures (the building materials including car packing cases, beer cartons, corrugated iron and strands of wood), high population densities and a lack of basic services such as water, sewerage and electricity. They have developed as close to the urban-industrial centres as possible because that is where the jobs, or the possibility of jobs, are. Their exact locality is generally determined by the status of the land adjacent to the town/city: they are more likely to expand in Indian and African freehold areas (released or block spots), inside KwaZulu and on trust land than within white South Africa, since controls are generally less rigorously enforced in the former areas than the latter. The fact that there are parts of KwaZulu very close to all the major metropolitan areas in Natal has facilitated the emergence of informal settlements in the province.

One of the myths that the authorities have fostered about informal settlements is that

* It should be noted that the illegality of informal settlements is in most cases in terms of the State's legislation only. In informal settlements that have developed on freehold and even tribal land the residents are generally living there with the approval of the legal landowner or land controller, to whom they pay rent.
they are made up of rural people who are flocking to the cities and imposing an un-
bearable burden on urban resources and facilities. Although some of those who live in
informal settlements are relatively recent arrivals from the outlying rural areas, a
substantial proportion of the population of informal settlements is made up of urban
people, people who have spent all or most of their lives in the urban area and have no
clear ties with rural communities. This has been shown by surveys conducted in
Kwakwani and Richmond Farm (described below) and in Phimanga, Inanda (described in
the Inanda Newton case study in Part Three).

ORIGINS

The origins of informal settlements are linked to events in both the rural and the
urban areas. As already described, it is State policy to exclude as many african
from the urban areas as possible; informal settlements are both a product of and a
major source of pressure on the system of influx control.

Many of the people living in informal settlements have suffered removal from other
areas because of farm evictions (e.g. Bekukuthetho near Mndolo), black spot removals
(e.g. Rhanwebees, near Nkandla, Newcastle), township abolition (e.g. Murehwen
and Bushbokoi on the South Coast) and group areas removals (e.g. the Inanda district outside
Durban). They have moved to informal settlements either because they have wanted to
avoid the official relocation sites or because they have not qualified for these sites,
as in the case mentioned in the chapter on urban relocation, of Transkeianese affected by
the abolition of Mpharothi township in the mid 1970s.

Residents of informal settlements are not necessarily living illegitimately in the area.
In the Durban area in particular, informal settlements have grown in response to the
severe housing shortage in the african townships; they accommodate large numbers of
people who are legally allowed to be in the urban area but cannot find anywhere to stay
in the formal townships. In 1981 the Black Seah in Durban reported that there were
75 631 applicants on the official waiting list for houses in the seven Durban townships
of Umzim, Umzimkulu, Umzimvubu, Collingwood, KwaZulu, Umzimkulu and Umzimvubu.
(Black Seah Natal Coastal region, 1981, 4. For details see Appendix 1.) The official
housing backlog in the townships controlled by Emfulu has already been mentioned
- 100 000 units in April 1982. (Natal Mercury, 23.04.82)

As in other parts of the country (e.g. Winterwold near Pretoria) informal settlements
have also come about as a result of the granting of independence to adjacent bantustans.
This has happened on the south coast near Port Shepstone where hundreds of families
reportedly moved across the Transkeian border just before its independence, so as to
avoid becoming Transkeian citizens. The informal settlements of Bushbokoi and Murehwen
have provided a home for some of these people.

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

The State regards informal settlements as dangerous for a number of reasons.
Chief of these is the way these settlements serve to undermine influx control and the much
looser control that the State exerts over their residents in general, compared to what
it has managed to establish in the formal townships. Informal settlements are regarded
as politically volatile, centres (real or potential) of subversion. In addition they
present serious health hazards, threatening not simply their own residents but, more
importantly, the residents of the towns and cities on which they border. The State's
response to informal settlements has, been to move forcefully against them.

* For an account of the State's response to the typhoid epidemic in Inanda in 1980 see
the Inanda Newton case study in Part Three.

It has attempted either to clear and eradicate them entirely, or to reduce their
populations to manageable numbers by acting against individual households and
pushing them back into the rural areas from which, it is maintained, they have
originated.

The following extract, taken from an article printed in the official journal Bantu,
in August 1960, which describes the conditions prevailing in the huge informal settle-
ment of Cato Manor in Durban, gives an indication of the fears which were uppermost
in the authorities' minds then and which still prevail today.

Before the clearing operations started, approximately 100 000 Bantu
lived in these shacks areas ... The results of these despoilely poor
living conditions were:

1) poor or no control and therefore poor or no public
conveniences;
2) uncontrolled influx with a resulting overflow of all
types and elements coupled with unemployment and
delinquency;
3) developments of all kinds of criminalities;
4) social, ethnic and racial decay;
5) fertile soil for politically-inspired bodies to cash
in on grievances and complaints which must naturally
arise out of such conditions of living.
6) unrest and ultimate riots. (Bantu, August 1960)

The clearing of informal settlements and the removal of their residents by the State
have been and are affected by a whole barrage of laws which can be brought into play
depending on the status of the land on which the informal settlement is found and the
degree of opposition encountered in the settlements. These laws include the Black
Administration Act of 1927 (as amended), the Slums Act and the Prevention of Illegal
Squating Act of 1951 (as amended). In addition, informal settlements have been
moved or are threatened with removal in terms of the Various Acts of the 1970s legisla-
tion empowering the State to exmiate black spots or consolidate the bantustans (e.g. in the Gout-
ville area), the proclamation of Group Areas (e.g. at Cato Manor), the enforcement
of influx control (e.g. at Mhondi south of Durban) and the establishment of townships or
other infrastructural developments (e.g. at Bekithemba, south of Durban).

Not only the illegal occupiers of the land have been harried in informal settlements.
In cases where there are landowners who themselves have given permission to people to
erect shacks on their land and are collecting rent, the State has put pressure on
them to evict their tenants and has prosecuted those landowners who have failed to
comply. This tactic has been applied in the Inanda area and also at various black
spots, e.g. at Umhlabenhle near Ladysmith.

Possibly one of the laws used most successfully by the authorities has been the Group
Areas Act. Many informal settlements in the Durban area developed on indian freehold
land and were thus adversely affected when the land was proclaimed for whites and
the landowners expropriated and relocated. The Department of Community Development has
admitted the usefulness and limitations of the Act thus:

Group Areas legislation has contributed towards much being done as regards
slum clearance and urban renewal. This legislation enabled the clearing
of random areas like Sophostix, Cato Manor ... which were unfit for human
occupation. Group Areas legislation was, however, not the complete solution
because it could not sanction urban renewal in those areas where there
was no change in the racial group in a particular area. (Summary of
Activities of the Department of Community Development, 1981, 24)
However, despite all the legislation at its disposal the State has not always managed to remove informal settlements easily. In many instances the removal of people from informal settlements has been delayed and hampered by legal intervention on behalf of those to be removed. The elimination of Otto Manor in Durban in the late 1950s and early 1960s was accompanied by a number of court cases which slowed down the pace of removals. A more recent example of legal intervention has been at Richmond Park, described below; another contemporary example is found at Inanda. Lawyers acting on behalf of threatened residents and, in some cases, threatened landlords have been able to make use of loopholes in the laws and win reprieves for their clients on technicalities. The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act in particular has proved valuable to such sections. It appears that because of this, the State has often favoured the use of legal regulations as a way to effect removals in informal settlements. This has the added advantage of obscuring the political issues involved and defusing local or international protests to the removals. In November/December 1981, for instance, the authorities ordered landowners in the Inanda district to provide services (sanitation etc.) to their tenants or face prosecution and the eviction of their tenants.

RESPONSE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

In many instances local authorities have initiated or supported the removal of informal settlements, e.g. at Otto Manor in Durban in the late 1950s. Sometimes, however, the responses of local authorities, supported by big business, have been to counter the State's attempts at eradicating and to defend informal settlements. This has happened primarily where they have seen that these settlements provide workers to their cities and industries or where they fear the politically destabilizing consequences of large-scale removals. One alternative they have advocated is to provide more formal housing. Recently the Urban Foundation has also been promoting site and service schemes as the solution to the housing crisis. The most prominent example of this has been at Inanda Newtown, which is described in Part Three.

2. Informal settlements in the Durban region

Durban has had informal settlements since the 1930s. In 1959 it was estimated that about half of Durban's African population - about 200 000 people - were 'illegally housed in shack slums.' (Univ. Natal Econ. Dept, 1952, 357) Despite various attempts to clear these settlements, undertaken by both the State and the local authorities, there are now estimated to be about half a million people living in informal settlements in the Greater Durban area. (Sunday Tribune, 5-7-81) The reasons behind the various clearing operations have not all been the same and the localities of informal settlements have moved over the years. However, what has become clear is that the majority of families presently living in informal settlements in the Durban area have been living there for a substantial time; they are not 'flocking in from the rural areas' as the authorities would like the public to believe.

HISTORY OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENT DEVELOPMENT

The growth of shack settlements in Durban in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s stemmed from a number of factors:

1) The deteriorating living conditions in the reserves and the consequent flow to the towns of thousands of Africans;

2) The 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act which prohibited Africans from buying land in urban areas and from living in white urban areas, unless they were housed in hostels, locations or in the servants' quarters of employers. Their only other option was to lease land or a shack from Indian or already established African landowners.

3) The minimal township housing provided for Africans, especially families.

During the period 1923 to 1937 the authorities were concerned chiefly with housing migrant workers in hostels and compounds. In 1923 46 000 Africans were housed (in hostels). (Meadsop and Humphrys, 1975, 11)

Until the mid 1930s Rhamaville was the only location to offer family housing - it had 500 houses. Lenontville was first established in 1933 and Chesterville in 1940.

4) Industrial expansion in the area which was dependent on the employment of cheap African labour; the availability of jobs attracted people to the city far faster than housing was provided for them.

One of the first major informal settlements in the Durban area was that at Otto Manor. The building of shacks was relatively uncontrolled since the land was owned by Indians who were prepared to rent out their land and this area only fell under municipal control in 1932. During the 1930s and 1940s the DCO attempted to prevent the growth of the settlement by exerting pressure on the landowners but their efforts were largely futile.

Between 1940 and 1944 in one area at Otto Manor the number of Native occupied shacks grew from 500 to 3 000. During 1944, over a hundred notices were served on owners of some 1,000 shacks requiring them to provide basic services. During the following year similar attempts to compel owners of shack-buitl land to provide basic sanitation were held up by protracted litigation. Shack landlords still failed to provide necessary water or sanitary services for their squatter tenants.

Instead they tried to evict them. The Courts were reluctant to give them the required authority to do so. Although more than 4,700 was paid in fines, only 2 out of more than 700 landowners had made any attempt to improve conditions. (Univ. Natal Econ. Dept, 1952, 358-359)

Two other major shack settlements developed at about this time on the Bluff, the one based on the St Francis Xavier Catholic Mission and the other on land owned by the Hulem Trust. Both settlements were founded on the Zanisiberi community, the so-called 'lost tribe', captured slaves who were apparently brought to Durban by the British in the 19th century. As the African population of Durban grew in the course of the 20th century, so more and more newcomers moved into the Catholic and Hulem settlements. By the late 1940s there were in the region of 3,500 people living there, many in appalling conditions, sheltering in rough shacks and converted oil drums. Other shack settlements developed at South Coast Junction, Umbutsana and Happy Valley (also on the Bluff).

REMOVALS BEGIN

Until 1971, when the Administration Boards were created and took over this function, African housing in urban areas was controlled by the local authorities of each area. Before 1949 the Durban local authorities had no power to demolish shacks. However, in that year the DCO passed an ordinance empowering them to demolish shacks on condition alternative accommodation was provided to those whose houses were demolished - a limitation that was often not respected.

The removal of informal settlements in the Durban area got underway from this time, with the Zanisiberi communities on the Bluff among the first victims. In the late 1940s and early 1950s these settlements were cleared bit by bit, most of the residents being moved to Umshini.
In 1950, both Cato Manor and the Bluff were proclaimed white under the Group Areas Act. Cato Manor was moved during the period 1958 to 1966 while Happy Valley (situated on the Bluff) was moved in 1967. It has been estimated that about 120,000 Africans and 40,000 Indians were affected at Cato Manor while at Happy Valley about 640 shacks were demolished. (Vandendorp and Humphreys, 1970, 64) The move at Cato Manor was used to fill out "illegal elements" and it is estimated that in the removal about 30,000 to 40,000 people 'disappeared'. (Ibid, 61)

The majority of residents were resettled either in Umbilo or in KwaZulu or KwaNatal, which was developed by the 300 and finally handed over to KwaZulu in 1977. Life in these towns is plagued with unfamiliar controls over its residents as the following description made by a woman who was moved there at this time makes clear:

Actually, many people came here to KwaZulu but many of them were not very quick to adjust themselves to this life. Others, they stayed here for a few months or six months, then they jumped off to go build those 'squatters' at Inanda. They were real Cato Manor people, Umhumbane people. Because there were no many laws to deal with now, in a somebody's four-room.

Then, in Cato Manor, we were not even paying for this water. And you see the life changed totally, because too expensive a life, you know. And then they couldn't tolerate it, they said: 'Oh no, I better go and start another Umhumbane further out here,' you know, rather than pay this water.

If I don't pay the rent I'm being told that, 'Well, we've got to kick you out.' There were some policemen harassing us in the township. People couldn't do what they were doing in Cato Manor and couldn't brew all those things which I've mentioned. So life changed completely for some people. They said, 'Oops, life have! Because there is somebody who is on our shoulders. It shows that this is not your land, this is not your house, you never paid a thing over it, you just pay rent. And so they jumped off. (Interview with Mrs N., staff rider, February 1980)

Those previously living at Cato Manor who could not find places in the existing townships or were not eligible for houses had no option but to make their own arrangements. Many of those who disappeared during the Cato Manor removals moved to new informal settlements further out from the city centre. Some went to the Inanda district as described above, where much of the land was owned by individual Indians and Africans who were prepared to rent plots out. Others moved to St Mandelins or to Clermont, both freehold areas in the Pinetown district.

Other areas cleared of informal settlements included those near Clerwood which were situated on land wanted either for industrial development or, as at Bayview, for the expansion of the South African Railways yards; near Bee Cow Lake, affected by the proclamation and development of the area as an Indian group area and the expansion of industry, and near Queensburgh, which was proclaimed a white group area in 1965 and from where various informal settlements were moved as a result. More recently, in the 1970s, informal settlements next to the township of Umbilo (Marikhana and Umukazi, described below) and KwaZulu (Richmond Park) have been affected by removals in order to allow for the expansion of their parent formal townships.

In a similar vein, the black spot of New Park was moved in the early 1970s so that the Indian group area township of Phoenix could be built.

*KwaZulu itself was built on land from which some 2,800 Indians were removed (at Duff's Road) in the 1950s.
3. Malukazi

INTRODUCTION

Malukazi is situated on the edge of Umzali township, Durban, but within the Umbumbulu district of KwaZulu. None of the land is freehold but some of the long-standing residents have had relatively large tracts of land allocated to them by the chief; these people can be classified as traditional landholders. The bulk of the population are tenents and have no legal status to be there.

In general there are two ways to achieve residence in Malukazi: either to pay a traditional landholder for the right to build on his holding, or to rent a dwelling—either built by a tribal landholder, or from someone who has already acquired permission to build from a landholder. (Stopforth, 1972, 2)

In late 1977 the population was estimated at 15,000 people. As with other informal settlements, surveys have shown Malukazi to be a stable, settled community. A survey done in 1977 in the area showed that 95% of all people were born in Durban, or in a nearby peri-urban area, only 2% recorded a clear rural origin as their place of prior residence before moving to Malukazi, and 7% have spent all their lives in or near town. (Ibid, 7)

The same survey also revealed that the masculinity rate was 0.99 and that only 3.6% of households comprised one person. 73.6% of the male population and 39.5% of the female population were formally employed (Ibid, 35, 36) while only 3% of the male population and 1.7% of the female population was unemployed. (Ibid, 27) (These figures should be compared to the figures for the various rural relocation area case studies presented in Part Three, where male migration and high unemployment are the norm.)

NEW INFLUX OF PEOPLE

In February 1978 5,000 households arrived overnight from another nearby informal settlement known as Mkhethatha—it had been expropriated to make way for the expansion and development of Umzali township. The Mkhethatha people were moved in 50 trucks and dumped at Malukazi with no housing provided. Both KwaZulu and the central government were involved in this removal. At this point there was only one tap in Malukazi, which now had to service an extra 5,000 families.

REMOVAL OF PEOPLE

In 1979 Malukazi itself was incorporated into Umzali township. The status of the land thus changed. No longer under tribal tenure, the land now came under the regulations controlling townships. This made the originally tenement legal position of the tenants even more tenous. Landholders were no longer entitled to receive rent from tenants since they had been expropriated; tenants were unaware of this and landholders continued to charge rent, and tenants to pay. At the same time landholders were ordered to hand in lists of the tenants on their properties and, once they had been expropriated, were ordered to demolish their tenants’ houses. Landlords were offered either houses...
or site and service plots in Ulundi and moved there themselves. Tenants were offered no alternative accommodation. At this stage the Kamulu Minister of the Interior expressed his concern that houses were being demolished and people were being removed from Maluzakzi.

**FURTHER REMOVALS**

Despite the expropriations, tenants continued to remain on the land until 1981 when some people were again served with eviction notices, this time by the KwaZulu government. By this time it was estimated that there were 27 000 residents at Maluzakzi.

People were given 3 months notice to quit their homes and demolish them or risk being charged. The KwaZulu government claimed that it was not a forced removal since, as Mr J. Z. Dube, the urban representative for Kamulu, has explained, it the people have been offered alternative accommodation at a place called Polweni (Golosodjo) in the Umbumbulu district.

We have had big gatherings there (Maluzakzi) to explain the position to the people. The South African government was not clear to the people on the reasons for the removal. The KwaZulu government claimed that the people of Maluzakzi should not be removed until alternative accommodation could be obtained for them. They now have this alternative accommodation at Polweni. (Sunday Tribune, 24.05.81)

The three months notice period at Maluzakzi was intended to give people sufficient time to build a new house at Polweni. However, not everyone has been offered alternative accommodation at Polweni.

Only people who are legally married, either by Christian rites or customary union, qualify for the plots at Polweni. The fate of the others -- there are thousands of them -- hangs in the balance. (Sunday Tribune, 24.05.81)

Many people have expressed their unwillingness to move to Polweni, but have nevertheless signed the application forms for a site there because they feel they have no alternative.

**CONDITIONS AT POLWENI**

Polweni is situated 10 km to the south of Maluzakzi, further away from Durban. It falls within the magisterial district at Umbumbulu which means, in terms of influx control and labour bureau practices, that residents are more disadvantaged in relation to job opportunities in Durban than before when they lived in the Ulundi area.

Polweni is a site and service scheme. Those qualifying for sites in Polweni are required to pay R5 for the plot and R2 per month for services (i.e. water taps and bucket toilets). The sites measure 12 m by 16 m and by January 1982, 6 500 sites had been made available to people from Maluzakzi. (Daily News, 7.01.82) Basic services have been provided by contractors with funds made available by the Department of Cooperation and Development, supervised by the KwaZulu Department of Works. The cost per site for the services put in by the Department was a mere R900 compared to the standard cost of R3.500 per site in a township. No shacks are allowed on the site; most houses are made from wattle and daub, building materials being available from local black entrepreneurs. Some people are putting up houses worth R500, but most of the houses cost in the region of R1,000. The total cost of an average house (including the cost of the services put in by the State) is therefore, about R3.500 - in contrast, a township house with the same number of rooms would cost the State R10.500. In January 1982 there was a waiting list of 2,000 at Polweni while it was reported that 3,000 additional sites were being planned by KwaZulu. (Daily News, 7.01.82)

Originally the land at Polweni was also under tribal tenure. Some of the original residents had sugar cane at the nearby sugar mill, others kept cattle. With the expropriation of their land for the site and service scheme, these residents have had their homes demolished and given 'tents and aluminium huts to live in until they are able to build their new homes for themselves. Tents have been provided and sheds for bucket toilets erected. (Sunday Tribune, 24.05.81) Many former residents were reportedly angered at the expropriation of their land and there were reports that the new residents from Maluzakzi were terrified of moving to Polweni because they had heard that the old residents were planning to fight them. (Umbumbulu is noted for its high incidence of faction fighting.)

**RECENT EVICTIONS FROM MALUZAKZI**

As already mentioned, large numbers of people at Maluzakzi did not qualify for a site at Polweni and remained behind. In June 1982 about 12 families reported to the Black Shack Advice Office in Durban that they had received 90 days notice to vacate their premises. Notice sheets were given to children, from the Umbumbulu Magistrate's office, while their parents were at work. The notice sheets stated clearly that only employed people would be allowed to stay in the area and then only on condition that they took up legal accommodation in the townships or in hostels. It also stated very clearly that no alternative accommodation was to be provided for their families and that they would have to go back 'where they came from.' (See Appendix 2.)

People immediately went to Polweni to enquire whether there were sites for their families there. An official at Polweni told them that the place was full and confirmed the terms of the eviction notices concerning the destination of non-workers. On further investigation by the Black Shack, the magistrate stated that he was acting under instructions from the Squatters Inspector based in Ulundi. Officials at Ulundi have, however, claimed that Polweni is not full and that legally married couples or women with children would therefore be allowed to take up residence there. At present the Black Shack Advice Office is still waiting for written confirmation of this claim by the officials in Ulundi and the future of these people is unclear.

4. Richmond Farm

**INTRODUCTION**

Richmond Farm is an informal settlement of about 3,000 families, on the northern outskirts of Durban. It falls within the local authority for the expansion of Stellenbosch township. Many of its residents came originally from Olotu Macor, when it was first cleared, and still have their names on the waiting list for housing in KwaMashu or Stellenbosch. Others had moved into Richmond Farm because of the overcrowding in the existing townships. However, Richmond Farm's population has not been static, as shown by the following brief history.

In 1971 the area was totally cleared for development and those squatters living there were rehoused in Stellenbosch. However, during 1972 and 1973, Indians sold sites illegally to squatters and there was a further influx of people - the Indians were subsequently prosecuted. The MABS surveyed and recorded the population and those that were working in Durban were relocated in Stellenbosch; their survey revealed a total of about 500 families living in the settlement. At this stage the land was owned by the RAC and the Department of Cooperation and Development was administering it through their agents, the MABS.
In 1977 an additional 2,500 people moved in according to the Department of Cooperation and Development; in October 1977, they were given notice to vacate the area because they were in the way of the development of Ntumane township. At this time some - not all - of the houses were numbered. Then in January 1978 proceedings began in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act.

SIGNED UNDERTAKING, 1978

Black leaders made representations to the Department of Cooperation and Development and reached an agreement that there would be no prosecution of Durban workers who would be allowed to stay on if they were not in the way of development and provided they signed an undertaking drawn up by the Department. (See Appendix 5.) This undertaking forced the inhabitants of Richmond Farm to declare that they were unlawful residents of Richmond Farm and that as soon as they received written notice to vacate their premises, they would demolish their premises and vacate them with their belongings. If the occupant did not demolish his/her structure by the time stipulated, then in terms of the undertaking the Commissioner would have the right to demolish it 'and to dispose of the materials at his discretion.' The occupant further declared that the State would not be liable for compensation for any buildings, or structures the inhabitant had put up, nor for 'any expense, inconvenience, loss or damage of whatever nature incurred as a result' of the occupant having to vacate the premises. The occupant also had to declare that he/she would immediately take steps to find alternative accommodation.

The full part of the declaration was the most drastic -

I acknowledge that this document does not confer on me any occupational rights or any preferential claim for alternative accommodation on State-owned land.

This forced inhabitants into a viciously paradoxical situation - to be allowed to stay at Richmond Farm they had to sign the undertaking, a document which merely reinforced their powerlessness and vulnerability to a later removal anyway.

At the same time the Department of Cooperation and Development insisted that the local residents' organisation, the Richmond Farm Committee, would have to aid the Department in the control of squatting. This meant that Richmond Farm inhabitants became very wary of newcomers who threatened their already tenuous position. Not only were they to control newcomers, but they would also have to assist in getting non-Durban workers out of the area.

The Department of Cooperation and Development claimed that during 1978 this control broke down and there was a further influx of people. Another survey was carried out by the Department; they found that two-thirds of the people worked in Durban while one-third were not workers. (Some of these were unregistered, others self-employed.) The Department claimed that those who had worked had done so for many years and so would have to hostel accommodation provided for them somewhere. They also claimed that single lodgers were bringing their families into Richmond Farm; the implication of this was that families should go back to where they came from and should not 'squat' in the urban areas.

ARRESTS IN 1979

In 1979 many people were arrested under the Illegal Squatting Act. In July/august 1979 two months were demolished to make way for an electricity pylon. Lawyers intervened and the township manager of Doelbanku was approached. He agreed that homes could not be demolished without alternative accommodation being provided. Appeals to the Durban Corporation, who were putting up the pylon, were successful and resulted in the pylon being re-erected so that it missed other houses.

In September 1979 29 people were arrested for illegal squatting; in three cases charges were withdrawn soon afterwards. Many of these arrested had signed the undertaking, which shows how limited the protection it gave them was. In October 1979 a further 14 people were arrested for illegal squatting. Three of these were people who were visiting friends in Richmond Farm while one was unemployed. Of the 29 arrested in September, 6 had been born in Durban; 1 had a father who was born in Durban; more than 21 had lived in Richmond Farm for more than five years and some for over 30 years. People with Section 10 rights and people who had names on the waiting list for housing were among those arrested.

After a long court case the charges were eventually withdrawn in December. It is not clear why the charges were withdrawn - it appears that the one policeman who was supposedly responsible for rounding up all the 'squatters' and arresting them was an unreliable witness and in some instances told blatant lies. There were also allegations that those arresting the squatters had offered them a chance to go free if they 'paid' R70 to the person arresting them, and had stolen money. Another squatter was allegedly assaulted by one of the BRRS rangers arresting him.

1979 SURVEY

During 1979 the Richmond Farm committee approached Diakonia (an ecumenical church group in Durban) and the Black Shaw to help them with the problems they were facing. These bodies helped organise a questionnaire which they hoped would dispel the myths being used by the Department of Cooperation and Development as an excuse to force out the people of Richmond Farm. The Department claimed that 'hundreds of (illegal squatters) come into Richmond Farm all the time.' The survey represented a 27% sample of households and produced the following results:

- 42% had at least one adult with Section 10 rights;
- 45% had lived at Richmond Farm for 5 to 10 years;
- 65% had lived in Durban for more than 15 years;
- 15% had lived in Durban for less than 1 year;
- 76% had 1 adult in employment;
- 74% had their names on the 1977 survey;
- 78% did not have their names on the township waiting list for housing;
- 66% had not signed the undertaking.

This information was put into a memorandum and sent to Mr Kroonhof. His reply was that the people would still have to go eventually to make way for the development of Ntumane, but he accepted that only new arrivals would be arrested.

Since then no-one has been arrested and there have been extensive negotiations between the Department of Cooperation and Development and the Richmond Farm committee. The threat to the community has not abated, however. In November/December 1980 the Department said that they would only allow those whose houses had been numbered (in 1977) to stay. It was also announced that the extension of a railway line to Ntumane had been planned to go through Richmond Farm.

In March 1981 the Department produced a list of about 200 names, some with the requisite numbers and some without, and said that those people would have to move. When the Committee asked that they be told that those people had broken some regulations which were not specified. When they pressed the Department for details, they got no response. The Committee then called a meeting with the community which was just as puzzled about the developments. The Committee reported back to the Department and the list was cancelled.
5. Informal settlements in Natal: a summary

The following list represents a summary of the major informal settlements found in Natal in recent years, using the loose criteria of official illegality, slums, informal housing and locality as discussed in the introduction to this chapter. Black spots and traditional reserve settlements are not included on the list. The summary is divided into two parts: 1) Greater Durban and 2) Rest of Natal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ESTIMATED POPULATION</th>
<th>CURRENT STATUS</th>
<th>FACILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ORANGEMAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjoins Malukazi.</td>
<td>Taps, bucket toilets. Some substantial housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ekukhlashe</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hlanga</td>
<td>(1977)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Clarmont</td>
<td>420</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(indians)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Innenskoon</td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1977)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ennensu</td>
<td>65 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hurumshill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Inanda</td>
<td>68 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1977)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Malukazi</td>
<td>27 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Melkhout</td>
<td>279</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(indians)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Hoatala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Newlands East</td>
<td>565</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(indians)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. New Farm</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(indians)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Parlock</td>
<td>2 163</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(indians)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Phoenix</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(indians)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Richmond Farm</td>
<td>3 000 hh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* It seems that this stipulation does not apply to the site and service scheme at Inanda Newtown and provided applicants from Richmond Farm are working in Durban out are KwaDulu citizens, they can apply for sites there.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ESTIMATED POPULATION</th>
<th>CURRENT STATUS</th>
<th>FACILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. Shalnetsa</td>
<td>8 000 - 10 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>People evicted off farms moved here to avoid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Khangelwana (relocation site). Late 1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>staged would be moved as illegal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>farm workers under leadership of a man who</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>controls allocation of sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Welbedacht</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Inside KZ but threatened by consolidation Dec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1979 1 000 people being evicted from 1983.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Many people who did not qualify for 1983 moved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>here when Margate township abolished; also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tshwaneans settled here to avoid independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Elandswca</td>
<td>62 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Premises area inside KZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Massive influx of tenants in last 15 years,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mainly off farms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Gwagwane</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Indian group area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Grootfontein</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Colourful squatter area north of town, due to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lack of proclaimed group area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Grootfontein</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Premises land in released area. People screamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>off that cleared for extension of Immrendale,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Premises moved here. Reports to be cleared 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for extension of Immrendale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. KwaKhulu</td>
<td>40 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Within KZ. Informal settlement adjoins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>township section. Attempt to control building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>materials &amp; rumour of site &amp; service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Mbamane</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>Informal settlement adjoins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mbamane township. Many people moved here off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KZ 1981 under threat because of complaints by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>township dwellers but KZ granted reprieve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Removals threatened in 1980/81. KZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>organised reprieve. Notice of removal to Khwela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Mkhize</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **NAME**: Barolay Site; Bulawayo
- **ESTIMATED POPULATION**: 10 000
- **CURRENT STATUS**: On Trust land. Established in 1977 by evicted farm workers under leadership of a man who controls allocation of sites.
- **FACILITIES**: Some local organisation - a committee, community built school, some shops.

- **NAME**: Apart; Bulawayo
- **ESTIMATED POPULATION**: 36 000
- **CURRENT STATUS**: Inside KZ but threatened by consolidation Dec. 1979 1 000 people being evicted from 1983. Many people who did not qualify for 1983 moved here when Margate township abolished; also Tshwaneans settled here to avoid independence.
- **FACILITIES**: Inadequate water; cholera outbreak.

- **NAME**: Elandswca; Bulawayo
- **ESTIMATED POPULATION**: 62 000
- **CURRENT STATUS**: Premises area inside KZ. Massive influx of tenants in last 15 years, mainly off farms.
- **FACILITIES**: No sanitation; inadequate water supply. High school & clinic.

- **NAME**: Gwagwane; Bulawayo
- **ESTIMATED POPULATION**: 1 000
- **CURRENT STATUS**: Indian group area.
- **FACILITIES**: Taps.

- **NAME**: Khuzumvutha; Amanzimtoti
- **ESTIMATED POPULATION**: 40 000
- **CURRENT STATUS**: Within KZ. Informal settlement adjoins township section. Attempt to control building materials & rumour of site & service.
- **FACILITIES**: Informal settlement adjoins Khuzumvutha township. Many people moved here off KZ 1981 under threat because of complaints by township dwellers but KZ granted reprieve.

- **NAME**: Nhlanhla; Bulawayo
- **ESTIMATED POPULATION**: 150
Appendix 1. The housing backlog, Durban townships

**Source:** Black Staal Natal Coastal Region Report 1.01.81 to 31.07.81.

**IELD:**
- No houses built since 1979
- No houses rented out since 1979
- 1,400 houses bought between January and December 1980
- 8,400 still on the waiting list.

**MVAHABU:**
- 370 houses built between January and December 1980
- 100 houses rented by people on the waiting list
- 270 bought by people on the waiting list
- 1,000 still on the waiting list.

**KUKUMBA:**
- 96 houses built between January and December 1980
- All given to people on the waiting list
- 3,000 still on the waiting list.

**CHASTEVERVILLE:**
- No new development since 1965
- 400 on the waiting list
- However, there is a proposal to move Chasterville?

**LONDINVILLE:**
- No development since 1968
- 10 on the waiting list.

**EYAMBATHA:**
- No houses built over the last year
- 100 on the waiting list.

**EKADARBHA:**
- 225 houses built in the last year
- 105 houses about to be completed
- 1,300 on the waiting list.

---

Appendix 2. Notice of eviction, Mabuksi

The following notice of eviction was served on several households living at Mabuksi to June 1980.

To the Occupier
Mabuksi and
EPRIVU
4/05

UNAUTHORISED STRUCTURE(S) AND TAKING UP ABODE ILLEGALLY.

1. It has been reported to me that you have, without permission erected, established or occupied a building or homestead on the Malukazi communal in contravention of (4) of Chapter 6 of Proclamation No. R 188 of 1969 (BLACK ARESA Land Regulation).

2. You have rendered yourself liable to prosecution and in your own interests you are warned that you should remove yourself and your family (if any) and demolish the building within 90 days from the date of receiving this notice.

3. As you have not received prior approval from the Chief or the Safety Affairs Commissioner to enter and live in the area, there is no responsibility on the Trust to provide an alternative site for you.

4. As this land is required for a development of new houses it is necessary that the buildings be demolished.

5. You are advised to seek accommodation for your family in your home district and if you are employed in the Port Natal area to take up hostel or alternative accommodation.

(signed)

MAY MAGIMBANI : MAGISTRATE
Hundreds bitter at living conditions

Daily News

HUNDREDS of people living at the Edlovini resettlement camp in the Ulundi district, South of Durban, are bitter about their living conditions — and have criticized the Department of Co-operation and Development for what they call "unbeneficial policies of 'dilution and beautify homes'."

A group of social care-givers near the camp have complained that the Department of Co-operation and Development "robbed" them when they were paid compensation money for their land which were regarded as "indigents" in the way of resettlement.

Edlovini resettlement camp is a 25-minute drive from Durban. It is a barren piece of land which shows all the characteristics of a shanty town or squatter area.

Exposure to malnutrition and other health hazards are common. There are heaps of rubbish rotting without anyone removing them.

Due to the lack of recreation, centres and without nursery or pre-primary schools or a creche, toddlers play in narrow drains while parents are at work.

The Daily News team visited the camp and found some toddlers playing with empty orange juice cartons filled with mud.

According to a recent Daily News survey, most of the housewives work in Durban, which means longer transport expenses than they had when they used to live at Malizani.

Shacks and makeshift rooms dominate the camp, but some residents are busy trying to build more established houses.

Schoolchildren are now having to travel long distances from the camp to Ulundi, where a stone's throw when they were still at Malizani.

"We have bought our site at Malizani but when we were moved we were not refunded," said one man.

Some residents expressed strong feelings about the Government's relocation policy.

"At present we are paying about RI.90 a year in school fees for each pupil, brought up with this new long distance, we have got no money to travel to work," added Mrs. Thabebe. Shops are kilometres away. People have to board a bus or taxi to get there.

Mr. J.B. de Wet, official in charge of the camp for the Ulundi Township office, was not available for comment.
Appendix 5. Richmond Farm Undertaking

The following undertaking had to be signed by people at Richmond Farm in 1978, in order to be allowed to continue living there.

UNDERNEATH

1. , B.I.H. ---, occupier of shank No. --- on the South African Development Trust Farm Richmond/Saldanha do hereby acknowledge that I am occupying premises and have erected structures on the said Farm without permission and that I am, therefore, illegally in occupation. I do hereby undertake that-

(a) I will demolish the structure erected by me and remove the building materials and other property belonging to me and my family, and

(b) vacate the aforesaid Farm together with my family, immediately I am advised by written notice that the structures I am occupying are in the way of developments in the area or of any planning of the area. In my absence at the time of delivery of the notice at aforesaid premises, the service of the notice on an adult inmate or the icing of the notices to the door of aforesaid premises shall be deemed to be sufficient notice for purposes of this undertaking.

Should I not have demolished aforesaid structure occupied by me and not have removed the materials upon my departure from the place I hereby give consent to and acknowledge the right of the Commissioner Durban or his authorized representative to demolish said structures and to dispose of the materials at his discretion.

I specifically acknowledge that the State shall not be liable to pay or compensate me for any buildings, structures or improvements and for any expense, inconvenience, loss or damage of whatever nature incurred as a result of my having to vacate premises or having to remove from aforesaid area, and specifically also in respect of any building material or other property left behind upon my departure.

I undertake to take steps immediately to find alternative accommodation and, in any event, to organize in due time a position to build a house of my own elsewhere should a residential site become available to me in a planned area. I acknowledge that this document does confer on me any occupational rights or any preferential claim on alternative accommodation on state-owned land.

WITNESS

SIGN 1.

2.

Signed before me at NEKOMA on this the --- day of --- 19 .

(SIGNATURE)

9. GROUP AREAS REMOVALS

1. Introduction

The Group Areas Act of 1950 has had a devastating effect on South African cities and towns. The Act provides for the proclamation of areas for occupation by members of a particular race group, and controls by permit inter-racial property transactions and changes in the occupation of properties.' (Schimper, 1967, 13) It thus enforces a system of ethnic residential segregation in urban areas and supports the rigid race classification system refined by the apartheid policy. In the course of the implementation of this Act approaching 120 000 families, almost all of them black, have been forced to move and many long-standing communities destroyed. Black people have been driven out of their homes in central urban areas and relocated in bleak crude townships on the outskirts of the metropolitan areas. Transport costs and rents in these townships are generally high; in addition there are many social problems: crime, unemployment, alienation amongst residents."

Nationally the Group Areas Act has affected coloured and Indian people the most severely since African occupation of land in urban areas was already largely controlled by the Urban Areas Act (consolidated in 1945). However, the Act has affected African people as well, particularly in Durban as discussed below. In crude statistical terms, coloured people in the Cape followed by Indian people in Natal have been the two groups worst hit by Group Areas legislation. Whites represent only 1.9% of the total numbers of families officially affected by the Act, as indicated below. Altogether a total of 27 639 white, coloured and Indian families, 84% of them Indian had been relocated in terms of this Act in Natal by 1981. Furthermore, it was estimated in 1961 that some 80 000 African people had been affected by the Act in Durban alone. (Bokak, 1961, 4) The numbers of Africans affected in Durban is still greater, at least 175 000.

(For details see p. 227) The way in which the Group Areas Act has been used to remove African living within urban areas but outside of proclaimed locations is a topic needing further research.

Table 14. FAMILIES MOVED IN TERMS OF THE GROUP AREAS ACT BY 1981, BY PROVINCE AND RACE CLASSIFICATION (EXCLUDING AFRICANS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>WHITES</th>
<th>COLOURS</th>
<th>INDIANS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>61 119</td>
<td>2 774</td>
<td>64 650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>1 185</td>
<td>10 911</td>
<td>72 785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>1 355</td>
<td>2 300</td>
<td>23 227</td>
<td>27 623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2 259</td>
<td>70 193</td>
<td>36 912</td>
<td>117 354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For an account of the two Group Areas townships in Durban, see the case study on Phoenix in Part Four and the appendix to that case study, on Newlands East.

f Africans moved because of the implementation of the Group Areas Act have not been officially recorded with the other groups moved and do not therefore appear among the SABIR figures.
One of the notable features of the way in which the Group Areas Act has been implemented in Natal has been the frequent proclamation of formerly African freedhold areas as coloured or Indian group areas. One of the obvious results of this has been to direct the hostility and resentment of the Africans moved from their land against the coloureds and Indians moved onto their former land, rather than against the white legislators.

In Newcastle, for instance, the African owned areas of Lennoxton and Fairleigh were expropriated by the State and the entire African population (estimated to have been as large as 20,000 people) moved out to Mabuhleni and Osierinti; Lennoxton was subsequently proclaimed an Indian and Fairleigh a coloured group area in 1962. In Vryheid coloured families displaced from the centre of town by the Group Areas Act were allowed to squat on Backergruit, an African owned area removed in about 1960/61. More recently, in 1966 sections of the mission freedhold area of St Wendelins outside Durban were proclaimed into white, coloured and Indian areas and the African landowners and tenants living on the land subjected to removal or the threat of removal. (On St Wendelins and the most recent developments in terms of the Group Areas Act, see the case study in Part Four, below.) In 1972 the Indian township of Craigisham, outside Umganyambe, was proclaimed on the former African freedhold area, Umganyambe Drift. The adjoining black spot, Woodlands Lodge, was also proclaimed an Indian area and both communities removed.

**EFFECTS OF THE ACT ON TRADERS**

Black traders have been dramatically affected by the Act. Many have complained of being offered inferior alternative sites and of not being offered 'goodwill' compensation even though the provision of the latter is provided for in the Community Development Act. Since the Eckert Commission (1979) legislation has been amended to allow for special trading zones, but only seventeen such areas exist in the country at present. Indian traders have been the hardest hit. Nearly 2,000 of them had been moved in terms of the Act by the end of 1979 - 1,152 of them in the Transvaal, and 454 in Natal. A further 421 were still to be moved at the end of 1979, most of them in the Transvaal. By comparison, only 21 white traders had been affected by the end of 1979, with a further 79 under threat at that stage. The competition that Indian traders offered their white counterparts constitutes a major reason for the implementation of the Group Areas Act in Natal.

**Table 12. Traders Affected by the Group Areas Act, by Province and Race Classification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Removed by End of 1979</th>
<th>Still to be Removed at End of 1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louglen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange Free State</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HOW THE ACT IS IMPLEMENTED**

Before a group area is declared, the Group Areas Development Board (now operating within the Department of Community Development) hears evidence from interested groups, e.g. city councils, ratepayers' associations etc. However, the Board has the final say in the proclamation of areas and has rarely been known to alter its proclamations once made.

Once an area has been proclaimed for a particular group, a list is drawn up of the affected properties, i.e. those owned and/or occupied by people disqualified in terms of the proclamation. Initially this task was handed over to the local authorities who were also responsible for the relocation of the affected people. However, most local authorities responded slowly and it was partly for this reason that the Group Areas Development Board was created in 1956, to take over this function. The powers of the Group Areas Board were consolidated and strengthened by the creation of the Department of Community Development in the late 1960s, under whose auspices the Board now functions.

Once an owner is affected, a basic value is placed on his/her property which represents the declared value of the property before the group area was proclaimed. The owner can then only sell in the following manner. First he/she has to notify the Board of an intention to sell. The Board is entitled to buy the property at its basic value and it has first option on the sale. If it refuses to buy, then the owner can sell to a private individual. Up until 1967 if the owner sold the property for more than its basic value, 50% of the excess had to be paid to the Board. Amendments to the legislation in 1967 and 1971 provided that if a property were sold within eight years of either the 1st of February 1967 or the date when the particular group area was proclaimed (whichever was the later), then the owner did not have to make a contribution to the Board. However, in the ninth year the owner would have to pay 2.5% appreciation contribution and at any time thereafter a 5% contribution. In 1978 this contribution provision was abolished - but by that time many thousands of families had already been affected by this law.

If the price received by the owner in a private sale is less than the basic value, then the Board has to pay a 'depreciation contribution' of 80% of the deficiency. If the owner sells a property without first referring it to the Board, then he/she loses the right to receive any depreciation contribution. Those who receive more than the basic value through selling in this way have to pay 7.5% of the difference to the Board. The above methods of selling are classed as voluntary sales.

The Board can also expropriate the property from the owner at any time and pay the owner the basic value. In many cases the original owners have been allowed to remain on their properties as tenants of the Board, to their detriment. For instance, one Indian family in Durban bought some land in 1949 for R50. They subsequently built a house on the property and then, in 1961, were forced to sell the property to the Board for R4 650. They remained in their house as tenants and in the years from 1961 to 1974 they paid R3 320 in rent to the Board. (Beer, 1979: 10.) Another example, of a house in Oos Mansor (Durban) which was bonded in 1960 for R1 600 and then sold the same year to the Board for a mere R150, also shows up how black property owners have often been on the losing end in Group Areas transactions. (SABR, Natal, 44/1962: 4)

2. Forrunners of the Group Areas Act in Natal

Forrunners of the Group Areas Act in Natal can be found as far back as the 1850s. The major difference between the early legislation and the Group Areas legislation was that the former sought to control the spread of Indian traders and, through 'pegging', particular areas for Indian occupation and acquisition, to restrict their settlement to certain areas, while the latter has involved large-scale removal of predominantly black people into segregated residential and business areas. Agitation against the Indian community began in Natal and the Transvaal as soon as Indian traders arrived in South Africa in the late 1800s. Using family labour they were soon competing with and sometimes undercutting the white traders; and with the capital they had
accumulated in the trading sphere, they were then able to invest in property - two spheres in which restrictions were soon imposed. As early as 1889, Superintendent Alexander of Durban recommended that 'no licences be given to any Indian for any building in either of our two main streets.' [Handerson, 1904, 139]

The Lange Commission of 1921 recommended that segregated areas be developed for trading. Evidence from the Licensing Officer in Durban to the Commission merely showed up the existing restrictions.

We do what we can to restrict further licenses ... A European license is granted as a matter of course, whereas the Indian is refused as a matter of course, if it is a new one. [Calpin, 1949, 45]

As a result of the Lange Commission, special streets were set aside for Indian traders in Durban. The commission also touched on the right of indians to acquire land in rural areas. For Natal it recommended that right be limited to a strip stretching from the coastal belt to 20 to 30 miles inland, but this was never implemented.

In the following year, 1922, the Durban City Council restricted the sale and lease of property under its jurisdiction to whites and this restriction was extended to all Natal towns (Council land only) a year later. In 1927 an even more extreme and discriminatory measure was introduced in Northern Natal when, in terms of the Asiatics in Northern Districts of Natal Act, Indians were prohibited from living in various towns in this part of the country - Uvihle, Umshala, Pietermaritzburg, Umthetho, Bethanien and Lourosburg. Indians wanting to work in these areas had to apply for special permits and serve long distances for a time, this Act, as described below, is still in operation today.

The Pegging Act of 1943, which applied in the Transvaal and Natal, prohibited the purchase and occupation of white properties by Indians. The subsequent Asiatic and Land Tenant Act of 1946 divided Natal into 'controlled' and 'uncontrolled' areas. Indians and coloured acquisition of white-owned land in controlled areas was only allowed by special exemption. No restrictions were placed on uncontrolled areas, but these were areas already largely occupied by Indians. The 1946 Act also prohibited Indians who had previously purchased but not occupied land in white areas from occupying it after January 24th, 1946.

The Land Tenure Act affected most seriously those Indians capable of purchasing land in white areas for either residential or investment purposes. It did not immediately affect the majority of less affluent Indians who had no plans for either living in or investing outside existing Indian ghettos. [Johnson, 1951, 78]

3. Group Areas removals in Durban

The Group Areas Act was directed first at the major metropolitan areas of the country - Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria - with group areas beginning to be proclaimed in these centres from the mid 1950s. The following section looks mainly at the effects of the Group Areas Act on the Indian population in Durban. Coloured people have been affected too, but on a smaller scale since they constitute a far smaller portion of the city's population. In 1980 there were 335 092 Indians, 209 973 whites and 59 980 coloureds in Durban. [City Engineer's Research Dept, Population Estimates, 1980. Most of the African population, as already described, are located outside the city's official boundaries.]

INDIAN SETTLEMENT IN DURBAN BEFORE 1911

Indians began to arrive in Durban in the late 1800s. The majority were brought out by the Natal government to work as indentured labourers on the sugar farms and later in the first factories in Durban. Having worked out their period of indenture, most of them then moved to leased properties, or, in a few cases, bought their own small-holdings.

The extreme poverty of the indentured Indians (ensured) that most Indians were obliged to settle in areas of low cost, on the Alluvial Plate near marshy ground, on the outskirts beyond municipal control, or in blighted central areas, areas which were always the last to be developed. [Reper, Katta and Davies, 1956, 130]

The following quote describes this process of settlement in the Riverside area:

The original and early settlers in this area were those who had come out as indentured immigrant labourers and who were employed in one or other of the early pioneer industrial enterprises and plantations of the Coloniats in this area as well as in the immediate neighbourhood. As these mills and plantations tended to terminate operation, the Indians gradually turned to other areas of occupation for economic existence. A number of them acquired land in this area and followed agricultural pursuits by market gardening and providing the people of Durban with fresh vegetables. Many were employed in the Lion Match Factory, the quarries and brick yards. In fact in almost all the early industry and enterprises, Indians were the pioneer workers, for they were eminently suitable and reliable. [Memorandum from Riverside-Durden and District Hating Co Association, 1951, 2-4]

Many ex-indentured labourers took up market gardening in areas such as Riverside, Gato Manor, Bayhead, Sea View, Hillcrest, Selborne, Kylemore, Ten Cow Lake and Springfield. Most plots were small and not economically viable. Thus, as industrial development boomed, some plots were turned over to more profitable shack farming, e.g. in Gato Manor. In other areas industrial expansion engulfed the market gardeners' land or market gardeners were squeezed off their land by financial pressures. By 1951 the census revealed that only 391 males and 59 females were still involved in market gardening. A survey done in 1949 of 275 market gardeners had shown that only 64% of the sample worked full time, the remaining 36% were involved in gardening part time and were otherwise involved in wage labour. At that time over 90% of the land cultivated by market gardeners was leased and many areas were already owned by encroaching industry. Bayhead and Springfield Plots were just two examples. [Dept Economics, UDB, 1951, 14]

Thus by the time the Group Areas Act was passed, the majority of Indians had already moved out of the agricultural sphere into other sectors. The Act did not, therefore, cause the decline of market gardening within the Indian community of Durban. It did, however, affect the small number of people still remaining in market gardening in the 1950s, as described below.

In the city itself, various restrictions were imposed on the sale and lease of property owned by whites or the City Council to Indians long before the Group Areas Act was passed. Durban initially comprised only the area now called the Old Borough. This stretched northwards to the Umgeni River, inland to the Berea ridge and southwards to the Bluff. It was in this area that the 1922 clause restricting the sale and lease of property owned by the City Council to whites only was first implemented. Various other individually owned white properties also had anti- Asiatic clauses attached to them. By
1943 Indians owned only 4% of the total area of the Old Borough. (Maxted and Pilay, 1977, 90) However, the total Indian population living in this area, in white-owned or municipal housing, was substantial: over 30,000 by 1951. (1951 Population Census).

The restriction on property ownership in the central areas serves to direct much Indian settlement into the uncontrolled areas, outside the Old Borough, into areas such as Sun View, Bellair, Hillair etc. where there was no control over building or shack settlements.

If they desired possession for residential purposes there was no other outlet, and the evaluation roll of the 'added areas' indicated that most of the land owned by Indians was used residually, mainly on a very low standard. (O.A. Wood, 1954, 10)

Despite the small number of Indian property owners in the central area, whites in Durban agitated against what they crudely described as 'penetration' by Indians into the property market in this area. As a result, in 1940 the First Indian Penetration Commission was set up to investigate this process. According to its report, there had been 512 cases of penetration by then, most of these in Block A, Block AI and the Botanic Gardens. It noted that 362 of these cases had not been followed up by actual occupation of the properties by Indians and declared that there was no cause for alarm. The white inhabitants of these areas were not to be silenced, however. Three years later, after further agitation by them, the Second Indian Penetration Commission was set up to look at any further cases of penetration in the intervening three years. This Commission found that there had been 356 more cases of Indian purchases of property in the Durban area, 17% of which had led to occupation by Indians. It reported that Block AI had formerly been a 'respectable' white suburb but that three years it had experienced 16 cases of penetration. (Maxted and Pilay, 1977, 88)

The Pegging Act of 1943 which came straight after this Commission, was an attempt to restrict further penetration.

It inhibited the natural expansion of Indian-occupied areas and restricted outlets for investment. Indian land ownership comprised only 4% of the total area of the Old Borough, but this did not mean that all of that 4% was available for Indian residence. (Maxted and Pilay, 1977, 90)

The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946 entrenched the Pegging Act. It created 2 kinds of areas, controlled and uncontrolled. The uncontrolled areas were 'free from restrictions on acquisition or occupation of properties'. The controlled areas were 'non-Asiatic areas except for properties already owned and occupied by Asians on 21st January 1946'. (Univ. Natal Econ. Dept, 1952, 409) Most of the controlled areas were within the Old Borough.

Generally then, the settlement of Indians in Durban prior to the Group Areas Act was overdetermined by both economic and legislative factors. The poorer class of Indians set themselves up in areas outside of the main area (although some were housed in shacks in the central area), while the wealthier tended to try to acquire property in the centre of town, probably more as an investment than with the intention of living in those areas. The 1951 census indicated the main areas where Indians were living prior to the Group Areas Act as follows:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GROUP AREAS ACT

The implementation of the Group Areas Act in Durban has led to massive removals of people and a decrease in the amount of land available for Indian occupation. In 1956 it was claimed that whites would gain almost 3,000 acres in the city, at Indian expense. (Kuper, Watts and Davies, 1956, 172) In 1967 a spokesman against the group areas removal reported the effects of the Act on Durban towns:

Briefly we may record that the 1958 proclamation in Durban envisaged the uprooting of about 75,000 Indians, 80,000 Africans and some 8,000 or 9,000 Coloured people. Affected Indian property was valued at about 20 million pounds and the loss of some of the oldest and best cherished institutions of our people, such as mosques, temples, schools and a cemetery. All this, notwithstanding the fact that in some of these areas Indians first settled some 80 to 90 years ago. (Knutson, 1961, 4)

Although the first proclamations for Durban were made in the 1950s, expropriation of property and removal only started getting under way in the 1960s. In the early 1960s the new group areas township of Chatsworth, to the south of Durban, was developed but there was not enough alternative housing available and some of those displaced by the Act had to be housed temporarily in the Springfield Emergency Camp. This developed rapidly into a slum. Another Emergency Camp, called Minimint, had to be established in a section of the Indian area of Meredale in 1971. In 1976 the relocated township of Phoenix was begun to the north of Durban. (On Phoenix, see the case study in Part Three.)

In 1967 it was reported that 6,146 Indian families had been relocated in Durban as a result of the Group Areas Act, and a further 13,000 Indian families were estimated as still under threat. (Schlemmer, 1967, 15) This means a total of just over 120,000 individuals affected by the Act—either moved or threatened with removal. By 1979 the number had reached 300,000, and this number is expected to rise as the Act is implemented in the future. (On Indian removals, see Appendix 1.)

The implementation of the Act in Durban has forced the Indian community into a heavy dependency on the municipality to meet its housing needs. All displaced people have the choice either of applying for municipal housing in Chatsworth or Phoenix, or of applying for serviced plots controlled by the Department or the City Council, or of buying from the few Indian property developers in proclaimed Indian areas. The price of serviced plots and houses has rocketed since land allocated to Indians is small relative to their population. In some cases plots have sold for three times the price of a plot of the same size in an adjacent white area. In 1966 75% of the Indian population still lived on private freehold land but it was estimated in 1977 that as a result of the Group Areas Act, 80% would be living in rented council housing by 1990. (Minority Rights Group, 1977, 13)

At the same time the Indian community has been shifted out of central city areas to the edges of the metropolitan area. In 1951 21,419 of the total Indian population of Durban lived in the Old Borough. The 1980 census figures show that by then only 2,446 lived in the same area while 60% lived in the two townships of Phoenix and Chatsworth. (Calculated from Population Estimates of the City Engineer, 1980)

This also means that Indians were moved out to undeveloped areas where infrastructure was poor and services inadequate. There were few existing houses to be rented. People were forced into putting their names on the waiting list for council or government provided housing. By 1967 there were 5,624 applications for housing in the Indian townships and by 1967, 12,419 applicants were still on the waiting list. (Memorandum to City Council from Indian Housing Committee, 1967, 4)

The present housing shortage for Indians is close to 17,000 units and, as a result, slums are developing in areas such as Meredale.

ROLL OF THE DURBAN CITY COUNCIL

Agitation against Indians had been strong on a local level as well as a national level and the Durban City Council (DCO) was right behind the government's proposals for race zoning in the city. Even before the Group Areas Act of 1950, in 1943/44 the DCO had drawn up its own plans together with a map detailing the possible relocation of Indian population. This included the installation of Chatsworth, Phoenix and the future Ulundi, Chatsworth, Phoenix, Hanover and the Inner Nekkan and Nkuzulo townships. It even shows a large area of Oato Nkwanza as an Indian area which, after various deproclamations and proclamations it has finally been declared. (On Oato Nkwanza, see Appendix 1.) The Province of Natal also contributed its own plans for race zoning to the Post War Reconstruction Committee in 1944.

Both these proposals were used by the City Council when they drew up zoning plans for Durban subsequent to the Group Areas Act. More research needs to be done on the motivations behind the City Council's moves. There is evidence in the James Commission (a committee set up in the early 1960s to investigate allegations of corruption amongst City Councillors in Durban) to show that certain councillors, including the Mayor, were taking advantage of their positions to buy up land cheaply from Indians who had been affected by Group Areas proclamations. But these occurrences hardly seem significant enough to have motivated such radical removals of people.

OPPOSITION TO THE PROCLAMATIONS

Before group areas were proclaimed, 'interested parties' were invited to attend hearings. Various non-government organizations, as well as political organizations such as the Natal Indian Congress (NIC), the Natal Indian Organisation, together with the African National Congress (ANC), gave evidence to the Board. The NIC and the ANC declared their total adherence to the Act. The NIC declared that the Act was nothing but the redistribution of wealth and resources in favour of Europeans and removal of non-Europeans from their developed areas of residence and trade to remote outskirts of towns and cities, far from centres of commerce and industry. The main target is the Indian population.

(Quoted in Kuper, Watts and Davies, 1956, 161)

The ACT looked at the effects of the Act on Africans;
The sole purpose of the Group Areas Act, is to deprive them (Africans) of the right of occupation and ownership of land, so as to ensure that they will be Government tenants at all times, and hence a source of cheap labour. (Quoted in Ibid, 162)

Evidence before the Board at the hearings was detailed and well prepared by various ratepayer organisations but as Euper, Watts and Davies aptly comment:

The procedures of the Government Group Area Board, public hearings, invitations to interested parties to submit plans, examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and the whole paraphernalie of judicial process appear to have little relevance for the final result. The Board's decisions could have been reached by discussion between its representatives and the Durban City Council. (Ibid, 167)

They also point out how white interests were recognised. At one stage there were recommendations that an area to the south east of Durban be given over to Indians. Within two months these whites affected had lobbied supporters in the City Council and the suggestion was reversed. The area was given to whites, involving the removal of over 6000 Indian people.

**EFFECTS ON TRADERS**

As already mentioned, white commercial interests regarded Indian traders as a threat and the Group Areas Act was partly a response to that. In 1933 evidence submitted to the Group Areas hearing on the proclamation of Cata Manor as a white area revealed that the following Indian-owned businesses would be forced to close or relocate: 69 shops, 4 clothing factories, 2 box factories, 1 bicycle factory, 1 cinema, 1 crematorium, 90 bazaars. (Evidence of Mr. Bhephu to Land Tenure Board, 1.09.53) At the same hearing it was reported that 10 businesses with a total capital investment of £250 000 would be forced to move from Riverside, 10 businesses (£27 000 capital) from Prospect Hall, 9 businesses (£39 000 capital) from Umbani and 6 businesses (£49 000 capital) from Morningside. (Evidence of Mr. Opupa to Land Tenure Board, 1.09.53) In 1936 the Morningside Indian Ratepayers reported that the Group Area proclamation in their area threatened businesses and factories valued at £20 million. (Minutes from Morningside Indian Ratepayers, 30.04.56)

Obviously many Indian-owned businesses and factories have been adversely affected by the Act. However the Indian business and trading sector is still a very powerful force in Durban. More research needs to be done on the process of relocation of factories and businesses; possibly this would show up what has determined who have managed to remain in the sphere and who have been pushed out. It is possible that the Group Areas Act has aided the process of increased capital concentration in a few hands, so it seems that it was mostly the smaller Indian traders who have been pushed out.

**SUMMARY OF GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATIONS, DURBAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>PROCLAMATION, DATE</th>
<th>POPULATION AFFECTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Roseburgh</td>
<td>white, 1958</td>
<td>Indians 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coloured 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Africans 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Woodlands</td>
<td>white, 1958</td>
<td>Indians 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Coloured 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Africans 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montclair</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Group Areas removals in the rest of Natal

Here work needs to be done on the exact and effects of Group Areas Proclamations in the rest of the province outside of the metropolitan area of Durban. This follows is a brief and incomplete summary of developments in some other parts of the province.

ZULULAND

In 1970 the Minister of Planning and the Minister of Native Administration and Development said that from that date indians and coloureds would be classed to areas south of the Tugela River. Employers in those areas had to apply for permits to retain the services of those affected. (DAEN, 1970, 175) In 1977, with the development of the harbour and industrial town of Richards Bay under way, it was announced that from November 1977 coloured and indian employees would no longer be required to have permits to be north of the Tugela River. The Group Areas Board announced that it was looking into proclaiming areas for coloureds and indians and whites in the area. Finally, in July 1981, Indian and coloured group areas were proclaimed in Richards Bay. (Sunday Times, 12.07.81) and, also in 1981, in Kilmokhe. In January 1982 a coloured group area was proclaimed in Ebeneeze and both coloured and indian group areas were proclaimed in Mthublu. (National Mercury, 11.01.82) In May 1982 coloured and indian areas were proclaimed for Gingindlovu. (National Mercury, 11.05.82)

As a result of the lack of proclaimed areas and thus sanctioned housing for them, coloured and indian people working in Zululand were forced either to commute long distances - many living in Stanger, south of the Tugela River - or live in illegal and rundown squatter areas. One such squatter camp, described to SPP as a slum, exists to the west of Empangeni. In July 1981 the Chairman of the Zululand Indian Welfare Workers Association described living conditions for indians in the Richards Bay area prior to the proclamation of an indian group area as "preliminary". Some have had to stay in caravans or make do with whatever accommodation was offered, usually at exorbitant rents. In the early days of the industrial boom many workers even slept in the bush. Others have had to commute over long distances from proclaimed Indian areas. (Sunday Times, 12.07.81)

NORTHERN NATAL

The restrictions on indians living and working in Vryheid, Hibben, Mpumalanga, Utrecht, Mahlangeni, Louwburg, first legislated in 1927, was still in operation in 1980. In July 1980 the National Mercury carried a story reporting that "determined efforts" to get the 1927 legislation repealed were "being strongly renewed." (17.07.80) In Vryheid coloured people were displaced from the centre of the town in 1962 when that was proclaimed a white area but no alternative township was established for them. As a result these people were forced to move to Betsisperspit, a black spot that was expropriated and cleared of its african households and tenantry at about the same time. According to the Sunday Tribune (20.12.81) the coloured families moved to Betsisperspit with the permission of the Department of Community Development but no formal housing was provided. In 1961 there were 107 families living there, still in shacks, without piped water and formal sanitation arrangements. The Vryheid municipality and Department of Community Development both denied responsibility for the area but there were plans for building a township for 78 families 'as soon as the Government gave money.'
(Sunday Tribune, 20.12.81) According to a survey undertaken in the area, 60% of the residents earned more than R500 a month and would afford to build houses if land was made available. *(Ibid)*

In Newcastle, African-owned land was also used as a relocation site for Black victims of the Group Areas Act. In this instance official Indian and coloured Group Areas townships were proclaimed in 1962 on the former African-farmed areas of Lemnos and Fairleigh respectively—two areas falling within the municipal boundaries of Newcastle from which some 15,000 to 20,000 Africans, landowners and tenants, were moved between 1961 and 1970. Further south, at Ladysmith, coloured and Indian group areas were proclaimed in 1962. In 1980/81 the Indian business community was being forced to move out of their premises on the main street of the town to a separate shopping centre. In this instance, however, it seems as if white commercial interests on the main street may in fact lose from the move since the centre of gravity in the commercial life of the town appears to be shifting with the Indian traders away from the main street.

PIETERMARITZBURG

Group Areas proclamations were first made for Pietermaritzburg in 1960. The main threat behind the proclamation was to reserve most of the central city areas, both residential and commercial, for whites and to push Africans, Indians, and coloureds to segregated townships on the perimeter of the city. According to T. Wills, of the Department of Geography at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg:

The major effect was felt by the Indian community, many of whom had been for nearly a century occupying areas of the city now zoned exclusively for white occupation. *(Wills, nd, 5)*

According to him a total of 384 Indian families and 73 traders were forced to move, mainly from the Upper Church Street area in the central city. *(Ibid)*

In 1961, at a conference called to protest the proclamations, it was claimed that a total of 7,000 Indians, 1,750 Africans, and 1,000 coloureds were affected by the enforcement of the Act in Pietermaritzburg, compared to a 'negligible' number of whites.

Table 16. SUMMARY OF EFFECTS OF GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATIONS,
PIETERMARITZBURG, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: Natal, 1961, 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO. OF AFFECTED PROPERTIES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLOUREDSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having summarized his information as above, Natala comments:

* A complete list of the areas affected by the Group Areas Act in Pietermaritzburg in 1960/61 is contained in Appendix 2.

It is glaringly obvious from the above
(i) that European interests remain practically untouched;
(ii) that the non-European peoples must bear almost all the losses caused through the proclamation.

(Natala, 1961, 10)

SOUTHERN KALARE

Indian group areas have been proclaimed in Port Shepstone, Harding, Park Rynie, Durban, Umzinto, Richmond, and Clifflande. Tourism dominates a large part of the south coast region and many Indians are employed in the services sector in these towns. Indians have developed successful farming ventures in some areas as well, mainly on lots granted to ex-indentured labourers in the late 19th century in the Umzinto/Brendan and Clifflande areas.

The vegetable growing area of Clifflande was for many years under threat from the Group Areas Act, with local white farmers pushing for it to be proclaimed white. However the Clifflande Indians finally got the support of industry which was wanting an Indian township to be developed there for the workers of Manamalale, Cato Ridge and Connah's town. R. Godman, then MP, also lent his support, saying that the area supplied much of Durban's vegetable needs.

It will be in the national interest to allow Indians to develop the area as well as for housing. . . . Natal produced only 15% of its vegetable needs. *(Natal Mercury, 5.06.75)*

Clifflande was finally gazetted an Indian area in 1975.

The expansion of Indian farming outside of these areas has been largely prevented by the Group Areas Act, since Indians have been prevented from buying land outside their proclaimed group areas unless they have a permit. A recent report in a Natal newspaper documented the case of an Indian farmer at the Peddock. He had used another, white, farmer to buy a badly eroded farm. After two years of hard work on that farm, the Indian owner wanted to transfer it into his own name. Once the local Farmers' Association found out, there was a tremendous outcry, and the farmers refused to have an Indian farmer in their midst. *(Sunday Tribune, 4.04.82)* The dispute is still continuing.

Very little provision has been made for coloured housing in Southern Natal. In both Port Shepstone and Richmond, coloured families are living semi-legally in Indian areas. A coloured group area has been promised in Port Shepstone. At Richmond attempts to establish a coloured group area, with 500 people, during the course of 1982 has run into opposition from local whites and Indians who may be obliged to give up some property. A proposed coloured group area was gazetted for this town in July 1982 but approval has not yet been finalised.

GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATIONS

The following list sets out in chronological order the dates in which Group Areas were proclaimed in various Natal towns. The list is not regarded as comprehensive. Furthermore, the fact that an area has been proclaimed does not necessarily mean that people are moved immediately; this list can therefore only be treated as a guide to the implementation of Group Areas legislation in the province. More fieldwork is necessary to uncover what has actually taken place on the ground.

* Major sources include: SABR 1963, Government Gazettes and various newspapers.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>GROUP AREA</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Dundee</td>
<td>white, coloured</td>
<td>Indian (SAIRR 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1960</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>white, coloured,</td>
<td>Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Pietermaritzburg</td>
<td>white, coloured</td>
<td>Indian (SAIRR 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Estcourt</td>
<td>white, coloured,</td>
<td>Indian (SAIRR 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Glencoe</td>
<td>white, coloured</td>
<td>Indian (SAIRR 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Queensburgh</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>9 000 Indians affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Newcastle</td>
<td>white, coloured</td>
<td>Indian (SAIRR 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Vryheid</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>(SAIRR 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Indakwam</td>
<td>white, coloured</td>
<td>Indian (SAIRR 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Colenso</td>
<td>white, coloured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Weenen</td>
<td>white, Indian</td>
<td>(SAIRR 1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Port Shepstone</td>
<td>white, Indian</td>
<td>(SAIRR 1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Kokstad</td>
<td>white, coloured</td>
<td>(P72/65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Dannhauser</td>
<td>white, Indian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Howick</td>
<td>white (1966);</td>
<td>coloured, Indian (1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>9 000 Indians affected. All coloureds and Indians under threat but subsequently g.a. declared for them 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Pinetown</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>4 000 Indians threatened but subsequently, 1981, proposed for Indians again. Few controls on shacks; site &amp; service scheme. (Sunday Tribune, 27/06/82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Ammanstot</td>
<td>white</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Nelspruit</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>29 Indians and 2 Indian shacks affected. (SAIRR 1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Hout River</td>
<td>white, Indian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>New Hanover;</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>40 Indian hh affected. 1965 Indians renamed of Cool Air established and 13 hh moved by April 1968. (Daily News, 13/12/61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Kroonkop</td>
<td>white, Indian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Verulam</td>
<td>white, Indian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOWN</th>
<th>GROUP AREA</th>
<th>DETAILS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Stanger</td>
<td>white, Indian</td>
<td>(SAIRR 1969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>white, Indian</td>
<td>13 Indian hh, 7 Indian businesses affected. (Daily News, 2/12/69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Enzinto</td>
<td>white, Indian (1968); coloured (1968)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Bergville</td>
<td>white</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Greytown</td>
<td>Indian (1969); coloured (1968)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Park Rynie</td>
<td>white, Indian</td>
<td>(P93/70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Zinkwazi</td>
<td>white, Indian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Clifford</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Originally under threat but repealed when g.a. proclaimed 1978.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Stockville</td>
<td>coloured (1978); then proposed Indian 1981</td>
<td>Originally 10 000 Indians under threat but proposed for Indians November 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Hardinx</td>
<td>white, Indian, coloured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Cedarville</td>
<td>white, coloured (P86/80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Shakeskral</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Itefa Bush</td>
<td>coloured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Richards Bay</td>
<td>white, coloured, Indian</td>
<td>see above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Melmoth</td>
<td>white, coloured, Indian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Mbamthu</td>
<td>white, coloured, Indian</td>
<td>see above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Gingindlovu</td>
<td>white, coloured, Indian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Eshove</td>
<td>white, coloured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* In 1978/79 an estimated 100 African households were moved from the Dunn reserve, a small coloured reserve north of the Tugela river and south of Gingindlovu. More research is required on why they were moved and whether the impetus came from the government or the local coloured landowners. The people were relocated at Wanga, a little to the north.
Appendix 1. Cato Manor

Cato Manor was founded by George Cato in 1849. By early 1928 the beginnings of shack developments were becoming evident, largely because of the increased movement of Indian immigrants in and around Durban. After the Second World War, with increased industrialisation and therefore urbanisation, thousands of African labourers were attracted to the cities. As a result of the lack of accommodation for them, shack farming in Cato Manor became a lucrative business for Indian landowners. Much of the land at this time was also being used for market gardening.

By the mid-1950s Cato Manor had an estimated population of 120 000 Africans and 40 000 Indians. The area stretched from the University of Natal as far as Westville, Mayville and Hilliard. Overcrowding was rife and crime and disease widespread. Despite these problems the community was a well-organised one. The residents established schools, religious institutions, old age and children’s homes etc. They also developed their own political and welfare organisations.

In 1954, the Group Areas Board recommended that the area be proclaimed for white occupation. At this time the area was in fact rejected by the Durban City Council and white people in general on the basis that the poor condition of the area, and in particular the widespread presence of soon shacks made it unsuitable and expensive for white housing. There was also much opposition to the resuming of the area from the Cato Manor residents themselves. The Natal Indian Congress branches of Mayville and Cato Manor organised mass meetings around the removal of people from this area. Cato Manor was officially proclaimed a white area in 1958 and massive removals got under way. By 1964 the demolition of shacks in Cato Manor was completed. By 1965 the African community had been largely relocated to the new townships of Zhamabah, Lenontville and Umblai, while most of the Indian community was moved to Chatsworth.

All properties were frozen for development and the land owners forced to sell to the Department of Community Development or the Durban City Council. In most areas compensation paid to those whose properties were expropriated was poor.

By 1968, Stella Hills, a section of Cato Manor had been developed by whites. The University of Natal also bought almost the entire Second River complex. The Department of Community Development was, however, able to dispose of very little of the land and it was for this reason that in November 1979 about one fifth of Cato Manor was (re)proclaimed a white area and, in May 1980 was gazetted for Indian occupation once again. With this proclamation the 500 Indian families still resident in the area faced many problems. The Department of Community Development wanted to move all residents out of the area in order to develop the area. There was no consultation with the people on the redevelopment plans. All the land had been expropriated with the result that the residents of Cato Manor were now tenants of the Department of Community Development.

The need for an organisation of the residents became evident and in November 1979, the Cato Manor Residents' Association (CMRA) was formed. The immediate tasks facing this association were vast, but from the beginning their demands were clear:

1. Removals from the area must be stopped immediately.
2. Cato Manor must be re-developed in stages - thus allowing residents to remain in the area while re-development takes place.
3. No auctioning of plots to take place.

4. Housing must be provided for all income groups in Cato Manor.
5. The authorities must consult with residents on any plans they may have for the area.
6. Residents and ex-residents must be given priority in terms of housing.

In December 1980 the Durban City Council took a decision to sell the land they owned in Umthwana, which made up 27% of the proclaimed area, by public auction at prices ranging between R17 000 and R17 000 a plot. As part of the CMRA campaign against the auction of plots, which would cause the area to become an elitist suburb, a conference on Cato Manor was held in February 1982. 48 organisations were represented. At the conference the Department of Community Development was called upon to expropriate the land from the Durban City Council. The residents asked for the plots to be sold at cost, and that the city council, besides disclosing the formula for pricing the plots, be made to absorb the cost of providing services there.

Early in May 1982 Durban's management committee announced that there was no hope of a significant reduction in the selling price. (In order to recover all costs, the DOC needs to charge R13 191 per site. If the cost of the land having been left unoccupied for 20 years - after the Group Areas removal - is subtracted, the land would cost only half that figure.)

The South African Indian Council has also entered into negotiations with the government around the issue of providing housing for the low income group in Cato Manor. They are also in favour of the Department of Community Development taking over the entire development of the area from the DOC which only owns 20% of the land.

At the end of May a massive campaign was planned in Durban by the CMRA to bring public pressure to bear on the authorities, as both the DOC and the Department of Community Development were then refusing to negotiate with them, whereas they were continuing to negotiate with the Local Affairs Committee and the SAIC. A petition was therefore organised to back the demands being made by the CMRA for the area to be developed for all income groups as well as requesting the State and the DOC to accept responsibility for subsidising housing for the low income groups.
### Appendix 2. The effects of the Group Areas Act in Pietermaritzburg

**GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATIONS, PIETERMARITZBURG, 1.04.60**

**Source:** Notala, 1961.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREAS PROCLAIMED</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>EFFECTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central area, city</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>200 properties affected; 91 Indian owned, with municipal valuation of £266 000; 50 coloured owners, with municipal valuation of £79,000. 1,000 Indians and 500 coloureds to move. Indian traders given 1 yr to wind up businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Church Street</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>36 business properties + 42 Indian owned shops affected, with total municipal valuation of £279 000; 43 Indian residential plots also affected, plus mosque, school and library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pantrich – Campsdrift</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>294 properties affected = 271 Indian, 57 African, 4 coloured. Total municipal value of Indian properties approx. £250 000. Approx. 2,500 Indians and 200 Africans to move. Properties included 4 Indian schools, 1 mosque, 7 shops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Scotland Road</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>37 properties affected = 24 African, 13 Indian. Municipal value of properties £27 000. Approx. 250 people to move. (See Black Spots Summary.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarendon area</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>47 properties affected = 43 Indian, 4 African. Municipal value of affected properties £49 500. Approx. 190 people to move. Area first settled by Indians and Africans c. 1920.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oorlogs Kral</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>58 properties affected = 40 Indian, 10 African, 8 coloured. Total value of these properties = £40 000. Total acreage = 37 acres. Approx. 400 Africans and 100 Indians to move. (See Black Spots Summary.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweetwaters</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>6 Indian properties, valued at £15 000, affected. Approx. 65 people to move.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallington</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>50 African properties, valued at £11 000, affected and 400 Africans to move. African title first acquired c. 1922. (See Black Spots Summary.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Church Street</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1 white (a hotel) &amp; 6 coloured properties affected. Municipal value of coloured properties £10 500.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainathorne</td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>30 white properties or residents affected; 22 coloured properties, municipal value of £15 000, and approx. 350 coloured people affected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. INFRASTRUCTURAL/DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

1. Introduction

One could argue that ultimately all removals in South Africa have been related to infrastructural development in its broadest sense; control over and exploitation of the country’s wealth and resources being the basic concerns shaping the policies of the ruling class. So broad a definition creates problems of classification: how to delineate a separate category for infrastructural development and how best to classify the many instances where the overlap between this category and the others that have already been described is very marked. Examples of this overlap at a descriptive level abound.

Group Areas legislation, for instance, has been used to allocate much of the prime urban land in Natal to white commercial and property interests and to clear black squatters off land wanted for industrial development. The removal of black spots has been linked to the development of the coal-mining industry in Northern Natal and the expansion of the timber and sugar industries in the south. Township development has taken place on land formerly housing informal settlements (e.g. Isaanwatho township, built at Duffs Road) and on black spots (e.g. Phoenix, Durban, on New Farm; Criagleburn, Umkomaas, on Umkomaas Drift and Woodlands Lodge); industrial zones have been similarly located on land affected by Group Areas legislation, black spot removals and informal settlement removals.

This chapter looks at infrastructural development in a fairly narrow sense, applying the term to those projects and schemes that have been designed to expand the infrastructure serving the economy of the province and its regions, agro-industrial areas, towns, roads etc. It also looks at certain development and conservation projects where these have led to the removal of people. To try to record every instance of population removal caused by these developments would be a mammoth and probably ultimately unenlightening task; instead this chapter makes some general observations about the nature of these removals and then isolates some major examples under the following sub-categories:

- Industrial and township development
- Agricultural and rural development projects
- Conservation and forestry
- Dams
- Roads

LACK OF BENEFITS FOR LOCAL PEOPLE

The relocation of people for such purposes is not unique to South Africa or the apartheid system. What links this category of removals as it is implemented in South Africa to the categories of forced removals already discussed is that 1) the people mainly affected by these developments have been black, 2) have, as a result, had no direct access to or political leverage with the people who make and apply the decisions about where schemes are to be sited and how they are to be developed and 3) generally do not benefit from the schemes developed on the land on which they used to live.

An example of this is provided by the Woodstock Dam site is currently being built near Bergville. 656 African families (Hennard, Question 120, 23.04.02) were removed from both scheduled and freehold land to make way for the dam, part of the function of which is to generate power that those removed will not enjoy. Another example is provided by the eviction of scheduled land from Kwalulu next to the Natal Parks Board fishing camp at godman’s Bay — here some 700 people have been threatened with removal so that this camp site, which caters exclusively for whites, can be expanded. (Both examples are discussed more fully below.) Furthermore, even where one can argue that the relocation of people for a particular project is in the interests of society in general, the manner in which this is carried out tends to leave the affected community disorganized and disempowered and often ballyhooed in terms of compensation and land.

Many of the major infrastructural and conservation schemes developed in Natal have been sited on black-owned or occupied land precisely because of the lower costs, both political and financial, that face the State or other development agencies in those areas when compared to what they would find in the white areas. Opposition from threatened black communities has not been nonexistent — the people affected by the building of the Woodstock Dam, for instance, put up a strong fight between 1979 and 1981 and eventually succeeded in being relocated on compensatory land adjacent to their former homes instead of right out of the district as originally envisaged. Generally, however, the more isolated and rural the area, the smaller the chance is that the State will be troubled by serious local opposition or adverse publicity. Furthermore, the lack of infrastructural development in rural black areas in general means that compensation costs are kept low and relatively little in the way of already established resources (e.g. agricultural land) is destroyed when large-scale projects are built there.

The prospects for conservation projects and nature reserves, too, are most promising in the least developed areas of the country, where the natural environment has not been as radically transformed as in the white farming areas. This has been especially true in the north-eastern corner of Natal, in Tongaland, where a number of game and conservation areas have been demarcated, all of which have encroached upon the land available to the local black people. Conservationists correctly describe this area as uniquely unspoilt and therefore ecologically extremely valuable, an area that should be conserved. However, the same could just as well have been said of Durban, before it was transformed into South Africa’s major port, or of Richards Bay before its industrial transformation. Environmental issues in Natal have, by and large, been diverted away from the urban-industrial centres where the ruling class is based — and where the ecological issues are as, if not more, pressing — to the underdeveloped rural areas where the least powerful and economically most vulnerable sector of our society lives.

Lack of consultation between planners and the local black population affected by development schemes is widespread. The local people are generally the last to be informed of what a hidden bureaucracy is planning for their area; often all that they have to go on are vague and unsettling rumours which may impel them to move of their own accord. Hard information, when it finally filters down to them, rarely takes the form of genuine consultation. Thus in the case of the proposed Inanda Dam (described below) very little attempt was made to inform the people to be affected about developments. Although 3 500 dwellings may be affected, people in the area have not been informed of what the authorities have in mind and do not know if or to where they may be moved. The only meeting between officials and locals seems to have been one at which the building of the dam was announced. Some people in the area only know about the proposed dam through the newspapers.

Lack of consultation can be as true of development projects planned by State bodies within and for the supposed benefit of KwaZulu as it is of other schemes. A coconut project planned by the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture in an area just to the east of Kosi Bay, for instance, was implemented without any forewarning to the 30 households whose land was to be used. According to local informants, the first these people knew about it was when large holes were dug on their land for the trees. The people were moved, but after
2. Industrial and township development

The expansion of industrial undertakings in established urban centres such as Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Newcastle has frequently been sited on land formerly owned or occupied by black people. The ISDN plant at Newcastle, for instance, has been developed on a black spot called Milton which was expropriated and cleared of its residents in 1970. In Pietermaritzburg land in the Pethrich/Campadrift area which was cleared of its African and Indian residents in the late 1960s, in terms of the Group Areas Act, has been proclaimed an industrial zone. In the Durban/Pinetown area a number of informal settlements have been cleared over the years because they have stood in the way of industrial development, e.g., at Clairwood, Mayfield and Kloofwater. Similarly, a number of township developments in the black residential areas have been established on land cleared for farming, e.g., at the black spots of West Hesseltone, West Hesseltone and Slangfontein in the Dunhuaser district; elsewhere because of coal-mining have threatened people inside KwaZulu too, in the Gwilo area west of the Umlalazi Game Reserve.

Another important aspect of relocation because of industrial development has been that caused by the establishment of new industrial growth points in response to the various border industry and decentralization initiatives of the State. Two major examples of this have been at Hammarsdale and at Richards Bay. (See also Appendix 1 on Clairwood.)

1. Hammarsdale

Hammarsdale, established in the early 1960s to the west of Pinetown, was one of the first places to be set up as a border industry area in Natal. As already described, this involved expropriation of African freehold land that had been classified as black spots, to make way for the establishment of the township of Nyamandla where the workers for the new factories were to be housed. 200 to 300 landowners and thousands of tenants were affected; many of them moved onto other, neighbouring black spots from where they were later moved into Nyamandla.

The first factories were opened in 1961. By 1968 there were 12 industrial concerns, 11 of them clothing/textile concerns. Initially the Natal Chamber of Industries opposed the development of Hammarsdale which they described as presenting 'a grave threat to the stability of Natal's clothing industry.' (KwaZulu Mercury, 7-3-62). Because of the lower wages paid in Hammarsdale, shirts being produced there were selling for $1.45 each, whereas in Durban, where labour costs were higher, they were being sold for $1.00 each. (Ibid) Although border industry concessions were withdrawn in 1966, Hammarsdale is generally regarded as one of the successes of the border industry policy. Ownership of factories is dominated by both multi-nationals and local groups, e.g., Tongaat.

2. Richards Bay and the Removal of Reserve 6 and Reserve 4

Richards Bay has been described as the cornerstone of the government's national policy of decentralization. (Sunday Tribune, 8-3-81) Although it was earmarked for development as a major port and industrial centre in the mid 1960s and granted border area status in 1967/68, construction did not get under way on the port until 1971. In the past decade the State has poured millions upon millions of rand into the development of the area, in a major effort to attract private industry; it appears that this policy is now beginning to produce results. One of the inducements the State is offering is a subsidised waste disposal scheme - a $20 million pipeline which will dump industrial effluent (including gypsum and paper mill waste) into the sea and, according to ecologists, cause devastating damage to the marine life. 'What on earth does it matter in the sea if plankton in that small area is affected?' a government advisor on the project has been reported as saying. (Sunday Tribune, 8-3-81)

The indifference shown to the environment at Richards Bay has been paralleled by the indifference shown to the local African people who were living on the land earmarked for the development of the town of Richards Bay. In early 1971, just before the new harbour was scheduled to open, about 6 000 people living at Reserve 6 in this area were removed and relocated to the Klusmanna area, about 45 km inland from the sea. In 1977 a small section of Reserve 4, just to the north, was exsicated from the schedule of African land in Natal and several hundred people removed to another part of Klusmanna as well; the rest of Reserve 4, home for 20 000 people or more, is under imminent threat of removal, having been exsicated from the schedule of African land in Natal in 1979 and exsicated from KwaZulu in 1980. (See case study, Part Four.)

Reserve 6 was a small scheduled area, lying in a lush subtropical belt that enjoys a high rainfall. Klusmanna, in contrast, is dry, bush country, suitable for ranching and not for intensive settlement and agricultural production is far lower than it was at Reserve 6. Water has been a consistent problem there since the people were first moved in and in some parts people are dependent on supplies brought in by water tankers. People interviewed by SAP have claimed that the compensation paid them was inadequate and did not cover the true worth of the trees, both fruit and lumber, that they had to leave behind at Richards Bay.

Because people were removed from scheduled reserve land, they were not moved into a closer settlement situation but compensated, as a tribe, with some agricultural land. However, the people were moved in such haste that this land had not been planned along betterment lines before they were settled on it, as required by Departmental policy for released areas. The people were thus warned that their settlement was temporary and that at a later stage they would be shifted again, within Klusmanna. Six years later they have not yet been allocated their permanent sites, although it appears that plans for the area have now been drawn up. Much of the housing is of a makeshift type as a result, and in poor repair - a major source of frustration and bitterness locally.

3. Agricultural and rural development projects

As already described in the chapters on farm evictions and black spot removals, the development of commercial agriculture in Natal has been directly and indirectly linked to large-scale removals in the province. The abolition of labour tenancy and the increasing mechanisation of agriculture has led to a massive displacement of farm workers over the past two decades. In addition, commercial agricultural interests have formed a
powerful lobby against black apothesis and individual farmers and agricultural companies, in the sugar and timber industries in particular, have been able to expand onto former black apothesis once they have been removed.

The type of agricultural development encouraged by various State and parastatal agencies within Kwazulu has also been of a large-scale, commercial kind which has frequently necessitated the removal of people off land that they were formerly farming on a subsistence or peasant level. Here the benefits of such agricultural development, if any, have gone to the central Kwazulu administration and to those managing the projects; food production among local people has not been boosted, but diminished by the loss of their land.

The remote and isolated north eastern region of Natal/Kwazulu (Tongaland) has seen several examples of people being removed to make way for development projects. Many of these projects appear to have been poorly conceived and implemented, and have made little or no contribution to solving the problems of underdevelopment in the region.

1. FISH FACTORY, KOSI BAY

In the early 1970s a number of families were moved from a place called Pianagwani, on the north bank of the Kosi estuary, because of plans to build a fish factory there. The factory was never built.

2. COCONUT PROJECT, KOSI BAY

About 30 families were moved from the Illomula area, to the west of the Kosi estuary, because of a coconut plantation that was established there by the Kwazulu Department of Agriculture in about 1968. Families were apparently not actually told to move but were pressurised into doing so by discovering that their land was being systematically prepared for the planting of trees. Most families moved closer to Mapula (Manqai) and were not paid compensation because they had moved voluntarily. The project was subsequently abandoned, after the trees had been planted.

3. COCONUT AND CASSAVA PROJECTS, MAKHATHINI PLATEAU

Although the Makhathini Plateau have not been developed on the scale anticipated in the 1960s, KDC and CBP have started a few projects while some private agencies, including the church-based ACAT which has strong links with KDC, are interested in the potential of the area as well. Details are lacking but there are reports that households living in this area were removed in the early 1970s when land was cleared to make way for KDC and CBP cotton and cassava projects in the proposed irrigation scheme area. Although the cassava projects have not proved successful, the cotton project is being pursued. It is estimated that about 1 000 ha has been cleared and fencaded for a cotton farm and that a number of households living in this area have been driven off the land as a result, these removals taking place in 1980 and 1981. Some of the households threatened in this way were cultivating quite extensive areas, some of it for cotton, but because the Makhathini Plateau is classified as State land, they were regarded officially as squatters and had no claims to compensation or security of tenure. Once evicted, they have had to make their own alternative arrangements for somewhere to stay.

