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Abbreviations

Beenso Bureau vir Ekonomiese Neversing en Swart Ontwikkeling
BMR Bureau of Market Research
CED Corporation for Economic Development
Ciskei Debates Verbatim report of the Ciskei Legislative Assembly
CLA Ciskei Legislative Assembly
CNDC Ciskei National Development Corporation
DD Daily Dispatch
ECAB Eastern Cape Administration Board (formerly BAAB)
EPH Eastern Province Herald
SABT South African Bantu Trust (later SADT)
SADT South African Development Trust
SAIRR South African Institute of Race Relations
WP Weekend Post

Glossary

Categories of Relocation

Relocation All three terms are commonly used to describe both the overall policy and the processes involved in the massive, State-sponsored removals of people (almost all of them black) from one area to another that have characterised the apartheid system. SPP has favoured using either 'relocation' or the more descriptive 'removal' (for 'forced removal') in preference to 'resettlement' since 'resettlement' implies some accrual of benefit to the people who are moved and disguises the coerced nature of these population movements. (Vol 2 uses all three words.)

Consolidation This is the official term used to describe the policy developed by the central government in the 1970s to reduce the number of separate, isolated pieces of land making up each of the bantustans (see below); it is part of the process of turning these areas into independent 'national states'.

Betterment Planning This refers to the schemes introduced by the central government in the African reserves since the 1930s and 1940s in an attempt to control land usage and thus improve and rationalise reserve agriculture. Under betterment, tribal areas are divided into residential and agricultural land and the people living on the land moved into rural villages.

Black Spot See below.

Influx Control This refers to the network of legislation and regulations which controls African access to the urban-industrial centres. In what is claimed to be white South Africa; it severely limits the numbers of African people allowed to live and work there to those deemed to qualify in terms of Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act of 1923, as amended.

Urban Relocation This refers to the deproclamation of African townships falling within prescribed (see below) urban areas, and their removal to newly created townships within the boundaries of the bantustans. Physical removal does not always occur, as the boundaries of the bantustan can also be redrawn in order to encompass already existent townships within its boundaries.

Categories of Rural Land

Reserve Those are the terms that have been officially applied to the African areas by the central government at various stages of recent South African history. 'Reserve' dates from the pre-apartheid period; the last three represent stages in the policy of apartheid and refer to the various ethnic political constructions that have been created on the basis of the former reserves: Transkei, Ciskei, Kwa-Zulu, Owaqwwa, Bophuthatswana, KwaNdebele, Kangwane, Lebowa, Gazanikulu and Venda. 'National state' is the most recent term to have been coined. SPP has chosen not to use either 'homeland' or 'national
state' because of their unacceptable ideological bias. They present
an image of these territories as economically viable, politically
separate entities that are the only true and traditional 'homes' of the
African people of South Africa, themselves divided along ethnic lines,
and thus serve to justify the apartheid policy. Where possible we have
referred to the various territories by name directly (e.g. KwaZulu,
Ciskei etc.); otherwise, depending on the context, we have used 'reserve'
or 'bantustan'.

Scheduled land
Land set aside in terms of the Natives Land Act of 1913 for occupation
and ownership by Africans. The schedule to the Act was based on the
existing African reserves and locations and amounted to about 8.98
million ha.

Released land
Additional land set aside for African occupation and ownership, to be
added to the scheduled areas, in terms of the Native Trust and Land
Act of 1916. The total amount to be released in South Africa in 1916
amounted to about 6.2 million ha. Some of this was land that was
already occupied or owned by Africans; the balance had still to be
acquired by the South African Native Trust (SANT, later SATD, then
SADT) which was established at this time.

Quote land
The total amount of land to be added to the scheduled areas in terms of
the 1916 land legislation was apportioned between the four provinces
on a quota basis: that amount represented the maximum area that could
be occupied or owned by Africans in each province. The total area of
African land (scheduled and released) was thus fixed at a little below
13% of the total area in South Africa.

Trust land
Land purchased by the State in terms of the 1936 land legislation and
administered by the SATD/SADT.

Block spot
This is an official term that is generally used to refer to African
freehold land which was acquired before the 1913 Land Act and which
lies outside the scheduled or released areas. It is one of the categories
of land threatened with removal because it falls within what is considered
the white area. In the SPP report we have used this term to refer to all
African freehold land that is under threat of removal, including land
falling within scheduled or released areas that are to be moved in terms of
the consolidation policy.

Badly situated areas
This is a term used by the authorities to describe scheduled or released
areas (tribal and, in some instances, freehold) that are to be moved
because of the consolidation policy. Officials often use this term and
'black spot' interchangeably and SPP has tried to avoid using the term
altogether.

Excised land
Land which has been is or is to be excised from the bantustans in terms
of the consolidation policy of the government.

Added land
Land which has been is or is to be added to the various bantustans, in
compensation for the areas to be excised in terms of the consolidation
proposals of the government, so as to meet the quota of land set in
1936.

CATEGORIES OF URBAN / RESIDENTIAL AREAS

Group areas
These are areas that have been proclaimed solely for occupation by
members of a particular race group, either white, coloured, Indian, in
terms of the Group Areas Act of 1950. The Act also affects trading
rights and interracial property transactions.

Prescribed areas
Prescribed areas are proclaimed or de proclaimed by means of a notice
appearing in the Government Gazette; they take in all the white urban
areas and the presence of Africans in them is governed by influx
control regulations.

Townships
Residential areas set aside for African, Indian or coloured occupation,
usually situated adjacent to or within commuting distance of a white
urban area on which they are economically dependent. Conditions in
these areas vary, but generally formal housing is provided for rent,
and sometimes for sale. These areas are generally better off with
regard to services and facilities than are the closer settlements
described below.

Informal settlements
Areas of settlement which are not planned or approved by the local
authorities or the State. Housing is erected by the occupants of the
land themselves, generally out of unorthodox building materials. The
areas are often densely populated and generally poorly serviced.

Deproclamation
(of a township)
The process by which the legal procedure for establishing an authorized
African township is reversed. This is a necessary preliminary step
before such a township can be relocated.

Closer settlement
The official term used to describe a type of settlement established for
African people on reserve or Trust land that is for residential purposes
only - no agricultural land is attached - and far more rudimentary in
the type of facilities it has than a township. People who are removed
off black spots and white farms are generally relocated to these
settlements. They are provided with temporary accommodation and are
expected to build their own permanent houses. Facilities vary but
generally (not always) include pit latrines and a communal water supply
point/s.

CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE

black
african
indian
coloured

In terms of the Population Registration Act of 1950, everybody in South
Africa was classified according to their 'race' as defined by the Act;
the four major classifications being established as 'White', 'Native'
(subsequently Bantu, subsequently Black), 'Coloured' and 'Indian'.
This is another example of language being manipulated by the govern-
ment to promote the ideology of apartheid. In this report the term
'black' is used to include all those who are disenfranchised and are
not classified as white; it thus includes all the people who are
officially classified as Bantu/Black, Coloured or Indian. However,
since the apartheid legislation affects these different sections of the
black population differently in certain important respects, it is often
necessary to distinguish between people along the official lines, and in those instances we have used the terms 'african', 'indian' or 'coloured'. We have deliberately not capitalized the first letter in 'african' or 'indian' because we do not wish to legitimize the ideology of ethnic divisions and racism implicit in their usage.

**Labour tenants**

These are african families living on white-owned farms who supply their labour to the landowner for part of the year (3 - 9 months) as a form of rent, in return for the use of some of the land for themselves. Historically the most widespread form of farm labour in the northern parts of the country, the labour tenant system was finally abolished by the government in 1979.

**Rent/cash tenants**

The term 'rent' or 'cash tenants' has been used in the report to refer specifically to those african families living on white-owned farming land who have commonly been referred to as 'squatters', because they are not labour tenants or full-time farm workers, but who pay a cash rental for the land. The term has been used to distinguish them from labour tenants. The government has over the years acted to eliminate this class of people.

**Squatters**

This is another ideologically loaded term. It is used in the report to refer to people living illegally on land without the permission of the landowner. The official use of the term is far broader and looser and it may be used to describe any black person whose presence on a particular piece of land is not approved of by the authorities, regardless of the nature of the agreement between the occupant and the landowner. It has been used to describe people living on white-owned land, on black-owned land, both within and without the bantustans, on tribal land and on State land.

**Commuters**

The term has been used in the report to refer to workers who work outside of their place of residence but who are able to travel to and from work on a daily or weekly basis, i.e., as distinct from migrant workers (who only return home monthly or annually) or people working in the place where they live. We have not restricted the use of the term to workers travelling between bantustan settlements and non-bantustan centres of employment only, which is the official usage.

---

**General preface to the SPP report**

Within days of announcing a reprieve for the Crossroads community outside Cape Town in April 1979, the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr F G J Koornhof, confirmed that 656 african families would be removed off tribal and african freehold land in the Tulbagh Basin in Natal, to make way for the building of the Woodstock Dam. The latter removal received an obscure report in the press and was forgotten in the wave of euphoria which marked the Crossroads Settlement. In April 1979 Total Strategy (against the Total Onslaught) was at its peak and ad hoc decisions appeared from a number of Departments serving, in this case, to highlight contradictions in the apartheid system.

While Crossroads had been the focus of national and international attention from the churches, liberal organisations and those in opposition generally, it was by no means the only community under threat of removal. Factors which helped Crossroads into the limelight included firstly, the fierce resistance of the people to be moved; secondly, its proximity to a metropolitan area (and therefore press, concerned public, welfare organisations and university resources); and thirdly, the recent demolition of all other squatter communities in Cape Town.

The idea of establishing the Surplus People Project, as a national research project on relocation, took root at this time in response to these events. Some people who had been involved in the Crossroads support group were unconvinced of the desirability of the Koornhof deal there and felt the need to focus on forced removals throughout the country, particularly in the rural areas where access was difficult, resulting in relocation unknown to outsiders. It was felt that an update of The discarded people by Cosmas Desmond was due, looking particularly at what had happened during the 1970s since the publication of Desmond's study. At the same time Gerhard Maré was compiling African population relocation in South Africa, for the South African Institute of Race Relations; this raised the general issue of relocation and suggested further areas of work.

After consultation with various community workers and academics, it was decided to hold a seminar of interested people to see if a national project on investigating relocation and raising the issues in public could be launched. The first meeting was held in February 1980. It was attended by 23 participants, most of whom became the core of the project which adopted the name Surplus People Project SPP.

The objects of the project were established then as follows:

1. To co-ordinate and initiate research projects into population relocation in South Africa, and anything which has a bearing on such relocation.
2. To work in conjunction with other groups and individuals who are engaged in similar work.
3. To publish the results of the research in any manner that is decided by the management committee.
4. To engage in any activity which is deemed by the management committee to be necessary to the adequate fulfilment of the above objects.

Initially the project was intended to last one year, but this became clearly inadequate and while funds were raised for that period, they were stretched to cover three years. Sincere thanks are expressed to the Interchurch Co-ordination Committee for Development Projects in the Netherlands for its financial and moral support.

The Surplus People Project derives its name from obvious sources. As a result of increased capitalisation of industry, agriculture and mining, relatively fewer unskilled workers are demanded by the economy. The changing nature of capitalist development in South Africa has
resulted in an increased demand for skilled workers, hence an attempt on the part of the ruling class to consolidate an urban black population with a stake in the system, and the determination to isolate South Africa of the unproductive, unemployed, disabled, and youth. From surpluses and field work, it has become clear that there are thousands of people who will never gain access to employment in urban areas and unless they are prepared to work for R1,00 per day on white-owned farms, where there may still be some work, they have been made redundant permanently. These surplus people will never enter the wage labour market under the present economic system.

However, during the course of the project, it has also become clearer to those involved in that relocation has not been used only against those surplus to the economy’s needs. Large numbers of skilled workers and employed people generally have been relocated under the group areas and urban relocation policies, for instance, while the removals linked to the consolidation planning of the 1970s have had a major political component to them. The original conceptualization of what the project was investigating, as reflected in its name, has been broadened as a result.

The Surplus People Project was created as a voluntary group with a part-time national co-ordinator and a small steering or management committee for administrative matters. The strengths and weaknesses of a voluntary group were continually present. The experience from so varied a membership, based in Cape Town, Grahamstown, Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Johannesburg but with participants from all over the country, was very valuable. There was a healthy mixture of theoreticians and practitioners with each learning from the other. For the first time many of the academics were involved in field work while community workers, priests and health workers were introduced to theoretical material which helps them plain what they had observed for years. But the difficulties of voluntary work lie in the coordination of work and the responsibility of members to the group when it comes to working to deadlines. Some dropped out of the group and others joined. Those left to the end have had the major task of collating and writing up the masses of material collected.

The State intervened at various stages: Guy Berger, an early participant, was jailed (under the Terrorism Act) for other activity; Cedric de Beer and Aaret van Heerden were detained for over ten months and released without being charged. A number of other participants were detained for shorter periods in connection with other alleged activities. Field workers were harassed at various times.

It became clear that while a national understanding was essential, the whole country could not be covered in the same detail. Some areas were more accessible, both in terms of proximity to metropolitan areas and the level of political repression, e.g. KwaZulu: other areas exhibited less relocation on a mass basis, e.g. Transkei. In the case of the Transkei it was decided that the Eastern Cape group could not deal in depth with more than the Ciskei where mass removals have taken place on a very large scale and some of the worst conditions in the country occur. Relocation in the Transkei is therefore dealt with only as a chapter in the regional report. The national 5-volume report attempts to be comprehensive but it cannot claim to be uniformly reliable. It is, however, the most up to date and the most comprehensive account yet published.

While it is difficult to offer the right proportion of thanks to organisations and individuals, AFRA (Association for Rural Advancement) in Pietermaritzburg deserves special mention for making the services of Cheryl Walker available at all times for research and field work (which accounts for the Natal volume being so much more detailed than the others). Co-operation has been particularly close with Saldru (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit) at the University of Cape Town. It gave generously of research officer and research assistant time and facilities for computer processing and for printing. The University of Natal and Lovedale Press have also been helpful in printing matters. The churches, particularly the Church of the Province of South Africa, the Roman Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church and the South African Council of Churches co-operated warmly. Without their network and contacts this project would not have been possible.
Preface to the Eastern Cape report

This report on resettlement in the Eastern Cape is divided into four parts. Part I deals with the background to removals. It attempts in the first place to locate them in the context of the political and economic development of South Africa. Resettlement is not a mere policy aberration. It forms an integral part of the strategy employed by the South African State to ensure the continued reproduction of the present society. Part I also discusses the environment in which relocation in the Eastern Cape occurs. The Ciskei, the destination for most of those resettled in the Eastern Cape, has widespread poverty and unemployment. For those in the Ciskei, often the only road to employment runs via the migrant labour market. The Ciskei cannot really cope with all the people being foisted on the area.

Part 2 is devoted to the overall picture of resettlement and describing the various resettlement sites and types of removal in the area. Removals to the Ciskei during the seventies were dominated by a continuous flood from the rural areas involving ex-farm workers, squatters and independent subsistence farmers; an unexpected flight from the Transkei on the eve of its independence; and a sustained transfer from the proclaimed townships of East London to Mdantsane. Altogether no less than 150,000 people, a quarter of the current population, moved into the Ciskei over the past decade. Many removals are still planned for the future, in particular the clearing of the East London/Queenstown corridor which is receiving high priority.

Part 3 contains in-depth information mainly collected from questionnaire surveys in six resettlement sites in the Ciskei. Three of them (Mdantsane, Dimbaza and Sada) are established towns; the other three (Elukhanyweni, Kammaakrai and Glenmore) are typical closer settlements. Mdantsane represents an instance of urban removal, Dimbaza a notorious camp turned industrial town, Sada the future for closer settlements, Elukhanyweni a violent elimination of a black spot, and Kammaakrai and Glenmore rural removals.

The substance of Part 4 is a number of individual life histories which try to capture some of the emotional drama and dislocation involved in removals. It also includes a brief study on legal resistance as attempted in a case made by the people at Klipsfontein.

The term 'resettlement' is used in this report in a fairly wide sense. The classic 'GG' government-supervised removal is only one aspect of the movement of people to the bantustans. Many institutions and laws exist in South Africa which have exactly the same effect and are part and parcel of the process of forced population migration. One cannot avoid this in any discussion of resettlement.

This report has numerous shortcomings. It is primarily a work of reference, and much of the information can only be viewed in this light - yet the many gaps in that information are only too apparent. We hope it will also serve the general reader with a clear picture of resettlement in the Eastern Cape - but here again there was a problem because a number of people, with differing views, participated in the writing, and this is reflected throughout the report since we were unable to resolve these views and had to let them stand.

On a technical point, please note that all prices mentioned were those established by our surveys in 1980/1. Statistical tables are derived from the sources cited on p 376, unless otherwise specified.

The Eastern Cape division of the Surplus People Project was initiated and co-ordinated by Guy Berger until his detention in 1980. This report has been very much a group effort, but the group would like especially to thank Andre Roux, who has been responsible for co-ordination, Priscilla Hall, who has borne the heavy burden of production, and Ben Maclean for his mass of eloquent photographs.

Participants in the working group at one time or another were

Guy Berger Ron Jall
Vivian Bickford Smith Kirk Helliker
Sipho Billie Lindile Jela
Jeanne Chunnert Marian Lacey
Jacklyn Cock Ben Maclean
Richard de Villiers Pat McCcartan
Dave Forbes Raymond Motshwane
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PART 1

Introduction & background
1.1 INTRODUCTION

The Eastern Cape's unique combination of a high level of education and a low level of subsistence has always made it one of the most inflammable regions of South Africa. From the early days of the frontier wars, through the ICU and the ANC, to the contemporary trade union struggles in the docks and factories of Port Elizabeth and East London, the Eastern Cape has maintained a militant tradition of resistance. There is, however, another face to the Eastern Cape, a face which has a much lower public profile: the face of the rural areas. Its most prominent feature is not organisation and resistance. Nor, despite the efforts of the Sebas and the Matanzimas, is it submission and co-operation. It is the poverty and helplessness of underpaid employment, underemployment, and unemployment. Graham Greene, writing of Latin America in The Honorary Consul, said, 'Hunger drives a man to fight. Malnutrition makes him too tired to raise a fist.' The same could be said of the rural Eastern Cape.

The focus of this study is the resettlement camps of the Ciskei and the threatened black communities of the 'White Corridor'. We believe that many of our findings also hold true for the established black locations of the Ciskeian bantustan, but that 'normal' Ciskeian conditions are aggravated in the case of the resettlements by the social and economic dislocation of forced removals. There are therefore more visible and more acute, but they are in no way atypical or accidental. The resettlement camps are the fruit of South Africa's policy of 'separate development', and should be seen not as an aberration but as the inevitable consequence of such a policy.
1.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The present resettlement programme is intimately related to the bantustan policy of the South African State. Without an understanding of this policy, resettlement is simply incomprehensible. This section will therefore provide the outlines of a framework for such an understanding. The other sections of this report do not rely too heavily on this first part, though, and so it may be ignored if the reader wishes. Its aim is to counter the popular myth that resettlement is simply an instance of National Party insensitivity or ideological insanity.

We will not try explaining the development of the policy in any historical detail. That would be far beyond the scope of this piece. Instead we focus on one aspect of the policy: control. Whatever the particular causes, whatever the other functions, one cannot deny that the bantustan strategy is an extremely sophisticated system of control over the African population, simultaneously at the political, economic, ideological and demographic levels. We will try to show how and in part why these various controls work.

1.2.1 Historical background

However, limited, this analysis at least gives a rough outline of some of the problems confronting the Nationalists when they assumed power in 1948. The problems are not proved exhaustively, nor is there any serious attempt to explain why, in a causal sense, the State’s responses took the particular form they did. But we must outline these problems, otherwise the bantustan policy will appear excessively arbitrary.

Secondary industrialisation began on a meaningful scale in the thirties. The pace, initially under the impact of the gold boom and later under the stimulus of the war, was very rapid. By the end of the war, secondary industry had established itself as the major production sector of the economy.

These developments, and others such as the relative decline of the reserves and the white rural areas, triggered a process of rapid African urbanisation and proletarianisation. As the urban demand for African labour expanded and rural African incomes declined in relative terms, Africans flocked to the towns in search of employment. Influx control measures were not consistently and systematically enforced. Shanty towns and squatter camps mushroomed on the edge of metropolitan centres. Though many found employment, many others settled simply in the hope of doing so and thereby swelled the ranks of the reserve army of labour. In short, a typical third world process of urbanisation and proletarianisation was taking place.

The political and economic consequences of these developments were dramatic. The forties saw an upsurge in the political consciousness of blacks. Some political community and industrial organisations were revitalised. Others were started afresh. All expanded rapidly. Many - and this is perhaps more important - developed more sophisticated strategies, became more tightly organised and took on more aggressive stances. Resistance erupted on several fronts simultaneously. There were industrial strikes, urban and rural riots, and the beginnings of the defiance campaigns. The demand for a democratisation of the political system and for an end to economic discrimination emerged as the two uncompromising goals of the dominated sections of society.

It is all too clear that these demands were in conflict with the particular structures of privilege and prosperity on the one hand, and on the other, discrimination and exploitation, as they existed in South Africa then. Any real democratic shift was inconceivable. The denial of serious political and economic rights to Africans in a common society had always been a pillar of State policy, and it continued as such under the National Party. But the Nationalists introduced some new elements.

Firstly, they set about preserving the structures of white domination and exploitation in a systematic way that, say, the United Party never did. To some extent the state was simply forced to develop a more coherent way of coping with black demands as the contradictions between capital and labour, and in its South African variant, between white and black, deepened during the fifties. The bantustan policy was elaborated under the pressures of a time of unprecedented struggle. But there were other important elements too, in particular the virility of Africaner ideology.

In the second place, they finally rejected any evolutionary process of political and economic accommodation and integration. This is not to say that the United Party had been firmly on such a course. On the contrary, they were on the whole still very much committed to a system of white domination. But South Africa then was passing through a stage when cohesion within the dominant group was somewhat weak. Some interests within this group did favour a more liberal path of development. The United Party, among others, represented some of those interests and hence at least entertained some notion of partial accommodation and integration. The complete rejection of this path by the Nationalists in fact poses a basic historical question. An answer to it would have to analyse the interplay among political and economic structures and processes at that particular stage in the development of the South African social formation.

It would also have to reflect the diverse and competing interests and ideologies within the dominant classes then, and the form and extent of the class and other struggles. Unfortunately we cannot provide such an analysis. Here we can only pose the problem and proceed on the assumption that the actions of the State were henceforth based on a strategy of perpetual domination.