Threatened removals were also reported to SFP in 1981, at a place called D3, 80 km north east of Jozini. No details were available, but apparently the people threatened with removal were living on land earmarked for another KDC project.

4. Conservation and forestry projects

The development of conservation and forestry projects has occasioned large-scale removals in Natal, many of these also in the north eastern corner, in Tongaland. There are many State and parastatal development and conservation agencies active in this region, including the Department of Forestry, the Kwazulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the Natal Parks Board, the Department of Nature Conservation, as well as various private development agencies. All are jostling for a stake in what has been described as a 'natural wonderland' - one of the last relatively undeveloped areas of any size left in South Africa and hence an obvious target for both conservationists and safari-type entrepreneurs. Until recently conservation and development planning for the region was conceived and implemented with little or no regard for the people already living there, whose land it in fact is. The people of the area were not, by and large, seen as part of the total ecology of the area, with, moreover, prior claim to its resources, but as problems, obstacles who could be and frequently were moved elsewhere so that the environment could be 'preserved'. One observer described the Natal Parks Board as 'cowed' in this context: they preach a kind of conservation imperialism and have been accused of regrouping areas inside the boundaries of Kwazulu and hence officially outside their jurisdiction, as their own to patrol and police.

These attitudes are clearly still entrenched in many quarters. More recently, however, there has been a debate within some conservation circles about whether it would not be better to allow those people whose land in to be conserved, controlled access to it. This approach has been suggested in a recent study of the ecology of the Hapantland area commissioned by Kwazulu, the Zinkie / van Hest report. It advocates establishing resource areas in which the local people would be allowed to live although within strictly circumcororchised and controlled limits. However, even though this approach would not lead to official relocation, it is likely that the lack of infrastructural development that would be allowed in these resource areas as well as the restrictions that would be imposed on people's ability to call a living from the environment (e.g. by fishing or hunting) would lead to people relocating themselves in more promising areas.

There obviously is an important argument to be made for the preservation and nurturing of the environment and its resources, but at present it is a very one-sided presentation that is being propagated, at the expense of the local people who have no say in how the resources are to be conserved (or developed) and do not draw any perceivable benefit from such programmes. Furthermore, some of the conservation schemes being promoted are purely recreational, to provide fishing and pleasure resorts for the wealthy (and white), and cannot be justified at all in ecological terms. The most glaring example of people being threatened with removal to allow this kind of conservation to be implemented is that provided by the expansion of the triangle of land edging the Sodwana Bay fishing resort.

Strategic considerations too have played an important part in determining the location of forestry and game reserves in Natal, with the removal of the local population out of strategically sensitive areas being an important consideration for State planners. Many forestry reserves have been located in the State land along the northern coast, thus sealing this area off from occupation by local black people; some reserves and conservation areas have been planned for border regions where they can provide an occupied buffer zone between South Africa and neighbouring States. (Removals for directly military purposes, such as at the missile range at Lake St Lucia, are discussed in the following chapter.)
The threatened removal of people in the triangle of reserve (scheduled) land to the north of the Sodwana Bay fishing resort received some publicity in Natal newspapers in 1968. As the plan to extend the existing Natal Parks Board resort, situated on the southern boundary of Reserve 14, by adding this piece of scheduled land to it and removing the 700 African people living there. (See map on p. 280)

Background

The idea of shifting the southern boundary of Reserve 14 a couple of kilometres north of Sodwana Bay was already being canvassed in official circles in 1968/69 when the future of the State land in the Makhasini Plateau was being considered. In 1973 the local commissioner at Umhlobo said that the northern boundary of the Sodwana Bay Camp was still uncertain, owing to the lack of finalisation of consolidation plans for the area. However, it appears that a line establishing the northern boundary of a triangle of land to be ceded from Reserve 14 for the enlargement of the camp was surveyed in 1973/74, known as the Inhloko line. This line, or one approximating to it, was incorporated into the 1975 consolidation proposals for KwaZulu and thus the proposed eviction of land was made official.

The proposed hand-over of this area to the Parks Board was a source of friction and unease locally throughout the 1970s. Resentment at the high-handed manner of the Parks Board in demanding - and obtaining - access to water supplies for the camp from within KwaZulu and in treating the area north of the camp as though it were in their jurisdiction, was already strong: to the local people the Natal Parks Board represented not an agency of conservation and protection of the environment, but a despotic of their land and their livelihood. In the late 1960s or early 1970s the Parks Board built a bridge across the stretch of Sodwana Bay which had the effect of curbing the ebbary to ebb up and which destroyed a large mangrove swamp which had been a rich fishing ground for local people.

Although the Parks Board later admitted responsibility for the destruction of the mangroves, and replaced the bridge with a better designed one, the mangroves have not, to date, recovered and the local people have not received any compensation for the loss they suffered. In 1973 the Parks Board obtained access to Lake Ngobanesi, within Reserve 14, to augment the inadequate water supply for the holiday resort. Although the local commissioner at Umhlobo did not support their application for the water, his opposition was overruled by the Minister of Native Administration and Development. In opposing the Parks Board's application, the commissioner referred to the uncertainty about consolidation plans for the area and described the holiday resort as a potential point of friction with the local people - water was already a problem for them and they would resent fiercely seeing their water being used to service a holiday resort for whites. Once again he stressed the long-term security implications if local people were alienated from the authorities.

Local resentment about the activities of conservation groups was not directed at the Parks Board alone. In 1976 there was criticism of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry for planting forest on land that the Chief of the area, Chief Hosei Zikalala of the Mzila Tribal Authority, claimed was their tribal land. There had been a long-standing dispute about whose land the area was; in challenging the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the Chief went so far as to instruct attorneys to take the matter up. The outcome of the dispute is not known - the KwaZulu officials denied that the land in question fell within the Mzila tribal area.

Resolution from 1973 Land Act Schedule and KwaZulu

Local unease re the government's intentions for the area simmered throughout the 1970s. Finally, in 1979, the eviction of the triangle from the schedule of land allotted for African occupation in Natal in terms of the 1973 Land Act, was approved by Parliament and in January 1981, the area was formally excised from KwaZulu as well. (See House of Assembly Debates, 14.06.79 and Proclamation R19, 23.01.81). Sodwana Bay was one of four areas affected in this way; the others were the Driehutfontein area near Ladysmith, the block of released land east of Paulpietersburg and Reserve 4 north of Richards Bay.

Opposition to the removals

At first the excisions from KwaZulu passed without notice, the local people not even being kept informed on developments. In May 1981 the excisions became publicised when Dr Koornhof announced at the SNU's congress on consolidation that removals were due to begin at the four areas in question. While little attention was paid to the other three areas at the time, the threat to Sodwana Bay developed rapidly into a controversial issue.

The press took up the story and gave it prominent coverage in both Natal and Johannesburg newspapers and both the central government and the Natal Parks Board came in for criticism. The KwaZulu government also joined the fray, with Chief Buthelezi at first saying that he had no knowledge of the impending removals and then lambasting some of the excision plans as part of 'the evil ideology of apartheid.' (Dana Daily Mail, 22.05.81) The proposed excision of Sodwana Bay and the other areas had, however, been discussed at some length between Pretoria and Umhlobo in 1978/79, before the motion deshieduling 1 and Reserve Four was passed by the House of Assembly in June 1979. While the KwaZulu Government had not been in favour of these proposals, they could hardly claim ignorance of them.

Press reports on the threatened removals put the number of people to be moved at between 500 and 1000, but noted that many of them had moved several times before, linking them to the earlier removals out of the missile range area. (Described in the next chapter.) The Sunday Times quoted a Mr Steven Zikalala who had been moved in 1974 (presumably out of the 'danger zone' in the missile range area) on his previous experience of being removed:

'I had 2 cows, 3 kuswa, a tin-roofed house and a lot of land. My family and I were dumped in an open space and given tents to live in for four months. Then we were taken away again. (Sunday Times, 17.05.81)

The Daily News reported that the chief in the area, Chief Hosei Zikalala, had himself been moved twice before and had lost about 2 500 of his tribemen to other chiefs. (Daily News, 20.05.81)

The response of the officials responsible for the excision was to try to smooth the matter over by playing down the effects. Wentzel, the Deputy Minister of Cooperation and Development, denied that 700 people would be moved, saying the exact number had still to be determined. He claimed, however, that the area to be excised was very small and that his department had been negotiating with the Natal Parks Board to reduce the land so that as few people as possible would be affected. (Dana Daily Mail, 21.05.81). He also described those who had been moved from the state land previously as 'squatting' with no claim on the land. The MEC in Natal in charge of the Natal Parks Board, Daring Steinhanck, denied all knowledge of the excision - 'I don't read the Government Gazette' - and promised that it would not lead to any removal of people. Rather, future developments in the area would lead to more job opportunities for local people. (Sunday Times, 24.05.81). In his he described the depopulation as the result of a misapprehension and said that the Natal Parks Board would exclude the entire area occupied by people within the depopulated triangle from the proposed additions to Sodwana Bay. (Dana Daily News, 26.05.81) It would seem that this was intended to soothe Chief Buthelezi who, during
the course of 1981, has made several attacks on the Parks Board and conservationists in general. Finally, Dr Koornhof himself promised that there would be no removals, pending further investigation, and with that the matter faded from the press.

Position in 1982

The current position of the area is unclear. There has been no attempt made by the government to reverse the earlier excisions of the land so the legal status and tenure of the local people is an extremely tenuous and vulnerable one. In April 1982 Dr Koornhof confirmed in Parliament that the removal of people from this and the other affected areas were to go through. (Hansard, Parliamentary Question 465, 23.04.82) However since then, the controversy surrounding the proposed excision of the Ingwavuma district from KwaZulu has arisen and it has been reported that the Sodwana Bay area may be restored to KwaZulu as part of the compensation being offered for the loss of Ingwavuma. While officials juggle their plans and redraw their maps, the local people live in a state of continued uncertainty and ignorance about their future.

2. GAME RESERVES

1. Thongzimane

As already described, the north eastern areas of Natal have long been a target for conservationists; the military too have shown interest in the idea of establishing existing game reserves or creating new as a way of establishing population-free (or strictly controlled) buffer zones on vulnerable borders. In recent years there have been several studies, produced under the auspices of the KwaZulu government, which have supported these proposals, notably the Thorrington-Smith/McCristol report, *Towards a Plan for KwaZulu* of 1979 and, in 1981, the Tinley/van Riet report. (See map opposite). While it seems that the earlier proposals of Thorrington-Smith et al envisaged large-scale removals of people out of the areas designated for game reserves, the approach adopted by Tinley and van Riet is more sympathetic to the position of the local people and calls for the establishment of 'resource areas', to be linked to the economic development of the local people. It appears that their report envisages allowing people to continue living in these 'resource areas' but with strict controls on their use of the land. However, the report also refers to extending the boundaries of the Nduku game reserve on the extreme north, to establishing wilderness trails and rustic camps for tourists as well as recreational areas, which would point to restrictions on the local people's access to some of the areas as well. As already mentioned, even if there were no official removals, it is likely that the controls on land use and restrictions on infrastructural development would pressure many people into moving away from these areas of their own accord.

These plans are all proposing future developments. In the meantime, the threat of game reserves being established in these areas has already been pressuring people to move. Several hundred people at least have already moved south from the Nkomazi border, near the Nduku game reserve and the Nosi Swamp, over the last 5 years or so because of rumours circulating in the area that their land has been earmarked for game reserve territory (which, according to the above two reports, it has been). In addition, a couple of hundred households have been moving in from the coast south of Kosi Bay over the past ten years because of conservation plans for the area - a medical worker at a local hospital estimated the total number of households affected in this way to have been in the region of 250. (In the Nduku area, see Appendix 2.)

2. Proposed game reserve, Lake St Lucia area

One result of the Ingwavuma proposals has been that all the State land on the coast north of the Lake St Lucia estuary has been promised to the Natal Parks Board for the
development of an enormous game reserve. This is in compensation for the loss of the Umfolozi and Nhlabwe Game Reserves which have now been promised to KwaDulu, also as compensation to make up for its loss of Ingwavuma.

It is not clear whether these promises are contingent upon the Ingwavuma land deal with Brazilian going through or not. If, as appears likely, this coastal stretch will be turned into a game reserve, then the African population living in the Nhlabwe reserve, just to the north of the Lake (see map on p. 280) will be moved — perhaps 12,000 people altogether. However, these people have already been under threat in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans for the area, which called for the removal of this and several other scheduled areas in the Umbozo district. Development in the area has already been frozen, and the people have been living with uncertainty and with rumours for the past six years; the latest threat does not, therefore, alter their position in any significant way.

As described in the following section on forestry and the next chapter on strategic removals, large numbers of African people used to live in the State lands along the coast which are also to be included in this proposed game reserve area; they have already been removed, however, during the course of the 1960s and 1970s.

3. *Umlalazi Nature Reserve*

Details on this small reserve near Loumbura are sparse. In about 1976 the Natal Parks Board took control of four farms in order to develop this nature reserve. The local community was asked to remove the 1,600 people living on these farms but was unable to find alternative accommodation at the time.

4. *Nhlabwe Nature Reserve*

This nature reserve was established on two former labour farms in 1975. These farms had accommodated several thousand people who were subsequently removed, many to the relocation area of Shoalstone, when the farms were expropriated. (In Shoalstone see the case study in Part Three.) The farms had been extremely overpopulated and neglected by their white landowners, but had provided valuable access to land to the tenant households living on them. Their removal and the subsequent use of their land as a game reserve for animals has left the angry and embittered. One former tenant on the farm who was interviewed by ETP remarked that he should have been born an animal — then the government would have taken care of him. His view of conservation was very clear: it meant that animals were provided with fenced land, while he was deprived of his land.

5. *Corridor between Nhlabwe and Umlalazi Reserves*

Details are lacking on this area too, but it appears that during the late 1960s and early 1970s household living on the State land separating the Umlalazi and Nhlabwe Game Reserves were removed. Numbers affected are not known; although there had been people there for generations, they were technically squatters and thus illegally on the land.

3. FOREST PLANTATIONS

1. *North eastern Natal*

The development of forestry plantations in this region has gone hand in hand with the demarcation of conservation areas and the establishment of the military missile range on the coast next to Lake St Lucia. This too has been the cause of large-scale population removals over the past twenty years or so, most of it undocumented and unknown, however. The entire coast from St Lucia Estuary to Sodwana Bay as well as the west bank of Lake St Lucia itself — all of it 'State land' — were proclaimed forest reserves long before the military moved into this area, and already during the 1960s there were removals both within and from out of this area. Details are lacking; presumably it was the area actually planted with trees that was affected. In October 1972, when the local commissioner at Umhlanga was trying to organise the removal of the families living in the danger zone of the missile range, the people affected complained of previous moves because of the forestry programme and said that large numbers of them had already had to move, some more than once.

In the 1970s removals because of afforestation programmes overlapped with the removals being enforced because of the establishment of the missile range in the area. Clearly the siting of the plantations served a strategic function; at what level the decision about the siting was taken is not known. In 1972 between 70 and 80 families living south of the missile range territory proper, in the vicinity of the Mangeni Pan, were threatened with removal. From information collected in 1981 from a Zionist priest and local leader living in the Nkundusi ward of Reserve 3, it appears that these families were moved during the course of 1972 and 1973 and settled, by 00 truck, in the Nkundusi district — he claims to have been one of them.

During this period, or possibly earlier, people were also moved out from the western bank of Lake St Lucia in the areas known as Hlulezi and Eywandzi, and also settled in the Nkundusi area or further south, towards Nhlabubza but still on reserve land. Numbers and details of the actual numbers moved are not available. It seems that along with official State-implemented removals (in which the State actually provided the transport etc.) went private removals in which people moved elsewhere themselves because of rumours of their pending removal. According to the Zionist priest interviewed by ETP the community were told to move by officials; those that still remained in the area after a certain date were rounded up onto trucks and taken elsewhere. He reported further that some people got compensation but many did not; similarly, some people got the temporary use of tents while they were re-establishing themselves in the new area while others did not. According to his "knowledge" people were moved during this time.

Those households in the Nkundusi ward may face a further threat of removal; the area is due to be excised from KwaDulu in terms of the 1975 consolidation proposals, although it too, as with the Sodwana Bay area, has been mentioned as possible 'compensation' to KwaDulu in the Ingwavuma land deal saga.

In the north, along the coast of Reserve 14 which stretches between Kosi Bay and Sodwana Bay, the concern of conservationists to protect the coastal dune forest has led to pressure being applied on people living in the area to shift inland — this process going hand in hand with other conservationist pressures, e.g. rumours about the establishment of a game reserve. In addition, there is also an afforestation programme in the vicinity of Lake Stikye and Kwanza. Currently, a small community at a place called Mahibi, near Lake Stikye, is under threat of removal — perhaps 30 households in all. There were also earlier moves in this area because of afforestation programmes that were developed in the late 1960s. No details have been uncovered on these removals, although one local informant reported that there had been resistance to them among the affected people.

2. *Vergelegen Forest Reserve*

This forest reserve in the southern Drakensberg was established partly on three former African freehold farms — the black spots Larrance and property 9590 in the Underberg district and FP 749 in the Amathole district. The properties were expropriated and 1,370 people relocated to Roberts Farm in the Amathole district in 1969. (For more details see Desmond, 1970, 77-78)
5. Dams

Rivers in Natal/KwaZulu account for a quarter of the entire water runoff of South Africa and, because of the relatively low rate of evaporation compared to other parts of the country, these rivers account for more than 40% of the total usable water resources in South Africa. (Thompson-Smith et al., 1976, 137) The tapping of water resources has been an important aspect of the economic development of the region; the construction of the Tugela - Kwa scheme will export the benefits from these resources out of the province, to the rest, as well. Many of the major dams proposed or developed in the province have been situated on land occupied by blacks.

1. REMOVALS DUE TO DAMS ALREADY BUILT

Information is available on only a small percentage of the dams which have been built.

1. Tongogara Dam

Completed in 1972, the Tongogara Dam on the Tongola River in north eastern Natal has had adverse effects for the local population. Until the dam was built farmers used seasonal flooding of the river to advantage — as irrigation, and for fishing (supplying food between the planting season and reaping period). The construction of the dam has halted this utilisation of natural flooding. Now the floods occur irregularly, and at the wrong time of the year. It is not known how many people were moved in the process of construction, nor how many have been forced to move by irregular flooding.

2. Malkenbos Dam, Ladysmith

In 1972 the closer settlement of Valencondo outside Ladysmith (established in 1964) to house people moved from the black spot Emmalouville) was moved to Bambeni because of the construction of this dam, along with the neighbouring freehold area of Hobeland.

3. Woodstock Dam, Blyvoor

The construction of the major Woodstock Dam, part of the Tugela - Kwa scheme, meant the removal of some 656 families between 1979 and 1981. (Hansard, Question 537, 22.04.80)

People were moved off both reserve land in the Upper Tugela Location and adjacent freehold (and released) land at the farm Buchdale. In addition, several families were threatened at the nearby Rosemead Mission, a Lutheran Mission Station. Originally the threatened people were to be moved out of the district altogether, since the 1975 consolidation plans called for the eventual removal of the entire Upper Tugela location. The people were strongly opposed to this. An ad hoc Committee was formed to represent not only the people threatened by the dam but all the other areas owned and occupied by Africans in the district as well. After a lengthy and difficult struggle, they succeeded in getting compensated with a number of farms that were bought up from white farmers adjoining the reserves and the people have been relocated into a series of betterment-type closer settlements established on these farms.

In this instance effective organisation by the committee, backed up by the very real threat of violence from angry members of the community, managed to achieve important concessions from the authorities. Officials attempted to bypass the committee to deal with the chief only but the committee succeeded in asserting that they be party to the negotiations; they also managed to block private negotiations between officials and
individual landowners in the freehold area and to insist that all the landowners were interested in land-for-land and not cash compensation. Tensions between the supporters of the chief and the supporters of the committee spilled over into violence on several occasions; these problems were partly defused by the deposition and banishment of the chief in 1981.

2. THREATENED REMOVALS

Several dams have been proposed in various areas of Nkhaleni/Umzimkulu. It is not clear how many people will be removed as a result of the construction of these dams, nor how many will benefit from their construction.

1. Nkwanze Dam, Nqogela River

The construction of the Nkwanze dam on the Nqogela River appears to be under way. The wall is apparently to be constructed 20 km from the mouth of the Nqogela (Sherrington-Smith et al., 1978, 15). The effects of construction are being felt over a wide area. On the northern bank of the river, within Nkwaleni in the Dandini area, residents have reported the presence of surveyors. No explanation of the surveying activity has been offered to the residents. They are ignorant of the fact that a dam is to be built higher up the river. Rumours abound. Some believe that the land is to be used for sugar cane planting, others believe that a road is to be built. A few households have moved from homestead close to the river, up onto the ridge above.

Further up the river, where the Mathi River flows into the Nqogela, people have reported the presence of contractors engaged in ploughing four large furrows down the hillside towards the river. Again, they have no information on the purposes of these furrows. Some people have said that they have only managed to prevent their houses from being bulldozed by confronting the contractor driver as he was about to continue the furrow through their homes. Here too there are many rumours circulating about the future of the area. People believe that they will be relocated, and that their land will be given over for use as a game reserve, or for roads and railways. One resident said, ‘It’s going to be like Ingwenza where they give our land to somebody else!’ Local people are employed to work in front of the contractor, clearing bush, at R7.00 per week.

On the southern bank of the Nqogela, in the Lower Nqogela district, the chief at the relocation site of Dalwer Park has been told by officials that the 600 families at the site will have to move as a result of the construction of a dam on the Nqogela. Some residents on this closer settlement have been there since 1981. Some have moved on even more recently than that (and many of the black spots in the Manager/Lower Nqogela area are under threat of removal to Dalwer Park at present.) People have not been told where they are likely to be relocated to.

Reporters trying to investigate this dam have struggled to gather information but it appears that work is going ahead at the dam site. Chief Buthelezi said that the KwaZulu government had already agreed in principle with the South African Government to allow the construction of a pumped storage hydro-electric project on the river at Nkwanze near Nkwaleni. This will benefit the homeland because it will provide employment, irrigation, a new bridge over the river and a large lake with a surface of 78 sq. km.

The same article reported that the South African Government proposes to transfer more than two-thirds of the water from KwaZulu’s Nqogela River to encourage centralization of industrial development in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand Vereeniging Basil region. Both Chief Buthelezi and the economic adviser to the KwaZulu Government feel that this makes a mockery of the Government’s decentralization proposals. A Department of Water Affairs spokesman, however, has denied this, saying that the Nkwanze scheme would not provide water to the Tranvaal; further -

Neither will the entire water supply of the Nqogela be stopped by the new dams. Some of the water will be dammed and circulated to provide power. (Mbalu Mercury, 12.05.82)

2. The Coedstanview Dam, Eshowe

A dam is planned for the Whis dass River, 13 km from Eshowe. The purpose is to make available a reliable water supply for urban and industrial use in Richards Bay, Eshowe and Eshowe Valley. Information on the number of people to be affected by this dam is lacking.

3. Ndwedwe Dam

On the Black Umfolozi River the Ethane and Mhlasmekweni Dams are planned. A dam is also proposed below the confluence of the Black and White Umfolozi Rivers - the Mkhosi-Bonyo. Dr Roger Porter, senior ecologist with the Natal Parks Board, has opposed the building of these dams because if built they would have serious social consequences because a large number of Zulu people would have to be resettled. (Daily News, 1.07.81) Precise details are not available.

4. Umzimzini area

Rumours are circulating in the Umzimzini area that people living in the Broklands area are under threat of removal as a dam to supplement Mhlambe dam is to be built there. Details are not known. (Fieldwork)

5. Amadu Dam

Near Durban, in the Mdawedwa district the building of the proposed Inanda dam may affect 25000 people. The project is to proceed in two phases. At the end of the first phase the dam will cover 645 ha and have a shoreline of 31.3 km. At the end of the second phase the dam will cover 7440 ha. (Mbalu Mercury, 12.08.80) The dam will supply water for Durban.

The valley that is proposed as the base of the site is vastly a good natural site but is generally populated. In March 1981 a White Paper prepared by the Department of Water Affairs said the dam would flood an estimated 3 500 houses. The White Paper said that the Department of Cooperation and Development would have to spend an estimated R350000 on relocation and a further R590000 on buying land as compensation. (Mbalu Mercury, 25.03.81)

Around 1979, four chiefs in the area were told of the proposed construction of the dam at a meeting with officials. However, since then there had been no discussion on the matter. Subsequently a delegation (including one of the chiefs) went to Umzini to clarify the position on the dam. According to the chief, KwaZulu denied any knowledge of or involvement in the plans and sent the enquiry on to Pretoria. Pretoria also denied any knowledge of the plans. The first the people living in the area were aware of the implementation of the plans was the arrival of surveyors to mark the site in late 1980. Two chiefs said officials had not been consulted or informed them of the plans for the area.

In March 1981 the plan was temporarily halted. According to a spokesman from the Department of Water Affairs the decision to halt the project was made on human considerations and because there appeared to have been a breakdown in coordination between the Department of Water Affairs and the Department of Cooperation and Development at the outset of the project. (Mbalu Mercury, 25.03.81)

However roads in the area continued to be graded, on the site marked. In November 1981 an announcement that the Inanda dam project was to continue "after land negotiations with the KwaZulu Government have been completed" appeared in the press. (Sunday Tribune)
8.11.81) A spokesman for the Department of Water Affairs in Pretoria said the project had never been scrapped, and that the project was going ahead on the site as originally planned. ‘At present there are certain matters of access to site and land issues that have to be cleared up between Emkuhle and the Department of Community Development.’ (Sunday Tribune, 8.11.81) When approached for comment, the Emkuhle Department of the interior refused to say anything but the spokesman for the Department of Community Development said ‘negotiations are still on between my department and Emkuhle.’ (Sunday Tribune, 8.11.81)

Lack of consultation has meant that people in the area are confused about the plans, unsure whether they will be directly affected or not. Some have only heard of the plan through the newspapers.

In November 1981 the Headmistress of a lower primary school said some people had moved out of the valley because they feared the dam would go ahead.

I don’t know what will happen to us, as far as I can make out they are having trouble resettling people from other areas so I don’t know where they will find room for us. (Sunday Tribune, 8.11.81)

Opposition to the threatened removal is widespread. ‘We will consent to move only at the barrel of a gun, because the land was owned by our forefathers’, one local resident has been quoted as saying. ( Natal Mercury, 12.08.82) A shop owner interviewed by the Sunday Tribune said residents had been aware of the project but were strongly opposed to it. ‘Many have lived here for years and years and refuse to move.’ He said the government would never be able to replace his shop because they would not be able to find as profitable a site for him. (Sunday Tribune, 8.11.81)

People living in the area told the Natal Mercury that they were prepared to protest the Department against their removal because they had not been consulted by Pretoria. ( Natal Mercury, 25.01.81)

6. Roads

Very little information on the number of people affected by the construction of roads is available. Removals in the major urban centres are more likely to receive attention in the press than those in the rural areas. As the two examples below illustrate, access to organised representation to the authorities is more readily available in the urban areas than in the rural areas as well.

In the urban centres it is the local authorities who are responsible for the expropriation of properties. Usually relatively small numbers of households are affected by road construction compared to the numbers that may be involved in the construction of a dam.

The following two cases illustrate that many of the issues are similar, however.

1. CHATSWORTH ACCESS ROAD

The creation of a second access road to Chatsworth (an Indian relocation township south of Durban) has been under consideration by the Durban City Council since 1961. The City Council has several possible routes for the road. One option involves placing the road just inside the boundary of the Stainbank Nature Reserve. This is land, originally owned by Mr D. Stainbank (a member of the Executive Council for Natal), which was subsequently donated to the city on certain conditions, one of them being that Mr Stainbank reserved the right to object to any proposed development of the land. It has been alleged that the land was originally donated by Mr Stainbank in order to prevent the access road from being built near his property. (Daily News, 23.03.82)

The second option, and the one the City Council is most likely to choose, is to put the road through part of Umhlatuzana township, an Indian township adjacent to Chatsworth on the western side of the nature reserve. This option will involve the expropriation of between 30 and 100 households and 5 owners of business premises. While property owners have been given assurances that ‘every effort would be made to keep the number of affected properties as low as possible’ and that compensation would be given, the residents of Umhlatuzana are bitter about the City Council’s choice. (Sunday Tribune, Herald, 25.01.82) They feel that the welfare of the ‘birds, bees and buck’ have been given preference over the wellbeing of people. (Sunday Tribune, 13.05.82)

The community to be affected by the road have launched a ‘Save our properties’ campaign through existing civic associations. A petition objecting to the expropriation has been signed by residents in Chatsworth and surrounding townships. The South African Indian Council are supporting the community’s opposition to the road route.

2. AVONA

Indian residents at Avona, north of Durban, reacted strongly in May 1982 to the news that 40 properties are to be expropriated there in order to build a six-lane North Coast Freeway linking Avona to the outer ring road for Durban. This move comes at the same time as the move to expropriate properties for the second access road to Chatsworth.

One resident at Avona commented ‘Why is it that Indians appear to be the only community which is forced to sacrifice their homes for roadworks?’ ( Natal Mercury, 11.05.82)

The community’s efforts to oppose the removal were supported by the South African Indian Council. A committee was formed at a public meeting on 10th May 1982 - this body is planning to make representations to the Durban City Engineer.

![Image of road and nature reserve]
Appendix 1. Clairwood

Clairwood is an Indian suburb of Durban, originally settled by ex-indentured Indians who took up market gardening there. Situated on prime industrial land - flat, bordering the harbour and close to central Durban - it has, for the past thirty years, been the subject of a dispute between its residents who want it to remain a residential area, and the Durban City Council (DCC), who want to zone it for industrial purposes.

The DCC has been working to get Clairwood zoned as an industrial area since 1953. However, it has no power to do this without the permission of the Administrator of Natal. The original proposal of the DCC was opposed by the Administrator of Natal who declared it a special Indian residential zone instead. The DCC appealed against this decision in 1956 but their appeal was dismissed, the Administrator stating that one of the main objections to the scheme was that the Council had failed 'to demonstrate that the inhabitants of this 100 ha tract of land could be satisfactorily rehoused.' (Memorandum of Durban Town Planning Scheme, M.A. Pistorius, n.d., 1)

Residents claim that since then the DCC has been using indirect methods of forcing people out of the area. With zoning as special residential in 1953, all new buildings and structural alterations were banned, in terms of Section 67 of the Town Planning Ordinance, unless a permit could be obtained. (Memorandum to the Indian Affairs Committee, 19.07.65, 5) A direct consequence of this ban on building has been that houses have become dilapidated; many have then been declared slums and their occupants evicted. 'Over the last 5 years quite habitable houses were declared slums in a move that would appear to be a ploy to get people out.' (Sunday Tribune, 6.09.81)

It has been alleged that the neglect of the area by the DCC is deliberate, to create a justification for the removal of people once its condition is 'beyond improvement.'

Once this cycle of self-fulfilling rationale is complete, the area can be demolished without conscience. At a recent meeting to discuss Clairwood, a city councillor put forward the view that the 'whole scheme amounted to no more than the usual slum clearance procedure'. (Sundheim, 1981, 7)

In early 1970, more than 50 families were moved out of one street to make way for an abattoir. (Sunday Tribune, 6.09.81) Many more families were moved to make way for the building of the new Durban market. The market was subsequently built but is operable but the abattoir was built at Otwo Ridge, 40 km from Durban, instead. Most of the families who were moved went initially to Merebank Emergency Camp and were then moved again to Phoenix, once that township had been built.

Finally, in November 1978, the DCC obtained approval for the rezoning of Clairwood provided that alternative accommodation was made available for its residents. The Council, however, has not finally adopted this. Instead it has drawn up a 'comprehensive redevelopment plan' to 'facilitate urban renewal'. (Memorandum, Durban Town Planning Scheme, Pistorius, n.d., 1) This plan provides for roads to be widened, certain properties expropriated and services installed in a 10-phase programme over a period of roughly 10 years.

Even though industrial zoning has not been implemented, it appears that these plans for urban renewal have been designed to bring that a step closer. By widening roads, the DCC can expropriate properties without needing the Administrator's approval, a move which makes the people of Clairwood powerless. It can also move people out gradually so that eventually no one will be left to object and the DCC will be able to go ahead with its industrial zoning. Road plans have already been used in this way. According to a report in the Natal Mercury in early 1982:

"More than a decade ago the local Indian Football and Sports Trust was forced to sell, out of fear, its vast football field in Archery Road as plans proposed by the council at the time showed new roads cutting right across its playing fields. These ghost road plans were never implemented and the lands in question are now occupied by large white owned businesses, Makro and United Transport. (Natal Mercury, 1.03.82)"

Furthermore, residents claim that although the new services provided by the Council (road maintenance and sanitation) have not been substantial, rates have risen drastically. In addition vacant lots in Clairwood are being charged at industrial rates, assessments being as high as R600 p.a. (Sundheim, 1981, 6). Some of these vacant lots are the result of prosecutions under the Slums Act. High rates set another pressure on residents to leave the area.

Objections to the Council's moves have been coordinated by the Clairwood and District Ratepayers and Residents Association, a body which has continually refused to yield over the issue of Clairwood becoming industrial. They have advocated that the nearby Clairwood race course be used as industrial land instead, rather than have thousands of people uprooted. (Natal Mercury, 1.03.82) However this suggestion has never been taken up by the City Council, which seems determined to go ahead with its own plans.
Appendix 2. Ndumu Game Reserve

The following report outlines the contents of a meeting held between a development worker and 4 tribal leaders in the Bongweni area, just to the east of the Ndumu Game Reserve and just south of the Mozambique border. It illustrates the problems the local people encountered in living in an area that has been earmarked for conservation. The establishment of the Ndumu game reserve has cut them off from the Pongola River and taken much of their best agricultural land. There are approximately 450 homesteads in the area.

WATER SUPPLY

The tribe's main problem is their water supply. At the moment they are cut off from the Pongola River by the fence running along the eastern boundary of the Ndumu Game Reserve. Only women and young children are allowed to enter the reserve, to collect water, through two special gates. Men and boys are specifically prohibited from entering the reserve. It is thus very difficult for unmarried males to get water, since they have to rely on relatives to fetch the water. Males generally find it difficult to wash, as the women are unable to carry large quantities of water back to their homesteads.

Cattle from along the Mozambique border have to be driven over 71 km, to a place called Fumotini, to be watered.

The scarcity of water also creates problems at the cattle dip. The Pongola River is less than 1 km from the dipping tank but if the head pump is out of order — as it frequently is — it is impossible to fill it. The tribe has asked the KwaZulu government for a water tanker but have not yet got it. When the pump is not working they have to wait for heavy rains to fill the tank — they once waited for four months. At the time of the meeting, they were unable to dip as well; they simply took their cattle to the dip to be counted and were then dismissed. As a result the cattle are covered in ticks and numbers have died.

GARDENS

Before the game reserve was established, people used to cultivate vegetable gardens in the swampy areas and all the land up to the Pongola River belonged to them. The game reserve boundary incorporated their garden area, but even though they lost their access to this land, they were not paid any compensation. People then started making gardens along the Pongola River across the border, in Mozambique, but in 1975 the border was closed to them by Pretiino.

At the moment the people from Bongweni buy their vegetables from people living to the south of them. They do cultivate maize and cowpeas during the rainy season. If they have a good harvest, they are able to store some of the maize for the winter; otherwise they are dependent on buying from the store. There is a good market for vegetables but they are unable to take advantage of it.

Being cut off from the Pongola river has also had negative effects on the quality of their houses. The best thatching grass and the reeds used for building the walls of their houses grow next to the river; they are both more difficult to gather as needed.

ANIMAL HAZARDS

The local people have complained to the game reserve officers about crocodiles in the Pongola river. A child was killed and a woman injured recently. As a result of their complaints, the Natal Parks Board appointed some game guards to look after the women while they were collecting water. Recently, however, the Parks Board has informed the indunas that the game guards are to be withdrawn because they should be patrolling instead.

Elephants living to the east of them, towards the Mozambique, are another serious hazard. Elephants periodically travel through the people's land, causing enormous damage to their crops. People have heard rumours that there is to be an Elephant game reserve in the area but have not been told anything officially. When told that, according to the Tiniyayi Ham Riet report, the land separating their community from the elephant area is likely to become a 'resource area' to which both the local people and the elephants will have access, the indunas' response was a rhetorical question: 'How can people and elephants stay together?'

REMOVALS

The people of Bongweni have never been told officially to move out of the area. However several households have moved by themselves to land to the south and to the west of the game reserve. The reasons given for this movement were: 1) the water problems, 2) loss of land and 3) rumours that the area is to be declared a nature conservation reserve.

FACILITIES

The area is very poorly served. There are no schools in the area and only one clinic. Transport is a major problem since there are no proper roads. Old people have to travel long distances to collect their old age pensions; they have requested that a local pay-out point be established but nothing has come of that yet. There is no local employment. The young men work on the sugar mills at Ethembeni and in the mines; the indunas estimated that about half of them are working out of the district; the rest are unemployed.

Despite the problems, people like the area because it is where they have always lived. In their view, if only the game reserve fence were removed, they would be able to make a better living.
11. STRATEGIC REMOVALS

1. Introduction

In addition to those removals for conservation projects in which strategic considerations have played a part, as already discussed, there have also been removals in Natal that have been initiated by the Defence Force (SADF) for directly strategic reasons. In an address to an Urban Foundation workshop on rural development held in Durban in 1979, Brigadier C.J. Lloyd, then Commanding Officer of the Natal Command, put the position of the Defence Force in relation to the people living in strategically sensitive areas thus:

"To have or not to have a local population in the border and rural area, is the question. ... Wherever we have a local population in our border and rural areas we will have to secure their loyalty, goodwill and co-operation against the insurgents. Where this is not feasible, we will have to move them out of the critical areas and resettle them elsewhere."

He went on to say that:

"The SADF is keen to see that i) there is a strong local population presence in our border and rural areas (White and KwaNulu); ii) this local population is loyal and co-operative towards the Republic of South Africa, iii) proper population control is exercised in these areas. (Lloyd, 1979)

In Natal there have been to date at least two instances of relocation of people by the military:
1) To make way for a restricted-entry missile range on the north coast at Lake St Lucia, between 1968 and 1979;
2) To establish a strip of open land along the Mozambican and Swazi borders.

It is estimated that about 3,500 people, mainly in the missile range area, have been affected by these two processes. In addition to those removals that have already taken place, some 96,000 people have been threatened with incorporation into Swaziland as a result of the attempted Umzimvukana land deal which has already been described in the chapter on consolidation. Although strategic considerations do not appear to have been the only ones involved, they must have played an important part in Pretoria's formulation of this scheme.

2. Removals from the missile range

Although the missile range was demilitarized in 1968, the removals to clear the area of the people already living there only got under way in the mid 1970s. This area was cleared in several phases:
PRELIMINARY PLANS

In late 1968 Government Notice 1959 established the boundaries of a restricted zone under the control of the RAFP, for the establishment of a missile testing range. The restricted zone takes the form of an elongated rectangle, stretching up the coast from just north of Ope Vidal for some 40 to 45 km, and inland for about 15 to 20 km. (See map.) It takes in part of Lake St Lucia and straddles both State land and the eastern part of Reserve no. 1 - all of it land settled by black people for a very long time. At that stage government officials estimated that about 4 500 people would have to move to make way for the missile range. It was envisaged that they would be relocated on the State land in the Ingweama district - the northern Makhatini Plata - with some access to the proposed irrigation scheme for that area. It seems that at first the removals were seen as urgent, but that it soon became apparent that the bureaucracy could not achieve so large-scalc removals at short notice. Clearing the land involved negotiations and allocation of duties between, inter alia, the Department of Bantu Affairs, the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner of Natal in Pietermaritzburg, the local commissioners at Umzim, Ingweama, the Department of Defence, the Department of Water Affairs, the Department of Agriculture and of Forestry, the Department of Justice (to determine the legalities of moving people from reserves; officials were unsure what the position was and were anxious to close any possible loopholes), the Department of Health and the Public Works Department, quite apart from the negotiations necessary with the local people.

Apart from these immediate problems, the planning for the future development of the entire Ingweama/Umzim region was in a state of flux and this also slowed down the process of removal. By late 1968 the State was already re-evaluating its earlier dream of establishing a large white sugar-growing settlement on the Makhatini Plata and was drawing up the first tentative plans for the establishment of a consolidated Kambulu bantuwan. (The Legislative Assembly of Kambulu was finally established in 1972.) An Ad Hoc Committee to make recommendations on the future of the State lands and the reserves in this area, consisting of the Chief Bantu Commissioner of Natal, the two local commissioners and senior agricultural and engineering officials, had been appointed. It reported in early 1969, recommending that the Makhatini Plata be divided for both black and white ownership and that the southern portion of the Umzim doctric, including Reserve 1, 2 and part of the southern ends of Reserves 16 and 14 become white - substantially the proposals later put forward in the 1972 consolidation proposals for Kambulu. It seems that already the planners for this region were concerned that the large-scale removals that such a plan would necessitate should not alienate the local people in a strategically sensitive area - a concern that local officials have consistently spelled out to their superiors throughout the 1970s. The Inamashile removals taking place in the Mabve/Bundu district at the time had generated a considerable amount of very negative publicity about removals which the people were not wanting to repeat. The planners were therefore anxious that nobody should be moved until proper preparations had been made and facilities such as schools, clinics etc. provided.

The interplay of these various factors led to a relaxation of the pressure to remove the people still living in the missile range as soon as possible. While the removal was thus temporarily delayed, the local commissioner was instructed not to allow any further capital expenditure in the affected area (presumably to reduce the amount of compensation due when the people were finally removed). Throughout this time local people had not been officially informed of what was in store for them - they were only finally notified in 1972 - but they were clearly aware that something was in the air. The prohibition on building added to their growing unease and suspicions.

THE FIRST REMOVAL PHASE, 1972 - 1974

Matters appear to have been allowed to lapse until about 1972, by which time Pretoria's first consolidation plan for Kambulu had been drafted and made available to the public for comment. During 1972/73 the removal of people in the missile range became an issue once again, with two areas included as priorities. The first target for removal was to be those people living in what was known as the danger zone in the testing range - some 400 people altogether, living on State land in the central part of the missile range. The second target was to be a further 70 or 80 households living in the forest reserve just south of the missile range, in the vicinity of the Msangi Pan at Ope Vidal. It seems that this group was removed in 1973/74 - part of the general relocation of households from this area at the time to make way for forestry development (already described in the previous chapter).

Local people's response

By the end of 1972 the news that they were to be removed had been broken to the people living in the danger zone. The newly established Kambulu government had also been informed. It is not clear what the responses of the government itself was, but certainly seconded officials in the infast Kambulu civil service appear to have cooperated well with Pretoria. By that stage the proposals for the wider areas were being modified once again and the earlier 1972 consolidation proposals were amended by the publication of new proposals in April 1973. In terms of these proposals the entire Makhatini Plata area was to be handed over to Kambulu and the southern ends of Reserves 14 and 16 were to remain black land. Because of this the relocation planners had more land to work with; the original idea of relocating the people from the military zone into the northern Makhatini Plata was abandoned and it was decided to move them instead to the Khomsvana area, west of Sodwana Bay and within Reserve 14 - still within their own tribal area, as officials pointed out soothingly to the affected people.

Although resistance was not organized nor systematic, there was a widespread mood of opposition to the removal plans among all the people on the reserve. In December 1972 when the commissioner at Umzim held a meeting with the local people to inform them of the removal they made it clear that they did not want to be moved. With an eye on their own powerlessness in the matter, they also stressed that if they were finally moved, it should be to a permanent place. They had already felt the pressure of the Forward Plan on their coastal area, as a result of which many people had been forced to move more than once in previous years as more and more of the State land was planted under forest. Although their opposition to the move was understood, it was nevertheless apparent and the commissioner was concerned about the negative response. Subsequently, when the commissioner arranged to show the people their relocation area, hardly anybody came, while a government employee who was painting numbers on the doors of households to be moved was so severely threatened that he had to be transferred out of the district.

The removal

The removal finally got under way in mid 1974. It seems that it was planned as a full scale army manoeuvre, with the army undertaking to transport the people and their goods; in terms of numbers officially relocated, it was a dismal failure. When the trucks arrived to take the people to Khomsvana, most of the households to be moved had already
abandoned their homes, taken their movable possessions and disappeared into the neighbouring Reserve no. 1 or to the as yet unaffected State land to the north. Only a handful of households had waited for the trucks. The terrain over which the trucks had to move was also extremely sandy and rough and this made even the removal of those few people a slow, difficult and frustrating process which took several days to complete. By the end of the exercise less than 10 households had been transported the 50 km or so to their relocation site in the Khawanani area, but the area as a whole had been emptied. Once the removal was completed, all the houses left were burnt to prevent the people who had been transported from the area or those who had moved by themselves from returning to their former homes.

Those relocated in Khawanani were given tents on loan until they had built new houses, rations for a few days and poles for rebuilding. Other facilities were non-existent, although some households and trading stores were scattered around in the wider district for the people already living there. The sites did not have latrines in them - people were told they were expected to build their own. Although the small number of facilities hardly made a closer settlement in the conventional sense, they were settled on small, township plots without agricultural land. This was a source of discontent from the start. The commissioner attempted to take up the people’s request for more land with his superiors but this was turned down - revealingly enough by the Director of Agriculture and Forestry in the Kambulu government, to whom the request was directed.

The available evidence suggests that the Kambulu government service was fully involved in the removal - the Department of Native Administration and Development in conjunction with the army, taking responsibility for the removal of the people out of their former lands and Kambulu departments for their relocation in what was Kambulu territory. (In this respect the removals differed from black spot removals in the Natal interior, where people are generally removed to Trust land.) To what extent the black members of the Kambulu government were informed and active in the planning is not apparent; their white seconded civil servants appear to have taken an active part.

Compensation

The compensation paid to those people removed was, from all accounts, extremely low with figures ranging from R10 to about R50 or R70 per household being reported. A Pretoria official made the evaluations on which the compensation paid was based in late 1973. It appears that only buildings and agricultural produce were taken into account, not the value of the land itself since this was State land and the legal status of the people living on it that of squatters despite the fact that they had been living there for generations and the land had never been occupied by other groups.

Housing in the area consists mainly of wood and reed structures, with each household generally having several such buildings. Most people had quite extensive and well-established agricultural assets in the form of sub-tropical fruit trees: bananas, mango, avocado and orange trees as well as pineapples. One household which had an orchard of some 200 banana trees as well as several mango trees and orange trees, was apparently paid out only about R70 for the lot. There was no legal assistance for the people removed, nor any publicity on the move. People were obliged to take what money they were offered, leave their land and start rebuilding on their closer settlement lots.

THE SECOND REMOVAL PHASE, 1976

It seems that by 1975, with the independence of Mozambique in the offing, the SAPF had become anxious to speed up the removals from the rest of the area. Once again, however, it proved impossible to push through the necessary negotiations and planning in a short time and the actual removal, in the second priority area, only got under way in September 1976.

This removal

In late 1976 a further 1 000 people were removed from the area immediately north of the danger zone (see map). Once again not all the households were actually moved to their relocation site. 200 people were housed in the same general area as that of the previous group - although the record was somewhat better than in 1974 and only a minority of those to be removed had disappeared by the time the trucks arrived. In these removals the allocation of tasks appears to have followed the pattern of 1974, with the South African government and SAPF being responsible for the actual removal of people and the Kambulu administration for their relocation at Khawanani.

Despite the years of planning and replanning that had preceded the removal, it was not without its attendant problems. No sooner had the people been placed at their new sites than it was realised that the area was unsuitable since it was intended for nature conservation purposes and had in fact been proclaimed a forestry area many years before. Attempts to get the people to agree to a further move ran into problems when they flatly refused. What the final outcome of this situation was, is not clear. The commissioner seems to have been anxious to adopt a conciliatory approach and not to antagonise the people by any roughshod measures but it is probable that eventually they were shifted yet again, to the south of Khawanani village but still within Reserve Fourteen. People living in this area, who are now threatened by the proposed removals out of the Sodwana Bay triangle, claim that some of them have been moved before. Thus, if the Sodwana Bay triangle is finally cleared of its residents it will mean that some local people will have suffered perhaps as many as three relocations since 1976.

Compensation and facilities

Both the compensation paid out and the facilities provided in this second phase of removals out of the missile zone were inadequate, or on a par with what those moved in 1974 had received. People have reported being paid compensation averaging out at about R50 per household, with the value of their land excluded from the calculations once again. People were moved into tents and no provisions were made for extra schools or a clinic. (The Khawanani clinic only started operating in January 1981.)

THE THIRD REMOVAL PHASE, 1977 - 1979

The final phase in the removal of people from out of the military zone began in early 1977 but was not completed till 1975, when up to 2 000 more people were moved, all into the Khawanani area. This brought the total number of people moved out of the military zone to a little under three and a half thousand; it appears, however, that the eastern region of Reserve no. 1, which falls within the restricted area, has not been cleared to date and if it is, this will happen in 1979/1980.

There were two sets of people to be moved in this final phase: 1) about 300 people living in the northern parts of the military zone (as defined in 1968) round Lake Nongomis and 2) another group of perhaps 1 000 people who were living in the stretch of State land between the military zone and Sodwana Bay which previously had been proclaimed a Forestry Reserve. In mid 1975 this area was added to the military zone and the army then came to control virtually the entire stretch of coast from Cape Vidal to Sodwana Bay. Once again there were numerous delays and obstructions to the smooth implementation of the removal. It seems that by this time the Department of Defence had adopted a far more cautious approach to removals than it had had in the early 1970s when it had been so deeply involved in the actual physical shifting of people. Although, as Brigadier Lloyd made clear in his address to the Urban Foundation workshop in 1979, it still considered removing people from strategic areas as one method of 'people control', it did not want to be seen as the agent of removal by the local people since this would
prejudice its attempt to secure, in the words of Frindier Lloyd, their 'lovely, goodwill and co-operation against the insurgents.' It thus left the task of transporting people to other government departments.

Complicating the picture further, by 1977 discussions were already under way within government circles about the removal of people in the Triangle of land that the Natal Parks Board wanted to acquire in Reserve 14 to extend the white holiday resort of Sodwana Bay. This threw the status of land to the south of KwaZulu into question, making it unsuitable for relocation purposes, and also meant that at a later date still more people might have to be accommodated at any relocation site chosen.

The reasons:

Despite all the forewarnings that had preceded this last act of removals, when finally carried out it took at great speed and with minimal advance preparations. According to the staff of a mission hospital in the vicinity of the relocation site (in the KwaZulu area again), the local health authorities were not warned of the impending influx into their district. Not only was the hospital not prepared for the sudden influx of people, the malaria control officials based at Jomini were not notified either, despite their need to monitor all dwelling places for their programs of spraying against mosquitoes.

Furthermore, despite earlier promises of schools and clinics that were made to those being removed, no additions to the existing facilities at KwaZulu were made to cope with the added pressure of people. Most serious of all, no advance preparations had been made to increase the water supply in the relocation area. The people were moved from well-watered places to a much dryer area: the move also coincided with a severe drought so water was — and still is — an acute problem.

People were moved into tents, as in the previous moves. While no precise figures are available, much of the compensation paid, this was also very low, although possibly somewhat higher than what had been paid out in 1974 and 1976. Figures of between R80 and R100 have been reported as the usual amount paid out. A local doctor has described the situation during the removals as ‘the most pathetic sight’ — people were unprepared, confused, disoriented. He reports considerable bitterness among the people but says there was little organized resistance to the move and there is still a low level of organization among them today.

This latest removal was relatively recent, in the period of Dr Koonhof’s public relations exercise in which forced removals were said to be a thing of the past and great play made on the minimum standards laid down for relocation areas — water, clinics, schools, shops etc. Because the area is so isolated, there was hardly any press coverage at the time and the lack of preparation and lack of basic facilities for the people who were moved was never sufficiently exposed.

Present conditions at KwaZulu

Living conditions at KwaZulu are hard, the problems for those relocated there compounded by the lack of land available to them. The hospital at KwaZeleni is one of the major employers in the district. Recruitment of migrant workers in this district has also fallen off drastically in recent years, according to a local clinic sister: whereas previously local men could find jobs in Johannesburg or Durban, now ‘the rule’ is that they can only take jobs in Zululand north of the Pongola River — at Richards Bay and Empangeni — and unemployment is high. There is still no adequate water supply and people have to travel quite long distances to collect domestic water. This is collected mainly from rivers and streams and is not clean so bilharzia and other water-borne diseases are common.

The superintendent at the nearby KwaZeleni hospital has reported to SFP that half the malnutrition cases in the hospital’s entire health ward came from the area of KwaZulu.

He attributes the high malnutrition rate directly to the relocation of people into the area, and the concomitant social and economic disruption to their lives.

Future developments in the missile range area

On the 25th June 1982 the central government announced that 140 000 hectares of State and scheduled land in the KwaZulu/St Lucia area was to be handed over to the Natal Parks Board as a conservation area, the proposed area incorporating both the entire missile range and the neighbouring African reservations of Reserve no. 1. Although Dr Koonhof was at great pains to deny that this offer had any connection with the Ingwavuma land deal, it was clearly intimately connected.

As part of that land deal Pretorius had offered KwaZulu various pieces of land in return for the loss of Ingwavuma — including the Northern Natal game reserves of Khuzo, Hluhluwe and Empangeni. This had outraged the Natal Parks Board, conservationists and the white public in Natal in general. The offer of this land at St Lucia to the Parks Board was clearly an attempt to mollify that outrage and to win acceptance of Pretorius’s land deal in influential circles in white Natal.

The population removes that this game reserve will necessitate in the affected areas of KwaZulu have been discussed in the previous chapter. As far as the missile range area is concerned, local people will not be directly affected since they have already been removed — although those who used to live there will undoubtedly be embittered when they see their former land used as a sanctuary for animals and a holiday area for tourists.

What is not yet clear is whether the missile range will be retained as a restricted military area within the new game reserve or not: this has not been discussed in the press. It does however seem improbable that the NADP would relinquish this area after they have invested so much time and energy to clear it for their own use.

3. Clearing land on the north-eastern borders

It is difficult to get accurate information on what has been happening in the border areas — to what extent removals have already taken place and to what extent they are still planned. The army apparently plans to build a military road along the Mzimkulu border. Although this has not been built yet, the few households in the way were instructed to move during 1980, and have settled further south, gravitating towards the growing settlement of Mbuyane (Mzimkulu/Kwemane). In addition to the road, the army is also putting in a small fence along this border and about 20 families in the vicinity of Kosi Bay have been moved to make way for this. It does not appear as if the small fence has stretched very far yet.

Further inland, around the Mozambique, about 50 households have apparently moved away from the border over the past four or five years, partly as a result of rumours circulating that they will be moved at some future date, and partly, according to local information, because of the attractions of the more built-up areas of Maputo where houses can be bought and a hospital are all to be found. There are also reports (again, well-founded) that the Ingwavuma Game Reserve on the border is to be extended and this too has put pressures on the people living in the area to shift away from the border. This area is sparsely populated and the movement has not been significant in terms of numbers but is significant in terms of the increasing militarisation of the region. It does not appear as if any compensation has been paid to the people who have moved; certainly those who have moved themselves do not generally qualify for any such remuneration.

The position on the Swazi border (prior to the announcement of the Ingwavuma land deal) seems similar. A twelve metre strip along this border was cleared in readiness for the planting of a similar fence but by April 1981 this fence had not yet been begun. However,
a few families living in its way have already shifted away from the vicinity of the border. The Ingwavuma land deal has thrown the future of the entire area of north eastern Natal into question. It seems inevitable, however, that whether inside KwaZulu-Natal or not, the area will become an increasingly sensitive one for the SADF as the political conflict within South Africa escalates and that further pressures from the military on the local population can be anticipated as a result.

12. BETTERMENT PLANNING

1. Introduction

Betterment planning grew out of an awareness within government circles in the 1930s and 1940s of the urgent need for rehabilitation of the reserve areas; that the increasing deterioration in the quality and productivity of this land was threatening the continued subsistence basis of the migrant labour system. Already in 1936 the Beaufort Commission noted that soil erosion and the destruction of grazing land in the scheduled areas was on the increase. In the 1930s the authorities began to devise ways of protesting the land from the worst effects of overpopulation and overstocking, accepting always the fundamental constraint imposed on the reserves by the all-white Parliament - that their area could not be increased beyond the 136 of the total land mass in South Africa, as legislated in 1936. Given this refusal to acknowledge that both the unequal distribution of land between black and white and the prohibition on Africans acquiring land outside the reserves were at the heart of the problem, the solutions put forward were necessarily flawed from the start - technical tinkering to an essentially political problem.

Proclamation 31 of 1939 introduced the first piece of ‘Betterment Planning’ for the reserves. It made provision for any area in the reserves to be proclaimed a betterment area where controls could be imposed on stock ownership (through cattle culling) and the demarcation of arable and grazing land. It was the enforcement of this land usage aspect that has led to massive relocation of people within the reserves over the years. Even though the distance moved might only be a short one, from scattered homesteads into a consolidated residential area within the community, households still have to rebuild their houses and restructure previous land tenure arrangements. The peasant response to these controls was generally hostile, with resistance becoming violent on occasion. (See B. Hiraoon, 1977 and J. Yaritch, 1982 for discussion on this.) The reaction of the authorities was to call for stronger legislation to enforce the controls rather than to review their manner of consultation with the affected people.

In 1944 a further Proclamation was passed making betterment planning compulsory on all Trust Farms, i.e. on all land purchased by the SADF in terms of the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act. The following year the scope of betterment was broadened to allow for the creation of ‘rural villages’ in which residents would have no access to arable or grazing land - for example, the closer settlements of the 1950s and 1970s. These rural villages were intended for housing the families of Africans regularly employed in industry. In 1949 Proclamation 116 was gazetted, introducing harsher penalties for transgressions of betterment regulations. Native Commissioners were given powers to declare and implement betterment schemes in their areas, to fine and imprison opponents of such schemes and to call on any adult African male to provide his labour free on projects associated with betterment e.g. fencing, making fire-breaks etc.

Despite these measures, little was achieved in practice in this period and by 1954 it was estimated that only about 3% of the reserve area had been planned. More land than this had been proclaimed as betterment areas but, largely because of local opposition, implementation of planning had fallen behind.
THE TOULMIN COMMISSION

The Report of the Toulmin Commission (UO 61, 1955) ushered in a new phase in the history of betterment planning. Swisch has argued that the solutions proposed by the Commission did not differ radically from those already adopted by earlier government planners, but rather "reflected and gave coherence form and rationalism" to them. (Swisch, 1962, 24-25) Had the Toulmin recommendations been carried through in their entirety, the scale of removal of surplus people into closer settlements without land would have escalated enormously. Toulmin's solution to the manifest impoverishment and environmental degradation in the reserves was to propose that the practice of allowing each reserve family a piece of land be abandoned. The reserve population should be divided into a class of permanent, small-scale farmers and a class of fully proletarianized people dependent on wage employment, who would have to be removed from the land. Only "economic units" of land capable of supporting a middle peasantancy should be allocated and "sub maintenance farming" should be abolished. (UO 61, 1955, 114, para 15)

In trying to determine the size of an economic unit, the Commission came face to face with the degree to which the reserves were underdeveloped and overcrowded but refused to confront the fundamental political issues involved in this land shortage. The Commission was however obliged to take account of the potential impact of its recommendations on the local people and the likelihood of resistance to them. First it set out to determine the minimum income that an economic unit would have to yield if it were to provide for a family of six, including one child, and one full-time farm worker. Most of the witnesses before the Commission suggested a figure of £120 per annum. Acknowledging that "no scientific reasons were given for these recommendations" the Commission nevertheless considered this figure and then halved it to £60 on the grounds that the plot capable of yielding £120 per annum would have to be larger than could realistically be aimed for within the area set aside for Africans. In a revealing paragraph it stated:

"If £120 were to be adopted as the standard for determining the future size of the Bantu farming unit, this would mean that at least 80% of the present number of families in the Bantu areas would have to be removed from the land. Not only would this be impossible to carry out in practice but, from a broad sociological standpoint, it would be wrong to uproot so large a portion of the rural population. (UO 61, 1955, 113)

A target of £60 per annum per economic unit was preferable because it would only necessitate the removal of the land of 50% of the reserve population!

Thus Toulmin advocated a form of betterment planning that in fact involved the relocation of the whole reserve population. 50% of them were to be removed to closer settlements where they would have no land and depend entirely on migrant labour or local wage employment for their survival, and the other 50%, those to remain in agriculture, would have to be relocated on their land to allow for the planned division of the land into residential, arable and grazing areas.

The Toulmin recommendations were not adopted in their entirety and those that were have not been implemented in all respects either. While accepting the principle of a division between a farming and non-farming population in the reserves, the government refused to allow tribal tenure to be replaced by individual ownership. (UO 14, 1959)

The government also rejected a further recommendation that white industrial enterprises be allowed to establish themselves within the reserves and drastically reduced the budget proposed by Toulmin for the rehabilitation and development of the reserves, from a recommended £104,5 million to £36,5 million.

Despite the degree to which the Toulmin recommendations were not adopted, the Report remained a firm reference point for land use planning in the reserves in the years that followed. As the massive relocation of surplus farm workers and black spots into the reserves began to get under way in the 1960s, however, the ideal of a 'contented full time Bantu farmer' became more and more remote. At the same time the reality of a class of people living in closer settlements, without access to agricultural land, became more widespread; a group of landless people without access to local employment, however, and without assured access even to migrant labour. Within planned betterment villages themselves landlessness is on the increase and the average size of allocated farming plots is on the decrease. With only a fixed amount of land at their disposal, these villages cannot expect to achieve the natural population increase, never mind the influx of people being forced back into the reserves areas.

2. Betterment in KwaZulu

Betterment planning in the Natal reserves started getting under way in the 1950s and by 1959 a total of 12,9% of the total area had reportedly been planned. According to a NAD report in 1964, between 1954 and 1959 a total of 380,946 morgen (26,019 hectares) had been "reclaimed" and a further 73,266 morgen (6,338 hectares) "stabilized", meaning that permanent residential areas had actually been demarcated on them. (RP 78, 1964, 15) By 1965 a total of 1,199,413 morgen (10,633 hectares) had been planned representing 32,67% of the total reserves in the province.

Table 17. AREA UNDER BETTERMENT PLANNING IN NATAL RESERVES, 1954 - 1965 (Morgen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL AREA PLANED NO. DATE</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL RESERVE AREA</th>
<th>TOTAL AREA PLANED IN YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>10,7%</td>
<td>41,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>477,424</td>
<td>12,5%</td>
<td>4,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>583,151</td>
<td>16,7%</td>
<td>105,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>708,102</td>
<td>22,07%</td>
<td>204,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>950,066</td>
<td>26,54%</td>
<td>162,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1,042,441</td>
<td>26,82%</td>
<td>172,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,199,413</td>
<td>32,87%</td>
<td>156,972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Natal, as in other parts of the country, planning an area did not necessarily mean implementation of the plan and the actual area of land where plans had been enforced was less than the figures supplied in the table above indicate. In 1967 a NAD report noted that in only 60% of the 1,199,413 morgen planned in Natal by 1965 had planning been physically carried out. (RP 37, 1967, 13) Natal revealed the greatest discrepancy between planning and implementation - by contrast 79% of the plan for the Ciskei had been implemented, 76% for the Northern Territories and 80% for the Western Territories. (1264)

Part of the reason for this was the strenuous opposition to the implementation of betterment planning in parts of the Natal reserves. In the 1960s the district of Bongolivu in Northern Natal witnessed extremely violent opposition to attempts to collect and relocate houses into residential settlements. Although betterment planning...
was eventually enforced in the district, today there are many problems associated with the upkeep of the system. A local agricultural officer interviewed by SPP in 1981 admitted that fencing was in poor condition because the people living in the betterment villages were not interested in maintaining them. He also reported that the number of cattle grazing on the land was too high and that a culling programme was necessary, but described this as a 'thorny problem': the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture was afraid to implement such a programme because of the anger that it would engender locally. (Fieldwork)

Suitability on the extent of betterment planning carried out in KwaZulu in the 1970s are extremely hard to come by. In 1980, in answer to a question asked in Parliament, the Minister of Cooperation and Development disclaimed any responsibility for betterment planning:

The information required relates to matters over which the various National States have full jurisdiction and the Department of Cooperation and Development is therefore not in a position to furnish it. (Hansard, Question 540, 22.04.80)

KwaZulu is however firmly committed to betterment planning as a study of various of their policy documents, for instance 'The Final Report of the Select Committee on Land Tenure in KwaZulu' (1976), shows. Betterment planning has continued to be enforced, with 'Compensation payments ... in respect of ... resettlement necessitated by the implementation of agricultural planning and development' being an annual sub-category within the budget allocated for agricultural planning and development.

Between 1972 and 1979 a total of R252 170,11 was allocated for this purpose in KwaZulu. The numbers to be paid out in this way are, unfortunately, not known. Assuming an average of between 3500 and 4000 compensation per household this would mean something of the order of 60 to 80 thousand households relocated in this period. These figures show a marked upsurge in the funds allocated for compensation between 1976/77 and 1977/78, indicating a renewed upsurge in the implementation and enforcement of betterment.

Table 18. COMPENSATION PAID OUT FOR RELOCATION AS A RESULT OF BETTERMENT PLANNING, KWAZULU, 1972 - 1978.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>COMPENSATION</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ALLOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>R33 339,13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>R13 936,56</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>R3 759,36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>R 9 782,04</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>R16 285,00</td>
<td>1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>R57 122,00</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>Information not available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From fieldwork it appears that it is mainly the northern and western parts of KwaZulu where betterment planning has been carried through - Songoza, Mahlabathini, Sputu, the Upland areas of Nkandla, Epcoole, Valindile, Polise and Retouuri.† Many of the

* This figure is based on the average household compensation paid out by the Department of Cooperation and Development to two black spots removed in 1978 and 1981 respectively (See p. 379 and p. 494 for details)

† For an account of a betterment village in the Nkandla district see Appendix 1.
coastal areas - where the population density is high and the logistics of relocation correspondingly more intimidating - have not been planned or, if plans have been made, these have not been carried through. Similarly the extremely densely populated and socially unstable district of Ximnem has seen no planning effort.

The available evidence suggests that the speed with which betterment has been implemented and the areas chosen in KwaZulu have been influenced by the degree to which local resistance has been anticipated. In 1975 the authors of a study on social and political change in KwaZulu noted:

Robert has privately expressed his fears ... in regard to peasant reaction to agricultural planning in KwaZulu, which must unavoidably cause discontent to many. (Schlemmer & Mull, 1975, 113, quoted in Hare, 1980, 30)

In 1980/81 planning was being implemented in the district of Khwaza. In interviews with BPS, an agricultural officer for the region and a local priest at Khwaza both stated that maximum consultation with the people and minimum relocation were the two overriding criteria for the way in which the plan for the area was to be implemented. According to the agricultural officer, the lessons of Nongam had been learnt. Consultation was being achieved mainly through the chief, who approved of the plan and apparently had the support of his people.

The emphasis on consultation has been endorsed by the KwaZulu legislature. In 1980 a 'Guide to Land Use Planning' was passed by the legislature. This stipulates that no community can be 'bettered' unless it is willing and the community must be involved in the implementation of the plan, through a local Planning and Development Committee.

In practice it appears that indirect but compelling methods of coercion may be applied where a community persistently refuses to agree to betterment being introduced in its area. In a policy document entitled 'Land Use Planning' that was drawn up by F. le Roux of the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the criteria or factors which should influence the selection of betterment areas are outlined. Priority is to be given to those areas where co-operation prevails; next are such areas where co-operation is likely to be obtained. These areas should be left alone for the time being until the co-operation of the people can be obtained either by propaganda or by the application of sanctions.1 (Le Roux, 1980, 5)

In seeking clarification on the phrase 'application of sanctions' a researcher was told that this meant the withholding of government funds for the provision of infrastructure, services and community facilities. (See Senque, 1981, 77)

In 1981 SPP also heard of one instance where the local chief was applying pressure on his people to agree to betterment planning: in Reserve 7, a sugarcane growing area on the north coast, most of the local people did not want to move into a betterment village and the chief was reported to be refusing to allow an access road into the area to be fixed, as a means of pressurising his people to agree to planning.

Note : Readers are referred to a recent thesis by G. Senque : Betterment Planning in South Africa, W.T.H.R., University of Natal, 1982, for a further discussion on betterment planning. Most of the above chapter is drawn from his work.

Appendix I. Ngwengweni - betterment village.

The following is taken from a report on a SPP fieldtrip to the Khemlis district, in which a betterment village called Ngwengweni was visited and two women, one a local school teacher, were interviewed.

Ngwengweni is a betterment scheme, about 3 km from Khemlis hospital on the Ntabambe road. We estimated that there were about 100 - 150 households in it, although it was difficult to be confident of the assessment because there are several houses per lot. The settlement is up on a hill with the fields below. Most of the people are local and were moved there by the government. Some have moved in themselves, however. We spoke to one person whose family had moved there from the Quedeni area, because they did not like the conditions at Quedeni. Others have come from farms in the Ntabambe, Vryheid, Corvissen and Dingaanstad districts.

A teacher we spoke to said the place was now full. There are no more plots available, and she wondered what would happen when the young people are adults and want plots of their own.

History

The earliest date we got for the beginning was 1962, with other families coming in in 1963/64. We spoke to one woman who had been moved there in 1963/64. Previously she had lived nearby, on about 4 morgen of land. She was told that there was a new law and they had to move since their chief had agreed to adopting the new system - the flat places were to be turned into fields and they would have to move up the hill. The chief also told them that by accepting the new arrangement they would be benefitting their children. The new lands would be fenced so their children would not have to hard stock any more and could attend school. (In reality, because of poor supervision of the fences and gates, cattle are not looked after properly and still strayed.)

Under the betterment scheme this woman's arable land was reduced to 1 morgen. Compensation for buildings on the old site was inadequate. They were paid a standard amount of R64 per building, being the estimated value of a rondavel. Our informant had had a cement house and the compensation did not cover its value.

Land and Stock

Residential plots appear to vary in size between 1/8 and 1/4 of an acre. Most of the houses were of silt and mud. As people moved in they were allocated land by the induna - a residential site for their house plus a field. There is no rent for the residential plot but people must pay the induna R2 per year before they are able to plough their fields.

When people were moved in, they were told that the official limit on cattle was 10, but this is not strictly enforced. One informant said her family had no cattle although they had goats. The other informant had 2 cows. She complained about the lack of supervision of the animals. Animals are meant to graze in a separate, fenced off section most of the year and can only graze in the arable land after the harvest is in. Some men who live near the grazing lands are meant to check the gates and see that stock does not stray. However, they do not get paid for this task and take little responsibility for it. Nobody looks after the fences, which are in poor condition and animals can and do stray. If stock is caught in the fields, their owners...
have to pay a fine.

The school teacher said cattle are not fat as there are too many households for the land. She thought however that people are probably better off than before. When asked what the signs of this were, she said that people had furniture and there were signs of competition between them over that.

There is an agricultural officer based in the district who visits the community. He does not come regularly but only if he wants to promote the growing of some particular crop. The teacher did not know his name - only knew that he drives a 25 jeep. We were told that people are interested in what he has to teach, especially the women who form the bulk of the permanent population. One problem is that he advocates the use of fertilizer which most people cannot afford. "Even if one is trying to farm it is difficult without a cash income," commented the teacher.

WATER

Water is a problem, especially with the current drought (1980). There is a furrow which was built a long time ago (by the informants' grandfather) to harness water from a river. This serves some households. The furrow is shared by the residents about once a fortnight and the water is considered reasonably clean. Other households have to get water from rivers and streams and these are very low. Women have to walk long distances to find water.

The drought hit the community very severely and very little had been harvested. This has been the worst drought the teacher can remember. She knew nothing about drought relief schemes organised by the Department of Agriculture. However, the local agricultural officer had initiated a scheme whereby each household was to contribute R2 a month towards a pump to pump up river water. This project is only at the discussion stage as yet but people are interested. The teacher thought people should contribute more, e.g. R5 per month, because of the great need.

SANITATION

Each household has a pit lavatory, built by themselves. These are compulsory and constitute a great improvement, according to the teacher, since before many people did not have any toilets.

FUEL

These interviewed reported 'such a scarcity of fuel'. Where there are, people gather wood from the forests, but this is very scarce. The teacher buys wood from a farmer. One tractor load, which lasts her family 3 to 4 months, costs between R14 to R20.

Most people cannot afford to buy wood and are dependent on what they can gather, a diminishing commodity. There are areas where people have chopped down their fruit trees to get wood. A couple of people do burn dung - we were told that they are not local people and that the local people are not familiar with that practice.

FACILITIES

There is one two-room and several 'shackshops', but most shopping has to be done in Windfield. Although our local informant did not report any shebeens, we were told by staff at the nearby hospital that Ewengeni is a centre of liquor-brewing. When a community is dislocated, that was inevitable, commented one doctor.

The local school goes up to Standard 5, and has about 500 children enrolled in it with children coming from other areas too. There are 9 teachers altogether. There is another school nearby which goes as far as Form I. It also has about 500 children, with 13 teachers. We were told that Agriculture is not generally a subject in primary school. Girls do needlework and boys gardening. There is no provision for any girls to learn gardening until they get to high school when they can choose Agriculture as a subject if they wish.

There is no local or visiting clinic but the Nkandla hospital is only 9 km away. The church is Anglican. The schoolteacher described the transport service as good. Except for Sunday there are two buses a day to Nkandla. There is also a daily bus to Kumsap from a place about half an hour's walk away. On Sundays, a railway bus service to Sibeni and Dandace operates.

WORK

Most men are forced to become migrant workers. They work mainly in industry in Johannesburg and Durban but some go to Iscor in Newcastle. Many come home over weekends. The teacher was not aware of people using the local labour bureaus to find jobs. She said most jobs are obtained through relatives and possibly registered afterwards. She did not know of anybody working on farms. Apparently Baptist used to recruit and show films at the school but they have not been recently - she did not know why. Unemployment is high and men are coming back saying they cannot get work.

ORGANISATION

Women's Church Associations (Methodist and Anglican) are quite strong and give help to families in the case of deaths. There are also football associations. We were also told that Inkatha had a branch. 'We meet together and are taught, giving reasons for upholding Inkatha'. Attendance at these meetings is reportedly good. Teachers are censured to teach Inkatha studies in the schools. They do not have text books nor is there a specialised syllabus but are expected to use 'our little knowledge' about Shaka and the Zulu kings to teach the children. We were told that another topic they teach is 'fumity', 'how to get united'.

The teacher did not think that there were any serious points of friction or tension in the community. She did not regard land shortage as an issue 'because if there is no more land one simply has to move somewhere else'. The chief manages to control fighting with the threat of banishment. Generally people get on reasonably well, although there are inevitably those who do not co-operate, she reported.
13. REGIONAL OVERVIEW

The following chapter summarizes very briefly the major aspects of relocation in each of ten geographical sub-regions in Natal. The chapter is intended to serve only as a guide for people wanting to research removals in particular areas of the province. Details on the categories and places mentioned will be found in the preceding chapters.

The map on the opposite page shows the boundaries of the ten sub-regions. These are discussed as follows:

1) North Eastern Natal
2) Northern Natal
3) North Western Natal
4) The North Coast
5) The Midlands
6) The Drakensberg
7) Lower Ndwedwe
8) Greater Durban
9) Southern Natal
10) Griqualand West.

1. North Eastern Natal

This region consists of the three magisterial districts of Ingwavuma, Umlilo and Hibisi. It is one of the least developed areas in Natal. There is a relatively small block of white farming land stretching from Nkutyana in the south to Mkuze in the north. The rest of the area is divided between scheduled reserves and State land, the largest single stretch of State land left in South Africa. (The history of this land is described on p. 193.)

In recent months considerable attention has focused on the area because of the controversy surrounding the proposed Ingwavuma land deal with Swaziland. This is discussed on p. 159-163.  

NATURE OF REMOVALS

In general, removals in this area have been of a more diffuse nature than those in inland Natal. Rumour of impending removals has played a large role in getting people to shift themselves without the State having to intervene and provide transport, facilities and pay compensation. The movement of people from one area to another has been spread over several years, involving the movement of individual households over time rather than entire communities all at once. A major thrust of relocation in this area has been to shift people inland from the coast, which is consistent with the general strategic interest of the State to control and limit access to the northern coastline. Both the current consolidation proposals and forestry and conservation planning for this area sees to it that virtually the entire coast, from Kosi Bay in the north to Richards Bay in the south will be controlled either directly by the military or indirectly by other State departments such as forestry, nature conservation etc. This pressure on coastal people to move inland has major economic implications for them since fresh fish has been an important element in their diet.
RELOCATION AREAS

There are no relocation sites of the typical closer settlement type. People who have moved by themselves as a result of rumour or other pressures make their own arrangements for sites with tribal indunas. The only official relocation site is at Nhlangano, an already existing centre that was used by the State as a relocation point for people being moved off State land in the St Lucia area. Little attention was paid to preparations before hand; conditions are still poor, with water a major problem. In addition, Reserve 1 has reportedly been used as a relocation area by the State for people described as 'trouble-makers'.

PROPOSED RELOCATION AREAS

State land on the Mahathini Flats has featured in numerous consolidation plans as compensation land for other areas to be excised from KwaZulu. This land is already settled by African people. Bambulo, north of the Kuhluwe Game Reserve, has been acquired by the SAPR as compensatory land for the excised Isimangaliso Bay triangle.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Strategic and Military removals

The following developments have led to thousands of people being moved in the region.

- Establishment of the St Lucia Estuary range in the 1970s. Pressure on households on Mocambique and Swazi borders to move away from the border area.
- Strategically located forestry and conservation projects, since the 1960s.

There are predictions that the entire area north of Musi will become an operational area soon. The attempted Ingwavuma land deal has been partly shaped by strategic considerations.

2. Conservation and Forestry projects

The following are examples of projects that have caused or threatened removals. The numbers affected vary from a few households to hundreds of households. Details are available in the chapter on Infrastructure Development and Conservation.

- Forestry plantations in the St Lucia area in the 1960s and 1970s.
- Corridor of State land between Kuhluwe and Umfolozi Game Reserve cleared in late 1960s, early 1970s.
- Establishment Rumi Game Reserve; rumours of expanded conservation resource areas in Thongland.
- Ebuli (Lake Sibayi) under threat of removal, to protect dune forests.

3. Para-military development projects

- Proposed fish factory, Kosi Bay, led to the removal of several households in the early 1970s.
- Abandoned coconut project, Kosi Bay, led to the removal of about 30 households in about 1974.
- Cotton and cassava projects, Mahathini Flats, have led to the eviction of people classified as squatters who have been living on this State land.

4. Farm Evictions

Large numbers of ex-farmworkers have been moving into the tribal lands in the south since the 1970s. In 1981, a mission doctor estimated that 150 households a year were moving
11. **Group Areas**

An Indian Group Area was finally proclaimed in Mhlabatini in 1982.

2. **Northern Natal**

This region consists of the megadistricts of Utrecht, Paulpietersburg, Vryheid, Nqutu, Nqumane, Mngomezulu, KwaNkomazi, Mkhuzi, Mhlathini and Umzimkulu - the last two all part of KwaZulu. Economic development in the white districts is uneven. There are extensive commercial farming areas - maize, cattle, timber and, in suitable parts, sugar cane - and large companies, including Nutal, Namco Extracts and SAPP, are becoming more prominent. There are also important coal mines in the north. In contrast, there are some very neglected, backward farming areas, particularly in the Lowveld area where there is a high degree of absenteeism among landowners. Winters in these border areas are showing signs of insecurity about their future in the area.

**Daily News**, 13-09-79

Economic development in the KwaZulu districts in the region is virtually non-existent. There are coal deposits in the Tonguma and Mhlathini districts, due to be exploited, and the KwaZulu capital of Umlazi has been awarded 'industrial development point' status in most recent decentralisation / development blueprint of the government. Much of this area is chronically drought-stricken and deforestation and soil erosion are dangerously advanced.

**RELOCATION SITES**

**Official**
- Bilamvuri (Under threat)
- Phindile
- Nkosi
- Phindile (major site only)
- Phinda
- Umzimkulu
- Umzimkulu
- Ukuthula
- Umzimkulu
- Umzimkulu

**Non-Official**
- Barclays Site
- Bankwethu
- Ngqumazi
- Paulpietersburg Trust Farm
- Mendwi

**UNOFFICIAL**
- Bankwethu
- Mendwi

In addition to the above, many existing reserve communities have experienced a large influx of people (coming mainly from white farms), in the past two decades. Places mentioned in this regard include Bilamvuri and Mvulani (Songoza) and KwaNkomazi and Vula-

**PROPOSED RELOCATION SITES**

There is a very large block of Trust farms in the western Nkhamange. The farm Nkhamange has been mentioned as a potential relocation site. This whole area has been suggested as the relocation point for thousands of Zulu-speaking people living on three threatened black spots in the Piet Retief district of the Drakensberg (Drakensberg, KwaZumile and Daggwerk), and for an estimated 50,000 or 60,000 people living in the threatened released land east of Paulpietersburg. **Invisi**, next to Kqutu, has been suggested as the relocation site for the two threatened African townships at Dundee and Glencoe.

The Trust land in the Qudeni area appears to have been earmarked for relocation purposes in the near future as well.
6. **Group Areas**

There are restrictions on Indian living and working in Vryheid, Hlabisa, Paulpietersberg, Utrecht, Hlabisa and Louwsburg. Coloured families squatting at Besterpunt, Vryheid, are agitating for a group area to be set aside for them.

7. **Game Reserves and Bush**

**Establishment of Isolo Nature Reserve, Louwsburg, affected 1,600 people.**

Proposed dam on Black Umfolosi River threatens an unknown number of people.

---

3. **North Western Natal**

This region consists of the Newcastle, Donnybrook, Glencoe, Dundee and Klip River districts. Historically no land was scheduled as African reserves in the 19th century, but individual Africans and syndicates bought up extensive areas. Part of this freehold land was released in terms of the 1936 legislation but much of it was classified as black spots. The SAFT bought up large areas of white farmland in the Klip River and Newcastle districts in the 1960s; this has been used extensively for relocation purposes.

The region is rich in coal and this has made the removal of black spots in this region a priority in the general removals programme. Newcastle has developed into an important industrial centre, being the site of an ISCOR plant (sited on a former black spot) and surrounded by coal mines. The relocation townships of Mdadeni and Osini served as its labour pool. Ledjani and Zembeni, established as a relocation township in KwaZulu in the early 1970s, have been designated as industrial development points in the most recent decentralisation blueprint.

The region has seen very large scale removals since the 1960s, with black spot removals and the eviction of labour tenants being the two most important categories.

---

**RELOCATION SITES**

**Official:**
- Embakeni (see case study)
- Mdadeni
- Osiniweni
- Asyukraal
- Emuvukeni
- Limahlil
- Utvel
- Vulekopp
- Vergelgen

**Unofficial:**
- Hlanuwbosch

In addition, all the black spots in the region have experienced a large influx of displaced people, evicted from farms and other removed black spots. The relocation site of Mdadeni, established in 1963, was removed to Embakeni in 1972.

**PROPOSED RELOCATION SITES**

**Plant Farm,** on the south-eastern corner of the place of KwaZulu east of Newcastle, has been suggested as a possible relocation area for the threatened townships at Dundee and Glencoe. The **Fruit Land** lying between Embakeni and Emuvukeni is the likely relocation area for the large number of black spots still to be moved in the Klip River district. There is a major relocation works depot about 5 km east of Embakeni on the Selmphebora road, housing workers and storing disassembled flat-pack pieces, prefabricated blocks, etc.
1. Black spots

All but one of the rural black spots (both freehold and mission) in the Dambeswiler, Dundee, Helmskraal and Newcastle districts have been removed; the one exception, Utulvpil (Helmskraal), was incorporated into KwaZulu. In addition, 12 black spots in the Klip River district have been removed as well. A significant proportion of these properties had coal deposits and are being or have been mined; for details see pp. 102-106. In addition, the urban freehold areas of Charlestown and Lennoxton and Fairleigh, (both in Newcastle) have been moved. The focus of attention is currently on the remaining 15 black spots properties in the Klip River district (14 freehold and 1 mission). Local opposition within these communities to the removals has succeeded in staving off the threat thus far but the government has made its intentions to remove these areas very clear. The local Farmers' Associations have long been a very vociferous lobby for black spot removals. The Driefeinstein block of farms, formerly incorporated into KwaZulu, were excised from the bantustan in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans in January 1981.

2. Farm evictions

Labour tenancy was prohibited in this region in 1970 and large scale evictions followed, most concentrated in the first half of the 1970s.

3. Urban relocation

Newcastle location removed to Omodini, 1973.
Dambeswiler township deproclaimed, 1969.
Parts of Ladysmith townships moved to Ezimbheni in early 1970s.
Dambeswiler Emergency Camp, Sibongile (Dundee), and Theemballie (Glencoe) under threat.
Steadville (Ladysmith) promised 99 year leasehold but Dr. Koornhof stated in 1981 it was to be moved.

4. Group Areas

Indian: Dundee, Glencoe, Newcastle, Ladysmith
Coloured: Dundee, Newcastle, Ladysmith, Dambeswiler

The urban black spots of Lennoxton and Fairleigh in Newcastle were turned into Indian and coloured Group Area townships after the African occupiers had been moved out.

5. Dum construction

Construction of the Walkerbrook Dam outside Ladysmith led to the removal of the relocation site of Tulanezulu and some adjacent African freehold areas in 1972.

4. The North Coast

This region consists of the districts of Isibindi, Isimangaliso, and Khazikwe. When the Zululand reserves were deannexed in 1909, a strip of land along the coast and two strips leading inland to KwaZulu and east of Mphangeni were opened up for white settlement. Much of this is cultivated under sugar cane.

The coastal areas of KwaZulu are densely settled; sugar cane and sub-tropical crops such as bananas, avocado pears and pawpaws are grown. Further inland the annual rainfall decreases and the land becomes more marginal. Tsihlabo, established in 1968 as the first industrial growth-point within KwaZulu, is located in the south of this region.
Apart from the recent acquisition of Trust land in the Ntshanganana area, nearly all the areas presently occupied by Africans were scheduled as reserves in 1913. The only quasi-freehold land in the region was at a farm called Ndanja, and in the 'Amakhulu lots', within KwaZulu. The farm Ndanja was eventually incorporated into KwaZulu. There is no other African freehold land in the region and hence black spot removals have not featured here. In addition, township development has been located inside the reserves so urban relocation has not been an issue either. However, the provision of township accommodation is inadequate and informal settlements have developed on the edges of the major townships, at Sundumbili, Gosiangesi, Ngelesana and KwaDlangezweni.

A major focus of relocation in the region has been to open up the white strip from Nelspoort through Empangeni, to the important new harbour and industrial growth point of Richards Bay. In the early 1970s KwaZulu laid claim to Richards Bay. These claims were firmly rejected although the van der Walt Commission has made some vague, pacifying hints that this development could be turned into a 'joint venture' area in the future. The development of Richards Bay has been accompanied by large scale relocation of people - 6,000 people were moved from Reserve 6 in 1976 and 20,000 people living in Reserve 4 to the north are under threat, their land having been excised from KwaZulu in January 1981. If Reserve 4 is removed it will mean that the entire coast between Richard's Bay and Sobhama Bay will have been cleared of all its African occupants.

RELOCATION SITES

Ntshanganana
Wangaliso

Ntshanganana is the name applied to a large area of Trust farms that were acquired in the early 1970s. In addition to the two relocation areas already established within it, a third area has been laid out, apparently in readiness for the people remaining in Reserve 4. This site consists of empty flatfarm lots and latrines erected in closer settlement style. There are also, as already stated, informal settlements in the region outside the townships of Gosiangesi, Sundumbili, Ngelesana and KwaDlangezweni.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Development of Richards Bay
   6,000 people moved from Reserve 6 to Ntshanganana in 1976. See p. 241.
   A small number of people living in Reserve 4 in the vicinity of the
   Richards Bay airport moved in 1978.

2. Consolidation
   In terms of the 1975 consolidation plans, the following areas are under threat:
   - Reserve 4, with an estimated 20,000 people, already excised from
     KwaZulu in January 1981 (a small part of it has been removed
     already).
   - Two parts of Reserve 17 : a small piece west of Empangeni and a
     larger piece in the Nkamalini valley north of Escombe.
   - Part of Reserve 9, north of Empangeni.
   - Part of Reserve 70, south of Singindlovu.

3. Group Areas
   Until the development of Richards Bay created a demand for skilled labour, it was
   official policy to block Indian and coloured settlement north of theDraga River.
   No Group Areas were set aside for them and people had either to commute long distances
   or live in squatter settlements. In 1981/82 coloured and Indian Group Areas were
finally proclaimed in Richards Bay and Gingindlovu and a coloured Group Area in Bebeve.

In the late 1970s Africans living on land occupied by the Dunn clan, on the northern bank of the Nugala, were removed to Nangats. It appears that the area was proclaimed a coloured reserve and the African occupants, who were living there in a labour tenant relationship to the Duns, were made to move.

4. CONSTRUCTION OF DUNN

Proposed construction of two nnm. Dunn threatens communities at Umialasi and Phlokoboko, on the north bank of the Nugala.

5. REGISTRATION

See chapter on Influx Control.