This strategy had a number of corollaries which together define the content of the bantustan policy. We have already noted the historical chain of events that commenced with a sustained industrialisation and urbanisation and culminated during the fifties in a struggle of unprecedented intensity. It was all too clear that large urban African concentrations meant political and economic conflict. That being so, and under a strategy of continued domination, it was more or less inevitable that restricted African urbanisation would become a cornerstone of State Policy. During the sixties this policy, for rather similar reasons, was extended to the white rural areas. At a new remove this entailed relocating Africans to the bantustans on a massive scale. Along with these demographic controls came new forms of political and ideological domination. Over a number of years political power was decentralised, first towards traditional elites and later bantustan authorities. Contrary to popular opinion, these new forms of State control also had substantial economic repercussions: the migratory labour system was expanded; capital intensification in industries was encouraged; industrial decentralisation began; and control over the location of the labour force was intensified.

The above argument implies that the State in capitalist society acts, broadly speaking, to
ensures the expanded reproduction of capitalist social relations and that the main threat to the continued reproduction of these relations in South Africa during the 1950s took the form of, firstly, African nationalist political struggles and, secondly but to a lesser extent, industrial struggles. The bantustan policy is part of a strategy, the adoption of which was by no means inevitable, of repressing all these overt forms of resistance. In other words, this argument assigns primacy to the class struggle in shaping the particular content of Nationalist policy. Economic controls thus appear as a consequence of a more general strategy of demographic and political control.

This approach has obvious deficiencies. It completely ignores the concrete economic interests of particular classes within the dominant classes such as agricultural, mining and industrial capital, not to mention the white petty bourgeoisie and working class. It also ignores the economic conditions necessary for the expanded reproduction of capital in general. These economic questions are obviously of crucial significance, but they are very complex and best postponed till later. We redescribe this imbalance somewhat during the discussion below of the mechanism of economic control over the African working class.

1.2.2 Demographic control

Demographic control over the African population is a key aspect of the bantustan policy. Moreover, the resettlement programme is directly linked to this particular system of control. Since these are discussed in greater depth elsewhere in this report, a very brief outline of the State's policy in this regard will suffice here.

The country is divided into three types of area: white urban (prescribed) areas, white rural (non-prescribed) areas, and bantustan areas. The State aims at having the fewest possible Africans in the first two types of area, and the most in the bantustan areas.

The following table gives some idea of this strategy's success:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White urban areas</th>
<th>White rural areas</th>
<th>Bantustan areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly the percentage of the African population present in white South Africa on the various census nights has been decreasing steadily. This is particularly spectacular in the case of non-prescribed areas, but even in urban areas, despite the inclusion of migrants in the urban population, there is also a noticeable trend. Efflux from the areas of white South Africa must naturally show up as influx into the bantustans. By 1980 the bantustans contained well over half of the total African population. If migrants are included in the bantustan population, then the figure rises to nearly 60%. Thus, in terms of relative population sizes, the demographic aims of the bantustan policy are in process of being realised fairly effectively.

The African population in the white parts has not decreased in absolute numbers, however. In the rural areas it has been more or less constant, though an actual decline is imminent. The African population in urban areas is still on the increase, but at a declining rate, and certainly at a rate considerably slower than that of the total African population.

The attempt to contain the urban African population in white South Africa has required, above all, control over the urbanisation process of Africans. This is exercised through the system of 'influx control'. Although there has been influx control for a long time in South Africa, it was considerably intensified and rationalised in the 1950s. That was the time, we argued earlier, when stricter limits to the African urbanisation process became a necessary condition of a strategy of containing the struggles within South Africa.

As is well known, under the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 as amended in 1952, the only Africans allowed to stay in a white urban area are those who qualify under Section 10 (1) of the Act as amended, thus:

(a) those born in the area and who have lived there continuously;
(b) those who have worked continuously for one employer in the area for 10 years;
(c) dependants of those with (a) or (b) rights;
(d) other workers with special permission to be in the area for their jobs.

Africans under (a) and (b) have the permanent right to stay. Dependents under (c) may lose their right, as when a child grows up - and here we should add that dependants who have not got (a) or (b) qualifications themselves may only win their right to stay subject to certain provisions, and these often include insurmountable obstacles.

The residential rights of all other Africans in urban areas are of a strictly temporary nature. These people may not stay in the area for longer than 72 hours without explicit permission. Generally, it is only given to those in employment in the area. This is the provision which condemns Africans from the bantustans and white rural areas to being migrant labourers. A whole host of other regulations govern their entry, stay and exit from proclaimed areas. For the moment we need only note that they may not stay beyond the duration of their employment, which may not exceed one year.

It is clear therefore that the legal African population in proclaimed areas is divided into a settled and a migrant component. This division in law has been strictly enforced in practice.

There are of course also many illegal Africans in the urban areas. The identity documents all Africans must carry, the hundreds of pass raids and arrests, the subsequent legal process, 3-minute court appearances, jailing, fines, deportation, which are so much part of township life are simply some of the necessary elements in the business of limiting the number of illegal Africans in a particular area.

There have been several attempts over the past three decades and especially during the sixties to eliminate the settled urban African altogether. For various reasons, they were never fully implemented. But this does not mean that there has been no erosion of Section 10 rights. On the contrary, the legal security of the settled population was far greater during the fifties than the sixties. In the latter period they became subject to a number of conditions over and above the basic requirements - for example, it became possible to withdraw Section 10 rights from Africans who had the basic qualifications but were declared idle and undesirable.

But the main attack against Section 10 rights came through the urban resettlement programme. In some cases, small town locations within the 7 km zone around a bantustan were relocated to the bantustan. In other cases metropolitan townships were moved across a border into a bantustan. Now and then it has merely meant redrawing a bantustan boundary to include a township. In all these cases people lost their Section 10 qualifications and, depending on circumstances, the associated rights.

On the other hand the State has made it very difficult - and since 1968 virtually impossible - for anyone to acquire Section 10 rights except through the provision of 10 (1) (c).

The continued impact of influx control and urban removals on the settled African population in
prescribed areas has been considerable. In the 10 years this population group has grown at an average annual rate of roughly 2.2%, which is significantly less than the national growth rate for Africans. The de facto urban African population grew even more slowly, at 1.3%, which also clearly shows the power of the barriers against urbanisation. If we bear in mind that the South African economy is passing through a stage which would have provoked fairly rapid urbanisation under less coercive circumstances, then it is still more obvious that the policy of limiting the urbanisation of Africans in the white areas has had considerable results.

Demographic control in the white rural areas has a more ambivalent history. During the fifties the African population in the white rural areas increased steadily. While influx control limited permanent migration, the system of labour allocation contained the temporary migration from rural to urban areas. Under the latter system, Africans from the white rural areas were prevented largely from taking migrant employment in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy. These measures definitely contained the movement off the land, and may even have forced Africans back from the urban to the rural areas.

Furthermore, the fifties predate the programme of resettlement from rural to bantustan areas and thus it is unlikely, especially since this was a period of increasing demand for farm labour, that there was any net African migration from the rural areas to the bantustans. More likely the main flow went the other way.

Whatever the details of interregional migration, the increase in the African population in the white rural areas during the fifties was more or less equal to the expected national increase in the population. Besides, there is no doubt that the demographic controls already mentioned played a crucial role in dampening the African population in the white rural areas.

To a certain extent these controls simply reflect the attempt to limit normal urbanisation. But the interest of the farmers is also a key point here. At that time agriculture faced a severe labour shortage, and it was therefore in their interest to have a steadily increasing rural population. During the fifties, therefore, the State not only tried limiting urbanisation per se, it also tried to ensure that any urbanisation occurring drew on the bantustans, not the white rural areas.

From 1960 the position in the rural areas has changed fundamentally. By then the State's antipathy towards large urban concentrations had been extended to include the rural areas. No doubt part of this aversion was ideological in origin. The bantustan policy was being elaborated fully then for the first time. But mainly it was provoked by fears not unlike those about urbanisation. The rural riots of the fifties, even though they were primarily based in the reserves, showed that rural Africans were quite capable of taking threatening political action. In other words, a verwoesting of the white countryside contained definite political dangers.

There is no doubt that such a verwoesting was taking place. The rural African population was increasing steadily in absolute numbers. Relative to a decreasing white population it was exploding. A commission established specifically to investigate the problem found that in the Orange Free State, for instance, 25% of all farms were without any white supervision at all.

Over the next two decades the State dealt with the problem through a massive programme of rural resettlement. Chapter 4 of the Native Trust and Land Act - which is the rural equivalent of the Urban Areas Act - specified the terms under which Africans could reside permanently in the white rural areas. Groups included were Africans with freehold rights and their tenants, full-time registered labour tenants and their dependants. But since this Act of 1936, labour tenancy and squatting has been officially eliminated through resettlement and associated adjustments in the law. There have also been considerable inroads into African freehold. Nowadays the African population in white rural areas consists more or less exclusively of settled full-time farm workers and their dependants. Even these families have been leaving. Here again the hand of the State has been significant.

The relationship between the State's rural resettlement policy and the interests of agriculture is more fully discussed below. Suffice it to say that there was mostly a happy coincidence of interests, and that probably the wishes of agriculture directly helped to shape policy, in the sixty-six, agricultural employment stabilised and preparations got under way for the sharp decline of the seventies. From the farmers' point of view, therefore, normal population growth inevitably produced a surplus population. It is hardly surprising that agriculture accepted and encouraged the elimination of those patterns of rural occupation such as labour tenancy, squatting and black spots, where much of this surplus population was concentrated.

Many settled full-time farm labourers have also left the white rural areas for the bantustans, either through eviction or by choice. Bantustans are of course the only lawful destination, and also the only route (via the migratory labour system) to the labour market.

The staggering consequences of these demographic controls is apparent in rural population trends. The settled African rural population has for the past two decades been virtually stagnant. A number equivalent to all natural additions must therefore have left.

While it is true that the depopulation of rural areas is a standard consequence of industrialisation, clearly the State first delayed the process and then accelerated it by destroying virtually all traces of incomplete proletarianisation in white South Africa, on the one hand, and on the other by compelling white landowners to expand agriculturally unproductive people. This is not unique to South Africa. What is unique, however, is the deportation of the effected people to economic backwaters such as the bantustans.

The awesome impact on the bantustans of both the urban and the rural demographic controls is demonstrated by the following statistics: between 1979 and 1980 the de facto population increased from 7,4 to 11,3 million, and the de jure population (i.e. migrants included) from 8,4 to 12,6 million. This amounts to an annual population growth rate of over 4.3%. Roughly 1% of the increase in the population can be attributed to the resettlement policy (broadly defined). While some of these people joined the bantustans merely as a result of boundary adjustments, the vast majority are new immigrants. A few of these managed to settle in established rural villages, others found accommodation in bantustan townships, but most moved into either closer settlements or squatter camps.

1.2.3 Political control

The immediate response of the State to the struggles of the forties and fifties was, as is well known, ruthless repression. All resistance, whether violent or passive, was forcibly crushed. At the same time a whole battery of legislation was developed and deployed enabling the State to restrict the activities of individuals and organisations. The agencies of repression were also expanded and modernised. Altogether these repressive measures paid off beyond all expectations. By the mid-sixties all overt internal resistance had been eliminated.

These forms of political control are still in force today. But the State also realised that mere repression of revolts and suppression of organisations could never suffice in the long run to maintain the structures of exploitation and domination. The bantustan policy entails, at the political level, a brutal restructuring of the forms of political control over the 60% of the African pop. the remaining squatters. Firstly, the State apparatuses in the bantustans themselves have been overhauled. Secondly, the class structures within the bantustans have been modified. Thirdly, the division between the bantustan populations has been intensified. Below we briefly discuss each of these in turn.
A component in the renewal of the bantustan State apparatuses has been the replacement of the old State functionaries in the bantustans. The first step was passing the Black Authorities Act of 1951. This Act provided for the retribalisation of administration in the bantustans.

During the fifties local government passed into the hands of tribal authorities, which ideally coincided with traditional chiefdoms. Each authority consists wherever possible of a traditional chief, village headmen and councillors, all of them salaried officials accountable to and where necessary appointed by the higher authorities. The functions of tribal authorities include the typical duties of local government such as maintaining roads, dams and schools, keeping law and order, giving pensions and welfare applications, administering tribal or local labour laws, and relief employment, organising agricultural activities (especially those associated with the betterment programme), and in theory allocating land. Thus in effect the Black Authorities Act decentralised local political power towards the traditional elite.

But this was not accompanied by greater local democracy. Rather, the Act completed the incorporation of the traditional elite into the overall structures of domination. The tribal authorities are not accountable to the people they control. Furthermore, any member can be removed, as happened on several occasions in the fifties. Nowadays the chiefs and their associates are more like magistrates than traditional rulers. They have also acquired a vested interest in the system beyond their official remuneration because they can use their position to their own economic advantage. This is not to suggest that the average village headman has become rich as a result of the tribal authorities, but they and their clients do manage a little better than the average commoner. They are therefore, broadly speaking, fairly deeply committed to the bantustans. The traditional elite is perhaps more aptly and certainly more graphically described as 'the new camp commanders of the bantustan labour camps'. That role is revealed in reports of how tribal authorities use their control over the allocation of welfare benefits, employment and land for political purposes.

The collaboration between tribal authorities and the South African State showed up clearly in the fifties when the betterment programme was implemented despite widespread resistance. In most parts betterment was done simply by getting the co-operation, often easily elicited, of the tribal authorities. Elsewhere, where resistance was more intense, brute force became necessary. Even then, the divisive role played by tribal authorities was crucial.

The 1951 Act also tied the various tribal authorities hierarchically to a territorial authority in each bantustan. But the territorial authorities really derive their significance from the next major step in the restructuring of control over the people in the bantustans. The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 had made provision for the decentralisation of considerable territorial executive powers towards the territorial authorities and eventual self-government for the bantustans. These territorial authorities have subsequently, mostly since 1971, become legislative assemblies with certain legislative powers. The 1959 and subsequent Acts in effect simply extended the system of tribal authorities to the territorial and therefore higher level.

The legislative assemblies consist of the chiefs in the bantustans and a minority of elected members. The traditional elite therefore effectively dominate both executive and legislative activities within the bantustans.

But by implication the transfer of executive and legislative functions to the bantustan authorities extended still further the African component among those running the control system. As State and local government expanded it became necessary to recruit beyond the traditional elite. Thus certain members of the educated stratum as well as clients of existing functionaries were drawn in as State officials and party representatives.

Even allowing for disagreements and some conflicts of interest between bantustan leaders and Pretoria, there is no doubt that these extra bodies and individuals are, like the tribal authorities, just new agents of the central State in these areas. Their actions proclaim it. For example, no bantustan has scrapped the South African security legislation. The few changes have mostly been cosmetic. The reasons for compliance are the same as for the tribal authorities. The bureaucrats also have vested interests in the bantustan system. In fact the widespread corruption at all levels in the bureaucracies of these areas is entirely functional to the system because it helps to maintain commitment among the agents of the State. Furthermore, any serious threat to the existing power relations in white South Africa must inevitably spill over into a threat against the bantustans themselves. The bantustan authorities thus have very little option but to keep control in the bantustans as the South African State requires of them.

Replacing outsiders to the bantustans with locals has several implications. The fact that the new functionaries are African is in itself significant. It cannot but blur the coincidence of racial, political and economic divisions in South Africa and thereby weaken the alliance among the various regimes in South Africa. This plus the fact that many of the functionaries are based among the traditional elite and the educated stratum gives the new agents a greater legitimacy than the old ones had. The possession of some political and economic power is also significant here. This is not to say that the bantustan leadership have no credibility crises - on the contrary, they have very severe legitimation problems. But responses vary across the bantustan population. In some rural parts, for example, the bantustan authorities may even enjoy some support. The whole question of legitimation is in fact rather complex and need not concern us here. The point for now is that they do have greater legitimacy than the previous agents, and more importantly this is a decisive factor in the South African political environment.

Another aspect of restructuring of the bantustan State apparatuses is that the State now has at its disposal other instruments of control in those areas. Though the bantustan authorities have more legitimacy than the previous agents there is at least no question, and there could never be a question, of their rule resting on broadly based consent and consensus. As a result the majority regimes can pressurise such security agencies and laws as security agencies and laws are extensively and even more intensively used than before. These are key forms of control, without which the bantustans could not last for long.

But new instruments of control have been added. These mainly relate to economic and development resources. The bantustan authorities have a virtual monopoly over the allocation of resources in the area. This power can be and is used for political purposes. A community, or even individuals, who come into conflict with the authorities may find that they are denied certain resources. It would certainly be their expectation. This particular form of political control derives directly from the decentralisation of executive powers to the bantustan authorities. They have both the information and the commitment, not to say desperation, to transform control over the allocation of economic resources into a political weapon. The resources at their disposal are of course strictly limited because the bantustans are so badly underdeveloped. They may yet be adequate for effective control, especially in some areas. The leverage needed to manipulate or divide rural communities may be quite modest, where poverty is the norm and where there is no really organised resistance. Even delays in payment of salaries can make a big difference. The heavier pressures used by the bantustan authorities include its control over the regional allocation of employment opportunities, agricultural inputs, educational facilities and transport services.

The initiatives of the South African State with regard to the economic development of the bantustans are particularly important here. While the developmental resources being transferred to the bantustans are relatively small in comparison with the economic problems there, exactly the opposite holds for the political problems. These resources considerably strengthen the political hand of the bantustan authorities. The reason, as we have said, is that a small economic lever may often suffice to elicit political assent.

The depth of fear for both the repressive and hounding forms of control was vividly revealed in 1976. A large number of people from the districts of Glen Grey and Herschel moved to the Ciskei after these areas were ceded to the Transkei, because they had previously voted overwhelmingly against their proposed incorporation into the Transkei. They felt that retribution
Restructuring the forms of political domination has also to do with the new class structure that has emerged inside the bantustans. Although this new structure is intimately related to the changes in the State apparatuses it is nevertheless distinct from them. It is also far more significant, because it has fundamentally changed the nature of politics in the bantustans.

Basically, certain privileged classes have been called into existence. They derive their positions directly from both the political and economic developments in the bantustans. As already mentioned, the decentralisation of political power has created an indigenous group of State functionaries. The class positions of the functionaries vary, but they fall mainly within the more privileged groups. The transfer of executive functions has therefore had a direct effect on class differentiation. There have also been some indirect effects. Because a bantustan has executive control over the allocation of economic resources, it can channel these to selected groups, which further intensifies class distinctions. This has already happened. One of the key aims in decentralising the economic resources towards the bantustans is to extend class differentiation there. It is perhaps here that the main impact of the economic development of the bantustans is found.

This new pattern of class stratification is a direct result of bantustan policy. The privileged elements are therefore more or less firmly tied to the bantustan system and hence to the South African State. Thus the South African State has not only managed to extend its support base, but has simultaneously created groups within the bantustans willing to fight for the preservation and consolidation of their positions, and thereby the bantustans themselves. Added to that, the divisive effects of class differentiation on African resistance are obvious.

The working classes in the bantustans stand in sharp contrast to these beneficiaries of the system. They are absolutely tied to the South African economy, as a part of its work force. The bantustan policy holds no significant material benefits for them. It simply mediates and modifies the control that the South African State must ultimately exercise on them.

At the top, in each bantustan, there is a very small compendium bourgeoisie comprising the highest echelons of the State bureaucracy, a few truly capitalist farmers and a number of successful entrepreneurs. The class owes its entire existence to the South African State. This is obvious enough in the case of State officials. The farmers in question are those who have managed to obtain, typically on lease from the State or its agencies, some of those white farms which have been incorporated under the consolidation programme. The entrepreneurs have followed much the same path. They have either taken over old white establishments or new ones created by the development agencies. The identification of this compendium class with the South African State is unambiguous. One may expect concerted efforts from this class to help the State’s survival.

The petit bourgeoisie in the bantustans has also had a substantial and deliberate boost. The traditional fraction of this class, the shopkeepers and petty producers, has to date been released from many of the constraints hampering this group in white South Africa. It has also benefited from the new provision of economic services in the bantustans and benefited from the take-over of petty white firms. Its numbers and confidence have both increased. The other fraction of the petit bourgeoisie, consisting mainly of teachers, nurses and State officials, has also grown in size with the expansion of government services in the bantustans. Thus on the one hand the middle classes have gained from the bantustan policies and therefore have allied themselves with the compendium class. There are definite tensions within this alliance; however, because the extent of underdevelopment in the bantustans is such that the aspirations of the petit bourgeoisie can never be fully realised within the current environment. This tension is in fact by no means unique to the bantustans. The switch in the alliance of a disaffected and petit bourgeoisie is often the cause of a change of government in developing countries. Whether the bantustan leadership and ultimately Pretoria can retain the support of this class remains to be seen. They are, however, keenly aware of its importance.

A more reliable ally to the dominant class in the bantustans is found in rural areas among the better-off subsistence farmers. This includes those who have gained access to the more capital intensive State-sponsored agricultural schemes, local headmen and a few successful dryland farmers. This peasant class is also heavily dependent on State support. Therefore the petit proletariat, though it has fairly limited influence in the bantustans, is unambiguous in its commitment to the bantustans. In fact in most bantustans it forms the backbone of the ruling party. The special significance of this better-off peasantry derives from its ability to play a decisive controlling role, both ideologically and politically, in the rural areas.

The working classes in the bantustans may be divided into a semi-proletariat and a rural proletariat. The semi-proletariat comprises those families, the bulk of the bantustan population, who have access to a small piece of agricultural land but cannot reproduce themselves entirely on a basis of subsistence agriculture - they therefore have to participate more or less continuously, via one or two members of the family, in the formal sector of the economy. Most of the South African migrant labour force is drawn from this group. Their economic interests are quite obviously opposed to the bantustans. Recent industrial action by migrants, which is intimately related to the increasing stability of the migrant labour force, may in fact be indicative of a growing assertion of their interests. However, the position of the semi-proletarianised migrant labour force has in the past and still does impede the articulation of its interests. On the one hand, at their place of work they experience the extreme control and regimentation of compound life and the structural insecurities of migrant employment. On the other hand, in their place of permanent residence and, more particularly their families, are subjected to the conserving and limiting influences of a traditional way of life, and confronted by the bantustan system of rural control. This includes a politically selective process of economic resource allocation, as well as paramilitary repression. The increase in class differentiation in the rural areas is also important because it strengthens those groups such as the better-off peasantry and the petty traditional elite, who can exercise some political and ideological hegemony in the rural areas and who are committed to doing so on behalf of the bantustan authorities.

The full proletariat is that fraction of the working class which have lost all access to agricultural land. They live either in the urban townships or the semi-urban closer settlements of the bantustans. Many are migrant workers, especially those from closer settlements, but the majority are a growing core of those in the South African frontier commuter labour force. These commuters typically go to and fro daily between their place of residence in a bantustan town and their place of work in an adjacent white industrial area. There is also a small internal working class in each bantustan.