6. CLEARING OF STATE LAND

About 100 households living on a tiny piece of State land just north of the Nugala mouth, known as Red Hill, were threatened with removal in January 1981. The land adjoins the scheduled area of Reserve 73 and its occupants, who had lived there for generations, believed that it formed part of the reserve. The community appealed to Umlandi, but in March 1981 it was reported that the Department of Cooperation and Development had ordered the eviction notices to the community to be withdrawn. (Daily News, 6.03.81)

5. THE MIDLANDS

This region consists of the districts of Kruusnepo, Beerset, New Hanover, Pietermaritzburg, Louie's River, Mooi River, Wenen and Nkudza. Most of the land is white-owned and well-favoured as a mixed farming and timber area. KwaZulu forms an irregular arc of land circling its eastern edge. The region includes the Nkundza district of KwaZulu, a notorious for its overpopulation, its droughts, its soil erosion and its factional violence. Consolidation planning has made little impact on the region; only two small areas east and south east of Greytown are due to be excised from KwaZulu while the former black area of Appalachee is to be incorporated into the bantustan in terms of the 1975 consolidation proposals.

RELOCATION SITES

Ephedemoni
Bongamali
Pollux Farm / New Politique — established as a temporary transit camp in 1967 and under threat of relocation as a result of
Shabumbe, Nongama, Mzwandile, Mashunika. (See case study)
Wenen Emergency Camp
Cool Air (Group Areas township, New Hanover)

Northdale

Nkundza

There has been extensive in-migration into the Nkundza district and into the Blendsdale /

Vulindela area of KwaZulu west of Pietermaritzburg. Nkundza Spruit, in the Nkundza

district north of Greytown, has been suggested as a potential relocation site for the

Greytown location.

MAJOR CASES OF RELOCATION

1. Farm Evictions

The abolition of labour tenancy in the Wenen district in 1969 led to massive evictions stretching into the early 1970s; this had a cumulative effect on the district. It is described in more detail on p.70-78. The institution of labour tenancy continued to be widespread in the Wenen / Greytown areas throughout the 1970s, with a further spate of

evictions of tenants occurring in 1979/80. Farm evictions, of both tenants and full-
time workers, are still a major problem in the region.

2. BLACK SPOT REMOVAL

12 properties in the Pietermaritzburg and New Hanover districts were classified as

black spots in the 1960s. 4 of them have been moved to date. 3 have been incorporated

or are scheduled for incorporation into KwaZulu and 5 are under threat: Broughton,

Cambeek, Trust Feeds, Hopedale and the Church of Scotland property, Imboceni. The

elimination of black spots and enforcement of Group Areas proclamations went hand

in hand in Pietermaritzburg in the late 1960s since the properties which were removed were

owned by both Africans and Indians. Tenants at Stendahl Mission, near Wenen, which

was sold by the Berlin Mission Society in 1978, were initially threatened with eviction

but in 1980 they reportedly won a reprieve.

3. GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATIONS

Indian: Pietermaritzburg

Wenen

Howick

Mooi River

Kruusnepo

Greytown

Coloured: Pietermaritzburg

Wenen

Howick

Mooi River

Kruusnepo

Greytown

The effect of Group Areas proclamations on Pietermaritzburg are described on p.

4. URGENT RELOCATION

Zenzale (Howick) being moved to Nhopheromeni.

Shikhalashe (Greytown), Brunttville (Mooi River) and Wenen Emergency Camp all under threat but removals do not appear imminent.

Shobantu (Pietermaritzburg) was under threat before 1979 but reprieved and 99 year leasehold is being introduced.

5. INFORMAL SETTLEMENT

Squatters moving into the Willowfontein area (released land west of Pietermaritzburg) in 1980/81 facing prosecution.

6. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATURAL RESERVE

Wennen Nature reserve, established in 1973 on former labour farms which had a population of several thousand.

6. THE DRAKENSBERG

This region consists of the Bergville, Estcourt, Mzamba, Polsla (Mzule) and Underberg districts, all lying along the foothills of the Drakensberg. Conservation projects and infrastructural development have led to large scale removals in the past and proposals to protect the watered area threaten well over 100 000 people living in the 3 scheduled reserves in the Bergville and Estcourt districts.

RELOCATION SITES

Wennen

Compensation (see case study)

Northdale

Leskop

Hoyeni
RELOCATION SITES (continued)

Oliviersnek
Roberts Farm, Ermington, Helder
Winterton Emergency Camp

There has been a significant level of movement of people evicted off farms in the region into the Drakensberg 1 and 2 locations, e.g., at Komhloha near Stutsholme. Uncertainty about the consolidation plans for the region has blocked planning of future relocation sites.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Consolidation

Controversy surrounds the future of the 3 major reserves - the Upper Tugela Location near Bergville and the 2 Drakensberg Locations (no. 1 and no. 2) near Estcourt. White farmers have been lobbying for the removal of all 3 reserves because of the damage they claim is being done in them to the watershed. The 1975 consolidation plans call for the removal of the Upper Tugela Location only and the creation of a consolidated area out of the 2 Drakensberg locations. The people of Upper Tugela Location are strongly opposed to being moved at all. The 1975 consolidation plans also threaten an extensive area of African freehold land in the Nqandu/Underberg districts, all of it released.

2. Black spot removals

This region saw extensive purchasing of land by Africans in the late 19th and early 20th century. Much of the African-owned land in the Nqandu and Underberg districts was released and incorporated into KwaZulu but is currently threatened by the 1975 consolidation plans. Many properties were not released after 1935, however, but classified as black spots. A total of 9 of these freehold black spots have been moved in the Tolda (Hlave), Nqandu and Underberg districts. Tenants at Sonhe/Reebilt, a Hermannsburg Mission near Winterton, were given notice and finally accommodated at Emanzeni Mission in 1981. Major removals are still threatening in the Bergville, Estcourt and Nqandu districts. 3 black spots were cleared to make way for the Vergeliegen Forest reserves in 1969. Portions of 3 black spots (2 freehold and 1 mission) affected by the construction of the Woodstock Dam.

3. Farm evictions

Bergville was one of the very first districts where labour tenancy was prohibited in about 1968. Labour tenancy was prohibited in the Estcourt district in 1970 and evictions followed. More work is required on developments in the southern districts of this region.

4. Conservation and dam construction

Establishment of the Vergeliegen Forest Reserve in 1969 led to the removal of 1,370 people off 3 black spots. Building of Woodstock Dam, near Bergville, led to removal of 3,000 people on reserve and freehold land between 1979 and 1981.

Proposed dam in Nqandu district, in Bracklands area, threatens an unknown number of people with removal.

5. Urban relocation

Estcourt township moved to Nembu late 1960s, early 1970s. Inkanyazi (Colenso) and Winterton Emergency Camp under threat of removal but relocation sites dependent on final consolidation plans for the Drakensberg locations.
7. Lower Tugela

This region consists of the districts of Lower Tugela and Mapumulo, the latter in KwaZulu. The coastal Lower Tugela district is under extensive sugar cane cultivation. It is largely white-owned but there are small Indian-owned areas and a number of threatened African-owned areas as well. African sugar cane growers in this region delivered 5,000 tons of cane to the local mill in 1978. (Natal Mercury, 12.03.79)

There are a couple of sugar mills and a paper mill in the vicinity of Stanger, where the commercial sector of Stanger is very low. Some workers commute to Durban daily. Very little formal township housing has been provided for African workers. The only township in the district is Shabhaville at Stanger, which is very small and under threat of removal. Accommodation in the mill compounds is inadequate as well. The pressure on accommodation is shown by the fact that tenants on black spots sub-let rooms to sub-tenants at exorbitantly high rents in relation to the rents they themselves pay.

RELOCATION SITES

Rulzer Trust Farm – apparently under threat from construction of the Nyumbe Dam on the Tugela.

Langspruit – proposed.

In addition there has been large scale movement of displaced people into the informal settlements of Nthaweni, Riets and Gledhow, which have developed on African and Indian freehold land in the Groenvlei area. These areas are threatened with removal.

MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Black spot removal

The Lower Tugela district saw land purchases by both Africans and Indians in the 19th and early 20th century. Only one black spot had been moved completely to date, Sebatapal in 1972. There are a total of ten threatened African-owned farms of varying size scattered throughout the district; recently removals of tenants have begun on three of them. In addition there is the large Groenvlei area which is made up of several adjoining properties and has some Indian property owners as well. This area was re-leased and incorporated into KwaZulu but is due to be excised in terms of the 1975 consolidation plans. It is an important sugar cane growing area within KwaZulu. Plans to remove the area which were announced in 1979 were frozen after Chief Ntabenhle intervened to support the protests of the threatened owners and occupant.

Large numbers of rent-paying tenants live on these black spots; many of the Groenvlei settlements south of Stanger are extremely densely populated. It appears many of the tenants used to live on an Indian-owned property near Stanger known as Lot 14; this was cleared in 1968. Others formerly worked in the sugar mills but having been retired or lost their jobs have been driven to renting shacks or rooms in these settlements.

2. Consolidation

The Groenvlei area, discussed above, is under threat; there is speculation that it may be reprieved.

3. Informal settlement

The dense settlements in the Groenvlei region south of Stanger, at Nthaweni, Riets and Gledhow are described as squatter settlements by officials and are thus threatened with removal even if the landowners are finally reprieved. Lack of water and sanitation pose
serious health problems; there were major cholera outbreaks in 1981/92. There is also a settlement of about 150 households at Ngurum, Indian-owned land north of Stanger.

4. **Urban relocation**

Shakville (Stanger) is under threat.

5. **Den construction**

The construction of the Ngumane Dam on the Tugela appears to threaten a large number of settlements in the Lower Tugela valley, including the relocation site of Bulver Trust Farm. Preliminary construction work is already under way. Local people have not been kept informed about developments and there is considerable confusion and insecurity as a result.

8. **Greater Durban**

This region consists of the districts of Durban, Pinetown and Inanda. Details on the history of settlement and housing in this region can be found in the chapters on informal settlements and Group Areas removals, as well as in the Inanda case study in Part Three.

**RELOCATION TO THE PERIPHERY**

Until the 1950s, when relocation began to be implemented in this area, many Africans, Indians and Coloureds lived close to the centre of the city. The trend in relocation within the Durban – Pinetown metropolitan area has been to push African, Indian and Coloured residents in informal settlements, black spots and townships into larger townships and informal settlements on the periphery of the city. To this end, townships such as KwaMashu, Umnumzaan, Ndwedwe and Phoenix in the Inanda district, KwaMlangeni, KwaNdenze, Marianridge in the Pinetown district, and Merebank, Chatsworth and Esikhawini in the south west, have been built over the last thirty years. The transformation of the city has been facilitated by the use of various types of relocation, including the proclamation of townships or urban relocation, group areas removals, black spot removals and the clearing of informal settlements.

Today, even the peripheries are threatened. Informal settlements on the edge of formal townships on the periphery are under threat. In addition, a phenomenon of the 1970s has been that control of African townships has been handed over to KwaZulu. Most of the African townships in the Durban area, administered initially by the City Council and subsequently by the Port Natal Administration Board, are now either already under the control of KwaZulu, or are due to be incorporated at some future date. For the African residents this has meant an extension of their peripheral status. With the redefining of boundaries they have become homeland commuters with a corresponding reduction of their rights in the urban areas.

**RELOCATION TOWNSHIPS**

- Chatsworth
- Inanda Estate
- KwaMashu
- KwaMlangeni
- Marianridge
- Ndwedwe
- Nkqubane
- Phoenix
- Merebank
In addition to these formal townships, there are large informal settlements in the Umzimkulu district and the Umulule and Umlujulu districts south of Durban, into which displaced people have moved.

**MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION**

1. **Group Areas**
   - See chapter 9, Part Two.

2. **Informal Settlement**
   - See chapter 8, Part Two.

3. **Land Control**
   - See chapter 7, Part Two.

4. **Urban Relocation**
   - Umzimkulu was proclaimed 1962, moved to KwaKhulas.
   - Central hostel moved to KwaKhulas in early 1960s.
   - Part of Cato Manor removed to KwaKhulas; 1959, under threat of removal.
   - Emergency Camp at Umlazi was removed in 1970.
   - KwaKhulas incorporated into KwaZulu in 1977.
   - Clermont (Pietermaritzburg) to be incorporated into KwaZulu.
   - KwaMarani (KwaZambezi) threatened with removal.
   - Khumsibhi (Congempt) and Lenontville (Durban) were promised 1993 by 1999.

5. **Black spot removals**
   - Roman Catholic Mission of St Francis Xavier on the Bluff removed in late 1940s and early 1950s.
   - Cato Manor and Good Hope Estates (Cato Manor) removed to KwaKhulas, 1960.
   - New farm (Inanda) cleared to make way for development of Phoenix, early 1970s.
   - St Endolina (Pietermaritzburg) under threat for Group Area township development; rehouse possible in one part.
   - See case study in Part Four.
   - Many thousands of tenants living in firebreak areas in Inanda under threat from authorities.

6. **Infrastructure Development**
   - Construction of Inanda Dam (Eden Dam) may affect up to 250,000 people.
   - Claywood (Indian area) is under threat because the Durban City Council wants to develop it as an industrial area.
   - Road construction has affected many areas; currently there are disputes about roads in the Indian areas of Claywood and Avoca.

9. **Southern Natal**

This region comprises the 7 magisterial districts of Cato Manor, Umlujulu, and Umlujulu. White and black areas form a complex patchwork pattern; this has made consolidation planning an extremely contentious issue in the area. The agricultural output in the white farming areas is high. Sugar cane is grown on the coast; dairy, beef, mixed and timber farms are found inland. On the 21st May 1980 the Natal Mercury reported that Ixopo supplies 25% of Natal's milk supply (and 37% of Durban's needs). 10% of the province's beef and 20% of the province's potato crop. All sectors of agriculture have seen increased concentration of farms in a few hands in recent years. In the sugar industry there are now 3 sugar mills in the region - at Illiho, Gisela and Port Shepstone. All are owned by G. G. Smith. The timber industry is dominated by platters owned by Mokoni, Sibale and MAPO. The general impression from fieldwork is that farming has become increasingly mechanized, particularly in the dairies, and this has led to a cutback in farm labour. The African reserves include some of the most densely populated areas in Natal. Both in the Alfred and Umulule reserves there are continual reports of faction fighting. Interviews with inhabitants of black spots in this region made it apparent that one of their greatest fears in moving from firebreak land into KwaZulu is their fear of violence and fighting. Although a large section of this region is suitable for sugar cane, most plots are very small because of the high population density. However the South African Sugar Association (SAA) is promoting sugar development in this region and has set up a base in the KwaZulu area. There are a large number of African firebreak properties in Southern Natal as well. Most of the 64 properties still in the region are small compared to the African farms in Northern Natal, but densely populated. There are also small pockets of Indian-owned land, mainly in the Umkwa and Cliffdale areas. Expansion of Indian farming has been largely prevented by the Group Areas Act, however.

**RELOCATION SITES**

- Gomlesho
- Ngxambili
- Polweni / Zolongdo
- Funcha
- KwaNgqiyama
- KwaNkomo
- Nyalondolo

Platt Estates bought in 1962 as a relocation site for Africans living on black spots in the Ixopo and Umlujulu districts, has never been developed although plans for a townships of 36,000 people were presented in Parliament in 1968. Many people who have been evicted or removed have been forced to find their own accommodation. Some have moved on to other black spots; others have been forced into an already overcrowded KwaZulu or into numerous informal settlements which have proliferated along the south coast, notably Shabholyo and Eshshigam near Port Shepstone.

**MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION**

1. **Farm evictions**

Although there was once labour tenancy practiced in the region, mainly on the estate and mixed farms, its extent did not compare with Northern Natal, and there have been no State-sponsored removals of labour tenants in the region. Eviction of labour tenants has been left largely to individual farmers and in most cases this seems to have fitted in with the changing labour requirements of farmers and forestry. Farmers on mixed farms now rely on a core of permanently resident essential workers such as tractor drivers and indunas, while nearby KwaZulu supplies them with ample casual labour - women, children and old men. Traditionally the timber and sugar industries have relied on migrant workers, housed in compounds but there has been a strong trend towards using more and more local
labour, commuting daily from KwaZulu, instead. Recruitment from Transkei has declined steadily over the last 5 to 10 years, and even the large sugar companies are becoming reluctant to recruit inexperienced sugar workers from Transkei. Instead they have introduced a graded card system whereby recruiting bases in Transkei filter out 'good, experienced' workers to go to work in Southern Natal.

To try to quantify farm labour evictions in this region has proved impossible. It is evident, however, that this has been a major area of concern in the region and that this has also created serious social problems. A recent report in a Natal newspaper stated that 'people who had been pushed out by white farmers in the Cooperstown district' have been instrumental in raiding and burning down the KwaZulu residents' houses. (Natal Mercury, 2-04-82)

Tenants living on Indian farms have also been evicted. Towards the end of 1981 about 30 to 50 African families living on an Indian farm in the Rammur district were served with notices and relocated to KwaMzimhle. The farmer told them that he wanted to cultivate the land that they were occupying. Coloured farmworkers have been affected as well. In 1980 the Natal Mercury reported on a farm at Masudale near Ramsgate, where more than 150 coloured people were under threat because the farmer wanted to cultivate the land they were occupying. After representations to the farmer concerned, they were told they would be allowed to stay until the planned coloured township at Medleen, near Port Shepstone, had been opened. (Natal Mercury, 3-07-80)

Lack of rehabilitation by the Government of KwaZulu makes it extremely difficult for this group of people to find alternative housing if evicted.

2. Consolidation

This has been a very controversial issue, because the various proposals advanced during the course of the 1970s have affected substantial white interest groups adversely. In 1980 there were reports that the van der Walt Commission planned to hand over a large part of the Ixopo, Highflats, Harding and Dooymbrook districts to KwaZulu. Local farmers' organisations put up strong resistance and managed to win a reprieve: the Daily News reported on the 3rd September 1980 that proposals that Ixopo would go to KwaZulu had been dropped after 'strong opposition from organized agriculture'. Another issue that has angered white farmers in the north is that farmers in the Bergville area in the northern Drakensberg are lobbying for the three Drakensberg locations (1, 2 and Upper Tugela) to be removed into the southern Harding / Ixopo area.

This created tension within the SAC in 1980/81.

The following areas are proposed for expropriation:

- Honeydew's location (south west of Port Shepstone):
- Released area west of Port Shepstone;
- Scheduled area, part of Location 5 (Port Shepstone) - This is densely populated and includes the informal settlement of Robb's where the population is estimated at approximately 36 000 people;
- Farms north of Port Shepstone;
- Ixopo Mission and scheduled area, including Mwalwani Mission - described in 1972 as 'one of the finest (India) agricultural land in Natal' and having a population of 30 000 people (Pravista News, 17-05-72);
- Released area south of Richmond;
- Released farms and Mwalwani Mission south west of Richmond - population estimates vary between 30 000 and 90 000; depending whether or not the mission land or the mission plus the two freehold farms of Vines River and Newlands are considered. When attention was focused on this
excition in March 1962, the local Richmond Town Board came out against the removals, arguing that Richmond is "dependent on labour from Indelani ... if the people living there were removed, the economic structure of Richmond would collapse". (\textit{Daily News}, 21.04.61) None are yet inhabited by Africans, though some farmers are grazing their cattle on the land. When plans were put forward for the expropriation of white farms in the area, not all farmers objected strongly. Some that were directly affected started putting improvements into their farms so as to get good compensation from the sale of their farms to the SAPS. However, it seems that most farmers whose farms have been expropriated have been on the losing end. Some have been allowed to lease their farms back on an annual basis, but there is no security on this lease which may be terminated after a year. This means that farmers are reluctant to put money into their farms for fear of never seeing any return. There are also rumours in the area that if a "friend" of someone in the SAPS wants a farm for a few years he will get it, at the expense of the local farmer. If the 1975 consolidation plans are accepted in their broad outline, well over 100,000 and perhaps as many as 200,000 Africans on reserves, mission reserves and freeshold farms will be moved.

3. Black Spots

This is a major category of threatened removals in the region. The first black spot to be moved in Natal, the Patch (Port Shepstone), was moved in this region soon after 1948. A further 20 African-owned farms have been moved since then, with a total population estimated by ZDP of about 12,000. However, there are still 66 freeshold farms (many very small) that have not yet been moved. While some are under imminent threat, others, mainly in the Umzinto district, may be incorporated into Kwazulu if the 1975 consolidation proposals for this region are ever put into effect. The sugar and timber industries have benefitted from the removal of black spots in the region. In the Humbersdale area a number of black spots were expropriated in the late 1960s to make way for the development of both the industrial township and the white and African townships built to serve it. In Umzinto, the two neighbouring black spots of Umkama Drift and Woodlands Lodge were expropriated to make way for an Indian Group Area. The Indian township of Cugieburn was proclaimed in this area in 1972. In a number of cases where black spots have been expropriated and even reported in Parliament to have been moved, tenants are continuing to live on the land because they have nowhere else to go and have not been offered alternative accommodation by the authorities. Examples of this are D 78 (reported to have been moved in 1972), D 136 (reported to have been moved in 1972) and D 785 (reported to have been moved in 1973). (\textit{Handbook}, Question 537, 22.04.80)

4. Urban relocation

There have been very few townships built in the prescribed areas: most African people live in Kwazulu. The townships at Margate and at Harding (the latter very small) have been relocated to inside Kwazulu, to Dunblane and Kwambonco respectively. Only Kwambonco: citizens were allowed to move to Dunblane; many who did not qualify, mainly Transkeians, went to the informal settlement of Umhohoyi. The township of Shamyanga, Umzinto, is under threat.

5. Informal settlements

The major informal settlements under threat of removal are Malukis, south of Durban; informal settlements adjacent to KwaMhweni township, near Umkomaas; Georgeville, outside Nkaneng, and Umhohoyi and Munchien near Port Shepstone.

6. Squatter on State land

There are reports that over 4,000 people living on State land in the Umzinto district are under threat. Houses were numbered in 1979, even though there was resistance from residents who reportedly attempted to beat up the officials. Further follow up on this is required.

7. Group Areas

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Indian} & \textbf{Coloured} \\
\hline
\textit{Port Shepstone} & \textit{Very little provision} \\
\textit{Harding} & \textit{made for coloured} \\
\textit{Park Ryrie} & \textit{housing} \\
\textit{Umlomos} & \textit{Opposition} \\
\textit{Umzinto} & \textit{to proposed area} \\
\textit{Richard} & \textit{in Richmond} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

10. Griqualand East

This region comprises the Port Alfred and Matatiele districts in Southern Natal. Before 1963 this area was under the Pondo chief, Puku. It was then ceded to John Zok III and his followers, who had struck there from Griqualand West, near Kimberley. White settlement began in the 1850s; over time, whites acquired more and more farming land from the Orkney people until the district became a predominantly white farming area, with a few scattered African, coloured and Orkney farms. Until 1977 the area fell under the administration of the Cape Province. In 1977, as a sequel to the Transkei being granted independence by Pretoria, it was incorporated into Natal. The whole area is claimed by Chief K. Satsamshisa as rightfully part of the Transkei.

\begin{center}
\textit{RELOCATION SITES}
\end{center}

There are no relocation sites in the region; people relocated as a result of black spot removals or consolidation planning have been relocated into the Transkei, which was made independent in 1976.
MAJOR CAUSES OF RELOCATION

1. Consolidation
The location of this district on the borders of the Transkei have made consolidation a major issue. Starting soon after the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act was passed, nearly all the white-owned farms in the adjacent Umlilikhu district were expropriated.

The only exceptions were a block of farms in the north-eastern part of the district which were incorporated into the Mount Currie district and a single farm, called Khota, near the town of Umlilikhu. The Umlilikhu district is now part of the Transkei. In the Matatiele district, large blocks of white-owned farms in the Qacha's Nek and Ongelukwenke areas were allocated to the Transkei along with some farms in the southern part of the district, to the east and west of a part of the Transkei known as Kaka's Location.

The farms in the Qacha's Nek area have been incorporated into the Transkei but the Ongelukwenke and Kaka's Location farms are still under the control of the SAPF.

2. Black spots
Griqua and coloured-owned farms have not been expropriated, but restrictions have been placed on these people's rights to purchase additional land; they can only do so with the consent of all their white neighbours. Removal of African-owned black spots started far earlier than in the rest of Natal. Of the 17 African-owned farms classified as black spots, 11 had been moved by 1961, another 2 by 1969 and 1 in 1973. In the case of one of the removed black spots, the owners (3 brothers) sold to white neighbours and stayed on as their former land as labourers. The farm Poortkraal was communally farmed and densely settled, and reported by neighbouring white farmers as a "fouling of iniquity." It is not certain that the owners of this farm were compensated on removal.

Of the other 11 black spots, 2 have been incorporated into the Transkei and only 1, Pukkies, still remains in African ownership. It appears to consist of 3 surveyed farms, Donderberg, Meterni and Malekpruit. It is possible that some part of this property was cleared before 1961. The future of the farm is undecided. The Van der Walt Commission was expected to visit the district in June 1982 and still has to publish its recommendations for the area.

3. Group Areas
In Kokstad all the plots were originally allotted to the Griqua, except for those occupied by the magistrate and the clergyman. As white settlement increased, an informal grouping of people along racial lines took place, but this was not enforced and all racial groups lived in the town. When Group Areas legislation was enforced in Kokstad in the 1960s, the Griqua and coloured community were forced to move out to a new township on the outskirts and had to sell many good houses, with well-established gardens, to whites at unrealistically low prices.

4. Urban relocation
Cedarville township possibly under threat of removal though 99 year leasehold also rumoured.

Bongweni (Kokstad) been granted Community Council and 99 year leasehold and appears will not be relocated into the Transkei.

Matatiele township likely to get 99 year leasehold.

It appears that the Transkei has refused to cooperate in allowing these townships to be relocated to within its borders.

5. Farm evictions
Labour tenancy has never been practiced on any scale in the area.
1. Sahlumbe

1. Introduction

Sahlumbe is a rudimentary closer settlement of several thousand people, established on the north bank of the Tugela River about 2 km from Weenen and on the edge of the KwaZulu district of KwaZulu. It is one of several relocation sites that stretch for some distance along the Tugela or Trust land - former white farms that were bought up, apparently in the mid 1960s. Other sites are Kumeza, Mzumazigga (see Appendix 3) and Nkati. All these places were established in the late 1960s to provide a temporary relocation area for the thousands of labour tenants then being evicted off farms in the Weenen area; Sahlumbe is thus the oldest of the relocation sites surveyed by SPF. Although people understood that they were to be there only temporarily, they have not been offered any alternative site since.

This relocation area is bordered on its southern boundary by a UDF farm, Tugela Estates. This has been a source of tension and deep resentment among the relocated people since they were not given any agricultural land themselves and have had to live next door to land that they know is supposedly for the people of KwaZulu but from which they draw no benefit. In the last year or two there have been negotiations between the local Tribal Authority, Ulundi and Pretoria about this land and as a result some land has been made available to selected individuals within the Sahlumbe area - apparently those considered potentially 'excomi farmers'.

This area has been deeply scarred by factional violence over the last decade. For more information on this, see Appendix 2 at the end of this chapter. The origins and causes of the violence are exceedingly complex. There is an historical dimension that predates the resettlement of people into these closer settlements. However, conflict over land lies at the heart of the violence - landlessness, overcrowding, competition between people for inadequate resources, the pressure of newcomers on the original people's territory. The relocation of thousands of people into these closer settlements has thus contributed directly to the violence, but more work is needed to draw out the relationship between relocation and factional violence clearly.

The Survey

The SPF survey was conducted in late 1980. 129 households were interviewed, selected more or less on an 'every third house' basis in one section on the western end of Sahlumbe. Sahlumbe, unlike most other closer settlements, was not laid out in a grid; it struggles out in a long thin ribbon on either side of a dirt road that runs along a narrow shelf between a line of hills and the Tugela. The houses are built fairly randomly along this axis over a distance of several kilometres. Because of the very jumbled layout of the community as well as its geographical spread, it was impossible to select houses for the interview according to a consistent grid pattern.

There were other problems with the survey as well. Although the sample interviewed was larger than at any other relocation site surveyed in Natal, there are a large number of missing answers on several questions. Partly this was because of resistance by the people interviewed to particular questions (for instance, concerning diet), partly because of difficulties they experienced in answering certain questions, especially those to do with time, number, age etc. These are difficult questions for illiterate and immemorate people to answer adequately - and there is a high level of illiteracy in the community - and can antagonise the interviewees if h/e/she is pressed. Sometimes, therefore, the sample on which conclusions are based is smaller than 129. Where the gaps are large, this is indicated in the report.

2. Origins and background

ORIGINS OF HOUSEHOLDS

The bulk of the population were relocated at Sahlumbe by 1970. A very small number of households were already living on the farms on which Sahlumbe was established when these were taken over by the SAP; they would have been former tenants of the white farmers when the SAP bought out. These people remained in the area and now form a small landed elite since they have retained access to the fields they had before. A few households arrived between 1965 and 1969, apparently having been evicted off other white farms during this time. The great majority of households - 64 out of 119 for whom this information is available, or 72% of the sample - came to Sahlumbe in 1969, at the time of the massive eviction of labour tenants in the Weenen district. A further 8% of the sample arrived at Sahlumbe in 1970; a small number of households continued to trickle in through the 1970s.

Sahlumbe was created by the State in response to the crisis precipitated in the Weenen district by the abolition of labour tenancy in 1969. As already described, it tried first to resettle all the ex-labour tenants from Weenen outside of the district but, partly because of opposition from the tenants themselves, it was eventually forced to accommodate some of the displaced people in the immediate area. Thus most of the households interviewed by SPF came from the Weenen area where they had been settled for many years - often for generations - on white farms. 96% had been labour tenants (usually on a six-month basis) before they were relocated and most of these had moved or been brought to Sahlumbe under pressure. A few households had chosen to leave the tenant farms because of dissatisfaction with working conditions but they were exceptional. Almost all of the households surveyed (96%) want to see Sahlumbe as a result of having been evicted. Some had been given notice by the farmer because their families were no longer supplying him with workers; most evictions were victims of the abolition of labour tenancy.

As already described, most labour tenants in Natal were bitterly opposed to the attempt to introduce a full-time farm labour system in Natal and many - up to 20 000 in the Weenen district alone in some estimates - refused to sign permanent, full-time labour contracts with their employer/landlords. When they refused, they were evicted. Of those interviewed at Sahlumbe, just under one third (39%) had been evicted and moved to Sahlumbe under their own steam because they had had nowhere else to go. A little under two thirds (64%) had been forcibly removed and brought there by GO truck.

AGRICULTURAL OPPORTUNITIES BEFORE RELOCATION

There were two major reasons why labour tenants along so fiercely to the six-month system - 1) it gave them access to agricultural land and 2) it allowed the male members of the household some free time each year in which they could get wage employment in the urban-industrial centres. In the Weenen area many labour tenants were also relatively free from the direct and constant control of their farmers over their lives. Just over half those surveyed reported that their landowner had not lived on the land on which they worked, hence they were living on farms and spent their farm labour period away from their homes on the
commercial farms of the landowner. Women was notorious for its labour farms - none with up to 1 500 people living on them - so this information is consistent with what is generally known about the district.

As labour tenants, most households at Sahlumbe had had access to some agricultural land before they were removed or evicted. There was no major and most devastating difference between their previous places of residence and Sahlumbe, where they were given only small parcels of land not allowed to keep stock. Only 101 households for which information is available, 66% reported having 2 or 3 fields beforehand while 17% had only 1. Only 7% had not had any access to agricultural land. There are no details about the size of the fields, but 70% described them as 'large', 27% said they were 'medium' and only 3% said they were 'small'. Realms were grown universally. A very large percentage also grew sorghum (90%), while only 10% grew beans.

In addition to their arable land, most households had had stock in their previous places - mainly sheep and cattle (91% had goats and 91% cattle) with about a third reporting having had pigs as well. A small minority reported having had sheep and almost a fifth said they had had hens. Virtually everybody kept chickens as well.

Before they were moved, private agricultural production served a very important subsistence function for the people of Sahlumbe, contributing significantly to their survival since, as described elsewhere, cash wages on labour tenant farms were either nominal (81 or 82 per month) or non-existent. Most households produced for their own consumption only, but a very small minority - 6% of those sampled - reported having sold their surplus. Meat, followed by dairy produce, hides and eggs were the most important products - 34% said they produced meat, though how much is not stated. As would be expected, people said they had produced more at their previous places of residence - most (90%) described it as 'much more' while a further 17% said they had produced 'more'.

The removal put an abrupt and severe end to this food production since households were not given agricultural land and not allowed to bring stock with them to Sahlumbe. While it seems that a number of households disobeyed and smuggled animals into Sahlumbe, the great majority were forced either to try to find alternative grazing for their stock or, in most cases, sell their animals. 82% of those who had had stock before had to sell them on removal and almost all of them said they did not get a fair price for their animals. The forced cattle sales that accompanied the evictions in Wemben were, and still are, a potent source of bitterness in the area. Many labour tenants had had extra stock, of 50 head of cattle or more, and were, by subsistence standards, wealthy. Because of the short time period in which they had to dispose of their stock, they were forced to take what prices they could get and many white farmers, both local and from as far afield as the Orange Free State, exploited the situation ruthlessly. Other households lost their stock when they were impounded after their notice period had expired. There are allegations, still vividly remembered in the relocation areas of Wemben, that some local whites made quick profits out of the mass impoundings of stock at Sahlumbe, and that some local whites did not wait for the impoundments to be moved around and impounded animals of evicted labour tenants if their original owners could not afford to do, or did not know they could, release them. Despite the passage of time since the removal, the resentment and anger caused by the losses people suffered do not seem to have abated: the memory of this period is still sharp.

EMPLOYMENT BEFORE RELLOCATION

Unfortunately the questionnaire used in the survey was not designed to get much information about the working conditions on the farms from where the former tenants came. While almost all households were in a labour tenant relationship beforehand, hardly any - only 2% - had had formal registered contracts with the farmer. This confirms the general impression that labour tenant contracts were not successfully enforced in many parts of Natal. Almost all households had had at least one member of the household working for their landlord (on a six-month basis), with the average being 2-3 people per household working in this way. Unfortunately the interviews did not pick up details on child labour on the farms but appear to have recorded adult employment only. Since child labour, both casual and regular, was common in this area, this is an unfortunate gap.

Information on employment outside of agriculture is unfortunately incomplete as well. As labour tenants, many of the workers in the sample worked on the land of their former landlords for six months of the year and then went as migrant workers, most commonly to Johannesburg or the Rand or the greater Durban area for some of the remaining six months of the year. It was common for male labour tenants to spend about 3 months during their 'off period' working in the towns to earn cash wages to see them through the rest of the year. The other 3 months of the year would generally be spent at home, ploughing and working their own piece of land over the summer. However, the survey failed to pick up information on this part time employment which played an important role in the household's survival. Table 1 sets out the figures for previous employment which are available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>RESIDENT</th>
<th>NON-RESIDENT</th>
<th>OTHER / MISSING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As explained, this information does not include data on part time industrial work: the non-agricultural workers indicated in the table are fulltime workers, people who were not called upon to perform a six month stint on the farm of the family's landlord. Furthermore, the survey only gathered data on previous employment - the unemployed and those not economically active were not recorded - so one cannot reconstruct from it what the rates of economic participation by households before they were moved to Sahlumbe was. (It would be a difficult task to reconstruct an accurate picture of economic activity more than ten years previously in any case.) Details on the sex of the workers were not supplied either, but almost all, if not all, the workers were undoubtedly male.

The table shows that there were 164 wage workers before the removal in the 129 households interviewed. As would be expected, the overwhelming majority of them were in agriculture - 143 out of 164, amounting to 87% of the total. The rest were distributed very sparsely between manufacturing (7), transport (7) and service (6), with one person in finance. Almost all of these workers were unskilled - 160 out of 164.
3. Conditions

CONDITIONS IN 1969

Shalubne was, as already stated, a very rudimentary relocation camp when it was started in 1969. Although established at the time of Linskill, it did not achieve any of the publicity and notoriety that surrounded that place, even although its conditions were certainly not better. What made the difference was that at Linskill there was a group of church workers, with links with liberal organisations in the towns, and they saw to it that the story of Linskill was thrust into the national press. At Shalubne there was none of that. There were general press stories on the mass evictions in Weenen, but few reports on conditions at the other end. Without pressure on it, the State could afford to get away with absolutely minimal preparations at Shalubne.

For a first-hand account of the situation confronting the people relocated to Shalubne, see Appendix 1. As this account makes clear, very few facilities were available when the people started being brought in or moving there themselves. Only 76 had permanent houses, presumably those who had been living there before. Next people, 76%, were in temporary dwellings and the remainder had 'temporary accommodation' - of what kind is not specified. Latrines were not provided by the authorities and people were expected to dig their own pits for latrines. People were allocated plots measuring 30 x 50 paces by government-appointed indunas. A very small number of households reported having paid a lump sum for land and a few said they paid rent. Neither cash payments nor rent were officially enforced so it appears that these people were involved in private transactions with other Shalubne residents.

No permanent water was laid on, though GG trucks brought in water temporarily to help with the building of houses. Once the trucks were withdrawn people had to revert to using the river, a kilometre or more away, or such small streams and springs as they could find. The other temporary service lay authorized by the authorities was to provide a supply of fuel; this did not last long and once it had been used up people became dependent on the vegetation in the surrounding hills for firewood for cooking and heating purposes.

There were no schools nor clinics nor churches built before people were brought in. Ninety-three households in the sample said there were no shops when they arrived but 17 said there were. Since the community is strong out for some distance along the main through road, this probably influenced the reply and only those reasonably close to an existing shop recorded a positive reply. It does not seem that any preparations were made to supply extra shops before the influx of people and the community had to make do with whatever rudimentary facilities already existed to serve the former farm community.

Shalubne was thus almost entirely unplanned at its establishment and hastily manufactured in the void at which the authorities could dump the troublesome but politically and economically unimportant surplus agricultural labour force in the

Weenen area. Having put them there, they could then forget about them.

PRESENT CONDITIONS

In the years that have elapsed since the relocation of people at Shalubne, conditions have improved but not very much - much improvement as there has been has come about mainly from the efforts of those relocated, with little help from the government. Most people interviewed in fact see no real improvement in the conditions around them; 80% of those questioned felt this way and only 12% reported 'some' improvement in conditions.

There is still no protected water supply for the community and people are dependent either on the Tugela River, which is notoriously dirty and accessible only through the CDP farm, or one of the less reliable streams and springs. These were badly hit by the severe drought in 1980/81, many drying up completely. A typical night - illustrative of official development strategies and priorities for KwaDul - is that of the women from Shalubne walking through the sprinkler-irrigated fields of the CDP farm, containers on their heads, to collect water out of the Tugela. In early December 1987 an old irrigation furrow, built by a former chief and his people and allowed to fall into disuse, was finally reopened as a result of a two year undertaking initiated by a nearby agricultural project with labour supplied by the community. This may ease the water position and allow for some irrigation of gardens, if the furrow is adequately maintained.

A clean and plentiful water supply still remains a major problem in the community, however.

Shops are still few and far between, with only 1 General Dealer and 1 Butchery in the area surveyed, supplemented by a number of illegal 'shekeshops'. Prices are, as would be expected, high. In late 1980 500gm of powdered milk was selling for 65c, 1 kg of sugar for 47c, 75c of paraffin for 45c and a packet of candles for 65c. A sack of mealie meal cost then 816.50c. The community is dependent for many commodities on shops in Weenen, 23 km away. In the period from Weenen three times a day, a single fare costing 65c at the end of 1980.

School facilities have improved but are still completely inadequate to meet the community's needs. There is only one primary school serving a very large area with another primary school and a secondary school planned. In 1979, when factional violence was at its height, many children could not attend school because it fell outside of their territory. Even in times of peace, however, many children do not attend school - about 40% of the child population, according to one resident. There are a number of factors at work: inadequate facilities and poor teaching; the expense of sending children to school; both in the outlay required for school fees, uniforms, books etc. and in the loss of potential earnings that children who work on nearby white farms can bring home. There is also suspicion towards formal school education among some parents. School fees are reported to be 50c per child and children are expected to wear uniforms.

A mobile clinic now visits the community, three times a week. It is not clear whether this is a government-sponsored or private operation. Clinic fees are reported to be 25c a visit which, in an area where R20 is the average monthly wage for a farm worker, is high.

The legal and administrative status of the area is ambiguous. For although it is (or was in 1980) officially Trust land, it falls under the Embulu magistrate at Zan-

kheni, about 35 km away.

The distance to be travelled to reach the magistrate imposes an additional burden on the community, especially on old age and disability pension applicants who have to travel to Zankheni for their applications to be processed.

Locally Shalubne is governed by a system of tribal inuums, responsible to the local Chief (of the Kwenhu Tribal Authority).
Unfortunately there is a very large gap in the recorded information about the age structure of this population. A large number of the respondents could not give the age of the members of their households. Many were illiterate and innumerate and do not measure time according to the calendar year. Unfortunately the interviewers left these answers blank, instead of trying to obtain approximate ages. There are 553 missing answers about the age of household members - 56% of the total sample. Most of these missing answers are for permanent residents. If one assumes, as is reasonable, that the 160 commuters and migrants whose ages are not recorded are all of working age, then that still leaves a total of 413 missing answers - 42% of the total sample.

If one looks at the age sample that one is left with, then the masculinity rate amongst the permanent population of working age is very low, at 39.4. In the 25-64 age group it is still lower: 13.7. This corresponds broadly with the high level of male migration but these statistics should be viewed as indicators, rather than exact proportions.

Table 3, Sahulube. DISTRIBUTION OF PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION OF WORKING AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>MALESITY RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further demographic imbalance is revealed by comparing the age groups of the permanent population with that of the total population. Using the limited age sample, Sahulube has a high child-dependency rate - 42% (105 out of 499) are children of 14 years or younger. Because of the very high incidence of migration, over half of the permanent population are children - 52%. It is difficult to assess how useful this partial information is. The possibility that the sample is a very skewed one is there. However, the results are not so extreme as to be completely implausible. Sahulube does have a particularly high male migration rate and a very small female migration rate.

The high rate of male migration has serious repercussions on family structure. 11% of the 201 male migrants and commuters are married so that whereas 36% of the permanent female population are married, only 12% of the permanent male population are. In general there are slightly more married women than men. 30% of all the men are married while 35% of all the women are. This can be accounted for by the incidence of polygamy in the area, still widely accepted, although not practiced as frequently as before.

There are also many more widows at Sahulube than widowers. While 0.4% of the male population is widowed, 6.4% of the female population is. This seems a very high figure, even if one allows for the preponderance of female widowers over males that is common in most societies. This may be a result of the factional violence that has periodically devastated the general area. Certainly a number of women have lost their husbands because of the fighting.

Table 2, Sahulube. TOTAL POPULATION BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESIDENTIAL STATUS</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>SEX NOT STATED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commuter</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Res. not stated</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Economic Activity

ECONOMIC STATUS

Because of the large number of people whose age is not recorded, the sample of people who fall definitely within the working-age category (15-64) is much smaller than it should be and it is difficult to state how representative it is. If one considers the total population, not distinguished between children and adults of working age, Sahlumbe contains a very high level of people who are not economically active in the formal wage economy. Out of the 975 people in the sample, 734 (75%) are not economically active in this sense; 212 (22%) are employed, and 29 (3%) are unemployed. Thus only 25% of the total population are either engaged in wage labour or actively looking for work. Furthermore, among the permanently resident population only 29 are economically active—five with jobs and a further 24 looking for employment.

Obviously a high percentage of the permanent population are children, many of them at school, and a fair proportion are elderly people. Nevertheless these figures illustrate dramatically how heavy the dependence of Sahlumbe is on migrant labour and how many of the adults who remain behind are excluded from the job sector. The only local employment is of a casual or seasonal nature on white farms. Most farmers already have their quota of resident, full-time workers—Sahlumbe was created specifically to accommodate their redundant farm labour force—and people looking for casual agricultural work from Sahlumbe compete with enormous numbers of unemployed people in the adjoining Magaliesburg district of Roodepoort. Nevertheless some women and children do work on a casual basis on white farms—this irregular, part-time work is not recorded in the figures below, which look at full-time employment only.

Table 4. Sahlumbe. EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, BY RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Status</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>273 142</td>
<td>1 716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>3 2 - 5</td>
<td>16 2 - 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Status not identified</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20 4 - 24</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Status not identified</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6 7 - 13</td>
<td>0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>302 455 1 758</td>
<td>16 6 1 23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EMPLOYMENT

As already described, the great majority of workers are migrants going to unskilled jobs on the Rand and the Durban/Durban area. Out of a total employment force of 212, 185 (87%) are migrants. Almost all the labour force is male (98) out of the 212 workers, or 91%. (As noted, casual agricultural work which in this area is performed mainly by women and children, was not picked up by the survey; its scale and significance for household income, unfortunately, not therefor be measured.)

The most important source of employment for Sahlumbe workers is provided by manufacturing industry, which employs over half the total number of workers. The next most important source of employment is in the construction industry, employing a little less than a quarter of the total. This industry is traditionally a major employer for rural, migrant workers, who are often illegally in the cities, poorly paid and vulnerable to being laid off periodically as the industry goes through cycles of contraction and expansion.

Significantly, in view of the origins of Sahlumbe, agriculture is not a large source of full-time employment, for either men or women. Farmers do, however, depend on seasonal or casual labour, particularly at harvest time and labour trucks which drive along a prearranged route into neighbouring African areas, collecting whoever happens to be at the various pick-up points, are a regular sight. Casual agricultural work is extremely poorly paid—adult wages of 60 cents a day are widespread and sometimes workers get paid in kind only. Child labour is common too and it is likely that from time to time children from Sahlumbe work in the nearby fields of white farmers, earning between 20 and 50 cents a day, or a bucket of rejected potatoes or whatever other crop is being harvested.

* The one employed female for whom no residence status has been recorded is excluded from the subsequent calculations in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5, Shalumbe. FULLTIME EMPLOYMENT, BY INDUSTRY, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMMUTER</th>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M F T</td>
<td>M F T</td>
<td>M F T</td>
<td>M F T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>9 3 12</td>
<td>4 2 6</td>
<td>13 5 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>3 0 8</td>
<td>8 0 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIMARY</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>9 3 12</td>
<td>12 2 14</td>
<td>21 5 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1 0 2</td>
<td>1 1 3</td>
<td>1 1 3</td>
<td>1 1 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elect. etc.</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>3 0 3</td>
<td>3 0 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1 0 2</td>
<td>1 1 3</td>
<td>11 6 14</td>
<td>14 6 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>0 2 2</td>
<td>2 2 4</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1 1 2</td>
<td>2 0 2</td>
<td>2 0 2</td>
<td>3 1 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>2 0 2</td>
<td>5 0 5</td>
<td>7 0 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>1 1 2</td>
<td>1 3 4</td>
<td>2 4 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1 1 2</td>
<td>5 1 6</td>
<td>3 3 9</td>
<td>12 5 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry as</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>20 2 22</td>
<td>20 2 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3 2 5</td>
<td>16 5 21</td>
<td>174 11 105</td>
<td>193 18 211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SKILL LEVEL OF WORKERS

The great majority of workers at Shalumbe are unskilled - 90%, if unskilled industrial workers only are considered, and 95%, if semi-skilled and farm/forestry workers are included in the unskilled category. Although the number of women in employment is very small (only 16), the percentage of women workers in skilled jobs is higher than the percentage of men workers. The only 2 professional people in the sample are women (probably either nurses or teachers) while 5 out of the 18 women workers are in white-collar jobs - 28% of the total women employed.

Table 6, Shalumbe. SKILL LEVEL OF WORKERS, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMMUTER</th>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>C AS %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M F T</td>
<td>M F T</td>
<td>M F T</td>
<td>M F T</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>0 2 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>0 3 3</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>1 1 4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 1 0</td>
<td>0 1 0</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm/forestry</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>2 0 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilld</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>1 2 1</td>
<td>1 2 1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>1 0 0</td>
<td>1 0 0</td>
<td>3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>3 0 3</td>
<td>10 3 13</td>
<td>7 164</td>
<td>170 10 180</td>
<td>90,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>9 2 2</td>
<td>9 3 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3 2 5</td>
<td>16 5 21</td>
<td>174 11 105</td>
<td>193 18 211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNEMPLOYMENT

The unemployment figures for Shalumbe are high. The general rate is 125 - 11% for males and 211% for females. The available evidence suggests, however, that many people have given up hope of finding a job and joined the category of 'not economically active' rather than remaining permanently unemployed, so this statistic does not convey an accurate picture of unemployment if read on its own. The high level of adults who are not economically active points to the depressed level of employment opportunities - a situation that is likely to get progressively worse as the State's strategy to tighten influx control and exclude rural people from the wealth and employment opportunities of the cities, becomes more developed.

REMITTANCES

Questions were asked about the regularity with which absent workers sent home remittances - obviously a crucial issue in a community as dependent on migrant earnings as Shalumbe. However, neither the question nor the recorded replies are very satisfactory as an index of remittances since the amount sent home and the definition of 'regular' were not detailed. The replies indicate that most of the commuters remit regularly, but irregularly. Amongst the migrants information was lacking for 77 but regularly, for the rest, the majority were reported to send money home, but generally irregularly. Thus 73 migrants - 40% - were said to send money home regularly, and 106 - 58% - irregularly. Only 4 were reported never to send money home - 2% of the total.

OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME

Earnings from employment are by far the largest source of income in the community but pensions and other grants play an important part too, particularly in view of the relatively small economically active population, the low wages and the irregular nature of most remittances. Old age pensions are important, as in other rural communities, with 29 people recorded as receiving them. Another 3 people get unemployment benefits and one a disability grant. Yet despite the importance of pensions, not everybody who is eligible receives one. 24 people of pensionable age are recorded as not getting any money, 6 because they have not, for one reason or another, applied and 18 because of problems with the bureaucracy that allocates and administers the pension payouts. The distance to be travelled to the local authority office in charge of this area - at Zambeni, about 35 km away over dirt roads - inhibits old people from applying and also from sorting out any complications which may (and generally do) arise. In this regard the interviewer for the SPF survey noted:

There are many handicapped people at Shalumbe who are entitled to disability grants but are not getting them. Some do not know that they are qualified. Some have applied but never got them. Old Age Pensioners are not getting the pensions to which they are entitled too. Some have not applied because they have to go to Zambeni Magistrate's Office to apply. Zambeni is about 35 km away. One trip by bus costs 92. These old people do not have the money to go there to apply. [SPF Field Report]

In addition to these formal sources of cash income, there is considerable informal activity as well. 3% of the households surveyed reported some informal sector activity, although details on the incomes derived from this are lacking. The most common activities reported are: selling beer strainers and grass mats for sale, selling the traditional leather skirts worn by women, knitting and selling woolen hats and scarves, selling secondhand clothes, doing bead work, selling Maize (ground milk), hairdressing, chopping and selling wood. What the survey failed to uncover, not surprisingly, is the role of illegal informal activity in the community. One person reported running a shabu but otherwise all the activities listed were legal. Yet Shalumbe is in an area notorious for both its drug trade and its illegal arms trade - both manufacturing pirate weapons and selling weapons. In
society as depressed as Shulumba, many people are forced to rely on illegal activities to survive, but few would freely admit it.

Agricultural Activity

Lack of land for agriculture is the single most important issue within the community. 74 of the respondents noted access to land as the major improvement they wished to see, and 45 listed landlessness as their major problem. Almost all the households questioned about the differences between their former place and Shulumba identified lack of land as the most telling one: 'We were farming and producing food before; here we have nothing.' 'Before we had a place; we had land to farm.' 'Before it was better. I had cattle, goats, fields, so I was not starving.' 'Before my family had enough land to farm and had large livestock. Though we were under a white farmer, it was much better than here.' These responses are typical. Nevertheless, even though Shulumba is a closer settlement and access to land has been drastically curtailed for its residents, agriculture does still play a small part in the community's survival.

Only 9 households reported having fields — presumably the original inhabitants of the area or individuals who had managed to hire or otherwise gain access to some source of land. However 77 households reported having gardens in which small and varying amounts of maize, beans and other vegetables were produced, depending on the rains. Furthermore, 35 households reported having some cattle, 50 households some goats and 55 households some poultry; scattered through the community there were also a few pigs and donkeys and sheep. Although there is no official grazing — and 60 of the 68 households who reported having grazing said they paid no rent for it — it seems a substantial number of households have defied the official ban on stock. This has created problems however and several households complained of the managers on the neighbouring GED project who impound their stock if it strays.

The benefits derived from this small scale agricultural activity were not quantified in any detail, but 74 households reported that they produced 'some' meat (including chicken), 22 that they produced 'some' milk and a further 22 that they produced 'some' eggs. Only 5 households reported producing for sale — presumably meat, if not all, of these would have been in that tiny minority of households with access to fields.

Comparison of previous with present employment

The information on previous employment is, as already mentioned, incomplete and one cannot, therefore, draw too firm a set of conclusions. Nevertheless a comparison of the nature and level of employment before people were removed to Shulumba with conditions prevailing at the time of the survey reveals the following significant trends:

1. A shift to fulltime wage employment, with a larger number of people presently in wage employment than before (212 compared to 164); 2. A strong shift to migrant labour — before the removal permanent and commuter workers amounted to 35% of the total workforce but by 1980 this had dropped to 12% and the percentage of migrant workers had risen correspondingly from 62% to 87%.

3. A very marked shift away from agricultural employment; before being moved to Shulumba, 87% (14 workers) had been employed in agriculture but by 1980 only 10% (3/68) were employed (fulltime) in this area. Corresponding to this, manufacturing industry had risen from relative insignificance as an employer to being the major source of work while construction, previously not employing anybody from the surveyed households, had become the second most important source of work.

In the household histories of those now forced to live at Shulumba one can see clearly the process of complete proletarianisation of former labour tenants at work. Instead of being absorbed into the urban-industrial centres on which the community depends for its survival, however, the people of Shulumba have been forcibly blocked from that option, through government legislation, and deliberately diverted to this rural slum.

6. Education

The level of education at Shulumba is extremely low and likely to remain so for a long time to come. Although there is a primary school in the area — one of the few improvements noted by residents since they have lived there — the standard of education is low, many children either do not go to school at all or drop out at an early age, and there is no programme of adult education.

Because of the large category for whom information on age is missing, the available data cannot easily be analysed to eliminate the population of school-going age. In the population as a whole, 734 (74%) have no formal education at all. If one eliminates 50% of the total population on the assumption that they are children 14 years and under, that still means that approximately 230 to 240 adults have no formal education — almost half the adult population. 141 people have lower primary education only (146), 84 (85) higher primary and only 31 have reached high school, 26 of these (36 of the total) to lower secondary school and a mere 7 (0.7%) to Standard 9 or beyond. The community is thus severely disadvantaged when it comes to seeking work and as rural unemployment increases its disadvantages in this respect will become more marked.

There is no marked differentiation between the different residence categories as far as education is concerned. 75% of the permanent population, 74% of the commuters and 70% of the migrants have had no formal education. As might be expected given the society as traditional as Shulumba, females are less well educated than males, with 70% of the total female population non-educated compared to 69% of the male population. While 9% of the female population has had primary education, 26% of the male has had, and while only 25% of the female population has had any secondary level education, 4.5% of the male population has.

| Table 7, Shulumba. Educational Standards by Sex and Residential Status |
|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| EDUCATION  | PRESENT | COMMERCE | MIGRANT | MINING | TOTALS |     |
| LEVEL     | M | P | Sex | T | M | P | Sex | T | M | P | Sex | T | M | P | Sex | T | M | P | Sex | T | M | P | Sex | T |
| None      | 199 | 370 | 1 | 570 | 14 | 2 | 17 | 133 | 7 | 140 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 350 | 382 | 2 | 734 | 74 |
| Low-Pri   | 98 | 53 | 0 | 111 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 25 | 0 | 29 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 85 | 56 | 0 | 141 | 14 |
| High Pri  | 89 | 27 | 0 | 96 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 90 | 4 | 24 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 49 | 39 | 0 | 88 | 8 |
| High Sec  | 14 | 4 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 6 | 0 | 26 | 3 |
| Std 9+    | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 7 | 1 |
| TOTAL     | 302 | 455 | 1 | 758 | 16 | 6 | 1 | 23 | 185 | 15 | 200 | 4 | 7 | 11 | 507 | 483 | 2 | 992 | 100 |
7. Organisation and attitudes

A far more in-depth study than that allowed for by the BDP survey would be necessary before one could provide an accurate picture of organisation within the community. The survey interviewed only one section of the community. All those interviewed, with one exception, reported that they did not have problems with their neighbours. Yet Shalumba itself has been riven with feuding and factional violence. While those interviewed were all within one geographic location and thus all inevitably located on one side in any faction dispute, the larger community is divided and torn with tensions and conflict.

It is probable that the most efficient organisations in the general community are the different factions, which often have an elaborate structure of leadership and rank, but about which no information was uncovered. Nearly half those surveyed said they belonged to no organisation and of those who reported that they were members of an organisation, almost all were Church members. A little over half those interviewed (70%) were church members divided fairly equally between Zionist and other orthodox (mainly Lutheran) churches. The only other organisation mentioned among those households was Inkatha - 15 out of the 109 households mentioned it as an organisation to which they belonged. It is difficult to gauge how active these Inkatha members were - only 3 of the 109 respondents mentioned it later in the interview as an organisation from which they expected help.

The community is run by indunas, under the chief of the Mhembu, as already described. It seems that the indunas wield considerable power in the area - almost everybody interviewed described them as the local leaders - although to what extent they enjoy popular support is less clear. An attempt to organise a tractor-co-op scheme in this general area in early 1981 ran into immense difficulties with the local indunas and strongmen who objected to attempts to establish a cooperative membership and committee outside of the formal tribal structures. Eventually they forced control of the scheme into their hands, taking over the tractor and curtailing the origins of the project from the committee.

Attitudes towards conditions at Shalumba were almost totally negative with the great majority of households surveyed reporting that there had been so improvements to the place since they arrived. A few respondents (13) noted that they were pleased to be away from the control of their former employer/landlords on the white farms but the tone of their replies makes it clear that Shalumba does not represent a positive alternative - it is only the lesser of two evils.

The only difference is that before my family was under a farmer's rule, therefore being exploited by the farmer, so it is a little better here. It is better here because we are not under the rule of the white farmers. But the poverty then was not like it is now. Before I had land to farm and had enough livestock.

Lack of land was the most bitter and frequent complaint about Shalumba and it is clear that most of those living there still regard farming as a desirable occupation - whether out of actual preference or because of the material subsistence advantages of having land and stock when jobs are so hard to find and wages low, is not, however, clear. The strength of this attachment to agricultural activity helps explain why most of those interviewed see their former lives as labour tenant as better than what they are experiencing now.

The most common problems identified by those interviewed were:

1. No land for farming - 49.
2. Distant and scarce water - 36. (One person noted that she has to walk 5 km to collect domestic water).
5. No toilets - 17.
6. The CED project in general or the fact that the CED managers impoverish their stock - 9.

These answers reinforce and complement those supplied when people were asked to list the improvements they would like to see in Shalumba. Once again, land was the most important issue, followed by decent water:

1. Land for farming purposes - 74.
2. Water, either simply a clean and close water supply, or water on tap - 40.

Less frequent answers were schools (9), toilets (3), closer shops (7) and a nearby supply of wood (4). The fact that so many people cited collecting firewood as a problem, but so few listed a better fuel supply as an improvement they would like to see, is indicative, perhaps, of how the miserly chore of gathering firewood is accepted as part of the pattern of life.

The overall impression that the comments on conditions at Shalumba provide is a bleak and depressing one. 'Here there is nothing, we are starving', was a typical response. 'Before we had land to farm, before we had stock - here we have nothing' is another.

However, few people interviewed had any constructive ideas about how they could solve, or begin to solve, their problems. 109 out of the 129 people interviewed said there was nothing they could or intended to do themselves. The rest of the answers were either very limited - 9 planned to dig their own toilets - or looked to distant government or employment to help them - one planned to report the CED to the District government, another planned to ask the government for help (unspecified) and four planned to buy water pumps if they could get jobs or the necessary cash. All these replies dealt with future possibilities. Nobody reported on present action. When asked who they felt could help them with their problems, people were more forthcoming but it appears that in replying they were not giving voice to an expectation that help would be forthcoming from these sources but rather that help ought to be forthcoming from there, if anywhere. The two major sources mentioned were either the local chiefs and indunas (6 times) or the government (56 times, with the District government mentioned specifically a further four times.) The implication in the latter set of replies was frequently that since 'they' had put us here, 'they' should do something about our problems.

Only three people mentioned the possibility of community action and organisation as a source of help. 'If the men of this place are organised like other places then our problems will be solved', said one of these respondents. All the evidence suggests, however, that constructive and democratic community organisation is far from being achieved in Shalumba as presently structured.

Footnote: Figures represent the number of times each issue was mentioned; many respondents listed more than one problem.
Appendix 1. Dombi Khumalo’s story

Dombi Khumalo is a woman of about 40 who lives at Shulumba. She is not one of those interviewed in the SPF survey. Her story was told in Bulu to workers at the nearby Church Agricultural Project, in March 1979, and then translated. This was at a time when factional violence in Shulumba was at its height. The two factions in the area were the Madendas (controlling the area where the SPF survey was carried out) and the smaller and weaker Empolos.

I was born in the Malinga area. My father was a migrant labourer in Kimberley. I married Pigeon Khumalo and he took me to live on a farm in the Wesman district which belonged to a man who had a chicken farm at Botha’s Hill. My husband worked on the six-month system and was paid £1 (R2) a month for the six months he had to work for this farmer on his Botha’s Hill farm. His work was to pluck the fowl. At the end of this period, he would come home to Wesman and then he would work for the Town Hall in Wesman. He started working for them at three times what he was earning at Botha’s Hill, at £3 (R6) a month.

Occasionally, after my husband’s six-month contract was up, he would find that the Town Hall had no vacancy for him and he would have to look around for another job. But he very seldom went to Johannesburg, preferring local work. Later he became a tractor driver and then the Town Hall would always keep him a job, because he was considered reliable with the tractor. He then earned £14 a month.

The Indian foreman on the chicken farm quarrelled with my husband because of the red blood between them, we moved to another farm in the Wesman district belonging to a Mr Hain. We called the farm ‘Xatehale’. This was a vegetable farm and we all lived at home all year round, but also working for the farmer on the six-month system.

We had four children during this time, three girls and one boy. The farmer gave us two fields, one to grow melons and one to grow maize. We had three cows, with one usually in milk. We also had twenty goats and so, compared to many of our neighbours, we were comfortably off. My husband would start work at 7 and finish at 5. I did not have to work on the farm because my children were very small and they did not have to work either for the same reason. My husband earned £5 a month when he was working for this man.

We then heard that the six-month system had been abolished and we had to work for the farmer all year round in order to continue living on our land. We were quite agreeable to this but said that our children would starve if we had to live on the low wages that we were getting on the farm for the whole 12 months. If the farmer would pay us more, we would gladly stay on the farm where we were happy. The farmers refused.

The Bantu Administration Department told us that if we were unwilling to work for the whole 12 months, we would have to go to the location across the Nqopela River. They used 55 lorries to cart some of the people and their belongings to this place. But as soon as we refused to work for the farmer at the wages he was paying us he ordered us off the land and threatened us with jail if we did not move at once. We could not wait for the 55 lorries (which were busy elsewhere), without getting into trouble, so we had to hire lorries to take our belongings. It cost us £50 to hire the lorry.

We had heard that the government would give us compensation for our houses — nobody got this. A mad man gave us a stand which had 4 poles at the corner and said that
was where I could build my house. I was given a tent to erect on the stand. As soon as we had put a roof on the first hut, the tents were taken away for someone else.

A water tanker was parked nearby so that we could get water to make the mud walls of our house. The moment the tents were taken away, the tanker was also taken elsewhere. After the tanker went, we had to carry water in 5-gallon drums from the Ngupa which was a mile downhill from our new living places. This we still do.

There were no latrines. It was horrible to have to squat in public. The stands were clear and there were many of them and everybody had to do that. There was nowhere else to go that was private. We came from homes where the nearest neighbour was 1/2 a mile away and there were thick bushes to give one privacy. Now we were all living right on top of each other.

When we moved to the land we could not take our cattle and goats with us because there were already too many in the location and that there was no land for us to cultivate. They told us not to worry about this because we would soon be moving to a place of our own. Our buildings must be temporary because this was a transit camp. They said it would be a short time before we would be moved.

When we heard that we couldn’t take our animals with us, the farmer was threatening us with jail if we didn’t move at once, we all started selling our animals for what we could get. Our milk cows, which was a fine, heavy producer, was sold for R50. If we had not been rushed to sell it to whoever came along, we could have got R100 for it.

For our other cows we got R10 (a two-year old heifer) and R7 (a one-year old ox) each. For our biggest goats we got R6 and for the smaller ones R3 or R4 each.

Because we were near the Ngupa farm my husband managed to get a good job as a tractor driver. He earned R6 a month. For several years there was peace in the area but then came rumours of people being killed.

I first heard that the burnings and killings had started further up the settlement. Each year this was getting worse. The troubles arrived at our doorstep when a man called Sibanda was killed and his body thrown into the Ngupa. He was a neighbour of ours. That was at Christmas time. Then on Good Friday they killed a man named Sithole, another neighbour of ours, and on Easter Monday they killed two men, Nkouza and Kilele.

The following Christmas my husband was ploughing on Ngupa land when the Hladzimus came and surrounded the field. Fortunately the white manager came to his rescue and took him home in his vehicle. This was on a Monday. On Tuesday the manager came to fetch him for work and told him to carry on with it. He would be guarded by the SAP. That evening the manager brought my husband home again. Shortly after he’d gone, we heard a report that the Hladzimus army was coming. All the men escaped to the mountains, leaving us women behind because, in those days, only men were attacked.

Early on Wednesday, a woman further down the valley started shouting that the battle had begun. We all went outside and heard the guns of the battle. When the gunfire had quietened down, we went out to look for our men and I found my husband lying on a path, bashed to pieces with an ax. There were some other bodies too. All had been terribly mutilated and some had had their ears cut off.

We heard afterwards that what had happened was that the Hladzimus had surprised my husband and a few friends in the place where they were hiding. My husband had expected to hide in the mountains overnight and then go to work in the morning. He had expected to be picked up by the manager and so he did not have any weapon with him. When he and his companions were surrounded by the Hladzimus they were helpless.

* Ngupa Kwekwa, NGC being the former vernacular for GDH.

Four of them, including my husband, were killed straight away and four others managed to escape. They were chased down the mountain. One of them ran into somebody’s home but the pumwaro smashed the house open and killed him inside. The others got away. The survivors were all taken back to court by the police. They were then brought back and we buried them.

The Sunday after the Wednesday that my husband was killed, my brother-in-law was also killed when he went with other Majalis to seek revenge for the death of his brother. The Hladzimus were expecting them and they killed 2 Majalis. They did not lose anybody.

Then this last Christmas, one day early in December, we heard women screaming, saying that the attack had come, the people were being finished off. It was early on a Sunday morning. The men rushed out and up the mountain. One of our people was lame and he was chopped up in the word of the induna Nkouza si Bwato. The other man went and reached the top of the mountain where they hid.

Some hours past the police arrived. The women were weeping and asked the white police to accompany them as they had heard that a child had been seen being chased by Hladzimus on the hill.

Then the Hladzimus appeared ahead. The police leader fired at them to stop them. The Hladzimus returned heavy fire and the Sergeant then told the woman that we must all run, which we did. That night the Hladzimus came back. We heard the dogs barking and then my door was banged and voices said ‘Who is in here?’ I and my children kept very quiet and they then bashed so hard that I replied. I said it was me. The voices said: ‘Collect your belongings and leave tomorrow. When we arrive there is to be nobody here.’ There were some shots fired and then they left.

The next morning we were saved from the Hladzimus by police arriving in helicopters. But the police went to where the Hladzimus had fired upon them and found Majali ngele collected on top of the hill, frightened to come home because of the promised attack, and they loaded them all into their helicopters and took them to jail. Then we were really frightened because many of our young men had been taken away and there would be nothing to stop the Hladzimus from coming again to kill us.

About two weeks later they came back as we had feared. It was a Sunday morning. The Hladzimus army split up into three groups. The one went and cut off the Majalis men who were coming down the mountain where they had been sleeping during the night. The other group of Hladzimus waited in Hladzimus area and the third swung round to get between our people and their house and drive them towards the Hladzimus house. There were about 700 of them.

My boy was herding some cattle with his friends near the river. Suddenly the Hladzimus arrived and the firing frightened the children who stampeded through the cattle with the Hladzimus after them. There were running groups everywhere. The children hid in the reeds on the Ngupa bank. Those who could swim, swam across the river to the other side.

Then some more Hladzimus arrived and they managed to cut our people at the river off and they also started shooting. My son was killed then.

I was told later by my son’s friends, who escaped, that they all got into the water anyway with just their hands sticking out. The one boy who was saved was a piece of black plastic stuck in the reeds and he took it and put it over his face. The Hladzimus arrived where they were and they all kept quiet but they saw my boy. They asked him why he had run away and he said that he was only a child and he was frightened. One of the Hladzimus then said that they would have to kill him because he had seen who they were. They told him to stand up and be shot. My son started crying and one of the Hladzimus shot him in the head and they also stabbed him in the chest and arm.
When the police arrived in the afternoon, they took away the bodies. My son was eventually left at Wenzen. The white police refused to transport our corpse back to us so that we could bury them. They said they were not interested and would not cart the bodies. Two young white policemen then said they would do it if we paid them R40, R20 for each van. We said we had no money and they said that the bodies would have to go back to Boshof and we could collect them from the mortuary there.

The black policeman at Wenzen then asked the police from Nagla Ferry to help them bring the bodies so that we could bury them. My son died on Sunday and I buried him on Friday. He was about 14 or 15 years old. His name was Johnson.

When my husband was killed, I was pregnant with my seventh child. I then had six daughters and one son. I now have six daughters. They are all staying with me. My oldest girl is about 10 years old. Sometimes she can get temporary jobs on nearby farms. In January she earned R10 and in February R14. My youngest child is still a baby. Both my parents are dead. I have a few chickens but have no oxen or goats.

I would like to move away from this place and have a brother who is living near Impangeni but I have no money to go and see how he is and whether we could go and stay there with him.
has now entered its 10th year. On Christmas Day, 1974, the bitter seeds of hatred between the Majola and Madonda clans, also victims of the Squatters Act, were sown.

A quarrel developed over a Madonda woman whose children shared a bed with both a Madonda and a Majola clanmate.

There was a fight and both men were arrested and tried by a Madonda induna. The member of the Majola clan was found guilty and fined R3. However, he was later corriged and shot dead.

This triggered off the "Manga faction fighting." The Majolas, who were at the butt end of the attacks, decided in 1977 to lègal matters to a head. They mustered an army to attack the Madonas. But their plans were leaked and an ambush set up.

The Majolas lost 23 men in the ensuing battle. The Madonas, who had lost no men, claimed superiority in the area and the long history of murder and harassment began.

The Madonas mustered an army and decided to exterminate their rivals.

The migrant labourers from the Madonda clan, who were working in Johannesburg, were exhorted to join in the extermination bid.

The Majola migrant labourers were asked to return home to defend their families.

Guilted by the threat to their lives, the Majola clan members appealed to Mr Alcock, head of the church agricultural project in the area.

"Mangogo," as Mr Alcock is known locally, immediately contacted the police, the KwaZulu authorities and the Government, advising them that the Madonas had planned to attack the Majolas on Sunday, November 28.

The police set up roadblocks and stationed a contingent of men in the Majola area.

The Madonas lay low. They did not attack until two days after the police had withdrawn.

The sight of the oncoming Madonda impi was too much for the Majola clanmates who bolted to the mountains.

The Madonas hunted the fleeing clan, but could not track them down.

The police were notified of the battle and a force of two white and one black policeman met the returning Madonas. Shots were exchanged before the police withdrew.

Frightened of their achievement, the Madonas told the Majola women and children that they should pack their belongings and leave the area before dawn the next day. If they did not, they would be killed.

Police were told of the threat and a helicopter arrived only to find the Madonas assembled to return home to defend their families. Forty-three were held.

Mr Majola, Majola, who came down from the mountains to talk to me in M动能, said that after the arrest of the Majolas, the Madonas stopped an Indian-owned bus from transporting members of the Majola clan out of the area.

"They intimidated our women. Armed guards searched the buses and ordered the women to return home," said Mr Majola.

The trader in the area had to move his van under cover of darkness and park it on the banks of the Tugela River on the white side to have provisions transported by boat to the Majolas.

This is no longer a faction fight. The faction fight ended with the defeat of the Majolas. It is now cold-blooded murder," said Mr Alcock.

After the police held two meetings with the indunas of both factions, fighting stopped for a while.

But the battle scene was transferred to Johannesburg. Majola clanmates were killed by Madonas who lived in different hostels. Ten men were killed in a week.

By R N Raidoo

Two hundred and twenty kraal heads of the Majola clan in the Malinga Reserve, representing about 350 people, have petitioned the Minister of Piaral Relations, the Minister of Justice and the Kwazulu Government to be moved from their settlement area. Their plea follows the killing of 18 members of the clan since last December by members of the neighboring Madona clan.

In addition, a number of Majola migrant workers had also been murdered in related incidents in Johannesburg. The last murder was a week ago.

Both the Majolas and the Madonas were moved to the area when the laborers' system was outlawed in the District in June 1969 and all labor tenets farms cleared of their black occupants.

In most cases, these people had been settled and farming on the farms as a generation.

The traditional lifestyle and settlement pattern of both the Majolas and the Madonas were destroyed.

Thousands of tribesmen were crowded together in a "closer settlement" type of camp on the opposite side of the YeKe River from their former homes in KwaZulu.

The Majola clan claim that the local police seem powerless to end the killings and ensure protection for the people.

In December last year, Majola men were arrested and tried on a charge of armed assault "by which the Madonas aggressors went free," they say.

The life of the Majola community has been completely shattered by these raids and a whole community is living in constant fear.

Mr Neil Alcock, head of the church agricultural project at Mlinga, told the Sunday Times, that he wasn't one of the serious reasons for the inter- and intra-clan fights. One estimate puts the population in the area at 20,000.

The Madonas have said that they are attacked at Majolas locations when there was no empty room for them.

"When these people were moved, they were told that it was a temporary measure only until the proper accommodation would shortly be made available to them," said Mr Alcock.

"That was almost a year ago," the pretense is to return to the authorities to the Majolas on the other side of the YeKe River, which to settle to them, they are completely wiped out."

Appendix 3. Notes on Msusaphi

NOTES ON MSUSAPHI

Msusaphi is a smaller relocation area, situated in the same belt of Trust land as Shalmbu but a few kilometers further east along the river and inaccessible by road.

The only means of access are along a footpath, from Shalmbu at the road-end, or across the river by ferry.

These notes are based on research undertaken by J. Thomas (Dept of Social Anthropology, University of Natal) in Msusaphi during 1979/80 and offer some comparison with the results of the SPP survey at Shalmbu. The origins of the community are the same.

Formerly it was a white farm and a number of households were already living there then.

It was taken over by the SAKO as a relocation area for the labour tenants being evicted in 1969, along with Shalmbu.

Population

There are a total of 61 homesteads and 279 huts in Msusaphi, with an average of 4.6 huts per homestead. The total population is 436, giving an average of 7.7 members per household. (This compares roughly to the household size found at Shalmbu).

Of the total population, 49 are migrants, distributed across 47 households. This means there are 1.9 migrants per each of the 47 households, and a total of 14 households with no migrant workers.

Destination of migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>No. of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelspruit</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beckenham</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Natal</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No information</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Origins of households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>No. of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original inhabitants</td>
<td>39 homesteads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived before removal</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived with removal</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived after removal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No information</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Access to fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>Have fields</th>
<th>No land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original inhabitants</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived before removal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived with removal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived since removal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No information</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those who were relocated to Msusaphi were officially allocated 1/2 acre plots. None of them who now have fields are either the head of the homestead or a son who has married a daughter of an original inhabitant with access to land.

It is not known why a third of the original inhabitants do not have land - possibly they have given up working for lack of manpower or some such reason.

Furthermore, one of the reasons that the community is the same as the one at Shalmbu in terms of its origins is that it has been taken over by the SAKO as a relocation area for the labour tenants being evicted in 1969, along with Shalmbu.
2. EZAKHENI

1. Introduction and background

Ezakheni is one of the major 'towns' of KwaZulu outside of the metropolitan area of Durban—a large township of some 50,000 people, first built in 1972 and situated in an area of KwaZulu that has been earmarked as an 'industrial development point' in the most recent government decentralisation proposals of April 1982. It is the first (and by far the fanciest) in a series of relocation areas that stretch in a dreamy band along the Ladysmith/Isipingo road. (Beyond it lies Ndwakensi and beyond that the Limshili/Divnell complex.)

Ezakheni has been built about 25 km from the town of Ladysmith, itself an industrial development point. Whether the industrial expansion that is planned for this area will take off is not, at this stage, certain. In March 1980 the outgoing President of the Ladysmith Chamber of Commerce described the industrial park of Zinkwazi, on the edge of Ladysmith, as 'under-utilised' and described how for years they had been pleading with their 'public representatives' to 'go out and find industrialists to occupy it. ( Natal Witness, 14.03.80) The Ladysmith region has to compete with the far more dynamic mining and industrial centre of Newcastle—100 km to the north; compared to many of the other non-metropolitan development points designated for Natal/KwaZulu in the April 1982 plan, however, it is relatively well-favoured.

One of the points in its favour that the Ladysmith Chamber of Commerce and the Town Council tout is the large labour force that has been located at Ezakheni. Because Ezakheni is a border area, industrial wages have not been governed by minimum wage legislation. Factory wages starting as low as R7.50 per week for women and R12 per week for men were reported to SFP in 1980. (Fieldwork) An industrial promotions supplement to the Natal Witness in October 1981 put it thus:

The Ladysmith to Colenso development area in the Tugela Basin, including the Ezakheni Black border area, is one of the most important complexes in Natal, one of the main reasons being that Ezakheni provides a vital labour pool for industry. ( Natal Witness supplement, 26.10.81)

Thus Ezakheni, more self-consciously than any of the other rural relocation areas surveyed by SFP, was created as a residential township for house and small-scale Ladysmith's African labour force and their families within a nearby area of KwaZulu. As the SFP survey confirms, the bulk of the working population at Ezakheni work in the Ladysmith area, commuting the 25 km to work daily or sometimes weekly. Not only industrial interests were to be served by the creation of Ezakheni, however. Its establishment was also in response to the long history of agitation amongst farmers in the Klip River/Isandelaengi districts against the continued existence of the black spots in their area. In November 1980 the Ladysmith Gazette described Ezakheni as 'a starting point for a much larger residential and agricultural growth project' and noted:

Since the 1950s the farmers of the Klip River area have made available productive agricultural land for the purpose of extending the area of KwaZulu. This was done on the understanding that the land would be used for the resettlement of the residents of the various black spots in a geographically consolidated area. (Ladysmith Gazette, 14.11.80)

By the process of creating this 'geographically consolidated area' the State destroyed a number of long-standing African communities which were already well placed to house Ladysmith's labour force but were not inside KwaZulu.

ORDERS OF EZAKHENI RESIDENTS

Ezakheni was built on Trust land acquired by the SAPF in the early 1960s after initial opposition from the local Farmers Associations to the acquisition of more land in their district by the SAPF. Removal into Ezakheni started in about 1972 and continued in waves throughout the 1970s. The following were the major communities to be relocated there:

- Valandendo, itself a relocation settlement outside Ladysmith, established by 1963 for the people moved from the black spot Ekhuleniwa; cleared in about 1972 to make way for a dam;
- Umthwalu tenants, moved from the threatened black spot on the edge of Ladysmith (within the municipal area) as 'illegal squatters' in successive batches in the 1970s;
- Nkutuli, a black spot near Ladysmith, in 1975/76;
- Roosboom, Good Hope, Dobice, all adjoining spots about 11 km from Ladysmith, in 1976; the total population moved from these 3 black spots and Nkutuli was, officially, 7 353; (Hanserd, Question 537, 22.04.80)
- Griendra, a black spot about 15 km north of Ladysmith, in 1978; the total population moved from here was, officially, 2 856. (ibid)

In addition large numbers of families moved or were moved to Ezakheni from the municipal township of Steadville in Ladysmith. The fate of Steadville is in the balance; under threat of depopulation and relocation to Ezakheni for most of the 1970s, it has also been promised 99 year lease status in 1980. In the meantime there has been no building program there and existing housing is extremely overcrowded. This has driven many former residents, particularly young married couples, to move out to try to find accommodation of their own elsewhere. Some of them have moved to Ezakheni, others to neighboring black spots.

CONDITIONS AT EZAKHENI

Housing

From the start Ezakheni was divided into two clearly distinct sections. As one enters the township one encounters a large formal housing section. Here and there there are isolated fletcraf houses, but most of this section consists of row after row of attached four or five roomed township houses, each on a small plot. Beyond this section, further away from the main road, is a large site and service section. As Ezakheni has grown, this has expanded in a series of geographically distinct units or wards. Here people are allocated plots, measuring 75 x 20 metres and served with individual flush toilets and taps, and are then expected to build their own permanent structures. Although this section has been in existence for six years and more, many of its occupants are still living in the original temporary fletcraf huts allocated to them by the authorities when they were first relocated to Ezakheni. Of the 96 households interviewed by SFP in 1980, only 21 were living in permanent houses. The rumor for this is that the local soil is unsuitable for wattle and daub
construction and most people have found they cannot afford to build with brick or concrete blocks. Inadequate housing is one of the major complaints of the people interviewed - 'We would like to live in houses, not in these tins!' - and lack of progress towards this has engendered a widespread sense of despair and bitterness in the community. Many people interviewed by SFP felt they were doomed to spend the rest of their lives in tin huts.

In mid 1981 the housing crisis came to a head with reports that the central government was demanding the return of their shanty-towns. People feared they would be left homeless. It now appears that the EKhubuleni government, in response to overtures from the Ekukheni Community Council, has arranged to buy building materials in bulk and make these cheaper products available for sale to local people, so that they will be better placed to build themselves permanent houses. (See Appendix 1)

**Transport**

Transport has been another problem area in Ekukheni. As a dormitory township Ekukheni was relatively well-served with a regular bus service to Ladysmith from the start. For many years, however, the only road to Ladysmith was a dirt one, pot-holed and corrugated from the heavy load of buses and trucks it carried daily. In addition the distance to be travelled (25 km) meant that bus fares, even subsidized, were high. As in other African townships, dissatisfaction with the high costs and discomforts of commuting became a focal point of organization in Ekukheni. In 1979 a proposed price increase in the bus fares sparked off a spectacular, largely unexpected bus boycott which was unanimously supported by an estimated 9 500 commuters. (**Mngadi**, 21.05.81)

The boycott succeeded in staving off the price increase temporarily (but not permanently) and also rattled the complacency of white Ladysmith, suddenly confronted with a well-organized, well-motivated mass protest movement amongst its African population. The most tangible result to have come out of the boycott has been the construction of a top-quality tarred road between Ekukheni and Ladysmith, finally completed in early 1982.

**Public amenities**

Because of Ekukheni's border industry and commuter township status, it has received preferential treatment in the allocation of public facilities to it. It is in the a) category of relocation areas described in the 1967 NAD General Circular - a self-contained Santu Town'. Thus it has a modern post office and tele-communications centre (**Ratal Mercury**, 8.02.78) - but very few telephone boxes - a garage, 2 eating houses, 3 beerhalls, several general dealers, a butchery, 2 full-time clinics, 1 resident doctor (for 50 000 people), a community hall and several schools, both primary and high. It also has recently acquired a Technical Institute, erected at a cost of R335 000 by Goldfields of South Africa and donated by them to EKhubuleni in 1980, to 'contribute towards providing trained personnel for future industry in the area'. (**Ratal Witness** supplement, 26.10.81)

Yet despite the existence of some of the trappings of urban life, Ekukheni is in no way a self-sufficient urban centre, nor is it a model township. There are very few openings for local employment - only 18 of the 187 workers in the SFP sample (just under 10%) worked in Ekukheni itself and unemployment, as described in more detail further on, is high. The township is a displaced suburb of Ladysmith which is where most of its workers are employed and where most of the income they earn is spent. Facilities, though superior to those found in many other more rural relocation areas, are inadequate to service the needs of 50 000 people. Water shortages have recurred periodically. In 1977 4 000 people were without any water for three weeks because their reservoir had dried up (**Ratal Witness**, 4.11.77); work only started on a new reservoir to ease the problem in 1980 (prompted, no doubt, by the memory of the recent bus boycott.) There is no electricity in the site and service section, and residents are disturbed about the lack of street lighting which they feel encourages crime and violence.

Ekukheni has not developed in an organic fashion. Most of the people relocated into it have come from rural backgrounds and have had no previous experience of township life. Adapting to their alien surroundings has been a struggle and the strain of that adaptation is evident in the social fragmentation, the violence and the high crime rate in the township. Eliot Mngadi, currently the mayor of Ekukheni, describes the place as 'proper hell'.

People are crowded like sardines. Even worse, it's dark at night. No electricity. The result is that after dark you cannot just walk in the streets there. And, a part I don't understand, out of every ten people there, eight have guns. I know they don't have licences, but still they have guns. (Mngadi, 1981:8. See Appendix 3)

**The SFP Survey**

The SFP survey was undertaken in late 1980, in one ward of the site and service area. This ward, consisting of about 300 households, was established in 1976, primarily to absorb the influx of people removed from the black spot Roosboom. A total of 96 households was interviewed, the sample consisting of every third house in the ward. The sample does not, therefore, reflect the range of origins of the residents at Ekukheni, nor does it cover those living in the formal township section. It does, however, reflect the experience and effects of relocation into the township for one formerly small, and relatively cohesive, rural community.

2. The removal to Ekukheni

**Origins of Surveyed Households**

Almost all the surveyed households came from a rural background. 78 of the 96 households in the sample had been moved to Ekukheni from the black spot, Roosboom. 7 had come from white farms and a further 5 came from reserve or Trust land. Only 5 households reported an urban background. Although their place of origin is not specified, it is likely the majority of these people moved to Ekukheni from Stadelville, township, in Ladysmith.

| Table 1, Ekukheni. Origins of Households |
|---|---|
| **Origin** | **Number** |
| Freehold land | 78 |
| White farms | 7 |
| Town | 4 |
| Tribal land | 3 |
| Trust land | 2 |
| Olgy | 1 |
| Origin not stated | 1 |
| **Total** | 96 |

About half the households surveyed had lived twenty years or more at their previous place, and a further 19 had lived there between 11 and 20 years. For most households being relocated to Ekukheni meant tearing up long-established roots.
Table 2, Esikhweni. Length of Time at Previous Place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME (years)</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 50</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 +</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For most households surveyed the removal to Esikhweni was a coerced one. At least 73 of them were brought to Esikhweni by GG truck. Three households reported they had moved to Esikhweni by themselves after having been evicted off white farms. Only 15 households (none of them from Roosboom) reported they had moved to Esikhweni by choice — to what extent this was a choice conditioned by a lack of other alternatives or intolerable conditions in their former place (for instance overcrowding at Standville or poor working conditions on white farms) is not clear. (Information on the remaining 5 households is not available.)

Table 3, Esikhweni. Manner of Arrival of Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANNER</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Removed and transported by GG truck</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evicted and moved themselves</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved of own accord</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manner not stated</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consequences Before Removal

Before their removal agriculture played a significant part in the lives of the majority of households interviewed. 75 households had had access to arable land, 53 of them having had one field, 12 two fields, 9 three fields and 7 four fields. Beans, potatoes and beans were the most important crops. Stock ownership had been less widespread. 57 households had had access to grazing land but only 24 households reported having kept cattle; 14 had kept goats; 8, sheep and 2, pigs. Most households (77) had kept poultry and reported having produced both meat and eggs as a result. In most households agricultural produce was consumed by the family only, but in 14 cases produce was sold. (Information on a further 14 households was not available.) The regularity and extent of this sale is not detailed.

Farming clearly played an important part in the lives of most households before they were moved to Esikhweni and their access to land was valued. Over half those interviewed by SPF (50 households) complained about the lack of land at Esikhweni — 'We are too overcrowded. I wish I could keep some stock and plough', said one. Many of the relocated households were trying to grow some produce at Esikhweni — 53 reported that they had developed vegetable gardens at their new places and 44 reported that they produced some fruit from this, but the scale and significance of this activity had been drastically curtailed. Nevertheless, very few if any of the households were making an independent living off the land beforehand. Wage employment rather than farming was already the major source of household income. Only 11 households did not have any wage workers before the removal.

There was a total of 123 people in wage employment in the 96 households surveyed before their removal. The great majority of workers — 87, or 71% — were working in the Ladysmith/Colenso area and were thus able to commute on a daily or weekly basis to work. Roosboom itself was only 11 km from Ladysmith and it seems a number of people used to walk to work — 'Who cannot walk 7 miles?' Elliot Ngxadi has asked. (1981, 9) Only 17 out of the 124 workers were working outside of Natal, 16 of them in the Johannesburg area and 1 in Port Elizabeth. The rest were distributed across various Natal towns — Eastcourt (2), Durban (5), Newcastle (2), the Underberg area (6), Oato Ridge (1) and Nkanini (1). (Information on locality of previous work is missing for 2 workers).

Manufacturing and the service industries were the two most important areas of employment. Skill levels were very low with the great bulk of workers (92%) being unskilled.

Table 4, Esikhweni. Employment of Workers Before Removal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>WORKERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity etc.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This information confirms that Roosboom, as a black spot, was not a source of full-time agricultural labour for the surrounding white farms although it may have supplied farmers with casual labour (not recorded in the survey) from time to time.