In general the people in closer settlements are very isolated and, as a result of their migrant status, in a weak position in the labour market. These constraints, together with the system of bantustan controls, can still quite effectively neutralise this group. But this is not the case with the fully urbaniagte component of the proletariat. The main threat to the bantustans comes from this class. This class also is one that in general meets with the most blatantly repressive aspects of the bantustan political process, which is also a key point in the system of control. There are, besides, several factors such as high unemployment, high rationalisation, with both dirty urban and dirty rural populations. Unlike the working class organisation, and so does class differentiation among urban africans.

As well as new tools and new class differentiation, the bantustan system of control has a third component: the division of political services on the dominated groups. In fact a divide-and-rule strategy is used at all levels. It has already been said that the new functionaries themselves, by virtue of being local men, generate divisions within the bantustans. Control over the allocation of resources can also do so between communities. Most obvious of all are the divisions created by the increasing class differentiation within the bantustans.

The separation of the African population into eight ethnically defined groups is an attempt to activate these tribal differences within the African population which, though politically latent.
nevertheless have distant historical roots. The political separation of the bantustans according to ethnic identity lends a new material basis to old ethnic differences. This must create serious divisions within the ranks of African resistance because it institutionalizes competition along ethnic lines for the limited handouts of South African society. The government has also pursued some policies which, whether deliberately or not, intensify these divisions. A very prominent issue is the allocation of land. The proposed expropriation of parts of KwaZulu for incorporation into Swaziland is a move that has been made before, albeit under less dramatic circumstances.

To conclude, it is quite apparent from the above that the forms of political domination in South Africa have undergone substantial modifications over the past thirty years. While simple repression is still important, other more subtle methods of political control have been added and extended. These new forms moreover definitely complicate the task of those in search of a democratic South Africa.

1.2.4 Ideological control

The impact of ideology (used here to mean "world view") is all-pervasive on social, political and economic life. The interpretation and evaluation of experience, and the responses to events, are of necessity based on a conceptual framework, in other words on an ideology.

The bantustan policy also acts at the ideological level. The attempt to fragment and restructure African ideologies along ethnic lines is a deliberate State strategy. At the ideological level it parallels the political and economic division of the African population into ethnic units.

The newly created ethnic ideologies call upon people to identify themselves on the basis of culture, language, territory and history - in other words, to define themselves ethnically. Experience is interpreted and evaluated as far as possible in ethnic terms. Thus, independence is presented as the culmination of a struggle for ethnic liberation, while any organisation working for equality within a common society is portrayed as, among other things, a threat to ethnic emancipation.

The ethnic element in bantustan ideologies is usually accompanied by sentiments that foster nationalist beliefs. Thus it is claimed that the bantustan policy enables ethnically separate groups to attain nationhood, to develop their own national way of life. These claims are obviously aimed at creating legitimacy for the bantustan authorities.

A third theme in the new ideologies concerns the emphasis, at least in words, which is being placed on the economic development of the bantustans. This developmental ideology is meant to give credence to the viability, both politically and economically, of the bantustans. The accompanying reference to individual economic advancement and the virtues of free enterprise provide justifications for increased class differentiation in the areas.

The bantustan ideologies also try to limit the expectations and responses of Africans to the given dispensation. Thus Africans are told that they are foreigners in which South Africa and that they should live their political lives in a bantustan. Likewise, it is right and proper for an African to have petit bourgeois aspirations for economic advancement provided these are confined to life in a bantustan. It is more difficult to redefine the economic demands of the African working class in ethnic and individualistic terms, of course, but even here the attempt is being made. Firstly, the bantustan ideologies draw a clear line between economic and political demands, and confine the latter to the domain of bantustan politics. Secondly, the micropolitical ethic is left unchallenged in the competition or potential of competition along ethnic lines for jobs in South Africa, and the ambassadorial status that this entails for each worker. For supposedly ‘mister’ reasons, trade unions are suppressed and attacked. Thirdly, the emphasis on individualism and free enterprise within the development ideology is a deliberate counter to working class unity and organisation.

The fraudulence and force behind many of these prescriptions are only too clear. Yet the impact of the new ideologies is perhaps far greater than many wish to admit. There is undeniably some historical basis to the ethnic divisions. During the segregationist period of South African history these were kept alive within the precapitalist structures of the social formation. Through the system of migrant labour also, ethnic sentiments were perpetuated even within the capitalist sectors of the society. This means that ethnicity has remained available as a divisive instrument. The important thing now is that the bantustan policy tries lending a new material reality to these ethnic divisions and ethnic ideologies. Of course, since this takes place within the context of a social formation in all spheres of the formation is almost complete, this ethnic reality assumes a very different form from what it had before. Nevertheless an experiential basis for ethnic ideologies is being created by the granting of self-rule and independence to the bantustans. For example, there is a real danger that many Africans will start defining themselves ethnically and as aliens in South Africa now that border posts are going up, travel documents are being issued and people expelled from white South Africa under the aliens procedures.

The bantustan authorities also exert some political power and control the distribution of some resources, both of which lend a certain reality to the notion of ethnic nationhood and nationalism. These are fostered again through the pressure on people to join in political and nationalist processes. Hence, the extent of involvement is far greater than seems reasonable at first sight. In fact no-one with residential ties to the bantustans can easily afford to ignore ethnic realities and symbols. Limited development at the economic level is also occurring and this lends some substance to the ideology of economic development and individualistic economic advancement.

We must also recognise that there are groups within the bantustans - such as State officials, teachers, traders, artisans and so forth - whose interests, at least at the moment, are more compatible with the partition of South Africa into separate States than anything else, and who therefore go to great lengths to propagate the bantustan ideologies. They also control a range of instruments through which ideology is formed and advanced.

To summarise, new ideologies that support the bantustan policy have become of potential importance recently. These views are naturally actively encouraged by the South African State. But they are also reinforced to some extent by the very implementation of the policy because it lends a kind of experiential basis to concepts such as ethnic identity, ethnic nationalism and ethnic development. These ethnic ideologies are also strongly supported by certain groups of Africans. As a result they exercise some control - and may come to exercise considerably more - over people’s interpretation and evaluation of events in South Africa.

The bantustan ideologies have a greater hold over people than is often believed, but of course this does not mean that they have or will capture the African masses. Too much of the daily experience of Africans still militates against accepting ethnic nationalism, and will continue to militate against it. Yet it cannot be denied that the bantustan ideologies weaken those ideologies which call for economic and political change within a unified South Africa.

1.5 Economic control

We must first look briefly at the relation between the bantustan policy and the interests of capital in general. Any capitalist State must ensure the continued capital relations. This implies that it must create an environment where the narrow economic interests of the various fractions of capital are not impeded. It will be shown below that the interests of agricultural and mining capital have been closely aligned with the
bantustan policy, and that the former fraction may even have played a decisive historical role in its creation. On the other hand, in the case of industrial capital matters are more ambiguous, especially the narrow economic considerations.

But the capitalist State must not only deal with the narrow economic interests of the various fractions of capital. It has to provide the socio-political climate in which capital can expand. In South Africa this means that it has the task of containing the struggles which continuously emerge or threaten to emerge as a result of the deeply exploitative relationship between capital and labour in this country. One example can illustrate the point. Since the relationship between capital and labour is essentially a market relationship, the State must ensure the perpetuation of those market ties. Thus it cannot allow a redistribution of income or a determination of wages based on non-market criteria. The low wages of black workers characterise the South African economy and the market determination of wages. The State can thus only ensure the continuance of the low-wage structure of the economy if it preserves market relationships.

Resistance to the exploitation of labour by capital must ultimately take a political form. It is capital in general. There is of course no suggestion here that all the elements of capital will agree on the form this political control should take. As a matter of historical fact they don't. Some elements of capital may even be severely constrained by the State's policies. Nevertheless, without some systematic mechanism of political control a country like South Africa could never keep its particular pattern of capitalist relations.

Implicit in most of this chapter is the view that the bantustan policy and its associated restructuring of the political and ideological mechanisms of control are primarily directed towards providing the political conditions necessary for the reproduction of capital, labour and the relationship between them.

There also exist some more specifically economic controls over the African working class. First and foremost among these are the restrictions on African trade union activity. Until recently the State has consistently striven towards eliminating all serious African labour organisations. Now the policy is one of control rather than straightforward repression. Other controls worth mentioning act through the educational, occupational and legal systems.

Here the focus will be on another type of control, namely control over the allocation and location of the African labour force. These controls are intimately related to the bantustan policy. They are also closely related to the narrow economic interests of particular fractions of capital. The details of this system are described in an addendum to this chapter. A very brief outline will suffice here.

The division of South Africa into prescribed, non-prescribed and bantustan areas has a parallel division of the labour force into settled urban, rural and migrant labour. The settled urban labour force is relatively free to search for employment in the urban areas, but the rural areas have been restricted and hence labour from other areas is needed as well in these areas. Entry into the urban areas is carefully controlled, however. Only migrants are allowed in, and then in restricted numbers, only where required, and under limited conditions. These people come mainly from the bantustans because an influx of labour from the non-freely for jobs within the non-prescribed areas, though. This division of the labour force and control over the interregional flows of labour is done through the labour bureaux.

Some of these controls over labour migration are in part simply correlates of the demographic controls. For instance, restricted urbanisation presupposes some control over the influx of labour into the urban areas. But some of the controls have a more specifically economic purpose too. These will be discussed later.

There is hardly a shadow of doubt about the beneficial economic impact of the bantustan policy on agricultural capital, briefly reviewed here.

The process of economic development during the thirties and early forties was particularly uneven. While mining and industry both boomed, agriculture, despite some support from the State, passed through a difficult phase. This meant it could not offer wages comparable to those in industry and it was therefore unable to compete with the other leading sectors of the economy on an open labour market. To a significant extent, therefore, the urbanisation of Africans occurred at the cost of the white rural areas as farm labour streamed into town. The situation in the urban and rural areas was such that many farm wages was such that many farm wages were higher despite high levels of urban unemployment. This contraction in labour supplies caused a severe agricultural labour shortage.

After the war agricultural production grew rapidly. Along with this went an intensification of production and an acceleration in the rate of accumulation and mechanisation that continued until around 1955. In the main this drive towards greater mechanisation was due to the increased profitability of agriculture, which in turn derived from the strong demand and favourable prices for agricultural goods after the war. Persistent labour shortages also played a part. But mechanisation at first was not accompanied by a decrease in the demand for labour - on the contrary, the expansion of agricultural activity led to a greater demand. At this stage much of the mechanisation amounted to capital substituting (tractors for oxen) rather than labour saving. There must also have been some labour substitution but it seems this was more than offset by the increase in the intensity of production, and hence the overall increase in demand for all types of farm labour. The call for casual labour grew even more for regular labour, because mechanisation then was centred on pre-harvesting activities. The need for extra labour around harvest time, due to increase in the intensity of production then, was in to way affected by the substitution of capital for labour. This expansion in the demand for labour intensified the labour shortage.

But farmers either could not or would not respond to the labour crisis by raising wages. Instead they demanded stringent curbs on African movement from country to town. In effect, a strong interest-group in the dominant class was advocating centralised control over the spatial allocation and geographic mobility of African labour and labour reserves, a key ingredient in what later became bantustan policy. It has even been suggested that these demands more than anything else were responsible for the bantustan policy. However, this is to mistake a part for the whole. Agricultural interests, narrowly defined, needed to restrict african mobility not only between urban and white rural areas, and this in itself did not entail a bantustan policy. Yet agricultural interests were certainly just about perfectly compatible with the bantustan scheme.

The State's compliance during the fifties with these demands eased the farm labour crisis considerably, and at the same time enabled farmers to continue with wages and working conditions at extremely exploitative levels. This policy worked so well that the employment in agriculture rose sharply in the early fifties, wages hardly increased at all in real terms at that time or even immediately afterwards. The policy of centralised control over the allocation and location of the African labour force has, above all, served the interests of agricultural capital. Without the restrictive labour practices, agricultural capitalism would not have accomplished the transition to mechanised and fully fledged capitalist agriculture as easily as it did.

The state of agriculture changed fundamentally during the sixties. White accumulation continued at a modest but steady pace, and output went on rising, employment stabilised. For most of the sixties regular farm labour stayed at a more or less constant level. The casual labour input increased, but only marginally. A shift towards more skilled farm labour was also starting to emerge. Thus the labour shortages of the fifties soon became surpluses. In other words, some of the Africans in the rural areas were becoming redundant as farm labour.

A large part of this surplus population was concentrated in squatter, tenant and black spot communities. ("Squatters" here means primarily the rent-paying African subsistence
farmers on white or black-owned land in the white rural areas.) Many of these squatters were engaged in subsistence activities for only part of the year. For the rest they either migrated to town or worked as casual labourers on farms. Many squatter families also had members who worked away from home on a full-time basis. Labour tenants are agricultural labourers on white-owned farms who give at least 3-6 months' service a year to the farmer in exchange for certain land rights. In all respects they are very like squatters. Black spots are areas of black-owned land in the white rural areas. They are occupied either by squatters or the owners themselves, as with squatters and labour tenants, many black spot residents have worked either in urban areas or on white-owned farms, continuously or intermittently.

The first serious ideas of eliminating African squatters, labour tenants and freeholders were mooted already in the 1870s. These forms of African occupation of land tied a large potential agricultural labour force to other pursuits. This conflicted with the interests of agricultural capital as a whole because of the general labour shortage at the time. The abolition of squattings, labour tenancy and black spots would have released many Africans for full-time wage employment in agriculture and it would also have rationalised the allocation of labour within agriculture by limiting competition in the farm labour market to the matter of wage only. Both effects would have been of all-round benefit to agricultural interests.

Enabling legislation was passed, but the State postponed the actual attack till later. This was partly due to a conflict of interests within agriculture. Some farmers clearly benefited from the status quo, but also, the State was not yet in a position to implement the proposals. The machinery for canalising labour was still too underdeveloped to ensure that its action would not disrupt the agricultural labour surplus - which, under the then tight conditions in the agricultural labour market, was a real possibility. Besides, other land and housing was not yet available for resettling those who would have had to move out of the rural areas.

The real thrust against labour tenancy and squattings finally came in the sixties. It is ironic that by then a general condition of labour surplus had arisen. The requirements of agriculture were thus very different from those outlined above. Agriculture at this stage, with the exception of Northern Natal and Northern Transvaal, stood virtually united behind the State in its drive to eliminate squattings and labour tenancy. A change in position was no longer a priority for agriculture in general, as far as the actual labour supplies were concerned. Rather, organised agriculture accepted that eventually the sector would have to rely entirely on full-time wage labour for its regular labour needs, and to a large extent on the dependants of the settled labour force for its casual labour needs. In fact there was a steady trend towards that system in the sixties. Full-time wage labour formed a necessary adjunct to the change towards more skilled labour and more mechanised production methods (which included those for harvesting). The South African Agricultural Union also recognised that labour tenancy and squattings were inefficient forms of labour and land use, and that market forces would have eliminated them eventually. For these reasons some farmers were already starting to evict tenants and squatters on their own. But many farmers could not do this comfortably although they were aware of the advantages of full-time wage labour and wanted to rid their properties of these tenants and squatters. One of their problems was quite simply that redundant tenants and squatters had nowhere else to go. The period under discussion predated both the creation of closer settlements and the serious land-buying by the Trust. Entry into the bantustans was blocked by the Trust and many previously redundant squatters were evicted in eet. Africans and Africans were also constrained from leaving on their own. A second problem for farmers was that many rural Africans definitely preferred some type of settlement or squatting because it implied access to some land. As a result, from the narrow economic point of view of the farmers, there was little competition between full-time wage contracts and those involving land, and this prevented many farmers from shifting easily and independently of other farmers to a pure wage form. Finally, many farmers feared for their supply for white labour if there were an uncoordinated approach to the elimination of tenancy. Everywhere, more and more the casual labour needs were being met by dependants of full-time settled workers, and yet it was still necessary to get extra casual workers from elsewhere. A farmer expelling any squatters and tenants whose full-time services were not required could be threatening the most obvious sources of supply. Meanwhile, access to other sources had not as yet been adequately developed.

In short, certain elements within the situation delayed the inevitable adjustment under the impact of market processes to a unified system of labour utilisation and land occupation throughout the white rural areas. The intervention of the State simply accelerated the already existing but constrained trend in this direction.

This intervention, as we have said, was largely based on broad political considerations. The State was in no mood to allow concentrated African settlements beyond the scope of either the urban or the bantustan system of control. This is obvious enough in the case of those squatter communities who worked in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy, by and large. (They often only by no means always lived on the edges of urban areas.) But for similar reasons the State also disapproved of the squatter labour tenancy communities who were mainly tied to agriculture. A more important factor in the earlier stages of the State's intervention could have been industry's interest in the labour reserves. The abolition of squattings and tenancy definitely held some advantages for capital here, though it is not clear how significant the benefits were or how they were perceived.

The responses of agriculture were also crucial. Not all farmers favoured the abolition of squattings and labour tenancy, but the dominant fraction certainly did. The system still helped some farmers economically, but they were overwhelmed. Those who saw that a shift towards full-time wage labour in agriculture was inevitable represented the progressive and modernist forces in farming. They argued that speeding up the trend could only have a beneficial impact on labour and land utilisation. In the sixties they already dominated most of the agricultural unions. Their opposition was a motley bunch of more backward farmers and farming areas and absentee landlords, most of whom were at odds with the main thrust in agriculture. Here we should remember that many farmers shared the political views of the government; also that the State's intervention threatened a potentially greater overall supply of labour which, though no longer strictly necessary, was not unwelcome either; thirdly, that clearing away these concentrated communities implied an end to much of the petty theft that plagued the relations between farmers and neighbouring squatters and tenants. Yet the expected elimination of casual labour shortage could be offset by a shift to more short-term migrants from the bantustans, provided that adequate recruiting mechanisms were made available.

Through the sixties and seventies the State moved literally hundreds of thousands of squatters and tenants. By the end of the seventies they had ceased to exist in a formal sense. The shift towards full-time settled wage labour had more or less run its course.

Organised resettlement was accompanied by the movement of many other full-time farm workers and their families who were either evicted on the farmers' initiative as being redundant or who withdrew by themselves through dissatisfaction with their lot. Altogether then, thousands of people, surplus to the needs of capitalist agriculture, have left the white rural areas.

It is worth noting here that while the depopulation of the rural areas is a standard adjunct to economic development in most countries, there are unique features in the South African experience. Severe inflow control dammed up the African population in the rural areas so that it eventually outweighed the employment capacity of agriculture. This ultimately led to the excessive discontinuity associated with the rural exodus in South Africa. Inflow control also, by implication, forced this flow from the countryside into the bantustans. In this sense, rural resettlement is a form of displaced urbanisation. But the underdeveloped state of the bantustans and the migratory movements of compulsory people back to the urban areas as migrants, making resettlement a migrationist process as well. Together with other factors, inflow control may also have forced the economy onto a growth path where the rate of labour absorption in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy is less than it could have been, and so exacerbated the unemployment and underemployment in the economy than it could have been, and so exacerbated the unemployment and underemployment in the economy.
contrary, the absolute size of the surplus population in the rural areas is probably as large, if not larger, than at the beginning of the seventies. The number of people recounted during the seventies is of the same order as the natural increase in the rural population through that decade. Hence the rural population now is much the same as it was in 1970.

But meantime, starting around 1969, there has been a significant decline in employment in agriculture. It has affected both regular and casual workers, but especially the latter. This trend has been associated with the quickening rate of mechanisation, particularly in harvesting and increase in the average size of farming unit due to a consolidation surge. The mechanisation of harvesting activities is normally labour saving. The same applies to a large extent to other types of employment, and more in response to an upward trend in wage costs which were encouraged by the State and agricultural unions.

Table 2 below reflects some of the changes mentioned above. Although investment and expenditure on sophisticated equipment and intermediate goods is not necessarily an adequate index of mechanisation of farm processes, the growth in both types of expenditure that mechanisation was speeding up. The decrease in the number of farming units is evident from the table, as is the increase in farm wages during the latter part of the sixties.

There can be little doubt that the population in the rural areas still includes a large surplus, and that this is by and large, not been at all systematically investigated. Probably many of these families live on white farms under informal labour-tenant-like arrangements whereby they agree to one family member being allowed to live in the rural areas nowadays, full employment is not full employment in usual large-scale infringement. This is not to say that this surplus population will not be moved, though. Quite the contrary.

To sum up: the bantustan policy and the concomitant control over the allocation and location of the labour force, and in particular influx control and resettlement, stand in a close alliance with the interests of agricultural capital.

In the fifties the State divided the African labour force into rural and urban components. Through influx and influx controls it effectively trapped a sufficiently large African population in the rural areas to satisfy agriculture’s labour demands. The current dependence of agriculture on those sectoral allocative controls is of course considerably less than during the fifties. Nevertheless the persistent huge wage differential between agriculture and the other sectors of the economy could never be sustained for as long a time in the absence of these controls. Hence agricultural capital still insists on them.

In the sixties, a population emerged which was marginal to the needs of agriculture. This was a consequence of the one hand of influx control, population growth and certain semi-feudal patterns of labour utilisation and land occupation: and on the other, of changes in both the quantity and quality of the labour required by capitalist agriculture. Many of these people were forced into the bantustans in one way or another. Yet there is still a surplus population in the rural areas, and since we may expect a continuation of the policy of locating redundant workers in the bantustans, resettlement from this source is likely to continue.

Mining interests have, at least until recently, also benefited from the bantustan policy. It is the migrant industry par excellence, with an almost total reliance on migrants. The reasons for this are largely historical.

It has been argued that during the first half of this century, before the subsistence economies of the reserves declined, the mining industry was able to pay migrants particularly low wages because part of the subsistence of the families of migrants was derived from subsistence agriculture, and that as a result migrant labour was extremely cheap. But this is controversial. Even if it is incorrect, though, there certainly must have been some economic advantages to migrant labour, or other coerictions on these workers, for otherwise the mines would have settled their labour force. There were certainly no compelling legal obstacles to doing so.

More recently it has been suggested that after 1950 mining tried a few times to shift towards settled labour, but was prevented by the intensified influx control legislation of the Nationalist government. Industry might have wanted to settle a component of its labour force, but it is doubtful whether this was envisaged for the bulk of its labour. Migrant labour probably remained economical, for several reasons.

Firstly, until the seventies the mining industry was fairly labour intensive and the extent of mechanisation limited. It therefore used primarily a rather unskilled level of labour, which migrant labour suited. Moreover, the skilled black labour force was easily stabilised by using migrants from those regions like Lesotho where career mining was widely accepted.