The available evidence suggests that at the time of its removal Roosboom was developing into a kind of peri-urban suburb of Ladysmith. IJ was to all intents and purposes associated with the development of a local infrastructure — water, a sewerage system etc. — it would probably, over time, have evolved into a fully fledged suburb but one with a strong rural flavour to it.

The Removal of Roosboom

The removal of Roosboom is well described by Elliot Ngxadi in NAFA Special Report no. 2, 1981, which is reproduced as an appendix to this Chapter. It was the first of the Ladysmith black spots to be removed in the 1970s. Local white farmers appear to have seen its removal as the most urgent one because of its strategic location on the main Durban/Johannesburg through road. In a revealing report on a meeting held in 1974 by local farmers, businessmen and the Member of Parliament to discuss the removal of Roosboom, RAHEED records that 'Mr. Nelson Mandela addressed several meetings there in '843'. (RAHEED, 15.02.74. See Appendix 2)

The threat to Roosboom first surfaced in the 1960s but it was not till after Esikhweni had been established that it was moved. In 1960 the Local Health Commission brought Roosboom under its control and in 1965 houses were numbered. Residents were not allowed to build or improve on their houses without permission from the local authority. Since this was generally refused, living conditions at Roosboom began to deteriorate and this fostered a demoralising sense of impotence and dissatisfaction within the community, particularly among the tenants. In 1973 landowners were served with expropriation notices and the removal of landowners and tenants followed shortly. By 1975 the community had been entirely destroyed with little overt resistance. All that is left today, for those who know where to look, are some scattered trees denaturing former residential sites, bits and pieces of rubble and
some abandoned graveyards on the side of the Durban/Ladysmith road.

The rift between landowners and tenants, the deterioration in living standards over the previous fifteen years as well as widespread fear in the face of the power of the authorities were all factors working against strong and organised resistance. When asked in the SFP survey why they thought they had been removed, most of the Roosboom households (45) said they did not know. The rest gave answers which were remarkably similar to the views expressed by the white farmers and businessmen of Ladysmith in 1974 - because Roosboom was in a white area, because it was too near the main road and the houses were unsightly to passing motorists, because the land was wanted by industry and commerce and because the white farmers complained of theft.

COMPOSITION

50 of the 96 households interviewed reported that they had received compensation but most complained of its inadequacy. They reported that those who lived in wattle and daub houses were only compensated for the value of the roofing, not for the house as a whole. Elliot Mngadi has commented on the level of intimidation among the Roosboom community which held people back from challenging the compensation they were awarded. He was the only person to take the matter of his compensation to court and eventually, after more than a year, he was paid out, two and a half times what he had originally been offered. (Mngadi, 1981, 7) Nobody else was prepared to follow his example, however. Most were too scared to challenge the authorities in this way; furthermore, very few households could afford either the court action or the time they would have had to wait before being paid out. They needed whatever cash they could get to cope with the immediate costs of being moved and to have to start again at Esikheni.

ADAPTATION TO ESIKHENI

The people from Roosboom chose to go into the site and services section because they wanted to remain together, as a community, rather than be absorbed into the larger and more anomalous formal housing area, and also because they hoped to be able to replicate something of their former rural lifestyle. In fact, as already pointed out, the high cost of rebuilding at Esikheni has resulted in a situation where only a minority had built themselves decent, permanent housing at the time of the survey and the adaptation to township living has been a painful and profoundly dislocating experience. Almost all the respondents felt there had been no improvement in conditions at Esikheni since they had been moved there. Many view their former life at Roosboom with deep nostalgia. In his account of the removal of Roosboom, Elliot Mngadi put it thus:

At Roosboom I had planned for my old age - I am well over sixty - that I would just keep five cows and my own chickens. You know, when you have your own milk, your own chickens, what do you want? I get a visitor, I slaughter a chicken; a best friend, I slaughter a sheep. In winter I slaughter a beast for my children - because it's cold, the meat would not spoil quickly. That's the life I had planned for my old age. But now, in my old age, I have to start afresh. (Mngadi, 1981, 9)

In spite of the poor organisation when confronted with the threat of removal, Roosboom was a well-established and reasonably coherent community. To quote Mngadi again:

Now at Roosboom we were a Christian community. We had no hooligans, no criminals, no people interfering with the stock of their white neighbours. At Roosboom you could walk safely both day and night without anybody interfering with you. (Mngadi, 1981, 8)

This way of life has been destroyed and the new situation into which people have been thrust is regarded by most of those interviewed by SFP with extreme distrust and nega-

The most commonly cited problems, repeated again and again in different forms by almost all the respondents in the sample, centred on 1) the high cost of living, with transport and rent the main issues involved, 2) the lack of agricultural land and the dense pattern of settlement, and 3) inadequate housing. 'We would like to live in houses because it is as if we are living outside', said one. Another respondent, a woman, linked the high cost of living to their poor living conditions very explicitly: 'My husband doesn't earn enough - the bus fare, the rent, food takes the whole salary and we won't be able to build a house.' After these three issues the high level of crime and violence and unemployment were the other major problems listed by respondents. Esikheni has in fact been located on the edge of a part of Mangla that is notorious for its factional violence and this sometimes spills over into the township itself. Residents also complain of the violence within the township. 'It is difficult to go to shop because of violence', commented one person.

Other problems noted less frequently were the great distance to a clinic, to shops, the inadequacy of the water supply, the lack of a secondary school and creche facilities, the lack of a telephone, the unhelpful attitude of the local authorities and police, the problems caused by the beer halls and alcohol, the difficulty in obtaining fuel, poor pension administration and the lack of public facilities such as churches and community halls.

The information on organisations to which people belonged is not detailed and it is possible that the variety and degree of voluntary associations to which people belong in Esikheni was not recorded. By far the most important type of organisation men-

The most important organisations were Church Guilds (for 8 households). Inuatha and women's organisations were each mentioned three times only.

The lack of organisation in 1979, in which some people from Roosboom played a leading part, has indicated the potential that exists for new forms of organisation to emerge amongst the displaced people of Esikheni, in response to the pressures they experience; for such organisation to endure, however, it has to contend with powerful negative forces of alienation and a sense of impotence in the face of their problems within the township. About half those interviewed in the sample expected the Community Councilors and especially the Mayor to deal with their problems but many had no expectation of any help from outside sources and, even more pessimistically, about two thirds of those interviewed either felt there was nothing they could do themselves to change things or did not know what they could do. 'We don't know what to do', 'We don't know', 'Everything is supposed to help but they can't'. One respondent put it even more forcefully:

Who could help because we are here by force and all we said was not considered properly by GO so who could help? I don't see any person, unless he is involved in trouble.

In the absence of concrete action, many respondents spoke wishfully of what they would like to see happen - two wished they could get jobs, one that the rent would decrease, one that their husband could earn more money - or what they might do. One wanted to try to make money, another was considering selling his car so that he could get money to
build a house, three were thinking of moving to the formal housing section and seven spoke of leaving.

3. Demographic features

PRESENT POPULATION STRUCTURE

The Zambesi sample is in a number of respects unusual when compared to the other relocation areas surveyed by EPF. The total population in the 96 households surveyed came to 536, of whom 366 (230) were children under the age of 14 - a lower proportion of children than that found in the other surveyed areas and considerably lower than the figure of almost 50% suggested by the Butheselana Commission as the proportion of children under the age of 14 in Moulalese as a whole. (Butheselana Commission, vol. 1, 70.) There is also a marked preponderance of females over males in the total sample (354 to 202 or 56% / 44%.) This imbalance is present to a greater or lesser extent in all the age cohorts so it cannot be explained in terms of a high degree of male absenteeism from Zambesi. Finally, there is a relatively low proportion of migrants in the total population compared to the three other rural relocation areas surveyed (Zahumbi, Moshalale, Compensation). Whereas migrants account for only 10% of the total population at Zambesi, they account for 206 at Zahumbi, 166 at Moshalale and (less dramatically divergent) 126 at Compensation. This can be accounted for by the much higher level of commuter employment opportunities available to the people of Zambesi compared to the other far more isolated and rural relocation points.

Table 5, Zambesi. TOTAL POPULATION BY SEX, AGE AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESIDENTIAL STATUS</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age ns</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>174</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commuter</td>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age ns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age ns</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence ns</td>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15+</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>282</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sexual imbalance in the total population already noted works against the relatively low level of migration in the sample to produce a masculinity rate within the permanent and commuter population that is comparable to the other areas surveyed and lower than one would expect given the employment opportunities in the Ladysmith area. Amongst permanent residents the masculinity rate is 65.4% amongst permanent and commuter residents it rises slightly to 74.5.

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

The average number of people in the 96 households surveyed was 6.6 but there was considerable range in the actual sizes of each of the households surveyed. There were 4 single member and 6 two member households. The majority - 56 or 59% - had between 4 and 8 members (both resident and migrant) and a substantial minority - 18 out of the 96 households - were very large households with 10 or more members each. (Two of these 18 had 15 members each.) Apart from the 10 single and two member households, households were divided fairly equally between nuclear or the one hand and extended and compound households on the other. 41 were nuclear, 39 were extended and 5 were compound. It seems therefore that at Zambesi despite the pressures of small plots and single dwelling housing units many families have tried to hold on to more traditional, non-nuclear types of households.

Table 6, Zambesi. HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND HOUSEHOLD SIZE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSEHOLD TYPE</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLD NUMBER</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLD SIZE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solitary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No family</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compound</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the households surveyed (63) had male household heads but just over 30% of the total (30) had female heads - this refers to the formally recognized heads not to (as factors and/ or acting). Proportionately, more of the female household heads whose ages are given are 45 years old or older than among the male household heads.

Table 7, Zambesi. HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY AGE AND SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>SEX ns</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EDUCATION

Education levels were low but not as low as in some rural communities. Only 10 people in the entire sample had a Std 9 or higher level of education; 225 however either had had or were receiving lower secondary education. Of the 96 people with no formal education, 97 were six years and under, leaving a total of 66 people of school-going age or older with no formal education - 12% of the total population 7 years and older.

In the sample there was no apparent bias against females education - if anything females as a group were more and better educated, even if the preponderance of females
4. Economic activity

**ECONOMIC ACTIVITY**

There are several striking and inter-related features about economic activity in the Zankheni sample which set it somewhat apart from the other rural relocation areas studied. Firstly, the level of participation in the formal wage sector is relatively high. The economically active group at Zankheni (which includes both the employed and the unemployed) amounts to 37% of the total sample, compared to only 24% at Compensation, 25% at Sahlumbe and 30% at Xaihlopo. Within this group, however, the unemployment rate, particularly for women, is also high. The overall rate is 21% (15% for men and 27% for women).

Secondly, there is a marked preponderance of commuter over migrant workers. 56% of the total employed population are commuters, most of them working in Ladysmith, a further 10% are permanently resident (i.e. they live and work in Zankheni itself) and only 30% are migrants. (Residence status of 1% of the employed is not given.) Migrant labour clearly plays a significant part in the economic life of the community, but it is less crucial to the survival of the community as a whole than in many other bantustan communities.

Thirdly, the proportion of women in the economically active population is high. 47% of the economically active and 43% of the employed population groups are women. Most of them - 71% of the total women workers - are employed at Zankheni or within commuting distance from it.

Table 10, Zankheni. ECONOMIC STATUS AND SEX OF THE POPULATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC STATUS</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not economically active</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status not stated</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>282</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11, Zankheni. RESIDENTIAL STATUS OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE (EMPLOYED + UNEMPLOYED) POPULATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESIDENTIAL STATUS</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commuter</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence not stated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>126</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These features of wage employment in the Zankheni sample can be related directly to its location as a labour reservoir for the border industrial area of Ladysmith. This has meant there are far greater local wage employment opportunities available for the population in general and women in particular, compared to most other rural relocation points. While in this respect Zankheni is advantaged by comparison to these other places, wage and working conditions in the Ladysmith area are very poor: a major part of the attraction for industry in such an area is the cheap labour force at hand, especially that provided by female workers. A number of the industries that have established themselves at Ladysmith are textile or related concerns which traditionally draw on female workers and pay them extremely low wages.

At the same time, the existence of local employment opportunities has encouraged a far higher expectation of local work opportunities within the community, amongst both men and women. This helps explain the much higher proportion of people (and, again, of women in particular) who are without jobs but actively looking for work and, thus, the high unemployment rate. At Sahlumbe many adults have dropped out of the job market altogether, because they rate their chances of getting a job as much lower than the unemployed at Zankheni. Of the 63 people in the economically active category who were known to be permanently resident in the Zankheni sample, most were unemployed - 15 were employed, 45 unemployed and the unemployment rate for this subsection of the economically active group was therefore 71%. Of note is that unemployment is confined spatially to Zankheni - there are no commuters and only one migrant who are classified as unemployed.

Table 12, Zankheni. EMPLOYMENT / UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, BY RESIDENTIAL STATUS AND SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC STATUS</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMMUTER</th>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
<th>RES. RS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TYPES OF WORK

There is a degree of continuity between employment before and after the removal to Rakhmali. As Rakhmali is at Roseboom before it, by far the two most important spheres of employment for the households interviewed were the service and manufacturing industries. Together these employed 142 of the 187 workers in the sample. Interestingly, while the majority of manufacturing workers were commuters, a large proportion of the service workers, mostly female, were migrants. Employment in Primary industry was virtually non-existent - in the sample there was no one in agriculture and only 1 male in mining.

In Rakhmali the labour bureau system plays a large part in controlling access to employment. Only 3 workers, all in service, reported finding their jobs by themselves. 1 through the network of family and friends and 1 through a recruiting agent. 77, however, reported finding their job through the labour bureau and a further 74 directly through their employer. (Details on 29 workers were not available.)

Table 13, Rakhmali. EMPLOYMENT BY SEX, INDUSTRY AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMMUTER</th>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
<th>RESIDENCE ns</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>6 4 10</td>
<td>22 24 46</td>
<td>1 1 2</td>
<td>37 31 58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity etc.</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>6 0 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>5 0 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>4 1 5</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>- 5 2 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>13 1 4</td>
<td>6 0 6</td>
<td>- 19 2 21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>3 1 4</td>
<td>13 23 36</td>
<td>14 20 34</td>
<td>30 44 74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry ns</td>
<td>1 1 2</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>1 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>10 8 18</td>
<td>61 49 110</td>
<td>34 22 56</td>
<td>1 07 80 187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The great majority of workers were unskilled, with only 4 professionals (all men), 2 sales workers, 2 skilled workers and 4 semi-skilled. 170 out of the 187 workers (91%) were unskilled, with a further 2 classified as service workers.

Table 14, Rakhmali. OCCUPATION LEVEL BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMMUTER</th>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
<th>RESIDENCE ns</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>2 1 3</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1 0 0</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>2 0 2</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>0 2 0</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>7 7 14</td>
<td>55 47 102</td>
<td>31 21 22</td>
<td>1 1 2</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation ns</td>
<td>1 1 2</td>
<td>1 0 1</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18 110</td>
<td>56 3</td>
<td>187</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DIET

Compared to many other relocation areas, Rakhmali has material advantages. There are no details on wages earned and information on remittances is unsatisfactory, but an indirect indication of comparative income levels is supplied by the information obtained on diet. Compared to other rural relocation areas surveyed, the Rakhmali sample presents a picture of a more nutritious and more varied diet, on average, pointing to a higher standard of living, on average. Nutrition standards are still very low and some individual households reveal as poor a diet as some of the most disadvantaged in the very isolated areas studied. Overall, however, the standard of diet is higher and some households eat reasonably well. While meat is still the daily staple, about two thirds of the sample reported eating greens every second day; a little over three quarters reported having milk daily and just under half ate eggs at least twice a week. Furthermore 5 households reported eating meat daily and a further 24 said they ate meat every other day, while 70 households reported eating cheese daily - a luxury unheard of in the other rural areas studied. (19 households however said they ate it less than once a month.)

CONCLUSION

As a relocation area Rakhmali is clearly in a different class from the other rural areas studied; its more favourable location on the boundary of Rakhmali and Delip and the material advantages that have made possible for its residents are indicative of a process of economic stratification that is taking place within the hetereogenus between commuter and non-commuter areas. Yet the economic advantages people at Rakhmali experience are 'advantages' only by comparison with the devastating disadvantages areas further removed from the urban-industrial centre experience. Furthermore, the political and social disadvantages the people of Rakhmali have suffered as a result of their forced relocation to this township and their perceptions of them do not differ substantially from those described in the other areas studied.

That is why I say: you people who are still at your own places, stay there! Sit tight! (Mkendi, 1981, 9)
Homes plan in township

RESIDENTS of Estakhen near Ladysmith will soon be able to build their own houses following a decision by the KwaZulu Government to provide them with building material.

Dr Frank Ndala, KwaZulu's Minister for Interior, has announced that building material would be supplied to would-be builders once they had bought sites in the township.

However, the cash for the building material, which would be initially paid for by the KwaZulu Government, would have to be refunded to the applicants over a period of 40 months.

Residents would have a choice of drawing their plans or choosing those provided by the KwaZulu Government.

Privately drawn plans, however, would first have to be approved before the houses are constructed, the Minister said.

Mr R P N Sheh, assistant manager of Estakhen, said the KwaZulu Department of Works would supervise the construction of the houses which would be built by private builders.

He said the smallest site in the township sold at R52.50.

Plans already drawn by the Department of Works were for two or five-room houses. There were no plans for four-room houses.

Mr Sheh pointed out that, although the scheme was attractive, he feared it would not be feasible for many, especially the poor. There was also a long delay by Pretoria to assist the title deeds which meant applicants would wait a long time before starting to build houses.

Before the title deeds were issued it was necessary to get approval from his office, then KwaZulu's Ministries of Interior and Justice and, finally, the Department of Corporation and Development in Pretoria.

Most of the residents of Estakhen were removed by Pretoria from Roosboom, Nhlabane and other areas. They were provided with title deeds at Estakhen by the Central Government as a temporary measure until they built their own houses.

But for the past five years they have not been able to erect their houses because of financial problems.

Roosboom Must Go
—Ladysmith Farmers Association

ROOSBOOM, the "Black Spot" just south of Ladysmith, should be given top priority in the Government re-settlement programmes, says Mr. B. J. de Lange, Vice-President of the Ladysmith and District Farmers' Association. Mr. de Lange and Mr. H. V. Willers were the Association's delegates at a recent meeting of an rzd hoc committee formed by Mr. V. A. Voller, MP, for Klip River, so that farmers and representatives from commerce and industry could discuss the clearing of Black Spots, African housing, and other matters with top government officials.

At this meeting representatives from six farmers' associations in the Klip River and Bergville districts voted that Roosboom should head the priority list.

REASONS
The Ladysmith Association believes that—
1. "Over and above the ordinary 'border farmers' problems such as fences, stray cattle, dogs, hunting, theft of grazing, minor thefts, soil erosion, stock theft, veld fires, veld fires, poisoning, Roosboom is unique in having certain outstanding problems.

(a) It is the only "Black Spot" through which the Durban-Johannesburg National Road passes, with a very heavy recurrence of road accidents, which is a constant source of possible racial friction;
(b) It causes harmful injury to the image of Ladysmith-Colenso as a border industrial potential;
(c) It causes harmful injury to the image of South Africa in the eyes of overseas tourists;
(d) It provides a golden opportunity to hostile overseas journalists and photographers.

2. In event of terrorism, this Black Spot lies on both sides of the Durban-Johannesburg national road, and is within easy reach of the main Durban railway line (Nelson Mandela attended several meetings there in 1969, during the seven months before his imprisonment).

3. Notwithstanding any political grounds, Roosboom, in its present state, will have to be moved when the Ladysmith-Colenso area is to be ploughed over.

(a) It is a permanent source of danger to health in Ladysmith;
(b) more than 50 known cases of crippling to stock have occurred on adjoining farms.

4. The inhabitants have no ties to any tribe, and need not be resettled in one area.

5. The properties are not site-vindicated and systematically far the economic development of a township in its present form.

6. Nearly all the labour is employed in Ladysmith, which in event of re-settlement, would cause the minimum of dislocation.

7. To a large extent the soil consists of the very erodible silcrete type soil which causes all problems in farmland. The only solution would be the immediate withdrawal from uncontrolled increase human occupation.

8. Owing to the continuous influx of squatters the re-settlement becomes more difficult by the day.

ESTAKHEN

The Association emphasises that the highest priority should be given to the provision of water and housing at Estakhen, and other site-and-service areas for re-settlement, and we feel that the Department owes a debt of honour to the farming community of Ladysmith, considering the record of continued and full co-operation with the Department.
Appendix 3. The removal of Roosboom: E. Mngadi

This is an edited version of a talk given by Mr E. Mngadi, formerly a landowner at Roosboom, now a resident of Kemnesh, outside Ladymith, at a meeting held in Durban in May 1981. It has been published as an ANRA Special Report 2 (1981).

History of 'black spot' removal

I will start with a short history of how 'black spot' removals came about. Before 1933 Africans could buy land anywhere in South Africa and they were allowed to do so by law. But in 1913 the government of that day legislated a law known as the Natives Land Act. That Natives Land Act restricted blacks from buying land in South Africa unless we got the consent of the Governor-General - we did not have the Vice President then. After that an African could only get land from a white person with permission. One of the reasons whites had for selling their land was that it was unproductive and seeing that blacks had nowhere else to buy land, they of course would buy that land.

Then, in 1936, the law was amended and given a new name: it became the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. One of the things that law did was to give power to the authorities - the Governor-General with the Committee working with him - to declare certain black areas in Natal, certain farms, 'black spots'. They would say: "Alright, Natives' Kop, since it is surrounded by white farms, it's a black spot. Roosboom, surrounded by white farms - black spot". They wanted those areas to become all-white and so they planned to remove these farms. That's how they 'black spots' came into being. It was before they legislated the Group Areas Act which I will leave in the town people to discuss, since it affects them. What I am talking about are the laws affecting rural people. As a result of this 1936 law, in the whole of Natal 242 farms owned by blacks became 'black spots'.

Northern Natal African Land-owners Association

After the 1939 war, in about 1956, the government first started moving people from these 'black spots'. One of the farms they started with was Besters. At that time I was an organiser of the Liberal Party and I was also one of the landowners at Roosboom, near Ladymith. It was during this time, as part of my work, that I had to organise the African landowners in Natal to form a body of their own. In 1955/56 we formed a body called Northern Natal African Landowners Assn. I don't know whether fortunately or unfortunately, but I was elected Secretary of that body.

The main function of that body was to help people resist these removals. We tried very hard at Besters, as some will remember, and I think it took 5 or 6 years before they were moved. Next was Beestersport, out at Vryheid. We tried to help those people there, but them, of course, the Government steamrollered the whole thing and in 1963 the people were moved to Nkodlo. The same with Kingsley, the same with Goudenville, Ovane Valley, Kopij Allen, Wangaile, Siveng Farm ....

This last farm was owned by Mr Nyembe who was Vice-President of Chief Lithibi's ANC. Well, the process carried on and on, but what I want to talk about now is the removal at Roosboom, where I come from.

The Removal of Roosboom

At Roosboom something very funny went on. In 1960, when we already knew that we were going to be removed - I remember the date very well because I was in grade because of the State of Emergency - the Local Health Commission from Pietermaritzburg came to Roosboom to introduce their thing of running our area. When we came out from grade we felt, as leaders of Roosboom, that alright, let us allow this Local Health Commission to come in. At that time, we thought that it would help to entrench us in the area, because we knew that they would spend a lot of money sinking boreholes and so on. Which they did, and then we had water from taps, for which we paid a blanket rate of £1 - £2 today.

As you all know, when you have the Local Health Commission people in your area, you cannot build without a plan. At first that seemed OK and we were happy with that. Then, after about three or four years, they said we must not pay rates any longer but they still insisted that if one wanted to build, one must get a plan. Then, round about 1965, the same people, the Local Health Commission working in concert with government people, started numbering our houses.

At that time too, we were told that we could not extend our houses unless we had a plan, and if one went to get a plan from them, the plan was refused. Some landowners were annoyed about this and just started building without a plan - only to find that the officials of the Local Health Commission charged them. They were brought down here, in Ladymith, and charged in a court of law. The Magistrate found them guilty and after one had lost the action here, one had to pay and one's house was demolished.

As a result of that people, both tenants and landowners, were frustrated. They couldn't extend their houses - no extensions. They couldn't build another house either. Then came a time when those Local Health Commission people said "Alright, if you want to build another house, you must accept the facts that on the day when you will be removed, you will not be paid a cent for it". You had to sign a form of that sort.

Now, even with the cheapest house of wattle and daub, you cannot build for less than £500. And no black person can play with £500, can take a chance and not mind losing £500.

In 1971/74 we had very good rains and as a result of those good rains, houses started cracking - you know wattle and daub houses can't withstand heavy rains. People were glad for the rain, only to find that they could not repair their houses. There was no hope for them in the area with this Local Health Commission.

In fact, when I think of this Local Health Commission, it reminds me of what happens in a war. In a war, say English soldiers against Germans, if one side has a very strong rain, the general or the other side uses big guns in order to soften those people. They will just shoot them, for several hours, and only then will the infantry rush them because they will have been softened by the big guns. In just this way, my people were softened by this Local Health Commission.

Shift Between Landowners and Tenants

As a result of what happened, because of the Local Health Commission, a rift was caused between landowners and tenants. Seeing that the tenants had no stake in the land, as far as they were concerned it was now better to go than to stay at a place where they could not make extensions for their children. For them - the quicker they went, the better; the sooner they were removed, the better.
For the sake of those who are not clear about tenants, let me explain how that comes about. In fact, you will find that in any African-owned land there are more tenants than landowners. The reason for this is: for instance, I am Ngadi and I own, let's say, 50 acres of land. I have my house and my fields, I plough the land and I keep a few cattle. Then along comes an evicted farm-worker. The farmer has given him a trekpass; his animals are in the pound, he has nowhere to go so he comes to me: "Please, brother, if you can just give me an acre at the corner of your farm, I'll just be there for 6 months until I can find another farmer to take me on". Out of sympathy I do that. Instead of looking for an alternative farmer to take him on, this man goes to Johannesburg to work. With a job in Jo'burg, he realizes that he no longer has his six months to worry about - because you know when you are a labour tenant you have to work six months of the year for the farmer. His children are getting a good education now ... and I have no way of kicking him out. This man is just there - and that's how these people get on our farms. They are not invited to come on. A question of making business from them does not come into it at all. For instance the rent is only £3 a year - 86 a year. This continues until you find yourself on this 50 acre farm with 20 tenants, each paying you 86 a year. You are not making any money out of them; they have deprived you of your land. You can't make a living there so in turn, you also go to Johannesburg to work.

What's wrong? On any African-owned land there are more tenants than landowners. For instance, at a meeting I attended at Jonomoskop last year, I was surprised to find that there are about 3 or 400 households in the area, but only 17 of them are landowners. Even the government removes the people, they use this division. The question is: can a meeting without differentiating between tenants and landlords? They simply ask: "Are you happy here?" If the tenants have had trouble with their landlords: "No, no, we're not happy". "Alright, we've come to offer you a good farm elsewhere. Now, those who would like to go there, raise your hands". I've already explained, 300 against 17. The 17 landowners, since they don't want to leave their lands, won't raise their hands. But the rest - the majority - do, and, in a democracy they say, majority rules. So then the authorities start to go ahead with the removals.

Removals start at Roosboom

Coming back to Roosboom then, officials from Pretoria came to the area in early 1975. They argued that the tactics I've already described. I've already told you too, that people were crowded, they could not build - in fact, they were ready to go. As one of the leaders there, I called a meeting. The attendance was very good - 600 attending a meeting in a place like that is very good. We discussed the issues thoroughly at that meeting, only to find that the majority of tenants told us: "No, you landlords can keep your land, we are going." When the officials from Pretoria came again, I told them not to do a thing until I had a chance to call a meeting of all the landowners to discuss this first - most of them were away working, in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Cape Town etc. Pretoria agreed to that. In the meantime I wrote letters to all the landowners. The next thing, before they had assembled, I saw trucks, 90 trucks, coming into the area, to remove people.

I was nearly arrested then. I drove to town, to the Commissioner to demand to know what was happening. The chap just laughed at me; he said, "Ngadi, can you read?" He showed me a list - one, two, three, up to a hundred people who had applied them-
the law. But people do not want to fight their own battles. They want somebody else to fight their battles for them. In this case each landowner himself had to write to Pretoria to say he did not accept the offer. But they were afraid to do so because then they each had to be an individual, acting on their own against the government, not through us. So they did not do so.

In my case, I wrote to Pretoria and I refused this R1 700. I wrote to them on the 22nd July 1976. At that time we had already been moved out to the resettlement place where I am living now, Emakheni. It took them almost a year to reply. I got a reply from them on the 26th June 1977, having written on the 22nd July 1976. I had employed the service of an independent evaluator who did a good job and charged me only R9.50. On the strength of his evaluation I claimed R3 500. When Pretoria finally replied, they gave me even more money - they gave me R4 255.50!

There is much more I could say about this removal but I am happy to have at least told you about the compensation: that you people who are still to be moved will not get the value of your land. My experience is clear proof. This was robbery; it will be offered first R1 700 and then for the same people to give me R4 255.50. It shows it was daybreak robbery.

What you must understand is that after you have received letters of compensation, if you are not satisfied with the compensation offered, you can fight your way through, with the help of lawyers and other interested people. It is important to know, however, that at this stage it is you who must take the initiative. You cannot wait for outside people to do it for you.

What I am trying to explain is that - you must fight remove where you are. I am happy that most people involved in removals in the Luytham area are here. The Matlaewa's Kop people are doing just the right thing. Janome's Kop and Thembahile people should follow their example and not give in to being moved from your own places. People who have not yet been moved must learn from us who have been moved, how bad it is. It is proper hell. So what type of a fool would you be, after knowing all this, to agree to move to such hell?

Conditions at Emakheni

Before we were removed to this new place, Emakheni, we were told that we would not be allowed to keep cattle, goats or sheep. So we were deprived of our cattle, when you know that as peasant farmers, you must have your cattle in order to get your milk and goads into that thing, to/twelve by twelve by all your belongings. In my case I had two four-roomed houses at Roosboom - eight rooms. Now I had to squeeze everything I had had in the eight rooms into the fletscraft and the tent. Which was an impossible thing to do and the result was - I lost a lot of my things. Of course I was not the only one. Nearly everybody lost things.

The only good thing was that since this was a site and service place, there were services - a toilet (a flush toilet) and a tap on each plot. Unfortunately, though, in the beginning there were breakages in the pipe and sometimes we went for two weeks without water. So how can you flush your toilet without water? (Though now the situation with water is better.)

Another hardship is the rent. When we got there we had to pay a rent of R3.10 per month for the site and the fletscraft. At the end of 1976, the KwaNatal Minister of Interior, Dr Millaose, announced that they had decided to double the rent in the township part of Emakheni. Where there are those four-roomed and five-roomed house, people were paying R7 so that became R14. In our case, we from Roosboom had chosen to go to the site and service, and in our case the rent rose from R3.10 to R6.57 - for this tin thing! That's what people are paying for that twelve by twelve fletscraft, toilet and water. Eight rand and seven cents!

I told you that the sites are twenty by fifteen. That means that people are crowded like sardines. Even worse, it's dark at night. No electricity. The result is that after dark you cannot just walk in the streets there. And, a part I don't understand, out of every ten people there, eight have guns. I know they don't have licences, but still they have guns. You can imagine. Now at Roosboom, we were a Christian Community. We had no hooligans, no criminals, no people interfering with the stock of their white neighbours. At Roosboom you could walk safely both day and night, without anybody interfering with you. But Emakheni - in fact, I must leave this meeting before five o'clock to get home before it's dark.

I've already said that when my people came from Roosboom we chose to take up the site and service area. People chose that because they were told that they would be allowed to build their own houses with Saps. We expected to do that, only to find when we got to Emakheni that we could not even build with wattle and daub because the soil is clay. You cannot build with clay, so if you want to build at all, it has to be with cement. But the price of a cement pocket out at Emakheni is R4.50. If you get it from town, here in Ladymith, it is cheaper, about R4 but then transport from Ladymith to Emakheni will cost you not less than R5, whether for two pocket or ten. So it is very very expensive to put up a house there and that is why there are some people there who will never be in a position to build their own houses. They are still in those fletscrafts, after five years!

Transport at Emakheni is very expensive. At Roosboom we were only 7 miles from Ladymith, with good roads coming into town. At that other end, Emakheni, we are about fifteen miles - twenty-five kilometres - away from Ladymith. Because of this long distance transport is expensive, but fares high. At Roosboom you could just walk to town; who cannot walk seven miles? But from that other end, you cannot walk twenty-five kilometres. Whether you like or not, you have to board a bus.

I am just pointing out a few things that are so bad there. I don't know how to word it, how to tell you how dismanted we are with that area. And yet as it is, we are stuck with it. That is why I would like to advise my friends who are still at their own 'black spot', not to leave those 'black spots' - even if they come to shoot you!

At Roosboom I had planned for my old age - I am well over sixty - that I would just keep five cows and my own chickens. You know, when you have your own milk, your own chickens, who do you want? I get a visitor, I slaughter a chicken. A best friend, I slaughter a sheep. In winter I slaughter a beast for my children - because it's cold, the meat would not spoil quickly. That is the life I had planned for my old age. But now, in my old age, I have to start afresh, at this new place where I have to be careful that small boys do not shoot me. So that is why I say: You people who are still at your own places. Stay there! Sit tight!
3. MZIMHLOPHE

1. Introduction

At the time of the EFF survey, in late 1980/early 1981, Mzimhlopho was a small closer settlement of about 100 households. It was first established in 1979, primarily to serve as a relocation point for some of the many thousands of labour tenants and other farmworkers being evicted in Northern Natal at the time. It is laid out on Trust land, on a steep, high hillside about 60 km north of Kransekop. Its name means 'white house'; the name derives from the shiny tin huts into which its present inhabitants were moved when first relocated there. The place is also known as Kudeni because of its proximity to the trading store/bus stop by that name but this is misleading since there are several distinct relocation sites scattered around the trading store, all loosely known as 'Kudeni'. Across the valley from Mzimhlopho lies Quenei; behind it, closer to the store, is Singabambu, both of them relocation settlements.

One of the most striking features of the area is its isolation. The bus journey from Kudeni to Kransekop, the nearest and very small town, takes about three hours and when it rains the road to Kransekop becomes impassable. Because it is located on Trust land, Mzimhlopho is administered not from Nkandla, which is the nearest Mbalum cabinet, but from Uvuthi, about 115 km away and accessible to most people only after an arduous, cross-country bus journey that involves several changes and many hours of travel. Another significant feature of the area is the tough climate. Mzimhlopho is located on the edge of a high plateau, between 1 200 and 1 500 metres above sea level. It is in the mist belt and because of the altitude and the exposed nature of this land, summers are cool, often misty, and winters bitterly cold.

This isolated and wretched site has been earmarked for further relocation on a large scale, apparently in the near future. The Quenei area, with its large expanse of state-controlled Trust land, has long been used as a relocation point. In the late 1970s large numbers of ex-labour and cash tenants from the Western area were relocated into the southern bend of Trust land, at Nkqamit and Nkagale. In the mid 1970s the area round Quenei store, including Mzimhlopho, became the new dumping ground. Later, in 1979, the Chief Commissioner for Natal told the Financial Mail that they were looking for a further two new relocation sites at Quenei. (Financial Mail, 6.04.79)

Then in early 1981 a temporary government site office was erected on one edge of Mzimhlopho and the local people informed that construction jobs, preparing sites for the next influx of people, would soon be available. For a couple of months Mzimhlopho workers kept guard over the office, waiting for the officials to return. They eventually gave up, disappointed. There were no major developments in 1981 although a small number of households continued to be brought into Mzimhlopho by officials periodically, on an individual basis, as had happened in the past; generally evicted from farms with nowhere else to go.

Now, however, in 1982 matters have begun to move again. By May of this year about 30 new households had been brought to Mzimhlopho, all of them by boat, and more flotillas are presently being erected on the slopes behind the older section. In May 1982 well-placed but unofficial sources heard reports, emanating from government departments, that there are plans to move an additional 600 households into Mzimhlopho in the near future. At the time of writing, these plans have not yet materialised on the ground, but the signs pointing to their implementation are there - the new, empty huts; official enquiries at the local hospital 3 km away, about clinic facilities and prospects for expansion; unexplained visits to the area by anonymous officials.

One of the reasons for this revival of official interest in the area must be the fact that Nkondeni, 50 km to the north and for the last five years the major relocation centre in Northern Natal, has had to be temporarily closed to further relocation because of serious problems with its water supply. The hospital staff at Nkondeni, 50 km away, have been lobbying for some time for such steps to be taken to prevent a major health crisis erupting there. Finally, in early 1980, with the cholera epidemic in Natal reaching alarming proportions, the authorities agreed to suspend relocations to Nkondeni. Instead of abandoning relocation, however, they have simply abandoned relocating people to Nkondeni. They now appear to be diverting people who would have been sent to Nkondeni before, to Quenei instead - sending them further down the road to a place where facilities are far more rudimentary than at Nkondeni, with neither a clinic nor a reticulated water system.

Where the reported 600 households are to come from is not, at this stage, known. Possible areas, areas already under threat, include the exiled Reserve Four near Richards Bay, the exiled former released lands near Paulpietersburg and the relocation site of Bulwer Trust Farm near Stanger (which is likely to be moved to make way for a dam on the Lower Tugela). If the figure of 600 is correct it will mean a massive increase in the population - eight times the present number of people will then be struggling to build a living (and a community) at Mzimhlopho. The effect on those already living there will be no less convulsive than on those who are still to be forced to move there.

THE SURVEY

The EFF survey was undertaken in December 1980 and January 1981. At that time Mzimhlopho consisted of about 100 households, of which 97 were interviewed - almost a blanket survey. Subsequently, however, as already noted, the population has increased.

In June 1981 the Mzimhlopho community estimated the population to be 110 households (Report from Quenei: 1981;3), see Appendix 1) and since them about another 30 households have been relocated there. Very limited fieldwork among these newsmans indicate that most of them have come from similar backgrounds to those interviewed by EFF before, mainly from white farms. One can reasonably extend the general conclusions that emerge from the EFF survey to their situation as well.

2. Removals to Mzimhlopho

ORIGINS

The people living at Mzimhlopho at the time of the survey came from a number of different areas in Northern Natal, their dates of arrival stretching over a period of five or six years. Thus the history of their removal is not a single one. Mzimhlopho was established primarily to take ex-labour tenants and other farmpeople.
from the Danhauser and Louwburg areas in the aftermath of the abolition of labour tenancy in those areas. 79 of the 97 households interviewed by SPP had come there after being evicted off white farms since 1975; a further 10 had been tenants on black spots (unfortunately not identified) which had been cleared in the Danhauser area. 7 had come from other Trust or reserve land and only one had moved there from an urban area. Of those moved in since the survey, most appear to have come off white farms as well— including a group of about 75 households in late 1961 who were evicted off a farm owned by a mining company near Louwburg where they had been living as cash (not labour) labourers. (For a case study of a widowed woman relocated to Mainlopho in 1961, see Appendix 2.)

The first group to be relocated to Mainlopho, numbering 14 households, arrived in 1975 from a number of different places - Louwburg, Vryheid, Hudson and Danhauser. The largest single group - 13 households - arrived in 1976, over half of them from the Danhauser district, the rest from Louwburg, Vryheid and Bekamango. A further 27 households arrived in 1977, from the same general areas; thereafter the number of removals into Mainlopho fell to 11 households in 1978 and only four in 1979, before rising slightly to 7 in 1980. The Danhauser and Louwburg districts were the two most common points of origin for all residents. Bekamango, Vryheid, Dundee, Hudson/Greytown and the Trust lands around Qamani all supplied smaller contingents while a couple of households came from the Ngudi and Ladysmith districts (including one household that had been tenants at Dukwa). 84% of the households interviewed reported that they came to Mainlopho because they had been evicted from their previous place. 60% of the total sample were brought there by truck and the other 21% came to Mainlopho by themselves after having been evicted. 21% were brought by other means because they had had no other alternative. The remaining 19% of households chose to move to Mainlopho without the direct coercion of eviction or removal. Unfortunately their motivation for doing so was not probed in the survey. 7 of this group came from tribal land, 4 from black spots and 7 from white farms.

These relocated at Mainlopho did not reveal as high a level of residential stability at their previous place as in the other rural areas surveyed by SPP. Over half the households interviewed had lived at their previous place for less than 10 years, while only 6 had been there for many generations. This suggests that a number of households had been evicted or had had to move at least once already before their final relocation to Mainlopho. Since the majority of households were from white farms, it seems many of the farm people had been moving between white farms within the districts where they had been living beforehand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1, Mainlopho. LENGTH OF TIME AT PREVIOUS PLACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TENURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONDITIONS ON WHITE FARMS BEFORE REMOVAL

A small number of those moved off white farms (about 66) had been rent-paying tenants - evidence of the continued existence of this form of African occupation of land outside the reserves until the present day, despite decades of official attempts to eradicate it. Most households however, had been supplying workers to the white farmers on whose land they had been living. Although only about one third of these (28 households) had been labour tenants in the classic sense - working for the farmer for six months of the year for a nominal wage, in return for access to land - very few were working full time on cash wages and it appears that many of the former tenants were in fact involved in a modified and more onerous form of 12 month labour tenancy. 52 households reported that they had had registered contracts with their farmer, but at least 23 households had not. (Information on the remainder was not available.)

The 42 households engaged in full time farmwork supplied a total of 88 workers to the farmer (just over 2 per household, on average); hardly any received cash wages or even rations - the total wages earned averaged out to 95 cents plus 3.5 kg of mealies each month per worker. The only real advantage accruing to these workers was access to land. Almost all of the households evicted off white farms (65 out of 70 for whom this information is available) had had some grazing rights and land for ploughing at their previous place, the number of fields ranging from 1 to 4. Subsistence agriculture played a central part in their lives and the loss of their land has been the most resented and difficult adjustment that people at Mainlopho have had to make.

The loss of land because of eviction affected not only the former farm residents but nearly all the households from rural backgrounds as well. Thus 86% of all the households interviewed had kept some cattle beforehand; 76% had kept goats, 25% a quarter - had kept sheep; 10% had kept horses and 12% had kept pigs while almost everybody had owned poultry. In addition, 90% had grown maize, a little over 70% had grown sorghum and potatoes and over 50% had grown beans as well. A small number of households - 13% - reported 'some sale of produce at their previous place.

PREVIOUS WAGE EMPLOYMENT

Information on previous wage employment, outside of agriculture, is not detailed nor is it necessarily complete. According to the answers obtained in the survey, there was a total of 51 wage workers distributed across the 97 households in employment in fields other than agriculture before they were relocated. All of them were unskilled, with the service industry, followed by manufacturing the two most important areas of work. A small number (5) worked in the mining industry, most probably on the coal mines of Northern Natal. Johannesburg was the most common destination of workers, being the place of previous employment for 20 out of the 51 in the sample. A little over 60% of all the workers went as migrants to jobs in the Transvaal. Most of the remainder worked in various centres in Northern Natal (most frequently Newcastle and Mhlathuze), with 4 out of the 51 travelling to the Durban area.

THE REMOVAL

The circumstances surrounding the removal of the farmworkers in the Louwburg, Greytown, Danhauser and Bekamango districts are described in the 'Report from Qamani' appended to the end of this chapter. A variety of factors were at work but overall the majority of these evictions could be broadly ascribed to the phasing out of labour tenancy and the move by farmers towards having a smaller resident labour force on their farms. A couple of households reported that they were evicted because junior members were not willing to work for the farmer any longer. One man from Danhauser said he and several other households on the farm had been evicted after the authorities had ordered the farmer to register his workers in about 1976 (which was when the newly created Administration Boards had started to administer farm labour registrations). The farmer refused and when told he would have to, he evicted numbers of his workers instead.

It seems that by the mid 1970s the old labour tenant system had already undergone certain cosmetic changes in Northern Natal as a result of the pressures being applied
by the State over the previous twenty years on farmers who were unwilling to move over to a full-time wage labour system by themselves hence the number of households in the and the number of people employed on farms was reduced therefore to the issue of employment and wages on the farms eventually and the number of people employed on farms reduced in 1974 when the farm system was on new labour contracts were being negotiated and people were not allowed to register in the Natal that these registered before 1970 were allowed to continue to register. The relocation of farm people to the farms in the mid and late 1970s came to an end after this period and represented a further and more fundamental shift away from labour the few formal contracts were not given to the farm people. The relocation of people to the farms was the major reason for the eviction of the farmers in very personal terms - the farmer did not want us and we do not intend to return to the farms at the farmers' request. The government's role in the relocation of workers has been widely discussed in the literature. The Reserve Bank of South Africa has published several reports addressing the issue. One of the key concerns raised is the impact of relocation on the local community. The report highlights the challenges faced by the relocated workers, including the lack of access to basic services and infrastructure. The report also discusses the government's efforts to support the relocated workers, including the provision of employment opportunities and financial assistance. In the late 1970s, the government was under pressure to address the issue of relocation, and several policies were introduced to support the relocated workers. These policies included the provision of basic services and infrastructure, as well as the creation of employment opportunities. However, the report notes that the impact of these policies was limited, and many relocated workers continued to face significant challenges. The report concludes by highlighting the need for further research and action to address the issues faced by relocated workers.
3. Demographic features

POPULATION STRUCTURE

In June 1981 the local committee at Maimhlohe estimated the total population at 709 - 224 adults and 485 children. The total population in the 77 households surveyed by EFP came to 701, of whom 518 (74%) were permanent residents, 55 (8%) commuters and 115 (17%) migrants. The bulk of the migrants (84%) are, as one would expect, male but the bulk of the commuters are, perhaps unexpectedly, female. 38 out of the 54 commuters whose sex was stated were female. Most of them were employed on nearby (State-owned) forestry and forestry plantations.

Table 2, Maimhlohe. TOTAL POPULATION BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESIDENTIAL STATUS</th>
<th>MALES</th>
<th>FEMALES</th>
<th>SEX NS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commuter</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never returns home</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence not stated</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>250</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the composition of its population, Maimhlohe exhibited the imbalances that have come to be regarded as standard, if not normal, in rural areas. The masculinity rate in the non-migrant population was low - 74% if only permanent residents were considered, dropping to 77 if the permanent and commuter populations were combined (a drop reflecting the relatively large number of female commuters). The data on the age distribution of the total population is incomplete since ages for 62 out of the total of 701 (22 males, 29 females and 1 whose sex was not stated) were not supplied. Using the reduced sample of 639, the sexual imbalance between men and women of working age was even more marked, most notably in the 25 - 34 age cohort, where the masculinity rate for the permanent and commuter populations combined was 79.

Table 3, Maimhlohe. MASCULINITY RATES AMONG THE PERMANENT AND COMMUTER POPULATIONS OF WORKING AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>MASCULINITY RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 - 24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 64</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maimhlohe also has a high child dependency rate. The percentage of children 14 years and younger in the total population for whom ages were given came to 43%. (Of these, just over half were boys.) However, in the combined permanent/commuter population, the percentage of children was higher, being 48.5%.

Table 4, Maimhlohe. COMPARATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN AND ADULTS IN THE PERMANENT / COMMUTER AND TOTAL POPULATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>PERMANENT / COMMUTER NO.</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 14</td>
<td>274 (48.5%)</td>
<td>277 (43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15+</td>
<td>290 (51.5%)</td>
<td>312 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>564 (100%)</td>
<td>69 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 62 individuals for whom no ages were available are excluded from these calculations.

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

The average size of the 97 households surveyed came to 7.2 which is relatively large. Just under half of the households in the sample (49%) ranged in size between 5 members and 8 members, while a quarter of the sample were very large households with 10 or more members. The majority of households were nuclear but 33% were extended families and a further 26% were compound or extended-compound. There were 2 households consisting of a single member only.

The great majority of household heads were male, with females accounting for only 14% of the total. These women were on average older than their male counterparts. Whereas 50% of the male household heads for whom this information is available were between the ages of 25 and 45, only 27% of the female heads were, none of them being younger than 35.

Table 5, Maimhlohe. HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY AGE AND SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE GROUP</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 - 34</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 64</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age not stated</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EDUCATION

The level of education at Maimhlohe is very low, with a high degree of adult illiteracy. At the time of the EFP survey there were only 3 people who had attained a Standard 9 or higher level of education and only 48 people who had reached secondary school. Excluding the 126 children of pre-school age and the 62 individuals for whom no age was given from the calculations, 154 out of the total of 507 individuals left in the sample had not been to school at all - 30%. The low level of functional literacy among adults has been a major handicap for organisation within the community, focusing dependence on the few members with writing and arithmetic skills who tend to dominate on the committees.
4. Economic activity

**ECONOMIC STATUS**

About 30% of the total population in the sample were economically active - 182 in wage employment and 27 unemployed. Almost all of those not economically active were permanent residents (462 out of 476) and mainly children under the age of 14 (266 out of the 419 for whom ages were available in the permanent population). Of the 152 adults not economically active in the permanent population, 157 (704) were women, most of them presumably occupied with household chores. However 46 permanent adults who were not economically active were men. Most of them were in the 15 to 24 age group; while it is possible that a very small number of these young people were still at school, most of them would not have been, given the small number of people at Matshilope, with a senior school education. 8 out of the 46 were in the 45 to 64 age group.

Thus at Matshilope, as at the other rural areas surveyed, there is a sizeable group of adults of working age who are not directly involved in the formal wage economy and who appear to have given up the idea of even looking for a job.

**Table 7, Matshilope. ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE POPULATION, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC STATUS</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMMUTE</th>
<th>MIGRANT**</th>
<th>RES NS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key economically active</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This table excludes the 52 people whose ages were not supplied. Many, if not all of these, were of school-going age however. Educational levels of the 52 were:
None : 32; Lower Primary : 24; Higher Primary : 4; Std 9+ : 17.*

**Includes one male migrant who is employed and still considered part of the household at Matshilope but never returns home.

ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE PERMANENT POPULATION, BY SEX AND AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>NOT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE</th>
<th>EMPLOYED</th>
<th>UNEMPLOYED</th>
<th>ECONOMIC STATUS NS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 14</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 64</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age not stated</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EMPLOYMENT

Of the 182 workers in the sample, most - 63% - were migrants. The largest group of migrants, 139, were going to Johannesburg (possibly a general designation for the entire Reef area) with the Newcastle/Thembane area of Northern Natal the next most common destination (for 29 workers). A far smaller group of migrants travelled south to Durban (6 workers) and Pietermaritzburg (5 workers), with the remainder scattered through various small towns in Natal. Most of the working population were male but compared to the other rural relocation areas surveyed (Nkalaha and Compensation), Matshilope had a relatively large group of female workers - most of them commuters (37 out of 64) and most of these commuters employed in agriculture. About 15 kilometres from Matshilope there is a large formen project, apparently run by one of the parastatal development corporations (either CED or EDC), while closer to the settlement are some cattle and other forestry plantations and a small (also, it appears, State-controlled). It seems that most of the women workers were being employed on these projects as unskilled agricultural labourers.

These jobs, though very poorly paid, are highly valued since apart from them there is very little local employment in the area. SPP was told that in 1979 a serious dispute broke out between residents of Matshilope and residents of Stigeme, the older relocation area to the south and closer to the formal fields, about who was entitled to work on the plantations. The dispute threatened to erupt into violence on occasion, with the Matshilope people claiming that they should be given first option on jobs since, unlike those relocated to Stigeme, they had not been allocated agricultural land. The tension only abated after the plantation management agreed to recruit workers from Matshilope as well as Stigeme. The incident illustrates graphically the serious social tensions that can be generated in the rural areas by competition between landless people over scarce resources.

Because of this source of local employment, agriculture was, overall, the most important area of employment for Matshilope workers, employing 31% of them. It was followed by service (26%), manufacturing (17%) and mining (16%). For men, however, agriculture was not a major area of employment, ranking only fourth in order of importance after service, manufacturing and mining. Almost all the workers - 96% - were unskilled. In the total workforce there was only 1 professional (a female computer, a teacher), 1 clerical worker (a male computer), 1 skilled worker (a male migrant) and 1 semi-skilled worker (a male computer). As with the other rural areas surveyed, Matshilope workers entered the labour market at the lowest and most vulnerable level of employment, that of unskilled labourers.
Table 9, Maimohle. EMPLOYMENT, BY INDUSTRY, RESIDENTIAL STATUS AND SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>PERMANANT</th>
<th>COMMER</th>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
<th>NEVER RETURN/BLEEDING</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric. etc.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry na</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMITTANCES

Information on remittances was incomplete but of the 177 workers for whom this information was available, 82.5% were reported to be remitting to their households regularly, 16.9% were reported to be remitting irregularly and only 1% (2 workers) never sent money home. Thus overall Maimohle workers displayed a high level of responsibility towards their families. In view of the very heavy dependence of the community on outside wage employment for its survival, this is a very positive factor in its domestic economy.

UNEMPLOYMENT

The general unemployment rate at Maimohle was 12.9% - 10.6% for the men and 16.9% for women. Although the female unemployment rate was higher for women than for men, as in all the areas surveyed by SPP, it was lower than at any of the other rural areas surveyed, including Makhekhe. The maize and forestry plantations have provided limited local job opportunities for some women while the distance from urban centres has precluded other women from entering the job market in the hopes of finding work (as at Makhekhe, for instance).

Table 10, Maimohle. UNEMPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PERMANANT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, it seems clear that the relocation of these households to Maimohle has forced a greater participation in and dependence on wage employment than was in operation before when most households had a more sizeable stake in agriculture. On the available information the number of workers in fulltime wage employment has increased substantially. Physical areas of employment as well as the sectors of the economy in which people worked were not altered substantially by the relocation, however.

OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME

Wage employment was overwhelmingly the most important source of income for the people of Maimohle, but most households - 90 out of the 97 surveyed - were still managing to produce some agricultural goods out of their small gardens or illegal stock to supplement this. This was considerably higher than at the other rural areas surveyed by SPP. Most households, however, 93% - reported that they were producing less than they had before - 79% said that they had produced 'much more' before being relocated to Maimohle, and a further 15% said they had produced 'more' before. (7 households said they produced the same as before and only 1 said it produced more.) Interest in agriculture is strong in the community and in late '90/1 a development project, aiming to promote local food production, was started at Maimohle. If successful, it may boost agricultural production in the future.

Apart from this, pensions and grants constituted an important source of income for a minority of households. 14 people were receiving old age pensions, 1 was drawing unemployment benefits and two were receiving disability grants at Maimohle at the time of the SPP survey. There was little reported informal activity with only 5 households claiming that they were involved in such occupations.

DIEP

The information on household diet at Maimohle revealed that the average diet was nutritionally inadequate, with maize, bean, tea, coffee and sugar forming the staple foods. However, compared to Shalulwe and Concession, the other rural opium settlements surveyed, there was a significantly higher level of consumption of greens, milk and eggs, although Maimohle did not reach the levels prevailing in Zakhekhe. 64% of the households in the survey reported consuming greens daily (compared to Concession, where only 11% drank milk daily and Shalulwe where 76% drank milk less than once a week). The same number, 64%, also reported eating greens every other day (Concession: 63% ate greens less than once a week; Shalulwe: over half ate greens only once a week or less). Furthermore 2% of the households surveyed at Maimohle reported consuming eggs once a week. (At both Concession and Shalulwe most households reported that they very rarely ate eggs, less than once a month.)

The difference in diet between Maimohle and the one hand and Concession and Shalulwe on the other can be explained almost entirely by the fact that at Maimohle residents are more easily able to cultivate vegetable gardens, albeit on a restricted scale. Their plots are large enough to make reasonably sized gardens feasible and many have been keeping cattle (allegedly) on the open Trust land surrounding them. (Once this land gets used up for residential purposes, or more people are relocated into the area, these relative advantages will probably wither away.)

The availability of some local employment for women is a positive factor as well. The comparative data on diet at Makhekhe, Maimohle, Concession and Shalulwe suggests strongly that what makes the difference between poor nutrition and really serious malnutrition in relocation areas is firstly, access to local wage employment and secondly, access to some land for gardens and for stock; precisely the two resources most often desirately ranked relocation settlements.

5. Organisation and attitudes

The benefits derived from gardens and stock at Maimohle have to be understood in
very relative terms. For the majority of households at Nkholo, who had had quite extensive agricultural land and grazing rights before they were relocated, the biggest and most anxious readjustment they have had to make has been to the loss of land. This was emotionally the major grievance to emerge from the survey and access to land the major improvement sought. Most of the food that is consumed now comes from outside the area, and has to be paid for in hard cash. As one respondent put it, 'We are becoming poorer every day because we must buy everything'. Another put it more strongly: 'I am starving. Buying everything is not good. Also, where to buy is a problem'.

Apart from landlessness, the next most common complaints concerned lack of fuel and the poor water supply, since the time of the survey this last has, as already described, improved. People also perceived unemployment as a serious problem, coupled with the distance between Nkholo and work centres and general difficulties with transport.

Overall the respondents had a pessimistic view about the future and the chances of any help coming from higher authorities. Over the years a number of different government officials coming from both Pretoria and Ulundi (including the KwaZulu Commission that was set up in 1978 to investigate the compensation paid to relocated people) have visited the settlement. Nothing positive has been seen to flow from their visits and officials is perceived locally as an anonymous, remote and unaccountable force. The perception that they have been forgotten is strong within Nkholo. 'Helping us is a problem', said one. 'I don't think anyone cares about us'.

ORGANISATION

At the time of the survey the only organisations of note in the community were Zionist Church groups - which appeared to have strong support, especially among the women - and a local committee. In about 1978/79, largely through the initiative of one resident, a former induna on a white farm at Dnauhause and leader of a local Zionist Church, this committee was set up to try to deal with some of the problems facing residents. It took up three issues that were regarded as major at the time - land for pasture and ploughing, fencing for their graves, and a school. The kindergarten classes, established in the two Flotzcraft huts, was largely a result of their efforts. In trying to grapple with the other problems, the committee has thus far had less success. This has had a demoralising effect on it since both members of the committee and the community at large have questioned the value of such an organisation if it fails to make any meaningful gains. Nevertheless, at the time of the survey it was the only organisation to offer any prospects of help and about half the respondents mentioned its chairman as the one person who might help solve their problems.

At first the committee wrote to Ulundi asking KwaZulu for help. They were directed by KwaZulu back to the central government, the reason given being that they lived on Trust land and not within KwaZulu. They then contacted the magistrate at Vryheid and at a meeting held in November 1979 presented their requests for land to him. The magistrate promised to forward these requests to Pretoria. In mid 1980 the magistrate returned with no official. According to one informant the two promised that a school would be built and the graves fenced but they refused to consider the request for land. Subsequently, in August 1981 the committee sent a copy of their 'Report from Qutini settlement' to Dr Koornhof in Pretoria. His reply, written by an administrative secretary, was sent four months later, in January 1982, was to direct the committee back to the magistrate at Vryheid. It seems however that the report did have some effect on the Department since the magistrate paid another visit to the settlement in about May 1982, to investigate the circumstances surrounding the complaints and to check facilities. Large, it seems,
Appendix 1. Report from Mzimhlophe, Quedeni

This is a copy of a report prepared by the Committee at Mzimhlophe, Quedeni in June 1974 and sent to the Dept of Cooperation and Development and other interested groups to try to highlight their problems.

This is a report on the history of our resettlement. The people here were brought here from 4 places: Louwburg, Graytown, Dannhauser and Ithembeso.

1. **Louwburg**: We built our houses on a farm owned by whites because we were working there for them. When they told us to vacate the land they said it was because we were no longer keen to work which was in fact not true.

   In 1974 the farmers gave us letters telling us to leave the farm. We took the letters to Louwburg Bantu Affairs Commissioner who told us that he could not provide us with any place and further told us to go and see what we could get for ourselves.

   For 3 months we tried to accommodate ourselves but in vain; thereafter we returned back to the Louwburg Bantu Affairs Commissioner to report that we could not get a place anywhere. He told us that he was going to take us anywhere he likes by G.O. trucks. We were loaded on G.O. trucks without being informed where we were going to and left at Quedeni.

   Some of our goods were badly damaged and some broke because they were not properly handled. Our houses were left behind.

   On our arrival here we were placed in small G.O. tents and we started from scratch to buy building materials.

   Here we don't do any planting, have no grazing land for our stock, no schools, no health clinics – in short there is absolutely nothing provided for us.

   32 houses in all removed from Louwburg.

2. **Graytown**: Our houses were built on a white farm at Graytown. We were notified that we were no longer required on this farm which was for the N.O.G. company. They told us that they were going to place their beasts on the farm and we were given letters telling us to vacate.

   We went to the Graytown Bantu Affairs Commissioner to report the matter. He told us there is a place for us at Quedeni and instructed us to go and sell what we had and be ready for the removal. On a certain date white men came on G.O. trucks and took us to Quedeni. On our arrival we had to buy everything i.e. building equipment etc.

   We also noticed that there were no schools, no clinics, we can't cultivate anything and there is no grazing land for our stock either.

   4 houses altogether were removed from Graytown.

3. **Dannhauser**: We were removed from a farm of whites together with tenants who were staying at UMBEGET and also children. We only own whites arriving with police alleging that boys refused to work which allegation was denied.

   Thereafter we were given letters to vacate which we took to the Commissioner's office in Dannhauser and reported the affair to Bantu Affairs Commissioner. The Commissioner wanted to know our ideas. We told him that we only needed assistance because our children were no longer keen to work in farms.

   He promised to approach his senior officer at Pietermaritzburg to contact the KwaZulu Government. We then awaited the outcome.

   While we were still awaiting police came to arrest us and we were kept in Dannhauser cells.

   A fine of R3O per head was fixed. We requested the Magistrate to call senior magistrate at Pietermaritzburg and also requested help from Minister G.J. Whitbourn from the KwaZulu Government. The 2 officers arrived at Dannhauser on the 6th January 1975.

   Mr Dreyer and Mr Xhithima welcomed our request and told us that there is a place at Nomdeni but it is a town and no preparations had been made yet. They wanted our opinion about the suggested place.

   We told them that Nomdeni can't be a good place for us; in particular that we have stock, and if we were interested in town life we would be going to nearer towns such as Oatwini and Madadeni. The reason why we don't go to these places is only because town life is not good for us.

   Mr Dreyer advised us not to sell our beasts and further promised to fix something for us within a period of 6 months.

   During the waiting period we were summoned to come before the Commissioner's Court at Dannhauser where we were told that we are not required in the place and further we were threatened that if we do not move away we shall be arrested and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 6 months or pay a fine of R3O. We told him that we were not refusing to move but were still waiting for Mr Dreyer as he promised to fix something for us.

   Then we were told to leave till a further order.

   On the 17th July 1976 G.O. trucks arrived with soldiers, police and their dogs. They said they don't need any argument but have just come to move us to Quedeni. We acquired – how could we be moved to Quedeni while we were still waiting for something from Mr Dreyer?

   We were told that what was happening was his instructions. They also told us that we were already provided with 4 roomsed houses which we discovered to be false.

   All our building equipment was left behind and on arrival we had to start from nothing, buying building materials. In addition this place has no schools, no clinics, no grazing lands for our stock and no lands for cultiving. We have got absolutely nothing and are very much surprised because Mr Dreyer made a fair promise to us and said he won't make any mistake.

   34 houses were moved from Dannhauser.

4. **Madadeni**: Our children who worked on a white farm were chased away, the reason is that they complained of starvation. After they had complained the land owner cooked food with a very big pot; he then stood behind the
children with a sjambok, ordering them to finish up all the food in the big pot, falling which it would mean they did not want to work. The children could not finish all the food and were assaulted. We referred the case to the Umhlangana Magistrate who gave judgment in our favour. The landlord said "Even if you win the case you can't stay in my land anymore".

Thereafter G.S. trucks arrived with soldiers and police. We were told that we were being moved to Quedeni. We wanted to know whether there was any food provision for us at Quedeni. They told us to come along with our planting equipment because there is land for us to plant. They also told us that accommodation is also available.

On arrival we noticed that none of their promises were available, no schools, clinics, no fields to plant and no land for our stock - there was absolutely nothing.

**Quedeni Settlement:** This is the size of this resettlement place

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of houses</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of adults</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of children</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Prepared by:**

E. Mtuli (Chairman) J. Buthelezi,
P. Manazi (Committee Members)
O/O Quedeni Store
F. C. Alokhu
3557

Appendix 2. Case study of a removal

The following case study is taken from the AFRA Advice Office files.

T.N.K. is a widow with seven children, five of whom are living with her, the youngest still a small child. She no longer knows where her two eldest children are, both young men in their early 20s. The last she heard of her eldest son was that he was in jail.

Before being brought to Maimholpe she had lived with her husband on a farm near Volkswart, beyond Newcastle. In early 1981 her husband, a worker on the farm, died but she was allowed to continue living there. Then, soon afterwards, the white farmer 'disappeared' and new whites appeared on the scene. On the 3rd of June 1981 these newcomers gave her a trekpass which instructed her 'to vacate the farm with your family and household' within three months. The trekpass was written on paper bearing the letterhead of a construction firm; it appears that the farm had been bought up to make way for a railway line. T.N.K. herself was not clear on why she had been evicted. All she knew was that the trekpass meant that she could no longer stay at her house. She showed the trekpass to AFRA - a battered piece of paper carelessly preserved, the notice written in English, a language that she could not even speak let alone read.

She tried to find another place on one of the neighbouring white farms but because the eldest of her children living with her was only 13, no farmer would take her on. After three months her notice expired and since she had not yet moved, the new landowners called the police. She was sentenced to one month in jail for being an illegal squatter. Her two youngest children stayed with her in jail; the three bigger ones were left with neighbouring families.

When her sentence was up she told the magistrate that she had nowhere to go. She was then loaded onto a G5 truck, with her five children and few belongings, and brought to Maimholpe. She arrived there towards the end of October 1981 with a few sheets of galvanised iron, one broken table, one bench, a few sleeping mats, a couple of enamel dishes and pots and some clothing. She was assigned an empty fistocraft hut and left. She had no money of her own and no maintenance grant for her children. At the time that AFRA made contact with her at the end of October 1981 she and her children were living entirely by the other residents of Maimholpe. She was very thin, sick and apathetic. The best off of her children was the youngest who was still being breastfed.

In order to qualify for a maintenance grant for her children she had to present herself to the magistrate in person. The nearest magistrate, at Andndlo, was unable to help since she was living on Trust land and was, moreover, registered in her reference book as a Senzi, not a Bantu, citizen (although her husband had been Bantu). Her only alternative was to travel to Vaehied, a town she had never visited and a full day's bus journey away. Eventually she did manage to make the journey, after she had been provided with the bus fare. The magistrate gave her a food parcel and instructed her to contact the magistrate at Andndlo. He also promised to see that she was given work by the site manager in charge of the construction office at Maimholpe.

The food parcel saw her and her family through Christmas 1981 and in early 1982 she was hired as a casual labourer at Maimholpe. The work is erratic and there are
4. COMPENSATION

1. Introduction

Compensation is situated on trust land, 7.5 km west of Pietermaritzburg, in the Mpondoland district. Its Zulu name is 'KwaVulamhlo' - literally 'eyeopener', a blunt comment on how the people living there regard the place. The land on which it is situated is part of a block of trust land acquired by the State probably during the early 1960s and used since 1969 for the relocation of people off black holdings areas in the Underberg/Hiennville area. During 1969 about 400 people were resettled in this area from black spots in the Upper Mkomazi valley. (Hansard, Question 5, 14.05.69) Cosmos Desmond (1970, 71-73) describes the conditions they faced.

Compensation is thus surrounded by older relocation sites but is itself a relatively new one, having been established in 1978. It is a closer settlement. Plots measure 20 x 40 metres and they are laid out along a grid of roughly bulldozed roads. There is no grazing or ploughing land within the site. One of the residents, a former landowner, was given compensatory land adjacent to the site and he has been hiring out grazing to some residents. Most of his land is very steep hillside, however, and unable to support many head of cattle as well as being totally unsuitable for cultivation.

The RFP survey was conducted in July 1980. At that stage only a small section of the site had been settled and almost the entire community was interviewed - 40 out of 87 households. However, rows of tin toilets and a grid of recently bulldozed roads next to the settled part provided tangible evidence that the State planned to move more people in soon. In July 1981 a further 69 households were located there, tenants from a black spot known as Sw Aptela near the Stu Pass. There are still many more rows of waiting toilets and further removals into the area are anticipated in the near future.

2. Conditions before the removal

ORIGINS : THE SWAMP

All 87 households at Compensation in 1980 came from a single black spot known as The Swamp, situated near Pevensy, a small siding close to Hiennville and some 50 km distant from Compensation over dirt roads. The Swamp was one of several black spots in the Pevensy area and the first to go. (Heernekra, Free State and Reichenau Mission, very close to where The Swamp was, have still to be cleared.) It had been bought in the 1880s by Charles Houdwani at a public auction of Crown land - the auction was authorised in October 1880 but the exact date of the sale is not clear. The full purchase price was paid off on the 17th June 1896. (The original freehold grant refers to the land being possessed by Houdwani, his heirs, executors and administrators 'in perpetuity'.) The land remained in the Houdwani family until April 1970, when it was expropriated. However, while title was thus taken from the landowners, there was no attempt to remove them and their tenants at that stage and it seems that with the passage of time any threat of removal they might have felt in the early 1970s became dimmed so that the actual removal, in 1978, was unexpected and caught them unprepared.

The Swamp was typical of many black spots in the area and conditions there had many
points in common with those described already at Roebuck near Ladysmith. It consisted of 219,2 ha of flat but, as its name indicates, fairly marshy land in the low-lying areas, supporting a population of some 700 people. The bulk of the residents were tenants paid as casual rent to the landlord, in return for which they were allocated some land for ploughing and allowed to graze stock on the common. The amount of rent paid is not known; at Empitela, nearby, tenants paid on average about R2 per head. The officials branded the tenants as 'illegal squatters' when it came to moving them. In fact they were neither illegal nor squatters since most had been there a long time, they all paid rent and were there with the permission of the landowner. While the property had been in the Sowaweni family for approximately 100 years when they were moved, many tenants too had lived there a long time. 59,5% - over half - of the tenants had lived at The Swamp for 20 years or more; 20% had been there for over fifty years. Only 7,5% of the tenants had been at The Swamp for less than 5 years before they were removed.

All the households at The Swamp practiced some agriculture. All had land, in most cases only one field but a substantial minority (20/77 respondents in the interview) had 2 or more fields. Field sizes are unavailable; the majority described their fields as 'large' as opposed to 'small' or 'medium' - probably between 1 and 2 ha each. The most common crops produced were maize, potatoes and beans with a little sorghum grown in a few cases. 75 households surveyed at Compensation said they produced some maize at their previous place; an equal number said they grew potatoes before which was almost as many (72) said they had grown beans before. Not as many households had cattle at The Swamp as had fields but a little over half did keep cattle (46/80 households in the survey - 50% of the sample) and some kept pigs (49/80 in the survey). A few households kept goats, sheep and horses, and almost everybody kept poultry (77/80 households).

Thus agricultural activities made a significant contribution towards household income although the value of goods produced varied probably quite considerably from household to household and year to year. Most households only produced enough for their own consumption - eggs and meat mainly but dairy products were also important and about a third of the households (36% of the sample) produced hides and a few produced wool in addition. However, approaching one third of those interviewed - 22% - reported that they did sell agricultural goods from time to time. There are no details on the frequency or value of goods sold but it is unlikely that any household produced enough of a surplus to be classed as full-time market farmers. There is no evidence that before people were moved from The Swamp they could make an independent living out of their basic subsistence agricultural activities. Nevertheless, agricultural produce provided an important supplement to incomes derived from other sources and the loss of their access to agricultural land was one of the most devastating changes the community as a whole experienced on being moved. The importance of agriculture to the community is reflected in the replies given in the survey at Compensation to questions concerning the perceived differences between Compensation and The Swamp, as well as the problems people were encountering at Compensation and the improvements they would like to see. All but one household interviewed complained about the lack of ploughing and grazing land at Compensation. While 22% merely pinpointed the lack of land as one of the main differences between Compensation and their previous place, 70% were more specific and cited the lack of lands as a problem and/or listed its provision as one of the improvements they would like to see.

EMPLOYMENT BEFORE RELOCATION

The information on previous employment in households before the removal is not as detailed or as reliable as the information on conditions prevailing at Compensation at the time of the survey. A total of 62 people were reported to have been in wage employment before the removal to Compensation, distributed across 56 households. This meant that 24 households had no breadwinner, 42 households had one worker, 8 had two, 1 had three and 9 households were not answered. Information on other possible sources of income, such as pensions, gifts or informal activity is not available - though clearly subsistence agriculture played an important part.

Job opportunities in the immediate vicinity of The Swamp were few, and most workers had to move away from the farm to work - 61% of the workers were 'not resident' at The Swamp and only 36% were (details lacking for 3%). However, 60% of all those in employment worked within 15 km radius of Empitela for approaching 10 of the 56 households, compared to many other households. Long-distance migrant labour, as opposed to short-distance commuting, played a relatively small role in the community. The largest group of commuters travelled to Hilliwine, 16 km away (95); the second largest to Underberg, 23 km away (91). Only 5 individuals were reported to work outside of Natal, all in Johannesburg; the remainder were scattered between Bulwer, 25 km away (104), Durban (195), Ermashoop, Pietermaritzburg and district and other Natal towns. This relatively high degree of local employment may have had important repercussions on the well-being of the community since it increased the likelihood of wages being remitted to the families dependent on them and reinforced family structures and support networks.

Information on work conditions and wages for this period are not available but wages were probably low, particularly since so many people were employed in country areas, while the majority - 75% - were described as unskilled. The most important source of employment was in the service sector - generally a low wage sector. 17 of the 52 reported to have been working before the removal, were employed in the service sector. Both Hilliwine and Underberg have a number of hotels and holiday resorts in their area. Clearly a number of workers from The Swamp were employed in restaurants and cafes as cooks, waiters and kitchen or cleaning staff. The next most important category of employment was in the construction industry. 11 workers - 18% of the total - worked in this field, the majority as unskilled labourers.

Agriculture, while the third most important category of employment, was not a large area of work. 9 people - 14% - worked in agriculture, presumably on neighbouring farms. Thus The Swamp did not play a particularly important role as a supplier of workers to neighbouring farms. The number of full-time agricultural workers it is reported to have had is, however, higher than that reported for Roebuck. This reflects the lack of opportunities for non-agricultural, particularly industrial or commercial work, for blacks in the Hilliwine area compared to the opportunities available to blacks in the Ladysmith area.

From the above information, a picture emerges of a poor but stable rural community, dependent on employment in the wage sector for the survival but drawing a vital supplement from subsistence-type agriculture. In its broad outlines it appears to have been a very similar community to that of Empitela, which is described elsewhere in this report and which was removed to Compensation in 1950. Because of its location, far from any major centre of employment, it did not experience the same degree of pressure from an influx of new tenants in recent years as those black spots situated more favourably in relation to employment centres have, for instance those in the Ladysmith and Stanger districts. If one compares the length of residence of tenants at The Swamp (before it was removed) with that of tenants at Matjiva's Kopp near Ladysmith (currently under threat and written up as a case study in Part Four below), one finds that whereas at The Swamp only 11% of tenants had moved there within ten years of the date of removal, at Matjiva's Kop 20% of the tenants have lived there for 9 or less years.
Social stability, agricultural land, local employment — all positive advantages for a black rural community in South Africa in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the above information should not be interpreted to mean that The Swamp was a pastoral paradise and that the people only lived in a place that had real land access. The swamp would have faced many difficulties which were likely to be on the increase, not decrease; increasing pressure on the soil as an expanding population had to make do with a fixed amount of land, lack of capital, deterioration of the soil because of the pressure of both people and stock on the land, lack of infrastructural facilities — no piped water or electricity, a hospital and sanitation system that depended on private initiative, poor schooling and shopping services, etc. In addition, there were some tensions between the landowning family and the tenants — also a common feature of other blackland communities. This is manifested in the lack of support for the ex-landowner within Compensation today. He is not a popular leader, although many people point to him as the leader largely because his status as such has been confirmed by the local government officials.

Despite these real problems, stemming mainly from causes larger than the community could control by itself, there is no evidence that the people of The Swamp have gained any advantage by their unwilling removal to Compensation, as the following section shows. Rather they have lost the one material advantage they enjoyed at The Swamp — their land — without being compensated by secure access to wage employment.

3. The removal to Compensation

As already mentioned, The Swamp was expropriated in 1970 but the removal did not take place until 1979 — by which time most people had forgotten about the expropriation, if they ever knew about it. The removal itself passed almost unnoticed, with only a small report in the Natal Witness on the 6th December 1978, reporting that 94 'squatters' had already been resettled at Compensation and more were expected.

During 1979 there was a little more publicity about Compensation itself. The Sunday Post used it as a case study in its exposed series on 'The Surplus People' in July of that year, the Natal Mercury (14.05.79), the Sunday News (30.05.79) carried feature articles on conditions at the site.

According to the Natal Mercury (14.05.79) some tenants claimed that they were given only ten days notice prior to the removal. The landowner, however, knew three months before — whether he did not inform his tenants or whether the Natal Mercury's information was inaccurate or misleading is not clear. Residents put up no fight when they were told to move. According to the landowner, they felt helpless and powerless to do anything. He says that he himself refused to hand over his title deed to the officials until police took him to the local magistrate where he surrendered it. He said police warned him that they would lock him up if he did not hand it over. (Natal Mercury, 14.05.79)

This is how he described the removal in a letter to a Church agency in Pietermaritzburg, some time after the removal had happened:

'It was in September when the Europeans from Pretoria came to our farm 'The Swamp'. They said they were the GC company. They told me that we are going to be moved from this farm because it is in the white area. We were told that they need no cattle, no sheep and no goats at Impendle, where we are at present, and that there is not sufficient place for ploughing. We were given three month time notice. I did not want to move from The Swamp. I asked them to give some more months so that I can arrange to get on with their lives. They refused to do so. There was the magistrate from Howick to tell me that we are left with three days. On Monday the GC lorries started their work. They finished their job within three days. (Letter in APFA files)

According to the Natal Mercury report in May 1979, about 700 people and 95 households were loaded onto trucks and taken to Compensation. In July 1980, when the SFM survey was undertaken, there were 87 households at Compensation so either several had left since the removal (which often happens) or the Natal Mercury had slightly exaggerated the numbers moved.

The records of the Department of Cooperation and Development on this removal are hopelessly inaccurate. In April 1980, less than 15 months after the removal and only 8 months after correspondence between Dr Koornhof and Lionel Wood (NM) concerning the conditions prevailing during and after this particular removal (see APFA files), Dr Koornhof gave incorrect figures and dates for this removal in an answer to a question asked in Parliament about black spot removals during the 1970s in general. According to this reply The Swamp was cleared in 1976 and a total of only 125 people were removed. (Hansard, Question 537; 22.04.80)

CONDITIONS ON ARRIVAL

The people relocated at Compensation were provided with tents for six months, during which time they were expected to build their own houses. They were also provided with a pit toilet per plot and water in two 500 litre tanks on one edge of the settlement. Dr Koornhof, in a letter to Lionel Wood in August 1979, claimed that the tents were available until the people had built their own houses; some people at Compensation have said, however, that the tents were removed after six months and those families who had not yet completed their houses were obliged to stay with neighbours until they did. In addition each household received rations for 3 days: mealie meal, soup and skimmed milk powder.

The only other facility at the site was a temporary lower primary school in the form of several tin flat-roof huts. There were no shops in Compensation itself — the nearest one is a trading store about 3 to 4 km away — no clinic, no bus service into the settlement and no church buildings either. According to the Anglican Bishop Suffragan of Natal (Jim Bishop's Newsletter, July 1979) a local Roman Catholic mission provided the people with free poles for building.

Conditions were thus very rudimentary and considerably poorer than what Dr Koornhof claimed was the norm, in Parliament in April 1980, when he said that relocation areas were 'first planned, developed and certain basic requirements such as water, sanitation, schools and clinics are provided without any cost to the people resettled'. (Hansard, col.623, 22.04.80) Earlier, referring specifically to Compensation, his account of the settlement was equally reassuring:

'the site of the land was provided with compensatory land of equal agricultural or pastoral value — also actually for bigger — and the squatters were placed in a properly laid out settlement with cash compensation for their improvements and adequate temporary accommodation. Previously these people were illegal squatters on the owner's land but the settlement area has been provided in addition, and adjacent to his land. In conclusion I must say that the plan conditions under which these people lived on the swamp (sic) created a health hazard and we had no option but to remove them. (Private correspondence)
CONCLUSION

Details on the amount of compensation paid out are not available. While the authorities claimed that all people who were moved from The Swamp were compensated, only 60 out of the 84 households interviewed reported receiving compensation, while 9 said they were not compensated. (5 replies were classified as 'other' and 6 were missing.) Since all of the sample were moved from freehold land and thus equally eligible for compensation, it appears that a small number of households did not receive any money at all. However, because of the time that had elapsed since the payout and the possibility that the household member interviewed did not have the full information on the compensation paid to the household head, these results may be inaccurate. (For a detailed analysis of compensation paid to the Xempitela people moved to Compensation in 1981, see the case study in Part Four. According to this study, 3 out of 54 households surveyed about 6 weeks after they had been moved had not yet received any money in compensation.)

In late 1979 a Pietermaritzburg Church worker tried to make enquiries with the first the Drakensberg Administration Board, then the Chief Commissioner and finally the Department of Cooperation and Development about the amount of compensation paid out to The Swamp residents. The Secretary for the Department refused to give details, stating that it was a 'private and personal' matter, but said that all the people with improvements had been compensated - each compensation for the 'squatters' and compensatory land for the landowner. (Private correspondence) According to the Minister of Cooperation and Development, the land was originally expropriated for R18 851.40 plus R6 672.00 for the improvements on it. Later the improvements were revalued and a total of R3 426.00 was paid out at the end of 1978. What the reasons for the substantial revaluing were, is not clear. (Private correspondence) The landowner received 165 ha of land in exchange for the 219.2 ha of The Swamp - more land, as officials were quick to point out, but mostly steep and rocky, as officials did not point out. (The compensation money awarded for the land would have all been absorbed by this transfer of land.)

Assuming the ministerial figure is reasonably accurate, then the 95 households moved received an average of R373 each. This is comparable to the average of R350 paid out to the people who were moved to Compensation in July 1981 from Xempitela.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

By the time the CFP survey was undertaken, there had been little change in general conditions at Compensation. By then most people had built wattle and daub houses and the tents had been taken away. A few had planted vegetables in their plots but without water at hand, gardening was an arduous task that many families had abandoned. The temporary tin school was still the only school in use, with an enrolment of 102 pupils and 2 teachers. However, a new brick school, with 10 classrooms, was in the process of being built. These were the only tangible signs of improvement. There was still no clinic or mobile clinic service and the community was still dependent on the trading store across the valley. Prices were high - meals cost at R2.90 for an 80 kg bag and paraffin selling at 65c for 750 ml (July 1980). There were no churches either and it did not seem that any minister visited the area regularly.

Water still came from the 2 tanks originally provided although a windmill had been installed and work was proceeding on augmenting the water supply by the building of a reservoir - apparently in preparation for the next intake of people. The access road to the community was in very poor condition and no buses came into
the settlement; people had to walk to the main road, 3 or 4 km away. A single bus passed along this road to Pietermaritzburg daily, a one-way ticket then costing R1,65.

The impression that the SFU interviewer got of Compensation was of an apathetic and depressed community. In a report on the place she wrote:

"The people themselves are so depressed that they have lost touch with all the world around them. These people, they have difficulties in even naming their own kids by name ... They don't even know to whom they are responsible. They are chased from Bulwer to Umguza magistrate if they have problems ... They really feel unwanted, sort of hanging ... They have given up hope of helping themselves completely. They are about to be professional beggars. They fight even for the degree of poverty - no one wants to be seen as better off than the other". (SFU fieldstrip report)

Since that time the KwaZulu households have been moved in. The water supply was augmented to cope with the influx of new households by the addition of the new reservoir and a few taps have been laid in the streets - 5 in 1992. The access road has been improved and the new school is in operation. Otherwise conditions are the same as before. The only major difference is that now the population has nearly doubled and there are more people struggling to cope with the inadequate resources available to them.

4. Demographic features

POPULATION STRUCTURE

The total population of the 80 households surveyed was 508 of whom 243 were male and 265 female, with 10 whose sex was not stated in the questionnaire. 41% of the total population were children 14 years and under, the percentage rising to 49% when only the permanently resident population at Compensation (i.e. excluding commuters and migrants) is considered. The level of child dependency at Compensation is thus high, but not exceptional by bantustan standards. Sixtime, in the distribution of the African population of South Africa by age, sex and region type 1960, 1970 and 1980*, has calculated that 46% of the total bantustan population were 14 years and under in 1980.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE GROUPING</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>MALE %</th>
<th>FEMALE %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 - 24</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 64</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 - 80</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately there is no masculinity rate for the community at The Swamp, before they were removed to Compensation, to compare with the position in the community after they were removed, since the available information on residence status of the population at The Swamp deals with workers only. This information is further limited in that it does not distinguish between permanent, commuter and migrant residents (as the data on the population at Compensation does) but only between 'resident' and 'non-resident'. However, as already described, 60% of the workers at The Swamp worked within a 25 km radius of the farm, so well over half the working population of The Swamp would have been able to commute, if not daily, then at least weekly. The masculinity rate of the permanent plus commuter population must have been higher than that at Compensation where, as discussed below, only 44% of workers were either permanent or commuters and 56% long-distance migrants.

In addition, there was an increase in the level of employment - an absolute increase in the number employed in the wage sector - at Compensation as compared to The Swamp, from a total of 62 to 96. This also supports the argument that the sex ratio at Compensation is more distorted that it was at The Swamp. Furthermore, the relatively low level of masculinity at Compensation recorded in 1980 is likely to be a temporary phenomenon, as is discussed more fully below. A high proportion of men in employment at Compensation at the time of the survey were in temporary employment, with the local government, preparing sites for the next intake of relocated people. Once this temporary source of work dried up these men would be forced to find work as migrants elsewhere or face the risk of unemployment. The masculinity rate of the population living permanently at Compensation would thus presumably decline. One can thus argue that their relocation to Compensation contributed to a greater level of male migration within the community and further distorted the family structure.

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

As far as household structure is concerned, there are no details on the position prevailing at The Swamp so no strict comparison between before and after can be drawn. However, the available information on Compensation supports the hypothesis that removals encourage the nucleation of families as already indicated in the Bulbulu case study. Previous residence patterns were disrupted if not broken entirely. Loss of land and stock as a result of the removal help undermine the
authority and importance of the extended patriarchal family while the smallness of the
sites at the relocation area also encourages junior married members of former extended
households to establish themselves as separate units on their own small plots. These
tendencies are further encouraged by the increased dependence on wage labour and the
increase in migrancy. At Companation 64% of the households surveyed (51 of the total)
were nuclear while 27.5% were extended.

Table 3. Companation. HOUSEHOLD TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSEHOLD TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single member</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No family</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended-compound</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average number of members per household was a little over 6 - 6.35 (598/80), with
58% of all households surveyed ranging from between 4 and 9 members each. Three
households, as indicated above had only one member each. The largest household had
15 members.

68% of the households were headed by men (whether permanently resident or not) and 32%
were headed by women - a little under a third of the total and thus a substantial
minority. In view of the general tendencies for greater poverty among female-headed
households, related to the lower wages paid women and higher level of female unemploy-
ment, this figure takes on an added economic significance. The distribution of
workers between male-headed and female-headed households at Companation bears this
general observation out. Although female-headed households only made up 34% of the
total, 1) out of the 21 households (625) reported to have neither local nor migrant
workers were female-headed. Furthermore, while male-headed households had, on
average, 1.3 workers each, female-headed households had less than one worker each -
0.9 on average. Thus the data on workers' resistances in the Companation survey was
not satisfactorily recorded and, furthermore, there are no details on how much
the various migrant workers sent home in remittances. Thus there is not enough
information for a precise comparison of incomes in the male- and female-headed households.

Table 4. Companation. DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS IN MALE- AND
FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY OF WORKER</th>
<th>MALE HEAD</th>
<th>FEMALE HEAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No workers at all</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local worker/s only</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant worker/s only</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant and local worker/s</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Economic activity

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The employment position at Companation at the time of the survey shows some import-
ant shifts compared to the position already described for The Swamp. At Companation
there was a total of 96 workers distributed across 59 households, with a further 21
households reporting no wage earner. Previously at The Swamp 62 workers had been dis-
buted across 56 households, with 24 households reporting no wage earner, so the
evidence points to a greater participation in the labour market within the community
after relocation. This is consistent with the loss of land and stock which accompanied
the removal which would have created a greater dependence on wage employment. However,
while there has been a shift to greater participation in the wage sector as a result of the
removal to Companation, the rate of unemployment as well as the level of not
economically active person of working age are both high. The total number of people
who can be classified as economically active in the survey (i.e. both employed and un-
employed who are seeking work) is 123, made up of 83 males, 38 females and 2 for whom
no sex is recorded. Of these, 96 were employed and 27 recorded as unemployed. This
gives a high unemployment rate of 20% (i.e. 25/123) for the community as a whole. The
position is far worse among women where, out of an economically active population of
38, 16 were unemployed - 42% of the total. With the ending of the temporary employ-
ment that was being offered at the Companation site itself at the time of the survey,
the unemployment problem will probably become far more serious.

Table 5. Companation. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC CATEGORY</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>SEX NOT STATED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The available evidence suggests, furthermore, that, as at Dhalunbe, a number of people
of working age have given up trying to look for work and that the rate of unemployment
is actually being depressed by this large number of people of working age who are not
economically active in the formal wage sector. In the SEP survey a total of 141
adults in the 15 - 64 age group were in this category - 54% of the adult population
of working age.

Table 6. Companation. NOT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION OF WORKING
AGE, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESIDENCE STATUS</th>
<th>15-24 YRS</th>
<th>25-44 YRS</th>
<th>45-64 YRS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERMANENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex not stated</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPARERED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGRANT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is of particular significance is the large number of males in this category,
since the women were, arguably, busy with domestic responsibilities at home. 195
people in the permanent population were of working age in 1980; thus only 55 were
economically active. (195 - 140). This means that while 20% of the population of
working age who were permanently resident were economically active, 72% were not.
were neither working nor looking for work. Furthermore, about 30% of this last group were men (40/135), the great majority of them young men in the 15 to 24 age group.

The NNP interviewers, in her field report on the community, has suggested that not only is the absence of jobs a barrier. There is also the fear on the part of the household that if people go away to find work - as they must - they will be lost to the household. She noted in her report:

The young men and girls who could be working are not since they are discouraged from their parents being migrant workers since they are in danger of not coming back home. As I gathered, most people who leave home to work in faraway places don't come back, even if they have been in facilities and especially young people who are still free to choose between the new place and the old. So most women are not for the idea their husbands should go away to far places for work, hence the number of unemployed men. The idea is even stronger among old women who are threatened with the extinction of their home and family if their sons seek work far away. (NNP Fieldtrip report)

One result of this, she noted, was the increased dependence on pensioners within the family to bring in an income for the whole household.

LEVEL OF MIGRANCY

As with the other bantu communities, Compensation shows a high dependence on migrant labour for its economic survival - over half of its entire workforce are monthly or annual workers. The level of migrancy in the community has increased since they were removed and it is now comparable with the figure of 56% supplied by the Natal Commission as the percentage of KwaZulu's workforce employed outside the boundaries of the bantustan. (Natal Commission, vol. 2, 155)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>SEX NOT STATED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commuter</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is also striking about these figures, apart from the high level of migrancy (which one would expect), is the high proportion of workers who are permanently resident at Compensation. This is a deceptive and temporary phenomenon. In 1980 the dependency of the community on migrant labour for its survival was being lessened for the time being by temporary employment on the site for construction labourers, putting in toilets and preparing roads etc. in preparation for the next intake of relocated people. The largest single group of workers according to residence and area of employment in the survey were a group of 23 permanent residents employed in the construction industry as labourers - 22 of them men and one whose sex was not recorded but who was almost certainly a man as well. It is likely that most, if not all, of the 5 permanently resident workers for whom no specific industry was recorded, were construction workers at Compensation as well. This group constituted 66% of the permanently resident group of workers and 23% of the total workforce. They appear to have been hired on a casual basis - through their ex-bandwanger, who had been appointed foremen by the local government officials in charge of the construction site. Obviously this source of employment is only temporary. There is no other local employment at Compensation itself except for teachers in the school. Once the construction work dies down, these workers will be forced either to become migrants or to join the already high number of unemployed, and the dependency on migrant labour in the community will rise.

Undoubtedly the removal to Compensation disrupted previous patterns of employment. At the Swam 27 people worked in the nearby towns of Hinewillie and Underberg, and vicinity - 44% of the then workforce. At Compensation, 23 people were still working at these two towns in 1980 - 4% less than before and only 3% of the workforce. Instead of a 16 to 21 km commute to those two centres from the Swam, workers from Compensation who continued to work there had to commute 50 to 75 km, almost all of it over bad dirt roads. Whereas previously at the Swam 69% of the workers worked within 25 km of their homes, at Compensation, the large contingent of people working on the site itself, notwith-standing, only 4% did. Almost all of these were employed at Compensation itself; 2 were employed at Kpendle, the small village 16 km away and 2 at Bulwer, about 25 km away. After Compensation, Underberg and Hinewillie, the Durban/Pinetown area was the main centre of work (10 workers), followed by Johannesburg (5). The remainder of the workers were scattered in small numbers through a number of Natal towns, including Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle and Port Shepstone.

TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT

Details on the type of employment, by industry and the level of skills of workers at Compensation, reveal that the great majority of workers in the survey were unskilled and employed in low-wage industries, notably construction and service. Of 69 workers for whom information on skills levels is available, 76 were recorded as being unskilled - 85% of the total. The most important industries were:

1. Construction, employing 34% of the total workforce;
2. Service, employing 29% of the total;
3. Agriculture, employing only 7% - 8% of the total, and Manufacturing, also employing 7 workers.

For men, construction (39%), followed by service (15%), agriculture (9%) and transport (6%) were the most important industries. For women the order was service - fully 29% - with manufacturing and finance, each employing only 3% (14%), the only other industries mentioned. Less than a quarter of the total number of workers were women and most of the women who were working (17 out of a total of 22) were migrants.

Table 8, Compensation. EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMPUTERS</th>
<th>MIGRANTS</th>
<th>NOT RETURN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind. ns</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

appointed foremen by the local government officials in charge of the construction site. Obviously this source of employment is only temporary. There is no other local employment at Compensation itself except for teachers in the school. Once the construction work dies down, these workers will be forced either to become migrants or to join the already high number of unemployed, and the dependency on migrant labour in the community will rise.

Undoubtedly the removal to Compensation disrupted previous patterns of employment. At The Swam 27 people worked in the nearby towns of Hinewillie and Underberg, or vicinity - 44% of the then workforce. At Compensation 23 people were still working at these two towns in 1980 - 4% less than before and only 3% of the workforce. Instead of a 16 to 21 km commute to those two centres from The Swam, workers from Compensation who continued to work there had to commute 50 to 75 km, almost all of it over bad dirt roads. Whereas previously at The Swam 69% of the workers worked within 25 km of their homes, at Compensation, the large contingent of people working on the site itself notwithstanding, only 4% did. Almost all of these were employed at Compensation itself; 2 were employed at Kpendle, the small village 16 km away and 2 at Bulwer, about 25 km away. After Compensation, Underberg and Hinewillie, the Durban/Pinetown area was the main centre of work (10 workers), followed by Johannesburg (5). The remainder of the workers were scattered in small numbers through a number of Natal towns, including Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle and Port Shepstone.

TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT

Details on the type of employment, by industry and the level of skills of workers at Compensation, reveal that the great majority of workers in the survey were unskilled and employed in low-wage industries, notably construction and service. Of 69 workers for whom information on skills levels is available, 76 were recorded as being unskilled - 85% of the total. The most important industries were:

1. Construction, employing 34% of the total workforce;
2. Service, employing 29% of the total;
3. Agriculture, employing only 7% - 8% of the total, and Manufacturing, also employing 7 workers.

For men, construction (39%), followed by service (15%), agriculture (9%) and transport (6%) were the most important industries. For women the order was service - fully 29% - with manufacturing and finance, each employing only 3% (14%), the only other industries mentioned. Less than a quarter of the total number of workers were women and most of the women who were working (17 out of a total of 22) were migrants.

Table 8, Compensation. EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMPUTERS</th>
<th>MIGRANTS</th>
<th>NOT RETURN</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind. ns</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME

The most important source of income after wage earnings come from old age pensions. In this respect Compensation is typical of other banuatian communities where an aged grandparent in a family can make the crucial difference between total deprivation and grinding poverty. Unfortunately there is no data to compare the significance of pensions within The Swamp, previously, and at Compensation, currently. A total of 18 individuals recorded receiving old age pensions, 1 was getting unemployment insurance and 5 were drawing disability grants. The removal to Compensation undoubtedly disrupted this very important source of income within the community. A report in the *Natal Witness* on conditions at Compensation in 1979 noted that about 16 old age pensioners discovered that their pension files had not been transferred from Underberg to Bulwer and they thus missed at least one and probably more payments. (*Natal Witness*, 30.08.79)

As already noted, agriculture plays a very insignificant part in the community, since only the former landlord has land other than the small plots and there is no water laid on to each plot to encourage vegetable gardening. Only 2 households reported having 'cows' cattle, presumably the former landlord and 1 other, while 1 household reported some goats and 1 again had some sheep. Surprisingly, the same picture appeared for poultry - 77 households reported no poultry, 2 reported some and 1 answer was missing.

More important as a source of income was informal activity with 15 households reporting some activity of this sort and about a third of those appearing to depend entirely on it to bring in an income. Details on the amount of money generated by this is lacking but it is unlikely to be much since Compensation is not on any major road and thus the only market available is a local one. The most common activities included making and selling mats, brewing beer and plastering other people's houses for them. The survey also uncovered a small number of households which have no apparent source of income - no more than 5, but nevertheless a large enough group to raise questions about firstly the sensitivity of the questionnaire and secondly the strategies for survival used by people in communities as depressed as Compensation.

DIET

In view of the above information it is not surprising that the average household diet at Compensation is totally inadequate, seriously deficient in both protein and vitamins. The staple diet as revealed in the survey consists of maize meal, supplemented by other starches such as potatoes, rice, bread, and tea, coffee and sugar. Only 2 households reported eating greens daily; most (69%) eat them less than once a week. Cheese and fish are unknown items in the community while 65% of households eat eggs less than once a month, 42% eat meat less than once a month and 62% eat meat less than once a week. Only 11% drink milk daily. These figures are crude ones and do not indicate how food consumption is spread across the households, only what the household as a unit consumes. There was also some resistance among respondents to give details on these questions. Nevertheless the general picture that emerges, of a very poor quality diet with people living almost entirely on pure starch, is an accurate one. Although there are no details on food consumption patterns before the community was removed, it is a safe assumption that the loss of land without a significant increase in wage earnings has led to a drop in the consumption of meat and dairy products in particular within the community.

EDUCATION

The general level of education in the community is low, thus putting members at an even greater disadvantage in trying to find employment. 19% of the population of school-going age (7 and over) had no formal education at the time of the survey, a further 40% had lower primary schooling only, barely enough to make those who complete this stage of schooling functionally literate. Only 2% of the community had a senior high school or higher education.

**Table 9. Compensation. EDUCATION, BY STANDARD AND AGE CATEGORY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STANDARD</th>
<th>0-6 YRS</th>
<th>7+ YRS</th>
<th>AGES N</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Primary</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Primary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Secondary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 9+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std not stated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 90 416 2 508

The level of education among commuters and migrants is low, with only 15% of them (10 out of a total of 65) having progressed beyond primary school in 1980 and 21.5% (14 out of 65) having no education at all. The low level of education within the community is clearly related to the large number of workers from Compensation in unskilled occupations.

**Table 10. Compensation. EDUCATION LEVELS OF COMMUTERS AND MIGRANTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COMMUTER</th>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Primary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Primary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Secondary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 9+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 7 58

The prospects for the people of Compensation overcoming their educational handicap in the near future are very limited since educational facilities at Compensation are inadequate. Although the new brick school started operations in 1981, it is a primary school only. The nearest secondary school is 8 km away and there is no high school in the district. There is no literacy training programme for adults, either. In these respects Compensation does not differ from most other banuatian communities - but it can hardly be argued, as government officials have done, that the educational requirements of this relocation site have been met.

6. Organisation and attitudes

Compensation is a depressed and divided community. At the time of the survey, the people had been living there for over 16 months but there was little sign of any community organisation. At The Swamp there used to be at least one organisation, a Catholic Women's League, but that no longer exists. At the time of the survey, there
were no church women’s organisations, no social clubs or community organisations, not eveninkathas.

The ex-landowner was recognised as the official leader by government officials and in 1980 was in charge of recruiting workers for the local construction site, a powerful position in a community as depressed as Compensation. He did not enjoy the support of his ex-tenants, however. He has complained that now that he no longer has a landlord-tenant relationship with the rest of the community, they are unwilling to listen to him. They complain that he does not represent their interests. Nothing else appears to have emerged to fill the vacuum left by the destruction of the old landlord-tenant relationship. What is interesting is the way the one-time landlords have co-opted that old relationship and attempted to transform it into an inuudla/triba one. The community have acquiesced to the outward form of the relationship but it does not provide a channel through which they can organise or express their needs.

People willingly offered a formidable list of problems and complaints about the area, but as in other areas surveyed did not see themselves as capable of solving any of them. A universal complaint was the lack of agricultural land. Other common complaints were the overcrowding - people are not used to living so close together and this creates numerous social tensions - the absence of a local shop and clinic, the unemployment and the distance to the bus stop. People’s replies to questions about their problems in the survey were interspersed with much blank comments as ‘We are starving here’ or ‘We are too ill’. Everybody believes that they are worse off at Compensation than they were at The Swamp.

Very few people, however, had any constructive ideas about how they could improve their situation. The removal appears to have robbed them of initiative and of hope. When people were asked what they intended doing about their problems, most people answered along the lines of ‘Nothing’ or ‘I feel so helpless’ or ‘I feel so confused’. The most frequent response to a question asking who thought they thought would help them was a vague ‘Government’ - ‘They put us here, so they are responsible’ - or an equally vague ‘1980 and the leaders’. Interestingly, the kwaMhlanga Government did not feature at all in these replies.

The Community has been at Compensation for 3 years now. In July they were joined by a new intake of people from the black spaz, Empitile, near Mineville. From the road the older section looks like many other bantu townships to the casual observer - a collection of sattle and dusted houses set on a hillside. What is not apparent to the uninformed observer is that the community has no land. Even more hidden is the apathy and lack of organisation described above: a position that is likely to be exacerbated by the influx of newcomers in July 1981.

5. INANDA NEWTOWN

1. Introduction and background

Inanda Newtown is the name recently given to a site and service scheme implemented in 1980 by the Urban Foundation, in consultation with the Department of Cooperation and Development, in the densely populated, enormously complex area north-west of Durban known as ‘Released Area 33’ (RA 33). RA 33 forms part of the Inanda magisterial district and is located about 35 km out from Durban city centre. The released land includes both Trust land, vested directly in the SADT, and privately owned african and Indian freehold land. The whole of the Inanda magisterial district has been a relocation centre, both formal and informal, since the late 1950s. Inanda Newtown, a project put together largely by the private sector, represents a special kind of relocation and a particular phase in official relocation strategies in the greater Durban area.

Since it is impossible to understand developments at Inanda Newtown in isolation from developments in the rest of RA 33, the general events leading up to and following on the establishment of this scheme are set out in some detail below, before the results of the SFP survey itself are considered. This is followed by a section looking at the continuing crisis of water problems and evictions in the wider area of RA 33.

RELEASED AREA 33

Although falling within land designated for KwaZulu, RA 33 is in fact an extension of the greater metropolitan area of Durban city. Just to the south of it lies the formal African townships of KwaMabibi and Umsunu; to the east lies the Indian township of Phoenix. Because of its proximity to Durban and the employment opportunities there, as well as because of the desperate shortage of formal housing for Africans within the Durban area, this area has experienced a proliferation of informal settlements since the 1950s. Its population is currently estimated at over 250,000. The bulk of the population are tenants who rent rooms or structures or lease land on which to build their own places from the African and Indian landowners in the area. Population densities of up to 100 or more people per hectare were found in the central and northern parts in 1980. (Urban Foundation Natal region, 1980, 3)

RA 33 is administered on behalf of the SADT by the Department of Cooperation and Development, whose agent in the Magistrate at the nearby town of Verulam. One of the major problems of this area for planners and residents alike has been that it has no local authority of its own. Because of its ambiguous legal status, there has been no legal body to take responsibility for the provision of services and planned infrastructure and residents have to make their own arrangements with regard to sanitation and water.

* Thus in KwaMabibi only 370 houses were built in 1980, and the waiting list was 1,000 families. Umsunu, a township in the process of development had 96 houses built in 1980, and a waiting list of 3,000 families. (Black South Natal Coastal Region, 1981)
WATER CRISIS AND TYPHOID OUTBREAK, 1979/80

In March 1979 acknowledgement that a major water crisis was developing in the area began to appear in the press. What had brought this on was the severe drought then prevailing parts of Natal. Because of the drought, people normally reliant on streams and springs for water found themselves without supplies, and were having to buy water at R1,50 a barrel. (Daily News, 9.04.79) An Indian storekeeper in the Inanda district was reported to have built a borehole with donations from the Muslim community, and was selling water. Another storekeeper was selling water at 10 a litre barrel, with the permission of the Pinetown Regional Services Corporation. (Daily News, 14.04.79)

Officials paid little attention to these warning signs. In August 1979 the Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry at Ulundi said that his office had received no official complaints about the water situation in Inanda, and that 'a full investigation had to be held and had to be evolved a good 16 months to two years in advance to submit for budget requirements'. (Daily News, 8.08.79)

But surprisingly by March 1980 typhoid had broken out in Inanda and developed into an epidemic (the term used by the State Health Department) by mid-March. This had two consequences in terms of action by groups outside Inanda:

a) The State Health Department put pressure on the Department of Cooperation and Development to act as the local authority in Inanda, and then itself combined with Durban City Health to move into Inanda and inoculate 20,000 residents.

b) An emergency committee was formed to organize water relief, chaired by Brig. Charles Lloyd of the Defence Force and this began to send in water tankers to about twenty collection points in Inanda.

This emergency committee consisted of representatives of the Defence Force, the Departments of Health and of Cooperation and Development, and the Inanda Commissioner's office. It saw its function as 'to defuse immediate problems and not to attempt any solution of long-term problems'. Brig. Lloyd was also quoted as saying that the situation in Inanda would be 'back to normal within a month'. (Daily News, 5.03.80) By the end of March the Verulam Magistrate announced that the bulk of the R10,000 which the Chief Commissioner had sent to cover the costs of transporting water, had been spent.

What emerged clearly during this period was that no long term solution could be undertaken in Inanda because there was no local authority there. The Department of Cooperation and Development, although delegated the responsibility for RA 33, seemed unwilling to take any action, at least on a public level. One of the MDs for Natal, Mr Frank Martin, maintained that the only two options for a local authority were the Department of Cooperation and Development and the KwaZulu Government. He said that where there was no local authority in rural areas the Development and Services Board generally assumed responsibility for water, sanitation and roads, but in the case of Inanda, the Department of Cooperation and Development had not approached it or any other body to take control of services. (Daily News, 21.03.80)

URBAN FOUNDATION'S REPORT ON A WATER SCHEME

The Urban Foundation's interest in the area dated back at least to 1979. In March 1980 a confidential report it had produced on a proposed water scheme for Inanda was made public in the press. This feasibility study had been completed in 1979, and the findings submitted to the Department of Cooperation and Development.
The scheme proposed five alternative sources for a supply of water to Inanda:
1) mobile water tankers, 2) boreholes, 3) the Umhlanga Dam at Tongaat (these latter two proposals were considered to be uneconomic), 4) the Umgeni Water Board, and 5) the Durban Corporation. It indicated that the Umgeni Water Board was prepared to supply water from the proposed Inanda Dam. The report stressed that the whole scheme was not to be regarded as a temporary relief measure, but as a permanent upgrading of the facilities. It also noted that rehousing was not seen as a viable alternative to the problem.

The Establishment of a Site and Service Scheme

It was apparent that the Umcan Foundation and the liberal business interests it represented were extremely concerned by the typhoid epidemic and the threat this posed to the health and safety of white Durban. Although the details on the subsequent negotiations between the Urban Foundation and the central government have not been made public, it is clear from the timing of subsequent events that these must have taken under way in early 1980. It seems likely that the Urban Foundation was pressing the central government to make some initiative on the estate and that the central government, in turn, saw the Urban Foundation as a potentially useful ally.

At the end of March 1980, the Minister of Cooperation and Development announced in Parliament that the government was investigating, on a medium and long term basis, a water supply for Inanda. (Daily News, 29.03.80) Then in June 1980 the Urban Foundation approached the Department of Town and Regional Planning at the University of Natal, Durban, with the suggestion that the students in the Urban Foundation focus on RA 31 in the state planning project. The Urban Foundation explained that the Department of Cooperation and Development had agreed to the Urban Foundation preparing a report on the area which would serve as the basis for the drawing up of a brief for planning consultants. These consultants would then put together a plan for the formal, controlled development of the area.

In the meantime discussions about RA 31 must have been made at ministerial level and on the 17th July 1980 the Department of Cooperation and Development announced the proposed development of a site and service scheme on part of Piscang Rivier (SAI land) in conjunction with the Urban Foundation. At that stage the role of the Urban Foundation was described as a technical and resource one. It was to set up technical advice centres on the site and service scheme, encourage the building of permanent structures, and offer technical help and building plans for residents.

In contrast to its previous indifference to the area, the Department now moved with enormous speed to get the scheme launched. In a matter of weeks Department of Cooperation and Development planners put together plans for three parcels of South African Development Trust land in RA 31. The sites were surveyed and pegged, dust roads bulldozed, pit latrines corrugated iron shelters dug on each site, and water mains put in every 100 metres. The areas chosen were extremely hilly and steep and this was to cause severe drainage problems later.

No announcement of the proposed resettlement was made to the people affected until the 13th July 1980, when the Verulam Magistrate called a meeting of residents in the Amoseti area in the north eastern section of RA 31. The meeting was attended by Cooperation and Development, TDA and Urban Foundation officials. The Verulam Magistrate told residents that no-one would be compelled to move to the site and service scheme, but that people could start applying for sites, and trucks to transport them to the scheme would be available. It is not clear what else may or may not have been promised. As discussed below, many rumours that turned out to be false began circulating in Inanda - rumours that township housing would be available free, that people had to move there. These rumours were widely believed and this contributed to a crisis of expectations among many of the people who moved onto the scheme.

Once sites had been prepared, people began moving into tents on the new scheme at the end of July 1980. By early 1981 the total population of the first section to be opened up, Section A, was estimated to be 2,000 households. By mid 1982 the scheme was reported to be full, with about 4,200 households (25,000 people) divided into three sections (A, B, O). In April 1982 the scheme was formally proclaimed a township and given the name Inanda Newtown. (Proclamation No 99, 21.04.82)

The SFP Survey

The SFP survey of Inanda Newtown was undertaken between November 1980 and March 1981 when people were still moving into the scheme. A total of 100 households were interviewed in the western part of Section A, using a 1 in 10 sample.

2. The removals

Conditions on Arrival at the Scheme

Emadumoni (the place of tents) as it came to be known, was conceptualized as a scheme to provide residents with basic services and a rented site. Although hailed as a breakthrough in official housing policy, because of its flexible approach to the issue of building standards and its emphasis on self-help, the scheme in fact differed little from the relocation camps that have been established in rural areas since the 1960s. People were given a surveyed site, serviced with a borehole and a water-point nearby. Once on site in a tent provided for 6 months by the central government, residents could build their own houses - first shacks, and then, with loans arranged by the Department of Cooperation and Development and technical advice from the Urban Foundation, a substantial structure. (See Appendix 1 for details.)

Rumours circulating in Inanda before the relocations led people to think that they would get a month's rations free, and free building materials. A number of people claimed that they had been told houses would be built for them, that they could be able to move to a 'better place', and some expected to move into a regular township house. In reality, on arrival people found that they had to build their own houses, and live in tents until they could build; that they were given only a day's worth of rations; that many had to resort to bribery in order to obtain a tent and temporary building materials. (See Appendix 1.)

Living conditions were initially extremely poor. The summer of 1980 brought heavy rains following the severe drought, and tents and pit latrines were flooded. In a story on the scheme in December 1980 the newspaper Post noted:

... the entire tent city was flooded and residents had to dig trenches in a vain attempt to divert the water around their tents and toilets.
The toilets which were constructed on a shallow pit were flooded. (Post, 17.12.80)

One resident was reported in this story as saying that
The area was so waterlogged that we could not even go to the toilet.
I regret moving from my shack further down the road. Although it was a shack at least no water came inside when it rained. I now fear an epidemic breaking out.

Preliminary preparations, apart from the surveying and laying out of the sites were
minimal. At the time of the first arrivals, there were no schools, creches, community halls, police station, clinics, hospital, shops, recreational facilities, churches or street lights. Very soon shanty shops selling basic foods or providing services such as water repair sprang up. People in fact responded to the lack of services very positively and the level of informal activity in the settlement is, as the SPF survey revealed, high. Nevertheless residents felt that better facilities should have been provided from the start. One person interviewed by SPF commented that 'except for pure water and a solid toilet, there aren't any differences between the site and some of the schools and their former homes."

A free bus service provided by the government transported children to their old schools in Amatol. It is not known for how long this service operated. By mid-1981 a temporary tin shack school was operating but before then no school had been set up in the area. Parents were distressed to find their children were being turned away from schools in Kuzuma, a nearby formal township. General transport was provided by MINCO buses, but in the rainy season these were unable to operate on the extremely muddy roads on the steep hillsides on which the scheme was laid out.

Initially the area was administered as an emergency area 'pending proclamation as a township within a few years'. (Urban Foundation Natal region, November 1980) According to the Urban Foundation, once the township had been formally proclaimed, the purchases of land would be permitted and encouraged. 'Although the land so purchased will not be freehold, it is understood that it will offer security of tenure equivalent to 60 year leasehold.' (Ibid) In the meantime rent was fixed at R2.60 per month per site. In addition an initial lump sum of R10 per plot was levied on households, apparently to cover future refuse removal and water costs although many people were uncertain of its purpose.

ORIGIN AND ARRIVAL OF RESIDENTS

At the public meeting held in July 1980 to announce the scheme, the Verulam magistrate stated that to qualify for a site in the new project, applicants had to be residents in Inanda and be citizens of KwaZulu. The information on the origins of the households in the SPF survey confirms that official restrictions on who was entitled to sites were applied fairly successfully. Thus out of the 100 households in the survey, a total of 74 came from within RA 33 itself, a further 10 from the wider Inanda district and only 15 from areas outside of this geographical limit. (Information on the origin of 1 household was not available.)

Of those coming from within RA 33, 51% – just over half of the total sample – came from Amatoli and 23% from Hluhluwe and Phambiliwane, all freehold areas. People from these areas had paid rent to Indian and African landlords, mostly renting rooms in overcrowded settlements and had not had access to gardens, fields or grazing land. Amatoli had been pinpointed by the authorities as one of the areas most severely hit by the water shortage and typhoid epidemic.

Of the 15 households coming from outside the Inanda district, 13 had come from other parts of Durban, either single men's hostels, other townships or back yards in Durban, while 2 had come from more settled areas in other parts of the province. People came, overwhelmingly, from urban or peri-urban backgrounds. Only 3 of the households in the survey had had access to fields at their previous place and only one had owned cattle.

The great majority of households were resettled by 20 trucks. Out of 94 households for whom this information was supplied, 84 said they had been brought to the site by these trucks while 10 said they had hired their own means of transport. One resident interviewed said he had hired his own transport because of 'government truck delays'. 14 households brought with them their own building materials from their previous place of residence, intending to use them to build a shack on the new site.

LENGTH OF TIME AT PREVIOUS PLACE

Generally the households interviewed had not spent a very long time at their previous place before moving to the site and service scheme. Over half the sample – 53 households – had lived at their previous place for five years or less and only 15 for 11 years or more. Of these for between 11 and 20 years. Compared to the other African areas surveyed by SPF in Natal, the residents at Inanda Newtown showed a high degree of previous mobility. It seems that what this reflects is mainly movement in and around the greater Durban area, from hostels or townships out to informal settlements or from one informal settlement to another, rather than a major movement of households from outlying rural areas into RA 33 (although obviously this does form part of the total migration pattern). A study undertaken by the Isolomasi Health and Family Welfare Organisation in early 1982 in a part of RA 33 known as Phimanga, established that 70% of the sample had lived there for between 1 and 9 years (this is comparable to the SPF figures) and also stressed that the majority of the people were urban, rather than rural. 37% had moved to Phimanga from other parts of Inanda and 41% from other Durban townships while only 8% had come from other parts of KwaZulu. (Daily News, 30.06.80)

The area surveyed in the Isolomasi study is very similar to the areas from which the households interviewed at Inanda Newtown had come. This data confirms that the bulk of people moved to Inanda Newtown were people whose orientation and experience was basically an urban one.

Table 1, Inanda. LENGTH OF TIME AT PREVIOUS PLACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – 5</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – 10</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 – 20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21+</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REASONS FOR MOVING

At the public meeting held in Amatoli in July 1980, the Verulam Magistrate stated that no-one would be compelled to move to the site and service scheme, but that trucks would be provided to help residents move, and that tents could be obtained at the new site. In apparent confirmation of this, all the households interviewed by SPF reported that they had moved to the scheme 'of their own free will'. This response, however, requires further explanation, since there were many indirect pressures working on them. In March 1980 a reporter from the Daily News observed that 'most of those queueing for admission (to the scheme) believed that they did not have to move to the new area if they did not want to, but among those already on the site the consensus was they believed they had no choice.' (Daily News, 30.06.80)

Given the circumstances under which residents had lived previously (rent-paying landlord, poor facilities and not much security of tenure), it seems that many tenants were motivated by their poor living conditions in RA 33 to move to the scheme. Said one respondent in the SPF survey: The place where we were was filthy – people urinated behind our
houses. We had to fight for water and the toilets were hopeless compared to our present ones.

With the high percentage of rent-paying tenants in the sample (95%) one of the things which appeared to be attractive about the new scheme was that tenants would be able to escape "shanty" landlords. Many tenants reported that the landlords had had a "dictatorial" attitude to them, and tried to control their daily lives. What emerges clearly in the survey material is that the tenants found themselves subject to the whims of the landlord.

Here there is the prospect of building our own house. Where we were, we were going to remain lodgers for the rest of our lives, said one of the respondents in the SFP survey. It was reported that one of the landlords had pressured his tenants to move off his land to the site and service scheme.

There were also positive attractions at the other end, some real, as the comments quoted above indicate, but many only rumoured but which nevertheless encouraged people to apply for a site at the scheme.

Although it is not entirely clear what status of land tenure residents of the site and service scheme have, one of the benefits of the scheme cited most frequently by residents was that they would have their 'own land' on the scheme. The residents' frequent use of the term 'own land' probably refers to the freedom from landlords which they experience at the scheme since many of the residents are not in a position financially to purchase their own land. Another major attraction at the scheme was piped water. 57 households in the SFP survey mentioned this as an improvement over their previous place of residence. The prospect of their own pit latrines was also seen as important, in an area struck by a typhoid epidemic.

Another very important motivating factor, which resulted in considerable confusion and disillusionment when disappointments at the other end, was the widespread expectation that those who moved to the scheme would be moving into a formal township. Where and how these rumors originated is not clear but that they were widely believed is evident. Almost everybody in the SFP survey believed that the government should provide them with a 'proper' township house and many of them said they had expected to be allocated one when they arrived at the site and service scheme.

'We haven't got any of the things we were promised initially', said one respondent.

'We would like the government to build houses and rent them to us on a buying scheme,' said another. 'We expect the government to upgrade this place as promised at meetings with Mr Purvis (the Magistrate) from Verulam', said another. And another: 'We expect the government to build houses, schools, shops and roads as in other townships.'

Some respondents also said they had been told they would be given precious Section 10 rights if they moved. If true, this would have established them as urban insiders in terms of the State's influx control policies and given them the right to seek work in Durban directly. It would have been a compelling reason for moving. In fact, however, residents at Inanda Newtown have to go through the labour bureaux at Verulam or KwaMhusi to get legally approved work.

95 households indicated that the time of removal there were households which remained at their previous place. The reasons given for their staying behind were that they had not wanted to move, did not find the site and service scheme an attractive proposition or did not wish to live in tents. 9 households said they had lost between 1 and 2 members of their household as a result of the move. Some of those who had left the household had been able to acquire their own plot at the scheme. Others had moved to township areas to stay with relatives instead of moving to the scheme.

1. Demographic features

**POPULATION STRUCTURE**

The total population in the 100 households surveyed was 451, of whom 44.7% were children (4 years and younger). There were hardly any migrants in the sample – only 5.4% of them female and most of them domestic servants. Nearly 50% of the adult population (15 years and older) were commuters. Because Inanda is close to Durban most of the working population are able to commute on a daily or weekly basis. This allows for a balanced sex ratio within the permanent and commuter population. The masculinity ratio for this combined group was 95, indicating an almost equal proportion of males to females.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION BY AGE, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRINCIPAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HT F T HT F T HT F T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 14</td>
<td>108 108 216 0 0 0 0 0 216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 24</td>
<td>19 36 55 7 8 15 1 1 2 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 34</td>
<td>4 37 41 48 17 65 0 2 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 44</td>
<td>2 15 17 30 13 43 0 0 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 64</td>
<td>2 5 7 10 1 11 0 1 1 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE**

Compared to the other areas surveyed by SFP in Natal, as well as the commonly accepted average of 6 or 7 members for African households, the average household size in the sample at Inanda Newtown was noticeably smaller, being 4.81. 62 households had between 3 and 5 members and a further 23 had 6 or 7 members, these two groups accounting for 85% of the total sample. Only one household had more than 10 members – it had 11. These figures are even more striking when contrasted with the results of a study undertaken in the informal settlement of Nkuzeni, to the south of Durban, in 1977. This found the average household to be 8.1. (J. Haughton, 1977, 30)

In the absence of a more detailed investigation, the reasons for this relatively small household size remains speculative. It may reflect a fragmentation of formerly extended households as a result of the move to the scheme where plots were small, controlled and available by application to an outside bureaucracy. 57 of the households were nuclear and only 19 extended, with another 7 reporting as family beyond the nuclear couple – possibly young married couples who had moved out of parental households and established themselves on their own site at the scheme. This process of nucleation has, however, been noted at the

*Includes 1 woman for whom no residential status was given.
other relocation areas surveyed where average household sizes were still larger than at Inanda Newtown.

Also notable about the sample is that there were relatively few female headed households. Only 17 out of the 100 households in the sample (17%) had female heads (compared to e.g. 23% at Shallombe, 3% at Emakhele, 5% at Compensation). This is also something requiring further probing and analysis. It may be related to the almost complete absence of male migration in the sample and hence the greater marital stability. However, at Emakhele where male migration was not nearly as marked as in the other rural settlements surveyed, the incidence of female headed households was relatively high.

**EDUCATION**

Education levels were in general higher in the Inanda sample than in the other areas surveyed, a further reflection of the advantages spilling out into the area because of its proximity to Durban. Although only 22 out of the 360 people of school-going age or older had attained a Std 9 or higher level of education, a further 42 had reached lower secondary school. The proportion of the population 7 years and older that had reached high school was approaching 50%. There was little difference in education levels achieved by males and females if anything females were slightly better educated, with 15 out of the 52 members who had reached Std 9 or higher being female. Higher educational qualifications have meant that there are more skilled and semi-skilled workers in the Inanda Newtown sample than in the rural relocation areas studied.

### Table 1, Inanda. EDUCATION IN THE 7+ AGE GROUP, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMBATANT</th>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7 3 102</td>
<td>8 1 9</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Primary</td>
<td>33 39 72</td>
<td>7 2 9</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Primary</td>
<td>15 38 53</td>
<td>21 7 26</td>
<td>0 1 1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Secondary</td>
<td>13 46 59</td>
<td>33 26 79</td>
<td>1 3 4</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 9+</td>
<td>0 12 12</td>
<td>7 3 10</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>68 152 220</td>
<td>96 39 135</td>
<td>1 4 5</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **Economic activity**

The proportion of economically active people (employed and unemployed) in the sample was relatively high, again attributable to the proximity of the settlement to Durban and its incorporation into the economic life of the city. A total of 167 people in the sample, almost all of them (135) commuters, were employed. A little over two thirds of them (97) were male and just under one third (44) female. The unemployment rate was, however, high. 30 people in the total sample were reported to be unemployed, 11 of them being boys and 19 male. This gave an overall unemployment rate of 18% - 20% for females and 16% for males. 11 of the 30 unemployed had been working in the service industry beforehand. At least 4 of the unemployed had lost their previous jobs as a direct result of their move to Inanda.

Although a number of those who moved to Inanda Newtown expected that they would be issued with Section 10 rights and would be able to seek work directly in Durban, the residents of the site and service scheme have not been given this preferential treatment and have to work through the various labour bureaux. At the Emakhele bureaux, residents of that township have priority. Unemployment and problems in getting workseeker’s permits were two general complaints among the householder in the SPP sample. Overall household income, by urban standards, appears low. According to the Urban Foundation in late 1980:

The community of Inanda comprises a large number of domestic servants mainly females who earn between R5 to R90 per month, and about a quarter of pensioners, disabled persons, unemployed, and unemployed. Less than a quarter of the fully employed people earn well over R150 per month and the rest are mainly unemployed due to influx control measures against entering the city of Durban as work seekers and as a result of a lack of job opportunities at Inanda. (Urban Foundation Natal region, 1980, 12)

**Table 4, Inanda. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC STATUS</th>
<th>M FT</th>
<th>F FT</th>
<th>M P</th>
<th>F P</th>
<th>M T</th>
<th>F T</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not economically</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>342</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EMPL0YMENT**

The most important area of employment overall was in the service industry, which employed 37 out of the total working population of 141 (27%). This is because almost all the female workers were in the service industry, mainly as private domestic workers in and around Durban. For men the transport industry was the most important employer. This may be explained by the fact that in October 1980 a large group of PUTOO bus drivers moved onto the scheme, whether by arrangement between PUTOO and the Urban Foundation or not, is not known.

Most of the workers were employed in the private sector - 128 or 97%. The number of white-collar workers in the sample was low - there was only 1 professional and 1 business person, but 10 workers, all male, were classified as clerical workers. The industrial workers were divided fairly evenly between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, with semi-skilled accounting for the largest group. In this respect, the contrast between Inanda Newtown and the rural relocation areas surveyed, where skilled and semi-skilled workers were extremely rare, is a very marked one.
Table 5, Inanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Conduit</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical et al</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>'6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6, Inanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Permanent</th>
<th>Conduit</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INFORMAL ACTIVITY

In addition to a relatively high level of formal economic activity and probably related to the high unemployment rate, there is also a very active informal sector at Inanda Newtown. As already mentioned, within a very short time of the scheme having started, a host of small informal businesses and services sprang up, supplying many of the services that were not being provided by those in charge of the scheme. Whether the level of informal activity is higher than in the surrounding scheme is not known; it would be interesting to find out.

The most important forms of activity were sewing and knitting (9 households) and the most important informal sources of income were vegetable and chicken stalls (5 households). Other forms of informal activity were building chairs, running a shop, selling paraphernalia, selling straw hats, brewing liquor, breasting hair, operating an illegal taxi service, backyard kitchen, and a herbalist practice.

Diet

95% of the households in the sample ate three times a day, 5% ate twice a day and 3% ate once a day. The staple diet consisted of maize, bread, tea, coffee, sugar and milk. Only 45% of households ate greens daily, and 1% ate meat daily. However, 1% reported that they eat cheese and fish daily, 35% that they eat eggs daily and 65% of the households said they eat meat every second day. Although nutritionally deficient, these and very general figures do indicate that the diet of the Inanda Newton sample was, on average, superior to that found in the rural relocation settlements surveyed, with a higher consumption level of proteins.

5. Organisation and attitudes

Community Organisation at the Site and Service Scheme

At the time of the removals from Amato to Bentendeni, a Liaison Committee was appointed by the Verulam Magistrate for RA 33. The committee (did not involve representatives of the people affected by the removal, nor was it an elected body. One of the members was a Kdzulu MD and a major landlord, Mr. K. Khowo. At a public meeting held in March 1981, he said that 'A committee had been selected before the meeting (the meeting at which the removals had been officially announced) by the Department of Cooperation and Development. I understand this to be improper as they were giving us a committee in a straitjacket.' (Transcript of meeting at Inanda Soccer Field, 15.03.81) Mr Khowo accused the Department of Cooperation and Development of failing to involve residents from Amato in initial consultation on the new Inanda Site and Service scheme. A second liaison committee was formed, and Mr Khowo emerged as chairman.

At Inanda site and service scheme itself attempts were made to create a more representative Residents' Committee. Confusion surrounds its formation which took place in about October/November 1980. It is not known how the voting was conducted, what the percentage was, or how representative this committee is. Residents themselves did not seem to be well informed on the committee's formation. 35% of the households in the SPP sample said they did not know of any organization in the area. (The survey was conducted soon after the residents committee had been formed.) 45% did not belong to any organization in the area. Eight per cent belonged to the residents committee. 44% were involved in starting a burial club, and 2% in starting a self-help club. (5 households did not answer this question.) When asked specifically who the leaders in the community were the Residents' Committee figured more prominently. 59 respondents mentioned members of the Residents' Committee as their leaders and many looked to it to pressure the government to improve conditions at the scheme. However, twenty-four households did not know of any leaders in the area, while 10 households said there were no leaders in the area when they would support. 3 households said they had heard of elections, but had not heard the outcome of the elections. Only one respondent looked to Inkatha as a leading organization.

Once the Residents' Committee had emerged, conflict arose between the Chairman of the Liaison Committee and the elected Residents' Committee. At the time of the SPP survey it was rumoured that an attempt had been made on the Residents' Committee Chairman's life by Mr Khowo's 'men', since he was seen as a threat to Mr Khowo's power in the area.

REACTIO TO CONDITIONS ON THE SITE AND SERVICE SCHEME

By the end of 1980 the public relations exercises on Inanda site and service scheme of Bentendeni had begun to founder and disillusioned residents reported to the press that they had expected houses either from the central government, Amalusa government or the Urban Foundation; that they had not expected to be in tents, and that the pit latrines had been flooded in the rains. (Sunday Tribune, 26.12.81)

These and other complaints emerged strongly in the SPP survey. Almost every household interviewed mentioned the lack of a 'proper township house' as a problem -
despite the fact that most of them had not lived in such housing beforehand. The
rumours and the misplaced expectations that many people had had before moving to Inanda
Newtown have been described already. It is evident from the survey that most people
felt that if the government was going to relocate them, only formal housing was appro-
priate; they did not regard the site and service scheme as a breakthrough. Respondents in
the SPR survey also felt there was a need for better roads and bus services and in
the case of the Inanda survey waterborne sewerage and electricity as improvements they would like
to see. Clearly their expectations had been shaped by their knowledge of the facilities
that were available in the townships and their perceptions of the facilities available
in the white part of the city.

For many the blame for the lack of township facilities came to lie at the feet of the
Urban Foundation. A meeting of 1000 - 2000 residents of Inanda site and service
scheme was held at the Inanda Soccer Field on 15th March 1991. As a result of this
meeting the Urban Foundation was accused of 'robbing the people' and was told that it
should withdraw from Inanda'.

(Rhodesian Herald, 24.03.81) Mr Mountain, Natal
Director of the Urban Foundation, 'strongly disputed accusations made against the
Urban Foundation that it was doing the South African Government's dirty work in helping
the white part of the city.'

(Rhodesian Herald, 2.02.81) In an attempt to sort out the conflict the chairman of the official Liaison Committee,
Mr B. Ngcobo, and the Urban Foundation Natal Director, met with the KwaZulu cabinet at
Umkundla. It seems they were told to return to Durban and to sort out their differ-
ences through consultation and Chief Tubeheso appealed publicly to the Urban Founda-

The announcement of the scheme ... is a big step forward from the days
when the relevant department simply went ahead and built thousands of standard
houses and moved in the 'squatters'.

(Rhodesian Herald, 15.07.80) "The Department of Cooperation and Development has decided to alleviate hardships caused by estab-
lishing a new housing scheme in the area."

(Rhodesian Herald, 16.07.80) Headlines such as 'the hills are alive with the sound of building' appeared.

(Rhodesian Herald, 10.12.80) The private sector has also responded favourably to the scheme. Coorveld was re-
ported to be setting up a building block production unit and running training courses
at the Inanda site and service scheme.

(Rhodesian Herald, 7.01.81) While the bears group has decided to build an initial 14 houses for its employees living on the
scheme.

At the time that the scheme was first proposed, a Daily News article outlined the
advantages of the scheme as follows:

- Low income families have an intermediate stage between the
  insanitary, fire-prone shacks in a squatter settlement and a
  permanent house which is initially beyond their means.

- Areas will develop with the incomes of the residents,
  ultimately offering a better quality of life for their
  inhabitants than the rows of boxes in the established townships
  could.

- Landowners who rent out minute patches of ground to shack
dwellers, 'trapping' them by absorbing the money they could
otherwise have saved towards a better house, would be excluded.

(Daily News, 15.07.80)

Eighteen months after the start of the scheme the Daily News commented:

To the casual observer, Inanda New Town may appear little
different to the older shacks settlements which it replaced.
Thousands of packing cases and wattle and daub houses stretching
along the rolling hills to the north of Durban. But the differences
and the key to this kind of scheme is that the 'mijondolo' are
built on surveyed and allocated sites, each supplied with the
rudiments of civilization - sanitation, piped water and roads.

(Daily News, 20.03.82)

In reality, how do these advantages come across to residents? Clearly, clean water
and toilets are a distinct advantage, but as the section on conditions on arrival
shows these 'rudiments of civilization' were probably done on the cheap and the
planning of the area does not appear to have taken the topography into account.
Roads become muddy and impassable when it rains and toilets were inadequate.

Furthermore, the 'intermediate stage' described by the Daily News in July 1980 was
ever really spelled out. In fact, people moved from established shack houses into
tents. Heavy rains later turned the area into a quagmire and the tents became
waterlogged. A shack ('mijondolo') costs between R150 and R500 to build,
depending on the materials used. Most people put up mijondolas as the intermediate
stage - the same 'unsanitary, fire-prone shacks' as in the rest of SA 33. At one point it appeared that households with an income of less than R1 200 a month were
being refused loans to build permanent structures.

This would mean a continued existence in a shack, with no hope of a substantial house, for those with a
low income. It is not certain whether this ruling has now been reversed. One
resident said 'I can do as I please, provided I have enough money.'

While residents say they will benefit from 'saving their own land' and being away
from landlords, and 23 households said their rent was lower on the scheme than it
had been before, it is doubtful that savings accrued by living on a site and service
scheme will ever amount to the kind of savings needed for a better house. One
resident expressed concern in these words: 'We are worried about the way people
are housed without a hope for improvement.' Of the 3000 families on the scheme
only 80 had started to build permanent houses by March 1981. Daily News,
24.03.81) By March 1982 only 420 permanent houses have been built. (Sunday
Tribune, 20.03.82) It seems simplistic to glibly assume that residents' incomes
will improve and lead to a 'better quality of life.' The unemployment rate in
the section of the scheme surveyed by SPR was 18 at the time of the survey.

Many of the workers are domestic workers, earning low salaries and vulnerable to
unemployment.

General information gathered from people informed about the scheme and the survey
results point to the fact that lack of proper consultation with the people to be
moved led to a crisis of expectations and the self-help aspect of the scheme
lauded by the press, has a tenuous status in the community itself. The differ-
ences between the reality and what people were led to expect has been outlined
above in relation to housing, motions, free building materials, the right to
work and the 'voluntary' nature of the removal. In addition, lack of
consultation led to insecurity in the form of rumours. Since the beginning of
the scheme there has been a consistent circulation of rumours concerning re-
moves, housing, building materials and the Urban Foundation. The following are
examples of the rumours which have been circulating:

1. That people had to earn R235 a month in order to qualify for a loan
to build a house on the scheme.

2. That the Urban Foundation was behind people being turned away from a motor assembly factory where they bought CEO plywood for building of ‘mambolos’. It was felt that the Urban Foundation wanted to secure a monopoly on the sale of building materials.

3. That a block of flats was to be built on Indian land in RA 33 and that Amos residents would be compelled to move into the flats, and pay R30 a month rent.

4. That a large part of RA 33 was to be expropriated and the nearby Indian township of Phoenix extended.

In spite of the fact that the site and service scheme is said to offer security to residents, some residents on the scheme have expressed their uncertainty about their future:

- Amongst other things we don’t know the real future of this place, for example we don’t know whether the government is going to build houses for us, and whether we will really be granted permits to seek work in Durban. We are trying to save enough money in order to face anything.

- With enough money here one has good prospects of developing one’s own household land, although that will take some time. We don’t know what is really going to happen to this place in the future.

Things we were promised haven’t materialised yet.

The official response to the scheme has been more difficult to gauge. The central government worked with the Urban Foundation in launching it and recognition of the scheme has now materialised through its proclamation as a township, with further provision for a township council to be established. However, the scheme is now fully occupied and those currently under threat of removal in RA 33 are not being offered alternative sites, and have simply been told to go back to where they came from. Many of those currently under threat are resident in the same sort of shacks settlement at Amos as the residents of the site and service scheme occupied previously.

As the brief account that follows on developments in RA 33 since the site and service scheme was launched indicates, there is considerable confusion, at least publicly, over future plans for the area. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Inanda Newtown can be regarded as a pilot project, testing ways and means of accommodating the other residents of informal settlements in the area. It appears rather to have been a once-off response by the central government to a crisis situation in which it was facing mounting pressure from influential sources in the private sector to act. As at New Crossroads in Capetown, Inanda Newtown is to be regarded as an exception and cannot, at this stage, be seen to represent a fundamental breakthrough in either housing or influx control policies on the part of the State.

6. Subsequent developments in RA 33

PROPOSED PLAN FOR GREATER INANDA

On the 22nd February 1981, Dr Koornhof announced in reply to a question in Parliament that work on the provision of piped water to Inanda would only start when a master plan for the whole area had been completed. (Natal Mercury, 23.2.81) This, as far as can be established, was the first hint that further plans affecting Inanda residents were being considered. It has subsequently emerged that a private consultant is undertaking work on a plan for the development of the greater Inanda area as a town. The plan appears to involve the upgrading of squatter settlements rather than their removal.

The plan will cost more than R130 million in its first five years, providing 13 000 housing sites a year, with supporting infrastructure. (Daily News, 14.02.82)

It is not yet known whether the Department has accepted the consultant’s plan but the experience of the people living in the area thus far suggests that they have not.

In October 1981, the water tankers - up until then still playing back and forth from Durban - were withdrawn from Inanda. It is still not clear what took place - whether it was some bureaucratic hang-up at lower levels or not - but Mr Durandt, the Commissioner for the Department of Cooperation and Development denied all knowledge of the matter. (Daily News, 19.10.81) The tanker service was resumed at a cost of R5 000 to R8 000 per week. (Natal Mercury, 23.04.82)

EVICTIONS

At the time of writing, evictions in the greater Inanda area are already under way. According to a report presented to the Black Sash conference in Durban in March 1982, 9 500 people presently resident in the greater Inanda area are to be systematically evicted. It is said that only people who are regarded as legal residents will be relocated in the new townships. Legal residents constitute about 46% of the population according to official sources. The rest are expected to 'go back to where they came from' according to the Chief Commissioner for Natal. (Natal Mercury, 15.03.82) According to a press report the government was expecting to pump RH million in 1982 into clearing squatter areas. (Daily News, 9.03.82) The Minister of Health was reported in April 1982 as saying that in future in squatter camps such as Inanda, the government were not going to serve 'unlawful notices' to people wishing to settle there. (Daily News, 21.04.82) Dr Morrison, of the Department of Co-operation and Development said 'Inanda is a health hazard - we cannot tolerate the situation any more.' (Natal Mercury, 23.04.82)

Official worry on removals appears to deflect to the Inanda area. In one instance the Verulam Commissioner issued eviction notices to tenants, only to have them withdrawn by the Chief Commissioner. (Prowess, 5.12 - 5.13, 22.04.82) This seems to make it quite clear that residents who arrived prior to April 1982 legal. However, at the Assistant Commissioner at Verulam has stated that those who moved onto the land after June 1981 (in the case of SANDF owned land) would be evicted. (Natal Mercury, 21.06.82) The disputes in the position at an official level have not made the situation for tenants on RA 33 any easier.

Evictions and prosecutions are under way, in some cases irrespective of when tenants settled on the land and where they have come from. The official strategy has been to act indirectly, by putting pressure on the landlords.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1. The water crisis and the subsequent outbreak of cholera in December 1981 and January 1982 seem to have given the government an opportunity to begin evicting tenants on Indian-owned land in RA 33.

2. Towards the end of October 1981 Indian landlords in Amos were told by the Department of Health to issue eviction notices to their tenants. Pressure was placed on landlords either to put in services such as water and sanitation (at great cost), or failing this, to evict their tenants. One landlord is said to have been told to upgrade 30 households in 90 days, otherwise he would be responsible for paying the costs of transporting those to be evicted off his land. The threats from the Department were largely ignored because the tenants had nowhere to go. However, some Indian landlords have been issuing eviction notices (see Appendix 3), and it is rumoured that one landlord has been actively encouraging tenants to move off his land. Landlords are being pressured by a
threat from the Department of Co-operation and Development that their land will simply be bought out by the SADT. The Commissioner at Verulam has pressured one Indian landlord to furnish the names and reference book numbers of tenants on his land. Actions by Indian landlords exacerbate ill-feeling between tenants and landlords in the area. Some landlords have appeared in court, and have received suspended sentences. It is reported that the Department has replied to letters of protest from outside groups by saying that they are not responsible for the eviction notices – it is the work of the Indian landowners.

Two Acts have been invoked to prosecute landlords and tenants. First the Prevention of Illegal Squatters Act (1951) was used. Under Section 1(a) of this Act, however, tenants are allowed to live on privately owned land if they have the permission of the landlord. This is the case in RA 33, making many of the tenants legal in terms of this law. The government then began to prosecute landlords and tenants under the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936. In April 1982, 23 people were charged and arrested under this Act, and the landlord prosecuted.

Evictions have also taken place on SADT land in RA 33. In mid-February 1982, 43 notices of eviction were given to families in Khulumane in RA 33. They were told to move by April 1st. The PNAF issued the notices on behalf of the Department of Co-operation and Development who were said to be understaffed. A PNAF official commenting on the evictions said that 'in all probability, what's happening now is that they are picking up people who have moved in over the last few months and telling them to get back to where they came from.' (Daily News, 24-03-82) In fact many of the people given notices have been there for ten years or more, and have employment in Durban. Some people began demolishing their own homes because they were afraid that their houses would be completely destroyed by bulldozers.

On the day of eviction about 100 women picketed the offices of the Verulam magistrate. A deputation headed by Gobine Hlungu, local MP for Khumbula, and J.T. Balu, Khumlu's urban representative, had talks with the magistrate. Discussions between the PFP MP, Ray Searl, and the Department of Co-operation and Development also took place and a reprieve was granted. What emerged subsequently was that the eviction notices had been a mistake. The PNAF had been misled by the Department of Co-operation and Development to provide two officers to carry out a survey of the area. Instead, they served 382 eviction notices between February and April 1982, under instructions from Mr Durandt, Department of Co-operation and Development Commissioner.

Despite this temporary reprieve, no general reprieve has been granted in the area. The Chief Commissioner of Raila has said that 'People who squat in Inanda New Town could expect to be prosecuted 'as and when they are discovered',' (Sunday Tribune, 4-04-82) Land bought by the SADT was for the development of the area and 'much development which will be for the benefit of the entire community, will be negated if we permit further unlawful influx of people onto the land. Action is therefore being taken to prevent squatters from moving onto land which is acquired by the SADT.' (Sunday Tribune, 4-04-82) In a letter to the lawyers of some Shangwane residents, the Commissioner at Verulam stated that 'The residents who are taxpayers of Verulam district have been assured of accommodation by me, but those families of other areas who have moved into the area will have to return to the area from whence they came and put their cases to the authorities in that area. I am unable to assist them.' (letter to V.A. Hlange and Co., 11-03-82)

In early 1983, 19 people on SADT land were prosecuted under the Prevention of Illegal Squatters Act; this case continues. Lawyers for the 19 have been able to postpone the prosecution by raising technical points. One man was acquitted on the grounds that he had not known that the land on which he was living (previously privately owned) had been sold to the SADT. Subsequent to this the Department of Co-operation and Development issued notices to tenants to declare that the land was now owned by the SADT.

Appendix 1. The relocation and housing process

1. Rented shack
2. Apply to DCD site office
3. Application approved if RA 33 resident and KZN citizen
4. Allocated plot
5. D.C truck removes household (no charge) to site
6. Pay R50 for services and R2.60 monthly charge
7. Cents as shelter
8. Purchase OCD boards etc.
9. Build ad hoc (Most residents have not yet beyond this point.)
10. Shack as shelter
11. Apply to Urban Foundation on-site Advice Centre for house
12. First interview – family details, occupation, income, savings, general financial assessment
13. Second interview – discussion and preliminary choice of house type, type matched to site
14. Decision on house type and building method
15. Total savings determined, loan need calculated
16. Starting date estimated
17. Interest rates and monthly payments established
18. Deposit (minimum 10%) paid to Urban Foundation
19. Loan application signed before Commissioner of Oaths
20. Loan application assessed and agreed upon by Residents' Committee
21. Application to DCD
22. Application processed and approved
23. Urban Foundation notified of approval
24. Loan agreement signed and Building assistance Agreement signed
25. House built.

The relocation and housing process: some details

What follows is a description based mainly on Urban Foundation documents. It merely expands on the steps set out above and does not necessarily reflect correctly or accurately the actual implementation of procedures on the ground. However an attempt has been made to fill in the pictures with information from interviews and newspaper articles.

Step 1

This was outlined in the Verulam Magistrate's footnotes of 17th December 1980. In this it is stressed that no-one would be forced to apply. However it does state 'It is an opportunity for people to own land and to build their own houses' (emphasis added).

Further an Urban Foundation document states that:

'From the community it has been understood that the government has asked the people to abandon their original claims, to go to the areas A, B, C. The community has agreed to this and has been encouraged to do so. The government have promised decent housing, but the community has an idea that they will end up in worse conditions than before.'
and C under the impression that a location will be built for them. They were later promised that the government was going to lend them money i.e. in the form of cash, partly as compensation for their original shanties which were abandoned and partly for the construction of their new houses. No details were given as to how much would be given to them to start a new life, and what would happen in the event of default towards the loans. People were promised that they would pay land from the government and having paid the price they would mortgage the plots as security for government loans.  

(Urban Foundation Natal Region, 1980a, 2)

Add much inducements to the immediate experience of two years of severe drought, expensive or spoiled water, endemic typhoid, gastroenteritis and measles, landlords and tribal police, chronic lack of services and facilities, and one gets some idea as to what motivated or forced people to take the first step in ‘voluntary’ relocation.

Step 2
These two ‘filtering’ criteria are stated in the Magistrate’s factsheet. They do not seem to have been strictly applied. ‘Those who want to build are mainly those who are not originally from Amasi/Lamont and Inanda areas.’ This has resulted in the creation of a group who are under threat of further relocation: ‘They are keen to build in order to establish security for themselves so that they may not be moved should they be discovered that they in fact did not qualify to be in the scheme.’

(Urban Foundation Natal Region, 1980a, 2)

This assessment by the Urban Foundation needs to be treated warily since they later make what appears to be a contradictory statement: ‘It is essential that any self-helping project be accompanied by adequate security of tenure for participants as it is only once tenure has been assured that personal investment by participants in the dwelling is encouraged.’

(Urban Foundation Natal Region, 1980a, 8)

From the other Urban Foundation sources it is understood that the ethnocentric or homelands citizenship criterion was also not strictly applied and that an (unknown) number of non-Khambula citizens managed to obtain sites. They are (or possibly were) detected at the loan application processing stage, by the Department of Cooperation and Development.

(See steps 17, 18 for further details.)

Step 3
It is not known on what basis a particular plot or site is allocated, nor whether the resident has the opportunity to influence the allocation in any way. The sites are approximately 20 x 15 m.

Step 4
At this stage in the process the Department of Cooperation and Development made what appears to have been a mistake – they did not demolish the shack being erected. No ‘pointed number on the door’ system was used. Further, one (unsubstantiated) report indicates that the landlords devised a strategy to ensure that demolition did not take place. On hearing that a tenant had applied for a site in the scheme, the landlord would evict the tenant. The 50 truck would then arrive to find the household and their possessions sitting at the nearest roadside, their rented shack already re-let and occupied.

Step 5 & 6
The R10 was once only charge for services and the monthly charge of R2,60 covers site rental. On arrival the first wave of relocatees appear to have been faced with the confusing situation described in step 1 above. Then, ‘they were told to build nothing permanent except mudholing until some time in January when the government would either be giving them cash as loans, or building the promised houses, or compensating them for

loss of their shanties.’

(Urban Foundation Natal Region, November 1980a, 2)

Step 7
According to Urban Foundation sources, the supply of CBD boards to the area was initially done by Indian entrepreneurs. They sold these at about R10 a sheet. They obtained them from a timber company, Macrall. Macrall have a contract for the boards with Motor Assemblies at Prospect. The Urban Foundation went in hired trucks to the timber yards to buy large quantities and sell those to the residents of the scheme, at cost (transport and labour included). The Urban Foundation were able to sell these at about R3,00 per sheet. At these rates a one room structure would cost R50,00.

However, Rogers Ngobo tells a different story. At a public meeting held at Inanda Soccer Field on 15 March 1981, he maintained that:

When I complained that our people have been robbed by the Indians who sold them wooden material charging them R100 with one lond (maul yehlo) that Urban Foundation said – I left it for the Magistrate because he has tried and failed, he hit until he stopped, he has stopped since (?) Now the Urban Foundation says to me and this committee of mine, (the Liaison Committee) and this committee now Mr Ngobo I am now going to find a way of making wood material available to your people for R5. As time went on I discovered that this was a big lie. (Ah! yeho!) Do you ever get a wood material for R5? Nah... Nah... (a big noise from the people).

Come to me and I will come to you. And listen carefully. The bone of contention is that I do not want the people to be played games that it is the story. The story goes that you buy wood material with R10,00 each to R15,00 each (maul ... ) from each lond. Each lond has 20 to 30 wood materials. If you buy each for R10 or R15 then how much is that lond? It is R250,00. Is it that they want to reach from the sweat of the people.

(Transcript of Public Meeting, 15.03.81)

Shortly after this meeting the Urban Foundation’s new site manager took the decision to discontinue the supply of this building material.

It is difficult to lend much credence to Ngobo’s allegations. However he appeared to stir up resentment against the Urban Foundation and its decision was probably a tactical retreat from a conflict area.

Step 8 & 9
We have not been able to find any minimum building standards laid down for the erection of shacks on the scheme. However, it appears that the Urban Foundation had some minimum standards prior to the relocation of the first residents. After the first public meeting of Sunday 13th July, 1980, called by Purvis, the Victory Settlement Committee, the Urban Foundation Natal Region Director, in an interview with the Daily News, said:

Among the advantages of the scheme are: low income families have an intermediate stage between the umnhayi, fire-prone shack in a squatter settlement and an expensive permanent home which is initially beyond their means.

(Daily News, 15.07.80)

Of the 2 800 sites occupied by July 1981, under 100 had the formal Urban Foundation house erected on them. An additional 100 had filled housing applications. Most of the remaining residents sheltered in mudholing.

Step 10
The Urban Foundation has an on-site Advice and Technical Services Centre. It is comprised of two main sections – the Building Division and the Liaison Division. It is to the latter that the relocatees must apply for a house. From this stage on we have to rely on the formal description of the Urban Foundation documents. To date we have
not undertaken an investigation of this phase and aspects of the relocation process. Therefore we have not been able to assess the implementability of the process nor to quantify the time-cost this has meant for the relocation process.

However Figures have publically voiced the feelings of some, at least, of the relocated.

They say so the Urban Foundation that you cannot build here - you cannot build here, if you have not opened a file with them. Where does the Urban Foundation get such a right from that you cannot build if you have not opened a file with them? You must open a file with them, it is necessary that you open a file with them. If you are able to build yourself you must, of necessity, surrender your plan to them eh... then, then they can open a file at their own sweet time, if and when they want to. How do they assume such power? Who conferred such powers to them? And I say now to you if you have a plan that was issued by them, or if you have a plan of your own you have a right to build yourself even if... we even discuss this at Ulundi and we said to them if a person wants to build and he has come up with his plan, you must allow him according to his financial ability to build one room. He can add another second room, allow him to add the third one and the fourth one until he finishes building an eight room house, according to his ability. (Transcript, Public Meeting, 19.01.81)

Stage 11

The applicant must produce the original receipt issued by the Township Manager for payment of the site and 'should also have some proof of the number of the site'. During this interview or screening the following is collected: the plot holder's district of origin, family composition, occupation, address of present employer (so that he or she can be contacted if necessary to assist the applicant financially). income, fixed monthly repayments, savings, mortgageable assets, insurance policies.

The interviewer from the Linesion Division is required to make a 'General Financial and Family Assessment' at the end of the interview. These involve the interviewer's 'general impressions with regard to family structure, job stability and income... any... impressions that may help to clarify his (applicant's) ability to save and repay, and which may affect his choice of house type.' (Urban Foundation Natal Region, 1980a, 3)

Stage 12

House types available to the applicant are discussed and a preliminary choice is made. Only at this point is an assessment made as to whether the site allocated to the relocates suits his or her desired housing requirements - i.e. the size and gradient of the site. If there are problems the interview is suspended, the Linesion Division requests the Building section to carry out an on-site inspection. The latter must report back within two days on the suitability of house types for the site. The applicant and the interviewer then decide on a suitable house type. The document gives no indication as to what should be done if the site is unsuitable for the applicant's requirements, nor does it indicate what is to be done if any constraints then impose extra building costs which the applicant cannot afford.

Stages 11 and 12 would best have been carried out prior to stage 3. This is further indication of the role of 'sort out the chaos' resulting from the removals that the Urban Foundation has been forced into.

At this stage the interviewer informs the applicant that he/she has any building materials that he/she wishes to use, then the Urban Foundation will not undertake this

phase of construction but will merely supervise.

Stages 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17

These are carried out during the second interview. The maximum loan is arrived at by deducting the applicant's total savings from the value of the house type chosen. The minimum deposit required is R100. If there is a shortfall between the deposit lodged, the loan and actual costs the applicant can at this stage apply to the Building section for employment as a 'sweat equity' worker.

The interest rates on the loan and the applicant's monthly payments are calculated. Interest rates are very low and vary according to income level:

   0 - R150 per month = 6%  
   R151 - R250 = 3,5%  
   R251 - R350 = 5%  
   More than R350 = applicants referred to the EDC.

The loan is repayable over 30 years. The following tables are from the Urban Foundation's document 'Conditions of Building Assistance'.

1. APPROXIMATE MINIMUM MONTHLY LOAN REPAYMENT OVER 30 YEARS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPTION</th>
<th>DEPOSIT</th>
<th>LOAN</th>
<th>1%</th>
<th>3%</th>
<th>5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>R250</td>
<td>R250</td>
<td>R30,08</td>
<td>R11,13</td>
<td>R3,66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>6,46</td>
<td>9,97</td>
<td>10,85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4,05</td>
<td>6,80</td>
<td>8,44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,43</td>
<td>6,40</td>
<td>7,43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,43</td>
<td>3,40</td>
<td>4,07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,62</td>
<td>2,27</td>
<td>2,72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. RECOMMENDED MINIMUM MONTHLY LOAN REPAYMENT OVER 30 YEARS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPTION</th>
<th>DEPOSIT</th>
<th>LOAN</th>
<th>1%</th>
<th>3%</th>
<th>5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>R250</td>
<td>R250</td>
<td>R30,00</td>
<td>R11,00</td>
<td>R3,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>6,00</td>
<td>9,00</td>
<td>10,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4,00</td>
<td>6,00</td>
<td>7,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,00</td>
<td>4,00</td>
<td>5,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,00</td>
<td>3,00</td>
<td>4,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This allows for approximately 20% extra which will serve as an insurance in case of default. The above is of course the formal description based on Urban Foundation documents. The reality is somewhat different - the scheme has not provided permanent houses for the majority of its residents to date.

Stage 18 and 19

These involve filling in the loan application form and signing it before the Commissioner of Oaths. The Urban Foundation has laid down a number of prerequisites for loan applications.

Other sources of finance are to be determined. Loans are to be regarded as a 'last resort' after other finance possibilities have been exhausted. (Urban Foundation, undated memo, 7)

Great stress is laid on involving the applicant's employer in the financing of the house. The obvious dangers here are those of increasing the applicant's dependence on the employer. This would limit the applicant's ability to participate in industrial action and to enjoy job mobility. The Urban Foundation recommends that the employer
be supplied with a project information sheet and 'where possible in marginal casesrgress' to be put on employers for provision of the deposit.' (Urban Foundation, undated minute, 7)

An other prerequisite is that the full deposit must be paid to the Urban Foundation at the time of application. This has in practice proved to be a point of conflict. Rogers Ngobo gives his view:

'Now about the Urban Foundation I would like to explain this to you. It said to us, Liaison Committee, you people will pay a deposit of N100 (coles, clapping of hands and yeho! yeho!) What are we quarrelling about? It is the deposit of N100 which have been paid by our people some of whom are amongst you say that they have already paid N500 deposit. Some of them have already paid N500 deposit (yeho! yeho!) do you want me to agree to this and wait this deposit in for (yeho! yeho!) And I am asking now where does this new story come from which you are now doing which is unknown to us and the community. Are you suggesting that our community is a heap of earth, no! They are not a heap of earth the people can breathe, can see, can think.' (Transcript, Meeting, 19.03.81)

Ngobo does appear to articulate the doubts and suspicions of the residents on this point. Presumably this indicates that there was a long time delay between submission of the loan application and commencement of building. This conflict further confirms the strange level of distrust and suspicion about the Urban Foundation and its role within the project, at least in early 1981.

On the form applicants have to fill in their KwaZulu identity number or indicate that they have applied to KwaZulu for citizenship. As to the latter option the Urban Foundation document adds in a footnote:

'It is unclear at the present stage exactly how the Department will play this one. It is felt that provided application for citizenship has been lodged and the applicant can give some assurance that it has been, then there is likelihood that the Department will accept the application.' (Urban Foundation Natal Region, 1980, 8)

Our information to date indicates that the Urban Foundation was wrong. It appears that only KwaZulu citizens are having their loan applications considered. This point also indicates the role the Urban Foundation is playing in assisting the State in the implementation of its ethnic bantustan policy.

On completing the loan application form, the applicant must sign it before a Commissioner of Oaths. The Township Manager, 3 km from the Urban Foundation Advice Centre, is the nearest Commissioner during weekdays. The next nearest is the police station at Eswatini.

Step 20

Every week or two a representative of the Liaison Committee must meet with representatives of the Residents' Committee to agree on the loan applications being processed. A representative of the Residents' Committee must sign each application before it is submitted to the Department. (Urban Foundation Natal Region, undated minute, 10)

The reasoning behind this procedure, whether it has in fact been implemented and if not how successfully, is not known. Whilst being to be a democratic procedure, it would depend on the democratic nature of the Residents' Committee. Elections for the committee were supervised by Puria, the magistrate and the percentage poll and voting procedures are not known. An Urban Foundation source indicated that they were a little uncertain as to how representative the committee was.

Step 23 and 24

The loan application is then sent to the Urban Foundation Durban office. There it is copied and checked and sent to the Department of Co-operation and Development. Nothing is known of the Department of Co-operation and Development processing and approval procedure nor the time it takes. We also do not have figures as to how many loans have been rejected.

Step 25

When the loan is approved, the Urban Foundation is notified and its Planning Coordinator arranges with the Commissioner at SABC for signing of the loan agreements. The applicant must have with his/her identity documents and the site allocation papers.

Step 26

The house is then built according to the Building Assistance Agreement i.e. either completely or partially by the Urban Foundation - and the applicant is able to occupy a shelter that meets most of the standards of formal sector housing. However until recently there were very few other aspects which might constitute a community - schools, leisure and sports facilities and community services of all types, including post office, telephones, police station, community hall etc. Fitted water to standpipes, pit latrines, plots and roads are the contribution of the State. Partial attempts at some minimum standard housing are being made by the Urban Foundation.

The position of those on the site and service scheme who do not have Urban Foundation houses is insecure. All that has happened is that the Department of Co-operation and Development and the Urban Foundation have transferred chunks from landlord areas to SABC land. Whilst it is a far more controllable settlement, it is equally liable to degenerate into a slum. In order to prevent this the authorities will have to set certain minimum housing standards and force all residents to meet these or move. According to the Urban Foundation, the majority of the residents have an income of less than N150 per month, the possibility of further relocations out of the scheme is a real one.
Eight more Inanda homes demolished

The Mercury Reporter in its issue dated 17th November 1981, reported on the demolishment of homes in the sprawling Inanda township. Another eight homes were destroyed yesterday — bringing the total demolished to over 100 in nearly 30 days.

Mr. Albert Nimbala, a resident, told the Mercury yesterday, that in each case all the tenants from the demolished shacks had been notified and the owners were aware that they faced prosecution if they failed to remove the property. He further added that the owners were given a week to remove the property.

Mr. Zuma, the local magistrate, said the residents were angry that the authorities had not given them a fair hearing. He added that the residents were not given a chance to present their case before the eviction order was issued.

The booklet stated that the residents had been given a week to remove the property, but that they were not given a chance to present their case before the eviction order was issued. The residents had been given a week to remove the property, but that they were not given a chance to present their case before the eviction order was issued.

In terms of the Health and the Government by law, we have been asked to give you notice to vacate from our land by the end of December 1981.

In order to avoid any demolition by the government authorities, please find alternate sites given by the Department and build your house.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

Appendix 3. Landlord's eviction notice

Estate Late Ramdarie
Farmers and General Dealers

88 Swan Road, Durban North 4051

16/11/81

Dear

In terms of the Health and the Government by law, we have been asked to give you notice to vacate from our land by the end of December 1981.

In order to avoid any demolition by the government authorities, please find alternate sites given by the Department and build your house.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]
Appendix 4. Letter from Magistrate, Verulam

KANTOOR VAN DIE-OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER VERULAM
P.O. Box 21
Verulam
11 MART 1982.

Madlulela V.J. Isengor & Co
Suite 303 Durban Centre
19 Victoria Street
DURBAN
1980

LEGAL DRAWINGS RESTRICTED ON SUB 1 OF G AND SUB 2 OF H OF THE FARM PEERING HILL no 994 DISTRICT OF ILALOA

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter TV/25/21699 a letter of similar vein has been passed to me by the Durban Port Natal Administration Board, Stamer for attention. The land has been acquired by the S.A. Development Trust and a takeover took place in July 1981, at which time the residents were made aware of this fact from the Isengor, KwaZulu of the S.A. Trust who listed all the families on the property and handed them in at my office. The residents who are taxpayers of Verulam district have been assured of alternative accommodation by me, but these facilities of other areas are not able to move into the area cannot be realized and will have to return to the areas from whence they came and put their cases to the authorities in the area. I am unable to assist them.

The employment position is no concern of mine at all, as every person is registered employment assured the labour officer, Durban that he or she had approval accommodation in either Isla Nasha and Mzambe or the other residential areas such as Unalot, Coetzeriville, Entebivate and the hostels. Those people must return to such approved accommodation described above or that which was assured by the employer on his premises and return their families to the areas where they were not unlawfully occupying. Failing this, I will have to complain to the authority that they are squatting in my area and this could result in hardship.

Due to staff problems I have learned officially from the Port Natal Administration Board to warn all people in the area and explain the position to them. According to plans in my possession the State has other ideas about the use of this land and the extension of time sought cannot be entertained.

417

TWO OTHER RURAL RELOCATION SITES

This chapter describes more briefly two other rural relocation sites in Natal/Kwazulu. The two places are:

1) Emakhosini
2) Bilanyoni

Household surveys were not carried out in these areas. The description is thus impressionistic rather than statistically quantified. Both places were visited once, in 1980.

I. Emakhosini

Emakhosini is a very small relocation settlement that was established in the early 1960s on a Trust farm in the Mtamjane district and it differs in some important respects from later relocation places. It is clearly visible from the new Mkhomasho/ Vryheid road, a few kilometres past the Umbilo turnoff as one travels towards Vryheid, on the left hand side of the road; a ragged grouping of an estimated 50 households set on a dry, thorn-covered hillside. When HF visited there in July 1980 the severe drought then ravaging northern Kwazulu was at its height and its effects were clearly visible in the community. Visually it was one of the most depressed looking places we had yet visited in Natal, very dry, with empty, sandy fields lying exposed to the sun and listless children, many of them with clear signs of malnutrition: orange-red hair and pot-bellies.

Emakhosini is one of several relocation areas developed on Trust farms in the Mkhomasho/ Dambanayi area to accommodate surplus farm workers in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Others are Isingelawu and Nqumasho. Like these, it is not a standard closer settlement type relocation area since there is some agricultural land attached to the settlement and the first settlers were allocated fields of about 2 acres each. The settlement started in the early 1960s with an influx of labour tenants who had been evicted from their homes on white farms in the Mkhomasho area. This was before the period of mass evictions of labour tenants and before the 1967 guidelines for relocation of people had been formulated by the government. It appears that the farm on which Emakhosini is established had already been acquired by the Trust and evictions were allowed to move onto it, with their stock. Although not a betterment settlement as such, it was a Trust farm and thus settlement was planned on a betterment basis, with the residential sites grouped together apart from the agricultural land. Except for this basic division of the land into residential and agricultural sections, there were no other provisions made for those moving in: no water, no sanitation, no tents. Since that time there has been a steady trickle of households into the settlement, almost if not all from surrounding farms. Conditions have not improved very much.
Although our informant at Emakhasini did not appear to be aware of it, the settlement is
under a further threat of removal, since the 1975 consolidation plans call for the ex-
cision of all the Trust land bordering on the western side of the Vryheid/Keimoes road.
However, very recently, the central government has indicated that this proposed excision
may be waived if the Ingwavuma/Demsiland land deal goes through — that the area may,
along with several other areas earmarked for excision from Emakhulu in 1975, be retained
by Emakhulu in 'compensation' for the loss of Ingwavuma. (S. daily Witness, 19.06.82)
Whether this will materialize or not remains to be seen.

PRESENT FACILITIES

Despite the length of time the community has existed facilities are extremely rudimen-
tary. Until very recently the only water supply was the nearby river but in 1980
a windmill and 3 tanks were installed — possibly in response to the drought. For fuel
people rely mainly on wood gathered in the surrounding area — this is a rapidly
wasting resource. Sanitation is an individual matter and it appears that most
households do not have latrines. There is a primary school — 2 to 3 classrooms — and
a mobile clinic visits the community once a week. There is also one shop, with
a limited range of goods and, as would be expected, prices are high. There are daily
bus connections to Keimoes, Wahlabathini and Vryheid but transport costs are high:
the single ticket to Keimoes costs R1 in 1980 and is probably more by now; a single fare
to Vryheid was R2,30. Although Emakhasini is now located next to a major and very
modern road, it is still isolated from the urban-industrial network that that road
serves by its distance from town and its poverty.

LAND

As already mentioned, the first families to be moved into Emakhasini were allocated
fields — about 2 acres each. All the available land has been exhausted by now,
however, and more recent incomers do not get agricultural land of their own. Land
is clearly a prize, but without capital and help by the drought, landholders
struggle to produce any yield. There is no water for irrigation purposes so dry-
land farming only can be practiced. There are no restrictions on cattle ownership,
up to a maximum of 15 head per household, but, again, grazing is limited and of a
very poor quality. What exemplified for SPP the crisis situation being faced by
stock owners in 1980 was the sight of a cow trying to graze a prickly pear bush
that was growing out of the sand at the corner of one of the residential sites. The severe
drought of 1980/81 has, however, only exacerbated an already bleak situation; it
has not caused it.

Although the exact status of the land on which the community is established is not
clear, it is administered by Emakhulu and falls under a chief/induna system of local
government. The chief does not live there himself but in the nearby reserve area;
one of his indunas lives on the spot. It is the induna, in conjunction with an
agricultural extension officer from Emakhulu, who oversees the allocation of land
and the collection of rents. Residential plots, measuring approximately 70 x 50
paces, cost R1 a year; fields R2 a year.

EMPLOYMENT

In a single visit it was impossible for SPP to gather hard statistics on employment
figures but we did get some impressions. There is little local employment
and the community depends on migrant labour — to Johannesburg and Durban mainly.
In 1980 workseekers tended to bypass the labour bureau system, going out to get
jobs by themselves or through the network supplied by families and friends and
only registering jobs with the bureau once found. With the tougher regulations
on employment of 'illegal' this may have changed now. SPP was told that unemploy-
ment is high; how high we could not establish. Our main informant was an elderly,
frail man with 3 sons working in Johannesburg: he reported that they sent 'a little'
money home to support him, his wife, his youngest son and the 5 grandchildren who lived
with them.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

The only organizations mentioned to SPP were churches — many Zuluist sects — and the
distinct tribal structure of chief and councillors. At first our informant was very
reluctant to discuss problems encountered by the inhabitants of the place but eventually
he relaxed sufficiently to list several. His preoccupation was with land, or the lack of
it. The main problems, in his view, were:

- the fuel shortages which is getting steadily worse; people are driven
to steal wood from neighbouring white farms, but this is risky since
if they are caught, they are fined;
- insufficient grazing which leads to stock straying onto white farms;
- if caught they are impounded and securing their release is a costly
business for the owner;
- the overcrowded, township-style living arrangement which is unfamiliar
and leads to friction among neighbours;
- insufficient agricultural land for all.

Depressed, isolated, impoverished and bypassed — but Emakhasini is not unique in its
problems. There are countless other rural communities like it. It was, however, one
of the more extreme examples of a forgotten dumping ground that SPP visited in KwaZul.

2. Bilanyoni

Bilanyoni is a large township that was established in 1970 some 30 kilometres from
Pospelzbergreuth along the Pietermaritzburg road. It is extremely isolated and despite
its size — now 18 000 people (Hansard, Question 15, 20.08.82) — few people outside
of its immediate environs have heard of it. It thus represents a particularly
dramatic example of a large-scale relocation that has been successfully hidden
from the world. It is situated on one of several Trust farms which were acquired by the
SADF some time ago, in the late 1950s or early 1960s. (A top-on-sandel map of
1962 shows the area as already released.) A string of informal relocation com-
munites extends across the adjoining Trust farms to the east of Bilanyoni itself.

Despite Pretoria's use of this area as a relocation point in the early 1970s, the people
moved or already settled there are under imminent threat of a further re-
location. The 1975 consolidation plans called for the excision of this belt of
Trust land from Emakhulu and in January 1981 this was put into effect, along with
the excision of Reserve Four, the Sodwana Bay triangle and the Drakensberg farms,
by means of Proclamation R19/1981. In answer to a question in Parliament about
these excisions, in April 1982, Dr Kroooof confirmed that removals would take
place in the affected areas. (Hansard, Question 465, 23.04.82.) However, in May
1982 he denied that his Department planned to move Bilanyoni. (Hansard, Question 15,
20.08.85)

His denial does not square with the above facts. Bilanyoni is in the excised
area and it seems improbable that the Department would have gone to the trouble
of excising it and thus transferring this land back to the area set aside for
white occupation, had it not intended to clear it as well as the surrounding Trust
farms of their inhabitants. At what stage this will happen is not known. It does not appear that provisions for an extra 18,000 township people have been made at any of the existing relocation areas in Northern Natal (Nondweni, Nqoolo, Qudeni). In his reply to the question in April 1982 the Minister spoke of compensatory land being acquired in the Nkandla district and it seems that the people from Paulpietersburg will be relocated at a site still to be developed on Trust land in this district - possibly at Menagwadumo, mentioned by the then Chief Commissioner as a proposed relocation site in 1979. (Finansial Nieuw, 6.04.79)

The people of the excised area are not fully aware of these plans, but unsettling rumours of further removals have been circulating in the area since 1976. In 1980, before the excision, one informant told SPP that they had been told they were to be moved to the Nkandla district at some stage, 'but nobody will tell you the truth here'. The news of excision passed most people by. In May 1982 a shopkeeper and prominent local resident at Bilanyoni, having received a copy of the Parliamentary questions and answers concerning the excision of the area from AFRA, replied thanking AFRA for passing on this information to him - it clarified what had been happening and explained for him why the KwaZulu officials had suddenly left. (AFRA correspondence)

OCCUPANTS OF RESIDENTS

Bilanyoni was established primarily to cater for ex-labour tenants who were being evicted in Northern Natal in large numbers in the early 1970s. The first group of people to be moved there came in about 1970, from a former Anglican mission farm called Rivine; they were given temporary tin huts with toilets initially. Thereafter large numbers of people - at times up to 4 lorry loads a day, SPP was told - were moved in, mainly from farms in the neighbouring districts. The inflow of people stopped in about 1974 and since then, presumably because of the consolidation plans for the area, no new households have been accommodated at Bilanyoni.

In addition to the official relocation of people at Bilanyoni, a parallel process of informal relocation was going on around Bilanyoni on the neighbouring Trust farms. Although it seems that there were people already settled on this land, with Chiefs, before the 1970s, the abolition of labour tenancy led to a large influx of new migrants: families that had been evicted off white-owned farms but chose to avoid being relocated in a township situation such as Bilanyoni by seeking private alternatives with the local Chiefs. Their main objection to Bilanyoni, shared by those tenants who ended up there, was that they could not keep livestock: an unacceptable imposition for rural people, which exemplified the generally unfamiliar way of life that a township represented. These private arrangements were not sanctioned by officials, however, and in about 1977 at least one group of these people was arrested by the authorities for being illegal squatters and taken to the closer settlement of Nondweni, near Nyuku.

FACILITIES

Bilanyoni looks like an average location - an incongruous sight, as one approaches it after having driven for about half an hour along dirt roads, at first through white farmland and then through a short stretch of noticeably drier and more barren Trust land. People are now housed in brick, township-style houses arranged in long rows on the side of a hill. Each house has an outside bucket-system toilet - buckets are apparently collected and emptied by the local authorities once a week. Water is piped to tap outlets in the street; approximately ten to fifteen houses are served by one tap. There is no electricity and people depend for their fuel supply on wood and coal, both of which are expensive because of the high cost of transport. Public amenities are very basic but considerably superior to many
other relocation settlements: three shops, a primary and a secondary school, a bottle-
stores, a permanent clinic, a labour office, even a Post Office depot in one of the
shops. There are also twelve telephones in the community, few of them in private
houses.

LOCAL AUTHORITY

In 1980 there was no permanent local authority office at Bilanyoni and the nearest
police station was at Paulpietersburg. At that stage the area was incorporated into
KwaZulu and the local administration overseen by a KwaZulu magistrate who visited the
KwaZulu and the local administration overseeing Bilanyoni once a week. Since the
exclusion (but only after a year, it appears), the administration of the area has reverted to the white magistrate at Paulpietersburg.

EMPLOYMENT

The picture presented to SPF was depressingly familiar. Informants perceived un-
employment as a serious problem, with one man citing that and the general uncertainty
about the future as the two major problems faced by the community. It is not hard
to understand why unemployment should be high. Paulpietersburg, 30 kilometres away
and the nearest town, is a tiny place with no industrial development and very few
openings for jobs. The nearest industrial centre of any note is Newcastle which is
about 180 kilometres away and already served by a huge labour pool in Nkandla,
about 50 kilometres away and already served by a huge labour pool in Nkandla.

Organisers and neighbouring areas. Commercial agriculture in the district is not
Gaiswa and the neighbouring areas. Commercial agriculture in the district is not
labour-intensive - many raise cattle - and generally farmers have all the full-
time labour they need. The people at Bilanyoni in fact represent a surplus labour
force that commercial agriculture deliberately sets aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do
force that commercial agriculture deliberately set aside a decade ago. Farmers do

7. PHOENIX

Phoenix and Newlands East, the township described very briefly in an appendix at the end of this chapter, are both examples of ethnic relocation townships created as a result of the Group Areas Act. Both are urban townships, in Durban, and as such they differ markedly from the rural closer settlements already described. They have been build to house non-African urban, primarily working-class communities. Phoenix was built for Indian people and is located right next to a prime developing industrial area; Newlands East was built for coloured people. While the facilities they offer their residents are inadequate and of an inferior quality, they are of a much higher standard than what is made available in the rural areas of Natal for African people. This disparity reflects the cleavages that are institutionalized in South African society, between urban and rural people and within the black population group, among African, Indian and coloured people.

1. Introduction and background

THE SURVEY

Phoenix is divided into 18 community areas, each of which has been planned for 1 200 - 1 300 units. Each unit is planned to be as self-sufficient as possible with regard to civic, commercial, educational, and recreational requirements. So far 12 community areas have been opened with plans to open 2 more by the end of 1982. The SPF survey undertook a 1 in 20 sample in 2 of these community areas, Clayfield and Greenbush, in August and September 1981. A total of 75 households were interviewed.

INDUSTRIAL LOCATION

Phoenix lies 25 km north of Durban city centre. The township has been built on wind-swept hillside, land formerly under sugar cane and owned by Natal Estates. On approaching Phoenix, one is faced by a mass of semi-detached, terraced and high density cluster houses. This township has been located in such a way as to serve an adjacent industrial area. On the south west border approximately 250 hectares were earmarked in 1969 by the Durban City Council (DCC) for industrial development by the private sector. Sanlam has bought this area and is in the process of erecting 10 mini-factories for lease. The project at present is running 2 years ahead of schedule. Phase one of the industrial park cost Sanlam approximately R5 000 000 to develop. Phase two began towards the end of 1980 and development of the next phase is expected to begin towards the end of 1982. Prices for sites are R225 000 a hectare without rail service and R325 000 with rail service. Early in 1982 Coca-Cola bought 7.2 hectares at the industrial park for R1.7 million. According to a Sunday Tribune reporter this must rank as one of Durban's biggest industrial land sales. (Sunday Tribune, 21.01.82) The first phase of this development will cost about R3 million, and it is scheduled for completion by the end.
of 1981. With the Coca-Cola deal, more than one third of the total salesable area at the industrial park has been taken up. Development costs so far have been greater than $70 million and could treble before the park is fully sold out within a planned 8-year period. Buyers at Phoenix thus far include Barlow's, Metro Cash and Carry, and Sigma and Lester.

The Post Office has very recently (February 1981) bought a four-acre site in Durban for $4.8 million. The demand for industrial land at Phoenix is heavy and this trend is likely to continue.