Secondly, earlier in this century the industry centralised its recruitment through what is now called the TEBE agency (The Employment Bureau of Africa). This monopsonistic labour practice enabled the industry to keep wages below competitive levels and still does today. It is highly unlikely that this recruitment practice would have persisted in a settled labour environment.

Thirdly, mining has always had a virtual monopoly over the employment of foreign labour. Until 1970 foreign migrants constituted well over 50% of its black labour force. The advantages of this concession are self-evident. For equally obvious political reasons, foreign labour implies...
that the difference is significant. The costs of educational, health and social security services are much the same, whether offered in urban or bantustan areas. Furthermore, the income from subsistence activities has, along with the decline in the reserve economies, decreased to such an extent that for some time its contribution has been only marginal. In closer settlements, where an ever-increasing proportion of the migrant labour force comes from, subsistence activities are irrelevant. Urban and rural measures of the household Subsistence Level suggest that the only difference between urban and rural costs of basic living is housing and its associated infrastructure. Even that is not so much as to do with any inherent difference between urban and rural life, but because of the State's urban housing policy which bans the erection of cheaper rural-type houses in the urban areas. In other words, there may be very little difference, if any, in the physical costs of reproducing a migrant as opposed to a settled labour force.

But the position may be quite different when it comes to the socio-political elements in the reproduction of labour. We have already said that housing policy makes urban housing more expensive than rural. Control is the underlying motive of the policy, of course. In effect, this suggests that the socio-economic conditions for the reproduction of a settled labour force impose direct and indirect costs on capital which may not be necessary in the case of migrant labour.

We cannot go into a detailed analysis here on the socio-political conditions for the reproduction of labour in South Africa, but a few examples will illustrate the point more fully. Migrant workers, by virtue of their rural background and the structural insecurities of their position, may be more willing to accept factory discipline, poor working conditions and low wages than settled labour would. It may also be more difficult for migrants to organise, be it around work or more general political issues. These differences must ultimately translate themselves into differential costs to capital.

For capital there are thus advantages as well as disadvantages in the use of migrant labour. Unfortunately it is virtually impossible to attach relative weights to all the elements in the equation.

There are certainly some fractions within industrial capital that prefer migrant to settled labour. One of them is construction, as a result of the instability and variability needed in that industry. Some manufacturing industries, especially those involving heavy unskilled labour, also find migrants more suitable than settled labour. But the dominant elements in manufacturing prefer settled labour.

During the fifties, when the government tightened up on influx control and encouraged the use of migrant labour, many industrialists were strident in their opposition. They mostly wanted a skilled and stable, and therefore settled, labour force. Moreover, in their view influx control unnecessarily restricted the size of the labour pool supplying a stable work force, and so increased the wages and hence the costs of such a force.

This opposition softened during the sixties because industrial capital had some success in increasing stability among its migrant labour force. This practice was given official recognition through the call-in-card concession which accompanied the further tightening of labour regulations in 1968. Even so, industrialists want greater access to settled labour than is permitted.

But one must be cautious about taking the preferences of industrialists as indicative of the interests of industrial capital as a whole. For various reasons, individual industrialists are more likely to emphasise the narrow economic relative costs and benefits of migrant and settled labour, rather than the broader socio-political conditions of the reproduction of labour. We can therefore only say that the implications for secondary industry of the bantustan policy, and the extension of the migratory labour system it entails, have been ambiguous. This ambiguity is reflected in the history of relations between industrial capital and the apartheid State's settler industrial capital, with certain exceptions, has not exactly encouraged the bantustan policy, neither has the policy and its associated labour controls noticeably impaided
its ability to expand rapidly - otherwise the policy could never have been implemented. It would seem that industry has adapted fairly well to the constraints on access to settled labour. It probably also benefited significantly from the socio-political restrictions that the system imposes on labour.

1.2.6 Addendum: Current African labour regulations

The division of the urban labour force into settled and migrant, and control over each section, is enforced through local labour bureaux, as the bureaux in prescribed areas are called.

The employment of every African in a prescribed area must be registered at the relevant labour bureau. In other words, the employment must be authorised by the local labour officer. Authorisation will be withheld unless the employer complies with a variety of regulations and procedures outlined below. Failure to register the employment of an African is an offence. Although infringement of the regulations is widespread, the vast majority of jobs in the urban areas are registered. This would seem to indicate that the bureaux do have the means to exercise reasonably effective control over African employment.

The regulations and procedures relating to the employment of Africans differ, depending on residential status.

Procedures governing the employment of Africans with Section 10 rights are fairly simple. The employers must register with the bureau in their area and report any vacancies for Africans. For their part, Africans who are out of work have also been required to register as workseekers with the local bureau, although this is no longer compulsory. The bureau then tries to place workseekers in employment, and workseekers can also search for jobs themselves in that Administrative Board area. Any employment that is found must then be registered. Registration may be withheld unless the above procedures have been followed.

Some of these regulations are not strictly enforced. For example, some firms recruit without informing the authorities. Employment contracts entered into under these circumstances, provided of course that the Africans concerned have the necessary residential qualifications for the area they are to work in, are normally permitted, albeit reluctantly, by the local labour officer. Even so, probably most employment contracts involving Section 10 Africans do comply with all the regulations.

It is clear, then, that the local labour bureau acts rather like an employment agency. There is a lot of complaint about inefficiency in the bureaux, but nevertheless they do place large numbers of Africans in employment.

Perhaps more importantly, the system enables the local labour bureaux to collect fairly detailed information on conditions in the labour market in their area. This information can then be used to control the influx of migrants in such a way that, while unemployment among those with Section 10 rights is kept at acceptable levels, the demand for labour is still adequately satisfied.

Regulations on the employment of migrants are more complex and stringent. This is hardly surprising, since after all one of the objects is to limit and control the influx of migrants into the urban areas.

In the first place, the recruitment of migrants must be backed by a requisition from the local labour officer. Firms must get these requisitions from the bureau of the area they are operating in. This enables the bureaux to control entry. The idea is that requisitions are not authorised
Grahamstown 1979 - Klipfontein residents fight back in court
Grahamstown 1979 - moving to Glenmore

Glenmore 1979 - site of proposed town
Glenmore 1979 - "temporary" quarters for resettled people

Glenmore 1981 - amsplank homes

Glenmore 1980 - storm damage

Glenmore 1981
Dimbaza 1981 - graveyard

Saps 1981

Shiloh 1981 - security fencing around irrigation scheme

Welkomewood 1975 - storm-damaged homes
if suitable local (i.e. Section 10) labour is forthcoming. This then limits the number of migrants as well as the level of unemployment in urban areas. It also means that not only is settled labour better off than migrant labour in the search for employment, but that there is discrimination in their favour on the demand side. And this is quite apart from the preference some firms have for settled, and therefore more permanent, employees. In all, this has meant that migrants are usually stuck with the harsh and badly paid jobs. Restricted entry may also have had some impact on urban wage levels because it restricts the size of the pool of labour that employers can effectively draw on and thus may lead to higher wages. One should be careful about exaggerating these effects, though, since the labour bureaux are not all that efficient.

Actual recruitment takes a variety of forms. Some employers do their own, others recruit through agencies or compound managers. Whichever way, permission to recruit privately must be obtained from the labour officials. The bureaux themselves also help to recruit. Requisitions pass from bureaux in centres where migrants are needed to those where migrants can be supplied, and the latter then do the recruitment. Centralised control over private and official recruitment enables the bureaux to control the migrant flow from rural and bantustan areas. There are severe limitations on the extent of recruitment allowed in white farming areas, so that agriculture does not have to compete against urban areas for labour. Some bantustan areas have also been zoned for exclusive recruitment to specific sectors of the economy, though how extensive this practice is is not known.

Recruited migrants must then enter into a contract, not exceeding one year, with the new employer. Contracts must be attested at the recruitment point. Migrants also must get certain travel documents or endorsements in their reference books. Only then, when all this has been done, may they enter the urban area to take up their job, and only then will the employment be finally registered by the local bureau there. Some of the other restrictions on migrants have already been mentioned. They may not bring their families, live in unauthorised accommodation, stay beyond the term of employment, change jobs, or participate in labour organisation and strikes. Migrants who lose their jobs must immediately return whence they came, and if they want another job they must await recruitment again in the same way as before.

In all, these regulations reveal the utterly rightsless and insecure status of migrants in the South African labour market.

Two procedures enable employers and migrants to sidestep some of the excessive rigidities of the system.

Employers may, with the permission of the labour officer, issue call-in cards to migrants at the end of a contract period. These cards amount to a standing requisition and job offer. Migrant workers holding such a card may return to the previous employer if and when they wish. The system makes migrant recruitment a bit more flexible, but its main function is to enable employers and migrant workers to have long-term and stable employment relationships - which allows for a more permanent work force while still keeping a strict limit on the settled urban African population. Call-in cards are used extensively, yet there is some doubt about whether even this system can generate patterns of employment between employers and migrants that are as stable as those between employers and settled urban workers.

The second loophole in recruiting migrants is unofficial but nevertheless seems to work: some Africans who enter a prescribed area under the 72-hour grace period and find a job in the time can retain and register this employment. The newcomers, as they are called, must first inform the bureau at the job end and then go back home. The requisition for their employment is sent to the labour bureau in their home area, and then they are recruited. The usual procedures are followed except that the requisitions are made for particular workers instead of for types of worker. This practice happens more in some prescribed areas than others. It is illegal, strictly speaking, and some labour bureaux do not do it at all. Yet others use it extensively.
It should be noted that neither the call-in card nor the newcomer system stops the labour bureaux at all from being able to control the geographic mobility of labour. But both devices do leave a margin of manoeuvrability for both employers and employees.

The white rural areas of South Africa are covered by a network of district labour bureaux. They are mainly concerned with supplying labour to agriculture.

To some extent the district labour bureaux, like the local bureaux in urban areas, do the job of employment agencies. Farmers must notify the bureau in their area of any vacancies, and workseekers can be put in touch with these employers. In practice these bureaux do not work well. By all accounts they are much less efficient than the local bureaux. Farmers often do not report their vacancies. Workers tend to find jobs for themselves. No doubt this is partly because of the travelling distances involved, but perhaps the main reason is that filling the vacancies is a very minor function of these bureaux.

At any rate, the other recruitment and search methods seem to work well enough. It is claimed that it is really only the farmers with particularly poor labour reputations who rely on the labour bureaux.

Farmers must register their employees at the bureau in their region. In this too, compliance is only half-hearted.

The real role of the district bureau is to ensure an adequate aggregate flow of labour to agriculture in each region. The bureau has the right to endorse the reference book of any rural African with the words, "For farm labour only". This means exactly what it says. In addition, as we said earlier, it can prevent any recruitment in its own area by employers from outside. The district bureaux resort extensively to these measures, especially when there are farm labour shortages in their districts.

Finally we need to consider the position in the bantustans. Bureaux there are called tribal bureaux and are under control of the bantustan authorities. These bureaux mainly recruit migrants to work in the urban areas of South Africa. Most of the procedures have already been outlined. We need only add that requisitions for migrant workers pass through a central labour office in each bantustan which in turn distributes them among the various tribal bureaux. Then these bureaux do the actual recruiting. To help the process, all adult males not engaged in full-time subsistence agriculture must register as workseekers with their bureau. Clearly recruitment by the bureaux is necessary to ensure, given all the regulations about entry into urban areas, an adequate supply of migrant labour to industry.

The bantustan authorities also control private recruitment. All private agents must get permission to recruit in a particular area.

The bureau system in the bantustans is also important for the way it puts considerable potential political power into the hands of the bantustan authorities. The control over the distribution of migrant job opportunities among regions, groups or individuals can in certain circumstances become an instrument for political control.

Just a word on labour practices in the mining sector (or more correctly, those of the Chamber of Mines which is exempt from the regulations mentioned above). Until recently the mining sector was not allowed to settle more than 3% of its African labour force. For this and other reasons it has relied almost exclusively on migrant workers. These are recruited through the centralised agency called TETA (The Employment Bureau of Africa). This centralisation is a key factor of mining employment because it endues the mining houses with monopsonistic powers over their labour force. This much is quite evident from the extensive collusion on wage levels throughout the sector. The recruitment offices of TETA are spread right across Southern Africa. The mines have a virtual monopoly over the employment of foreign Africans in South Africa. Hence a substantial amount of their recruitment is done in neighbouring countries such as Lesotho and Mozambique. The rest of their labour force is drawn mainly from the bantustans, although some Africans resident in white South Africa also work on the mines. Recruitment of the latter group is subject to official permission to recruit in an area, but in all other cases the mines operate completely outside the system of government labour bureaux. For instance, mining employment need not be registered at the official bureaux: the mines do their own registration. Yet this in no way alters the extent of control over the allocation and location of the labour force.
1.3 EASTERN CAPE PROFILE

This short section aims to describe the main population and economic trends in the Cape during the 1970s. We also wish to show that certain economic pressures were directly responsible for much of the population movement, and that the Cape economy is quite unable to provide jobs for all the Africans in the area.

### 1.3.1 Demography

Table 1 below shows that the African population in the white rural areas of the Cape actually declined. This implies a net shift from these areas of no less than 176,742 people.

Although the population of the small towns of the Cape increased, the rate of growth was only 1.2% per annum, which is considerably slower than the expected natural population growth rate for these areas. Hence a substantial amount of outmigration from them must have taken place (migration flow + subsequent descendants = 47,193).

The only parts of the Cape that had population growth in excess of natural growth were the metropolitan centres of Port Elizabeth (10,153) and Cape Town (29,130), but compared with the exodus from the other parts of the Cape the inflow was fairly modest. The decrease in East London's population was due to the resettlement of people from Duncan Village to Mdantsane in the Ciskei.

The bantustans were the receiving areas, of course. The Ciskei's population increased, in addition to normal population growth, by a fantastic 161,283. That of the Transkei rose by 50,420 and the Xhosa population of the other bantustans by 33,056.

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Table 1: AFRICAN DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS, 1970 - 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>Annual growth rate</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
<th>Net Xhosa migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>59,908</td>
<td>32,892</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-45,646</td>
<td>-45,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>205,055</td>
<td>278,976</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>10,153</td>
<td>11,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>119,518</td>
<td>185,816</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>29,130</td>
<td>32,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>181,513</td>
<td>203,798</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-34,162</td>
<td>-32,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Cape</td>
<td>42,599</td>
<td>48,360</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-7,486</td>
<td>-8,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>36,361</td>
<td>42,124</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-5,545</td>
<td>-2,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>358,163</td>
<td>343,671</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-125,874</td>
<td>-121,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Cape</td>
<td>41,736</td>
<td>27,728</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-26,987</td>
<td>-22,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>48,260</td>
<td>39,387</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-23,891</td>
<td>-18,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantustans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>357,801</td>
<td>630,353</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>161,283</td>
<td>160,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>341,341</td>
<td>2,621,700</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>50,420</td>
<td>56,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Xhosa only)</td>
<td>48,712</td>
<td>96,916</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>33,056</td>
<td>33,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of South Africa (Xhosa only)</td>
<td>679,418</td>
<td>843,162</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-47,542</td>
<td>-47,542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: REGULAR AFRICAN EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE, 1972 - 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment in</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>Ann. growth rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>5,447</td>
<td>4,278</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of Ciskei</td>
<td>6,784</td>
<td>6,415</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of Ciskei</td>
<td>11,956</td>
<td>10,991</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of Ciskei</td>
<td>12,213</td>
<td>11,997</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of Eislelen '63</td>
<td>4,033</td>
<td>3,911</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of Eislelen '63</td>
<td>4,868</td>
<td>4,321</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsitsikamma</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of Eislelen '55</td>
<td>2,656</td>
<td>2,338</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of Eislelen '55</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George/Knysna</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>37,697</td>
<td>34,501</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Province total</td>
<td>89,279</td>
<td>80,903</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>149,437</td>
<td>149,829</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>262,329</td>
<td>254,173</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>118,284</td>
<td>111,385</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa total</td>
<td>619,329</td>
<td>596,290</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.3.2 Agriculture

The post-1969 contraction in African employment in agriculture was even more pronounced than before. As Table 2 above illustrates, African agricultural employment decreased in absolute numbers in nearly every region between 1972 and 1975. The fastest decline was in the central districts of the Cape. In actual numbers, however, the Eastern Cape was the most affected. Casual labour and domestic service on farms showed similar trends. Census material is not yet available beyond 1975, but there is reason to believe that the decline in all types of farm employment has continued.

We have already mentioned some possible causes of these trends, such as mechanisation, farm consolidation and labour rationalisation. Here we wish to consider the effects of the Coloured Labour Preference policy. The table below contrasts trends in African and coloured employment in agriculture.

Table 3 AFRICAN AND COLOURED EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE IN THE CAPE, 1965-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average annual growth rate in</th>
<th>1965 - 1972</th>
<th>1972 - 1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Cape</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table suggests that Coloured Labour Preference may have had a significant impact on the distribution of agricultural employment between Africans and coloureds. In the period 1965-1972, despite regional variations, employment of both groups decreased. But in the second period, while African employment went on decreasing, coloured employment started to rise. Thus in the latter period there has been some substitution of coloured for African labour on farms. The shift in agriculture towards more skilled farm labour may be partly responsible, but most probably it is in the main a consequence of the Coloured Labour Preference policy. Under this policy, farmers may employ Africans only if they cannot get suitable coloured labour. The occasional fierce objections from farmers to the policy suggest that its implementation does constrain the employment of Africans and that the policy led to a more rapid decline in African agricultural employment than would otherwise have happened.

The link between agricultural employment and resettlement has already been discussed in general terms. The special features of this relationship in the Cape will be considered in more detail later. Here we need only note that, although some types of resettlement from the rural areas were more or less unrelated to the state of the agricultural labour market (such as squatter and consolidation removals involving people not engaged in agricultural labour), most of the migration from the white rural areas was directly caused, or at least facilitated by, the contraction in agricultural employment. Prime examples are those who were evicted by farmers or who simply left of their own accord because the oversupply of labour mitigated against improvements in the conditions of farm labour. Many were also removed by the State because the law defines an unemployed farm worker as a squatter and prohibits squatting in the white rural areas. Finally, the marginalisation of squatter and black spot communities from the labour needs of agriculture heightened their exposure to the State's policy of reducing the rural African population as much as possible. The State further intervened in the process by limiting the destination of the migration flows to the bantustans.

1.3.3 Urban economy

The urban economies of the Cape have, as is generally recognised, not experienced adequate growth during the 1970s. Between 1972 and 1976 the growth in manufacturing employment in the Cape was significantly slower than elsewhere. The same probably applies to the other sectors of the economy.

Table 4 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT, ALL RACES, 1972-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>Ann. growth rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>292 578</td>
<td>335 939</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>564 854</td>
<td>681 496</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>229 322</td>
<td>284 533</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFS</td>
<td>33 529</td>
<td>39 992</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, the period of moderate employment growth of the early seventies was followed by a recession which affected the Cape especially badly. There is reason to believe that an actual contraction in African urban employment occurred between 1975 and 1980. This meant that for the decade as a whole, urban employment growth was very slow, and certainly not able to absorb the influx from the rural areas.

Although an adequate set of recent employment figures for the urban Cape economy is not available, it is likely that the growth of employment opportunities in most small towns of the Cape was not even sufficient to cope with the natural increases in their populations. The unemployment rates estimated by the Current Population Survey for the small towns of the Cape in 1980 and 1981 are considerably higher than elsewhere.

Table 5 AFRICAN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN SMALL TOWNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Nov 1980</th>
<th>Nov 1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This shortage of jobs, coupled with deteriorating housing and other facilities, must have been responsible directly or indirectly for a significant proportion of those who left the small towns of the Cape during the seventies.

The performance of the metropolitan centres was probably no better. Bekker & Coetzee (1980) showed that in Cape Town between 1974 and 1978, registered African employment declined from 70 039 to 54 140 and that most of this decrease was shouldered by the migrant labour force. No information on the periods immediately before or after these dates was available beyond the fact that they were characterised by significant growth. At best these periods probably just compensated in overall employment terms for the 1974/78 contraction. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the growth of employment was not commensurate with the 4.5% growth in the African population.

Some of this population growth was due to the illegal entry into the area of dependants of contract workers. Many people must also have come in the hope of finding employment rather
than with a firm offer. Evidence also suggests that many migrant workers who became unemployed during the decade did not return to their homesteads but instead remained in Cape Town illegally. The growth of squatter communities is in part indication of these migration patterns.

On Cape Town, it is also worth mentioning that the Coloured Labour Preference policy was implemented there with even greater intensity during the 1970s and that as a result the growth of African employment was definitely impeded. The main impact fell on the employment of migrants because considerable efforts by the State were made to ensure that they were last in the jobs queue. For this and perhaps other reasons the 1980 size of the Cape Town migrant labour force was somewhat below its 1970 level. The implication is that Cape Town not only failed to absorb its growing resident population fully into employment, but it also gave no additional employment opportunities to non-residents.

There is hardly any information on employment in Port Elizabeth. Judging from the regional economic activity level indicator published by the Stellenbosch Bureau of Economic Research, it would seem that conditions in Port Elizabeth were marginally better than in Cape Town. It probably managed to provide more jobs for its increasing African resident population partly because its population increased more slowly while employment expanded faster than in Cape Town. Yet there is considerable unemployment in the area, which suggests that absorption was only partial. The number of contract workers has hardly increased at all, and so it certainly did not help ex-farm workers in finding jobs.

In East London the growth in African employment during the sixties was fairly vigorous. In both manufacturing and overall employment terms it was way ahead as the fastest growing metropolitan centre in South Africa. Employment went on expanding during the early parts of the seventies, but in comparison with the earlier period and with other metropolitan centres, at a noticeably reduced pace (it was still doing reasonably well compared with Cape Town and Port Elizabeth though). The locational disadvantages of the area probably became more pronounced, even with decentralisation incentives. Then the depression of the late seventies finally brought complete stagnation to the area. Between 1975 and 1980 (the upswing already started in 1979), registered African employment actually declined. The implication is that for the decade as a whole, employment hardly increased at all. For instance, manufacturing employment increased by less than 2% per annum on average.

This brief survey of employment in the metropolitan areas of the Cape implies that these areas were quite unable to generate enough jobs during the 1970s for their 1970 populations plus natural additions. The Current Population Survey confirms this by showing that unemployment rates in the metropolitan parts of the Cape are much higher than elsewhere in the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Nov 1980</th>
<th>Nov 1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even more disturbing is the fact that only the Cape cities experienced a rise in African unemployment rates during the latter part of the recent boom (November 1980 to 1981).