Origins of Residents

The development of Phoenix township was planned in 1966 by the DCO when Group Areas removals in the city were getting under way. The plan envisaged the construction of 22 000 housing units to accommodate some 150 000 people. Construction of the housing schemes began in 1975 and the first people moved in in 1976. Unfortunately, 41 of the households interviewed by SFP did not supply the year of their arrival. Of those who did, the biggest group (35%) arrived in 1978, with 19% having arrived in the early 1970s. By March 1978 and by 1980 only a few households in the survey were moving in.

The total population stood at 35 000 and the original plans had been boosted to a projected 220 000 people.

Phoenix is a creation of the Group Areas Act. Indian families were moved there, mainly from "affected areas" in terms of the Group Areas and Slum Clearance Acts in and around the Durban metropolitan area. In the SFP survey 68 of the 111 households for whom this information is available, came from various parts of Durban. They represent 76% of the total.

The next largest category were 20 households who had moved from Indian freehold land mainly on the outskirts of the Greater Durban area. Of the remainder, 2 came from a small town, 2 from a white farm and 1 from Trust land.

A few households in the SFP survey were previously living in Springfield Plate, in the fluvial area of the Umgeni River, and a further 12 were living in Tin Town, a temporary emergency camp which was situated alongside Springfield Plate. At the beginning of the century the area was largely occupied by Indian market gardeners who leased their land from the Corporation. (The area has now been declared a light industrial area.) Tin Town was established in 1959 by the DCO to house, in temporary accommodation, illegal Indian shacks dwellers who had been moved as a result of the enforcement of health measures. After the Group Areas Act came into operation in the 1960s many more families moved into Tin Town, as Chatsworth, the then major Indian township to the south of Durban, was unable to enter for the vast numbers being removed in terms of the Act.

The understanding was that those who went to Tin Town would receive priority in the allocation of housing in Chatsworth. As Tin Town would receive more people, it became evident that Tin Town would more and more people were displaced, however, it became evident that Tin Town would be more and more people were displaced. A survey done by Masendor and Pillay in 1977 found Tin Town to be a "relatively low income area by Durban Indian standar". (Masendor and Pillay, 1977, 11) Families were reluctant to be moved to Chatsworth as this would involve an increase in rent and transport costs.

In March 1976 the Umgeni River flooded its banks and many Tin Town families had to be evacuated and moved to temporary accommodation at Springfield Plate. As a result of this housing programme at Phoenix was speeded up with the aid of R6.3 million allocated from the National Housing Commission. Families from Tin Town were given priority in the Phoenix housing schemes.

A significant number of families surveyed by SFP (14%) came from New Farm, Indian-owned land which was expropriated by the Department of Community Development for the development of Phoenix. New Farm was an important sugar growing region and the Indian farmers also grew fruit and vegetables. Over the years their holdings became fragmented into uneconomic farming units. Household income had decreased and move more from sources other than farming. During recent years, therefore, many landlords were only too keen to rent the land for housing purposes. This process was particularly rapid from the 1970s onwards as a result of the vast housing shortage for Indians in Durban. According to research carried out by Masendor and Pillay (1978, 16) 36% of the people living at New Farm in the 1970s had moved there after having been evicted in terms of the Group Areas Act. Accommodation costs were low at New Farm, the common site rental being R30 per annum and it is significant that the main reason given amongst the sample in Masendor and Pillay's survey for not wanting to move to Phoenix was the high rental they would have to pay there. All residents had been moved from New Farm by the end of 1975. Landowners were compensated, but tenants were not.

Eight families in the SFP sample arrived from Chatsworth, the older Indian Group Areas township in Durban established in 1962/63. A number of these families were probably people living either in outbuildings in Chatsworth or in very overcrowded conditions because of the shortage of housing there. A further 21 families came from Overport, Nyxville and Sydenham, residential areas close to the city centre. Most of these families had been affected by the Group Areas Act when their areas were declared white.

A few families came from the centre of Durban, from Greyville and Lorne Street. They were forced to move as a result of slum clearance. Because of the acute shortage of accommodation for Indians in the central area, these people had little option but to move to Phoenix. Eight families arrived from Clairwood, a mixed residential and light industrial area which the DCO has been attempting since 1975 to have rezoned as an industrial area for whites. Two families arrived from Sea Cow Lake, previously a market garden area alongside the Umgeni River.

Only one family arrived from Greenwood Park and one from Rivervale Hills, both fairly affluent areas.

This corresponds with the almost total lack of professional people in the sample. The majority of people arrived at Phoenix from poor and working class areas, this accounting for the large number of semi- and unskilled workers among the sample population. Only 10% of the SFP sample had owned their previous dwellings. 87% had rented them — about two thirds of them from private landlords and one third from the local authorities. The remaining 3% of the sample reported that they had occupied their previous dwellings free of charge. The majority had come from residentially stable backgrounds — 62 of the 111 families surveyed had lived in their previous place for 10 years or more. 24 of the families or 20% had lived in their previous houses for between 21 and 50 years. However another 20% had only lived at their previous place for between 0 and 4 years. The survey does not indicate to what extent this latter group of people had previously been forced to move as a result of the Group Areas Act or slum clearance. 11% of the sample had attempted to stay in their previous places, by putting up some form of resistance, but to no avail. Of a total of 122 families for whom this information is available, 14 had received compensation for their previous dwellings and 98 had not, chiefly because they had not owned the houses.
Table 1, Phoenix. LENGTH OF TIME PEOPLE LIVED AT PREVIOUS PLACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF YEARS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41+</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years not stated</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE REMOVALS

Removals to Phoenix were and are conducted in a very different manner from those removals taking place in the rural areas. People were not removed by direct force but given a period of notice during which they could look for alternative accommodation. Because of the shortage of housing, however, most people had no alternative but to go to Phoenix. 28 of the families interviewed by SFP said they had moved to Phoenix of their own volition, 44 said they were evicted and decided to move there and 42 families said they were evicted and then removed. Since they were not moved by GO trucks, they probably moved by this that they were compelled to go to where no one else was open to them.

On arrival at Phoenix the majority of households were provided with water and latrines in their houses. 65% were provided with electricity only after they had moved in. There were some roads and buses but very few taxis. Shops were few and far between and schools were only established in 1978. Churches, temples and mosques were not built at the beginning and a public clinic was only opened in 1980. 43% of households interviewed said they paid a lump sum for their house. This can be interpreted as a deposit on buying a house, but it seems more likely that most of these lump sums refer to deposits on rent and electricity as only 15% of the sample have bought or are buying their houses. All rent is paid to the DCC. Each community area has a combination of sub, economic and houses for sale. In order to pay a house, residents need to pay a deposit and continue paying instalments which amount to about the same as paying rent. Rents are fixed on a sliding scale, according to income. In October 1981 average rent was calculated to be R52,94 with lights etc. costing a further R20,15 - thus R73,19 total on average. (Information supplied by CNO.) In February 1982 rents were increased. High rentals (in relation to income earned) have been a major source of discontent and community organisation within Phoenix.

COMMUNITY ISSUES

Attempt to exile Phoenix from DCC jurisdiction, 1978

The area in which Phoenix is situated was initially outside of the area of jurisdiction of the DCC, within the magisterial area of Pinlana. Once the scheme had been planned, arrangements were made for Phoenix to be incorporated into the Durban municipality. On 13th April 1978, however, the DCC published a notice in the Provincial Gazette stating it had made application to the Administrator of Natal to exise Phoenix from the city of Durban, largely, it would seem, to save the Council money.

Once the residents of Phoenix became aware of the threat of being exised they began to mobilise around the issue. Mass meetings were held in 1978 and petitions stating the residents' aversion to autonomy were signed. Mobilisation around this and other issues necessitated the development of a community organisation, the Phoenix Working Committee (PWC). Each community area in Phoenix has its own residents' association and from these representatives were chosen to sit on the PWC. As Phoenix has no Local Affairs Committee to represent it on the DCC (because of opposition to such a body) PWC has made a number of representations to the DCC although they are not officially recognised by it. The SFP survey found a fair amount of support for the PWC amongst the residents interviewed.

The autonomy of Phoenix would have meant an increase in rent and rates as well as a 10% rise in electricity as the DCC adds 10% surcharge to electricity it sells to areas outside the Durban municipality. It would also have involved the provision of community facilities by the autonomous local authority. In May 1978 an anti autonomy week, organised by the PWC, attracted police attention.

Many organisations and individuals lodged letters and memoranda objecting to autonomy for Phoenix. Amongst these bodies were the PWC, Black Sash and National Council for Women. PWC outlined the following grounds on which it objected to autonomy:

1. The proposed secession is on racial lines and implements the policy of apartheid and is therefore objectionable in principle.

2. The City Council's proposals are against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the residents of Phoenix.

3. There has been no prior consultation by the Durban City Council on the issue with the residents of Phoenix.

4. The proposed secession will further impoverish an already poor community.

5. The secession at present proposed by the Durban City Council is premature.

As a result of the overwhelming objection, on 5th August 1978 the appointment of a Board of Enquiry into the autonomy issue was announced in the press. By August 1979, after the Board had carried out a full investigation, the DCC decided to allow Phoenix to remain within the Durban municipality.

HOUSING STANDARDS AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES

At about the same time as the Phoenix autonomy issue, another issue was arising - the housing tender debate which concerned the lowering of housing building standards. There were charges that a tenderer was attempting to lower building standards with an alternative plan he had submitted for a new Phoenix contract. Although the allegations proved unfounded, they did highlight problems in tender procedures and the system has since been altered so that the only tenderers accepted are those that conform with the City Engineer's specifications. (Satala Survey, 20.07.78) In July 1978, the PWC asked the DCC not to accept the next tender without prior consultation with the people of Phoenix.

In February 1979 the lack of schools and transport in Phoenix became a focal area; from the SFP survey in 1981, it can be seen that transport still remains a major problem for most residents. Soon after this and before the autonomy issue had been finalised, a statement in the Daily News (14.03.79) claimed that poverty in Phoenix was reaching crisis proportions and local civic leaders were planning to take the issue up with the Minister of Indian Affairs. In April 1979 a protest over the lack of amenities took place. Telegrams were sent to the DCC and the Department of Indian Affairs.

The Rents issue

In Phoenix there is no subsidy on housing - the selling price of houses and the rents are levied at levels to recover all costs. In March 1980 the DCC announced
proposed rent increases and in April a large group of women marched to the DCC in protest over the proposed rent increases. The Sunday Tribune (27.04.80) reported that Phoenix could become a ghost town if rents increased, as residents were prepared to return to squatting rather than stay.

In May 1980, the Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC) was formed by various organisations to deal with the numerous problems associated with black housing in Durban. The DHAC was formed to co-ordinate the activities of the various residents' associations, which represent people living in municipal housing schemes in different areas in Durban.

It arose in response to a need being felt by these associations for greater unity and co-ordination of work on certain issues. In September 1980 DHAC presented a memorandum to the DCC stating that Durban's housing schemes have been plagued by high rentals from their inception, in particular those at Sydenham Heights, Phoenix and Nelslands East. The memorandum gave four reasons for this:

1. It seems that a price higher than the market value was paid for the land.
2. The choice of land was poor: 90% of land in Phoenix is unusable for the construction of houses.
3. Construction costs were high, compounded by the presence of coal in large proportions.
4. National and local policy in financing housing schemes are inadequate – the only form of State subsidy is the provision of loans at a high interest rate. The municipality makes an absolutely minimal contribution to the operations of all schemes and attempts to recover all costs. (DHAC, 1980)

After much protest about the proposed rent increases in November 1980, the residents gained a victory when the DCC deferred rent increases for 4 months. By January 1981 Phoenix residents were in arrears with their rent and 1 000 were living without electricity. (Post, 14.01.81) In March 1981 when the proposed rent increases were to take place, a massive rent boycott was organised. 2 000 households refused to pay March rents. The boycott initially received widespread support and mobilised residents around the rent issue. After a period, however, residents began withdrawing from the intense struggle. The boycott did not, in fact, succeed in making the DCC defer rent increases and rents went up in March 1981. In October 1981 the DCC announced that rents would go up again as from the 1st January 1982. There has, however, been no mass mobilisation around this issue again, just a few low profile residents' association meetings to discuss the issue. The number of community struggles which have taken place in Phoenix have nevertheless led to an increased politicisation of its people and have nurtured an independent community spirit which has helped to counteract the socially disruptive effects of relocation.

2. Demographic features

POPULATION

In analysing the results of the survey, the population was broken down into permanent residents and commuters, the former being those residents who spend all their time in Phoenix, and the latter those who commute daily to and from Phoenix. School children, old people and women thus predominates in the permanently resident figures. There is a high degree of adult commuting which would be expected – Phoenix is a dormitory township for Durban and there is very little local employment. The results of this demographic analysis illustrated graphically one of the major differences between Phoenix and the other African and rural relocation sites surveyed by SPP – there is no migrant labour at Phoenix. Most of the adults who commute at Phoenix are male.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE IN YEARS</th>
<th>PERMANENT POPULATION</th>
<th>COMMUNER POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male     Female  Total</td>
<td>Male     Female  Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 – 14</td>
<td>162      125     287</td>
<td>0        1       1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 24</td>
<td>45       56      101</td>
<td>34       27      61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – 34</td>
<td>7        21      28</td>
<td>42       8       50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 – 44</td>
<td>7        26      33</td>
<td>35       12      47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 – 64</td>
<td>5        21      26</td>
<td>21       2       23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 plus</td>
<td>3        6       9</td>
<td>0        0       0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>229      285     514</td>
<td>130      50      180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HOUSING COMPOSITION

The majority of households (66% or 576) contain between 5 and 7 members, the average size being a little over 6. As the houses are small and cater only for nuclear families, most people (76% of those households interviewed) live only with their nuclear family. 22 live in extended families, 6 in compound families and 10 in extended – compound families. There were no single member households in the sample and only 2 households of 2 members each. At the other end of the scale there were 8 very large households of 10 or more members – 3 with 10 members, 1 with 11 members, two with 12 and two with 13 members each.

Compared to the rural relocation areas surveyed, the number of female household heads in the survey was very low: only 12 or about 10% of the total. Male dominance within the family is thus far more pronounced in this area than any other surveyed. The female heads were, with one exception, all over 35. Although most of the male heads were over 35 as well, nearly a third were under 35.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 – 24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 – 34</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 – 44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 – 64</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MARRIAGE STATUS

73% of the permanent population in the sample had never been married because most of them were children. 22% were married, 0,196 divorced and 0,6 widowed. In the communter population 36% had never married, 0,6% were married and 26% widowed. The divorce rate seems particularly low compared with the average divorce rate in South Africa. This would seem to be the result not of families having a lower incidence of marital strife (the Child Welfare Society claims that the incidence of family disorganisation has been high in families since their removal to Phoenix) but to various other factors. The women in this area would find it difficult to rely on extended family support because of the lack of accommodation for large families.
should choose to leave their husbands. Financial support is difficult if they do make the choice to leave their husbands as almost all the women in the sample have a low standard of education and their prospects of finding a job would not be good. A

EDUCATION

In the permanent population 75 people (34.6% of the total permanent population) had no education, 59% of these being female. 10% of these were of pre-school age, however, and have thus been eliminated from Table 4 below. The degree of illiteracy is higher among the permanent than the commuter population – whereas 1% of the permanent population in the survey had had no education, only 9% of the commuters had had none. Proportionately the standard of education achieved by the permanent population was lower than that of the commuters. Part of the reason for this is the preponderance of females in the adult population permanently resident. Females have generally been less well educated in the Indian community, a generalisation borne out by the results of the SPP survey. 73.5% of the population 7 years and older without any formal education were female and just over a quarter (25.6%) of the population with a Std 9 education were female and just over a quarter (25.6%) of the population with a Std 9

Table 4, Phoenix. EDUCATION LEVELS OF THE POPULATION 7 YEARS AND OLDER, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>PRESENT</th>
<th>COMMUTER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Primary</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Primary</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Secondary</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std 9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the generally low standard of education – only 39 or 7.3% of those 7 years and older in the sample had attained a senior secondary or higher level of education – the standard is far higher than in the rural areas studied. Nearly 59% of the population of school-going age or older had reached secondary school, even though most of this group were in the lower secondary standards. As one consequence, the percentage of school-going age and semi-skilled workers in the sample was relatively high, far higher than the rural areas surveyed, though comparable to the position in India.

DIET

The results of that part of the survey dealing with diet indicate a generally low level of nutrition in Phoenix, and reinforce the points already made, that this is a poor, working-class community. Most of the households (745) reported that they ate three times a day, but a significant minority ate less than that – 39% twice a day.

6% once a day and 1 household, clearly destitute, reported they ate less regularly than that. Starch and sugar were the basic of the diet. 7% of the households said they ate starch (rice, potatoes etc.) daily, 60% had milk daily, 99% had tea and coffee daily, 96% had sugar daily and 95% had bread daily. Most families did not eat meat but sporadically, with 40% having meat twice a week and 37% fish once a week, while the rest ate meat less frequently. Although the comparison is a crude one with this very general data, the aggregate consumption of protein – meat and milk – is higher in Phoenix than in the other areas surveyed. Nevertheless the information above describes a diet that is inadequate in absolute terms and suggests widespread poverty. These results are borne out by evidence from other sources. In May 1982 the Racial Mercury carried a story reporting on the level of poverty in Phoenix. It noted that according to a survey carried out by the Phoenix Indian Child Welfare Society, 53% of families in 5 Units spent more than a quarter of their income on rent and thus had very little money left for food and clothing. This survey also found that over 50% of the families interviewed were living below the poverty datum line. It noted:

The characteristic low wages of the tenant, high rents, increased transport costs and rising food prices manifest themselves in the under-nourishment of children, a feeling of hopelessness among many families, and eviction. (Racial Mercury, 18.05.82)

3. Economic activity

EMPLOYMENT

The survey did not pick up a precise picture of employment patterns before people moved to Phoenix; these questions caused some confusion and not all aspects were answered satisfactorily. On the available information, there used to be a total of 35 workers across the 115 households before the move to Phoenix. Over half of them (59%) were in industrial jobs – 25% of the total were skilled, 25% semi-skilled and 15% unskilled workers. 15% were in clerical jobs and another 15% in the service industry. Only 2% worked in business, 2% in sales and 2% in farming. This pattern has been retained at Phoenix. There was only one professional person in the sample; semi-skilled industrial workers formed the largest single occupation group (25% of the total), with skilled and unskilled workers the next most significant groups. Clerical and service jobs were also important, together accounting for 27% of the workers in the sample.

An analysis of the sectors in which people worked showed manufacturing as by far the most important, employing over a third of the total employed, followed by service, employing a little less than a quarter, followed by trade employing a little over 10%. Women accounted for only 27% of the total workforce, but the areas in which they worked did not differ substantially in ranking of importance except for an unexpectedly large group of 7 employed in the mining industry. It appears that most of these must have been clerical assistants in a mining firm’s office. The survey population were thus largely blue collar workers, relatively few were white collar workers and almost none were professionals. It is likely that when people were evicted from their previous places, professionals were able to afford to move elsewhere, whereas the relatively unskilled workers could only afford to move to Phoenix. In the permanent population 11% of the sample were self employed, 66% employed by the private sector, and 25% by the public sector. In the commuter population an even greater percentage were employed by the private sector.
### Table 5, Phoenix. EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6, Phoenix. EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical etc.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7, Phoenix. UNEMPLOYMENT BY RESIDENTIAL STATUS

| Employed         | PERMANENT |            |            |                  |            |            |
|                  | M | F | T | M | F | T |          |
|                  | 11 | 179 | 190 |              |            |            |
| Unemployed       | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0%        |
| Total economically active | 11 | 179 | 190 |              |            |            |

Only 0.5% of the sample or 3 households mentioned that they engaged in informal economic activities. In one family the wife of the head gave religious education to children for which she was paid. Another family sold excess fish after a weekend's hobby fishing. None of the families mentioned that they engaged in informal economic activities stated only that they sometimes helped someone else and did not state in what fields. 10% of the sample paid gifts in the form of money, food and clothing as an aid to subsistence. As most of the families came from the city, the questions relating to agriculture were irrelevant.

### 4. Organisation and attitudes

Of the 514 permanent residents involved in the survey, 494 (96%) were not economically active, 42% of them male and 57% female. Most of the group were married and had children or housewives. Only 4% were unemploye. The unemployment rate is 4%.

In their responses to the questions concerning the major differences between Phoenix and their place of origin, problems experienced and improvements they would like to see, respondents raised issues which have long been areas of organization within the community. The one positive improvement noted between Phoenix and their places of origin for many was the existence of electricity in Phoenix. High rents and the distance from the centre of town and jobs were the other two major differences noted.

Both of these were seen as pressing problems - 45 respondents found rent to be a major problem and 28 saw transport costs as a problem. Other problems mentioned included a lack of a park, the smallness of the houses, maintenance problems, crime, lack of medical and recreational facilities, the absence of a police station and the distance from the city.

Recreational facilities including a cinema were amongst the improvements most in demand.
demand - 38 people mentioned the need for these. 29 mentioned the need for shops, 20 for better transport and 14 for lower rents. More religious institutions, pavements and a hospital (32 mentioned this*), bigger and better houses, a creche, better drainage, police station, public telephones and regular and free maintenance of houses were amongst desired improvements.

In Phoenix, far more strongly than in any other area surveyed by SPP in Natal, community organisations do exist which have taken up some of these issues in the past and achieved some gains. Although people only started moving there from 1976, it has a full history of community organisation and resistance. Keen profiles campaigns have taken place in Phoenix since the early part of 1981, when increasing rents was an issue. However people were made aware of many other issues other than high rents through that campaign. The low percentage poll in the ZAC elections indicates that generally people are more politically aware than in many communities.

In the course of previous campaigns the people of Phoenix have acquired organisational skills and experience which will stand them in good stead in trying to achieve the improvements they wish to see in their lives.

* There are plans for a hospital to be built at Phoenix, but only for 500 beds, whereas it has been recommended by the DCO and other bodies that the hospital should cater for at least 4 000 beds.

Appendix 1. Newlands East

ORIGINS

Newlands East is a Group Areas township for coloured people, on the outskirts of Durban. Government plans for the construction of Newlands East started in 1971/72. The Coloured Affairs Department (CAD) bought the land from the Durban Corporation with the aim of creating a distinct, separate coloured township, 20 km out of Durban. People were first moved there in 1979.

Reasons for being moved in are multiple:

- Some people had been living in very overcrowded conditions in their previous homes. People renting houses in areas like Sydenham would sublet servants quarters and garages, so that a whole family might be living in a single garage. Some of these people had put their names on a waiting list for houses to rent, with the CAD, as much as ten years previously. The houses they were finally offered were in Newlands East.
- Other people had to leave the places they had been living in before because the area had been declared a slum and was to be cleared. The houses were pulled down and often the area would then be used for industry. Coloured people living in such places in the greater Durban area were given houses in Newlands East.
- Other people, who were living in mixed areas and areas not set aside for coloureds, were forced, by the Group Areas Act, to find other accommodation. One of the only legal places they could find was Newlands East. Some families were allowed to live out their leases in houses in Indian areas, but were not allowed to renew the lease.

- Many people moving into the Durban area from elsewhere in South Africa, when applying for a house to rent through the CAD, are allocated places in Newlands East.

Relocation into Newlands East is gradual and many people don’t see themselves as having been relocated; they feel they chose to move. Some people are trying to move out, back to Wentworth and Sydenham, but accommodation there is very scarce.

HOUSING

Newlands East is being built in sections. One section of houses is built, and when this is nearly filled up, by people being moved in, building on the next section starts. By August 1980 Section I was built and largely occupied, and Section II was in the process of being built. The final plan calls for 2 sections. Approximately 5 000 people were reported to be living in Newlands East by August 1980.

The houses are basically all built in the same pattern, small, double-storied, with one, two or three bedrooms. One woman, whose husband is a builder, told the SPP fieldworker that if her husband had built a house anything like the ones at Newlands East, it would never have been passed by the building inspector. The claimed that there is more sand than anything else in the bricks and that the
buildings are badly and carelessly built."

It is ironic that although a large number of men in Newlands East are builders wanting work, none of them have been given contracts with the companies building in Newlands East.

The houses are very basic when people move in - cement floors, no plastering, no tiling. All the houses/flats have running water, electricity and inside flush toilets. Most but not all have hot water. When they move in, people must decide whether they want to buy their house or rent. Those who choose to buy will begin to pay installments, and are allowed to improve their houses. Those who rent need to get permission to make any improvements on their houses, and pay a fee for what they do.

Officially when the Durban City Corporation is allocating flats or houses to people in Newlands East it allocates them according to family size - the larger the family the more likely it is to get a bedroom flat. In practice people say that they have no choice over which house/flats they will get, and that no account is taken of family size or needs.

Rent is meant to be paid according to the income of the household - households earning more pay higher rents. But in practice this is not always so and there are cases of people being charged rents higher than their income. High rent is one of the biggest complaints in Newlands East, as it is in Phoenix. One woman said the reason that the rents were so high is that the land bought from the Durban Corporation for developing Newlands East is bad land - much of it is not suitable for being built on. To make up for the loss of income from the places where it is impossible to build, the CAD has to charge high rents on existing houses.

**FACILITIES**

Facilities are poor (although there have been some improvements since the place was first established) and this is a cause of resentment. Most buses operating from Newlands East are 54000 buses. When people first moved to Newlands East the bus service was very bad and irregular and buses did not come right into the area but stopped on the outskirts. The Residents' Committee fought for regular buses and have pushed to get buses into all areas of Newlands East, and the service is better now.

There are special buses to take children to school. At first they had to pay fares, but now it is free. Perhaps 20% of the families own cars. Most of the migrant workers have transport costs paid by their employers (e.g. to and from Sneloi, or Darnland).

The only shop in Newlands East is in a house that was already there when the land was bought by the CAD. It has been converted into a shop. It sells "everything", but is very expensive. Most people try to do their shopping in Durban or Pinetown, although some things are also bought from vans that drive up and down Newlands East, selling goods at even higher prices than the Newlands East shop. (The vans are owned by a store just outside Newlands East.) There are no bottle stores, but many houses have shobums - "every second house", according to one respondent.

When the first people moved into Newlands East there was no school at all. Since then a high school and a primary school have been built. There is no community hall and there are no church buildings. All services are held either in the school building or outside. Three denominations meet to build, and the CAD says they will have to buy the land. The largest church, the Catholic one, would have to pay R36 000 for the land alone before it started on building costs. Some people thing this is another way the CAD is trying to get back some of the money it spent on buying up the area from the Durban Corporation.

There is one clinic. Like the shop it is converted from an old house. A doctor comes once a week. The clinic provides no visiting service so people unable to get there are not catered for. There are 2 doctors in the area, with private practices, both very expensive.

There is a rent paying office in Newlands East. All other offices of the Durban City Corporation and all the officials dealing with Newlands East are in Martin West Building in Durban.

There is no police station. The nearest police station is in Greenwood Park, just outside Newlands East. Among the residents there is generally a very hostile feeling towards police, but some would like to have a local Police Station because of the crime in the area.

**WORK**

The nearest places of wage employment are Durban and Pinetown. Many people approach social welfare agencies, both private and government, for help in finding work. People also get jobs by applying personally to places, or through the newspaper, or friends. Many women work in factories - especially textile factories.

Many men, perhaps 40%, are migrant workers, working in places like Sneloi, or Darnland. The pay is much better there. Some come back once a fortnight, others once a month.

**ORGANISATIONS**

There are very few community organisations. There is a Newlands East Residents' Committee, started by the first residents of Newlands East. It has pushed for better bus services, and has done a survey on rents in Newlands East. There is also a Women's Improvement Group, and some Christian groups, formed out of the churches.

The level of crime and violence in Newlands East is very high. Contributory factors are that a lot of people are unemployed - especially the younger people - and many of the men are migrants, and so away for a lot of the time.
1. MATIWANE'S KOP

1. Introduction

Matiwane's Kop is the only threatened community in Natal where a household survey was undertaken by SFP. As well as providing an insight into the conditions prevailing in this freehold area (black spot), the survey allows for some useful comparisons to be drawn between an established rural community and the various relocation areas (particularly the rural ones) that were also surveyed by SFP.

Matiwane's Kop is a very large rural community of well over 2,000 people, situated on 3,300 hectares of land, about 25 km north of Ladysmith. Formerly African freehold, its landowners were in fact expropriated by the State in 1980. Many landowners seem to be unaware of this, however, and doubts have been raised as to the legality of the manner of expropriation—whether the notices of expropriation were served in the correct manner or not. As in so many black spots, the significance of that expropriation has not really penetrated into the community—the loss of title is buried among the papers in the Deeds Office in Pietermaritzburg and both social relationships (e.g. that between landowners and tenants) and the daily routine do not appear to have been seriously affected as yet. The most tangible restriction to have flowed from the expropriations (which many do not understand) has been the curtailment of further property transactions; this only affects a small segment of the total community, however. The community knows it is under threat—all the houses have been numbered—but many are hopeful of a reprieve. They have, through their spokesmen, registered strong opposition to being removed and received a fair amount of publicity as a result. They believe they have managed to stave off the threat, at least for the time being, and it is this, coupled with their continued occupation of the land, that is of significance to them—not the actual legal status of the property.

The Klip River district saw a large number of land purchases by Africans in the 19th century and Matiwane's Kop is only one of a number of freehold farms to have been designated as black spots by the present government. On its southern boundary lies Jomo's Kop, with which it is closely linked. North of it, to the east and to the west, lie Nqumane and Lonitini respectively; further south, separated from Matiwane's Kop by a couple of ranges of hills, lies the Driefontein block of farms. Part to Ladysmith itself and incorporated into the municipal area is Umbuluma. None of these properties have yet been removed but all are under threat. In addition four other freehold areas have been either wholly or partly removed in the district to date: Khumalo'svilles in the early 1960s, the Rosedge complex between 1975 and 1977, Griemen in 1977/78 and over 1,000 tenants from the large farm Steelcombe's in 1978. (Landowners, although expropriated, have not yet been moved from there and are fighting a rear-guard action to have their land restored to them.)

Now that all the African freehold properties have been cleared in the coal-rich

* The official population in 1980 was 2,502. (Mareed, Question 200, 26.02.81)
districts of Newcastle and Dundee to the north, those remaining in the Klip River district appear to head the government's priority list in its black spot removal programme for Natal. Coal may be a factor in this district as well: there is a colliery (Platberg Collieries) very close to Matitwane's Kop and in the past twelve months new shafts have been established on land lying just to the east of the property. As already described, local white farmers have long been lobbying for the removal of the African farms in the district and they appear to have been a significant force as well.

Dr Koornhof has confirmed in Parliament in 1981 and again in 1982 that Matitwane's Kop, along with the other black-owned farms in the district, will be removed 'after the necessary facilities and services have been provided on the compensatory land and settlement areas applicable' (Hansard, Question 200, 26.02.81), in this case somewhere in the Eksheni/Ekwukweni relocation belt. The evicition of the formerly released land of Driefontein from Ekwuku in January 1981 has underscored the State's determination to remove the remaining Klip River black spots. Whether the removal of Matitwane's Kop will be finally pushed through or not and when, depends, however, on a number of factors among which the degree of local organisation and the strength of the community's stated opposition to being moved will be very important.

THE SFF SURVEY

The SFF survey was conducted in late 1980/early 1981. Because the community is very large and scattered in a random fashion over a wide area, it proved very difficult to select households on a systematic basis. Two interviewers were used and in an attempt to cover as much of the area as possible, they worked in separate halves of the community, each interviewing 50 households spread as evenly as possible through their chosen areas. 100 households were thus surveyed, having a total population of 744. In addition to this survey, there have been numerous follow-up fieldtrips to Matitwane's Kop and the information derived from these trips has been used to supplement the survey material.

2. General Conditions

Although larger in population and area than average, Matitwane's Kop is in many respects representative of other African freehold areas in Natal. Despite the problems caused by an expanding population that is confined to a fixed amount of land and has little or no capital with which to develop that land, it has many factors working in its favour when compared to the rural relocation areas surveyed by SFF: an agricultural base, both real and potential; a more stable demographic structure; long-established local institutions and strong ties to ancestral land, all of which feed and strengthen a sense of community and identity.

HISTORY OF ITS PURCHASE

The history of how the community of Matitwane's Kop came into being has been set out in a memorandum drawn up by 'the Chief, Trustees and Matitwane's Kop tribe' in 1979 and entitled 'Proposed Removal of the Matitwane's Kop Tribe, the Farm Matitwane's Kop No. 1953, County of Klip River, Province of Natal.' This document was forwarded to Dr Koornhof via the offices of the Ekwuku Minister of the Interior, in order to set out at length the community's objections to being moved. (See Appendix 1.) According to this, the farm was bought from the Natal Land and Colonisation Company by the Shabalahle tribe between 1970 and 1980.

At this time the Shabalahle Tribe ... was under Chief Mwel Shabalahle whose scattered tribe was in the White farms in the region of Bester. Chief Mwel died and Mhewa, his son, was still too young to take over chieftainship ... The Shabalahle tribe was warned about the rough treatment deliberately given to their Chief Mhewa, by the white farmers. They then decided to buy a piece of land where Mhewa would be peacefully settled with his tribe as soon as he came of age.

In making enquiries at the Dept Office, representatives of the tribe were directed to Matitwane's Kop which whites were unwilling to buy because, so the memorandum reports, 'it was a mere and unproductive.'

120 members of the Shabalahle tribe bought the farm, originally as a syndicate, the property later being subdivided and titled vested in individuals. Although the farm was bought in the late 19th century, it was not registered in the names of its new owners until 1914/1915 when transfer was finally ceded by the Natal Land and Colonisation Company to 'Mhewa Shabalahle, Rev. Henry Mhathuba and Ezra Shabalahle, all Natives of Natal, in their capacities as Trustees ... and certain 17 other Natives of the Klip River division.' (Proposed Removal of the Matitwane's Kop tribe'), quoting from the Transfer of ownership and transfer. According to local history, the Union Government also promised at that time that in recognition of the contribution made by those men from Matitwane's Kop who had joined the army during the 1st World War, it would link their land to the Driefontein block of land to the south, by buying up the intervening farms for African ownership and occupation. This promise (possibly a proposal put forward by the disregarded Beaumont Commission of 1916) was not honoured.

Instead of the Central Government fulfilling its promise now the Matitwane's Kop Tribe must be moved much against its will. ('Proposed Removal of the Matitwane's Kop tribe', i)

INFLUX OF TENANTS

According to its descendants, the original Shabalahle landowners drained the soil by building a number of dams and transformed what had been a marsh into productive arable land. During the course of the 20th century, however, pressure on the land began to mount as the population grew and agriculture waxed in importance as a source of income as a consequence. Matitwane's Kop, because of its size and its relative proximity to Ladysmith has attracted a large number of tenants over the years, the influx exacerbated in the past twenty years by the abolition of labour tenancy in particular and, to a lesser extent, the removals of black spots in the district. Today a substantial proportion of the community - perhaps as many as a fifth or more - are relative newcomers, tenants of the landowners, who have only settled there within the past ten years. The land has become increasingly subdivided, in parts resembling a rural village, and most households are dependent on outside employment for their survival. In many respects Matitwane's Kop serves partly as a displaced township for Ladysmith, with commuters amounting to 37% of the total work force in the SFF sample.

HOUSING TENURE AND LENGTH OF RESIDENCE

Of the 100 households surveyed by SFF, 24 were landowners, 65 were rent-paying tenants and 10, generally relatives of landowners, lived there rent-free. (Information on one household was not supplied.) Thus the landowner : tenant ratio is presently in the region of 1 to 3, a ratio that is remarkably similar to the overall ratio prevailing on the African freehold areas in Natal at the time of the Beaumont Commission in the early 20th century. (See p. 35) Since Matitwane's Kop has undoubtedly experienced a substantial influx of tenants since that time, this suggests that it entered the 20th century with a smaller tenant population than was usual on such farms.
Today the community of Matsimane's Kop is based on a core of households whose families have lived there for a very long time — 40 out of the 95 households for whom this information was available for forty years or more, and over half of the total for twenty years or more. Of the remaining households 17 had lived there for less than ten years, however seven of these for less than five years. The remaining 19 households had lived there for between ten and twenty years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 39</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/not stated</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey results confirm the general impression that the largest single category of people who have moved to Matsimane's Kop in the past fifteen years have come from white farms. 13 out of the 24 households for whom this information was available were ex-farm people, 7 of them having left their previous place because of the abolition of labour tenancy, 4 because they had been evicted and 3 of their own accord. The other reasons given for moving to Matsimane's Kop were: the desire for land (3 instances), the expense of urban life (2 instances), family quarrels (2 instances), a search for schooling and trade opportunities (1 instance each), the return to a parental home (1 instance) and a job transfer to Ladysmith (1 instance). Seven households gave no reasons.

**AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY**

Although agriculture is no longer the central economic activity of residents, it nevertheless makes an important contribution to the welfare of the community and, perhaps equally important, to its general image of itself.

We have cherished our land with jealousy because of the presence of the ever running streams and innumerable springs with crystal clear and cool water. Rain falls regularly and we have never experienced any droughts. Matsimane's Kop is a land of our comfort where we live creatively and peacefully. We cultivate all the different types of vegetables that suit the climate. People who cannot find employment are able to make a living through land cultivation. ('Proposed Removal of the Matsimane's Kop tribe', 4)

Several of the landowners cultivate quite extensive areas; a number own tractors which they also hire out locally. Two households in the SEF survey reported that they had 5 fields; 4 had 4 fields and 3 had 3. Apart from these 14, who could be called the large cultivators, another 12 households reported having 2 fields each and 40 had 1 field each. In most cases fields were described as large (40 households) or medium (22 households). 33 households in the survey did not have any fields, but nearly all of these had vegetable gardens in which some produce was grown. Thus 91 households reported such gardens and 93 households stated that they grew agricultural produce — maize in all instances and sorghum, potatoes and beans as well as in about 75% of the households. One landowner reported reaping 100 bags of potatoes in December 1979.

In addition to crop production, over half the households surveyed (57) kept cattle (grazed on the commonage), just under half (42) had goats and small numbers of households kept sheep (19), pigs (3) and horses (3). In addition, nearly all households kept chickens. 55 households reported that they produced some milk, 97 that they produced some meat and 75 that they produced some eggs. In addition just over a third (14) reported that they produced hides as well.

Most households produced for their own consumption only but nearly one fifth of the sample — 19 households — reported that they sold agricultural goods from time to time, and one household reported that it makes a living out of this. Although the survey did not probe the scale or frequency of such sales — both of which are likely to fluctuate quite considerably across the various households — this is nevertheless indicative that yields are large enough in certain instances to constitute a surplus. For most households agriculture is a supplementary but nevertheless valuable and valued activity, access to the land being regarded as one of the most critical differences between Matsimane's Kop and the proposed relocation areas into which the State wishes to move them. 'I am ploughing in this place and there is everything I need,' said one respondent. Another respondent, who had only recently moved to Matsimane's Kop, had moved there from Soweto, Johannesburg because 'we were tired of the town-expensive life' and considered that 'to make a living is cheaper here.' This particular respondent was unequivocal about not wanting to move again.

I have just come to this place and I have already cultivated my field and am waiting for my crops.

Neighbouring white farmers have accused the people of Matsimane's Kop of poor agricultural techniques that are damaging the land; this has been one of their main justifications for pushing for the community to be removed. In February 1961 the chairman of the local Mandalaslagie Farmers' Association described the type of agriculture practised at Matsimane's Kop as 'of the poorest kind, with virtually no production!'

Before anyone else could use this land, it would have to go through a long and very expensive process of rehabilitation. (Letter to the Sunday Tribune, 22.02.81)

This, as discussed in the chapter on black spots in Part Two, is an argument that raises extremely complex issues. There are two major constraints on agricultural production at Matsimane's Kop: 1) the population density which, as already described, is a product of a combination of factors over which the local community has no control, evictions from elsewhere, influx control which prevents Africans people from living with their families in the places where they work, the land laws which prevent Africans from acquiring land outside the already desperately overpopulated reserve areas, and 2) lack of capital for development — no State-provided infrastructure, loans or technical education similar to that which white farmers enjoy. In addition, the threat of removal has in itself had a debilitating effect on agricultural activity — in much the same way, though on a smaller scale, as the threat of expropriation because of consolidation has adversely affected some white farmers in the province. Thus a communal vegetable garden project initiated by a group of women with the Chief's consent in 1979/80 fell through because of the uncertainty surrounding the future of the community at that stage.

There is a minority of people living at Matsimane's Kop who, given mobility and a choice, would probably choose to give up their present rural lifestyle and live in an urban
township—provided there were accommodation, employment and security there. There is no chance of this happening, however. Influx control apart, Steadville, the only township at Ladysmith, is already desperately overcrowded and under threat of removal; and as far from Ladysmith as Mätivane’s Kop, is far more expensive, is also full and has a reputation of violence and lawlessness in addition. In any case, this group is not representative. Most of the people living at Mätivane’s Kop have a genuine commitment to the rural way of life still possible there. Community leaders interviewed by SPP have expressed concern about the declining productivity of the land and are not unaware of the importance of conservation. Given security of tenure and some capital assistance, they would be very glad to husband their land better than they are able to now. In the meantime, although lacking the resources to practice a more intensive form of agriculture, most residents draw a yield from their land that makes a significant contribution to the well-being of their families. Their agricultural production is not irrelevant, as the chairman of the Klansdale Farmers’ Association tried to suggest. Access to land is one of the most important material advantages enjoyed by the people of Mätivane’s Kop, allowing for a generally higher standard of subsistence than that found in the average closer settlement in KwaZulu.

This is borne out by the data collected on household diets. Although the average diet is a very basic one, with maize and other starchy vegetables serving as staples, it is far higher in protein than that found in the surveys undertaken by SPP in the rural relocation of closer settlements of Sahlumbe and Compensation and also higher than that found at Mätivane’s Kop. As already noted, agriculture is also practiced. 5% of the households surveyed at Mätivane’s Kop reported that they consumed milk daily; 16% said they ate meat daily and a further 31% said they ate meat every second day, and 52% said they ate eggs at least once a week or more. Furthermore 84% reported eating greens either daily or every second day. The following table contrasts these results with those already recorded at Sahlumbe, Mśinhlopo and Compensation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mätivane’s Kop</th>
<th>Sahlumbe</th>
<th>Mśinhlopo</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>99% daily</td>
<td>99% daily</td>
<td>99% daily</td>
<td>99% daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16% daily</td>
<td>16% daily</td>
<td>16% daily</td>
<td>16% daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31% every 2nd day</td>
<td>31% every 2nd day</td>
<td>31% every 2nd day</td>
<td>31% every 2nd day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75% daily</td>
<td>75% daily</td>
<td>75% daily</td>
<td>75% daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75% daily</td>
<td>75% daily</td>
<td>75% daily</td>
<td>75% daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63% 2x week</td>
<td>63% 2x week</td>
<td>63% 2x week</td>
<td>63% 2x week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63% 1x week</td>
<td>63% 1x week</td>
<td>63% 1x week</td>
<td>63% 1x week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1% daily</td>
<td>1% daily</td>
<td>1% daily</td>
<td>1% daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1% daily</td>
<td>1% daily</td>
<td>1% daily</td>
<td>1% daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% 2x week</td>
<td>30% 2x week</td>
<td>30% 2x week</td>
<td>30% 2x week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% 1x week</td>
<td>30% 1x week</td>
<td>30% 1x week</td>
<td>30% 1x week</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FACILITIES

Facilities, although often very basic, are better than most closer settlements visited by SPP in Natal. Most of the facilities that have been developed at Mätivane’s Kop have been financed and built by the community itself. Pride of place goes to a secondary school, recently completed (in 1981) and built almost entirely by community enterprise and funds, the principal of the school marshalling together as much money and credit as he could muster to ensure that the building would be completed in time for the opening of the school year in 1981. This school is attended by 400 students, mostly local. No sooner was the structure completed than numbers were dashed on the walls by officials, markings in their removal programme. The numbers represent a tangible sign of the threat of removal. The building itself, however, is a testimony to the committee of the community to remaining on their land.

In addition to the secondary school, there are four primary schools catering for about 2,000 pupils, 12 shops and several churches scattered through the community. There is also a regular bus service to Ladysmith, which apparently allows residents of Mätivane’s Kop to travel for nothing along its routes within the community. Housing is mostly of wattle and daub, generally in good repair; there are several substantial brick houses as well, in most cases belonging to long-established families. Water is not considered a problem because of the numerous springs and streams found on the property, although none of these are protected. There are 17 boreholes scattered through the community in addition. Fuel is becoming a problem, with much of the wood on the surrounding hills being chopped out, and more people are having to buy their fuel, either in the form of wood or coal.

An important to many people as the existence of schools and shops are two sites with religious and historic value—a caim of stones that is associated with a previous chief who reportedly had rain-making powers, and the community and chiefly graveyards. From the time of Mätivane himself to the very last Chief who recently passed away, their graves are in the area where they were traditionally buried. It is unthinkable to imagine that a tribe with a long traditional custom of burying Chiefs has to move away and leave these graves behind. The graves of our forefathers, the traditional burial places of our Chiefs, are the bonds that tie us inseparably with this place, Mätivane’s Kop. (‘Proposed removal of the Mätivane’s Kop tribe’, 4)

3. Demographic features

POPULATION STRUCTURE

Of the 714 people in the 100 households surveyed, 522 were permanent residents (279 male and 243 female), 120 migrated (81 male and 39 female) and 69 summerers (41 male and 26 female) with a further 2 individuals whose residence status was not recorded (1 male and 1 female) and 1, a child, whose sex was not stated.
Table 4: Matiwane’s Kop. DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY AGE, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMMISSO</th>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
<th>RESIDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-64</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE Ns</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE

The average size of the 100 households surveyed by SPP was a little over 7 - 7.14. 21 households were however very large having 10 or more members each. 4 of them having 15 or more members. A little over half the households surveyed were extended or compound families: 46 were extended, 4 compound and another 3 extended-compound. The remaining 48 households in the sample 46 were nuclear and 2 consisted of a single member only.

Table 5: Matiwane’s Kop. HOUSEHOLD TYPES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSEHOLD TYPES</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single member</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compound</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compound-extended</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just over two thirds of the households in the sample (69) had male heads; the rest (31) had female heads. Proportionately many more of the female heads were 5 years or older compared to the male heads whereas 87% of the 31 female heads fell in this age group, only 64% of the 69 male heads did. Just over half the household heads were permanent residents - 51 - while a further 22 were commuters, and only 27 were migrants. This conforms with the findings already noted, that the migrants from Matiwane’s Kop tend to be in the younger age groups, i.e. less likely to have established households of their own, and suggests that traditional family structures and the relationships of authority within them are more entrenched at Matiwane’s Kop than in many other rural areas, where the head of the household is often absent for large portions of the time.

EDUCATION

Of the total population in the sample, 204 had had no education; 95 of them, however, were 5 years or under, thus leaving 109 people of school going age or older who had not had any formal education. 159 people had had a lower primary school education (17 of them in the 0 - 6 age group), 167 a higher primary and 131 a lower secondary education, while 51 people had attained a senior secondary or higher level of education. Commuters

M masculinity rates for the combined permanent/commuter population in these places were as follows: Shalumbe: 69; Emakhensi: 74.5; Mailelapha: 77; Compensation: 84.4.

Total includes 1 permanently resident child whose sex was not recorded.
and migrants tended to be better educated, although the permanent population contained a large segment of persons under school age. Taking the population as a whole, there were more males than females among the non-educated, and more females than males among those educated to primary level. At secondary level, however, there was parity between the sexes, although there were more males with senior secondary education.

Table 6, Matiwe’s Kop.  
EDUCATION BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMMUTERS</th>
<th>MIGRANTS</th>
<th>RES. m.</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Primary</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>199</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Primary</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Secondary</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Secondary</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>714</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there is adult illiteracy in the community, the education levels found at Matiwe’s Kop compare very favourably with the relocation areas surveyed. The percentage of people educated to senior school or beyond is higher than at any of the rural areas surveyed, including Nkacheni, and higher than that found at the peri-urban site and service scheme of Zandria Newtown as well. The completion of the community’s secondary school has made post-primary education available to all of the present generation of primary school students and, if allowed to continue functioning, this school will serve to boost education levels still further in the future.

4. Economic activity

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Matiwe’s Kop is dependent for its survival on wage employment, as already stated, and almost all of the workers have to leave the community to find work. In the 100 households surveyed by SFP there was a total of 173 workers, all of them working outside of Matiwe’s Kop. Of the 523 permanent residents in the sample (215 of whom were of working age), 498 were not economically active and 25 were unemployed. Among the commuters 60 were in employment and 3 not economically active, while among the migrants 107 people were in employment, 11 were not economically active and 2 were unemployed. (The two individuals whose residence status was not recorded in the survey were both not economically active.) As already pointed out, the proportion of workers who are in a position to commute is relatively high when compared to the situation found in the rural closer settlements surveyed by SFP. Over one third (38%) of the total employed in the survey group were commuters.

Table 7, Matiwe’s Kop. ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PERMANENT</th>
<th>COMMUTERS</th>
<th>MIGRANTS</th>
<th>RES. m.</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not economically active</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of economically active people in the sample was thus 200, amounting to 26% of the total population. This figure is made up of 173 employed and 27 unemployed people. The unemployment rate in the sample was thus 13.5%. Although the numbers of men and women who were unemployed were almost the same, the proportion of unemployed men was considerably lower than that of women, with the male unemployment being 10.5% compared to the female rate of 19.4%.

Table 8, Matiwe’s Kop. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total economically active</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT

Most workers in the Matiwe’s Kop survey were unskilled - 126 out of 173, or 73% of the total with the distribution of unskilled workers between commuters and migrants showing no clear bias towards one or the other group of workers. The next largest occupational category was that of professional people, with 19 workers (11 males and 8 females) falling in this group - just over 11% of the sample, clearly drawn from the small but significant group of well-educated people in the community. 9 of these were commuters and 4 were migrants. Compared to the men, those women who had managed to find jobs tended to be in more highly skilled positions. Whereas 15% of the male workforce were in unskilled positions and only 9% in professional posts, 69% of the female workforce were in unskilled positions and 15% in professional posts.

* The total includes 1 individual whose sex was not recorded.
Table 9, Matiwane's Koppie: OCCUPATION LEVEL OF WORKERS BY SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>COMBERS</th>
<th>MIGRANTS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation not stated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall the largest group of workers, 66, were employed in the service industry, with manufacturing the second most common area of employment, having a total of 43 workers. 17 of these service workers were in the professional class (teachers, nurses etc.) and 48 of them were unskilled, presumably domestic workers, cleaners etc. Although the majority of the 66 service workers were women, this being by far the most important area of employment for them, 31 of these workers were male. The service industry ranked only slightly below manufacturing industry as an area of employment for men. After the service and manufacturing industry, the next most important areas of employment were in the transport and construction industries, followed by trade, agriculture and mining. The relative unimportance of agriculture as an employer is of significance in view of the location of Matiwane's Koppie within a white farming area. Although a number of women and children may be occasionally employed on a casual basis on neighbouring farms (this casual employment not being registered in the survey), very few people are employed in agriculture on a full-time basis. Matiwane's Koppie does not supply a labour force for white agriculture in the Klip River district; the orientation of its workers is urban rather than rural.

Table 10, Matiwane's Koppie: EMPLOYMENT BY INCOME, SEX AND RESIDENTIAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME</th>
<th>COMBERS</th>
<th>MIGRANTS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data on place of employment was only available for 148 out of the 173 workers. Within this reduced sample, the most important centre of employment was Ladymoth, 25 km away. 75 workers (46 men and 27 women) were reported to be working there - more than the number of working commuters in the sample which indicates that some migrant workers were based in Ladymoth but only able to return home to Matiwane's Kopp less than once a week. (It is probable that a number of female domestic workers 'lived in' in Ladymoth in this way.) A further 14 workers worked relatively close to Matiwane's Kopp - most of them (13) in Newcastle (about 90 km away), one in Glencoe, about 50 km away and one at Colenso, also about 50 km away. After Ladymoth, the largest centre of employment was Johannesburg, where 34 men and 14 women worked. 6 workers were employed in Durban (4 men and 2 women), 2 in Hazansdale (both men), 2 in Pietersmaritzburg (also both men) and one, a woman, in Piet Retief in the Transvaal.

OTHER INCOME
27 households reported some informal activity (apart from agricultural activity, already described) and 1 reported receiving 'gifts' from outside sources. In addition old age pensions represented a significant source of supplementary cash income, with 37 people recorded as pensioners - almost the entire population of 65 years and older. In addition one member of the permanent population received a disability grant. Only three households had no apparent source of regular income. When questioned how they survived, one was recorded as living on savings, another by selling stock from time to time; the third however had no apparent source of income at all.

The overall picture to emerge from the survey is of a community which is poor by urban standards but nevertheless economically viable, having a valuable subsistence agriculture base, and socially cohesive. In summing up the objections of the community to its threatened removal, the memorandum drawn up by the community for presentation to Dr. Rooshoof states:

The socio-economic life of the people has been so geared up that if this stable community were to be moved to another area:

- a. they would not be in a position to live the same way of life as they are living
- b. no matter what amount of compensation would be given, money-wise, that would not enable the tribe to be the same tribe as before.

('Proposed Removal of the Matiwane's Koppie Tribe', 9)

Furthermore:
We are still living traditional life unspoiled by any outside influence.
There is no hooliganism among our youth. (Ibid, 9)

5. The removal threat

Matiwane's Koppie has been under a general threat of removal as a black spot for a long time. In the 1940s and 1950s white farmers in the Blaauwfontein and Ladymoth districts were, as described in Part One, among the most vociferous opponents of the continued existence of those African freehold farms that fell outside the reserves. Until the necessary compensatory Trust land had been acquired, however, the removal of black sports could not get under way; when removal finally did start in the 1960s, the Klip River district was not on top of the priority list. Ermelo was moved in 1963, Thereafter there was a lull until the mid 1970s when the Roosenboom area, Oriaan and Steenuiland grain tenants were moved in rapid succession.

EVENTS BETWEEN 1978 AND 1980

Matiwane's Koppie was fourth on the list. The first serious warning the community had that they were to be removed came in October 1978 when an official from Pretoria arrived
to bell a hastily convened and poorly attended meeting that they were to be removed, probably in mid-1979. From the start the role of officials in the threatened removal has come across as devious and manipulative to the community's leaders. At this meeting the officials apparently made two claims, both of which representatives of Matiwe's Kop have angrily rejected. The first was that their Chief had himself volunteered that Matiwe's Kop be moved, in 1974, which, as a spokesman for Matiwe's Kop has pointed out, is impossible since the Chief in question had died two years previously, in 1972. (Ndlovu Witness, 19.11.80) The second claim was that the KwaZulu Chief Minister, Buthelezi, supported the removal because he wanted all 'his' people to be together inside KwaZulu — a claim rejected by both community leaders at Matiwe's Kop and the KwaZulu government.

If Pretoria expected an easy submission from Matiwe's Kop, they were quickly disappointed. They had pointed out that the meeting made it clear that they had no interest in moving and the official withdrew without anything conclusive having been arranged. The leaders of Matiwe's Kop followed up this apparent gain by drafting a memorandum setting out their objections to being moved (extracts from which have already been quoted). They sent this to the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr Koornhof, via the office of the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior at Umzintu. Thereafter they had no direct contact with Pretoria for almost a year. In the interim, however, local officials of the Department of Cooperation and Development moved onto the property and numbered all the buildings. When questioned in Parliament (nearly two years later) under what authority this had been done, Dr Koornhof stated that the officials had been to do this in terms of the Black Administration Act (Act 38, 1927) and had received permission to enter the premises 'from the landowners and tenants concerned.' (Hannard, Question 162, 22-09-81)

Ten months later, in August 1979, the official from Pretoria returned to try to organise members of the community to visit the relocation area that had been earmarked for them, near Ekukhweni. On this occasion he apparently claimed that the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior (Dr Mkhize) supported the removal — another allegation that was rejected at the time and later discredited. This meeting was no more conclusive than the first. When the official attempted to arrange a further meeting date, he was told that that was unnecessary since there was nothing further to discuss; should the community desire a further meeting, they would organise it.

Having failed to make any headway with the more direct approach, the State tried to adopt an indirect line of approach through the Chief. In early October 1980 the local commissioner at Ladysmith summoned the Chief (a young and inexperienced man) to his office. There he instructed him to organise a general meeting at Matiwe's Kop for the end of the month (to be attended by more officials from Pretoria) at which a new committee could be elected, to represent the community on the removals issue. The Chief immediately reported these developments to his councillors who pre-empted the commissioner by first demanding to see the official communication from Pretoria about the proposed meeting (which letter was never produced) and then calling their own general meeting to discuss the latest developments without any officials present. Report on this meeting indicates that it was made very clear to the Chief that the community would not tolerate private negotiations between him and the commissioner; the mood has been described as 'bolting' by one person who attended.

Having rallied the community to their support, the councillors and the Chief then went unannounced to the commissioner, accompanied by the local Member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (MPLA). They informed him that there was no need for elections — the councillors as a body (and not the Chief as an individual) were already the community's legitimate representatives. They also repeated that no more meetings were necessary and took the precaution of taping the meeting. They followed this up with a number of meetings at both Matiwe's Kop and the neighbouring smaller Jonono's Kop (also under threat), which they held during the Christmas period, when most of the migrant workers had returned home for their annual holiday.

PUBLICITY

At this time a number of newspapers were alerted to the developments at Matiwe's Kop and Jonono's Kop during November and December 1980 several stories appeared in the press that were sympathetic to the community's struggle to remain on their land. This succeeded in making Matiwe's Kop more widely known and a number of individuals representing various outside support groups have visited it periodically since then as a result. Generally, however, except for publicity, the role of these outside groups in the community has been small. The councillors have deferred largely to Ulundi and to Zikalha in their campaign and kept a tight control over organisation within the community.

EXPROPRIATION

While the leadership of Matiwe's Kop succeeded admirably within their own community and had shown considerable skill and resource in their direct dealings with officials, they were unable to exert the same control over events which took place off their land. Thus during the course of 1980, despite the fact that they had made it clear that they did not want to move, all the landowners were expropriated and title to their land transferred to the State. It appears that the landowners at Jonono's Kop were expropriated at the same time. Although matters have not yet come to a head, the effect of this has been to deprive the majority of the black community's land of place in jeopardy to relationships between the landowners and their tenants, the bulk of the population.

This could, potentially, have extremely damaging consequences for the unity of the community.

The social and material division that exists between landowners and tenants is a real one that has been successfully manipulated by the State in other black spot communities that they have wanted to move, for instance at Rosbooom, as described by E. Khadi in 'The Removal of Rosbooom.' To date the State has not tried to exploit this division at Matiwe's Kop itself but has attempted to do so in neighbouring Jonono's Kop which they clearly regard as the weaker of the two communities. In early 1982 a dispute arose over rents between an individual landowner and his tenants at Jonono's Kop. When it resolved the commissioner in Ladysmith informed the tenants that the land no longer belonged to their landlord but to the State and that they had no need to pay any rent at all. This of course threatened to set landowners and tenants against each other.

The community has managed to weather this storm by agreeing to continue with the rent arrangements as traditionally fixed and thus far there has been no further comeback. As the matter was decided (attended by people from Matiwe's Kop and also by the local KwaZulu MBA) a special committee was elected to represent Jonono's Kop in any further dealings with officials over rentals.

As mentioned in the introduction to this case study, considerable controversy surrounds the expropriation of Matiwe's Kop. Many members of the community are unsure that it has happened and are ignorant of the legal implications. Some landowners that SAPF has interviewed maintain that they were either not served with expropriation notices at all or else not personally; there are reports of an official distributing notices to whoever happened to be at home at the time, including to children. Because the State treats expropriation as a confidential matter between itself and the individual landowner involved, there has been no coming together of landowners on this issue. Some may have hoped for some form of expropriation, others may not — the extent of this is not clear. Apart from the memorandum and the oft repeated refusal by the community as a whole to move, it does not seem that any formal objection to expropriation has been lodged by the land-
owners of Natiwane's Kop themselves, although Kwekulu has apparently appealed for title to be restored to the people - without any positive results. (See below.) This makes the question of the compensation due in the event of the community ever being moved extremely confusing. Legally an expropriated landowner is given sixty days in which to lodge an appeal against the expropriation offered his/her if this is not done within the stipulated period the presumption is that he/she has accepted what has been offered.

DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE

That the State was still determined to remove Natiwane's Kop was confirmed in February 1981 when Natal members of the PPP tabled a series of questions in Parliament dealing with the removal of black spots in the province. On the 11th of February the Deputy Minister of Cooperation and Development acknowledged that his Minister had received representations from the people of both Natiwane's Kop and Kwekulu requesting that 'the proposed resettlement projects be reconsidered and that the residents be allowed to remain on the properties concerned.' (Hansard, Question 28, 11.02.81) This was the first acknowledgement the people of Natiwane's Kop had had that their memorandum had been received. When asked what the outcome of these representations would be, the Deputy Minister replied

The representations are still receiving attention and further negotiations will take place. (Ibid)

However, a mere two weeks later, when asked if Natiwane's Kop and five other black spots were to be removed, the Minister of Cooperation and Development stated very clearly that they would be.

Yes it is the intention of the Government to resettle the communities of the areas concerned. (Hansard, Question 200, 26.02.81)

The strategy adopted by the State during 1981 was to bypass Natiwane's Kop itself and to try to negotiate with Kwekulu instead. The role of the Kwekulu government in this has already been discussed in Part One. Although the Kwekulu government enforced Natiwane's Kop in its objections to being moved and requested that its expropriation be reversed, it was apparently out-manoeuvred. In mid 1981 the Department of Cooperation and Development suggested to Kwekulu that steering committees should be established to deal with removals on a regional basis and this was accepted by Kwekulu at the time, without the matter about title having been resolved and also without consultation with the communities affected. Later, Pretoria made it clear that the purpose of these steering committees was, in effect, to administer relocation; it also claimed that Kwekulu had eased its former 'rigid opposition' to removals. Only then did the Kwekulu government try hastily to distance itself from the committees. Very little of what was being discussed or negotiated between Pretoria and Ulundi made its way to Natiwane's Kop whose only and very limited source of information on these developments appears to have been the occasional newspaper or radio report.

The position of Natiwane's Kop at the time of writing appears to be a static one. Apart from the local commissioner's intervention about rights at Jonomo's Kop in early 1982, there have been no indications at a local level of what Pretoria's next move will be. In Parliament Dr Koornhof has confirmed, once again, that Natiwane's Kop will be removed. (Hansard, Question 450, 26.04.82) At the time he gave no hint of when this would be, merely stating

That the resettlement actions, as far as practical, be conducted after consultation and in collaboration with the committees concerned as well as the Government of Kwekulu. (Quoted in Natal Mercury, 27.04.82)

at the same time, in answer to another question on removals in general, the Minister gave an ominous warning, that because of their 'very sensitive and complicated' nature, future removals would be dealt with on a confidential basis between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the various national and black communities.' (Ibid.)

LEVEL OF COMMUNITY ORGANISATION

That the people of Natiwane's Kop do not want to be moved is unquestionable. The SAP survey merely confirmed the point that has been made repeatedly at local meetings - the 100 households in the SAP sample were, with possibly one exception (one reply was not recorded), unanimously opposed to being removed. Support for established leaders was also general, and only 3 respondents in the SAP sample felt that there was no point in opposing the government on the removal issues. It appears however, that within the community, opposition has been organised along very traditional lines, with popular involvement relegated largely to attendance at mass meetings and the traditional leaders - councillors and landowners - making the crucial decisions. This has meant that the general population has not been kept fully informed on all developments and their campaign is heavily dependent on the skills and integrity of a limited number of individuals. Most of the leaders are members of Inkatha and some of them have very strong personal ties with members of the Kwekulu government. They are members of the same relatively privileged rural elite.

This has encouraged a dependency on Ulundi which, in the long term, serve to undermine rather than enhance the community's campaign. Control has not always been retained within it; the as yet unresolved episode about steering committees has indicated how potentially damaging decisions made on behalf of the community but not with the community, can be.

Yet despite these limitations, the achievements of the community to date have been considerable. Natiwane's Kop has succeeded in warding off several attempts by the State to remove it. It has acquired a useful reputation of militancy; this and the abrupt manner in which community opposition has been mobilised by its leaders has encouraged other threatened communities in the area to adopt a stronger position against being moved as well. In late 1980 a spokesman for the community summed up the position thus:

The Minister has promised that people will not be moved against their will. None of the people at Jonomo's or Natiwane's Kop want to move.

We will not move. We intend to carry on as we always have done.

They will have to bring guns to push us out or bury us here. (Ibid)

It is apparent that thus far the State has taken this message of determination very seriously, and that it has been obliged to hold back on its intentions as a result.
Appendix 1: Memorandum: Proposed Removal of the Matiwane’s Kop Tribe

The following memorandum was compiled by representatives of the people of Matiwane’s Kop for presentation to the Minister of Cooperation and Development in 1973.

PROPOSED REMOVAL OF THE MATIWANE’S KOP TRIBE THIS FARM MATIWANESKOP NO. 1931 COUNTY OF ELIP RIVER, PROVINCE OF KWAZULU.

(i) Preamble

To the Honourable, The Minister of Co-operation and Development.

The Chief, Trustees and Matiwaneskop Tribe through our Government, KwaZulu Government hereby humbly submit the following facts regarding the above-mentioned matter for consideration and immediate salvation of the Tribe.

1. On the 9 October 1979, the Ladymith Bantu Affairs Commissioner introduced a very few inhabitants of Matiwaneskop, consisting mainly of women, Mr van Rensburg from Pretoria, Mr T. Kester, Agricultural Supervisor, Mr van der Walt from Pretoria.

2. Mr van Rensburg who was the speaker, alarmed and disappointed us when he announced that he had come to notify the Matiwaneskop Tribe that they would be removed from Matiwaneskop Land before the 1979 winter season. The reason being that we, the Matiwaneskop Tribe requested in 1974 to be removed from our land Matiwaneskop.

3. Mr van Rensburg further stated that Central Government would provide houses to take the Matiwaneskop Tribe to see the new place for their approval or disapproval, but we should bear in mind that enough land is not available.

4. We were also advised that we could plough our fields at our own risk.

(ii) Facts

1. In 1974 Mr Aaron Khainde acted on behalf of the present chief T.R. Shabalala after the death of the late Khlangamiso Ayiff Shabalala, chief T.R. Shabalala’s father. As an acting chief at that time Aaron Khainde and the Matiwaneskop Tribe made no request to be removed.

2. The Ladymith Bantu Affairs Commissioner sent Mr T. Kester to announce through our school children on the 7 October 1978 (on a Thursday) that he would like to meet the Matiwaneskop Tribe on the 9 October 1978 (on a Thursday).

3. This approach was very unfair because the land owners who are the heads of the families, were at work as it could be expected. This notice was too short to invite the land owners from far and wide to attend; so as a result mainly women could attend.

4. Our Chief T.R. Shabalala has since the 9 October 1979 been pestered by the Ladymith Bantu Affairs Commissioner with the idea that the Matiwaneskop Tribe is to be removed from the area they are occupying at present.

5. We, the Trustees and the Tribe, would like to put it in no uncertain terms that we have never asked any Government to be moved away from our present property where the Chief, Trustees and the tenants have become one solid Tribe and attained a standard of living and solidarity comparable to any tribal unit in KwaZulu and Natal.

6. Further we would like to point out that there is no record anywhere in the Tribal affairs where we ever intimated that we were dissatisfied with this area and therefore would prefer to be moved to another area.

7. We are therefore surprised to see our Chief everywhere and then being summoned to appear before the Bantu Affairs Commissioner in connection with the Matiwaneskop Tribe removal scheme.

8. We view this as a disturbing move on the confidence of the Tribe and the Chief because—

(a) it gives the impression that the Chief is going into some ‘private’ agreement with the Bantu Affairs Commissioner on matters that are tribal, without the consensus of opinion from the Tribe.

(b) such a step is side-stepping KwaZulu Government over matters that should be worked through Umindi.

(c) this perpetual private-message-sending to the Chief by the Bantu Affairs Commissioner is putting our Chief into a very difficult position, as it makes the Chief a private property owner and/or Tribe owner divorced from his Government KwaZulu and divorced from his Tribe Matiwaneskop Tribe.

E.B.: Some higher authority must step in to regularise the Chief, Trustees and the Tribe as any respectable law-abiding Tribe.

We demand this because we have no record of being a Tribe that has given the Central Government any trouble in any way that would have made it different from any other tribe in Natal.

(111) Land and Ownership

1. We would like to put forth the history of Matiwaneskop land for wanting to remain here forever because we are proud of our history and inheritance of the place.

1. Matiwaneskop farm, Grant 1931, area 8 225 acres was originally owned by Andreas Theodorus Spies from 29.10.1854.

2. In 22.10.1863 it was owned by Michael A.A.P. Browly - 74.

3. In 17.6.1869 it was taken over by the Natal Land and Colonisation Co. Ltd - 146.

4. These previous owners were Whites - they abandoned the farm because it was not productive - not arable - they failed to make a living out of it - it was therefore abandoned and forgotten for White men’s habitation. The Natal Land and Colonisation Co. Ltd then took it in trust, until some adventurer could take a chance on it. Nobody was forthcoming among the Whites because word had gone round that it was a ‘White man’s grave’.
At this time the Shabalala Tribe as it was then known, was under Chief Mwelzi Shabalala, whose scattered tribe was in the White farms in the region of Bester.

Chief Mwelzi died and Mbehwa, his son, was still too young to take over chieftainship. Batiniwa, Mwelzi's brother, acted as regent for Mbehwa.

Mbehwa Shabalala grew up on a farm KwaNdengaeni where he received rough treatment from a White farmer who knew that he was the future chief of the Shabalala.

The Shabalala Tribe was worried about the rough treatment deliberately given to their Chief Mbehwa, by the White farmers. They then decided to buy a piece of land where Mbehwa would be peacefully settled with his tribe as soon as he came of age.

The Shabalala Tribemen then went to the Deeds Office to look for land for sale. They were given Matimanekep farm and told that all the White farmers in the area did not want it because it was a mere and unproductive. It was during Sir Theophilus Shepstone's time as Chief Administrator of Natives in Natal. His idea concerning division of land was such that poor portions of land were set aside for the blacks.

Between 1870 and 1880 the Shabalala Tribe completed the deal with the Natal Land and Colonisation Co. Ltd but nothing was put on paper.

When the First World War broke out in 1914 the Natal Land and Colonisation Co. Ltd summoned Chief Mbehwa Shabalala, Rev. Henry Mathewba and Ena Shabalala, on behalf of the 117 others (total 120 people) to sign the agreement of the transfer of the title deed. This was done in order to protect the rightful ownership of the land against the Germans should they win the war.

The transfer and signing of the deed of ownership and transfer was put down as follows:

'Grant 966 -
"Elzard William Pitcher of Pietermaritzburg, Solicitor, appeared before the Registrar of Deeds, Hi, the said apnerrer, being duly authorised thereto by special power of attorney granted to him by Walter Dixon Zinther, solicitor and Cecil Alfred Lucas Ball, Secretary of Durban, the Attorney and Agents of the Natal Land and Colonisation Co. Ltd under power dated in London 10 April 1909, the special power ip favours of apnerrer being dated 29 April 1915 and drawn up and signed at Durban, Natal in the presence of and certified by one competent witness, which power of attorney was exhibited to me on this day and the said apnerrer declared that his principals the said Natal Land and Colonisation Co. Ltd did by these Presents cede and transfer in full and free property to and on behalf of Mbehwa Shabalala, Rev. Henry Mathewba and Ena Shabalala all Natives of Natal in their capacity as Trustees and certain 117 (one hundred and seventeen) other Natives of the Klip River Division ... (names Listed), their respective heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, a certain piece of land in extent 8 225 acres 2 roods and 20 perches more or less situated and being the farm Matimanekep in the county of Klip River, Province of Natal.

The boundaries and further particulars whereof will more fully appear on reference to the diagram of Matimanekep attached to Deed of Grant in favour of Andries Theodorus Spies I dated the 29 October 1896 and to the

3. The record of the Deed of Grant quoted above is known by every owner, and the Matimanekep Tribe, as it was known after the acquisition of this property has always been under the impression that the Central Government was still to fulfill the promise made when during the World War I several men joined the army to defend the country that after the war, Matimanekep would be joined to the Amatungu Tribe by the annexation of the White farms that separate the two tribes. It has been a complete surprise to learn that instead of the Central Government fulfilling its promise now the Matimanekep Tribe must be moved much against its will.

4. We have cherished our land with jealousy because of the presence of the ever running streams and impassable springs with crystal clear and cool waters. Rains fall regularly and we have never experienced any droughts.

5. Matimanekep is a land of our comfort where we live creatively and peacefully. We cultivate all the different types of vegetables that suit the climate. People who cannot find employment are able to make a living through land cultivation.

6. The Tribe is able to meet and satisfy its needs; housing accommodation is not a problem. There is ample space to accommodate houses according to our traditional and customary beliefs - taking into consideration the position and the status attached to the position each family member-occupied.

7. Among the people there are pensioners who have been loyal and honest to the Central Government during their youth. These people cannot make any fresh start elsewhere no matter how much they would receive as compensation. It would be tragic to have an impression that the Central Government does not consider and sympathise with such old people and their descendants after being loyal to the Government in their lives.

(iv) Improvements and Development

1. Matimanekep Farm was bought after being rejected by White Farmers as being unproductive and wettery.

2. The Matimanekep Tribe has worked up the farm and made it productive and comparable with any farm with the same population density per kilometre.

3. The socio-economic life of the people has been so geared up that if this stable community were to be moved to another area -

(a) they would not be in a position to live the same way of life as they are living.

(b) no matter what amount of compensation would be given, money-wise, that would not enable the tribe to be the same tribe as before.

(c) from the time of Matimane himself to the very last Chief who recently passed away, their graves are in the area where they were traditionally buried.

(d) it is unthinkable to imagine that a tribe with a long
7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.

7. The above facts are a humble request by the Matimaneskop Tribe that as far as the Tribe is concerned, the idea of shifting to another area is unacceptable.

Should the worst come to the worst, it will be much against their will and regrettable.
2. ST WENDOLINS

1. Introduction and background

St Wendolins is a community of some 21,000 people, situated about 14 km from central Pietermaritzburg, on land owned by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Mariannhill (until this was appropriated in about 1979/80) and individual African landowners. (See map on opposite page.) Although listed as a black spot by officials in the 1950s, it only came under threat of removal in 1966 when the Group Areas Board zoned the general area in which it is situated for non-Africans, accommodating various white, coloured and Indian group areas on it as well as an industrial zone.

Removals of individual households began to get under way in a piecemeal fashion in selected areas in the late 1970s, once the relocation townships of KwaNdungezi and KwaDweleni had been established for the Pietermaritzburg area. In 1979/80 the ongoing removal of families from this area and the threatened removal of the entire community began to receive press publicity. As the community's opposition to the removals has strengthened and outside groups rallied to their support, so the pressures have mounted on the State to reverse its decision to eradicate St Wendolins. At the time of writing a partial reprieve may be offered one section of the community; residents are trying to mobilise support to save the entire community. Although too early for the community to claim final victory, they have thus won some important preliminary rounds in their struggle.¹

THE FOUNDING OF THE MARIANNHILL MISSION INSTITUTE

The history of St Wendolins is closely linked to the history of the Mariannhill Mission Institute, which was founded one hundred years ago by Father Franz Pfanner. Before the possession of this land by whites, the area was occupied by the Nguni and the Ngunyagwa peoples. The latter were settled along the Ukhahlamba river in the Pietermaritzburg area and their chief Masmazi asked for missionaries to work among his people and to teach them to read. (Brein, 1979, 166)

In December 1882 Father Franz Pfanner purchased the farm Zeekoevlei from the Natal Land and Colonization Company for the sum of £1,000. The Mariannhill Mission was built on this land. Subsequently the Mission bought the farm Klarwater, adjacent to Zeekoevlei, and established the mission community of St Wendolins on a part of this farm. African members of the church were allowed to buy or lease land at St Wendolins from the Mission.

This area was regarded as an outstation of the monastery and in 1932 St Wendolins acquired its own parish priest. The Mission Institute permitted a number of African Catholics either to lease or buy portions of this land until 1950, when it was warned against selling further land to Africans.

By then the area had been divided into 140 plots and during the period 1930 to 1950 about eighty freehold title deeds were sold to resident Catholics at £10 a piece. This freehold area is now known officially as St Wendolins.

¹ The following account is compiled mainly from material drawn from a B. Sc. Honours thesis by S. Donald, submitted to the University of Natal in 1984; a research paper produced by the SARRB Durban, also in 1981 (Information Sheet 5/81); various newspaper articles and documents of the St Wendolins Welfare Committee and interviews with residents. SPP thanks all those whose research and contributions have gone into this Report.
Ridge. Many people who did not purchase stands paid a small fee for the right to reside on the Mission land. This was in the area now described officially as Savannah Park. Although we have used these official names where unavoidable (for the sake of clarity), SPP agrees with the St Wendolines Welfare Committees that the two areas should not be regarded as separate but form a single community. Thus, in speaking of St Wendolines we include both St Wendolines Ridge and Savannah Park.

THE PROCLAMATION OF THE GROUP AREAS ACT

In 1966 the entire area surrounding the Karainshill Mission, comprising 8 500 hectares, was subjected to the proclamation of the Group Areas Act and was zoned as follows:

1) Different group areas were proclaimed:
   - The land on which the monastery, hospital, schools and convent stand was zoned for whites;
   - The land to the west was proclaimed for coloureds and in 1976 the coloured township of Karainridge was established there;
   - The land to the east, incorporating St Wendolines, was proclaimed for Indians.

2) A further 400 hectares of Klarawater was zoned for industrial purposes.

(Katutura Mercury, 24.10.71)

Once their area had been proclaimed an Indian group area, the residents of St Wendolines were told by government officials that they would have to leave. Some plots were sold to Indians at the current prices and the rest of the land, both Mission and freehold, was earmarked for expropriation. Removals did not get under way until the late 1970s however, and thus the effects of the Group Areas proclamation were not felt immediately.

The proclamation of St Wendolines as an Indian Group Area had the potential for deflating the anger of its threatened residents away from the authorities who were responsible for their plight, onto the Indian community who apparently stood to gain from the removal of St Wendolines. Subsequent support from progressive Indian organisations for the people of St Wendolines has helped to counter this tendency and expose the divisive nature of the Group Areas Act within the black community.

INCORPORATION INTO PINSTOWN MUNICIPALITY

In June 1970 the adjoining areas of Karainshill, Seekogm and Klarawater (including St Wendolines) were incorporated into the Pintown municipal area. St Wendolines henceforth fell under the Pintown municipality and the holders of title deeds became ratepayers.

(Donald, 1981, 37) Concern arose over the general health situation in St Wendolines and this motivated the Pintown municipality to erect tape along the main road, where residents could obtain fresh water. In 1973 a Council was established to make provision for more effective communication between African residents in the Pintown area and the Pintown Town Council. The St Wendolines/Pintown Liaison Committee, acting for the Council, has made applications for lights, electricity, water and other services. As a result of this liaison various improvements have occurred in the community:

- The main road was tarred;
- Fresh water was laid along the length of the road;
- Street lights were erected along the road;
- A factory and health clinic and a creche were established;
- Bus shelters were erected.

INFUX OF WORKERS TO ST WENDOLINES

Industrial development in the Durban/Pintown area, together with the migration to the cities by people who could no longer be supported in the bantuems, has led to a massive increase in the peri-urban population of Greater Durban. This influx has been accompanied by a burgeoning of spontaneous housing and the growth of informal settlements, a process which became increasingly apparent during the 1970s and which has affected the St Wendolines area as well.

In recent years there has been a large influx of contract workers into the St Wendolines community. These contract workers, many from the Transkei, were attracted by job opportunities in the Pintown textile industries. Since no official accommodation was available for them, the newcomers were obliged to find shelter among settled communities like St Wendolines, where they rented land or rooms from existing residents. These people were warned by the Administration Board not to erect substantial dwellings as their residence in the area was not permanent and they would not be compensated for their homes when removed or destroyed. Consequently many informal dwellings and shacks were erected at St Wendolines.

While unofficial, this informal settlement has provided homes for many families. In the eyes of the officials, however, this area has become a slum, a phenomenon which the urban authorities have used to justify removals in the area. A press statement from the Liaison Officer of the Department of Co-operation and Development describes the area thus:

"Many of the people who are at present squatting on the land are doing so illegally and are living there under deplorable hygienic conditions." (BAIB Natal, 5/81, 6)

In 1981 in an interview in which the eviction of these tenants was discussed, an official from Pintown stated:

"The area is a slum. What are they (the tenants) complaining of? They are getting R150 to R200 (compensation) for a bit of scrub rubbish."

(Donald, 1981, Appendix 3, Question 9)

2. General conditions

The official viewpoint overlooks the reasons for the growth of informal housing at St Wendolines — the lack of alternative housing for many workers in the Pintown area — and exaggerates the health problems facing the community. Since 1973 there have been substantial improvements in the provision of water and the sanitation arrangements in the area, as already described; further upgrading of the area is a major objective of existing community organisations.

Overall the community is closely-knit and well-established. Many residents have lived there all their lives and their forefathers, family members and friends are buried in the local cemetery. (Concern over the fate of the graveyard if the community is removed is widespread). A survey conducted by the St Wendolines Welfare Committee in early 1982 revealed that 57,3% of the 581 households interviewed had lived at St Wendolines for 10 years or more. (See Appendix 2 of this chapter.)

Although incorporated into the Pintown municipal area, the community retains a peri-urban, village character. Many residents, particularly in Savannah Park, have vegetable gardens and orchards. Some residents even have cattle. Although the community is far from being agriculturally self-sufficient, the land is partially productive. Some commodities at least are home grown and this forms a supplement to household income from other sources.

There are a number of voluntary organisations in the community. Apart from the St
Wendolin's Welfare Committee (described below) is a vibrant and active organization that serves to support and improve the community. The committee is comprised of volunteers who are dedicated to helping others through various initiatives. Some of their work includes organizing events, providing assistance to those in need, and advocating for the rights of the community members.

The committee is located in the Wendolin area, which is a busy and vibrant neighborhood. They have a strong presence in the community and are well-known for their efforts to improve the lives of those who live there. In addition to their regular activities, the committee also works closely with local government officials and other organizations to address issues affecting the community.

One of the most notable initiatives led by the Wendolin Welfare Committee is the provision of free meals to children during school holidays. This program is designed to ensure that no child goes hungry and that they have access to nutritious meals during times when they may not have regular access to food. The committee also works with local businesses to source the necessary ingredients and funding to make this program successful.

Furthermore, the committee is involved in organizing community events such as festivals, cultural celebrations, and sports activities. These events not only bring people together but also help to build a strong sense of community spirit and pride.

In summary, the Wendolin Welfare Committee is a vital and dynamic organization that plays a significant role in the community. Through their various initiatives, they continue to make a positive impact on the lives of those who rely on their support.
3. Removals at St Wendolins

Removals from Savannah Park

The first removals in the area began in the late 1970s when people living in the vicinity of Kingswater Station, the area zoned for industrial use, were moved to make way for the industrial development in that area. Some moved over to St Wendolins proper, others were moved to Kwambiwe.

In early 1979 PNAF officials issued notices to all tenants in both St Wendolins Ridge and Savannah Park, instructing them to vacate their premises within a year. (Daily News, 23-09-81) Nobody responded to these notices and on the 8th August 1980 the PNAF began to demolish houses. After representations from lawyers to government officials, the removals at St Wendolins Ridge came to a stop but those at Savannah Park continued through 1980 and into 1981. By 1981 the PNAF claimed they had removed 68 families had moved "voluntarily" from Savannah Park, 21 to KwaMandazi and 47 to Kwambiwe. (Donna, 1981, 31). The question of whether the removals were voluntary or not is discussed below.

It seems that the freehold status of the land at St Wendolins Ridge was partly instrumental in winning the rights for the people living there since this complicated the issue of the compensation due to those removed. In 1979/80 community leaders obtained lawyers and evaluators to help challenge official assessments of what individual properties were worth and this acted as a brake on the process of removals in the freehold area. As community organisation against the removals strengthened and outside support groups began to exert pressure to stop the removals as well, the authorities seem to have decided to focus their attention on the more vulnerable Savannah Park area and have tried to divide the community accordingly.

THE ROLE OF THE PNAF

The PNAF claim that the removals from St Wendolins have all been voluntary. Many members of the community however have complained of the deceptive tactics used by the PNAF to pressurise people to leave. The SAIIR Information Sheet (5/81) lists several such tactics, including the following:

1. Cases have been reported of officials who have lied to residents with questions regarding their families and houses and, after signing documents testifying to the validity of their statements, the occupants have discovered that they had in fact signed a form requesting settlement in Kwambiwe.

2. Many people feel that the compensation paid out constitutes a bribe. When people have complained to officials that they cannot pay the high rentals for houses in KwaMandazi and Kwambiwe, they were misled into believing that the compensation would be sufficient to meet these requirements.

3. Further criticism is levelled at the PNAF for avoiding direct confrontation with the heads of households. Eviction notices have been served to wives, children, pensioners or lodgers while the breadwinners are away at work, so that when they arrive home they are presented with a fait accompli. When removals do occur the household heads are not available to protect their possessions.

4. The PNAF is alleged to have 'invited' certain individuals to their offices and have offered them alternative accommodation, thus making it appear they were on their own accord to request removal.

5. Families are given short notice that they are to be moved — usually only a week. This does not provide them with enough time to get their things in order, but they comply because they are frightened, sometimes because threats are made if they appear to hesitate, and sometimes because the removal of their neighbours has had a demoralising effect and they are afraid to be left behind alone. Many residents in the Savannah Park area have moved for this reason.

6. Some occupants complained that they were told that they would receive cheques of compensation only after they had destroyed their homes, thus making it impossible for them to return to St Wendolins.

7. Many residents feel that the PNAF has tried deliberately to undermine the coherence and morale of the community by manipulating the impoverished, weaker and more mobile elements of the community first. In this way the community gradually dwindles away and even the most determined are rendered more vulnerable and will ultimately be unable to resist removals on their own.

In September 1981 the Sunday Tribune printed extracts from a letter issued by PNAF officials to a household at St Wendolins instructing him of the date on which he would be moved to KwaMandazi. The letter stated the bleak options open to this household should he refuse to move, very clearly:

Should you, however, elect not to take up residence in KwaMandazi, you are hereby notified to vacate the house you are at present occupying and take up residence in a black homeland and to vacate and demolish the house you are at present occupying.

Should you fail to accept the alternative accommodation offered and should you fail to vacate your present house and demolish same before this date, your house will be demolished and you may be prosecuted. (Sunday Tribune, 6.09.81)

This same report carried an account of an interview conducted by a journalist and a PNAF official named Vermaak in which the official insisted that people were moving willingly but later admitted that those who had been instructed to move, 'must go.'

I have been given a task and I am doing it until I get instructions to stop. (Ibid)

THE ROLE OF THE MATJAAH MMISSION

The role of the Mission in the removal and subsequent negotiations for a reprieve for St Wendolins has been an ambiguous one. It has come under criticism from members of
the community as a result.

It seems that all of the land at St Wendoline except for the 80 individually owned plots was in fact expropriated by the Department of Community Development (the Department responsible for the establishment of Group Areas townships) at about the time when the first evictions began. Initially there was considerable confusion as to the exact status of this land. In June 1981 the Sunday Tribune reported on a family who had been told to leave Savannah Park in August 1980 ‘because the land had been sold’ by Variamichill. (7.06.81) However in September 1981, when the Sunday Tribune reported that a PHAB official had confirmed this sale and that all the land except for the 80 stands belonging to the individual African landlords at St Wendoline Ridge belonged to the Department, the Superior of Variamichill denied that this was the case.

He is absolutely wrong ... The whole hill of St Wendoline, except for 80 private plots owned by residents, still belongs to us. We have no interest in selling it, nor are we prepared to do so. (Sunday Tribune, 6.09.81)

Then, a few weeks later, the Superior of Variamichill admitted that ‘we sold (Savannah Park) because we had to.’ (Daily News, 21.09.81) He added that his negotiations with the Department had led to ‘absolute assurance of compensation for the people’s houses and anything they had established on the land, as well as provisions for rehousing and maintenance of jobs.’

However once the land had been expropriated and before this was public knowledge, the Mission did set out to obtain assurances from various government officials concerning the conditions of removal. This is apparent from the written replies received by the Mission from various officials during the course of 1980.

A letter from the Deputy Secretary of Community Development gave assurance that nobody would be moved without alternative accommodation being available in Dewsbury or Eondoebies, a fact which was reiterated by the Chief Commissioner of the Department of Cooperation and Development.

The Regional Representative of the Department of Community Development stated that an amount of R500 000 had been made available in March 1980 ‘for the express purpose of compensating the blocks for the improvements to houses and dwellings which they had erected.’

The Chief Director of the PHAB gave assurance that workers removed to Kwa-

In late 1980 the Committee began to establish links with liberal organisations in Durban which came out in support of the community’s right to their land. On the 22nd December 1980, partly as a result of these contacts, the Welfare Committee decided to send a statement to the Minister of Cooperation and Development ‘protesting against forced removals.’ (Memorandum, 10.06.82, 10) This received no more than a brief acknowledgment from the Minister. For this reason the Committee organized a petition from the community to back up its claims.