We can therefore safely conclude that the metropolitan economies were unable to cope with the influx, even though it was relatively small, of people from elsewhere into them, not to mention the thousands who lost their jobs in agriculture.

1.4 CISKEI PROFILE

Since the destination of most relocation in the Eastern Cape is the Ciskei, it is necessary to describe its economy and polity - the main aim here.

1.4.1 Territorial change 1971-1981*

 Pretoria’s plans for consolidating the Ciskei have not yet been finalised, but as they stand now they will convert scattered bits of territory into a single block of land, shaped somewhat like an irregular cone, with its base along the Indian Ocean from the Fish River in the west nearly to the Buffalo River in the east, and extending northwards to the Swart Kie River near Queenstown.

These smaller scattered areas had been set aside specifically for African occupation under the 1931 and 1936 Land Acts. The idea was to ‘solve the native problem’ in the white interest, apparently by removing Africans permanently from the body politic while keeping them always on tap from labour pools. In those interests the African areas did not have to make a territorial whole. The piecemeal reserves worked quite well in capitalist terms although they could not support even the 1930s population with the modified subsistence that employers would have liked behind their migrant labour. There were 19 separate tracts in all, totalling 918 643 ha.

In 1971 this was the land base of the Ciskei. Suddenly, in that year there was reason for joining the fragments together, with the new National States Constitution Act 21/1971 which provided for the creation of further self-governing black territories. It was the ‘homelands law’. To speed the process it enabled the State President to declare an area self-governing simply by proclaiming that a legislative assembly replace the territorial authority there. The Ciskei was declared self-governing in this way by Proclamation 197 of 1972.

* This section is heavily indebted for both text and maps to a very thorough review by Claire B Freeman, ‘An assessment of the territorial development of the Ciskei with special reference to independence’, submitted in August 1981 as part of her B A Honours course with the Department of Geography, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.
There would obviously have to be land changes for the Ciskei to even look like a political and economic area. The 1971 Act had left no doubt about who would decide the boundaries. The State President was empowered to change the shape of the self-governing territories either by adding or excising land. The Ciskeian Proclamation of 1972 declared that the self-governing Ciskei would have only the areas delimited by the 1936 Act, so that from the start the 'Ciskei Xhosas' had no hope of getting what their then Chief Minister Sebe said they claimed; the area from the Fish to the Kei, and from the Sturmmberg to the sea. Figure 1 of this section shows the shape of the Ciskei in 1972 (the shaded area). Figure 2 shows what Sebe claimed, contrasted with the area as defined in the 1977 proposals, virtually the Ciskei of today.

Consolidation began with the 1972 proposals in parliament. The 19 areas would be rationalised into five (four large and one small), with 14 black spots removed. Altogether the Ciskei would gain 185 185 ha, of which 97 645 ha lay in the poorish Peddie area. A somewhat better addition lay in the pineapple/malie strip along the coast from the Chalumna River to the Fish.

The 1972 proposals led to the 1973 Amendment to the 1936 Land Act. This new law spelled the end for black spots in the Port Elizabeth-Humansdorp area. Blacks from there were to be resettled on proposed land in the Keiskammahoek district. Plans were also made to buy land in the Queenstown and Whittlesea areas in the north.

In October 1973 a committee was set up to investigate the possible inclusion of Lady Frene in the Glen Grey area to the north; Keiskammahoek, Frankfort and Brunscheig on the eastern side halfway down to the sea; and Peddie in the south-west. All these towns were incorporated into the Ciskei in August 1974 (see Figure 3).

Also in 1974 another committee began considering the inclusion of Whittlesea up north, Middle-
drift in the centre, and Bell and Hamburg down towards the coast.

Finally there came the 1975 consolidation proposals, further refined in 1977, which form the base of the present Ciskei. Reading from north to south, places to be added were Seymour, Keiskammahoek, Alice, Brunscheig, Middle-drift, Peddie, Bell and Hamburg. All the black spots still remaining were to be removed. Lady Frene in the Glen Grey area was to have been included too, but there was a dramatic reversal in the intrigue whereby Glen Grey and Herschel, two vast tracts of Ciskei land amounting to about 45% of the whole Ciskei area, were ceded to Transkei to make independence more palatable. In compensation for that 420 000 ha lost to Transkei, the Ciskei was to get 310 000 ha in the south, smaller but more valuable agriculturally.

This is all the Ciskei consolidation planning that exists in law. Transkei was quickly given Herschel and Glen Grey in time for 'independence' in late 1976, a move which cut down the area while causing a backlash of some 40 000 refugees into Thornhill and Zwelitsha in the north. About 300 000 ha of white land in all will have been added to Ciskei eventually, but not all the Trust land has been handed over yet. Pretoria has undertaken to complete the consolidation by 31 December 1982. This means incidentally that Ciskei's 'independence' on 4 December 1981 was rushed through more than a year before it got all its territory.

Even when it is complete in law, the Ciskei will not amount to much. It will have about 830 000 ha, only 35% of what Sebe claimed, only 0.7% of South Africa's whole area, to be nominal home base for 2 million people.

Reluctant as Pretoria was to part with anything more, it has had to return to the basic task of making the Ciskei look at least a bit visible. The upshot of the Quail report of 1980 was Sebe's coercive referendum; after the negative appraisal, a rigged opinion poll to 'authorise' independence — not that Ciskeian opinions and the illusion of Ciskeian bargaining have ever affected anything at all: as Judge Cloete rather baldly put it in the Grahamstown Supreme Court when dismissing a last-ditch effort against Ciskeian 'independence', conferring independence is a unilateral act of parliament which does not depend on the acceptance of those
Map 2 THE CISKEI AS CLAIMED BY CHIEF L L W SEBE

Source: C S Freeman (1981)

Ciskei boundary according to the 1975 consolidation proposals
Ciskei boundary claimed by Chief L L W Sebe

Map 3 ADDITIONS TO CISKEI, 1974 (underlined)

receiving it. (In other words, you can be forced to take an independence you do not want by a parliament you have no vote in.) Meanwhile the Van der Walt Commission was told to review the Ciskei’s position and suggest any land changes.

The preliminary Van der Walt report was hardly impartial - the commission did not have a single African member for even token diversity of interest, for instance - but with all its limitations it has urged that 177 000 ha of extra land be added to the Ciskei. Four areas were mentioned for inclusion: the Swart Kei/Winterberg and Waterdown/Klipplaat/Hogsbek regions in the north; the Fishe/Kubuzi river area north of King William’s Town; the King William’s Town/Berlin area; and the Chelumee/Kidd’s Beach area in the south. The only exclusions they recommended were Gubi Dam north-east of Keiskammahoek and part of Peelton location north-east of King William’s Town. (See Figure 4 for the Van der Walt recommendations.) Ye: It seems unlikely that Pretoria will accept all the Van der Walt recommendations made so far. Hogsbek and King William’s Town have been refused to the Ciskei.

Various local appeals have been made about the plan. Coloured communities in the Kat River valley have asked Pretoria to leave their area out of the Ciskei since they own it in freehold and want to stay but do not wish to join Ciskei. Land barons in King William’s Town, by contrast, are begging Pretoria to include the West Bank there in the Ciskei: they had bought on spec hoping for a boom as often happens with land values under consolidation, and found themselves stuck. A whole world of disruptions and vested interests is at stake, as it has been throughout for the Africans themselves in the area.

Pretoria had originated a quaint ‘joint venture’ scheme whereby the Ciskei and the Republic might somehow carry on in partnership in East London and King William’s Town. This idea was obliquely reiterated by both Quail and Van der Walt, but after further reflection Pretoria has refused to adopt its own brainchild. The boundaries are to be solid, with no dotted lines.

Quite apart from the questions of principle, separating off the Ciskei in formal political terms will not make a working State out of it. Territorial problems are:

**Population Density**

The Ciskei urgently needs depopulation - not the constant inflow of resettlement. As Nancy Charton says:

> “The de facto population density of Ciskei of 126 persons per sq km, compared with 25 per sq km in South Africa generally - and with a minimum of 87 per sq km should the 1975 consolidation proposals be implemented - makes it one of the most densely populated rural areas in South Africa.” (Nash & Charton, 1981, p 18)

The proposals have mostly been carried out now but one may doubt how far the land gain really relieves the congested population. Large areas go to the supernates such as the Peddie South agricultural scheme which takes up 55 000 ha, of new Ciskei land. In fact, throughout the Ciskei, so much land is barred from habitation that overall population density figures must give a very warped idea of how terribly crammed the real living areas are.

Yet even at 126 - 87 per sq km, Ciskei density soars above the 33 per sq km of the adjoining ‘White Corridor’, the mainly white-owned strip between Ciskei and Transkei. With natural increase and more enforced influx from the Republic, overcrowding in the Ciskei will get far worse. Etzel Walt (1972, p 23) suggests the population could even double between 1989 and 1990 on the strength of relocation alone, with 662 000 Ciskeians on white farms and black agro under 60 000 illegally in white towns (Quail Report figures). The Ciskei could hold over a million people by the year 2000, says Claire Freeman. Job opportunities will not keep pace then any more than they do now, while the inhabited land gets more and more depleted.
LAND QUALITY

Physically only 15% of the Ciskei's very limited land is suitable for cultivation, Daniel said of the area as it was in 1980. Fertile regions are being used primarily for grand irrigation schemes and cattle ranches. With all the talk of 'food for the people', the Ciskei in reality is doubly perverse because Ciskei is 98% dryland and so should be putting its main efforts into borehole farming, not irrigation schemes.

As well as being wrongly used, the land is also terribly congested as we have said. The within ten years. By 1990, 38% of the Ciskei was overgrown and 47% was classed as too, as the land most people occupy gets worn out.

1.4.2 Geography

The Ciskei is very varied with but one common feature: rainfall, which is adequate in most years, is unreliable and periodically gives way to acute drought.

Loosely speaking, we may divide Ciskei into three parts:

- Nwa, north of the Winterberg/Katberg/Amatola chain of mountains and south-west of an inhospitable district, bitterly cold in winter with four months of frost. It was very district, but of course this has never been practicable to the Queenstown less in closer settlements. Seda, Thornhill, Oxton and Zweledinga, the most desolate have also been or are being developed there.

- The districts of Stockenstrom, Victoria East and Keiskammahoek which lie at the foot of the Amatola chain and thus in the fertile basin watered by the sources of the Kat, Tyhume, this area, which has the greatest potential for furnishing Ciskei with a lucrative cash the irrigation schemes, there is only one resettlement site in this district, Elikhanywini, where most of the Hungundorp people have been moved.

- The greater part of the Ciskei, from Alice south to Peddie, Zwelitsha and the coast, is flatter, less well watered, with sandier soils in which nothing grows with great enthusiasm carrying capacity, however, it can support mixed farming, with an emphasis on cattle and attracted by the industrial cities of King William's Town and East London has now been Athi, Phakamisa, Tlavele, Tlavele (Qura), Welkomwood, Chalauna, Potsdam many more. This far exceeds the very limited resources of the local environment and threatened to turn the entire area into a dustbowl, depriving of wood, pastureage and clean water.

1.4.3 Demography

The population (1980) of the Ciskei is in the region of 650 000 (Quill estimate 666 000, Department of Statistics 630 353). As we have said, this amounts to a population density of at least 87 persons per sq km now in 1992.

Most of the urban population (216 000) live in the two great dormitory centres of Mdantsane (150 000 upwards) and Zwelitsha (30 000). It is expected that the two will eventually link up into one massive agglomeration. There are already three substantial settlements, Potsdam (5 000), Phakamisa (1 000) and Ndeva (conservatively 40 000) strung out along the 40 km separating them. Many others, relatively unknown, have been and are continuously mush-rooming up all over the area. The emergence of the peri-urban squatter closer settlements repeats the squatter phenomenon of the thirties and forties, this time in the context of the bantustana.

Other notable towns in the Ciskei are Dimbaza (15 000) which is the main industrial growth point of the Ciskei, and Seda (30 000 upwards).

The rural population (414 000) is more or less evenly spread throughout the Ciskei. Most still live in small villages under real rural conditions, but a growing proportion of the official rural population live in closer settlements. While these closer settlements have some urban characteristics (they are densely populated and the average household has no access to agricultural land), they are nevertheless rural in that none of the typical urban facilities are available. Many new arrivals to the Ciskei, and especially those from white rural areas and small town locations, are housed in them. Thornhill, Oxton, Glenmore, Elikhanywini, Kamaskraal and Ndeva are some examples. It is hard to gauge the numbers involved, although a figure between 70 000 and 100 000 would not be far off the mark.

The composition of the de facto Ciskeian population reveals all the usual imbalances that are associated with the migrant labour system. There are only 86 males for every 100 females. The young (aged 0-14) and the old (65+) form well over 30% of the population.

The most significant feature of the Ciskei's demography is its staggering average annual population growth rate of 5.8%. At this rate a population doubles every 12 to 13 years. Although the natural population growth rate (2.7%) is high, resettlement accounts for most of this increase. On the basis of official figures it appears that at least 160 000 of the Ciskei's current population are recent arrivals of less than 10 years' standing. This accounts to over a quarter of the total. On average about 15 000 people move to the Ciskei each year, the biggest influxes being concentrated in the districts of Mdantsane, Zwelitsha and Hwe. In Hwe, more than half the present population are resettled people.

It is difficult to say what proportion of the new arrivals represent an increased strain on the economy of the Ciskei and surrounding towns. Many, notably the 45 000 resettled from Duncan Village in East London to Mdantsane, moved over relatively short distances and could therefore have kept their economic links as before. But probably the vast majority of the other 105 000 had to start anew. Further details of the resettlement process are contained in Part 2 below.

1.4.4 Economy

The key feature of the Ciskeian economy is its dependence on the outside. A large proportion of its population work, either as migrants or commuters, beyond its borders. Even the internal

* This official figure is lower than many other estimates which run even to 250 000, and which may be nearer the mark. But we are discussing the official version here.
formal sector relies extensively on revenues from the South African State.

The economy of the Ciskei has the typical dualism of a bantustan. The 320 000 rural people are exclusively involved in subsistence agriculture. Poverty is a feature throughout. The urban areas are quite different. Dimbaza is an industrial centre of sorts. Mthetho and Zwelitsha are primarily labour pools for the urban industries in the ‘White Corridor’. Yet there is also a faint glimmer of something else. Zwelitsha, for instance, was after all the seat of Ciskei government till recently.

Somewhere in between, neither really rural nor urban but containing the worst of both worlds, are the closer and squatter settlements. Depending on their fortune and distance from East London, these people either become migrant or commuter labourers.

Unemployment in all parts of the Ciskei is a major problem.

NATIONAL INCOME

Here we use the phrase ‘de facto national income’ to mean the total income of the Ciskei, in cash and kind, received by the permanent residents. This excludes migrant remittances and transfer payments. The other phrase ‘de jure national income’ refers to the income of residents plus migrants.

The Bureau of Market Research (BMR) estimated the de facto national income of the Ciskei to be R293 million in 1981, of which R283 accrued to Africans. Table 1 shows the sources of that R283 million.

Table 1 SOURCES OF AFRICAN INCOMES (BMR, 1981 ESTIMATES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>R’ million</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic incomes</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commuter earnings</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant remittances</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the BMR, fully 60% of the African share of the de facto national income was earned outside the borders of the Ciskei. The rest was either earned by commuter workers in the border areas (31%) or sent by migrant workers from elsewhere.

There is, though, reason to doubt the accuracy of the BMR estimate of the division between domestic and commuter earnings. The report states that R100 million of the R293 million earned internally took the form of wages and salaries, and it is this estimate in particular which seems suspect, because it conflicts with all estimates of the number of internal employment opportunities. Moreover, the BMR estimate of remittances and probably, to a lesser extent, commuter earnings as well. A 50-50 division between domestic and foreign earned incomes is probably closer to the truth. Whatever the actual breakdown, it is quite clear that the Ciskei economy depends heavily on South Africa.

It is also clear from Table 1 that commuter earnings are very significant in the urban area.

whereas internally earned income predominates in the rural parts. The small contribution of migrant remittances, even to rural income, is surprising and indicates that migrants are unable to send much of their earnings to their families.

Domestically earned incomes can be further subdivided:

Table 2 SOURCES OF DOMESTIC INCOMES (BMR, 1981 ESTIMATES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>R’ million</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commuter earnings</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant remittances</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic incomes:</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries and wages</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal activities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imputed rent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table clearly (if somewhat exaggerated) shows the importance of salaries and wages, and hence of the small internal formal sector, to the incomes of Ciskeians. The unexpectedly small contribution of agriculture and the informal sector indicates that these are not well developed. Even in the case of rural people, agriculture adds only 13% to their incomes. On the other hand, pensions and the rent imputed to privately owned houses is quite significant, especially in rural parts.

Over the five-year period 1972-1977 the real de facto national income increased by an average 7.7% per annum (Benso, 1980, various tables). This growth was due to the combination of rapid growth in the Ciskei’s population plus consequent increase in the number of migrants and commuters, and the increase in real African wages over the period (n/-8%). The next table shows that the growth of the internal Ciskeian economy was comparatively slow.

Table 3 SOURCES OF AFRICAN INCOMES (BENSO, 1972 & 1977 ESTIMATES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>1972 R’ million</th>
<th>1977 R’ million</th>
<th>Annual growth rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic incomes</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commuter earnings</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>8,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant remittances</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>7,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This growth pattern changed, among other things, an increase in the dependency on outside earnings. Although no comparable data are available, this trend may well have been reversed by recent economic development inside the Ciskei such as the increase in state expenditure and industrial investment. The results of the BMR survey, although not strictly comparable with the above Benso data, are at least suggestive in this regard.
The de facto African per capita income level in 1977 in the Ciskei was R261.52 (based on population statistics and Bembo data, adjusted in certain ways). Projecting forward on the basis of the 1972-1977 economic and 1970-1980 population growth patterns (and allowing for inflation) we arrived at a 1980 per capita income level of R334.17 and a 1981 level of R426.36. (This last figure is similar to the BMR estimate of R434.52.) In more vivid terms, this implies that the average family of six people received R197.09 a month during 1980, which points to very low living standards.

In evaluating living standards, one should note that incomes are distributed fairly unequally in the Ciskei. This means some families having a household income level well above the average while others end up far below. Perhaps the most striking income differences in the Ciskei are those between the urban and rural populations. The BMR survey found that urban per capita increases were more than twice as great as rural ones (urban = proclaimed Dibaza, Mdantsane and Zweifelsho; rural = all else). On the basis of this particular estimate we calculated that the average six-member rural household received a monthly income in 1980 of R146.97, and the urban equivalent, R301.65. For some perspective on these figures, we should note that the 1980 Household Subsistence Level for these respective household types was put at R170.66 (Peddie district) and R196.00 (East London) a month. (SAIRR Survey, 1988, p 84) In other words, while the average urban income level is significantly above the subsistence level, the rural income levels - and more than two-thirds of the Ciskei population is defined as rural here - are on average well below. There are income differentials associated with other variables in the Ciskei as well. The typical better-off families are those with a member in the professions (mainly teachers and officials) or with two or more members in reasonable full-time jobs.

The BMR report also estimates the distribution of income within urban and rural areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income groups (annual income)</th>
<th>% of households Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 800</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>801 - 1 600</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 601 - 2 600</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 601 - 3 400</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 401 +</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though this table does not allow for the effect of family size on poverty, it nevertheless indicates that many people are very poor. 59% of rural households and 20% of urban households earn less than R1 600 a year (R131.33 a month).

There is no reason either to expect significant improvements in the living standards of the mass of Ciskeians in the near future. Over the years 1972-1977 the total de facto income level rose by 7.7% per annum, but the population also grew at a rapid 5.8% per annum, which meant that the de facto per capita income level really rose at a mere 1.8% per annum. The fact of this slow rise in living standards during a period when real African wages and real Ciskeian State expenditure rose rather steeply suggests that the expansion in employment opportunities in the area was incompatible with the influx of people into the Ciskei. In other words, resettlement probably retarded progress in general Ciskeian living standards.

Compared with other bantustans the Ciskei is very badly off indeed. Only Qwaqwa had a lower per capita income level in 1977. Moreover, during the period 1972-1977 it had the slowest de facto national income growth rate and the second fastest population growth rate, giving it the second slowest de facto per capita income growth rate (Bembo, 1980, various tables). It is not known whether this pattern continued after 1977. Certainly the national income growth rate of the Ciskei improved in comparative terms towards the end of the 1972-1977 period, but its rapid population growth rate still depressed its per capita income growth rate to one of the lowest. So in all probability Ciskeians still have one of the lowest average living standards among the bantustan populations.

With this as background, who can rate the prospects of resettled people favourably?

**Migrant Labour**

Labour is the main export of the Ciskei economy. While the official 1978 figure for the Ciskei migrant labour force was 47 000 (Bembo, 1980) the Quall Report estimated that it may even be 87 000 (p 79). Allowing for the male-female imbalance in the Ciskei population and with certain assumptions about the extent of female migration, we arrived at a figure of 70 000. This agrees with the results of a BMR survey (p 11). Whatever the exact figure, clearly a very substantial number of people from the Ciskei migrate to a contract basis to jobs in white South Africa. Migrants probably amount to over half the formal sector labour force of the Ciskei.

In income terms the role of contract labour is considerably less significant because migrants remit a surprisingly small fraction of their incomes on average: the Quall Report puts it at 20%. If this is so, then migrant remittances yield about 10% of all incomes received by the families of migrants based in the Ciskei. The BMR survey arrived at a very similar estimate. Contrary to some current opinion, the migrant labour force with an estimated average annual growth rate of 3.7% over the past decade (BMR calculations) is, with the exception of the small, semi-internal industrial work force, the fastest growing section of the Ciskei labouring class. Ultimately this is because many resettled people are drawn back into white South Africa as migrant labourers.

Contract workers originate overwhelmingly in either closer settlements or rural villages. For people in these areas migration is often really the only route to the formal sector of the national economy. Our survey of closer settlements produced adult (age 15 - 65) male migrant rates of 55% of adult males and 10% of adult females of 20%. Among the employed male migrant population migration rates were between 70 and 78%. In one recent survey of the rural villages of the Amatola Basin it was found that 74% of adult males and 28% of adult females work away on contract in white South Africa. There are indeed very few households in the rural areas of the Ciskei who do not have at least one migrant member.

The BMR report has almost half the Ciskeian migrants between the ages of 20 and 30, and very few younger than 20 or older than 50. The report also found that the first-generation household members form less than 20% of the migrant work force. The rest are mainly sons and daughters, which of course does not imply that they do not have their own families.

There are no satisfactory estimates of the sectorial composition of migrant employment. On the basis of some partial sources we concluded that 25% work in mining, which is the leading male migrant industry. It would also seem that this figure has been increasing. Manufacturing relies heavily on migrants, and draws about 10% of the Ciskeian migrant work force, which employ about 22% of Ciskeian migrants. Construction is another industry, like mining, which employ about 22% of Ciskeian migrants. Construction is another industry, like mining, which employ about 22% of Ciskeian migrants.
of Ciskei migrants are found in agriculture than in the early seventies. This is simply through the decline in the demand for farm labour. The other sectors of the economy are more or less irrelevant as employers of migrants from the Ciskei, either because they are small (transport and electricity) or because they do not on the whole employ many migrants (trade and commerce).

The occupational structure of migrants is heavily biased towards the unskilled labour categories (80%). This means that migrants are generally incorporated into the lower wage occupations of the economy.

Although Ciskei migrants work in all parts of the country, even in the Northern Transvaal, they are for obvious reasons primarily concentrated in the PWV area (30%), Cape Town (9%), Port Elizabeth (9%), Eastern Cape (9%), Central Orange Free State (9%), small towns of the Cape (9%) and the rural parts of the Western Cape (1%). The very low figure for Port Elizabeth is because of the relatively settled nature of the labour force in this metropolitan area.

Despite the call-in-card system and the modicum of stability this gives the contract work force, job turnover rates for migrants are still very high. As much can be gleaned from annual fluctuations in the number of Ciskei migrants in each of the Administration Board areas. The swing in the number, in six of the 12 areas which employed a significant number of Ciskei migrants between 1977 and 1978, was over 25% and sometimes around 100%. Only in three areas were the numbers at all stable.

In the addendum to Section 1.2 above we reviewed the institutional framework of the contract labour system. It shows that contract workers are in an extremely invidious position. They cannot search freely for work in the urban areas but must rely on what, by all accounts, is a very inefficient system of labour bureaux. They are forced right to the back of the jobs queue, and are often the first to lose their work during a recession. And when a migrant loses his job, he cannot immediately search and take up new employment. He must return to his bantustan with the help of a work seeker and wait till a labour officer gives him one of the few special requisitions.

A migrant is doubly regimented once on a job in an urban area. At work he meets shopfloor discipline, off work he meets compound control. Overruling these direct controls is the threatening knowledge that losing a job means being bussed back to a bantustan. For the family left behind in life is also a constant struggle. For a variety of reasons, migrant remittances are meagre.

In spite of this, informal discussion with tribal labour offices in the Ciskei reveals that in most areas the demand for contract work far exceeds the availability. Economic opportunities inside the Ciskei are hopelessly inadequate, but so it seems are migrant opportunities.

FRONTIER COMMUTERS

These are workers living in a bantustan who commute on a daily basis to their work in white South Africa. They have become a prominent feature of the South African labour scene, either through urban relocation or industrial decentralisation. Most commuting in the Eastern Cape is between the Border Industrial area and adjacent parts of the Ciskei. Benno estimated that the Ciskei commuter force had reached 37,100 by 1979, of which 29,000 moved between East London and its dormitory town Mdantsane and 5,100 between King William's Town and Zwelitsha.

Commuter earnings contributed 41% of the de facto national income of the Ciskei, according to Benno (1977). The BM survey arrived at the much lower but still substantial figure of 31%.

Whatever the exact truth, it is quite clear that the Border area is vital for income to the Ciskei. In the case of urban incomes the dependency is a huge 60%.

The share of the Mdantsane and Zwelitsha work force engaged outside the Ciskei is also of the order of 60%. In fact Mdantsane's is even greater. This again implies that the economy of East London/King William's Town is vital to the Ciskei.

The Industrial Decentralisation policy, although initiated in the 1940s, only really emerged as a serious strategy once the bantustans had crystallised. It was recognised that influx control could only work finally if jobs were provided near the bantustans.

The East London/King William's Town area has been identified with the decentralisation scheme from its inception, and in the early sixties it was marked as the focal point for decentralising industry to the Ciskei and Southern Transkei. Incentives to encourage this process include tax concessions, rental rebates, favourable financial assistance, wage subsidies and exemption from Wage Determination and Industrial Council agreements. The extent of State involvement in the industrialisation of East London is clear to see: over the years the Industrial Development Corporation has helped create between 40 and 50% of the manufacturing employment in the area (Benso).

It is generally known that the East London economy would never have developed without State assistance. It has hardly any natural resources. The only assets are its harbour and an abundant supply of labour. The harbour has been going through a decline, which leaves the cheap labour supply as the only attraction. Against this is East London's distance from the main markets in South Africa where it runs 75% of its trade, and the absence of any economy of agglomeration (Davies et al.).

The East London/King William's Town economy is relatively small. Total African employment lies somewhere between 60,000 and 80,000. Manufacturing is the main activity and in 1976 it employed about 25,000 Africans and 7,000 others (Census of Manufacturing).

Industry in East London, which is dominated by food and textile producers, is on the whole fairly labour-intensive. This feature is obviously related to the huge labour supply, though the decentralisation incentives have also made it inviting for a few capital-intensive industries to set up in the area. This gives rise to a strong dualism in the industrial structure: in the one sector wage and skill levels are markedly lower than in the other.

Another key aspect of the industrial structure in East London is the high proportion of Africans in the labour force. This suggests that Africans in significant numbers are incorporated into manufacturing at comparatively high levels of skill.

In 1980 the average industrial wage in East London stood between R160 and R200 per month. In some of the labour-intensive industries they were as low as R110 a month. This is very low by metropolitan standards. In 1976, the last year for which comparative data are available, the average metropolitan wage in manufacturing exceeded the East London level by a startling 53% (Census of Manufacturing). A similar wage differential probably exists in the other sectors of the economy. Here too the over-supply of labour has stamped its character on the economy.

In the sixties both output and employment in the East London economy rose fairly rapidly. Much the same happened in the manufacturing sector, which is the motor of the economy. Clearly East London was exploiting the decentralisation incentives fairly well. But in the early seventies growth slowed down and East London started slipping compared with the rest of the country. The mining boom passed it by completely. Commerce also did very badly, but more important was the lack of relative growth that started showing up in the industrial sector. By then East London had become one of the slowest growing decentralisation areas in the country. There is
no doubt that over this period it was losing whatever comparative advantage it still had over the other areas.

The recession in the late seventies finally brought about a fully fledged economic crisis in the area. By all accounts conditions in East London were worse than elsewhere. Through this time African employment actually declined. The extent of the depression is explained partly by uncertainties about Ciskei independence and its boundaries, fragmentation of the development effort over several growth points, and the increases in energy costs.

One effect of this slump has been widespread unemployment. The average annual growth rate of African employment opportunities for the seventies as a whole probably did not exceed 2%. In the Ciskei itself, and especially in the districts of Mdantsane and Zwelitsha, employment grew a bit faster. Even so, it is hardly likely that employment increased in the Greater East London metropolitan region (urban East London, King William’s Town, Mdantsane and Zwelitsha, including peri-urban Mdantsane and Zwelitsha but not Dimbaza) by more than 3% per annum. Yet the population there was growing then at about 5% per annum, mainly with resettlement from white rural areas and small towns and to a lesser extent from elsewhere in the Ciskei. This divergence between employment and population growth does not sound like much, but over a 10-year period it is enough to turn a fully employed economy into one with a 22% unemployment rate.

The impact of the economic crisis on the commuter population is well summarised in the following point. In 1976 the commuter labour force numbered 36,900. Three years later it stood at 37,100, a mere 200 more (Benso), and this when thousands were being moved from Duncan Village and elsewhere into the commuter belt.

**Domestic Activity**

Here is the distribution of internally earned incomes, by sector of economic activity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Other subsistence</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Transport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Public administration</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Pensions</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table broadly shows the particular structural position of the bantustans in South Africa. They have large shares in public administration, education and health, and small shares in manufacturing, construction (1974), trade and transport. It basically means that while a lot of people work directly for the government, very few are in industry and commerce. This pattern results on the one hand from the labour-pool status of the bantustans, and on the other, Pretoria’s policy of having public services and administration in the bantustans on a similar scale to that provided for Africans in metropolitan areas.

The table also shows that agriculture’s contribution to domestic income was a mere 13% (1977). This relatively small income contrasts with its huge employment. No less than two-thirds of the internal labour force is engaged in agriculture. Income earned from this activity is clearly very little.

There are also important trends in this table. Subsistence agriculture is more or less stagnant, and so its importance is dropping sharply. The rising share of construction (though the 1977 figure seems a bit exaggerated) reflects the beginnings of some industrial and commercial development.

We now discuss each of the sectors in more detail.

**Ciskeian Industry**

1940 - 1960 saw a decline in the economies of the reserves. About then the idea of separate ethnic development began to emerge. It was in this context that the Tomlinson Commission was set up to investigate the question of developing the reserves. The report, following a recognition of the crisis in subsistence agriculture, recommended an enforced division of the rural population into a landless and a progressive farming group. It also advised providing employment to the landless group through industrial development in and around the borders of the reserves.

The government responded by initiating the Border Industrialisation programme, but it rejected the idea of letting white capital into the reserves and instead established the Bantu Areas Investment Corporation to encourage the development of black capital in these areas.

This last move failed hopelessly. Meanwhile a landless population was growing rapidly inside the bantustans, more as a result of resettlement than of agricultural planning, which created an urgent need for internal industrial employment opportunities. At the same time there was also the need to give a show of economic respectability to what were becoming self-governing areas. The need for a stronger African petit bourgeoisie also became more urgent.

So the decentralisation programme was overhauled in 1968. Since then white capital has been allowed in the bantustans through the agency of the Development Corporations. The Xhosa Development Corporation came into operation in 1965 and catered for both the Ciskei and the Transkei; since 1976 the Ciskeian National Development Corporation (CNDC) has taken over the functions of the XDC in the Ciskei.

Under the agency system, industrialists get exceptionally generous financial assistance from the CNDC:

- Factory buildings are erected for industrialists by the CNDC and then rented out to them at a nominal 6.25% of the cost of the land and buildings.
- Loan capital up to 50% of the capital required for plant, machinery, equipment and working funds is granted to entrepreneurs at a 3.75% annual interest rate.
- The CNDC bears all the costs incurred by firms that relocate themselves in the Ciskei.

In addition the South African government gives a range of concessions such as a 40% rebate on industrial goods, a tax rebate for seven years of 50% of the black wage bill, a tax rebate for three years of 10% of the plant and equipment costs, and a 5% price preference on government tenders. Finally there is complete indemnity cover for losses due to nationalisation
and the like. The total package has been described as the best in the world. In return the investor agrees to make the firm available for sale to Ciskeians after 20 years.

It should also be remembered that wage levels inside the Ciskei are far lower than in white South Africa. This is the effect of a surplus of labour coupled with exemption from all Industrial Conciliation Agreements and Wage Determinations, and the effective banning of trade union activity there.

Most manufacturing industries in the Ciskei have been established through the agency system. The bulk of these are at the ono-notorious Dimbaza growth point. By March 1979 there were 24 firms in Dimbaza (Benno), and now in 1985 there are about 35. They include a sophisticated steel foundry, a modern bicycle assembly plant, and labour-intensive textile, clothing, carpet and leather producers.

There are also two firms, a sawmill and a furniture factory, at Keiskammahoek which employ about 350 Africans, two small concerns at Alice employing 40 people, and a large chicken farm at Mdantsane employing 350 Africans. Together, employment creation for Ciskeians on the basis of the agency system amounted to 2,039 (Benno).

These developments represent a total investment outlay, excluding that on infrastructure, of R14,6 million. A mere R4,1 million of this was contributed by industrialists. The rest, R10,1 million or 70% came from the CNDC — clear evidence of the extent to which industrial development depends on State support (Benno).

By March 1979, other industries aside from those established through agency agreements included five wholly CNDC-owned concerns. Four of these are at Sada: relatively labour-intensive manufacture of ethnic and school clothing, knitwear, toys and carpets. Employment amounted to 600. The other firm, a beer brewery, is at Mdantsane and employed 120 workers (CNDC Annual Report). The CNDC also gave loans to two small African engineering firms, but these hardly contribute at all to employment.

Thus, up to March 1979, a total of roughly 2,600 employment opportunities for Africans were created in manufacturing through the CNDC. By 1980 it was in the region of 3,400.

The industries sponsored by the CNDC are on the whole fairly labour-intensive. In over 50% of the firms, and especially those making textiles, food and wood products which are often the large employers, the investment needed to generate one job ranges between R1,000 and R4,000. But the incentives offered to industrialists not only reduce labour costs, they reduce capital costs too, and that is why a few very capital-intensive projects were started at Dimbaza. As a result the average investment outlay per job in all industries under the agency system rose to R8,000 (1979 prices).

Unfortunately no systematic information could be found on the proportion of Africans in skilled, supervisory and clerical positions. The fact that in the vast majority of industries less than four, and often only one, white is employed suggests that it may not be insignificant. One of the CNDC's aims is definitely to encourage moves in this direction. In fact, current developments are seen as a mere springboard for African capital. The eventual transfer of first managerial and then ownership functions to Africans is seen as a vital part of the plan.

Another notable feature of the industrial labour force in the Ciskei is the intensive use of female labour. In Dimbaza 65% of jobs are held by women, in Sada a staggering 97%, and in Keiskammahoek 59%. Only in Mdantsane were males marginally in the majority. To some extent this is simply because of the type of industry sited in the Ciskei (e.g., textiles). But it may also be because female workers are more ductile and can be paid less.

The overall level of industrial wages in the Ciskei is very low. In 1980 the average Dimbaza wage was R7.3 per month, or 40c an hour (estimated from figures in the Annual Report of the CNDC). This agrees with casual reports of wage levels in the Ciskei.

Mention should also be made of the huge Good Hope Textile firm at Zwelitsha. It was established in 1946 as a border industry in response to the initial decentralisation moves of the government and later incorporated into the Ciskei under the 1975 consolidation proposals. The plant is the largest of its kind in the southern hemisphere and employs over 4,000 Africans. Together with this firm, total manufacturing employment inside the Ciskei stood at about 7,000 in 1980, which is still considerably less than 5% of the total labour force.

The Ciskei also has a relatively small construction sector. Mdantsane is being built by the 1,500 employees of the Mdantsane Special Organisation on behalf of the SADC and the Ciskei authorities. Construction elsewhere in Ciskei is mostly undertaken either by the Ciskei authorities directly or the CNDC and LTA jointly owned LTA (Ciskei). Employment for all construction amounts to roughly 2,500.

The developments outlined here are only the first steps in the Industrialisation of the Ciskei, but the pace has been so painfully slow that one has reservations about even calling it 'industrialisation'. Very slow growth is a feature of the employment and investment trends in CNDC-related industries.

**Table 6 EMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT IN CNDC-RELATED INDUSTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Employment (estimated)</th>
<th>Annual Increase</th>
<th>Capital (real 1980 R million)</th>
<th>Annual Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2,187</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,559</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,166</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the rate of employment expansion has been fairly rapid (26% per annum), the initial base was incredibly small. This implied that between 1974 and 1981 an average of a mere 400 extra industrial jobs was created, which is definitely less than 5% of the annual increase in the Ciskeian labour force. Meaningful industrialisation of the Ciskei work force would need at least a trebling or quadrupling of this figure. Even in Dimbaza, unemployment of over 30% has been found. Admittedly the population has been growing at a fast 15% a year over the past few years, but almost all the industrialisation effort has been concentrated here and it is still a small town of about 15,000. That being so, the success of the industrialisation scheme could fairly be judged by the level of unemployment here. The real (1980 prices) annual level of investment has also been far too meagre (e.g., R7.2 million in 1980/81), and though an upward trend is visible it is by no means strong.

One is therefore inclined to agree with Green and Hirsch when they say:

... the importance of industrial development in the Ciskei... derives more from its political effects than its economic effects. The economic effects are of little direct importance. (p 71)

It has generated relatively little employment, tax revenues or backward linkages. There is as yet no sign of any internally sustained accumulation. Not even outside capital wants to enter without the aid of the State.

Politically the development has several effects; it builds up a politically weak internal working class, and alongside it a small new petty bourgeoisie. (Ibid)
The latter can form part of the support base for the ruling group. The industrial developments also contribute towards the creation of a developmentalist ideology, which can definitely reinforce the banustan ideologies of ethnic separation and independence.

Industrial development may well speed up with the decentralisation incentives that came into effect on 1 April 1982. The new incentives for inside the Ciskei are significantly better than the old ones. The rental rebate has increased from 40% to 60%, the subsidy on the wage bill from 50% to 95%, the price preference on government tenders from 5% to 10%, the subsidy on interest payments from roughly 75% (assuming a market interest rate of 15%) to 80%, and the subsidy on rentals from about 55% (assuming a market rental rate of 15% as well) to 60%. Yet it is doubtful whether even these improved incentives will draw enough industries to provide jobs for up to 20% of the annual increase in the Ciskeian workforce over the next few years. Although the incentives offered at Dambaze and Mdantsane (also eZibeleni, Butterworth and Umtata in the Transkei) are the best in the country, the difference between them and some of the other industrial development points might well prove indifferent. Perhaps even more important than this constraint is the simple fact that, whatever the structure of incentives, the resources needed to finance them must be canalised through the central State, and the limitations on what the State can do here are very considerable.

Ciskeian Commerce

Commerce in the Ciskei is very underdeveloped. In the large urban centres of Mdantsane, Zwelitsha and Sada it is squashed by commerce in the neighbouring Corridor towns. Well over half the expenditure by Mdantsane's residents, for example, occurs in East London. In the rural interior, incomes are too low to support much more than the odd general dealer.

In 1977 there were 774 licensed commercial undertakings in the Ciskei, mostly run as family businesses (Bens). Nearly half were of the general dealer type. The CNDC owns a few of the larger concerns such as hotels and garages. Total employment in commerce hardly exceeds 2 000.

Yet commerce is a sector receiving significant support from the State. The CNDC provides funds on favourable terms to small-scale Ciskeian businesses. By March 1981 the CNDC had already given loans to 400 Ciskeians, mainly traders, valued at R5.5 million (CNDC Annual Reports). This figure is still small, but it does not compare unfavourably with its investment in industry. These loans are meant to enable Ciskeians either to extend their existing operations, start new ones, or buy out whites. White commercial businesses, which initially gave a thrust to African commerce, have nearly all been taken over now.

This encouragement to small-scale Ciskeian commerce is obviously linked to the attempt to foster an African middle class in the Ciskei. Progress on this front may not have been insignificant in recent years, but still it is definitely hampered. Ciskeian commerce is quite simply in no position to compete with white commerce in East London and King William's Town.

Transport services in the Ciskei are dominated by the CNDC and Corporation for Economic Development's jointly owned CTC bus company. It runs bus services all over the Ciskei and employs over 1,200 people (CNDC Annual Reports).

Ciskeian Agriculture

Agriculture in the Ciskei is dominated by small-scale subsistence farming. The returns, however, are not great. All of 50,000 people are involved in agriculture. But the total agricultural output in 1977 was valued at less than R10 million (Bens), or an annual output per worker of mere R280 (in 1980 prices). For all the effort, in other words, a subsistence farmer gets a return of less than R24 per month - a very low level of productivity indeed.

As a result the contribution of agricultural activities to family income is equally small: roughly R40 (1980 prices) on average a year per head of the rural population. This, as was pointed out earlier, is only 15% of the average rural household income. Given these conditions it is hardly surprising that more or less one member in each rural family moves to the urban sources of employment.

But of course subsistence agriculture is not irrelevant. To poor families every drop matters. It also provides a significant element of security in the often uncertain environment in which the South African working class finds itself. Furthermore, subsistence agriculture is usually accompanied by self-help in the making of some domestic commodities and in house building.

The BMR report gives estimates for the composition of agricultural output:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R value</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in value of stock</td>
<td>105.90</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal products sold</td>
<td>26.64</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal products consumed</td>
<td>74.65</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain and vegetable products sold</td>
<td>15.73</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain and vegetable products consumed</td>
<td>31.24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collecting firewood, renting farm implements etc</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total gross income from farming per household</td>
<td>260.75</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Animal production is clearly by far the most important type of agricultural activity (although it should be noted that a large proportion of the livestock output is attributable to appreciation in the value of the stock). The Ciskei has about 200,000 head of beef cattle and 400,000 sheep and goats, giving an average of four head of cattle and eight small livestock per rural family. Most of the area (70%) is suitable grazing land, although much of this is of doubtful quality. The Quusi Report points out that there is a lot of overgrazing, soil erosion and undesirable vegetation.

The BMR survey shows that the average return from crop-growing is almost negligible (18% of total agricultural output). Only 34,000 ha in the Ciskei are cultivated - less than 1 ha per rural household on average. While the soil is potentially fairly fertile, its actual productivity after years of neglect is very low. The average yield is 2-4 bags of maize per ha. This contrasts with yields of 18-24 bags in white capitalist agriculture.

It is also clear from Table 7 that only a fraction of the agricultural output is sold. Problems in marketing agricultural output, which arise in spite of the existence of the Ciskei Marketing Board, are partly to blame. But the main reason for the lack of commercialisation is simply that most farmers cannot produce a surplus, and so most of what they do manage to produce is aimed at domestic consumption.

Land tenure is mostly tribal, which means that chiefs have the right, at least in theory, to
allocate land. But it is not clear whether this right amounts to much in practice. Certainly it is important where new land is concerned. Probably there are severe constraints, though, on the chiefs’ ability to relocate existing tribal land. (This is not to say that chiefs cannot withdraw the land rights of individual opponents on occasion.) Other more secure forms of tenure such as quitrent and freehold are also found in the Ciskei.

Hardly any research has been done recently on the extent of economic differentiation in the rural areas. It is known that many rural families do not have any formal land rights at all. A recent survey of the Amatola Basin found that 53% of the households in the sample had no land rights, although more than half of these were able to gain access to arable land - at a cost, naturally. The survey also seemed to reveal a correlation between land rights and the number of cattle owned by households. Altogether this points to the existence of a definite hierarchy in the distribution of economic resources. It is not known how pronounced this hierarchy is, much less how it relates to the local structure of political authority. We can only suspect a strong link.

There have been many reasons advanced for the poor performance of agriculture in the Ciskei. The Quail Report mentions the extensive farming practices, the communal land tenure system, the laws which block entry and the absence of able-bodied male migrants. To this might be added the size of the plots and the consequent fragmentation of agricultural effort, the shortage of certain inputs such as draught power and fertiliser, and the inability to generate a surplus. These ‘factors combine in a regular and cumulative way so as to keep agricultural production and incentive at a low level’. (Bekker et al, p 41) But perhaps the main reason is that there are too many people, all desperately trying to eke out an existence on too little land. It certainly is what maintains many of the factors mentioned above.