The petition sent to Dr Kromkoorn on 16th April 1981 was signed by 1 300 household heads. It was a clear articulation of the community’s opposition to the removals, laying down the following points:

- The community has deep roots in the area and many residents have lived there all their lives;
- Their families are buried there, ‘to our identity and stability are tied up in St Wendoline’;
- Their present houses are large (seven to nine rooms) while the houses in the townships are much smaller (three to four rooms);
- Schools are further away and transport costs will rise;
- The rents in the new townships are too high, while many at St Wendoline own land and pay only nominal rentals;
- They find it hard that other persons, viz. Indians should enjoy the advantage of the land that has ‘beached and sheltered us these many years.’ (Johns, 23.04.81)

During the course of 1981 St Wendoline received an increasing amount of press publicity. Its proximity to Durban made it accessible to journalists and church and other community workers and this served to broaden and highlight its campaign. Partly as a result of these contacts and the experience, both positive and negative, of outside intervention, the composition of the Welfare Committee underwent some changes. Support for Inkatha declined within the community as Kembula failed to respond to their appeal for help. More conservative members of the Committee were either forced to take a more active role or to withdraw from the forefront of active organisation and decision-making. By the end of 1981 the Welfare Committee had come to emphasise the need to consolidate and mobilise grassroots support within the community, rather than to depend on outside support groups as before. The success of these tactics can be gauged by the overwhelming support the Welfare Committee currently enjoys in the community – about 90% of the 381 households surveyed in early 1982 recorded their support for it. (See Appendix 2.)

THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE GROUPS

1. The Durban and District Housing Co-ordination Committee (DHCC)

This committee was convened in 1977 in order to co-ordinate the activities of several concerned groups on the issues of black housing in Durban. The composition of this committee fluctuates to some degree but it is compiled mainly of representatives of Black Sash, KwaNdebele, National Council of Women (NCW), Women for Peaceful Change Now, the SABHI and at one time the Urban Foundation. It has been particularly active in St Wendoline during 1981 although various members, notably from NCW, were involved from 1980.
At times there is a lack of consensus regarding the nature or extent of this committee’s involvement. On occasions individuals have acted on their own initiative, whilst others have been particularly conscientious in attending regularly evening meetings with the Welfare Committee as well as Sunday morning community meetings. Lack of consensus stems from the fact that different organisations and their representatives have different views on the way they see their role in creating awareness in the white community and still others are concerned with researching and monitoring events.

The DEHCC sees its role as ‘supportive’. It regards St Wendolins as a Christian community, family-bonded, united and economically independent – viable but for removal. There has been a tendency to see St Wendolins as something of a special case, deserving special concern and therefore isolated from other removals. There is however some awareness that if a successful struggle is waged at St Wendolins this may make removals in other areas of Durban (such as the threatened township of Chesterville) more difficult for the State to carry out. The DEHCC has been responsible for a large measure of the publicity that has surrounded the attempt to remove St Wendolins.

Chronology of actions taken by the St Wendolins Welfare Committee in conjunction with the DEHCC, November 1980 – December 1981.

10th and 11th November 1980. Members of the SWA visited St Wendolins and drew up a brief account of the situation in preparation for a press release.

12th November 1980. Emergency meeting of the DEHCC called to discuss the St Wendolins issue and enlist the support of the Committee in breaking an approach to the government, by the Welfare Committee, to the removal.

22nd November 1980. Following a meeting of representatives of the DEHCC with the St Wendolins Welfare Committee, a statement from the people was sent to Dr Koornhof. In addition letters of support from organisations represented on the DEHCC were sent to Dr Koornhof.

January 1981. Brief replies to the statement by the DEHCC were received from the Department of Cooperation and Development indicating that the matter was receiving attention.

5th April 1981. Members of the DEHCC met with the people of St Wendolins following the Sunday morning service and a decision was made to draw up a petition to appeal to the government to the removal.

6th April 1981. The DEHCC met to discuss possible ways in which public awareness of the situation could be increased and also to enlist the support of church leaders, Lawyers for Human Rights, the Member of Parliament and of the Provincial Council for Pinetown.

23rd April 1981. A petition of 1 300 signatures of St Wendolins residents was sent to Dr Koornhof.

26th May 1981. Members of the DEHCC met with the News Editor of the Sunday Tribune. This resulted in a long article on St Wendolins on 7th June.

22nd June 1981. Support of church leaders secured, and a joint letter was sent to Dr Koornhof.

July 1981. Production of a tape presentation on St Wendolins ‘Against Our Will’ commissioned by the DEHCC.

8th July 1981. Petition from several St Wendolins women’s organisations was drawn up and sent to Dr Koornhof.

August 1981. 24 000 ‘Month of Compassion’ leaflets on St Wendolins distributed in churches in Durban area.

19th August 1981. Telegram sent by DEHCC to Dr Koornhof to stop removals from Savannah Park area of St Wendolins, and to Dr P. I. Peters, PFP MP for Pinetown, requesting him to ask questions in House of Parliament.

22nd August 1981. Solidarity Service at St Wendolins preceded by guided tour of area. Such time was spent by school pupils in sprucing up the area in preparation for the visit. Two bus loads of whites came plus a number of our loads.

24th August 1981. Telegram from Department of Cooperation and Development received by DEHCC stating that they had 300 people on waiting list for housing at Kendwanezi.

24th October 1981. St Wendolins Day Workshop, addressed by representatives of Black Sash, ANRA and various residents of St Wendolins.

26th October 1981. Telegram to Dr Koornhof following one of recommendations from Workshop of 24th. Telegram called for 6 months moratorium on all removals in Savannah Park and St Wendolins during which carefully researched proposals could be drawn up by experts in consultation with the people.

16th December 1981. The DEHCC organised a one day public meeting in Durban to protest against removals. Eleven other threatened or removed community sent representatives who addressed the meeting in addition to speakers from St Wendolins. This represented an attempt to link protests in St Wendolins to campaigns to stop removals in other areas. At the end of the meeting a resolution was unanimously adopted condemning removals and calling on ‘all relevant authorities’ to stop all forced removals immediately and to provide basic facilities to both existing relocation and threatened areas.

2. Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC)

The DHAC set up a workshop in conjunction with the Welfare Committee in late 1981. The main aim was to create channels of communication between coloured, Indian and African communities in order to break down the suspicion and isolation created by the Group Areas Act and by State action over removals. This served to draw the St Wendolins community into the general struggle that DHAC has been waging on behalf of coloured and Indian communities in the Durban area.

3. Legal Action

The SAIMR instituted a title deeds search in an attempt to clarify the legal situation with regard to title deeds holders and to establish the nature of the land transaction between the Mission and the State. In addition, lawyers’ letters were drawn up and given to Savannah Park residents for use in the event of attempted eviction by the PMAS. These letters referred the authorities to lawyers who were prepared to act on behalf of residents and asked all communications be directed to them rather than to the residents. Affidavits were also signed by all residents who did not wish to move, to counteract PMAS claims that no one was being moved unwillingly.

* The communities that were represented were 1 Reserve, Dlamnabane, Amoti, Amwotana, Shakaville, Motima’s Kop, Stainvloogznuit, Melukazi, Foudale/Upper Dvula Location, Chesterville, and Nemen farm.
In May 1982 the Group Areas Board announced that the hearing would be held in mid June. Although given very short notice, the Committee rallied around to get its case prepared in time. It set up the St Wendolins Support Committee, composed of students from all the Universities in the Durban area and representatives of various church and community groups. Loosely structured, this Support Committee played a relatively minor role in organizing for the hearing. Its input was mainly a resource and publicity one, helping collate the hundreds of affidavits, making posters, advertising meetings, photocopying documents for the hearing (everything had to be submitted in quintuplicate prior to the hearing), giving advice on the drawing up of the memorandum and linking with newspapers.

In St Wendolins itself, two mass meetings were organized. At both, the emphasis was on encouraging St Wendolins residents to attend the hearing. Members of DIFAC and the Natal Indian Congress addressed the meetings, declaring their support for St Wendolins and making it clear that the Indian community as a whole did not want to buy the land there. Members of the Committee held a number of smaller meetings and had a collection at both meetings to raise money towards the costs of printing and organizing for the hearing. The Committee also organized for a petition to be signed in Pinetown on two successive Saturdays. The petition declared that the people of St Wendolins did not want to move. Again St Wendolins residents were involved in administering the petition and in encouraging Pinetown residents to sign.

Because of the short notice given of the hearing, the Architecture Department could not produce the comprehensive plan for the area that it had hoped for, but it did compile a draft plan.

THE GROUP AREAS BOARD HEARING

The hearing was held on the 18th June 1982. Although the Board had declared that it would only consider St Wendolins Ridge, all submissions made by the Welfare Committee and their supporters were considered by the Board. The welfare Committee also made submissions to the Town and Country Planning Committee and the St Wendolins Residents Association.

As well as submitting a memorandum, the Welfare Committee also submitted 1) about 300 affidavits and statements from people stating their unwillingness to move, 2) a report on the results of the household survey, and 3) a brief plan for the upgrading of the area prepared by the Architecture Department of the University of Natal.

The bail at which the hearing was held was packed with St Wendolins residents, some of whom gave evidence and who reiterated their desire to stay in St Wendolins. Parties to give evidence included the Indian Municipality which declared that it was possible to upgrade the area but that certain parts of it would have to be 'sidelined'. The Durban Indian Congress gave its support to St Wendolins residents and stated, as already mentioned, that it was prepared to put in five million rand for the redevelopment and upgrading of the area as long as the people were not moved.

The Group Areas Board can only make recommendations as a result of such a hearing: it does not have the power to change the legal position of the land itself. However, as a result of the hearing the Board has recommended that St Wendolins Ridge should be de-proclaimed, to become a 'controlled area', and hinted that it would consider looking into the situation at Savannah Park as well. The residents of St Wendolins were given no indication of when the recommendation would be approved or disapproved, but the general consensus is that it might take up to a year.

Implications of St Wendolins Ridge becoming a controlled area

The effect of this is to freeze the sale of land according to race group; that is if
and is owned by an African it can only be sold to an African, unless a permit is obtained from the Department of Community Development. However, since St Wendolins falls within the Pinetown Municipality, laws such as the Illegal Squatting Act and the Slums Act will still apply and it seems that if the municipality wanted to, they could use these laws to remove those elements which they regard as 'untidy' - tenants and lodgers mainly.

EVENTS IN ST WENDOLINS SINCE THE HEARING

The Welfare Committee's response to the hearing has been cautiously optimistic. They regard the present as a time to consolidate organization, in the event of further removals. They are hoping to find funds for employing a full-time community worker who will be responsible for co-ordinating a community newspaper, will try to initiate or give support to self-help projects, will maintain links with outside organizations and will help set up an advice office in the community, to help residents. The Welfare Committee hopes to establish a semi-carrying membership with subscriptions, as well as eventually to employ another person who will be responsible for organizing administrative and clerical matters. It also hopes to continue with weekly community meetings which will draw on outside speakers to deal with various issues of general concern to the community.

The issue of Savannah Park has not been resolved and this remains of central importance. Because of the strength of local organization and the degree of external support and publicity, it seems the government may find it expedient to make a partial concession to St Wendolins Ridge, presumably in the expectation that this will de-fuse the situation and draw public if not local attention away from the clearing of the rest of the area. The difficult task confronting the community is how to bring the divisions that have been imposed and maintain the momentum already generated within it in the period of uncertainty before the official decision on the area is spelled out.

Appendix 1. Memorandum of the St Wendolins Welfare Committee

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE ST WENDOLINS WELFARE COMMITTEE TO THE GROUP HOUSE BOARD INVESTIGATING THE DESIRABILITY OF OTHERWISE OF DEMOLISHING OF ST WENDOLINS RIDGE AS AN INDIAN GROUP AREA

INTRODUCTION

We, the residents of St Wendolins, represented by the St Wendolins Welfare Committee, wish to submit the following memorandum explaining the history of our community, our present position and the reasons for our objection to the proclamation of our area as an Indian group area. We explain also our strong objection to our removal against our wishes to other areas, which will result in great hardship for the present residents of St Wendolins.

Consequently, we request that the proclamation of the St Wendolins area as an Indian area be set aside and that the present residents of the area be allowed to remain as the occupants. In addition, we request that the area known as Savannah Park also be de-proclaimed.

2. THE ST WENDOLINS WELFARE COMMITTEE

The community of St Wendolins is represented by the democratically-elected community organization, the St Wendolins Welfare Committee. The Committee was formed at a public meeting in St Wendolins in 1979 to represent the community in all matters affecting it and to articulate the needs, aspirations and apprehensions of the residents with regard to removals. Since its formation, the Committee has maintained effective liaison with residents of St Wendolins and consulted them in all matters. The Committee is therefore the sole and authentic representative of residents of St Wendolins.

3. HISTORY OF ST WENDOLINS AND SURROUNDING AREAS

The history of St Wendolins and surrounding areas can be traced back to the early years of the 19th century when the ancestors of the present residents first settled in the area. Indeed, the land held by the Catholic Church in Marianhill was granted to the missionaries by the ancestral chiefs of the present occupants of St Wendolins, namely the chiefs of the Nkhameni tribe and the chief of the Shangeni tribe in the early 1880s.

Generation after generation of residents have lived on this land as a stable and settled community passing it on to their children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Some of these generations lived on what is commonly called inherited tribal land. Others from 1930, until they were prohibited in 1950, purchased plots back from the Marianhill Mission Institute, whilst others paid a fee for the right to reside on the mission land.

Thus, the residents of St Wendolins believe that they have a legitimate right to reside
on this land and to resist any move which will disrupt their stable and secure community.

4.

The rapid industrialisation of the Pinetown area in the 1960s resulted in a marked increase in the population of St Wendolins. However, no additional housing was provided by the local authority or industrialists. As a consequence, the residents of St Wendolins felt a humanitarian need to provide accommodation for many of these workers and rapidly integrated them into the community. Indeed, it was at the request of the Port Natal Administration Board in the mid-1960s that such accommodation was provided by the St Wendolins community.

5.

GROUP AREAS PROCLAMATION AND REMOVALS

In 1966 the Saramint Hill monastery was proclaimed for White, Indian and Coloured occupation in terms of the Group Areas Act. Part of the area was also set aside for industrial development. The residents of St Wendolins were told by the government authorities "that they would have to leave.

Subsequently in June 1970, most of the above area was incorporated into the Pinetown municipality and holders of title deeds in the area became ratepayers of Pinetown. It was at this point that the Port Natal Administration Board excluded certain inhabitants from the right to reside in the St Wendolins area. Inhabitants who could not prove residence prior to 1970 were informed that they had to leave the area. However, it was only late in the 1970s that the Board acted upon this. Orders. Hundreds of residents were forced to move from the area around Elsmaater Station.

In 1979, however, all residents of St Wendolins were served with notices to vacate the area by 1 January, 1980.

6.

COMMUNITY RESISTANCE

The residents of St Wendolins and surrounding areas have always been opposed to removal from their ancestral lands. When served with notices to vacate in 1979, residents decided at a public meeting to form the St Wendolins Welfare Committee and to resist removal from the area in every possible way.

In January 1980 some houses were demolished. The community protested against the inadequate compensation being offered to residents and demanded that all demolitions and removals be stopped until the question of compensation was resolved. This demand was acceded to by the Board on 1 January, 1980.

The Welfare Committee continued to resist the removal of residents by telephonic and written protests to the relevant authorities, representations to members of Parliament and appeals for public support. On 22 November, 1980 the Welfare Committee submitted a statement to the Minister of Co-operation and Development protesting against forced removals.

On 16 April, 1981 a petition consisting of 1,300 signatures of household heads was submitted to the Welfare Committee to the Minister of Co-operation and Development. The petition emphasises the desire of the community to remain in St Wendolins and the strong opposition of residents to removals from St Wendolins and surrounding areas. The petition points out that there has been little positive response to the community's pleas from the authorities.

7.

SUPPORT FOR DEPROCLAMATION

The residents of St Wendolins and surrounding areas have a strong and profound attachment to their ancestral lands and homes, and have repeatedly demonstrated their unequivocal opposition to removals and any other form of disruption of their community. The residents, therefore, request the Group Areas Board to deproclaim the area in question for the reasons outlined below.

8.

TARGA AREA SHOULD BE DEPROCLAMATED

On the basis of our representativeness in the area we wish to point out to the Board that the residents of the area do not accept the exclusion of what is now called Savannah Park from the area known as St Wendolins. The residents of the area have instructed the Welfare Committee to bring this to the attention of the Board. The Savannah Park area has always been and continues to be an integral part of St Wendolins. Accordingly, the Welfare Committee requests that the Board deproclaim both the St Wendolins and Savannah Park areas.

9.

STRENGTHS OF THE COMMUNITY

The wishes of the people of St Wendolins and surrounding areas must always be the most important consideration when the future of the people is being considered by any authority. Only bitterness, anger and antagonism can result if the wishes of the people are ignored.

Both before and after the formation of the St Wendolins Welfare Committee, residents have demonstrated their opposition to removal to other areas and demanded the right to continue to live in the area of their birth. Until now, little regard has been shown for the wishes of the residents, as is evident in the many forced removals that have been carried out. It is hoped that the Board will be sympathetic to the wishes of the people to remain in St Wendolins.

10.

CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMUNITY

Adequate and meaningful consultation with the authentic representatives of the community is essential if problems are going to be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties and harmonious relations are to be maintained between different communities.

11.

AN ESTABLISHED AND STABLE COMMUNITY

Most of the residents have deep and historic roots in the area, many having lived there all their lives and some can remember their parents and grandparents living there as long as they can remember. Over the decades the community has achieved a high degree
of unity, stability and cohesiveness which has enabled the community to survive many hardships and problems.

The community is a closely-knit one, among whom there are many practising Christians. There is a well-attended church and attendant religious organisations.

Many families have several generations buried in the graveyard and are strongly opposed to the prospect of deserting ancestral graves and the very real possibility of exhumation and violation of the bodies.

COMMUNITY FACILITIES

The community has a long-established school with approximately two thousand children enrolled. There are three well-organized creches serving the St Wendolins community.

In addition, there are several well-established burial societies which enjoy broad membership thus fulfilling an essential need. Many of these basic facilities are not available in many of the new townships, and those that are established cannot adequately meet the demands presently being made on them. The further influx of persons from resettled areas will overextend such facilities to intolerable levels.

COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS

There are numerous religious organisations in St Wendolins. Several sports clubs operate in the area and the residents identify strongly with these recreational organisations. Women’s organisations play an important role in solidifying the community, developing many essential skills in needlework, cooking and handicraft amongst the women in the area.

The St Wendolins Welfare Committee has developed into a strong organization representing the interests of the community and has helped strengthen the identity and cohesiveness of the community.

All these organisations will be destroyed and their positive contributions lost to the community if the people of St Wendolins are moved to other areas.

SOCIAL SUPPORT AND STABILITY

The maintenance of the existing stability and cohesiveness of the community is critical for the network of informal support given to the aged, the pensioners, widows and orphans. People share each other’s problems and joys. All this will be destroyed by removals.

The crime rate is low in the area, due to the strong moral pressure exerted both formally and informally by the well-established traditions of the community. The residents of St Wendolins are understandably and justifiably anxious that removal to places like Khwabeke and XwaNdingelisi will significantly raise the crime rate in the community.

The residents have maintained a reasonable standard of health, a good example being the complete absence of any incidents of cholera in the area.

The longer travelling time of working parents and the new alien social environment will mean that children will be left unattended for longer periods resulting in a higher incidence of delinquency.

ADEQUATE HOUSING

The housing at St Wendolins, although not ideal, is spacious enough to accommodate comfortably the extended families of the residents. The existence of an extended family structure accommodated in one house serves a critically important function in maintaining the stability of home life. Many houses have fertile gardens which supplement the diet of the household and make survival in harsh economic conditions easier.

Residents are anxious that removal to the much smaller housing units at Khwabeke and XwaNdingelisi will have a detrimental effect on family life by destroying the family unit and its cohesiveness. They are concerned that the uprooting of the community will have an especially detrimental effect on the women and children of the family.

Rentals in St Wendolins for spacious homes are significantly lower than rentals for smaller homes in the areas to which they would be moved.

The Welfare Committee is confident that if the community is allowed to remain in St Wendolins, appropriate housing for all economic groups can be developed with the co-operation of the relevant housing authorities.

The aged, pensioners, grantees and a significant number of unmarried mothers would probably not qualify for housing in the townships and would be faced with an uncertain and problematic future.

DEMONSTRAL EFFECT ON HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY

A tremendous burden will be placed on the household economy of most families if they are moved. The rents will be very much higher in the new townships, without the financial strength of an extended family.

Removal to the proposed areas would significantly raise the transport costs of wage earners. In addition, commuters will spend more time travelling to and from work.

Removal to the new townships would result in the loss of Section 10 rights of workers, with a greater financial strain on workers.

LOSS OF SECTION 10 RIGHTS

To further compound the financial strain, workers, if moved to the proposed areas, would lose their Section 10 rights in terms of the Urban Areas Act, thus transforming them into contract workers. In effect, this would be turning them into foreigners.
SUPPORT OF OUR INDIAN COMMUNITY

There is clear evidence that the Indian community in the Durban – Pinetown area generally and the Indian community in the areas adjacent to St Wendolins do not support the removal of the residents of St Wendolins and surrounding areas. The Indian community has a long history of opposition to the Group Areas Act and will not support the destructive effects of this Act, with which the community is only too familiar.

In addition, the St Wendolins community enjoys the support of a large number of church, social, community, trade union and political organisations.

CONCLUSION

The people of St Wendolins are totally opposed to removal to any other area. In support of this we include 90 affidavits and statements from affected residents. Accordingly, the St Wendolins Welfare Committee requests that both the St Wendolins and Savannah Park areas be proclaimed as Indian areas and the present occupants be allowed to remain as occupants.

The St Wendolins Welfare Committee will lead further evidence at the scheduled Group Areas Board hearing on 18 June 1982.

Signed at Durban this 10th day of June 1982.

(Signed)  
H. E. Dlamini  
CHAIRMAN

Address:
F. O. Box 1125  
Pinetown  
4600

Appendix 2. St Wendolins community survey

The following data is drawn from the results of the surveys conducted by the St Wendolins Welfare Committee in early 1982, the results of which were submitted to the Group Areas Board hearing in July 1982. 261 households were interviewed, amounting to a 41.5% sample of the total number of households in the community.

1. ATTITUDES TO REMOVAL
   1. 98.1% are opposed to being removed.
   7. Reasons for wanting to remain:
      Quality of life at St Wendolins 30.6%
      Life at St Wendolins 16.7%
      Better work opportunities from St Wendolins 13.6%
      Lower cost of living at St Wendolins 12.6%
      Problems of townships 9.6%
      Established services at St Wendolins 8.3%
      History of community 3.2%
      Legal status, with Section 10 at St Wendolins 3.1%
      Title to land at St Wendolins 1.9%
      General financial reasons 0.7%

2. Support for St Wendolins Welfare Committee
   89.6% supported it. 10.4% do not.

2. HOUSEHOLD AND POPULATION DETAILS
   1. 23.2% of the households are multiple (extended and/or compound).
   2. Length of time at St Wendolins:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Percentage of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11+</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. 73.1% of the population is younger than 30 years.


4. Education
   70% of population have some formal education. Over 75% of scholars attend local schools.

5. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
   1. 54.7% of the population are economically active.
   2. Employment
      Over 70% of workers work in nearby Pinetown and New Germany. 73.1% of workers are unskilled or semi-skilled. Average monthly transport costs for workers from St Wendolins is R10.55.
3. KWAPITELA

Kwapitela is an African freehold farm situated in the foothills of the Drakensberg, some 8 km from Howick and about 3 km from the Sanis Pass Hotel. It is approximately 323 ha in area. The land is well-watered, with a river running through one end of the property, well-grassed and relatively free of erosion - one of the few African-owned farms where accusations of ecological damage are least justified. A qualified land evaluator who visited the farm in 1981 assessed the land as worth about R2000 an acre and noted that it was of superior quality to a number of the white farms in the neighbourhood. (APRA Report no. 14, November 1981)

In July 1981 almost all the tenants living at Kwapitela - 69 households - were removed to the lower settlements of Compensation. The landowners - 4 households, all related to each other - have not yet been expropriated and they and a few other families are still living at Kwapitela in a state of acute uncertainty. The landowners have been shown alternative, compensatory land by the local commissioner; three have agreed to be moved, one has not. One official source has admitted to a lawyer that the farm will not be expropriated for another ten years because there is not the money available for this. The landowners have not been told this and they believe their relocation is imminent.

The community of Kwapitela as a whole put up very little resistance to being removed. The following case study looks at the conditions that prevailed there and describes the process of its removal.*

1. General Conditions

HISTORY

The farm was bought by Pitela Hlopho, grandfather of the present owners, on the 23rd August 1900, at a public auction in Pietermaritzburg. By the end of December 1900, the full purchase price of £24 2s 3d had been paid off. In 1904 the farm was subdivided into two parts, Part A, amounting to approximately one third of the original farm, and Part B. Pitela Hlopho then ceded Part A to his brother, Godlani Hlopho, who took over the responsibility of paying off his share of the land. (Title Deed for Part A: 7516/41.) Part B remained the property of Z. Hlopho. (Deed of Grant 9819, registered in 1921.) On his death P. Hlopho willed that Part B be divided among his three heirs.

The actual subdivision of this land was not carried out at the time and this has complicated relationships among the heirs and their descendants ever since. Finally, in 1982 the local commissioner intervened to settle the estate and confer title on each of the heirs. Although some observers have interpreted this as a preliminary to expropriation, the commissioner has denied that this is the intention behind the settlement.

* This case study is based on various APRA reports and the results of 2 surveys undertaken in the community by APRA in 1980 and 1981.

---

4. INCOME DETAILS

1. Wage earners income:

- Average income per worker is R171,96 per month.
- 23.2% of workers earned less than R100 per month.
- 55.9% of workers earned less than R250 per month.

2. Household head's income:

- Average income of household head is R146,62 per month.
- 26.4% of household heads earned less than R50 per month.
- 33.3% of household heads earned less than R100 per month.
- 16 household heads earned more than R350 per month.

3. Household income:

- Average household income is R294,25 per month.
- 19% of households had incomes of less than R100 per month.
- 41.1% of households had incomes of less than R200 per month.

4. Family income:

- Average family income is R224,44 per month.
- 16.5% of families had incomes of less than R50 per month.
- 53.5% of families had incomes of less than R200 per month.

The economic viability of extended families living as households permits a higher level of living. (Survey results, 4)

The implication of this is that relocation into a township system, which breaks up extended households, will lead to a decline in household standards of living.

* 'Family' here refers to nuclear family units within an extended household.
In 1981, the year the tenants were moved, there were 76 households living on the farm, the great majority of them tenants of the Hlopo. APRA interviewed 63 of these households in mid 1980 and found their average size to be 7.4 people, 466 people altogether. The total population (76 households) was therefore probably a little over 550 people. Detailed information on household structure was not collected. The 63 households interviewed had, between them, 79 pre-school and 126 school-going children, as well as 31 members who were 60 years or older. Most households were based on an extended system, new houses being added to the family plot as junior sons married and started families of their own.

LENGTH OF TENURE

Out of 60 tenant households interviewed by APRA in 1980, 52 (87%) had been resident on Kweptela for more than 5 years, over half of them for twenty years or more. 7 of the 60 households (12%) said they had lived there for over 50 years. The community was thus a long-established and stable one, with strong ties to the land. Because of its isolation from centres of industrial employment, Kweptela had not experienced the same pressures from a steady influx of new tenants, as have other more favourably located black spots (Kwaiwa's Kop, for instance). Its isolation has also meant however that it was very vulnerable to other sorts of pressures when it came to be removed — pressures to conform to the authorities' plan for it.

IMPROVEMENTS

Before its destruction in July 1981 Kweptela consisted of a mixture of concrete block and wattle and daub houses and huts, scattered in several clusters across the farm, with grazing land and fields in between. The total number of buildings owned by the 63 households in the APRA survey amounted to 199, i.e. about 3 separate structures per household. Housing was generally of good quality and sturdy built, many of the rooms painted or wallpapered inside. Most households had fenced in their residential plots (and many their fields) in addition to building chicken runs and enclosures for their stock. Most people had built their own pit latrines as well. Each household was asked to assess the value of their buildings and improvements. The total value they arrived at was R53,769, or just over R850 per household. (This did not include the value of their agricultural land.)

The community had also built a stone church which served as a primary school during the week. The school had 120 pupils, ranging between Std 1 and Std 4 and 3 teachers. Teaching conditions were poor, with all the children collected in a single, undivided room. In 1978/79 funds were raised in the community to erect a new school building, with two classrooms, but all donations stopped when people heard they were to be removed. The building programme that was already under way had, therefore, to be abandoned.

In other respects Kweptela was poorly served, a typical rural community. There were no clinics or shops and people depended on the facilities available at Nineville which they reached either by bus (there was a daily bus to Nineville and Underberg) or on foot.

The community's water supply came from the river and a number of springs on the farm. For fuel people depended mainly on wood which they gathered free from a forest on a neighbouring farm. Neither water nor fuel were considered problems since the supply was plentiful and the women regarded the time-consuming chores of collecting these essentials as part of the normal routine of living.
EMPLOYMENT

like other rural communities the people of Kwempila were dependent on wage employment off the farm for their survival. Most workers were unskilled and their wages were low. The most positive aspect about the employment pattern at Kwempila was that the majority of workers were employed locally and thus able to live at home. Out of a total of 104 people working in the 63 households surveyed by APFA, less than half (45) worked outside the district of Underberg. Most of those who had to move out of the district for work worked in the Durban/Port elizabeth area; a few migrated as far away as Johannesburg. The remaining 59 were employed in the Howick/Underberg area, mainly as farm workers on local white farms or as weavers and domestic workers at the nearby Sani Pass Hotel. They commuted to work daily, generally on foot.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture played an important part in the community, both economically and socially. Each household had, on average, about one hectare of arable land to cultivate (in addition to their residential plots), as well as access to communal grazing for their stock. For their land (residential included) tenants paid an annual rent that ranged between R10 and R12.25. As in other black spots households were not self-supporting on their land but all except one of those interviewed by APFA had either stock or fields and generally both; their access to land made an important contribution to household income. The one exception was an old age pensioner, living on his own, who had neither stock nor a field to cultivate. He had only moved to Kwempila 3 years previously, apparently from another threatened black spot. Food production within the community supplemented low wages and boosted the health and general well-being of its members to acceptable levels.

Agricultural production: Only 2 households out of the 63 interviewed by APFA reported that they did not grow any produce - the old age pensioner mentioned above and another recent arrival in the community. The main crops grown were maize, beans and potatoes; many households grew all three. A small number of households grew other vegetables as well - cabbages, turnips, onions, radishes, gourds.

Advantages: There were greater discrepancies between households when it came to ownership of stock but most people kept some animals, though not always cattle. Just 1 out of the 63 households interviewed by APFA kept neither livestock nor poultry. The total numbers of stock owned by the surveyed households in mid 1980 were as follows:

- Cattle: 134
- Goats: 8
- Horses: 8
- Pigs: 14
- Poultry: 676

24 households reported that they had no cattle and answers were not recorded for 2, leaving 37 cattle-owning families with an average of 3.6 head each. There was no limit placed on the number of cattle a family could keep and the largest herd in the survey numbered 10. It appears, however, that by the time of the APFA survey people had already started selling stock in anticipation that they were to be removed. During 1979 the community sold 45 head of cattle for an average price of R300 per head. By July 1980 they had sold a further 19. This amounted to almost 50% of the total number of cattle then left on the farm.

Most households produced agricultural goods exclusively or mainly for their own consumption. However 6 households claimed to sell surplus produce outside of the community, mainly to people living on neighbouring farms, and another 24 claimed to sell a surplus within Kwempila itself.

The APFA report on the findings that emerged from its survey summed up the position at Kwempila thus:

Nobody can describe Kwempila as idyllis - incomes are low, jobs hard to find, the infrastructure of transport, supermarkets, schools etc. that urban people can take for granted is lacking in this as in other rural areas. But it is a settled rural community. It has an established way of life that has been built up over many years. Because Kwempila is black freehold land residents have greater independence and control over their own lives than they would in a township or 'closer settlement' situation. Most important of all, they have an assured access to agricultural land and have built up a lifestyle that centres around that.

It concluded:

A comparison with Compensation, the proposed resettlement site, makes it apparent how much Kwempila residents stand to lose by the move.


2. The removal

OFFICIAL DEALINGS WITH THE COMMUNITY

As early as 1969 the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal informed lawyers acting on behalf of Beekiel Hopke, one of the landowners, that owing to its situation, the above mentioned property is a black spot which in terms of Departmental policy will have to be eliminated in due course. (Letter in APFA files)

In September 1979 the commissioner from Underberg and a couple of other government officials visited Kwempila to inform residents that the farm would be bought up by the government and they would be moved shortly. The officials apparently also told the people that as they were to be moved soon, they should not plough and plant crops that season; if they did so, it would be at their own risk and they would not be compensated for any losses incurred. Many families did not plant as a result. This was to have important repercussions on morale within the community, many people missing two planting seasons before they were finally removed and becoming more alienated and restless at Kwempila as a result.

Shortly after the commissioner's visit in September 1979, houses at Kwempila were numbered by government officials. Residents had no further contact with officials until mid-August in 1980, when another government agent visited them. He informed these present - mainly women - that a date had been arranged for later that month when they were to be taken to see the area to which they would be removed - Compensation, some 60 to 70 km from Kwempila, over dirt roads. A number of people duly visited the site and it seemed that their overall impression was a negative one. Beekiel Hopke, the landowner, commented:

But I don't like that place because there is no ploughing and no place for the cattle. I think it would be better if they can move them to the place where they can do ploughing and where their cattle can live. (Letter in APFA files.)

Nevertheless, despite their reservations about Compensation, at a meeting arranged by the commissioner at the end of August 1980 the majority of people present agreed to move; they also indicated that they wanted to move at once, rather than delay it any longer.
When Ezekiel Kholpe complained about the poor living conditions at Compensation he was told that the matter did not concern him since only the tenants were being moved at that stage.

Subsequently the commissioner organised a further meeting, in November 1980. By that stage some people had planted for the summer season and were no longer as willing to move as they had been two months before. Reports on this meeting conflict but it appears that people asked that they should not be moved till after the harvest and that the commissioner accepted this, instructing them to contact him when they were ready. At least one person interpreted this to APRA to mean that they were safe; that all they had to do to ensure that they were not removed, was not contact the commissioner. 

The publication was premature as it was naive for in late June 1981 the commissioner returned to announce that removals of the tenants would begin the following month on the 2nd of July.

In answer to a series of questions in Parliament tabled by the FPF KP, Graham McIntosh, the Minister of Cooperation and Development maintained that tenants were informed about the compensation assessments made on their properties and had had an opportunity to object but that none of them had done so. (Hansard, Question 441, 7.10.81) In correspondence with lawyers acting on behalf of certain members of the community, his Department subsequently maintained that compensation was discussed 'at length' at at least two meetings held before the people were removed, the one in November 1980 and the other in June 1981. Those removed tell a different story. In a household survey undertaken by APRA in August 1981, none of the community had already been removed to Compensation. 42 respondents reported that they had not received any official notification of assessment before they were removed, 1, a woman, did not know whether her husband had received one or not, 1 person's reply was not clear and only 6 people said that they had known what compensation to expect when they were paid out.

COMMUNITY RESPONSE: VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY?

The official response to questions that have been raised about the removals has been to insist that the people moved voluntarily. 'They asked if they could move and they chose the date to move', the Press Liaison Officer for the Department of Cooperation and Development told reporters of the Natal Witness. (16.07.81) To the extent that most people agreed to go when told that they were to be removed and that no force was required to get them to load themselves and their belongings onto the waiting G6 trucks in July 1981, the move could be classed as voluntary. To say that people asked to be moved is completely false, however. People perceived that they had no choice in the matter and most felt that acquiescence was their prudent course; throughout the process of their relocation the people of Kwegidela have displayed a stoicism and a fatalism that may to some extent be interpreted as a measure of their strength and ability to endure but is also a measure of their sense of impotence in the face of the manifest power of the authorities.

APRA attended two general meetings held at Kwegidela in late 1980 to discuss the community's response to their imminent removal. The one was fairly well-attended but dominated by women since many of the men were away at work; the other was poorly attended, by about 20 people only. They clearly represented the core of residents most anxious to try to prevent being moved if at all possible. At the first meeting the matter of agreement by the community was thoroughly discussed. The most succinct summary of why people had agreed to move was given by one woman who said:

'We did not like to go away because we were born here; it was only that we heard that the government wanted it and we submitted to that. (Notes on the meeting, in APRA files.)'

Another woman said they had agreed to go because they were not allowed to plough.

It was apparent from both meetings that no community organization existed that was strong enough or well-supported enough to rally people together and allow for any serious negotiations between residents and officials. An APRA report on the meetings noted:

The fact that most people do not want to be moved, if they had a free choice, does not mean that the community is organized or strong enough to resist moving. There were a number of people present at the meeting who did not speak at all and are obviously extremely sceptical of the community's readiness to confront the magistrate ... These people most probably see submission to the government's will as the safest option.

(Note on the meetings, APRA files.)

A number of factors can be isolated as contributing towards this lack of organisation and need of acclimatisation:

1) Isolation: Kwegidela, as already described, was a very small and isolated rural community, completely cut off from the mainstream of political activity and organisation within urban and industrial South Africa. There were no telephones in the community, very few people had cars and the main mode of transport was to walk or travel by bus. The people had few links with other threatened communities. Although most of them knew about the removal of people from The Swamp to Compensation (The Swamp was located about 20 km away), it was not an event that had impinged on them in any way. The example of resistance offered by the people of Ntomane's Kop and St Wendolins had not filtered through to the community and the only information they had about the experience of other communities that had been threatened with removal was that all had eventually been moved.

2) Stigmatisation: The community's isolation and sense of insecurity were reinforced by direct warnings from officials and local security police that they should not have any dealings with outside groups who, as one member of the community reported it, 'are likely to deceive them.'

3) Rift between tenants and landowners: The potential conflict that exists in the landlord/tenant situation found on black spots, one that is rooted in their unequal relationship to each other and to the land, had acquired substance at Kwegidela by the time of the removal; this served to alienate many tenants from the place and from the one landowner who was most actively trying to put a halt to the removals. The conflict within the landowning family over the inheritance of the property spilled over onto the tenants when several members of the landowning family all began to demand that rent be paid to each of them. During the ensuing squabbles, many tenants fell into arrears on their rent and were then threatened with legal action as a consequence. The removal of the tenants was separated from that of the landowners - it was in fact carried through before the landowners had been expropriated - and a number of tenants came to see their removal as a means of escaping from the landlords.

4) Absence of men from community meetings: Although the majority of workers worked locally, a substantial number, mainly men, were migrant workers and thus unable to attend community meetings. Even those who worked locally found it difficult to attend the meetings organised by the commissioner since those took place during working hours. This means that most of the people who attended the various meetings held to discuss the removal were women. Kwegidela was a rural and strongly traditionalist community in which the role of women was clearly defined as a domestic and subordinate one. Few women felt they could take an active part in community affairs in the absence of their husbands and thus apparent 'decisions' were reached often by default, the women withholding consent. The commissioner's verdict, that the community was willing to move, was in fact based on a series of meetings that were not representative. A number of women commented afterwards
that they were waiting for their husbands to return home over the Christmas holiday period for an opportunity to discuss the issues relating to being moved more fully.

The removal

The removal of Kwapietsa has been described in APRA report no. 4, issued in November 1981. The removal was spread over two days, the government employing a fleet of about 800 trucks and a huge crew of workers to shift all the people and their goods. Of interest was that the workers, all of them African, were not local people and did not speak Zulu so any communication between them and the people they were moving was ruled out.

The outward appearance of those being removed was impressive - they 'submitted stoically to the demolition of their houses, loading what they could salvage from the rubble and the dust onto the waiting trucks - windows, thatch, sheets of tin roofing, doors and poles and fencing.' (APRA Report no. 14, 1981)

At Compensation the newcomers appeared more dazed than anything else. As each family arrived, it was allocated a site with a tin latrine, the standard one-room 'fletcroft' - a temporary tin hut, some not even fully erected as their occupants arrived - and one or two tents. It was winter, dry and dusty and bitterly cold at night. People's first concern was to store their belongings and secure their own shelter as best they could. (1984)

Most households were supplied with rations of maize meal, soup powder, powdered milk and salt, in quantities large enough to last them for about two weeks - a marked increase over the amount of rations reported in other instances of relocation where supplies, if available at all, were designed to last for three days only. A supply of fuel was also laid on but instead of this being free, which people expected, they had to buy it - their first experience of paying for a basic necessity that formerly had cost them nothing except their labour.

Compensation paid

According to the Minister of Cooperation and Development, a total of R35 606 was paid out as compensation to the tenants moved from Kwapietsa (Hannard, Question 390, 2.04.82); the highest amount paid to any one household was R1 457, the lowest amount was R50 and the average amount was R299.66 (Hannard, Question 441, 7.10.81) - about half what the community had estimated their improvements to be worth, on average, in the APRA survey of October 1980. As already mentioned, most people have maintained that they had no idea of what amount to expect when paid; nor did they know that they could challenge the amount they were paid if not satisfied. One recipient described the procedure as follows:

There was not much said. They would just shout one man's name as per folio number and summon him to the temporary office. On arrival you were just given a certain amount of money and there was no further discussion.

(Unpub. APRA report, 'Preliminary results: Survey of Kwapietsa residents moved to Compensation', 1981, 1)

People were paid in cash and there have been allegations that supervision of the payout clerks was insufficient and certain procedures adopted were irregular - for instance that some people signed or thumbprinted for their money before they received the cash. None of these allegations have been followed up in any way. The dominant attitude among those who were compensated appeared to be a sense of gratitude that they had been paid at all, coupled to a fear that by complaining they might place in jeopardy the money they had received. Subsequently five households did request legal help in securing compensation for damages caused to their goods in transit. After a protracted period they were finally paid out the full amounts requested.

Attitudes after their relocation

APRA conducted a survey among the former Kwapietsa tenants in August 1981, about six weeks after they had been moved. People's responses to questions about their attitudes towards their new places indicated much the same ambivalent spirit of resignation that they had displayed at Kwapietsa. 65% of the 54 households surveyed confessed they were not glad to be at Compensation, 15% said they were and 20% were noncommittal, framing their replies with such revealing statements as 'We have no way to like it or not', or 'Because there is no alternative, we have accepted this place.' Despite the majority of people who did not like Compensation, 97% said it was as they expected. Explained one woman:

I expected the place not to be good for I have seen and heard of other removals, I had no hope.

The conditions awaiting the people at Compensation have already been described in the case study in Part Two. Only 2 of the Kwapietsa households reported that they had no problems, with a further 10 unwilling to comment themselves. The remaining 42 households reported a wide range of problems, the 4 major complaints being fuel (23 times), no land (20 times), the general unsuitability of life in a situation where a person has to pay for everything (11 times) and no room for stock (10 times). (A number of households had refused to sell their stock when they left Kwapietsa. Some had found grazing to rent elsewhere; others brought their animals with them and have been hiring grazing from the landowner from the Bamp whose compensatory land adjoins the closer settlement; a very unsatisfactory arrangement since the grazing is poor and the land not properly fenced.)

15 out of the 54 respondents interviewed by APRA in August 1981 felt there were positive aspects to Compensation, these being better transport compared to that at Kwapietsa (6 times), the school (5 times), and their greater proximity to medical care and shops (3 times). The school, as mentioned in the chapter on Compensation in Part Two, is in the one substantial improvement to have been built in the closer settlement. It has made it possible for more children to attend primary school than did at Kwapietsa - but it is a facility that could just as easily have been provided at Himiswil.

The situation in 1982

The removal to Compensation has forced major changes in the lifestyle of the former Kwapietsa tenants. A year after their removal, most households have managed to start building new houses, but to date most of them have only managed to build single structures and many are still living in the fletcroft huts. Rebuilding has been slower and more expensive than anticipated and it seems doubtful that most people will be able to reproduce the size and the quality of the housing they had before. Most of the workers in the community appear to have retained their previous jobs but those who used to work in the Himiswil/Inferberg area have been turned into migrant workers, returning home once a week or once a month instead of daily. People complain heavily about the high cost of living and the landlessness which are regarded as major disadvantages in their new situation. However many have expressed relief at being independent of their former landlords; their attitude towards Compensation appears to have been softened by that.

In several trips back to the community since July 1981, an APRA fieldworker has picked up a growing concern within the community about the increased level of drinking since the removal. It appears that a number of people have returned to opening shebeens as a means of making extra money and that the incidence of drunkenness in the community has risen alarmingly. This suggests that the adjustment to the removal and the closer settlement way of life has been more traumatic than the stoical exterior of the people seems to indicate.
4. STEINCOALSPRUIT

1. History of ownership

PURCHASE

In 1874 a group of 42 Christian africans purchased a section of the farm Steincoalspuit from the widow of Dirk van Enoyen, who had owned it since 1852. The farm lies about midway between Elandslaagte and Weberskloof, on the southern side of the Bergendal mountains and within the Klip River district. Subdivision A (or Section 2 as it is now called) comprised 2 037 acres and the purchase price was £150. Transfer was effected on 7th April 1874. (Title Deed no. 149) The remainder of the farm, 6 714 acres in extent, was purchased by a group of 9 Christian africans in 1877, transfer being effected on the 31st October 1877. (Title Deed no. 772) Just over a hundred years later such land as still vested in the hands of descendants of the original owners was expropriated in order to implement the South African government's policy of black plot removals and bantustan consolidation. A further reason could be the potentially useful coal deposits that underlie this land. This could explain the timing of the removals, in the context of the energy crisis and the ensuing exploitation and re-exploitation of Natal's coal resources.

ORIGINS OF OWNERS

The original purchase of Steincoalspuit was part of that process whereby missionaries encouraged Christian africans to buy land on the open market, described in Part One. The owners of Steincoalspuit came originally from the Rev. Wilhelms Illing's mission station at Ladysmith. Illing, described by Norman Etherington as 'a queer, independent fellow who flirted about from society to society' (Etherington, 1975, 607), had originally studied at the Berlin Missionary Society, came to South Africa with a group of Hermannsburg missionaries, was briefly connected with Bishop Coleman's mission in 1866, and then became a missionary for the Rev. Dr. Cachet's Dutch Reformed Church at Ladysmith. Although Cachet's plans to found a permanent Dutch Reformed mission in Natal failed, Illing remained in Ladysmith, supported by the tithes of his black congregation. By 1879 the population of his station numbered 868, of whom just over half were of Khoi origin. (Ibid., 127 – 128)

Among those who gathered at his station were former slaves of Boer farmers in the Orange Free State and the Cape, and it is from these that the majority of the original purchasers of Steincoalspuit were drawn. Many of them adopted the names of their original captors, and only later did they or their descendants revert to their original names. Names such as Isawel Mhlebeny Pogilester, Elias Bhegu Schoeman and Nicodemos Bester appear among the 42 who bought Section A.

In all but a few cases, the history of these ex-slaves has been lost. The memory of the remarkable Abraham Limberg, however, remains very much alive among his descendants. Limberg was a Tswana who originally lived at Jericho near Pretoria in the Transvaal. In the turbulent years of war, raids and counter-raids that characterised the middle years of the 19th century in South Africa, he and his elder sister were carried off by Boers to live the formative years of their lives in the Orange Free State. At the age of about 14, Limberg decided to escape, and, armed with a spear, moved down the Van Reenen's Pass into Natal where he settled at Illing's station at Ladysmith. There he became a...
builder by trade and worked to save money to buy his own land. By his own account to the Natal Native Affairs Commission in 1907, he had adopted ‘European customs’ and had, in addition to his activities as a builder in Ladymith, become ‘a considerable fruit grower’ on his portion of Steinkopfgruit. By 1913 he also owned three in Bergville and Ladymith. He died in 1920. A little is known, too, of the origins of Stooffel Botha, whose African name was Christoffel Mbulu, through an affidavit lodged on 26th September 1926 with his title deed (no. 117 of 1887) in the Deeds Office in Pietermaritzburg. There it is recorded that he was at one time a slave in the Cape and settled in Natal after he had been liberated. He died in 1906. A further affidavit lodged with title deed no. 116 of 1887, records that Adam Jacob’s African name was Adam Mun (also spelt Munu) but there is no information about his history.

SECTION A (NOW LISTED AS SECTION 1)

This, the first purchase of a section of Steinkopfgruit in 1874, was made in the form of a syndicate, which was one of the most common ways in which Africans bought land in Natal at that time. Transfer of the land was made on 7th April 1874 to Abraham Limberg, William Afrion and Lucas Jacob, acting on their own behalf, and in trust for thirty-nine others. The land was divided into 600 shares and each of the 42 purchasers held shares in proportion to their contribution to the purchase price. The biggest shareholder was William Afrion with 40 shares. Afrion was a wealthy Christian who owned 600 acres of land in his own right in addition to shares in several other farms. (Rutherford, 1978, 118)

As shares were sold or ceded to heirs, it became difficult to administer the property and reconcile the different interests involved. In 1897, after the death of Lucas Jacob, one of the trustees, a kind of constitution for the Syndicate was drawn up. It was decided that the registered owners of the property would hold a General Meeting when necessary. The legal firm, Walton and Tawhe, of Ladymith was appointed as secretary to the Trust and it was their task to convene these meetings. Such meetings could be asked for by any of the Trustees or by a signed request from at least six proprietors holding a minimum of 50 shares collectively. Each shareholder had one vote and resolutions of the General Meeting would become effective and binding only when passed by a majority of the shareholders (i.e. more than half of all the votes of the shareholders).

None of the shares of the Syndicate could be divided. The General Meeting was empowered ‘to deal in any and every way with the said land’ and in particular was empowered to lease or sell or otherwise deal with or utilize minerals on the property, or such rights as were necessary for the complete working of such mineral rights. The General Meeting, with the consent of three-quarters of the votes of the shareholders, could sell the land as a whole or any subdivision of it ‘to any person or persons’ or could partition it, or portions of it, among the shareholders. (These resolutions were lodged with Title Deed no. 149/1874 in the Deeds Office, Pietermaritzburg, on 26th July 1898.) Additional rules were devised at a meeting of the Syndicate on 16th November 1916. Provision was made for the annual election, by majority vote, of a Committee of Management consisting of 6 persons from among the proprietors and including the Trustees, with vested powers to govern all matters concerning the working of the farm and the general welfare and good government of the lands and the occupiers thereof.

One of the Trustees would chair the Committee and would have a deliberative and a casting vote. Roads, founatains, springs, and natural streams were declared open to the use of all shareholders. Probably because of the provisions of the Land Act of 1913, it was declared that no shareholder had the right to sell any of his shares ‘to a person of European descent’. The transfer of any share would be subject to the approval of the Committee of Management. All shareholders were given the right to place one ‘native hut’ on the land for the purpose of securing labour. The Committee would decide whether any additional huts could be placed on the land for labour purposes. Rent-tenants on the Syndicate lands were absolutely forbidden. Any revenue from tenants would accrue to the funds of the Syndicate and would be lodged in their Standard Bank account at Ladymith. Finally, the Committee was empowered to adjudicate in any disputes over cattle. The shares of the Syndicate were arranged in such a way that each shareholder had land to cultivate and access to common pasture. (The new regulations were lodged with Title Deed no. 149/1874 in the Deeds Office on 9th August 1915.)

THE REMAINDER OF STEINKOPFGRUIT

The remainder of Steinkopfgruit, bought in 1877 by 9 Christian africans, was subsequently divided among them and each received transfer of their portions on 25th March 1887. Of these, Abraham Limberg and Lucas Jacob also held shares in Section A which comprised the Syndicate farm. The remainder was divided as follows:

- Sub B (now Sub 2) consisting of about 560 acres at a cost of £250 4s 6d to Adam Jacob (also known as Adam Know or Nkau), Title Deed no. 117/1887
- Sub C (now lot 349 of Washbank Township) consisting of 960 acres at a cost of £480 12s 6d to Stooffel Botha (also known as Christoffel Mbulu), Title Deed no. 118/1887
- Sub D (now Sub 1) consisting of about 750 acres at a cost of £285 to Isaac Wildschut, Title Deed no. 119/1887
- Sub X (now lot 293 of Washbank Township) consisting of 1 008 acres at a cost of £50 to Johannes de Bruyn of Naul (also known as Johannes Uebert or Botha), Title Deed no. 119/1887
- Sub F (now Sub 6) consisting of about 351 acres at a cost of £192 15s 0d to Philip Hofman, Title Deed no. 120/1887
- Sub C (now Sub 7) consisting of 646 acres and 8 perches at a cost of £232 to Abraham Limberg (also known as Abraham Limberg Kasi), Title Deed no. 121/1887
- Sub H (now lot 345 of Washbank Township) consisting of about 638 acres at a cost of £393 3s 0d to Timontho Sinyalwanda, Title Deed no. 122/1887
- Sub I (now lot 292 of Washbank Township) consisting of about 622 acres at a cost of £311 12s 6d to Thesiumb Shiyayelwa, Title Deed no. 123/1887
- Sub J (now Sub 10) consisting of about 716 acres at a cost of £356 to the estate of the late Lucas Jacob, Title Deed no. 124/1887

Of these, Subs B, D, I and J have, either in whole or in part, passed into white or Indian hands. Sub B was sold by Adam Jacob’s heirs to Hendrik J. de Vos in 1925, who in turn sold it to the Natal Steam Coal Company in 1946. When the Natal Steam Coal Company closed down in 1970, the land was sold to James Anderson who still occupies the farm. The partitioning of Sub D began in 1899 when Isaac Wildschut sold 200 acres to Walter Bycock. Today the land is owned by the Lubwahama family. Sub J I was subdivided with a portion passing into the hands of I. O. Assum. The remainder was purchased by the Natal Steam Coal Company in 1942 and in 1971 was sold to a white, Willem Jacobus Erasmus. Sub J was sold to Jacobus Kulu in 1891 and subsequently partitioned among his descendants. Sub A of J (about 516 acres in extent) was bought by Sgumi Pillay in 1944 and is still held by Indians today. The remaining portions of Sub J were expropriated by the government from various members of the Kulu family in October 1970 and January 1979. Stephen Vare, a man classified as of coloured descent and a shareholder in the Syndicate, bought Sub J; the existing title holder is his descendant and still occupies the land. A portion of Sub F, consisting of about 154 acres, passed
2. Development in early 20th century

Steincolagruit was one of the few African farms in the Klip River district that was designated for possible release as a black area by the Local Committee appointed to investigate increasing the area of the African reserves after the passage of the 1913 Act. It was not included in the schedule to the 1936 Act, however, and, along with the neighbouring African-owned farms of Booms, Lyell, Merton, Boomkloof and Beyfrinfontein, became designated a black spot.

On 8th March 1938, H. G. Lug, Chief Native Commissioner in Natal, reported on black-owned properties in the Newcastle, Dundee and Hluhluwe districts with a view to the implementation of the 1936 Land Act. As most of the land in released areas was already owned by blacks he recommended that an additional 74,000 acres of land be purchased to the north of Dundee, so that land could be offered in exchange for the 12,000 acres of black-owned land situated outside the released areas and to make provision for each factor as the natural increase in the black population and for accommodating a large number of landless Native living in Urban Areas and on farms adjacent to some of the coal mines where they are residing under most undesirable conditions, and should be removed. (Natal Archives, C.O.C. (19) N 2/10/2 X (NON 22/681))

One of the points stressed by Lug in his report was the fact that black-owned land outside the released areas was 'greenly overstocked' and overworked with tenants. With regard to this latter point, it is interesting to note the opinions expressed by the Native Commissioner at Ladysmith on the effects of the 1913 Land Act in the Klip River district. In his view, the 'extorting conditions' under which labour tenants were permitted to occupy privately owned 'white' land in Natal was a reason for the preference of many blacks to settle on black-owned land as labour or rent tenants. Every inmate of a black household on a white farm, male and female, was required to give six months farm labour 'at a wage ranging from nothing to 10/- per month.' Given the fact that there were no 'native released or accepted areas' in the district, the few black-owned farms inevitably became considerably overworked. (Natal Archives, C.R.C. (21), N 2/1/2 D 10)

Steincolagruit was no exception. Although the Constitution of the Syndicate controlled the number of tenants on the Syndicate farm, and forbade rent-tenants, and some landowners, like the Kaisie of Section G, did not allow tenants to settle on their land, preferring to allow their labour tenants to be housed on their share of the Syndicate farm, others permitted both labour and rent-tenants to settle on their land. Some areas, especially Subdivision C of the Kholovos, became very densely populated, particularly with rent-tenants who worked on the neighbouring coal mines of the Natal Steam Coal Company. In trying to seek solutions to this problem in 1938, Lug pointed out that any proposal for the removal of Africans occupying the block of farms consisting of Boomskloof, Lyell, Merton, Steincolagruit and Booms 'would probably meet with considerable opposition' and 'coercion should be resorted to only as a last resort.' Africans should be induced voluntarily to abandon their present holdings through making 'the terms of exchange and compensation on a generous scale.' He further pointed out that

Most of the Native-owned land constituting 'black spots' is fertile and enables the owners to derive a considerable income from the squatters.

On the other hand the land recommended for their accommodation is isolated and in many instances of poor fertility. (Natal Archives, C.O.C. (19), N 2/10/2 X (NON 22/683))

He also pointed to the fact that the black-owned farm 'Vrede' in the Newcastle district was said to have valuable coal deposits.

OPPOSITION FROM KLANDSALANTE FARMERS' ASSOCIATION

As already described, the white Klandalsante Farmers' Association (which was formed in 1919) and which had formed in the neighbourhood of Steincolagruit (among its members) was opposed both to the acquisition of white-owned land by the Native Trust and to the continued existence of black spots. In 1933 it was proposed to sell lot 2 of Subdivision P of Steincolagruit to an African, the legal firm Walton and Tatham argued that

The land lies within what is recognised as a large native settlement, but which has not been declared a native area, and consequently the property can only be knocked down to a European purchaser unless special permission to sell to a native could be obtained. As the property is only a small one, and surrounded by others owned by natives, we do not think it would in any case prove sufficiently attractive to interest a European purchaser... (Natal Archives, C.O.C. (25), N 2/1/6 (21) (NON 21/126))

The Klandalsante Farmers' Association strongly opposed this, arguing that

This association has always been opposed to the sale of the land in the midst of a European area. The present locations are a menace to European farmers and we have agitated for years to try and get the land exchanged for land in a native area. As far as the farm Steincolagruit is concerned a big percentage of the land has gradually been reverting back to European ownership and we are hoping that it will not be long before all this land will fall into European possession. (Ibid.)

As a result of this opposition, the proposed sale was blocked. This kind of pressure has been maintained consistently by the Klandalsante Farmers' Association to the present day. Archie Blyth records in his unpublished typescript history of the Association:

As yet, nothing has been done to remove the Black Spots from our area. We have met Dr Volkamer, our MP, and also Bantu Affairs officials but to no avail, yet more European farm land is being bought by the Bantu. (A. Blyth, Continuation of History of the Klandalsante Farmers' Association, 1979)

3. The removals threat

TEENANTS REMOVED

In 1977 the landowners of Steincolagruit were informed that they were to be removed and their land expropriated in terms of Section 13 (2) of the Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936. While white opposition to black spots and the desire to implement the blueprint for territorial segregation undoubtedly played a part, the actual timing of the move perhaps owes more to the realisation of the value of the coal deposits underlying the black-owned sections of Steincolagruit.

In response to a letter of objection to these proposals from representatives of the landowners, Dr F. Hartenberg, then Deputy Minister of Bantu Development, wrote to P.B. Xasi (who acted as spokesman for the people of Steincolagruit) on the 12th October 1977.

In this letter he stated that the tenants and landowners who owned less than 60 acres would be offered accommodation in Kuyukani Bantu Township which was situated about
502 kilometres from Ladymist. Those owning more than 42 acres would receive compulsory land in a new area purchased from white farmers where no people had hitherto been relocated. In the latter the landowners had objected to Evukveni because of the fantastic violence in the area. In reply, Dr Hartzenberg described Evukveni as 'a quiet, peaceful community' and stated bluntly that the owners of compulsory land would be 'able to exercise the necessary control and prevent unrest and faction fights.' He anticipated no problems and believed 'that the people concerned will be able to carry on as in the past.' (See Appendix 1) The true picture of Evukveni is one of an almost deserted settlement, with little water and firewood, located in an area suffering from endemic faction fighting. It is one of the largest closer settlements in Natal, with a population currently estimated at about 20,000 people. Unemployment is high and the general state of facilities very poor.

Late in 1977 and in 1978 the labour tenants and rural-ethnicity of Steinkopfland were removed to Evukveni. A total number of 11488 were resettled in 1978. (Hannard, question 577, 22.04.80) Apparently the tenants put up little resistance to the move, but, according to one landowner, 'only the 10% who are brewing beer are happy at Evukveni.'

LANDOWNERS' RESPONSE

But realizing that they could refuse the government's order to be removed, the landowners (some 100 households) initially agreed to remunou subject to certain conditions. A group of five were elected from among their number to act as spokesmen for the landowners and Mr F. B. Kesi was appointed general secretary. In a letter to the then Minister ofantu Development, M. C. Botha, Mr Kesi stipulated two conditions to their agreement to being removed:

1) it was to be an area free of faction fighting;
2) the new land must have adequate water supply.

After the landowners were served with expropriation orders on 16th June 1978, and a General Meeting of the Syndicate was held, further conditions were added:

3) The landowners must be given the opportunity to examine the compensatory land to ascertain whether or not it constituted a fair exchange;
4) There must be adequate compensation in cash for the value of the coal on their land.

Upon receipt of the expropriation notice, Mr Kesi, on behalf of the landowners, responded within the requisite sixty days informing the Minister of Agriculture that the amount of compensation offered were rejected, particularly because of dissatisfaction with the evaluation of the coal deposits. However the Secretary for Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure argued that from expert advice on the mineral rights ... it appears that the coal deposit is of such poor quality that it has practically no economic value. The value of the coal is thus purely nominal and was included in the land value. The offer represents the land value plus rights to minerals and improvements, if any. (See Appendix 2)

COAL RESOURCES

This conclusion is open to dispute. When the first systematic survey of the coal resources of Natal was made in 1980, Fred North, the government-appointed geologist, reported positively on the potential of Steinkopfland. (Natal Government Gazette, 24.05.1981) In the latter years of the 19th century and early 20th century, several companies worked the coal seams on Steinkopfland: Rammay Collyary (Subdivision B),

the Central, Victoria Navigation and Rammay's Rok Collyaries (Subdivision G) and the Natal Steam Coal Company (Subdivisions E and F). With the exception of the Natal Steam Coal Company, these collyaries were relatively shortlived. However, according to R. J. Wybergh

It would appear that the reasons for closing were salami or over the sudden exhaustion of the coal, but rather the encountering of broken ground and coal of low volatile contents, or the inability to compete with mines more favourably circumstanted in respect of width of seams, proximity to railway, etc. (R. J. Wybergh, The Inland Coalfields of Natal. Department of Mines and Industry. Geological Survey. Mapir vol. 19. The Coal Resources of Natal of South Africa. Vol. II (Pretoria, 1925, 79)

chasing technology, not merely with regard to the development of more sophisticated machinery but also with regard to the ability to exploit different types of coal, have brought the coal resources of Natal into fresh perspective, and it is not uncommon for old mines to be re-opened.

The fact that the coal resources of Steinkopfland are potentially valuable is indicated by the approaches made by the Flatberg Collyary (based at Khandalaagte) to the KwaD (Section G) and the Mdlalovu (Section D) to negotiate a contract for the right to explore and exploit the coal resources on their land. Each was offered R500 to cover one year's exploration, and, should the results prove positive, R200 per hectare for the right to exploit the coal. This occurred just before the land was expropriated; the collyary withdrew the offer after the government had expropriated the land. A neighbouring white farmer, the owner of Subdivision E of Steinkopfland and himself an experienced ex-miner, having worked for the Natal Steam Coal Company from 1945 - 1970, is currently negotiating with a collyary for the sale of the mineral rights on his farm. He has estimated that his neighbours, the Mdlovu, have at least a million tons of coal underlying their land. The Natal Steam Coal Company tapped these resources from time to time through their Inkunzi shaft on Subdivision C. This was done by means of a mineral lease concluded in 1926 for an initial period of fifteen years which was subsequently renewed.

The leasing of mineral rights which allowed the landowners to remain on their land was the most common means by which the coal was exploited. For instance, the Rammay Collyary leased the mineral rights from Adam Jacob Manu on Subdivision B and in February 1948, F. T. Newton, manager of the Natal Steam Coal Company, negotiated with Daniel Manu for the right to mine any coal left by the Rammay Collyary for the sum of £50. Arthur Rodgers Jenkins of Durban negotiated a mining lease from the KwaD of Subdivision G for thirty years from 1st April 1906.

Only in one case were mineral rights sold outright. On 23rd April 1896 Johannes Hlatu sold, for £500, to James Rammay all mines beds or means of coal as well opened as unopened lying or being in or under the lands ... together with the right and power to mine, work, get and carry away all coal from the whole of Subdivision E and Subdivision A of Subdivision D of Steinkopfland and Subdivision D of the neighbouring farm Bulgetfontein. Thus the mineral rights came to belong exclusively to the Natal Steam Coal Company. This company was eventually taken over by the Johannesburg-based firm Brick and Clay who presumably now own the mineral rights, even though the mines of the Natal Steam Coal Company was closed in 1970. It would appear, then, that the Hlatu and the Bhengu who married into the Hlatu family cannot claim compensation for the mineral rights on their land. However, there is a large mine dump on Subdivision E. The value of mine dumps has been recognised in recent years and one farmer in the Khandalaagte area sold the dump on his farm for
BGSO 000. According to an expert on mine dumps there is some good coal in the dump of the old Natol Steam Coal Company. Perhaps a case for some form of compensation could be made here.

INVESTIGATION OF KWAZULU

Determined to secure adequate compensation for their mineral rights, the landowners of Steincoasluprut decided in about March 1979 to involve the Kwazulu government in their negotiations. A deputation went to Umkunko and was received by Mr. Mhlongo, the Minister of the Interior. At his invitation they prepared a memorandum for him to submit to Pretoria. On 22nd November 1979 the landowners of Steincoasluprut held a meeting which was attended by the Commissioner at Ladysmith, Mr. Stander. At this meeting Mr. Kasi reiterated the landowners' standpoint. A month later a General Meeting of the proprietors of Steincoasluprut was held, with the local Kwazulu M.P. attending as advisor. The meeting decided unanimously that they would not leave Steincoasluprut, unless they were paid cash for the coal. However, given the fact that among the farms already allocated to Kwazulu, there were none that served as suitable compensation for Steincoasluprut, the meeting expressed the wish that the landowners be left until the consolidation commission had completed its recommendations, and better farms might emerge. These decisions were conveyed to the Commissioner at Ladysmith for submission to Pretoria. (See Appendix 3.)

In July 1980, the Kwazulu Secretary for the Interior informed Mr. Kasi of the result of his representations to the South African government. The request not to be moved was refused because the farm Steincoasluprut constitutes a black spot i.e. an isolated portion of farmland owned by blacks in the white areas of Ladysmith District. Nothing was said about compensation for mineral rights although it was pointed out that compensation had been allocated and the Chief Commissioner of Natal would show this to the landowners. (See Appendix 4.) And there the matter has stood. The landowners to date have not been shown the compensatory land. Although it appears that a few shareholders in Section I (the Syndicate farm) have been bought out by Pretoria, most landowners are still on the land. There has been no indication from Pretoria about when it intends to pay compensation and when it intends to move people – or where. Once more its tactics of delay, the withholding of information and a total indifference to the plight of the landowners are on display – and the effects are visible in the community, in the form of insecurity, confusion and a fear of probing the future too sharply, which inhibits organization.

THE POSITION TODAY

The position of landowners today is that they do not want to move at all. They are trying to fight a rear guard action to get their land restored to them; representatives have secured legal advice. In 1982 the Nationalist M.P. for the area, Mr. Volker, made a widely-publicised speech in Parliament in which he indicated that where black farmers were involved, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply, black spot removals should not apply. (Kuwait, vol. 1, 21.04.82) The landowners have tried to investigate this possibility with him; so far the results have not been encouraging. - Mr. Volker's attitude appears to be that the landowners must leave Steincoasluprut, although he has not committed himself to a position on their coal rights.

The story of Steincoasluprut is another tragic case study of the government's policy of relocation. It is not simply a question of people being deprived of adequate compensation for valuable mineral rights. It entails also the disintegration of what was once a viable and flourishing community. The mining community of the Natal Steam Coal Company, which was a presence at Steincoasluprut from the 1930s through to 1970, was undoubtedly an important element in the economic life of the black inhabitants. When the mine of the Natal Steam Coal Company closed in 1970, the inhabitants of Steincoasluprut lost the advantages of local employment opportunities, and the weekly visits of doctors from Ladysmith to the mine hospital. However, the people of Steincoasluprut had also created their own infrastructure. A brick and thatch church for Presbyterian services as well as a primary school were built for the community on the site of the old church and adjacent schoolrooms were built on Subdivision C. However, when the tenants were removed in 1977-78, these education in the valley were no longer available and had to close. Today only the walls of the church and shop remain, with rusting cones and cogs.

The Anglican church is in ruins. The high school was never built and is out of the primary school. The remaining landowners however still attend Sunday services in the Presbyterian church on the Syndicate farm. The remaining residents are children taken by bus daily to Esikhaweni. This is the only form of public transport available to the inhabitants, for of whom there are many.

Despite the disintegration of the community around them, many of the landowners still live in very favourable circumstances. The land is good – it is, now, under-utilized because farming is particularly difficult under present conditions. Their houses are large, well-constructed and well-established, with trees and gardens (flowers and vegetables). Water is plentiful. If the landowners could be allowed to remain on their land and dispose of their mineral rights in the most economically advantageous ways, they could well, with the capital and with extension service support, farm their land efficiently.

Mr. Kasi has described to fieldworkers how, as a young student, he became aware of his great-grandfather's foresight in erecting a secure land base for his family. This made it possible for him (Jubberg's great-grandson) to go to college when many of his peers, the sons of tenants of white farmers, were prevented from this privilege because they had to meet the labour requirements of their father's landowners. As a mark of his gratitude Mr. Kasi determined that the Kasi family should erect a suitable monument on his great-grandfather's grave. In the early 1960s this idea was realized and a large marble tombstone was carved on Abram Lushberg's grave in the next family cemetery sheltered by orange and pomegranate trees (probably planted by the first Lushberg) near the Kasi house. The tombstone is a symbol of the family's ties to the land and their faith in their future upon it. Now that future is in jeopardy and the tombstone may and up as a monument to how relocation has destroyed a community.
Appendix 1. Letter from Dr. Hartzenberg, October 1977

Ministerie van Bantoe-administrasie en -ontwikkeling en van Bantoe-onderwys
Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development and of Bantu Education

88/ P.O. Box 384 Pretoria 0001

Mr F B Kazi
C/o Aumaal
P O Messelenek
2910

Dear Sir

REMOVALS AT LADYSMITH

With further reference to your letter dated 27 August 1977, I wish to inform you that the tenants and the landowners, who own less than 42 acres, are to be offered accommodation at Ekuvkeni Bantu Township. The owners who own more than 42 acres will receive compensatory land in a new area which has been purchased from white farmers and where no people have up to now been settled. Ekuvkeni is a quiet, peaceful community and the owners of the compensatory land will, as is the case with their present properties, be able to exercise the necessary control and prevent unrest and faction fights.

No problems are accordingly foreseen and it is anticipated that the people concerned will be able to carry on as in the past.

Yours faithfully,

DR F HARTZENBERG M P
DEPUTY MINISTER OF BANTU DEVELOPMENT

Appendix 2. Letter, Secretary for Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure, 22.01.79

DEPARTMENT VAN LANDINNIS EN GRONDINNIS
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND LAND TENURE

Mr Ed. Fred. Dr. En. Mnr. Mr. Mnr.
Rooipark, Stropdor, Randburg, S.A.
Tel. 3240900

The Secretary for Tribal Affairs
and Development
F.O. Box 384
PRETORIA
0001

REMOVAL OF BLACK SPORTS: STEIN COAL SPRUIT NO. 1171
COUNTY OF KLIP RIVER

Your minute No. D189/1370/41 of the 27th September 1978, refers.

I have to inform you that this Department obtained expert advice on the mineral rights from which it appears that the coal deposit is of such poor quality that it has practically no economic value. The value of the coal in thus purely nominal and was included in the land value. The offers represent the land value plus rights to minerals and improvements, as any.

Kindly advise the Commissioner accordingly.

[Signature]

SECRETARY FOR AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND LAND TENURE
Appendix 3. Letter, Secretary of Steincoalspruit proprietors, 28.12.79

P.O. Box 53,
WASHBANK,

The Commissioner
LADYSMITH.

Dear Sir,

Re: RESettlement STEENKOALSprUIT.

On the 22nd December 1973 a General Meeting of Proprietors of Steincoalspruit was held to decide on the letter from the Secretary for Co-operation and Development with regards to cash payment for coal.

Mr. C.H. Sithabe, Hon. Member of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was also invited to advise us on this matter.

It was unanimously decided that:

1. As Steincoalspruit has coal, we are not prepared to leave until we are paid cash for the coal.

2. Of the farms set aside for KwaZulu Government we see no farms that can be a suitable compensation for Steincoalspruit. We, therefore, wish to be left until the commission appointed by the Hon. The Minister of Co-operation and Development completes its recommendation. We feel there will be better farms thereafter.

This matter has now been referred to the KwaZulu Government.

Yours humbly,
F.B. Kazi

GENERAL SECRETARY.
5. UMBULWANE

1. Background

Umbulwane is a black freestall area falling within the municipal Townlands of Ladysmith in Northern Natal. By 1980, according to the residents, there were a total of 610 adults and 300 children living there. Their houses, mostly small wattle and daub structures, are scattered in clusters across a bleak, flat plain on the outskirts of the town. There are 41 landowning families – mainly African, but there are some Indian and coloured owners as well. The rest of the population are tenants of the landowners. Most of the tenants are African but there are people classified as coloured living there too – Bantu-speaking and integrated into the community, but classified as a separate group by officialdom.

Umbulwane is one of fourteen black spots under threat of removal in the Ladysmith area. The landowners and tenants are eventually to be removed, but at present it is the tenants who are coming under fire. In August 1980 municipal and DAB officials arrived unannounced and started demolishing tenant houses but, as a result of subsequent organisation within the community and adverse press publicity about the actions of the officials, coinciding with a general closing-down of the removal programmes, the immediate pressure slackened and today, two years later, the community is still maintaining a tenacious existence there. The threat remains a real one however, although it is not clear when or how the local authorities will next act.

Umbulwane is of interest both as a case study of how a small and, on the face of it, very weak community has managed to resist being moved over for two years and as a case study of the growth of informal settlement and the workings of influx control in a medium-sized Natal town.

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNITY

Although it is no longer recognised by the authorities, landowners claim that Umbulwane is the oldest black residential area in Ladysmith. The land was bought by their grandparents in the late 19th century, long before municipal townships were built for the African population of the town, and grew into an informal, semi-rural township. It appears that at first the land fell outside the municipal boundary, but at some stage in the early 20th century it was incorporated and as a result landowners became rate-payers. Later, the municipal townships of Steadville, Jakwana City Location and White City Location were built on land lying between Umbulwane and the town and numbers of tenants moved into them from Umbulwane. Large numbers of families remained on as tenants however, presumably because life at Umbulwane was cheaper than in the official townships and permitted a more rural lifestyle, with grazing land for stock and space for small fields and gardens. Until the township of Ezenkheni was built in 1972 (25 km from the town) the supply of formal township houses was also completely insufficient to meet all of Ladysmith's needs.

HISTORY OF PREVIOUS REMOVALS

Umbulwane was not listed as a black spot in the list compiled by the NABE in the 1950s. At some stage, however, it was zoned for industrial purposes by the local authorities and since then landowners, while not yet expropriated, have been living there on borrowed time. The plan is eventually to relocate the landowners along ethnic lines – the Africans to Ezenkheni, the coloureds to the coloured group area township of Limietrill, and the Indians to one of the Indian townships. Shortage of accommodation in all these townships has delayed this process, however, and the priority has been to control the far more numerous tenants.

In the 1970s, once Ezenkheni had been built, there were several phases of tenant removals, but the procedure was adopted to remove them (to Ezenkheni) is not known. In July 1977 the Natal Witness reported that a large number of squatters had been taken to Ezenkheni 'several years ago' but others had entered Umbulwane since then and the local town council, magistrate and DAB were arranging to remove them to Ezenkheni as well. (Natal Witness, 1.07.77) According to a Memorandum from the people of Umbulwane, dated the 1st December 1980:

When they built all those locations, they used to take the tenants from Umbulwane and resettle them there. When they took tenants to the location, the landowners always used to get new tenants. The last lot of tenants they took to Ezenkheni and, as usual, the landowners got new ones in 1979. (See Appendix 1.)

The total number of people moved thus is not known but those moved in 1977 amounted to several hundred at least. (Natal Witness, 2.07.77) One Indian landowner (who does not live at Umbulwane permanently) has reported that he used to have about 20 people living on his land, all of whom were moved to Ezenkheni in the 1970s. According to him these people are struggling to cope with the increased cost of living at Ezenkheni, where rents are 4 or 5 times higher than what they had been paying their landlords at Umbulwane (R250 a month in his case) and transport costs are an added burden. He also says that after his tenants were removed he was warned not to take on more tenants and although the loss of rent has made it more difficult for him to pay his annual rates, he has obeyed. (Unpublished AFRA fieldtrip report)

Not all tenant households were moved in this way; some of the present residents have been living as tenants at Umbulwane for 30 years or more. In addition, in the course of 1979/80 small numbers of new tenants moved on to the property and started erecting new houses. These people have been the chief targets of official action against the community since then.

ORIGINS OF TENANTS

The official housing policy for the Ladysmith area for the past 15 years has been (as in other urban areas) to force Africans out of the urban area and relocate them in Ezenkheni in the rejoining space of Ezenkheni, Sowukeni and Limietrill. Steadville, the only official township left within the municipal area, (with a population of a little over 8,000) has been under threat of removal for years. All housing has been frozen and although there has been some talk of granting it 99 year leasehold status, this has not yet materialised. Thus, despite Umbulwane's long history, officials have refused to recognise it as an African residential area. They have classified the tenants as squatters and illegal residents and have attempted to justify their action against them in terms of that classification. In an interview with the Sunday Times in December 1980 Mr. Pieter Marier, the town clerk of Ladysmith, said:

Our concern is that squatters have moved into Umbulwane. It is illegal for squatters to live there, even though the land is privately owned.
In addition, in terms of the law plans must be submitted for the erection of any dwelling. No plans have been submitted by the squatters of Ubahleme. (Sunday Times, 14.12.80)

According to him, more than 50% of the people were not from the Ladysmith district. (Sunday Tribune, 16.11.80)

The Department of Cooperation and Development adopted a similar approach when, in reply to representations made by the community in late 1980, the Administrative Secretary of the Department stated, on behalf of the Deputy Minister:

Those families that have settled at Ubahleme illegally and without permission, will be required to return to their places of origin or arrange for accommodation themselves with their relevant Chiefs in Umlalazi. (See Appendix 2.)

Ubahleme represents a breach in the system of influx control and in trying to plug it, officials have resorted to all the standard clichéd used against peri-urban informal settlement throughout South Africa - the tenants have no claim to living at Ubahleme or to being in the district of Klip River, they belong to Umlalazi, they have places to return to there. In fact, most of the people living at Ubahleme are long-term residents of the Ladysmith district, many work in the town, and almost all the tenants who have moved to Ubahleme in recent years have moved there precisely because they have lost their previous place of residence, as a result of the implementation of the State's relocation and influx control policies in the district.

In a letter to Natal Witness in November 1980 two members of the Ubahleme committee put it thus:

To clarify the point regarding the origin of the many people at Ubahleme: it is totally incorrect to say they come from other towns. They all come from the Klip River complex and from local farms. They are all employed in Ladysmith. (Natal Witness, 27.11.80)

During the course of 1980 and 1981 APA interviewed 13 tenant households about their length of tenure at Ubahleme and their origins. The results confirmed the points made in the letter quoted above. Four of the 13 households had lived at Ubahleme for many years - one since 1927, one since 1931 and two for 23 years. Another tenant, a young man, was a close relative of one of the landowners and had previously lived in her house. In early 1980 he had married and had built a separate house for himself and his wife in the vicinity of his former home - and thus became an illegal resident.

The head of another household who had erected a tinny shack on the property of one of the Indian landowners, in 1979, was in fact in the employ of his landlord and had been for many years. He and his family had at one stage lived on their landlord's property in Ladysmith itself but had been forced to leave there, it would seem when Group Areas coming was first applied to Ladysmith (which was in 1962). Unable to find accommodation in any of the towns, they had moved to an informal settlement across the river from Ubahleme and had lived there until 1979, when the authorities started clearing the area. Their employer had then suggested they move onto his land at Ubahleme which suggestion they had gladly accepted.

Four of the remaining 7 households interviewed were victims of eviction or relocation in the Klip River or neighbouring districts, and had moved to Ubahleme during or after 1979 either because they had nowhere else to go or because they felt they could not afford to live at Elandeni. 3 of the 4 had been living and working on white farms but had then been evicted. A fourth, a widow, had formerly lived at Rosboom. When Rosboom was removed in 1976 she felt she could not afford to build or to rent a house at Elandeni so she had moved to Driesfontein and a house there. Later her house had burnt down. She already had a job in Ladysmith and so, in early 1979, she decided to rebuild at Ubahleme. A fifth tenant had also moved to Ubahleme to be closer to his job after a building contractor had hired him in early 1980.

The remaining 8 households moved to Ubahleme after getting married, to establish their own homes. In the case of one of the couples, before they had married, the man had been living in the single hostel at Steadville, while his wife had been a domestic worker living on her employer's premises. When they were married they applied for a house of their own at Steadville and in the meantime they lived in the township as lodgers. Eventually, however, despaired of ever getting a municipal house of their own, the couple moved to Ubahleme in August 1979.

2. Conditions

LACK OF FACILITIES

Ubahleme is a poor and very poorly-serviced community. There is no school - children go to Steadville - and only one small shop. Although the landowners are rate-payers, their properties are totally unserviced by the municipality. There is no reticulated water supply, no municipal sanitation system and no refuse collection. Residents draw their water from a couple of wells and dig their own latrines. Roads consist of little more than rough tracks and in wet weather frequently become impassable. There is no electricity and no bus service into the community; people have to walk to Steadville or to Ladysmith centre, several kilometres away.

The quality of housing varies. There are a few large, brick houses in the area while a couple of tenants live in very makeshift structures. Most people, however, live in modest shacks and shanty houses which do not, as the authorities have frequently pointed out, conform to municipal building standards but provide cheap and adequate shelter and are adapted to individual household needs and tastes in a way that the mass-produced 4-room township housing can never be. The houses cover a large area but are spread very thinly for the most part; prior to the evictions of the 1970s, the people must have been far more densely settled.

RATES

The lack of services is a major grievance among landowners who have been paying rates for many years and have received nothing from the municipality in return. Defaulter or those who fall in arrears on their payments have had their properties confiscated and auctioned off. In July 1981 the Natal Witness carried a small news report on the auctioning of 4 or 5 properties from Ubahleme by the Town Council in order to recover outstanding rates. (Natal Witness, 1.7.81) Rates paid vary but were reportedly in the region of R1000 - R1500 in the late 1970s. (One landowner whose property was valued at R6 600 (R2 600 for the land and R4 000 for the buildings) paid R1195,92 in March 1979. (Copy of Assessment in APA files.) According to another landowner, her rates were generally over R100 per annum but in 1981, after some press publicity had focused attention on the community, her assessment dropped to only R58.

REQUEST FOR SERVICES REFUSED

In an undated memorandum drawn up by the Ubahleme rate-payers and sent to the Chief Commissioner of Natal in late 1980 the landowners expressed their frustration thus:

1.3 No one has been interested in us in any way besides the rates; we have never been helped in getting clean water or any help except in collecting rates, and now breaking down the houses. Some, we are told, are too big, some have no plan and all sorts of things, and we get lost as to what is really expected of us.

1.4 We feel our fathers are not interested in anything except our payments. We are told we live very unhygienically, but no one
In a subsequent letter addressed, inter alia, to the Town Clerk of Lodzyn, the
committee pointed out that they were regular rate-payers and made a request for "our
services, as services, waterworks services as well as roads construction" to be improved.
The response from the Town Clerk was curt and to the point. Completely ignoring the
question of rates, he stated:

As far as your request for services are concerned, I regret that it is
not possible to supply services to the area, as this area is not zoned
for residential purposes. (Letter dated 1960-12-02.)

The area has, as already noted, been zoned for industrial purposes by the municipality.
Observers have, however, pointed out that there is already a very large area of serv-
ced cut unoccupied land that is zoned for industrial purposes lying to the north of
Unbulwana. The likelihood of more land being needed at this stage is very remote.
Unbulwana is another example of infrastructural development being used against, rather
than for, useless people.
The lack of services is clearly seen by officials as one way of forcing the unwanted
residents to move out by themselves; it also becomes another convenient justification
for removing the people, since the area can be described as a slum and a health hazard.
'Ve have to go because they are a health hazard to the borough and they have no
services!' the Town Clerk said in an interview with the Sunday Tribune. (16.11.82)
In June 1981 he repeated this point in an interview with the Natal Witness.

We do not want to cause any hardship but we just cannot allow an area
like this to grow. We have to control it. (Natal Witness, 29.06.81)

The municipality has made it clear that it does not want to install any services that may
be seen to legitimise the community or indicate permanence. However, during the course
of 1982 the outbreak of cholera in many parts of Natal did force them to review their
position slightly and consider making some improvements to the water supply. Although
no cholera was reported at Unbulwana, the danger of it getting established there and
then spreading to the town was clearly seen to be a real one. Residents at Unbulwana
have pointed out that piping could be laid on from a water point a few kilometres away
and this could bring water to a couple of central tap points within the community. The
Town Council dislikes the idea of laying water pipes, because of the permanence that
that suggests, and in 1982 were reportedly investigating the possibility of bringing
water in by tanker - a far more expensive undertaking in the long run. By September
1982 no progress had been made on this. In the meantime, the council continues to
collect rates and to appropriate the property of defaulters.

EMPLOYMENT

No detailed survey on employment in the area has been conducted but according to resi-
dents, most workers are employed locally, in Lodzyn. Many of the men appear to work
for the South African Railways which has a large yard at Lodzyn, and some for the
municipality. Of the women are employed in a textile factory; others are shop
assistants or domestic workers. Unbulwana is completely integrated into the economy of
the town; in the words of one spokesman for the area: 'We work for the Corporation, we
work for the people who are destroying our homes.' (Unpublished APRA fieldtrip Report)

In late 1980 residents complained that officials were refusing to register school-
leavers from Unbulwana as workers in the Lodzyn labour bureau; they regarded
this as another form of pressure upon them. This, however, was denied by the Minister
of Cooperation and Development in the House of Assembly in February 1981. In response
to a question it was stated that 4) workers had applied for registration from Unbulwana
and all had been accepted. (Sunday Herald, Question 6, 13.02.81)

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is no longer practised on any scale in the community. Until 1958 it was
legal to keep stock but mainly, according to the undated memorandum of the rate-
payers (already cited) this was forbidden.

In 1958 we were told that grazing and dipping will be discontinued; that the stock we had
up to now in grazing on the land we thought was our fathers', having at intervals an official from the government to come
and count and treat them for any outbreaks in the place of dipping them.

However, some of the landowners still keep a few cows and there are a couple of pigs,
donkeys and some poultry in the community as well.

Some of the landowners plough and plant melons every year as well - there is at least
one tractor in the community - and a number have fruit trees and small vegetable gardens.
In general, however, little cultivation is undertaken and much of the land lies fallow.
One can isolate several reasons for this. The general insecurity is a major factor,
combined with the fact that most of the present tenants are newcomers to the area.
The land is of poor quality. Most people do not have ploughing animals and are generally
too poor to afford the necessary equipment to cultivate the land adequately. Further-
more, most of the adults are working during the day.

Unbulwana is thus linked to an urban economy and is a part of Lodzyn - a disre-
garded, despised but nevertheless definite suburb of the town - and not a separate, rural
community. The people who live there, and particularly the landowners and longstanding
tenants, appreciate the peri-urban lifestyle, the space and the lack of institutionalised
township life. Nevertheless, they would like to see the place upgraded as a residential
area and would be unlikely to object to the introduction of more stringent housing and
health controls, if needed services and security were improved.

COMMUNITY ORGANISATION

The growth of community organisation in response to the crisis of the demolitions is
described in the next section. Unbulwana, at the time of the demolitions, was a de-
pressed community. The successive waves of evictions of tenants during the 1970s had
reduced the community, had undermined its cohesion and depleted its resources. Some
of the new tenants who had moved there in the afternoon had moved there only as a last
resort; they were demoralised, marginalised, with little stake in the world around them.
Nevertheless, the place had then and has now certain things going for it. There is no
crime, or more violence. All the residents know each other. There is an intensity of
scale and an ease of personal interaction that is not possible in a large, impersonal
and new township such as Ewakhini. It is close to people's places of work and, in the
residents and established tenants, there is still a sense of continuity with the past.

Unbulwana is our grandfather's place. We have been living here over
fifty years at this place. We don't want to stay at Unbulwana, only we beg
that our Municipality will improve the place for us and make it
healthier. (Memorandum dated December 1st, 1980, Appendix 1.)