The agricultural policy of the State also deserves mention. The disasters of betterment planning are discussed in Part 2. But there has been another main development: since the early seventies the Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry has shifted its agricultural policy to include the establishment of capital-intensive irrigation schemes. This means that hardly any resources are being channelled to subsistence dryland agriculture. It is not clear whether a general injection of capital would make a big difference, given some of the non-capital constraints and the limited funds at the disposal of the Ciskei authorities. But certainly the benefits of the irrigation schemes reach only the narrowest group. The three older schemes - Tyfu, Keiskamma-bokke and Shiloh - contain about 100 commercial 4 ha farms, 400 food plots of 2 ha and 300 job openings for farm labour. The plots are granted to individuals carefully selected by the local Tribal Authority in conjunction with officials appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. According to Green and Hirsch, selection is based on demonstrating some success as a commercial farmer and having a close relationship with local headmen and chiefs. The target income for the commercial farmers on the schemes is R2 400 a year. It has been suggested that a key underlying motive in the orientation of the Ciskei’s agricultural policy is political, ‘the creation of a new middle class of farmers firmly entrenched in the cash economy’. (Tyfu Irrigation Scheme pamphlet issued by the Dept of Agriculture & Forestry, Zwelitsha, 1979)

There is a similar approach in the Ciskei’s policy on the white farms bought up for consolidation. On the more viable farms the CNDC took over control direct from the white farmers. In turn it has been handing over control of these either to commercial African farmers or the Ciskei State. On many of the consolidated farms, though, production ceased when the white owner left. Some of these farms have been handed over to subsistence farmers or squatters, but normally only where a chief or MP loyal to Sebe was in need of a larger support base. Most consolidated farms are still inoperative. The intention is definitely to redevelop them as commercial African farms. (Pretoria sometimes uses consolidated farms to accommodate resettled people, but the Ciskei keeps trying to undo this.)

Both the objective conditions in the rural Ciskei and the agricultural policy of the authorities conspire against resettled people. Moreover, the Ciskeian authorities have absolutely no intention of letting resettled people onto consolidated farms (e.g. Kamwekri - Peedi removal), even where they lose their land in the process of consolidation (e.g. Bhekanyewen for those deprived of their land at Humansdorp).

STATE SECTOR

This is by far the largest formal sector employer in the Ciskei. In 1979 it directly employed just over 12 000 africans and 250 whites ( Benny). Roughly 4 000 of these were teachers, 1 000 medical personnel and 4 500 officials. The other 2 500 were mainly semi-skilled or unskilled workers involved in various State projects such as the construction of roads and dams.

The State sector is important as an employer. It takes up over half of the Ciskeian formal sector employment. The reason for this lies in the bantustan policy which requires the establishment of a bureaucracy that can control and administer a bantustan region more or less independently of the Republican State. It is clear from employment figures that the Ciskei bureaucracy has expanded rapidly over the past 10 years. In 1973 it comprised 7 000 africans and 280 whites. At that stage officials numbered less than 1 000.

Africanisation has been another significant feature in the development of the Ciskei State. Groenewold (in Chariton, p 39) shows that the proportion of whites in the administration fell from 25% in 1969 to 3% in 1977.

There are of course definite limits to the growth of the State sector. In the build-up to independence (1979-1981) the bureaucracy expanded by no less than 3 000. The experience of other independent bantustans leads us to expect similar increases till 1989, after which it must slow down.

The role of the State and the various State corporations is not confined to employment. It is in fact all-pervasive. Its involvement ranges from commercial agriculture to manufacturing, construction, transport and social services. The Ciskei bureaucracy itself is of course responsible for the provisioning of public services such as education, health, welfare and administration. It also initiates capital projects including infrastructure, housing, irrigation schemes and the like. Finally it directly manages a number of farms.

The various development corporations such as the Ciskeian National Development Corporation and the Corporation for Economic Development are mainly involved in investment projects. It was pointed out earlier that the CNDC initiates almost all industrial development and funds many commercial ventures. It also manages a number of farms. The CED in conjunction with the CNDC runs the public transport services. The SADT is mainly responsible for consolidation, resettlement and the provision of urban housing.

In other words, there is hardly a sphere in the formal sector of the Ciskei economy which is not State-controlled or -financed. Moreover in one way or another all internal development is State-managed or -initiated. In 1977 the Gross Domestic Product (goods and services produced in the Ciskei by Ciskeians) was valued at R61 million, the total expenditure by all State organs reached a level of R93 million. Thus State expenditure exceeded the GDP. (The reason for this curious state of affairs is that the GDP includes a number of South African - financed imported goods and services which are excluded from the GDP. The latter is a measure of domestic production by permanent residents.) The above figures imply that the State distributed 74% of the estimated R93 million of non-migrant and commuter expenditure in the Ciskei. The relative size of the State sector should of course not be taken as an indicator of its ability to restructure the Ciskeian economy. Changes are taking place. But
these are small in comparison with what is needed to turn the Ciskei into a balanced economy.

State expenditure, which has been growing at an average 6% a year in real terms, is distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land conservation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population settlement</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment creation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare services</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education and welfare services comprise just under 20% each. Another large item is population settlement which in addition to housing includes expenditure on land consolidation and resettlement. Employment creation, mainly due to the activities of the development corporations, is now the largest item in the budget.

Ultimately the internal Ciskei economy depends on the South African treasury. In 1980, 77% of the total amount spent by the State in the Ciskei came directly from Pretoria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei sources</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statutory grant</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional grant</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development corporations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADT and other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This however includes the so-called statutory grant, which is basically the estimated amount of taxes paid by Ciskeians to the South African government. Even so, 54% of expenditure (last three entries in table) consists of straightforward grants and is clearly growing in importance.

PUBLIC SERVICES

Most Ciskeians of schoolgoing age have access to some educational facilities. But education offered to Ciskeians is inferior. The expenditure on each of its 212 000 school pupils is just short of R100 a year. The (1980) number of pupils per teacher is 42 and per classroom 50 (Benso). Although the pupil/teacher ratio definitely improved between 1976 and 1980, real expenditure over that period remained unchanged. Other major problems in the education field are the distances in rural areas between homes and secondary schools (and so very few reach this level), and the financial burden that education places on households, especially as most Ciskeian headmasters make uniforms obligatory. But it must be said that Ciskeian education seems no worse than that offered to Africans in other parts, including urban areas, of South Africa, and at the primary level it may even be better.

The following facts on health facilities speak for themselves. There are only four hospitals in the whole of the Ciskei, which gives it one of the lowest 'hospital beds per population' levels in the country. Many areas are totally remote from any hospital. Health policy puts more emphasis on clinics, of which there are 70 (Benso). Even so, this means just one clinic with (typically) about two nurses for every 10 000 people. Recent figures on doctors are not available. In 1973 there were only 33.

The value of pensions in the Ciskei is about the same as elsewhere in South Africa, but their payment seems far more unreliable.

No housing service is provided in the rural areas. People build their own homes. The urban housing policy in the Ciskei was inherited from Pretoria and hence duplicates their approach in the prescribed areas except with regard to ownership. There is the same backlog, the same allocative mechanism and so on. The only difference is the limited incidence of private ownership in the Ciskei. The CNDC runs a loan scheme to help people buy their houses.

UNEMPLOYMENT & WAGES

The low wage level is a fundamental cause of poverty in the Ciskei. 8 000 or so professional and administrative employees of the State get R300 - 400+ per month, but otherwise wages earned inside the Ciskei are very low. It is rare for an unskilled or semiskilled worker to get more than R80 a month. Even the skilled workers are often paid less than R100. The earnings of subsistence agriculturists are a mere R24 a month or average. Although the incomes of migrants must range between R150 and R200, few can remit more than R50 a month. It is really only frontier commuters who can earn anything approaching the HSI.

Unemployment is another major problem in the Ciskei. The Ciskei has an employed population of 195 000 (own estimate, for 1980, based on various sources). If we assume that a third of the official population (plus migrants) are economically active, we arrive at an unemployment rate of 15%.

This, it should be noted, is a most conservative estimate. The employed population is made up as follows:

- migrants 60 000
- frontier commuters 40 000
- internal employees 25 000
- subsistence farmers 50 000
- informally employed 20 000

Now it is well known that there is extensive underemployment in the subsistence and informal sectors. If for instance we assume that a third of the employment in these sectors amounts to unemployment, then we arrive at an unemployment figure of 24%. Furthermore there is every reason to view the official population estimates with suspicion.
Most surveys of unemployment arrive at figures of a similar order. We arrived at unemployment rates of 32% in Mlilwane, 35% in Dimbaza, 39% in Sada and 30% in closer settlements. The Amelia basin rural survey found that 13% of the adult population (aged 20 - 60) was unemployed. The BMR report contains estimates which agree closely with the results both of our and the Amelia surveys. It also shows

- that unemployment is to some extent positively correlated with education in the sense that the higher the education level the greater the probability of unemployment;
- that very few unemployed people resigned from their previous jobs (it was mainly either a case of dismissal, illness, completion of contract, or no previous work experience);
- that the duration of unemployment often exceeds six months;
- that unemployed people do not (as is often maintained) have non-negotiable preferences for particular types of jobs;
- that less than 20% of the unemployed are unable due to health or disinterest to take up employment.

We said earlier that rapid population growth and poor economic performance combined in the Greater East London metropolitan complex to produce a disparity between the growth of employment opportunities and the labour supply. Likewise, in the rural areas the increase in the population exceeded the expansion of either contract work or subsistence opportunities. In other words, in all parts of the Ciskei the direct cause of unemployment is rapid population expansion accompanied by slow employment growth.

It is precisely here that resettlement makes its main impact on economic life in the Ciskei. Resettlement more than anything else is responsible for the excessive increase in the population of the Ciskei.

The other implication is equally true. There is not really place for resettled people in the economy of the Ciskei. Land and work are scarce, even relative to the established population.

1.4.5 Politics

We need not discuss the politics of the Ciskei in detail where a short bibliographical note should suffice. Articles dealing in a comprehensive way with the Ciskei's constitution, legislature, administration, political parties and ethnic relations appear in Charton (ed., 1980). Our earlier general analysis of the political functions of the bantustans is directly applicable to the Ciskei, and in fact a concrete application can be found in Green & Hirsch (1982). More particularly, after discussing the various classes found in the Ciskei they attempt to show that

... a close link between economic position and political power is probably the major cohesive factor in the maintenance of control in the Ciskei by the local ruling class. For the mass of people living in the resettlement camps or the rural areas, membership of the CNIP, loyalty to the local chief or headman and dutiful payment of party dues, are the ways to secure houses, pensions, land, local jobs, UIF payments and sometimes labour contracts. (GA Labour Bulletin, February 1982, p 74)

The migrant recruitment procedures for instance are open to abuse for political purposes at every stage. Nothing prevents a chief and his officials from overlooking an opponent in the allocation of employment opportunities. Even whole regions can be denied job offers if pressure needs to be applied on a chief or community. The recently established Ciskei Manpower Development Programme (CMDP) in part represents an attempt to rationalise the employment allocative mechanism of political control even further. According to the CMDP's own brochure,

All work-seekers will be registered and will form a large labour pool from which labour will be selected to meet the requirements of the business world when applications for labour are received. Records of the work-seekers will be stored in a computer data bank at a central office servicing the whole of the Ciskei. This procedure will enable the Government to guarantee prompt attention and speedy processing of employers' requisitions for labour.

The records of work-seekers will include information on the workers' past, and

Preference will be given to those who have acquired experience and a clean work record ...

Employers will be issued with a personal record card in respect of each employee .... The employer will be expected ... to indicate how the worker performed his duties ...

At the end of the contract the employer will return the worker's card directly to the Ciskei Manpower Development Centre where the master record file will be updated for future reference. (our emphasis throughout)

Exactly how tight the control of the CMDP over workers and worker organisation will become is not clear, but its operations are already fairly extensive.

As Green and Hirsch are well aware, however, some care should be taken not to exaggerate the controlling role of economic sanctions. Simple repression is important throughout the Ciskei, and is perhaps the main instrument in the urban parts. Structural factors such as high unemployment are also very significant. So are tribal structures. Finally, it should be recognised that

the extent to which patronage politics and straightforward CNIP intimidation can check the rising anger and despair of the people has definite limits.

GA Labour Bulletin, February 1982, p 82)

We should also mention here a forthcoming SALDRU publication by Green and Hirsch which considers the forms and weaknesses of political control that apply specifically in resettlement areas. This important element in the resettlement process is sadly missing from our report.
Ciskei Manpower Development Programme

Introduction
One of the Ciskei’s main assets, the abundance of manpower, is being under-utilised with the result that unemployment prevails.

Efforts have been made to attract and create industry in the Ciskei, and while this has been partially successful, not enough job opportunities exist for the available labour resource. It has become apparent that other avenues will have to be explored in an endeavour to find a solution to this problem. With this in view the Ciskei Government has embarked on an ambitious manpower development programme which it believes will be of benefit, not only to the Ciskei, but also to industrialists and other employers of labour throughout the country.

Objectives of Programme
The objectives of the programme are twofold:
1. The creation of opportunities for Ciskeians, and
2. The preparation of Ciskeians to meet the demands and requirements of the job when they are employed.

To attain the second objective, the Ciskei Government is:
(a) Creating machinery for the registration and classification of work-seekers, and
(b) Creating the necessary relationships with employers through which employment contracts for Ciskeians can be obtained.

To attain the second objective the Ciskei Government is introducing training schemes for various types of workers.

Operation of the Manpower Development Programme

Registration of Work-seekers
All work-seekers will be registered and will form a large labour pool from which labour will be selected to meet the requirements of the business world when applications for labour are received. Records of the work-seekers will be stored in a computer data bank at a central office serving the whole of the Ciskei. This procedure will enable the Government to guarantee prompt attention and speedy processing of employers’ requisitions for labour.

Categorisation of Labour
All work-seekers will be physically and psychologically tested and categorised into three broad workgroups, namely:
(a) Those most suited for manual work;
(b) Those who could be used for semi-skilled work, for example, simple operative jobs, artisans assistants, etc.; and
(c) Those who could be trained for more advanced types of work. This procedure is being used as a preliminary selection instrument to ensure that the worker selected is suited for the respective training required for success in the job.

The Training Programme
The procedure to be followed in the training programme will be as follows:
1. On receipt of an application for labour, prospective employees will be selected from the computer data bank and summoned to the centre. Preference will be given to those who have acquired experience and a clean work record.
2. Prospective employees will undergo medical examination. Attention will be paid to specific aspects of the medical examination for particular types of employment.
3. Applicants who have not been categorised into one of the three workgroups will be tested and grouped.
4. The development programme which has been arranged for all work-seekers is divided into two parts, namely:

A. Orientation Training
The object of this training is to give the new employee as much information as possible about the Employer and the job being offered, as well as advice on how to behave while away on contract work. Included in this information will be:
(a) The definition of a contract;
(b) The contract period;
(c) Description of the job offered;
(d) Details of remuneration and other conditions of service;
(e) Discipline at work and the consequences of breaking a contract;
(f) The importance of safety on the job;
(g) Procedure to be followed when sending money home;
(h) Motivation to work well thereby improving job opportunities for other Ciskeians;
(i) Information on Works Councils, Works Committees and Trade Unions;
(j) Information on the Workmen’s Compensation and Unemployment Insurance Fund Acts;
(k) Transport arrangements.

The duration of this orientation training will be two days.

B. Specific Practical Training
Depending on what job is being offered practical training will last from two to seven days. The training content will be decided upon in conjunction with the employer concerned. The training officers will liaise closely with employers in this respect.

Transport Arrangements
On completion of their training, employees will be provided with a rail warrant, placed on a train, and the employer advised as to when to expect them. Likewise, on completion of the contract, it will be expected of the employer to make the necessary arrangements to get the employee back to the Ciskei.

Records
Employers will be issued with a personal record card in respect of each employee. The card will contain personal information, details of training received and past experience. The employer will be expected to insert details of any new training given and experience obtained during the current contract. He will also be expected to indicate how the worker performed his duties.

At the end of the contract the employer will return the worker’s card directly to the Ciskei Manpower Development Centre where the master record file will be updated for future reference.

Steering Committee
The Ciskei Manpower Development Programme will operate under the guidance of a steering committee consisting of:
(a) Senior officials of the Ciskei Government;
(b) Senior staff members of the University of Fort Hare;
(c) Representatives from Mining, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry.

Employers’ Guide
1. One of the objectives of the programme is to simplify the recruitment process. Once an application to introduce labour has been approved by the appropriate authorities all he need do is to telephone the Development Centre, let them have his requirements and the recruitment process will be set in motion.
2. Should an employer choose to send an official to the Development Centre in Møntsane to select his own labour, he is at liberty to do so. Notice should however, be given to the Development Centre in order that suitable potential labour be available when he arrives.
3. Employers with queries or seeking further information should telephone either Mr Gavin Garandy or Mr Cecil Meyers of the Manpower Development Centre at Møntsane, code 043242 No. 837/8.
Applications for labour should also be addressed to:
Secretary for Justice,
Private Bag X519,
Zwelitsha,
4668.

Notice required
The ideal period of notice required is two to four weeks. However, depending on
the type of labour required, this period may be shortened. Employers should
discuss the matter with either of the abovementioned officials.

Summary
The Ciskei Manpower Development Programme is designed to assist both the
Ciskei Government and the employers of contract labour by simplifying the re-
cruitment procedure and by supplying labour better suited to meet the employers'
needs.

It should be appreciated that only orientation and simple basic training can be
given—more specific training will have to be given by the employer. It is neverthe-
less expected that employees selected in the prescribed manner will prove to be
better workers than they have been in the past.

PART 2
Overview of the Eastern Cape

Annexure 2 Ciskei Manpower Development Centre
Advertisement, Daily Dispatch, 30.01.81

WANTED
FRUSTRATED
HOUSEWIVES !!!
Select your HOUSEMAID
from the many available.
Trained to your specifications, medically ex-
amined, X-rayed, at no cost to you.
LIVING IS FUN — WORK BORING!!
Phone: 48-1404
Manpower Development
Centre
2.1. A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY

The earliest resettlement in the Ciskei was the result of the Pretoria government's urban relocation programme. The 1960s was Dr Verwoerd's decade - the decade of the greatest effort to 'reverse the flow' of blacks from the reserves to the areas prescribed for whites. East London, as a major city very near a bantustan, was an obvious target. In 1963, the decision was taken to phase out East London's urban township, Duncan Village, and transfer the inhabitants to the new 'self-contained Bantu town' at Mdantsane, some 25 km from the city centre. Over the period 1963-1977, some 82 000 people were moved from Duncan Village to Mdantsane. (PL, 7, 09, 79) Many of the nearby cases of resettlement were those of individuals endorsed out of the urban areas, especially the Western Cape.

The number of urban communities under threat of removal was greatly increased by the decision of the mid-1960s to extend the Coloured Preference area from the Eiselea Line (Kimberley - Colesburg - Humansdorp) east to the Kat - Fish Line (Aliwal North - Fish River). Whole urban communities, including many people with full residential rights, were removed as a result, notably 203 families from the Karoo town of Middelburg. Since such large concentrations of people could not possibly be absorbed within the existing reserve communities, 'towns in the homelands with rudimentary services and housing' (Category (b) of General Circular 25 of 1967) such as Mnesha (Dimbaza) and Sada were created for them. Conditions in these towns conformed less to Category (b) than to Category (d) (Trust lands where families are settled in accordance with a system of controlled squatting), where nothing was made available except 'a common source of water'. It was during this period that the worst excesses of the resettlement programme took place, when people were loaded up onto trucks, driven hundreds of miles and dumped in the open void without work or provisions of any kind. The results were grimly depicted in Last Graves at Dimbaza and The Discarded People, which did at least alert the Republican government to the fact that such savage behaviour could not continue forever unnoticed.

The early 1970s were free from major new resettlement initiatives, although the flow of individuals from white urban and rural areas continued unabated. The lid was broken by the unprecedented and possibly unique flight of the Herschel and Glen Grey people from the coming independence of Transkei. The Pretoria government had made a show of consulting the inhabitants of these two districts concerning their proposed annexation to Transkei. Many of these inhabitants were incautious enough to register their opposition (80% of the Glen Grey
electorate voted against the Transkei and, not unreasonably, panicked when their wishes were ignored. A block of farms was set aside for these dissidents in the district of Whittlesea - conveniently down the road from Sada - but neither Pretoria nor the Ciskei authorities were prepared for the full flood when it came, amounting at the very least to 40 000 people.

The 1976 Amendment to the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act heralded the third phase of forced removals to the Ciskei. By that time Pretoria possessed a much clearer idea of the way in which it wanted the bantustans to develop, and had accepted the responsibility of buying a great deal of white-owned land for their consolidation. At the same time, it was determined to seize its last opportunity to 'clean up' the neighbouring white areas. Consequently, the purchase of land by the South African Bantu Trust went hand in hand with the evictions of blacks from their homes in 'white' South Africa. Whereas the emphasis in the 1960s had been on urban relocation (although Sada and Dimbaza had their share of rural people), the people resettled in the late 1970s were predominantly from rural areas. Pretoria had learnt at least some of the lessons of the 1960s, and a great deal more attention was paid to the preparation of sites for the new arrivals. Many of the farm evictions were done on an individual basis. Families were dumped by the roadside, or simply warned in good time. They were not forcibly dumped in resettlement camps, and it was therefore easier to maintain the myth that they had moved of their own free will. The resettlement crop of the late 1970s produced Glennmore, Riedewaan, Gobityolo, Twelwe Twelwe, and a revived Potsdam. Forced removals did not, however, cease entirely, but took place when whole farms were occupied by squatters, as with Kammaskraal and the Klipfontein move to Glennmore.

It is clear that Pretoria is re-adjusting itself for a further spate of removals in the Eastern Cape. So far, two communities (Humansdorp, 1977 and Alisetta, 1982) have been moved in the interests of 'homeland consolidation'. Seven other 'badly situated Bantu areas', of which the largest are Mgwali near Stutterheim and Mooiquests east of East London, have either definitely heard or had formal notice of their impending removal, although no time has been specified. A joint committee of Ciskei and South Africa headed by Deputy Minister G Wenzel is still considering the final arrangements. It would seem that 31 December 1982, the date of the final handover of all Trust land to the Ciskei, was to be the deadline. There may be some delay, but this does not mean a change in removals policy as far as we know.

2.2 RESETTLEMENT SITES

This chapter gives a guide, district by district, to all known resettlement sites in the Ciskei. The information comes largely from field trips in 1980-82, updated where possible. Some of the communities are rather fluid and altogether there are many gaps in the picture, for which we apologise. Ongoing field work is needed even just to keep track of what is happening.