Furthermore, there is not a marked social and economic divide between landowners and
tenants, the material disadvantages of the community as a whole allowing for a degree of
egalitarianism not found in some other wealthier black areas. (This analysis excludes
the non-resident, mainly indian, landowners.)

The only community organisation that appears to have existed at Unbulwana at the time of
the demolitions in August 1980 was a loose and largely inactive landowners' rate-payers
committee. Nevertheless a core of a viable community still existed, centred on the long-
3. The removals threat

**CHRONOLOGY OF THE DEMOLITIONS, JUNE - NOVEMBER 1980**

As already stated, the immediate threat over the past two years has been to the tenants, when the authorities claim are illegal squatters in the area. The following account of the tactics adopted by the authorities between June and November 1980, to try to pressurize them to leave Umbelwane, is taken from AFRA Report no. 7 (December 1980) supplemented by unpublished reports on AFRA field trips to the area at the time.

1. The first warning of pending action against the community came in June / July 1980 when officials arrived at Umbelwane unannounced and started numbering all the black-occupied structures. They did not tell residents what the numbers were for. People were alarmed but did not know how to respond. "They are just putting numbers everywhere, we don't know what they mean," said one resident.

2. At about 8 a.m. on either the 18th or 19th August (the Ladysmith Town Council and Umbelwane residents subsequently disagreed on the date) several carloads of officials (the cars had Administration Board registration plates), about six SAP vans with police in camouflage dress (described as 'soldiers' uniform by local observers) plus a municipal front-end loader arrived, also unannounced. With minimal discussion with the tenants present, they proceeded to demolish, selectively, tenants' houses. They did not demolish completely. Where a household had more than one separate structure, they would leave at least one standing. Where there was only one building, they would only destroy part of the building, leaving one or two rooms standing among the rubble. Some 40 houses were partially or totally destroyed in this way. *(Sunday Tribune, 16.11.80, quoting the Town Clerk.)*

The Town Clerk later agreed that no notices were served before the demolitions *(Sunday Tribune, 14.12.80)* but claimed only unoccupied (and illegal) structures were demolished.

*(Sunday Tribune, 16.11.80)* The evidence of the owners of the houses and of the partly-demolished buildings themselves completely contradicted this. As residents pointed out if only unoccupied buildings were being destroyed, why were they not demolished completely instead of only partially? AFRA collected statements from several tenants whose houses were destroyed which described briefly what had happened to them. Three of these are quoted here:

1. My six-room house was broken down on the 19th August while I was at work. My wife was out collecting firewood, there was our three-year-old baby inside who was taken outside and ran away. I found my house broken down. All the doors and windows were broken, my tools were broken and they left me with only one room. They came back later, just to look everywhere. I did not receive a word of notice.

2. I was present. I was sitting in the yard with the children when they came. A white man was pointing out all the houses. They asked who the owner of the house was. They just said we were going to break them down. I tried to stop them. I explained that it was my son's house. They didn't mind - they called the bulldozer and started breaking it down. They did not give any reason. After breaking that one, they moved to the small one, where I keep all my tools and the grinding machine. They said I must take all the stuff out. I called Fellows to help me: we took it out and then they started to break the house.

3. They first broke the house. I was not home. I was looking after my home's house. There was nobody at home - my wife was outside. I saw my mother was out visiting. They took stuff out and then broke the houses with a machine. They knocked the whole house down. No furniture was damaged, but when I got back, one bed and three sheets of tin were missing. My cousin came and told me 4th house was broken so I came back. They came and gave me notice afterwards.

4. Having finished their task, the police issued undated notices to the landowners (where the landowners were not present, they pinned the notices to their doors) and left. These notices ordered the landowners to see to the final demolition of their tenants' houses themselves, within 28 days. *(See Appendix 4.)* The police apparently also warned people verbally that they would be returning to finish the job after 28 days themselves if the houses were still standing, and that the tenants must have left the area by then. No alternative accommodation was offered then or at any later stage. Said the Town Clerk later:

I am only involved in the removal of the illegal structures and the health hazard ... the people do not fall under my jurisdiction. I am not putting out people - just demolishing unoccupied illegal structures. *(Sunday Tribune, 16.11.80)*

5. Officials returned during the course of October, painted new numbers on some of the tenants' houses (in red, as opposed to the white used before) and issued several more notices of notices. Some of these were verbal, some dated the 21st October 1980 emanated from the Town Council and ordered buildings to be demolished by the 21st November 1980 and some, dated the 29th October, emanated from the DAS and instructed landowners to 'get the permission by form of a licence to have tenants or let them vacate your premises within three months.' *(See Appendix 4.)* When one of the landowners and a member of the Residents' Committee (which became active at this time) went to the local DAS office to find out what was happening, she was referred to the municipal offices. She was told there that only the families of landowners could be registered as tenants and the rest would have to go. She was also told that housing those who were to leave was not the responsibility of the municipality.

6. Until about October 1980, no news of what was happening at Umbelwane travelled further than the nearby township of Standville where some of the victims of the demolitions had taken shelter. During October a number of individuals connected to church and welfare groups in Ladysmith began to hear disturbing reports about the developments from contacts in Standville. Eventually, in early November, contact was established between the community and potential support groups outside of it. In the course of November and December 1980 most of the Natal newspapers and some of the Johannesburg papers carried stories on the demolitions. At the same time, the community began to rally to meet the crisis. The combination of the potentially stronger opposition within the community, the adverse press publicity (with the further threat that any confrontation that might develop between residents and police would be reported upon) and the time of the year seemed to persuade the local authorities to retreat from their former hardline position. The authorities continued to inspect the area periodically but the demolitions stopped in October 1980 and no action was taken once the various notice periods had expired.

**THE COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE**

Although the general mood after the first demolitions was one of anger and of bitterness at the treatment they had suffered, initially most residents felt intimidated by the obvious power of the authorities and helpless about how to defend their position.
The Role of Outside Organizations

In developing these responses, the community benefited from contact with outside groups. The initial contact with community leaders in neighboring Steindville was important in encouraging people to articulate their opposition and not simply to submit passively to the demolitions. Contact with sympathetic whites in Ladysmith was more tenuous and confined to a few individuals. Through these, however, contact was made with other groups outside of Ladysmith who were opposed to removals and this also played a part in boosting community organization.

The contribution of outside groups was both inspirational and technical assistance with addresses, with reproducing documents etc. The contact helped break down the sense of isolation and opened the way for the press to visit the area. Later, it led to individuals from Umlalwane attending a number of meetings and workshops organized outside of Umlalwane, where removals were looked at in general and people from other threatened communities were present as well. In this way, community leaders were exposed to new ideas about how to deal with their situation and developed a broader perspective on what was happening; they also contributed their own experience for other communities to draw on.

The support coming from outside was, however, limited. It helped foster a sense of purpose within the community, within the community in particular, but could not provide the leadership that came to articulate that nor the spirit that was necessary to sustain the momentum of organizations. Had Umlalwane been located in a metropolitan area it would probably have received far more active outside support which, in the long run, has inhibited the uncertain but clear growth of a more self-reliant attitude among the leaders.

His Official Response

The 'Memorandum from the people of Umlalwane in the Townships of Ladysmith' was sent off on the 1st of December 1980. It is reproduced in full in Appendix One. On the 2nd of December the Ladysmith Town Council responded not to the memorandum but to the preliminary letter, as it was said. The buildings demolished were illegal structures and did not comply with building regulations, and services could not be supplied since the area was not zoned for residential purposes. It does not say that the DAB, either locally or at the Chief Commissioner's offices at Pietermaritzburg, replied at all. The Department of Cooperation and Development did reply, at some length, but not until the end of March 1981. In the meantime, however, the attention focused on Umlalwane, limited as it was, was succeeded in making the Department adopt a more cautious approach, at least in public, than that displayed by the Town Council.

In February 1981 a series of questions were asked in Parliament concerning the future of Umlalwane. On both the 11th and 13th of February Dr. Koornhof acknowledged in reply to two sets of very similar questions that he had received representations from Umlalwane (the reply on the 11th of February referring to Natalwane's KO) as well as to the effect that the proposed resettlement projects be reconsidered and that the residents be allowed to remain on the properties concerned. He stated that the matter was still receiving attention and 'further negotiations will take place'. (Hansard, Question 26, 11.02.81) However, in response to a further set of questions also tabled on the 13th February, he denied that the people were to be resettled 'at present'.

If the people are eventually resettled, they will be removed depending on merit to appropriate accommodation at Esikhweni or to such accommodation may be arranged by the people with the chiefs concerned. (Hansard, Question 5, 13.02.81)
No 'negotiations' concerning the memorandum took place with the people who had written it although Dr Koornhof did later report that officials had visited Umbulwane during the course of February 1981, to number the houses 'for identification and control purposes.' (Hundard, Question 162, 22.09.81) In the reply that was finally sent to the people of Umbulwane on the 26th March 1981 the Minister (in the form of the Administrative Secretary, speaking for the Deputy Minister) declined to intervene in what was presented as a dispute with the Local Authority.

The reply, which is reproduced as Appendix 2, is a revealing one from a number of points of view. It attempted to drive a very clear wedge within the community between legal and illegal residents, classing landowners and 'approximately 105 squatter families' in the former group and an unspecified number of families 'that have settled at Umbulwane illegally and without permission' in the latter group. The letter did not explain on what basis a distinction was being drawn between tenants, nor did it identify who the groups were -- it was the first time the figure of 105 had been mentioned by officials. It qualified a previous and much-publicized statement that the Minister had made, in July 1980, that there would be 'no more fenced removals' in South Africa (quoted in, inter alia, the Daily Sun, 17.07.80) by stating that this 'did not imply that the country's legislation regarding illegal squatting' could be disregarded. Generally it avoided the basic issues raised in the memorandum -- the destruction of a long-established community, the lack of consultation by the authorities, the lack of alternative housing for threatened people, the positive aspects to life in Umbulwane and its contribution to the economic well-being of Ladysmith -- by taking refuge in legalistic and bureaucratic formulae.

It concluded:

In the circumstances my Deputy Minister is not in a position to intervene in so far as the matters raised are concerned.

This letter was discussed at a further general meeting and in June the community sent back their reply, reproduced as Appendix 3. What is remarkable about this letter, compared to the memorandum, is the articulate sense and the confidence with which the committee rejected the government's comments -- 'We feel that the Government did not answer any of our points properly' -- and restated their own position. This was not expressed as an appeal but as a statement of fact: 'It is incorrect that Umbulwane is not owned by Blacks,' 'We do not believe that we can only live in Kwazulu.' 'We know we can ask for rights in South Africa.' The letter pointed out that 'the Government is separating the people of Umbulwane by saying some people are illegal and that the Government cannot help them', and rejected Zanweni as a suitable alternative place to live because of the high cost of living there and the violence. It repeated:

We do not want to leave Umbulwane where there is peace.

The reply from the Department to this letter was received a few months later. It reaffirmed the intention to move Umbulwane eventually, but indicated that this would not be immediate. It also extolled the advantages of Zanweni and called on the committee to help explain to the community the advantages of moving.

DEVELOPMENTS IN 1982

The future of Umbulwane, at the time of writing, is still uncertain. In April 1982, in reply to a Parliamentary question, Dr Koornhof confirmed the intention to move Umbulwane (and a number of other specified communities) after consultation and in collaboration with the communities concerned as well as the Government of Kwazulu; the actual removals would only take place once the necessary housing, water, reticulation, sanitation, school and clinic facilities, shops, roads and other services had been provided and made available.' (Natal Mercury, 27.04.82)

In commenting his Department for the services it was going to supply, Dr Koornhof described 'the resettlement project as 'an effort to improve the general standard of life of the community concerned.' He did not, however, explain why it was necessary to remove people in order to provide these services, which the Umbulwane community had been requesting in the area where they already lived.

He also did not specify when the removals would be implemented, nor did he explain whether all the residents of Umbulwane were to be relocated to the planned areas, or only those who qualified as legal.

In Ladysmith itself there are reportedly differences of opinion between the Town Council and the local DAB about the future of African housing within the urban area. Although directed mainly at services, the outcome of the disagreement could have repercussions for Umbulwane. In this instance some officials within the DAB are apparently prepared to consider the possibility of allowing a permanent African population to remain in Ladysmith but the Town Council is strongly opposed to this. If this is so, it probably means that the Town Council would like to eliminate Umbulwane entirely, and soon, but are being held back by constraints emanating from within the Department of Cooperation and Development.

In Umbulwane the most significant recent development has been the decision made by some of the tenants to start rebuilding the houses that were demolished in August 1980. The question of whether to proceed with rebuilding or not had been a major topic of discussion and concern throughout 1981. People desperately wanted to restore their houses -- in many instances large families had been left with only a single room in which to live -- but were extremely nervous about doing so, fearing a further round of demolitions or eviction orders from the authorities in response.

Finally, encouraged by the apparent success of the community's representations to the authorities and the low key attitude of the officials towards them, a few individuals did start to rebuild towards the end of 1981. When nothing happened to them a few others followed suit. For a while there was no response from the local authorities but in mid-1982 warnings were issued to people to discontinue. The Committee responded by writing a letter explaining that the building did not represent a new influx of people and requesting permission to continue. To date no follow-up on this has been reported and the restored buildings have not been pulled down: a tangible sign of people's commitment to a future in the area.

Umbulwane has been able to take advantage of the general slowdown in the pace of removals in Natal. It is still extremely vulnerable, however. It does not have any significant support within the white community of the Klip River district. Its continued existence contradicts stated government policy. Although the level of community organisation within it has been greatly enhanced by the successes to date, there are major weaknesses in that still. Community participation tends to flag once the immediate crisis recedes and has never been unanimous while the committee is heavily dependent on certain key individuals and is not fully accountable to the community at large. Even if a permanent reprieve were to be offered to Umbulwane, it will still face major problems to do with the provision of finance, the control of the road and electricity services and the nature of its future development as a residential area. Nevertheless, in struggling to deal with the threat of demolition and removal, the community as a whole has learnt some valuable lessons and gained a degree of confidence that can only be of benefit to it in the future. It has also started to look beyond its immediate horizon, as its reply to the Minister of Cooperation and Development in June 1981 made clear:

We do not believe that we can only live in Kwazulu. We know that we owned a large piece of land all over Natal (that do not fall in Kwazulu) and this had been occupied a hundred years or more before the Whites came to Natal and took land for themselves.

We know that we can ask for rights in South Africa. We can ask for jobs, pensions, justice and more in South Africa.
Appendix 1. Memorandum from the people of Umbulwane, 1980

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PEOPLE OF UMBULWANE, IN THE TOWNSHIP OF LADYSMITH

December 1st 1980.

May it please Your Worship, to receive this memorandum from the people of Umbulwane:

History
Most people used to stay in town and in 1985 we moved from town to this place, Umbulwane. 
When we came here first life was very hard. There were no roads. We used to walk to and from work. In 1932 we first saw the roads, but there were no cars, only donkey carts and horses at that time.

We started paying rates. There was no school for the children at Umbulwane. At that time the children used to go to the churches for school. In 1934 each family at Umbulwane paid £5 to help build a school. The school was built at Steendville which was the only location at that time and named after Mr Steen who was the Superintendent. The school was opened in 1937.

Children from Umbulwane still attend school there.

After Steendville they built Jabavu Location, which was followed by White City Location. When they built all these locations, they used to take the tenants from Umbulwane and resettle them there. When they took tenants to the locations, the landowners always used to get new tenants. The last lot of tenants they took to Bambheni and, as usual, the landowners got new ones in 1979.

Breaking down our houses
If it was wrong to have tenants, the landowners should have been notified first. In the middle of the year people came to write numbers on each and every house but they did not tell us what the numbers are for. On the 15th August 1980 we saw the Municipality and the Drakensberg Administration Board as well as police, all armed with guns, and a bulldozer. They started to break down houses. Most of the owners of these houses were not at home but at work or fetching wood. When they came from work they found their houses broken down. Some were left with only one small room.

We don't want to leave this place because we all stay in peace. The problem is where must the tenants go? Also, they all work in Ladysmith and don't want to lose their jobs. The Municipality says this place is supposed to have floods but we never have any floods. Since we have been at Umbulwane there has been no danger of floods.

No help from our Corporation
The worst part of it is that we don't get any help from our Corporation. The landowners pay rates but they do not give us water, toilets, ashes, roads. We see to that ourselves. We are only good for the Corporation when we pay rates every year.

What we want
Umbulwane is our grandfathers' place. We have been living here over fifty years at this place. We want to stay at Umbulwane, only we beg that our Municipality will improve the place for us and make it healthier.

Most people paying rates are widows and pensioners who need the rents paid by their tenants. Widows help educate and feed their children with their tenants' rents.

Without their tenants they cannot live. Most people have no stock but those who have it use to make our living better. We use the milk to feed our families. Those who have milk help the others with a little milk.

What is worse is that people from Umbulwane find it hard to get work now. They don't want to register us but we must pay rates. Where must we work? How can we live without work?

Conclusion
This Umbulwane was bought by the white people, Indians, Coloureds and Africans a long time ago. We have 47 landowners. With tenants we are 680 adults and 300 children.

Many tenants work in Ladysmith which is only six miles from Umbulwane. Umbulwane is as big as a big farm.

Umbulwane has improved this town by working in this town. Up to now and before we had Locations and hostels, the workers have always stayed at Umbulwane. Dr Koornhof said no people must be forced to leave their homes, in the Daily News on the 17th July 1980, and that is what we want.

From: The Umbulwane Committee, on behalf of the landowners and tenants, Umbulwane,
P. O. Box 327
LADYSMITH
1370
Appendix 2. Reply, Dept. of Cooperation and Development,

Ministerie van Samenwerkings en Ontwikkeling
Ministry of Co-operation and Development

The Secretary
The Umubulwane Committee
Umubulwane
P O Box 327
LADYSMITH
3370

Dear Sir

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PEOPLE OF UMUBULWANE

With further reference to your memorandum dated 1 December 1980, I am directed by Dr the Honourable G de V Morrison, Deputy Minister of Co-operation to inform you that the points raised in your memorandum have been thoroughly investigated.

The so-called Umubulwane area is situated within the municipal boundaries of Ladysmith and is of necessity subject to the building and health byelaws of that local authority. It has not been set aside as an urban Black residential area and it is not the intention that it should be set aside as such. It follows therefore that my Deputy Minister is not in a position to intervene as far as the implementation of the Local Authority's byelaws is concerned.

As you are no doubt aware, the majority of the residents of Umubulwane were resettled at eZakheni prior to 1977. Those of the remaining standowners as well as approximately 105 squatter families that qualify for housing at eZakheni will eventually be resettled there as and when sufficient development funds become available for this purpose. These families will be negotiated with prior to their resettlement either at eZakheni or at such other accommodation as may be arranged by themselves with their relevant Chiefs in KwaZulu.

Those families that have settled at Umubulwane illegally and without permission, will be required to return to their places of origin or arrange for accommodation themselves with their relevant Chiefs in KwaZulu.

It should be mentioned that the Honourable the Minister's statement that "no people must be forced to leave their homes" did not imply that the Country's legislation regarding illegal squatting as well as other legislation could be disregarded. Illegal squatting is an offence in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act No 52 of 1951. Likewise, it is an offence in terms of the same Act for an owner or lessee of land to erect, cause to be erected or permit the erection of any building or structure intended for occupation by persons, on his land or the leased land, as the case may be, and to permit the occupation of such building or structure unless a plan or description thereof has been approved by the relevant local authority.

In the circumstances my Deputy Minister is not in a position to intervene in so far as the matters raised are concerned.

Yours faithfully

ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY:
MINISTRY
Appendix 3. Reply, Umbulwane Committee, 10.06.81

The Minister of Co-operation and Development, Pretoria.

Dear Sir,

Re: Umbulwane

With reference to your letter dated 26/6/81, I am directed by the Umbulwane committee and the residents of Umbulwane to reply to the Honourable Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development with these points.

Umbulwane has not been set aside as an urban black residential area, but it is incorrect that Umbulwane is not owned by Blacks. As we explained in our memorandum it was bought by our grandparents more than 70 years ago. Perhaps the Government is unaware that Umbulwane has been paying rates to the local authority up to now but getting nothing from the Town Council in return. We have no services at all.

The Government states that illegal people must go back to their places of origin yet people were expelled from white farms and most of these farms were taken by the Government. Some of these people were aiming to settle in Standville which is the urban Black settlement, but due to the fact that there was no housing, people became tenants of Umbulwane.

We do not believe that we can only live in KwaNdebele. We know that we owned a lot of large pieces of land all over Natal (that do not fall in KwaNdebele) and this land had been occupied a hundred years or more before the Whites came to Natal and took land for themselves.

We know we can ask for rights in South Africa. We can ask for jobs, pensions, justice and more in South Africa. In other words we do not want to blame the Minister. Maybe he was not informed that we have been paying rates for so long without any services, that we have title deeds and that the Government is depriving the people of Umbulwane by saying some people are illegal and that the Government cannot help them. We know they want to take this place and that is why we wrote and asked for help from the Honourable the Minister.

The Government states that those who are said to be illegal will be settled at Ezakheni. It sounds as if these people will be loaded after at Ezakheni. The fact that it is too far, that buses are so expensive, that there is a crime problem with violence and tribal fights that the people of Umbulwane do not now face, that rents are expensive and most are unable to pay all these things, is not being considered.

The Government said people must not be forced to leave their homes. We do not want to leave Umbulwane where there is peace. We would like to inform the Government about the local authorities who apply injustice to the people of Umbulwane who keep on paying rates but get nothing from the Town Council. The unhealthy situation is caused by them. We feel the Government did not answer any of our points properly. It is important that this be made clear.

Yours Faithfully,

Secretary: Umbulwane Community, Ladysmith.
6. Reserve Four

Reserve Four, lying along the coast to the north of Richards Bay, is threatened with removal in terms of the 1975 Local Government Act for KwaZulu. Unlike the previous case studies, it is not a freehold area; it was, until Parliament amended its legal status in 1979 and again in 1981, a scheduled reserve (in terms of the 1913 Land Act) that had been incorporated into KwaZulu when the KwaZulu Territorial Authority was established in 1970. Its legal status is thus significantly different from that of the previous case studies, but the political and developmental problems it faces are, in their broad outline, similar to those found in other rural communities in Natal (and South Africa).

The threat to Reserve Four is a very real one. Although there is no official indication of when the government intends to remove its people, the land has already been demarcated and excised from KwaZulu. Pending the removal of the people, the area has been designated a 'black area' for administrative purposes (in terms of Section 25 of the Black Administration Act of 1927) but its status in terms of the Group Areas Act has been proclaimed as white. Its people are thus living on the land entirely at the discretion of the government.

1. Background

The reserve stretches northwards along the coast between Richards Bay and the St Lucia estuary, hidden from view from the main north coast highway by extensive forest plantations.

It covers an area of 23 471 785 ha and is divided into two chief's wards, the Sokhulu ward in the north and the Mnomani ward in the south. The total population was put officially at approximately 3 000 families in September 1981 (Hunnard, Question 3, 4.09-41); compared to most other regions of KwaZulu, it is not at all densely populated.

HISTORY

The Sokhulu and Mnomani people have been settled in the area now known as Reserve Four since long before Zululand was annexed to Natal in 1897. The present Chief of the Sokhulu people is the 9th in an unbroken succession of chiefs stretching back at least to Shaka's time; all his predecessors are buried in the chief's graveyard.

The Sokhulu people originated in this place - during the reign of Shaka, the Sokhulu people were already here. There were no white people here then. When they came, they found us here. (Interview with Chief, unpublished AFRM fieldtrip report, April 1981)

With the annexation of Zululand to Natal, their former dominion over their land was brought to an end. The present boundaries of the reserve were established by the Zululand Land Commission of 1902-04, whose purpose was to open up parts of Zululand for white settlement. According to one of the present Sokhulu Councillors, the boundaries fixed at this time entailed a significant loss of land.

These traditional lands called the reserves do not have their traditional boundaries. Most of the land was taken by the Government and sold as farms to white farmers or proclaimed as State land ... For example, the
traditional boundary of the Sokhulu ward was N'wuvya River in the east, Nkundzu River in the north, the Indian Ocean in the east, and Nhlanhla in the south. Now N'wuvya is about 7 km from the present boundary. The original Nkundzu course was changed and is now about 2.5 km from the present boundary. (Letter to APRA, 16.07.02)

Subsequently, in 1909, ownership of Reserve Four and the 31 other Zululand reserves that had been demarcated in 1902/04 was vested in the Zululand Native Trust by means of a Deed of Grant. (Deed of Grant no. 7638, 6.04.09) This further restricted the people's claim to their land. In terms of the Deed the lands were to be held in trust for occupation by the Natives of Zululand and for their support, advantage and well-being, but the individual reserves were not reserved exclusively or in perpetuity for the particular tribes residing in them. Clauses 3(c) and 3(d) of the Deed of Grant specifically empowered the Trustees to exercise 'the removal of Natives from the land' and 'the removal of Natives from one part of the land to another'. However the Trustees could not allocate or dispose of the land without the consent of the Secretary of State or authority from a special act of Parliament (in Great Britain).

The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 shifted control of Reserve Four away from the settler government in Natal. In 1912 the Zululand Trust, along with other similar Native Trusts, came under the administration of the Minister of Native Affairs and in 1916 it was absorbed into the SAAT (later the SANZ), which thereafter became the registered owner of Reserve Four and the other Natal and Zululand Reserves. In the meantime Reserve Four was scheduled as an African area in 1911, in terms of the Native Land Act.

From the late 1950s the reserve was deserted into the bantustan system of government whose basic foundation was established by means of the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951. Tribal Authorities were established first in the Mbombani ward, in 1959 (Government Notice 295, 27.02.59) and then the Sokhulu ward, in 1968 (Government Notice 1125, 20.06.68). In 1960 these two Tribal Authorities along with six other nearby Tribal Authorities were grouped together into the Amagama Regional Authority. (Government Notice 1465 and 2163, 1961) When the KwaZulu Territorial Authority was established in 1970, the Amagama Regional Authority was included in its area of jurisdiction (Procl 2763, 21.10.70) and in 1972, when the KwaZulu legislative Assembly was established by means of Proclamation 1700, (30.07.72) it became an 'area' of the Assembly. In this way both the Sokhulu and the Mbombani wards of Reserve Four were incorporated into KwaZulu.

**CONDITIONS**

In the context of Natal, Reserve Four is an underdeveloped area. The contrast between it and the booming development of Richards Bay to the south, where in recent years the State has been spending millions upon millions of rand on infrastructural development, is a telling one. Access roads, particularly in the Sokhulu area, are very poor, many being no more than sandy tracks through the plantations. Most householders in Reserve Four depend on wage labour to supply the major part of their income, numbers of them being employed in the docks and industries of Richards Bay. While some of these workers manage to commute on a daily basis, the poor roads and inadequate transport services see to it that many of them are weekly or monthly migrants. There is no high school in the area, although there are a number of primary schools—four in the Sokhulu ward. (It is not known how many there are in Mbombani.) There are no permanent clinics in the reserve either, although mobile clinics do visit both the Sokhulu and the Mbombani wards twice a month. Shops are few, small and their goods expensive in the Sokhulu ward there are 5 local shops and 1 bottle store.

Nonetheless, compared to most other parts of KwaZulu, the area is well-favoured, with valuable agricultural and mineral resources. As the following brief account makes clear, its potential is large—a potential unmarked by the planners in Pretoria for white control.

**AGRICULTURE**

The government has described Reserve Four as 'badly situated' but in fact it is climatically and agriculturally one of the most favoured areas of KwaZulu and of Natal. It lies within the sub-tropical coastal belt, in a high rainfall area. Its mean annual rainfall is between 1 200 mm and 1 400 mm (Borrington-Smith et al., 1978, vol. 2, map 5, and its growing season is one of the longest in Natal, being over 200 days per annum. (Borrington-Smith et al., 1978, map 18) Although much of the soil is sandy and not especially fertile, there is a very fertile stretch on the south bank of the St Lucia estuary which is highly suitable for intensive cultivation, including that of sugar cane.

Most of the reserve is suitable for plantations and large land has been planted with, mainly under eucalyptus trees. Some is now owned by local individuals who sell their wood to nearby sawmills and the rest is owned by the KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry, which leases the land from the Tribal Authorities. The annual income to the Sokhulu Tribal Authority from their lease is R2 600, which money is paid into the Tribal Fund and is used to improve local facilities, particularly the schools. (Fieldwork)

The land is well-irrigated and erosion free; a first-time visitor might be excused for thinking she was not in KwaZulu. Homesteads are widely spaced. Most are sturdy, well-established; the materials used including wattles and mud, wood and reed, and brick. Many of the homesteads are fenced with wire or wooden poles, and surrounded by heavily vegetation. Neither fuel nor water are problems although the latter, in springs and streams, is unprotected.

Agriculture plays a very important part in the domestic economy of the area, making a substantial contribution to the general well-being of the people. Although much of the agriculture practised is at a subsistence level, there are people who make an independent living out of the land. In some cases a fairly extensive form of agriculture is practised. For those living close to the coast, fishing makes a further valuable contribution to household subsistence as well.

People grow a variety of sub-tropical fruits—avocado pears, bananas, mangoes etc. In the south, family roadside stalls line the main road into Richards Bay and some of the women claim to make a reasonable living out of selling their surplus produce at their front doors. There are private and communal vegetable gardens—according to the Sokhulu Chief, 'we plant bananas, maize, potatoes, sweet potatoes, cabbage, tomatoes, onions—all in abundance.' (Interview with Sokhulu Chief, unpublished APRA fieldtrip report, April 1981) In the Sokhulu ward a number of interested farmers have also recently come together to form a Commercial Farmers' Association, and are experimenting with this crop, with technical assistance from the University of Zululand.

In a letter to the Natal Mercury condemning the proposed removal of the reserve, a farmer (white) resident of the area neighbouring on Reserve Four described the agricultural achievements of the people thus:

The Sokhulu and Mbombani people ... have a commendable record of self-help. Encouraged by the evident success of their white neighbours, and indeed in some cases assisted by these neighbours, the tribesmen have established

---

*The Reserves are numbered no. 1 to no. 21; however Reserve no. 7 is divided into 7a and 7b, making a total of 22 designated areas.*
numerous eucalyptus timber lots and small plantations throughout the area. Furthermore, they successfully grow orchard and garden crops such as avocados, bananas, pineapples, passionfruit, etc. as well as sweet potatoes and melonmelons. Much of this has been achieved with the wage cash intake from the wage earnings of the migrant male workers. I doubt if there is significant poverty in this reserve, and certainly the people are aware of the economic progress they have achieved, and of their potential for further development. (Letter to the Natal Mercury, 4.11.81)

In an interview with an APRA fieldworker the Sokhulu Chief noted the value of their agricultural activity thus:

People from Chief Mabasa's ward come here to get food; even people from as far as Umsebenzi and Xlongoma come here. This land supplies different foods with food. Even during the drought, we had food and others brought their cattle here to graze. (Interview with Sokhulu Chief, unpublished APRA Fieldtrip report, April 1980)

He went on to add:

We are very concerned when we are told that we are to be removed. We prefer to die here.

MINERAL WEALTH

In addition to its agricultural wealth, Reserve Four also has very extensive mineral wealth - wealth controlled not by the people of the area, however, but by the SADZ, which is the registered owner of the land. A minerals fact sheet notes that the mining is in the coal bed, and includes rutile, zircon, titanium oxide sands, low manganese iron and titaniumiferous magnetite.

Rutile, they are mined by a company known as Richards Bay Minerals (RBM), which signed a 25-year lease with the SADZ in 1975. In 1980, according to the Financial Mail (1.11.81), RBM's sales topped R60 million, about one third up on the 1979 figure. The Financial Mail report described the mining operation as the world's second largest producer of zircon and third largest producer of titanium. It stated that the area has known reserves of 700 million mt of mineral deposits, expected to last for 30 years, but described RBM as 'secretive' about its long-term plans.

Company UK Shareholders told MM he could divulge no information on the company's expansion plans unless he had the prior approval of the board. He also declined to provide any information on the company's export markets, saying this could be 'prejudicial to the company's interests' (Financial Mail).

RBM is owned by South African, Canadian and American interests. According to the Financial Mail report quoted above, its shareholders are the:
- Quebec Iron and Titanium Corporation of Canada
- Union Corporation of South Africa Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)
- S.A. Mutual Life Assurance Society
- Southern Life Association.

* According to the Financial Mail (1.11.81), 'Titanium slag is used in the manufacture of white pigment which in turn is used in the paint, rubber, plastic, paper and ceramic industries. Low manganese iron is used in the manufacture of duralumin castings. Rutile is used in the pigments industry, in the production of welding electrodes, and in the manufacture of titanium metal used in the aerospace industry. Zircon is used for manufacturing glassware, metal fenders, steel refractories, pipe refractories and ceramic.}
CONDITIONS IN MAMBANAN, PROPOSED RELOCATION AREA

The advantages enjoyed by the people living at Reserve Four become even more apparent when their present situation is compared to the conditions prevailing at Mambanana; their proposed relocation site. Mambanana is the name given to a large wedge of Trust land cutting into an area of Kambulu that lies about 30 km to the west of Dzangasang. It was bought up by the SAID in the early 1970s, in anticipation of the removal of people out of the Richards Bay area. Climatically, and thus agriculturally, it bears no resemblance to Reserve Four. It is dry, rugged country, suited for extensive cattle ranching, perhaps, but totally unsuited for dense settlement and crop cultivation. Its annual rainfall is substantially lower than that of Reserve Four - about 500 mm, on average (Morrington-Smith et al., 1978, vol. 2, Map 11) - and drought is a recurring problem. In 1981 a farmer who had 'battled for 20 years to make a living there' and eventually left the area 'permanently', described it in these terms:

I know what it is like to farm in Mambanana. It's impossible. It is dry, thorn country with not one permanent running stream in the whole area. The soil is shallow, unfertile clay and the main river, the Musculebi, consists mostly of polluted pools unfit for human or animal. (Kweli Witness, 28.11.81)

A number of relocation areas have already been laid out at Mambanana. About 200 people from Reserve Six were relocated into the northern section in 1974; they have been struggling with inadequate water and other problems since then. Approximately 10 km away, several hundred people from a small part of Reserve Four that has already been excised and cleared (in 1977; see below) are housed in a closer settlement adjoining the Mambanana Police Station. In addition, on the opposite side of the police station, there is a huge unoccupied Pietrofalt settlement that stretches over several kilolitres. It was erected in 1975/76, presumably for preparation for removals that were regarded an imminent at that stage, but has been standing empty ever since; an eerie reminder of what is to come.

It seems that this ghost town was initially established for the people from Reserve Four, but the delay in their removal plus the hostility that they have shown to the area and the negative publicity that has surrounded the proposed removal may have produced a change of plan. It has been suggested that the government now intends to move the people from Reserve Four not into the closer settlement itself, but into the area to the north of it. Nevertheless, regardless of where in Mambanana the government intends to place them, it is indisputable that the proposed relocation area does not compare at all with what the people of Reserve Four already enjoy.

We are to be moved to a place which is dry. We're not used to it; we won't be able to cultivate it. It is stony. We've already developed this place. That place where we are to be moved - there is nothing there, only bush and stones. During the dry season there is no water and grass there. When we went there to see it, we saw zonkeys. Baboons are also there. Now it is said we must go and live there, leaving our lovely place where we have no complaints. (Interview with Sokhulu Chief, unpublished AZA fieldtrip Report, April 1981)

2. The descheduling of Reserve Four

THE 1973 AND 1975 CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS

The first threat to Reserve Four came in 1973, when it was isolated as one of the African areas to become white in terms of the government's revised consolidation proposals for Kambulu, a recommendation that was repeated in the 1975 set of proposals. Both sets of proposals were approved by Parliament, although the merits of each of the proposed excisions and additions were not debated individually.

A number of factors appear to have come together to isolate Reserve Four as one of the areas to be excised - its proximity to the growth point of Richards Bay, its general situation along a coastline regarded by the government and the military as strategically sensitive, and its favourable agricultural prospects. Of these, its relationship to Richards Bay was probably the most important factor.

Work on the Richards Bay harbour started in 1973 and clearly the consolidation plans for the surrounding reserves were designed in relation to the massive development plans for the region: a development that the government had already insisted would remain in the white area. Reserve Four was one of three reserves ringing Richards Bay. The other two were Reserve Six, lying immediately to the west of the bay, and Reserve Ten, lying to the south. Reserve Six fell squarely in the way of the development of a deep port at Richards Bay and it was also proposed for excision in the 1973 and 1975 proposals; its removal was seen as a priority and was rushed through in early 1976, as described elsewhere in this report. (See p. 241) Reserve Ten, however, was retained as the site for the new township of Makwini, whose construction as a labour reservoir for Richards Bay was announced in early 1975. (Kambulu Observer, 24.01.75) It appears that while the planners wanted to keep a part of Kambulu next to the growth point as its labour supply, they did not want to head in the planned 'industrial giant' with pieces of Kambulu on either side.

Strategic considerations reinforced this view. As described previously in this report, there has long been a general military interest in controlling occupation and use of the northern coastline, since this is regarded as a particularly sensitive area strategically. Reserve Four's proximity to Richards Bay probably further enhanced military fears about it as a potential shelter for subversives. It is one of seven areas that have been proposed for excision in the coastal plains stretching north from Richards Bay to Mtunzini and Sabweba Bay. If carried through in their entirety, the effect of these removals will be to bring the whole of the northern coastline between Richards Bay and Sabweba Bay as well as the land to the north and east of Lake St Lucia under direct white control. Thus far only the proposals with regard to Reserve Six (removed in 1976) and Reserve Four and the Sabweba Bay area (excised from Kambulu in 1981) have been implemented; so clearly the removal of these areas is considered the most pressing.

In addition, the extremely high agricultural potential of the area into which Reserve Four falls, as a timber area and, particularly in the north, a sugarcane-growing area, must have served to seal the decision to excise it. It seems unlikely that the mineral wealth

* The seven areas are: Reserve Six, Reserve Four, the Khamuzi ward of Reserve 3, part of Reserve 12, Reserve 1 (Ripatla), Reserve 2 (Moldasol) and the Sabweba Bay triangle.
of the reserve played a direct part in the decision, since this was being exploited already; however, it is possible that it highlighted the general development potential of the area for government planners.

REMOVAL OF SMALL PORTION, 1977

In 1977 the first phase in the removal of Reserve Four was set in motion when a small portion of land in the south (described as an inlet on the removed Reserve Six) was excised from the schedule to the 1913 Land Act by Proclamation no. 220, and its people subsequently removed to Ntshamakhana.

Details on this removal are not known. The area involved was a little over 40 ha in extent, the people removed numbered a few hundred. It appears that the land on which they were living was taken over by the State because of the construction of the Richards Bay airport in the vicinity. According to a memorandum of the Department of Plural Relations, dated 31st August 1977, the necessary approval for the exclusion of land from the 1913 Schedule was obtained in terms of Section 3 of the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act. What land was added to the scheduled areas of Natal in return for this excised area is not, however, known. According to residents in Reserve Four, the people who were moved to Ntshamakhana are struggling to make a living there and a number of residents of this area who wanted to avoid being relocated to such a place moved by themselves further up into Reserve Four in 1977/78.

PUBLIC NOTICE TO REMOVAL FROM 1913 SCHEDULE

Pressure on the rest of Reserve Four began to mount from 1976. In August 1976 the Department of Plural Relations sent the Department of the Chief Minister, Kwazulu, a memorandum outlining the proposed excision of the reserve and requesting Kwazulu’s help in organizing a meeting with the Chiefs of the reserve to discuss their relocation to Ntshamakhana. At this stage what was being discussed was not excision from Kwazulu at all, but excision from the schedule of land reserved for African occupation in terms of the 1913 Land Act - i.e. the de-scheduling of the area so that it could revert to white occupation and ownership.

Although the Department did not commit itself to an actual date for the removal, it anticipated that this would start towards the end of the year. It stated that the necessary recommendation that the reserve be de-scheduled was to go before Parliament ‘in due course’ - in itself not a prerequisite for the removal of people since the government had all-embracing powers to remove African people, whether living on scheduled land or not. More to the point, the memorandum stated that evaluators were planning to visit Reserve Four in October/November of that year to assess the compensation due to the people for their improvements, while the construction of the relocation site at Ntshamakhana was ‘proceeding satisfactorily’ - a reference which would seem, to the flat-craft sentiment then being erected near the Ntshamakhana Police Station. (Memorandum, Secretary for Plural Relations and Development to the Secretary, Department of the Chief Minister and Finance, Ulundi, 31.08.76) Their assessment of the ease and the speed of the removal of the reserve was soon proved to be unably optimistic.

It does not appear that any evaluators did visit Reserve Four, either at this time or later - or if they did, the residents of Reserve Four were not informed and do not know what the results of the assessments are. However, a meeting between a Pretoria official and at least one of the Chiefs, at Sokhulu, did take place in October 1977 - whether by the arrangement of Ulundi or not, is not known. At this and all subsequent dealings with officials, the Sokhulu people made their objections to being removed very clear. In February 1979 the Department of Plural Relations notified Kwazulu Secretary for the Interior that the meeting had taken place but gave no details on the discussion or their proposed follow-up to it. (Letter dated 6.02.79) However, according to the Sokhulu Tribal Council, the official told them that Chief Ntshumani had agreed to their removal.

The Council refused to be drawn by this play, saying they would need to get confirmation of such an agreement first. (Fieldwork) Subsequently the Councilors went by themselves to Ntshamakhana, to see the area at first hand and rejected it outright - a place of ‘bush and stone’. On the 5th November 1978 they appealed to the Kwazulu Minister for the Interior to help them resist the removal; their objections to being moved were only passed on to the Department of Plural Relations. (Letter, Chief in Tribal Council, to the Minister for the Interior, Ulundi, 31.07.79)

PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL 1979

In early 1979 Prime Minister F.W. de Klerk announced the establishment of the van der Walt Commission to reconsider the question of consolidation. Although heralding a new era of uncertainty about the final outcome of consolidation in Natal, the announcement did not materially affect Reserve Four - the government had already made up its mind on this and three other areas: the Sodwana Bay triangle, the released freehold area of Driefontein at Ladyweth and the released area east of Paulpietersburg, all earmarked for excision from Kwazulu since 1975. Thus in May 1979 the Department of Plural Relations tabled a memorandum in Parliament recommending that the two scheduled areas (Reserve Four and Sodwana Bay) be de-scheduled and the two released areas (Driefontein and Paulpietersburg) be designated as ‘Mask areas’ for the purpose of Section 25 of the Black Administration Act. (House of Assembly, Minutes of Proceedings, 26.05.79)

The matter was then referred to the Select Committee on Plural Relations and Development which produced a series of recommendations that mirrored those drafted by the Department. (P.7.79) These were presented to the House of Assembly on the 14th June 1979 and, predictably, approved, with only the opposition Progressive Federal Party objecting. From the House of Assembly the recommendations were forwarded to the Senate for its approval. It has not been finally established whether a proclamation actually de-scheduling the reserve was subsequently gazetted or not; however the formality of Parliamentary approval as stipulated in the 1936 Development and Trust Act had thus been met by mid-1979.

These preliminary steps in the removal of Reserve Four passed by virtually unnoticed in the press. The people living in the reserve were not informed of what had happened, although Ulundi had been kept informed of Pretoria’s intentions.

CONFLICTING LAND FOR OUR 1913 SCHEDULE

In terms of the 1936 Development Trust and Land Act, the total area of land scheduled as reserves in 1913 in each of the four provinces cannot be reduced; thus, if a scheduled area is exsised, then compensatory land of equivalent agricultural and pastoral value has to be added to the schedule in return. It would appear that the form of this requirement has been met with regard to Reserve Four but what requires further investigation is the degree to which land ‘of equivalent agricultural and pastoral value’ has been added to the schedule. (The issue of compensatory land in this instance concerns the schedule, not the people who may be removed - their claim to compensation is for their improvements only, and not the land. As has happened in the case of Reserve Four, the people to be removed need not necessarily be allocated the compensatory land that is added to the schedule.)

In finding compensatory land for Reserve Four, Pretoria made a revealing switch in policy between 1978 and 1979. In August 1978, in its discussion with Ulundi, the Department of Plural Relations indicated that the compensatory land was to be found on the Nhlovu-Thini Plains in the Ingwavuma district, north of Reserve 15. (Schedule attached to
The final question relating to the compensatory land cannot be answered in terms of the existing laws but is extremely pertinent nonetheless. It was made by the Sokhulu people in July 1979 when they reiterated their objections to being moved:

Although it is said that there will be another compensatory land in the Nkhalathini Plateau, the tribe does not see how it will benefit by that land, which is totally strange to it, while residing on the Nkanambane farm, a distance of about 300 kilometers. (Letter, Chair of Tribal Council, Sokhulu, to the Minister for the Interior, 23.07.79)

Of note is that although this letter was written two months after the government's intention to compensate the Sokhulu clan in the Nkanambane district (and not the Nkhalathini Plateau) had been published, the tribe had not yet been informed of the change. This simply underscores their point, that in this process their interests have been totally disregarded by the government.

KwaZulu's Position on the Re-Scheduling

In objecting to the exclusion of these areas from the 1913 Schedule, members of the KPF referred to the objections of the KwaZulu government to this step. Dealing with the recommendation concerning Reserve Four specifically, Mr. Hart of the KPF stated:

The exchange is disapproved by the KwaZulu Government and we do not believe that it is in the interests of the situation at the present time. In any case this land should be treated in this way and for people to be removed. (Hansard, vol. 8744, 14.04.79)

Two years later, in May 1992, Dr. Koornhof was to claim that 'agreements' were reached between Pretoria and Ulundi in April and again in August 1979 concerning the exclusion of the four areas from KwaZulu. (Hansard, vol. 8744, 14.04.79)

In view of the fact that Parliament... adopted certain firm decisions in connection with the consolidation of KwaZulu, Chief Bethelzai informed me that he had no alternative... other than to sign this agreement... because he felt he could not shirk responsibility for his people once the decision by Parliament in Cape Town had been taken. (Hansard, 23.04.82)

What does emerge from this murky and confusing incident is that KwaZulu was informed of Pretoria's intentions before Reserve Four was de-scheduled and before it was excised from KwaZulu, but that it did register its objections to any removal of people that would follow. To what extent it passed this knowledge on to the people of Reserve Four and tried to solicit their own strong objections to the removal into an effective political force is less clear.

Dr. Koornhof also claimed in 1982 that representations that the affected areas should not be excised (from KwaZulu) were received from residents after the above agreement had been signed. (Hansard, 23.04.82) Once again he appears to be confusing the excision from KwaZulu with the earlier excision from the 1913 Schedule. However,
certainly in the case of Reserve Four, people’s strenuous objections to being moved — the ultimate purpose behind all the legal manoeuvres on the part of the government — were not heeded by the Department of Plural Relations before April 1979. Further representations against being moved were lodged with the KwaZulu Department of the Interior in July 1979 as well.

3. Exclusion from KwaZulu, 1981

The next step in the government’s plan to remove Reserve Four came on the 23rd January 1981 in the form of a proclamation in the Government Gazette, Proclamation R 19. Although it was not apparent from a simple reading of the proclamation, what this did was to amend the schedules to the various proclamations defining the areas of jurisdiction of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and thus to excise from KwaZulu all of the four areas that had already been isolated in 1979: Reserve Four, the Sodwana Bay triangle, the Driefontein farm and the Paulpietersburg Block. Direct authority for the administration of those areas elsewhere reverted to Pretoria, although in practice the change did not appear to have immediate effects on the ground — teachers’ salaries continued to be paid by KwaZulu etc.

The news that their land had been excised from KwaZulu was conveyed to the people of Reserve Four by the local magistrate towards the end of February 1981. At the meeting at Sodwana, a general tribal meeting held on the 20th of February, the people repeated their objections to being moved. The magistrate reportedly told them that all he knew about the matter was what was contained in the proclamation. (Fieldwork)

This excision of Reserve Four from KwaZulu brought its eventual removal one step closer. However, achieving this goal was taking considerably longer than the Department of Plural Relations had expected when it started drawing up its plans in 1976. Pretoria has not given any indication of why it took eighteen months for this sequel to the de-scheduling of the area to be achieved. During the course of 1980 its general consolilidation program for Natal and the rest of the country was becoming increasingly bogged down in political and financial problems — in September 1980 P.R. Betha ‘admitted’ that traditional consolidation was no longer possible (Daily News, 2.09.80) — and this must have slowed it down. Local opposition was probably stronger and more resilient than anticipated as well; in Reserve Four both Chiefs have stood firm against removal from the beginning. The fact that Reserve Four and the other three areas were finally excised, however, showed that Pretoria had not finally abandoned the 1977 proposals despite the appointment of the van der Walt Commission and signs of a more pragmatic approach.

DENIAL OF SUPPORT FOR REMOVALS BY KWAZULU

The excision of these four areas passed by unremarked for several months, with no immediate response from Ulundi whose area of jurisdiction had thus been affected. Only in May 1981 did the matter get into the press, when Dr Koornhof announced at the MAU Congress that removals were to be begin in all four of the excised areas. (SADAN News, 14.05.79) The ensuing controversy focused initially on Sodwana Bay in isolation from the other three areas; it concerned both the morality of moving people to make way for a white pleasure resort and the degree to which KwaZulu had been informed of and/or opposed the removal. The dispute, which is looked at in more detail in Part One (pp 9-12) and Part Two (p. 247) simmered on throughout 1981 and into 1982, until eclipsed by the Ingwavuma land deal during May 1982. One effect was undoubtedly to delay further the implementation of the intended removals.

In response to Dr Koornhof’s announcement at the MAU Congress and subsequent press coverage, Chief Betha denied publicly that he had had any knowledge of the excision of Sodwana Bay — it is possible that the Minister responsible, Dr Milloos, may have been notified but I have no knowledge of the move’ (Sunday Times, 17.05.81) — and promised to investigate. Later that month Dr Milloos met with the Deputy Minister of Land and Development and urged that the removals in these areas (as well as several black spots) be abandoned. One of the Chiefs from Reserve Four, from the Mbonambi area, was present and put in a plan for his area as well. The Deputy Minister sidestepped the question of a reversal of the removals — there would be legal problems with that, he said — and suggested instead that steering committees be formed to deal with each particular case. The KwaZulu representatives accepted the idea of steering committees but subsequently, when their purpose was spelled out in an advisory role, to make the process of removals function more smoothly, they distanced themselves from them, claiming that they had understood the purpose of the proposed committees to be a developmental one. (Press release issued by the KwaZulu Minister of the Interior, 24.11.81. See Appendix 2, chapter one, Part One.)

Then in April 1982, as already mentioned, Dr Koornhof claimed that the excision of Reserve Four and the other areas from KwaZulu had been agreed to by KwaZulu, in April and in August 1979. (Hansard, Question 465, 23.04.82) This led to a heated denial by Chief Bethaasi, in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, and resulted in Dr Koornhof issuing his press statement on the 6th of May 1982. This, as already pointed out, exonerated KwaZulu from the accusation that it supported the removals but did not exonerate it from the accusation that it had signed on agreement and that it had been informed of what was going on. Subsequently, when the PNP MP, Graham McIntosh, pressed the Minister for details on the nature of this agreement, pointing out that KwaZulu denied having made one, Dr Koornhof appealed to him not to stir up trouble and to come and discuss the matter with him personally instead, 'to prevent a wedge being driven which could create serious problems in the country.' (Hansard, Question 7.09.82)

KwaZulu has used Dr Koornhof’s press statement as evidence of its complete uninvolve in the whole matter. In July 1982 a Sodwana Councillor wrote to the Minister of the Interior at Ulundi to seek clarity on the issue. The reply, received from the Secretary for the Interior, stated that Chief Bethaasi had explained in the legislature that no agreement had been reached and the Minister of Cooperation and Development had then issued a statement 'indicating that KwaZulu never agreed to have any land excised...'

CONFIRMATION THAT REMOVALS WILL TAKE PLACE

The government has not wavered in its intention to remove Reserve Four (and the other areas) eventually. In September 1981, in answer to a series of questions in Parliament, Dr Koornhof confirmed that the area had been excised 'because the people resident in Reserve Four are ultimately to be resettled elsewhere', and evaded a question on whether the people were being moved voluntarily or not. (Hansard, Question 3, 4.09.81) Without acknowledging any of the objections to being moved that had been lodged with his Department since 1979, he replied that that would be a matter for the steering committees that would be established to handle the removal of Reserve Four to decide.

But how can be established after the steering committees, on which they will also be represented, have been formed. And it will be possible to determine how the people themselves feel about the removal. (ibid.)

Then questioned further about why the removal of Reserve Four was to take place, he was uneven more evasive;

"Why?"

"Because the people there are not willing to stay there any longer."

"But that's a matter between the government and the people."
As this matter is in a delicate stage of negotiation with the KwaZulu Government, it is not considered wise to reply to it at this stage.

(Manzum, Question 7, 23.09.81)

In November 1981 the threat to Reserve Four featured in a number of stories in Natal newspapers. Towards the end of that month the Daily Express carried a prominent story reporting that 'a temporary halt' had been called to the removals. It quoted 'a spokesman' for the Department of Cooperation and Development who attributed the delay to opposition by the people of Reserve Four.

The people were shown the area to which it was planned to move them and we are aware they do not like it. It is our policy to try to reach consensus before moving people. (Daily Express, 26.11.81)

Two days later the delay was denied by another spokesman who reported that 'the plans to remove the people from Reserve Four will go ahead.' (Daily Mercury, 26.11.81) In April 1982 the intention to remove Reserve Four and the three other areas was confirmed once again by Dr Koornhof when he made his controversial statement about KwaZulu's agreement to the expropriation of these areas. (Manzum, Question 465, 23.04.82) However his reply did indicate indirectly that the removals would not be immediate and that opposition from within the communities was a factor they were having to consider.

The Black communities concerned will be resettled after further consultation on the compensatory land earmarked in the districts of Isanengana, Ubombo, Lower Umlalazi and Klip River and after the necessary housing facilities, sanitation, water reticulation, school and clinic facilities, and other infrastructure have been provided. A survey must still be conducted to determine the exact number of people involved. (Ibid.)

THE POSITION IN 1982

Four years after the Department of Plural Relations predicted that the removal of Reserve Four would start by the end of 1976, the people are still on their land. Although their legal position has deteriorated significantly in the intervening period, their political bargaining position has improved; if it had not, they would have been moved already.

Escalating costs and significant opposition to consolidation within Natal are succeeding in curtailing Pretoria's general removals programme; KwaZulu's legal victory in the Ingwavuma land deal has cast a shadow over the temporary brake. More significant, anger at the prospect of being moved in general is Reserve Four and their opposition has been repeatedly and articulatevoiced by Chiefs and Councillors. Reserve Four has acquired a reputation for militancy locally which may stand it in good stead.

Pretoria is clearly wary of risking a major confrontation and would prefer to remove Reserve Four by gentler forms of persuasion. Thus far the established leaders have stood impressively firm against all talk of removal but one can expect that the pressure on them to abandon their stance will mount. As in other rural communities, the people of Reserve Four are vulnerable to the corrosive effect of rumour and intimidation and divisions do exist, most notably at this stage between the two Chiefs' wards which thus far have not been responding to the threat they both face as a single body. Local leaders are aware of the problems and there are indications that steps are being taken to counter them.

That the people of Reserve Four do not want to leave their land and that they will suffer serious loss if they are forced to move is indisputable. In September 1982 at a general meeting attended by about 200 people, the Sothu people reiterated their opposition:

"We the people of Reserve Four, Sothu Tribe have today, the 26th September 1982, passed a resolution unanimously that we don't want to be removed from this traditional place of our ancestors. (Resolution of the meeting, 26.09.82)

"If you take a fish out of its water and put it in the sun, it will die", the Chief has commented - and that, he says with knowledge, is what will happen to them if moved to Kwanamana."
CONCLUSION

This volume of the Surplus People Project has set out to document the process of population relocation in Natal over the past twenty years, and to provide some historical background to that. This final chapter is an attempt to summarise and synthesise the major findings and working conclusions to have emerged from this undertaking.

DISLOCAtION AND EXCLUSION

We have called the policy of forced removals 'relocation' in the report, but it could be described more graphically as a process of dislocation. The community and individual case studies contained in Parts Two and Three, particularly when read together, reveal clearly the profound dislocation suffered by individuals, families and communities as a result of the enforcement of mass removals in Natal. This dislocation reveals itself concretely in several ways — in the high incidence of violence experienced in major relocation townships such as Emakheke and Newlands East and the faction fighting found in rural relocation target points in the KwaZulu district and along the South Coast; in the alienation, apathy and despair articulated by so many of the respondents in the relocation areas surveyed by SPP; in the very real material losses and psychological trauma suffered by rural households who had some land and some stock in their previous places and have been thrust into closer settlements where 'a person has to pay for everything' — where they have neither land nor cattle and few prospects for local employment; in the ecological devastation surrounding many rural relocation areas where the land is being denuded of its vegetation to supply fuel and building materials to those relocated there; in the deliberate destruction of good or adequate housing at a time when the housing crisis in Natal/KwaZulu is so acute.

Not visible in the same way, but at work and containing within it profoundly disturbing implications for the future, is the dislocation being inflicted on the wider society. More and more people are being pushed across the borders separating KwaZulu from the rest of Natal and, thereby, being excluded from direct access to and full participation in the economic and political structures of our society. Relocation policies mesh in with the system of influx control and the citizenship laws to underpin the Nationalist strategy of 'no more black South Africans' and to polarise the country into a white-controlled, affluent metropolitan and a black, impoverished periphery. The individuals and communities relocated in KwaZulu are being excluded not simply from certain geographical areas, but from access to jobs and the wealth of our society, and from a position from which they can bargain effectively for that. They are being dispossessed not simply of their land but of their citizenship and their rightful claim to political rights in South Africa.

In the process, KwaZulu is being dressed up as a separate political entity, complete with its own petty bureaucracy, its vested interest groups and its own ethnic identity. Although it has refused to take independence, it has gone a long way down the road to self-government. Yet, as this and other, more detailed, specialist reports make clear, it has no basis for an independent economy and no prospects of ever being able to meet the basic needs of the people who have been chained to it. The areas designated as KwaZulu urgently need to shed people before the devastation to the environment caused by overpopulation and underdevelopment becomes irreversible; they do not need more people to be squeezed into them.

COMPLEXITY

The overall violence done to the people of Natal as a result of the relocation policies of the past twenty or thirty years in this province is unquestionable. The massive programme of population relocation can be accurately described in general terms as a
broad support of the apartheid system, and a system of dispossession and exclusion. The way in which particular aspects of relocation have been developed and implemented in the province and the issues which arise from low level of abstraction and generalisation. The issue of insignificant and the primacy of economic determinants cannot account satisfactorily for all these complexities, except at a high level of abstraction and generality.

There are significant regional variations in the types of removals and the manner in which they are carried out across the province, reflecting differences in local history and political economy. Relocation areas are not all equally deprived or depressed but can be ranked according to whose been relocated into them, the economic function they are intended to perform, and where they are located - this point is developed below. There are important points of differences within the white ruling class over aspects of relocation; these differences can at present be seen most clearly in the debate over the consolidation of KwaZulu, in which liberal business groups and conservative farmers are both opposed to the central government's plans, although for very different reasons. KwaZulu itself is the most vociferously critical of Pretoria of the various bantustans and a major force to be reckoned with in the rural areas of Natal. It cannot be simply dismissed as an insignificant puppet state. Yet its response to relocation, as discussed in the report, has been a contradictory, ambiguous one - publicly very critical and uncooperative, yet in practice often very insidiously in its support for and mobilisation of effective community organisation.

There is also a significant gap between the way in which policies are formulated at the centre and the way they are actually enforced or administered at a local level. One example of this is found in the history of how labour tenancy was abolished in the province - a process that is still not finally complete in some of the more backward agriculturally rooted areas of Natal. The role of local authorities in determining the timing, the manner of selective and voluntary removals from areas of policy into reality cannot be fully realised if one looks at relocation only at a macro-level, yet it can be a key one.

LIMITATIONS AND USELESSNESS OF CATEGORY APPROACH

One of the major weaknesses in analysing relocation strictly in terms of categories is that the relationships and linkages between the categories is often distorted or obscured. For instance, group area removals are generally treated as a completely distinct set of removals that have affected Indian and coloured people only, yet, as the chapter on group area removals in Part Two shows clearly, in Durban group area legislation has affected the black population as a whole and, in relation to African people, has been used as an adjunct to urban relocation and influx control strategies as well. Nevertheless, the various categories of relocation, as isolated and described in Part Two, have not been generated by exactly the same interests and pressures from within the ruling group; the thrust behind relocation has not been a single one. There have been different, though overlapping stages in relocation policies since the 1940s and population removals have been used as a means to achieving a variety of particular, if ultimately complementary, ends. The category approach does make it easier to draw out these strands.

Thus, the removal of some three and a half thousand people out of the mission range area in the 1970s was carried out for directly military/security reasons; the abolition of labour tenancy in the same period was a product of both economic imperatives - the increased capitalisation of commercial agriculture - and, to a lesser though not insignificant extent, security fears relating to the large black population living in the white countryside. White farmers have been agitating for the elimination of black spots since the 1940s and earlier - in the period when they were experiencing a chronic labour shortage - because they wanted that land and because they could not tolerate blacks as neighbours. The choice of which black spots to move first was governed by largely material (coal-mining) interests. Black spot removals have now been absorbed into the consolidation programs but they were an issue long before and had been conceptualised as a self-governing territory. Consolidation of the bantustans itself has a large political dimension and the bantustan policy has evolved to the point it has as a means of reflecting the increasingly militant demands of the black majority for political rights. As with black spot removals, however, the decisions about which areas to excise and which to add to KwaZulu have been shaped by a combination of material and strategic interests - the case study in Reserve Four, in Part Four, illustrates this clearly.

A popular characterisation of removal areas by opponents of apartheid is that of 'dumping grounds': the areas where those who are redundant to the economic needs of white South Africa - the old, the sick, the unemployed, the women and the children (the 'superfluous appendages') can be dumped, out of sight and out of reach of any claim on the welfare and other resources of the country. This description captures the way in which those being relocated are regarded by officials - objects, disposable units - and accounts for the intention behind some of the removals but not for all. Thus most of those being evicted off white farms and being ordered out of the urban areas fall into the category of superfluous appendages - surplus people - but many productive workers have been relocated as well, particularly in the categories of urban relocation and group area removals. In these two instances, relocation has allowed for greater control over workers but it has also been developed as part of a general programme of political dispossessions in control of black people.

SCALE OF PREVIOUS REMOVALS

Most of the figures previously available have underestimated the magnitude of forced population removals in Natal. We have calculated that three quarters of a million people have already been removed in Natal as a result of farm evictions, group area removals, black spot removals, urban relocation, influx control and the elimination of informal settlements, which we were unable to count with any degree of precision. We have, however, estimated that if all the removals to date to have been totalled up, the final figure would probably represent up to 50% of the total population of KwaZulu. (p. 54)

The two largest categories of actual removals, outside of the under-researched category of betterment planning, have been those of farm evictions and group area removals, each having affected in the region of 300 000 people. Although farm evictions are an ongoing (though poorly publicised) fact of life in the rural areas, the implementation of group area segregation has been largely completed in Natal. If one includes as a form of urban relocation the incorporation of the people living in the township of KwaMashu into KwaZulu (by the redrawning of boundary lines, in 1977) then this becomes the third largest category of removals in Natal to date. In the process over 200 000 urban Africans have been excluded from prescribed areas and sections 89 rights in the province. Black spot removals, though the oldest and in many ways the most publicised type of removal, only rank fourth in terms of numbers removed thus far (a little over 100 000 people); the bulk of these removals have yet to be implemented.

The enormous scale of past removals makes it apparent that even were forced population removals to be abandoned immediately, Pretoria would already have succeeded in imposing massive changes in the distribution of the population and the allocation of land between black and white within Natal. The process of dispossessions in the areas into which these people have been relocated will remain long after the policies which have created them have been superseded. If the money budgeted for future relocation could be diverted to such programs of reclamation, then a start in restoring the results of dispossessions could be made.
Ultimately, however, the dispossession itself can only be redressed by the incorporation of the dispossessed into full citizenship in a democratic society.

SCALES OF THREATENED REMOVALS

We have calculated that, on the basis of currently available information, roughly the same number of people as have already been moved are living under threat of removal at the present time. Despite the massive removals of the past six months, Pretoria’s relocation programme is only halfway towards completion. This programme has been coming under heavy pressure, both financial and political, and there is likely to be modifications to it in the future as a result. Nevertheless, the evidence reviewed in this report does not support the optimistic view of some observers that Pretoria is finally softening its approach and likely to call a halt to relocation. Instead there are ominous signs that attempts to push through further, large-scale removals can be expected in the near future.

Relocation sites at Quaden, Compensation and near Enkanini are being expanded or developed; influx control in the Durban area is being tightened up more ruthlessly. There are unknown thousands of people threatened by major dam-building programmes in the Lower Tugela, Lower Umfolozi, Duma and Spandul districts. These dams are being planned so surreptitiously that not all the local people know about their fate is based on rumour and speculation. There is also the threat of a renewed drive being launched by the Department of Cooperation and Development against the large numbers of African people living on white farms; one of the implications of the controversial ‘Orderly Movement and Settlements Control’ Black Persons Bill currently under review.

In several pious speeches about ‘no more forced removals’, Dr Koornhof has not offered a reprieve to a single rural community threatened with removal. Instead he has reiterated on several occasions during the course of 1981 and 1982 the intention of His Department to move interim sites. Reserve Four, the Driefontein area, Matiwane’s Kop, Ubulwane, Thembellihle, the Sobantuva area, Jonnas’ Kop and Steincoliegruit, despite the fact that all these communities have objected repeatedly to being moved.

Whether the Department will succeed remains to be seen. However, at this stage the only category of relocation where there is any prospect of a change or modification in the actual, stated policy is that of urban relocation. Those small African townships still left in the white areas that are currently threatened with demolition and relocation into Kemblu may be allowed to remain - Shakaville, Sibongile, Steendruif etc. Those townships represent a small percentage of the total number of people under threat of removal, and can be accommodated fairly easily as exceptions to the rule. Their populations are fixed by limited housing to present levels and are small in comparison to the numbers of urban residents already incorporated into Kemblu. Furthermore, the shift in policy does not affect these areas about to be incorporated into Kemblu in the future, without any physical removal of people or new building of houses required, by the expeditious further manipulation to the Kemblu border, e.g. at Clermont, near Pinetown. Reprieves are not assured in all cases anyway.

At present most of these people are living under the threat of removal are the victims of consolidation planning: over half a million people, if both reserve and freehold areas are counted together. Pretoria has stated that it intends to complete its current programme for Kemblu by 1985. Given the very real financial constraints and the stiff opposition to consolidation it faces from every possible faction in Natal, it seems highly unlikely that it can complete so ambitious a programme as that contained in the 1973 proposals by then. Either it will fail to meet that deadline, or it will have to scale down or extend its plans quite radically.

Already modifications to the 1973 plan have emerged. The attempt to excise the Ingweswa district and hand it over to Swaziland represents such a modification: a new and more sophisticated refinement of relocation strategies, analogous to the incorporation of urban townships into Kemblu by boundary revisions. Although the attempt has been checked, there is no guarantee that it will not be repeated in the future. As described in the chapter on consolidation, a similar threat hangs over the Simlangelana district of Kemblu, on the Transvaal side of the Pongola river, as well.

Pretoria’s final consolidation plan for the region is being kept secret. Its release has been repeatedly delayed and it will now not be released before the 1985 national elections are indicative of the difficulties Pretoria has encountered, first in drawing up and then in imposing its blueprint for the region. That it is still using the 1975 plan as a guideline, however, is made clear by the omission of Reserve Four, the Bokswana Bay triangle, the Pauligeburg area and the Driefontein block from Kemblu in 1981. The removal of these four areas, which appears to enjoy high priority, will affect in the region of 150 000 people.

SHORT- AND INADEQUATE STATISTICS

Perhaps more shocking than the scale of removals is the degree to which the government has successfully concealed its programme of population relocation and control from the public. Compared to other parts of the country, black and white areas are intimately intertwined in Natal. Many threatened and relocated communities are fairly close to major transport arteries and surprisingly accessible to outsiders who are prepared to take the time and initiative to visit them. Nevertheless, most of the places mentioned in this report have never been visited by journalists, politicians or community workers and their names and stories have not been recorded. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the true magnitude of the forced removals in Natal (and the other provinces) has been played down and obscured as well. The government has achieved this both by controlling physical access to relocation areas and by manipulating and suppressing information. It has been aided in this by the support, be it overt or covert, of the white public which sues defamatory and vitriolic publications in government and manipulation of the media.

In compiling this report we have struggled with inadequate, inaccurate, contradictory or non-existent official statistics, data and maps. Most of the maps available to the general public are blatantly misleading. They show Kemblu not as it really is but as it is projected by the 1975 consolidation proposals - a mere ten pieces instead of the extremely busy, fragmented (and troublesome) jigsaw puzzle of reality. Much of the information needed to plot what is being planned is deliberately withheld from the public. The trend is towards greater secrecy on the part of government ministers and officials (as demonstrated by clause 2 of the Cooperation and Development Amendment Act of 1982) and many of the questions concerning relocation that were put to them by opposition party members in the 1982 parliamentary session were evaded on the grounds of the complexities of the subject, the delicacy of the issue or national security the subject.

The official figures that are available are often unreliable and many of the promises made and assurances given by government officials and Cabinet Ministers concerning removals have been demonstrated to be false - for instance that relocation areas are always planned and serviced with water, sanitation, schools and clinics in advance. A particularly disturbing aspect about official figures are the discrepancies that exist in such basic items as the total area of scheduled land in Natal and the amount of land purchased by the SAD - both quota land and compensatory land for black spots and 'badly situated' areas. Thus Dr Koornhof has claimed, in 1981, that the outstanding quota has been met in Natal, the first province where this has happened. Yet his figure of the total area of land purchased by the SAD to meet the quota obligation in Natal is 7 744 ha less than the total area of quota land quoted for Natal by Thornber-Jones and Smith et al. in 1974. (See p. 100) This may seem a small amount of land to quibble about, yet given the population pressure on the land inside Kemblu it cannot be dismissed as insignificant.

Furthermore, the discrepancy raises fundamental questions about the competence of the officials estimated with the responsibility for seeing that the land commitments on
so much of the segregation and apartheid policies of successive governments have been based, are set. It is extremely difficult for independent research bodies to monitor the land purchases of the SAPC on paper and virtually impossible on the ground. In such a situation major mistakes may be made and never be discovered or rectified.

State secrecy extends not only to dealings with the press and the public in general but to the threatened people as well. People who are to be removed are generally the last to be notified by officials of what is to happen to them; the question of genuine consultation does not come into it at all. In some instances this is simply a by-product of racist attitudes among white officials towards blacks - they are seen only as objects, so many units, who are not equipped with feelings and opinions. In other instances, however, it is clearly a deliberate strategy to delay organisation and undermine morale within the affected community. Ruour and the insecurity that suchengers have been found to be potent sources of disorganisation and fragmentation in areas threatened with removal. Major examples of this kind of secrecy in relation to relocation at present are found in the way the Vuwamwe, Imanda and Nzulaula dams are being planned.

LACK OF SECURITY: DOUBLE REMOVAL

The mass removals of the past twenty or thirty years have underscored a basic fact: no black person can be assured of security of tenure anywhere in South Africa under the present system of government. The Black Administration Act gives the State President discretionary powers to move any black person regardless of what category of land he or she is living on - scheduled, released, freeshold, urban or rural.

In the figures for past and threatened removals are several thousands of people who have been or are to be moved more than once, because of breaks in the policy or bureaucratic bungling. Thus Yalandondo was established as a relocation area in 1963 but moved to Nkakheni in 1972 because a dam was to be built on its site. Many people in the Kwenzi ward of Reserve 3 near Lake St Lucia who are currently living under threat of removal because of consolidation planning, have already been moved more than once as different stages of forest plantation programmes were implemented in the St Lucia area in the 1960s and 1970s. Bilancayo, established in 1970 and having a population of some 20,000 people, is also threatened by the 1975 consolidation plans. Rubururu Trust Farm, established in about 1980 is threatened by the construction of the Vuwamwe Dam which was already being planned by the Department of Water Affairs in the late 1970s.

Land has been manipulated and played with as if it were simply weights on a scale, to be taken off and added to according to the item to be balanced on the other side. The Makathini Plate: excluded from the Bululand reserves in 1909; to be developed as a white irrigation scheme in the 1960s; to be split between KwaBulu and white Natal in 1972; to be relocated to KwaBulu in 1973 and 1979; the northern part to be used to compensate landowners at Reserve Four in 1978; that same region promised to Eemel- land in 1979. The triangle of land north of Sodwana Bay: earmarked for exclusion from KwaBulu in 1973; exicised in 1981; promised to KwaBulu as compensation for the potential loss of land in Zunguza in 1982.

The examples could be duplicated many others. They expose as a cynically constructed myth the argument that KwaBulu represents the traditional home of the Zulu. KwaBulu, as the background chapters in Part One make clear, is a very recent political construction, the latest in a long series of land settlements imposed on the black population of the region by successive white governments. Its proposed boundaries bear scant relationship to the pattern of black settlement prevailing even in the coloni cal period, in the late 19th century.

CONDITIONS IN RELOCATION AREAS

The following section draws primarily on the surveys carried out by SPP in those relocation sites that have been written up as case studies in Part Three. The results of these surveys bear out some of the points made above. However, relocation has not led to a displacement of people into oficial relocation sites only. Very large numbers of evicted and removed black people have moved into unofficial relocation areas - black spots and informal settlements - in an attempt to avoid the limitations of the official sites (chiefly landlessness, isolation and the township style of living). In addition, as pointed out in the report, KwaBulu itself can be seen as little more than one large relocation site and to focus attention only on the official relocation areas can obscure the general crisis of landlessness, unemployment and social fragmentation in the black rural areas. In material terms, relocation areas in general do not differ substantially from other bantustan communities. This perspective needs to be borne in mind in the following discussion.

Pressure on the State over the past 15 years, beginning with the Umshini scandal in 1969/70, has made Pretoria more sensitive to negative publicity about relocation. This has manifested itself in two ways:

1) It has been forced to pay greater attention to the provision of basic (very basic) facilities in relocation sites - latrines, water points and temporary flatcroft huts are now fairly standard issues.

2) It has also been forced to pay a great deal more attention to public relations. In recent years Dr Kornhof and others have been at pains to project a positive image of removals as part of a process of nation building and development, and to deny that removals are forced.

The case studies presented in Part Three expose the fakleness and the cynicism of many of the claims made about relocation areas by the government. The extremely limited options and powerlessness of rural blacks in particular means that the demands they articulate are often skewed. If the only available choice in between relocation and moving or between no house and a house in a relocation area, many people will 'choose' the latter. Even so, the overwhelming majority of respondents in the surveyed relocation areas made it clear that they had moved there unwillingly and under coercion.

The form experienced by people being relocated may be direct (army trucks collecting people in the missile range areas in the early 1970s; 'soldiers' with guns and dogs arriving to shift labour tenants from Dombouwer to Mzimbulwane in 1976) but it may also be indirect (labour tenants having nowhere else to go in the Wesmen district in 1969/70; the ban on building improvements in Roboeom after 1965; the intimidation of tenants at Emptingata in 1979/80). The trend is increasingly in this direction - indirect manipulation of people - to back up the official claims that removals are volun tary, or at least voluntary. In this regard local officials have often revealed themselves as very adept at exploiting divisions within communities, e.g. those between landowners and tenants (Emptingata, Komeni's Kopp) and between old residents and newcomers (Richardson Farms).

Furthermore, while conditions in relocation areas may have improved overall in the last decade, these places are not the model, well-planned and flourishing communities they are made out to be. The basic infrastructure that Dr Kornhof has claimed is always supplied at relocation points has been shown to have been lacking in several recent instances of relocation. In general, the more isolated the area and the less the publi city focused upon it, the greater the likelihood is that officials will skimp on even the bare minimum of facilities that are claimed to be standard. Two examples of this are 1) Kwenzi, near Sodwana Bay, where initially no preparations were made for water or sanitation services before people started being trucked in out of the missile range area in 1979, and 2) Mzimbulwane, where no official water supply has yet been laid on even though people have been relocated there since 1975. In addition, the water supply...
The dependency on migrant labour in the rural relocation areas has distorted the population structure by creating an unnatural preponderance of women and children and thus putting further strain on family and community life. Migrant labour is a basic fact of life in the black rural areas, and is not confined to official relocation sites only. What makes the statistics more shocking however is that people have been deliberately moved on mass into these conditions - the relocation sites are the creations, so we are told, of official development and urbanisation strategies.

In the case of those people relocated off farms or black spots, the loss of land and of stock is a major blow, affecting both their economic and psychological well-being negatively. Access to land was the single most urgently desired improvement for the residents of the rural relocation areas. The loss of land has greatly increased their dependency on migrant labour and, in a situation of high unemployment and low wages, undermined household subsistence levels. The vital significances of land to rural households, even when members are employed, is brought out in the case study on the black spot of Matiene's Kop. A comparison of the average household diet found at Matiene's Kop with those found in the closer settlements of Shalumbe, Naisighbogs and Compensation showed the consumption of both protein foods and greens to be significantly higher at Matiene's Kop. (See p. 446.) Furthermore, among the three closer settlements themselves, the size of the plots available to occupents has made a noticeable difference in terms of overall household subsistence levels as well. Thus at Naisighbogs, where residents are able (for the time being) to graze stock (illegally) on adjoining Trust land, and where sites are large enough for small stands of maize and other crops to be cultivated, household diet is healthier and more varied, on average, than in the other two areas.

A comparison of the survey results brings out very clearly the marked differences that exist between relocation areas in terms not only of facilities but of economic opportunities and the nature of residents' participation in the labour market. In comparing them one is working on a scale of relative deprivation and disempowerment which in parts of the map areas township of Phoenix is insurmountably at the top and the closer settlement of Shalumbe, the oldest of the areas surveyed and one established to house ex labour tenants, is at the bottom.

The disparities between relocation sites reflects the stratification that is being actively encouraged by the State between urban and rural, firstly, and coloured/Indian and African secondly. The physical location and the facilities provided at relocation sites are stratified according to the function the site is meant to serve - commuter township are the most favoured - and the type of people being relocated. Evicted farm workers and tenants on the most isolated black spots, who in general are the least skilled and the most disadvantaged in looking for wage employment, are treated with the greatest amount of indifference and relocated to the most isolated areas: the classic dumping grounds.

The following Table summarises the comparative results of the surveys for each of the relocation areas under the following headings: distribution of the population in terms of gender, economic activity and skill level of workers. The equipment results in the survey undertaken in the threatened area of Matiene's Kop are included for additional comparative purposes.

### Table 19. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN FIVE RELLOCATION AREAS, JUL 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Employed M</th>
<th>Employed F</th>
<th>Unemployed M</th>
<th>Unemployed F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shalumbe</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makhameni</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naisighbogs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inanda Newton</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
<td><strong>149</strong></td>
<td><strong>509</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMBINED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>820</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes 2 individuals whose sex was not stated.
The detailed case studies in Parts Three and Four make it clear that opposition to being moved is widespread within threatened communities but the level of active organized resistance varies enormously. There are major difficulties standing in the way of strong community action, particularly within the rural areas. These have been isolated in the various case studies: intimidation by the authorities, ignorance of the laws and the wider political context on the part of those to be moved, their isolation from other communities and from the media or outside support groups, the lack of progressive leadership and of democratic local organizations in most threatened areas, the divisions within the communities and the very real powerlessness of the people in relation to discriminatory and oppressive legal and political structures.

In general the level of organization in the rural areas is very poor. The established leadership is rarely accountable to the community and vulnerable to manipulation and corruption by the authorities. The role of Inkatha and the uMkhonto government in local organization has been seen to be problematical. Where Inkatha is involved and in many areas it is not - the tendency is to encourage communities to rely on uMkhonto to negotiate on their behalf rather than to encourage mobilization of people at a grass-roots level. The smaller and more isolated the community, the poorer the organization is likely to be and the smaller the chances are that active opposition to being removed will be voiced. The contrast between the St Wendolins and Esikhawini case studies brings out this point. This broad correlation between size and urban links on the one hand and effective organization on the other can be seen at work in relocation areas as well: the level and sophistication of political organization in Phoenix (the rent protests of 1980/81, the lack of support for the SAPU elections) and Esikhawini (the bus boycott of 1979) being far higher than in Sobantu and Compensation, for instance. The correlation is not a mechanical one, however; the detailed case studies point to the complexities of community organization and the range of local variables that affect it.

Yet despite the limitations to community organization that do exist, the strength of popular opposition to removals has been and will be an important factor in shaping the strategies of the State on relocation. In cases where opposition has been organized and active, communities have forced particular concessions and reprimands from the authorities: the granting of local compensation land to those affected by the Woodstock Dam near Margerville; the possibility of a reprimand from the Group Areas Board in St Wendolins; the halt to the demolition of houses at Umhulwane. From a broader perspective, the general opposition to relocation has contributed to the delay in the implementation of various planned relocations in Natal in recent years. Pretoria is less willing to risk a violent confrontation with those it wishes to remove now than it was in the more confident days of the 1960s. Dr Koornhof himself admitted to this when he stated at the NAI Congress in 1981 that the major obstacle to the completion of consolidation in Natal was 'the unwillingness of the Zulu people to be moved'. (Natal Witness, 14.09.81)

The forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of black people over the last few decades has been a veritable tool. It has been one of several developed by a repressive, unrepresentative minority government as a means of retaining its grip on power and maximizing the exploitation of the wealth of the country by the ruling group. Up to a point the policy of relocation has worked frighteningly effectively but there are increasing signs of pressure and strain within it as well. This is particularly evident in Natal where the central government is having to contend with opposition to its plans from a very wide spectrum of interest groups.

The patchwork nature of umZulu, though facilitating the process of exclusion of blacks to some extent, also means that the black areas of Natal are in close proximity to the white-controlled, urban-industrial centres. The informal settlements ringing Durban, which the authorities have been unable to eliminate or reduce despite strenuous efforts over the past two and a half decades, are a visible sign of that - both a product of influx control and relocation policies, and a source of pressure upon those policies, a point of re-entry for the excluded into the white heartlands. In Natal the reality of an overwhelming majority of blacks is becoming increasingly difficult for Pretoria to deny and to control spatially.

* Residence of balance not stated.
# BIBLIOGRAPHY

## 1. General

### NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

- Rand Daily Mail
- Sunday Express
- Sunday Times
- Financial Mail
- Sash
- South African Outlook
- SATO National
- Work in Progress

### GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

- Government Gazette
- Parliamentary Debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA, Republic.</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Acquisition of land by the South African Native Trust and abolition of Bantu property rights in land in European areas. Memorandum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA, Republic.</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Removal of black spots. Departmental circular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA, Republic.</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Annual Reports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## BOOKS AND ARTICLES

- BALDWIN, A. 1974
- BALDWIN, A. 1975
- BALDWIN, A. 1975a
- BLACK BASH. 1972
- BLACK BASH. 1982
- HUNBY, G. 1975
- DAVIDPORT, T.B.H. & SWIST, K.S. 1974
- DIBBION, O. 1970
- DIBBION, O. 1970a
- DEVELOPMENT STUDIES GROUP. 1979
- DEVELOPMENT STUDIES GROUP. 1979
- DURDEGAN, S. 1977
- GUGUST, C. 1968
- HOBSELL, W. 1966
- HOBSELL, N. 1969
- HOBSELL, N. 1973
- INNES, D. 1979
- INTERNATIONAL DEFENSES AND AID. 1970
- JOFFREY, H. 1977
- LACHUR, M. 1983

- The right to the land. Cape Town: Philip. (Documents on Southern African History).

*This is a select bibliography, listing major sources only. For more detailed bibliographies, the reader is referred to Vare, G.: *African Population Relocation in South Africa* (1980) and Yawitch, J.: *Settlement: The Myth of Homelands Agriculture* (1982).*

**Maree, S.**
1979

**Maree, G.**
1980

**Morgan, M.**
1976

**Nabi, M.**
1960

**Resettlement**

**Sinkels, C.E.W.**
1981

**Sinkels, C.E.W.**
1981

**Smith, P. and Nooten, J.J.**
1977

**South African Institute of Race Relations**
Annual surveys.

**South African Press Clippings**
1980, 1981
Focus on Resettlement. Part 1 and 2. Barry Street, Hout Bay.

**Thomas, D. (ed.)**
1981

**Venter, B. (comp.)**
1978
South Africa: a land divided against itself. (Johannesburg): Black South. (Imp.)

**Venter, E. (comp.)**
1982

**Wilson, P. et al (eds)**
1977
Farm Labour in South Africa. Cape Town, David Philip.

**Yardley, J.**
1972
Betterment, the myth of homeland agriculture. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.

2. Natal

**Newspapers and Periodicals**

**Daily News**
Echo (supplement to the Natal Witness)
Ilanga lase Natal
Ledgemill Gazette
Natal Mercury
Natal Witness
Post
Sunday Post
Sunday Tribune

**Dinkonia News**

**KwaZulu, (Department of Agriculture)**
The final report of the select committee on land tenure in KwaZulu.

**KwaZulu, 1979**
Parliamentary report on compensation for removed people.

**Books and Articles**

**Amour, D.**
1980
From 'black spot' to 'closer settlement': an attempt to facilitate forced rural relocation within the larger context of apartheid. B.A. Honors Dissertation, University of Natal.

**Association for Rural Advancement**
Field Reports. Unpublished.

**KwaZulu, (Department of Agriculture)**
Parliamentary report on compensation for removed people.
BOOKS AND ARTICLES (continued)

BADAT, S.
1980

BENEDICT, P.M.
1981

BLACK SASH, Natal Coastal Region
1981

BLACK SASH, Natal Coastal Region
1981
Report 1(03.81) - 31.07.81

BRAIN, J.B.
1975

BROKES, E.N. and HUMBLE, E.
1957

BROKES, E.N. and WEBB, C. de B.
1962

BROWN, F.
1977

BRITTON, R.N. and COOPER, K.N. (eds.)
1977

BUNYI, T.
1974

BUTLER, J. AND Others
1977

CAPEL, G.H.
1969
Indians in South Africa. Pietermaritzburg : Shuter and Shooter.

CHESNOK, A.J.
1969

CLOOSTER, R.
1976

DE KURKET, C.V.
1937
The imperial factor in South Africa. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

DE KURKET, C.V.
1978

DESMOND, C.
1976

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING ACTION COMMITTEE (DHAC)
1950
Memorandum on rentals in Durban townships presented to the Durban City Council, 14th September, 1950. Unpublished.

DUMAS, A.
1976
Natal’s first black capitalists. Theoria, 45, 1975.

EDMUNDS, N.
1978

EDMUNDS, N.
1978

The distribution of population in Natal. Ph. D., University of Natal. (Published as Natal Regional Survey, v. 3.)

Address to the Institute of Citizenship, Cape Town, 30.05.68.


The destruction of the Zulu kingdom: the civil war in Zululand, 1879 - 1884. London : Longman.

Spontaneous housing in KwaZulu: a physical study. Durban : University of Natal, Department of Economics and School of Architecture. (Low cost housing project, Internal report, 5).

Informal settlements and urbanisation in an apartheid city: process and policy. Forthcoming Ph. D., University of Natal.


Fifty years of municipal Durban. (Durban?), n. pub.


XHOSHEHU speaking – an interview with Mrs M. on Cato Manor to Xhosa. Staffordside, 1, 1 February, 1980.


The economic structure of KwaZulu, a South African homeland. Ph. D., University of Natal.

Development or stagnation? agriculture in KwaZulu. Durban : University of Natal, Department of Economics. (Occasional paper, 7).

Land use planning. n.p., KwaZulu Department of Agriculture and Forestry. mimeo.

LLOYD, C.J.  
1979  

LOUDBE, E. B.  
1970  

MAASDOEP, G.G.  
1970  

MAASDOEP, G.G.  
1977  
Alternatives to the bulldozer: an economic approach to squatter housing with lessons for South Africa. Durban, Department of Economics, University of Natal. (Occasional paper, 6)

MAASDOEP, G.G. and HUMPHREYS, A.L.R.  
1975  

MAASDOEP, G.G. and PILLAY, S.  
1977  
Urban relocation and racial segregation: the case of Indian South Africans. Durban, University of Natal, Department of Economics.

MAASDOEP, G.G. and PILLAY, V.  
1978  
Indian squatters at New Farm and Selpings Farm: socio-economic surveys. Durban, University of Natal, Department of Economics and School of Architecture. (Low cost housing project, Interim report, 1)

MABGARD, J.  
1977  

MARKS, S.  
1970  
MARKS, P.  
1975  
NURMEJISKIN from Riverside-Briendane and District Resettled Farmers Association.


MARENDONK from Riverside-Briendane and District Resettled Farmers Association.  
1965  
MARENDONK submitted to the Indian Affairs Advisory Board on the subject of Clairwood rezoning, from Clairwood and District Resettled Farmers and Residents Association, 19.03.1965. Unpublished.

MARENDONK to the Durban City Council from the Indian Housing Committee, 1967. Unpublished.

MOSADU, K.  
1961  
The removal of Kosboom, Pietermaritzburg, Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA Special Report, 2)

MOSIHEL, V.  
1978  
Nobility on the urban fringes: some observations on 72 African households in the Umhlanga peri-urban area. Durban, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal.

MOSIHEL, V. and others  
1978  
MOLLEN, V. and STAFFORD, P.  
1980  
A Black township in Durban: a study of needs and problems. Durban, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal.

Ansamblion, experience and needs in informal housing. Durban, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Natal.