First, to give the overall scale of population movement, we review immigration to the Ciskei in the decade 1970-80 on the basis of estimates drawn from the population censuses. Then follows a description of the districts of Mdantsane, Zwelitsha, Newu, Victoria East, Keiskamma-choek and Feddie.

2.2.1 Immigration to the Ciskei

Immigration into the Ciskei is summarised in Table 1 on the next page, according to magisterial district.

In addition to natural growth of the 1970 population, the Ciskei has increased by 161 283, or 26% of the current population. Assuming that immigration was evenly spread throughout the 1970s and that it did not disrupt the natural growth of the immigrant population, this implies that 142 350 people entered the Ciskei during the decade. The flow was fairly evenly divided between those going to proclaimed towns and to rural villages.

According to the table, a staggering 55 250 were resettled in Mdantsane during the 1970s alone. Even this figure may well be a little on the conservative side.

Towns in the Zwelitsha district received 14 273 immigrants. Most went to Dimbaza and Ilimba rather than to Zwelitsha itself.

The estimate for new arrivals to Sada (Newu) in the 1970s is 3 385. Even ignoring the squatter settlement of Emadakont on the edge of Sada, there is reason to believe that this is a gross
Table 1 AFRICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE CISKEI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magisterial districts</th>
<th>African population 1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>Annual growth rate</th>
<th>Net immigration</th>
<th>New arrivals as % of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mdantsane</td>
<td>66 380</td>
<td>149 621</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>55 250</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zwelitsha</td>
<td>24 662</td>
<td>48 503</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>14 273</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hewu</td>
<td>10 671</td>
<td>17 825</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3 385</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>101 713</strong></td>
<td><strong>215 949</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>72 908</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mdantsane</td>
<td>18 975</td>
<td>29 122</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3 747</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zwelitsha</td>
<td>68 402</td>
<td>118 495</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>25 438</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hewu</td>
<td>19 574</td>
<td>36 240</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>26 989</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria East</td>
<td>42 303</td>
<td>65 616</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8 966</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keiskammahoek</td>
<td>26 800</td>
<td>38 280</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2 777</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peddie</td>
<td>43 300</td>
<td>58 725</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1 730</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middledrift</td>
<td>36 734</td>
<td>47 926</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>- 205</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>256 088</strong></td>
<td><strong>404 335</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>89 442</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>357 801</strong></td>
<td><strong>630 353</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>142 350</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was considerable influx into the rural areas of Zwelitsha (25 438) and Hewu (26 999). In the latter, more than half the rural population is recent arrivals and their descendants. The numerous resettlement sites in both areas testify to this influx.

2.2.2 Mdantsane district

**MDANTSANE**

Mdantsane is the massive dormitory township of East London. On the basis of census figures we estimate that 39 958, or 72% of the 55 250 new arrivals, were resettled from Duncan Village in East London during the 70s. The other 28% have a variety of backgrounds. Some came from rural parts of the Ciskei, some from small Eastern Cape towns, and others from the Western Cape. Only ex-farm people seem to be absent. Relocation to Mdantsane on a similar scale occurred in the 60s. During this period, people from the Western Cape were more predominant. A case study (p. 3 below discusses removals to Mdantsane in more detail.

**POTS DAM**

This settlement is on the left of the road from East London to King William's Town, just after Mdantsane.

Potsdam began in 1969 as a temporary transit camp for farm labourers evicted when the Development Trust purchased the white farmland where Mdantsane was later extended. It was initially a transit camp, and the Potsdam people were forced to sell their livestock and were told they would have no land to plough. The settlement was subsequently reinforced as farm labourers came from the Kongoia area. By 1972 there were 992 residents, but Potsdam still kept the character of a transit camp. Only now, in 1982, is the permanence of the settlement being recognised. There are no government services except for a mobile clinic and a single primary school. 18 out of 19 children are below the third percentile (weight/age should be 63% above, is more than 95% below) - a sign of serious malnutrition.

The 1981 population was estimated at 5 000, which is 4 000 more than in 1972. Apparently 1 750 people came from Kongoia, Kei Mouth and Moolaplaats, east of East London, in 1976 (Charton, 1981, 72). We do not know where the others came from.

2.2.3 Zwelitsha district

This large district of the Ciskei contains the towns of Dimbaza, Zwelitsha and Ilitha, and also a substantial rural population of 118 455. There are many resettlement sites in the area - these are outlined below. At least one other is planned, at Chalumna. Net immigration for 1970-80 is 25 438, according to estimates based on the census, but this figure is probably on the conservative side. Proximity to the border industrial areas makes this district ideal for resettlement in the interests of labour supply.

The tremendous inflow into the area has, however, been far less an act of deliberate planning
for labour supply than the effect of people simply wanting to go there rather than elsewhere in the Ciskei, since most non-migrant jobs in the Ciskei are found in and around here. Many of the new sizeable resettlement sites in the area, and this includes Dimbaza, had small beginnings. They started with a few squatters being resettled or a few workers evicted from farms bought by the Trust. Then they expanded as families filtered in one by one. They had become redundant on farms and been evicted; or they had found life on white farms intolerable, 'chosen' the Ciskei because they had not been allowed to move anywhere else and had no other route to industrial employment except through a bantustan with its migrant or commuter labour markets. Similar considerations would have applied to the much smaller group of people from small towns in the Cape.

The pattern of migration to the Zwelitsha district shows clearly that resettlement in South Africa cannot be viewed simply as the organised uprooting of certain whole communities. The unco-ordinated seepage from white South Africa to the bantustans, which moves a large number of people, is due as much to the impact of the legal and State-enforced institutional environment in which Africans find themselves as to planned removals such as Duncan Village to Mdantsane or Humansdorp to Ehekhangweni.

**DIMBAZA**

The site lies left of the road, about 15 km from King William's Town on the route to Alice and Fort Beaufort.

This resettlement camp, notorious in the 60s, is now the industrial heartland of the Ciskei. The first people came from towns west of the Eisleben Line as a result of the coloured labour preference policy. The influx increased in the 70s to between 8 000 and 9 000. A significant number are from towns throughout the Cape, and many came of their own free will. But just as many had rural backgrounds: some were evicted, others found farm conditions intolerable and left of their own accord. Conditions in Dimbaza are discussed in a case study in Part 3 below. The official population figure in 1978 was 14 562.

**ZWEKITSHA**

This dormitory suburb of King William’s Town lies slightly southwards. A right turnoff from the East London road as it leaves King William’s Town, at the SABC building, leads to Zwelitsha.

It is now a fairly long-established township, with a present population of about 30 000. In the mid-seventies there was a brief wave of new arrivals, but since then the influx has dropped again. No more than 3 500 people, probably mostly from the other townships of King William’s Town, could have entered in the last few years.

**ILITHA**

A turnoff right, signedpost to Ilitha, leads to this site about 10 km out of King William’s Town on the East London road, just before Berlin.

This place started in the mid-seventies. Chorton (1981, 72) records 2 000 arrivals in 1974, and there has been a lot of expansion since then, both in numbers and in physical planning. The community includes people who had been squatting at places such as Frankfurt near King William’s Town. Now Ilitha is an established town of the Seda/Dimbaza type where people are buying plots.
PHAKAMISA

The turnover to this site is the same as for Zwelitsha - a road to the right at the SABC as you leave King William's Town for East London. Instead of turning off this side road to Zwelitsha, you would continue along it for about 7 km. Just before a low bridge, there is a dirt road to the left leading to Phakamisa which is at the top of a hill. It is close to the Port Murray turnoff.

People who were unable to get houses in Zwelitsha created a squatter area just outside it called Silvertown. This was flattened by a great storm in June 1979. The squatters were left homeless, but managed to attach themselves to Sebe's interest in his then rivalry with Chief Lent Meqoma who was Minister of the Interior. The people were given temporary wooden houses on released farm 135, which they still occupy. This is Phakamisa.

Phakamisa is now being surveyed, and will eventually comprise 1 460 sites. The Ciskei government is hoping to sell these to its civil servants as sites for building their own houses (PD, 10.06.81). If this scheme gets off the ground, the Phakamisa people will probably have to move again. The current population is estimated at 3 000.

NDEVANA

This site is next door to Phakamisa. It lies about half a kilometre further along the dirt road, a little further round the hill, and it overlooks the valley.

One can only presume that the Quasi Commission was hallucinating when it wrote that Ndevana has flourished despite all the difficulties and beyond expectations ... a small but important example of what people can create for themselves out of nothing if they are given a minimum of support by the authorities.

On the contrary, Ndevana offers a picture of mass misery and deprivation unsurpassed anywhere in the Ciskei. It started promisingly enough when Sebe brought out 23 landless families from Ngwili to form the nucleus of his tribal domain (1970). One headman and his most reliable councilors come from this pioneer group. Then Petter Farm was purchased, and hundreds of evicted farm families began pouring in from Mt Coke, Komga, Macleanstown, and then 'farms all over'. When Sebe decided to save Farm D at Middledrift, he sent the people on to Ndevana. People are still coming in to Ndevana because 'Chief Sebe said everyone should have a place'. That is all they get - a 'place' of one-eighth of a morgen, and the right to run their cattle on the commons. The people were promised arable land, but at the time of our visit (June 1980) they had not yet received their allocations. Apparently some plots have since been made available.

A visitor to Ndevane sees nothing but endless tiny dwelling sites virtually back to back, with houses erected by the people themselves. There is no longer any grass or wood visible, the people have consumed it like a swarm of locusts. Water comes from two boreholes and there are a few taps (one per 500 dwellings). It is impossible to grow vegetables. Often there is no water to cook with. When the wind doesn't blow, there is no water at all, and the people have to walk to Ilitsha, about 6 km away. People dig their own pit latrines, and there is high infant mortality from gastro-enteritis, measles and chicken-pox. Infant mortality is higher than the Ciskei average, which is about 200 per 1 000. Adults suffer from scabies and neumatic fever.

Apart from the two headmen, there is no local authority, not even a tribal authority. People have to go to Zwelitsha to seek work at the crowded labour bureaux there. There were only three requisitions through the tribal authority in the first six months of 1989, and these took less than 100 people altogether. Many people have lost their pensions in the move. There are four schools and a clinic, but no shops. Everything must be got from Zwelitsha (25c single fare) or King William's Town (40c). People are divided, so they say, by starvation:

You get so hungry you feel you must steal a chicken. There is always suspicion of people from other places of origin.

In 1979 the population of Ndevana was estimated at 40 000. (CLA, v 11 (1979), p 186) A medical doctor today puts it at 90 000.

WELCOMWOOD

The site is 10 km from the Zwelitsha - Kidd's Beach road beyond Mt Coke.

The Welcomwood people were moved from the squatter town of Riemvasmaak near Upington in the North-Western Cape in 1973-74. Although classified as Ciskeians, they speak only Afrikaans and neither understand nor get along with the local people. Many worked in Upington and have no agricultural experience whatsoever. They have adequate garden plots, which they are unable to utilise. There is plenty of wood. There is a clinic and a school is projected, but there are no other facilities and they must go to Zwelitsha like everyone else.

A major ordeal the people had to survive, in addition to everything else, was a freak storm in 1975 which smashed most of the housing.

Out of the 215 who came from Upington, most of the men have returned. With other people arriving, the community now totals about 500.

TSWELELE

Tswelele (formerly known as Qura) lies about halfway between Mt Coke and Kidd's Beach.

This new resettlement area was established in 1979. It has a mixture of rural and urban (mainly ex-Duncan Village) people. No facilities exist whatsoever and the cattle and people drink out of the same dam. It is still very green and pleasant and not unduly crowded, so people are not discontented. They look forward to the time when they will be allocated plots, for which they have been waiting about 18 months. The main danger is that people are still arriving in a steady trickle, and the place is such a long way from anywhere. It costs 95c single by bus to King William's Town and 74c to Mdantsane. The population in June 1980 was about 1 000. (See also Stop Press section in Part 4 below.)

KALKEN

All we know of this site is that it is released land near Qura. There are about 150 illegal squatters there, under constant threat of eviction by Ciskei authorities.

ATHILE

This site is somewhere west of Mt Coke. We have no information about it.
The route from King William’s Town to this site starts as for Zwelitsha: taking the SARC turnoff on the right from the East London road as it leaves town. Then left at the first main crossroad, into a main road that almost immediately becomes a dual highway. Zwelitsha soon appears on the right of this road. About 27 km along, turn right down the Kidd’s Beach turnoff, and the present squatter site at Chalumna is on the right hand side of the road less than 1 km along.

In the time of the Territorial Authority (i.e. before 1971), evicted farm people from the Macleanstown district were settled here in tents. They suffered terribly in storms, and several died. (See v 11 (1979), p 193)

Towards the end of 1981 a wave of people arrived, ironically wanting to get a stake in the Ciskei before 'independence'. They were off farms, according to a report in the Mercury (King William’s Town), 12.11.81. In April 1982 this land was apparently still Trust land, due for consolidation soon into the Ciskei.

Minister Xaba for the Ciskei says this squatter area is where the Kwezela-Mooiplaats-Newlands people are to go. The present squatters are to be cleared off first, he says in the same Mercury story, but he does not mention where.

There were a mass of people on the site in April 1982. They were trekking 3 km to get their water from a dam further down the road. There were no facilities whatever. Some families were trying to grow food, apparently without success.

We could not gauge the population in April 1982, but it was certainly in the thousands. In 1979 it had been estimated at 6 000. (DD, 18.06.79)

Gobityolo

This camp is situated 10 km outside King William’s Town on the Longha road. A turnoff on the left virtually opposite Peelton leads over a slight rise and down to the site.

The settlement began in 1978 west of Frankfort nearby, and was subsequently moved to its present site. Much of the land around Gobityolo is vacant, and it is believed to be earmarked for the Mgwali and Warburg removals. The first group of families were farm people from that very district whose employers had sold their land to the CNDC. Another group of farm people from released land around Queenstown were trucked in the same year, 1978. They were ordered to sell all but three of their cattle. Since then, more evicted farm people have come in from the Cathcart, Queenstown, Stutterheim and Longha districts.

The people have residential plots of the standard size, but arable land is not yet allocated (May 1981). They are waiting for the survey to take place. Water comes from a borehole driven by an engine. Originally, people dug their own latrines, but new ti latrines were then provided. There was a clinic at nearby Peelton, and a primary school (there were complaints that pupils were turned away if they did not have uniforms). Many were adherents of the NGC mission church, we heard, and regular Sunday services were held in private houses.

The chief lives close by, but is generally ignored. The people defer to Mrs F Matiyase, a Ciskei MP who lives nearby in Frankfort, and to the appointed headman who runs the local store. (Prices in the store appeared quite fair for a country trading station.) There is also a village committee which seems popular and efficient.

The nearest labour bureau is in King William’s Town, about 10 km away. (The bus fare is 40c

single - when an attempt was made to raise it, the Gobityolo and Peelton people staged a successful boycott.) There were complaints that the mines did not take enough people, and also at the low number of requisitions (only two in the first six months of 1980). Nevertheless, there were very few men about on a weekday - they were said to be at work in King William’s Town.

All in all, Gobityolo seemed to be the best organised and most contented of the camps visited in the area. Nevertheless, one local accompanying the SPP group summed up the danger when he said, ‘Ndevana used to look just like this!’ An uncontrolled influx, as at Ndevana, would soon destroy the existing supply of wood and grass, and overburden the somewhat tricky water supply. In this respect it is worrying that arable plots have not yet been allocated and that there are plans to settle the 8 000 strong Mgwali/Warburg community herabouts.

The population in 1981 was estimated at 500 families, say 3 000 people.

MADAKENI (‘the muddy place’)

This site is near Dimbaza. It was established at the same time as Dimbaza, but while the latter was developed, the former was ignored. People still live in mud houses and tents, and there is no water supply. There were 175 families, say 1 000 people, in December 1980. (Evening Post, 6.12.80)

BRAUNSCHWEIG

It lies about 12 km from King William’s Town on the left of the road to Stutterheim, just before the Pirke Fish Hatchery turnoff.

DD of 10.03.81 has a story that these are farm labourers who left their employers through discontent, for example at restrictions on the number of cattle they were allowed to keep. This story is not totally far-fetched: many farm people are attracted to the camps inasmuch as there seems a prospect of getting their own land. Not all of Braunschweig will go to the resettled people - a good part of it has been set aside for a poultry farm. The population is estimated at over 100 families’, say 600 people. Another visit in 1982 confirmed the people were still there, fairly scattered about.

FRANKFORT

About 25 km from King William’s Town along the Longha road, a left turnoff leads to Frankfort. The dirt road goes through this tiny old dorp. A couple of km further on, and there is the new resettlement site on the left of the road, and the construction camp and stores on the right.

The first tomato box houses are up, some zinc latrines, some sketchy roads, a few taps fed from boreholes. 3 000 sites are planned; and the first grain trucks arrived in late June 1982 with the first 26 families. They were the entire community of Alsatia Farm, east of Cathcart - the first of eight threatened areas in the ‘White Corridor’ to be cleared.

Alsatia was a true black spot, bought by a Mr Diakadia in 1904. His two grandsons owned the farm when the South African authorities told them in December 1981 that they were to be bought out and everyone moved to the Ciskei. The price offered was R51 300 for the farm of
The brothers accepted. Some of the community only heard of the move in May, and others said the first they knew of it was when the GG trucks arrived. All felt helpless: there was nothing we could do. We told the people with the GG trucks that we didn't want to go, but they said we had to. We don't like it in Frankfort - this place is like a location. (Maponya, 1.07.82)

At Alsetsi, the people could keep stock and had land to plough. Nobody wanted to go, but they did not see how to resist:

Mr Wotesi Dlakade said the Dlakade family and the community did not want to leave but were forced against their will. They had large fields and the farm was big enough for their stock. Although they were allowed to take their stock, grazing was limited at Frankfort. (RR, 14.07.82)

Frightened, the people climbed onto the trucks. Now at Frankfort, they must join the hordes of workseekers already in the area. They have lost their subsistence base and have no other source of income. People were compensated for their structures. After using up their bucket of mealie meal, the 'removal rations' for each family, what else could they live on but that money paid out to them? It is buying nothing but some survival time.

The 5 000 people at Mgwill and 3 000 at Wartburg are scheduled to join the Alsetsi people here soon, perhaps by the end of 1982. Alsetsi was the thin end of the wedge. If they are resettled, it will be the same story all over again: well established families will lose their security, such freedom as they could assert before, and perhaps their lives. For discussion about these threatened communities, see Section 2.6 below.

### 2.2.4 Hewu district

Hewu extends from the Katberg northwards to the Swart Kei River, roughly the northern third of the Ciskei. This area of about 192 000 ha always was rather sparse country and thinly populated. The land cannot bear heavy use because of the long cold winters which cut down the cycle of growth. Yet thousands of people have been resettled here since Sasa began in 1964. The Ciskei authorities say there are almost 100 000 in Hewu now. (RR, 27.05.82) That total looks more realistic than the 74 000 of the 1989 census, but still may be rather low, taking into account Sasa with its possible 40 000, and the 50 000 who came from Herschel and Glen Grey in 1976/77.

#### THE FOUR AREAS

1 The central core of the district is the 1913 reserve area of Zulukama. The people here have been waiting for generations for the day when they would inherit the 'white' farms roundabout, only to find these areas given to outsiders. This has made for friction. The people of Sangingwa and Lower Didima in the 1913 area, for instance, have a running feud with the resettled community to the west at Phelendaba because 'these people from Herschel live on land that was meant to come to us'. The two sides impound each others' cattle and even have faction fights. We also heard that when the 'white' farms to the south were being bought out for consolidation into the Ciskei, people from the 1913 area quickly moved into that Zweledings area, only to be pushed back by the police who told them they had to leave the land for the people resettled from Glen Grey. The locals feel bitter about resettlement around them, we were told.
2 The Shiloh mission area, under the Umzimtoti tribal authority, is the other part of Old Hewu. Altogether the Old Hewu area has nearly 28 000 people living in its 21 locations. Until resettlement began in 1964, the main feature of the area was the Moravian mission. There was also the tiny dorm of Whittlesea, the administrative hub of Hewu. The very first removals took place within the Shiloh area itself as a small township outside Whittlesea was cleared and the people resettled at Sada on the old cattle post of Shiloh mission. Some local farmers who had also moved to Sada. Otherwise all those resettled in the Shiloh area are from elsewhere, mostly the Eastern Cape, Sada and its overflow Edendale hold up to 40 000 people, and the new Whittlesea North site, over the road from Sada, is designed for up to 10 000 houses, say 60 000 people. The labour bureau supplies almost all the jobs going, so the area amounts to being a rural dormitory for labour. The new Shiloh Irrigation Scheme and the four small CNDC factories at Sada, the office jobs in Whittlesea and the few recruiting white farmers roundabouts - these offer very little. For as long as the development programme lasts, there are also jobs on building roads and houses. But basically, this is labour bureau country now. Apart from the Shiloh scheme, the land is for housing, not agriculture.

With the population unusually high and about to soar again, pollution will be a growing hazard as it is already in the Zwelitsha/Mdantsane region to the south. Hewu is notorious even now for lack of proper sanitation and health facilities. There is no hospital in the entire Hewu district: the case study on Sada in Part 3 below gives a rough idea of how bad the position is. Patients are referred to the Cecilia Makiwana Hospital in Mdantsane, 280 km away. The terrible fact is that Hewu with its 100 000 inhabitants, most of them malnourished, has only 22 clinics and not a single doctor, according to the Ciskei Minister of Health. (DD, 27.05.82)

In 1980 the Republic finally agreed to pay the whole cost of a hospital at Pofam Gove, next door to the Whittlesea North site. The position is so critical now that Ciskei has asked for R34m for medical facilities in Hewu by 28 April 1981, a request that was still being considered at the time of the DD report on 23.05.82. To plan further resettlement into this grossly overpopulated area seems the apogee of cynicism, especially with the diseases of the deprived already rampant.

3 Zwelitsha has recently been formed from at least six 'white' farms east of Shiloh which were bought out for the Ciskei during 1977/79. The main farms are Oxton, Pavet, Bushby Park, Price's Dale, Heytor, and Bushman's Kraal, and the area is about 10 000 ha. This land and Ntabethemba to the north were ceded in part exchange for the Herschel and Glen Grey districts which were excised from the Ciskei and given to Transkei under the 1975 proposals.

Zwelitsha ('The Promised Land') was where most of the Glen Grey people came in 1976/77. The Zwelethi Development Plan (ZDP) dated 1979 gives their number as 6 085 but that seems a little low. Oxton transit camp alone has about 1 200 houses, we could say 7 200 people. Smaller encampments are at Embeweni/Bradley's Dale, Yonda, Zwelethi/Pavet, Oxton Manor and Groote. These have also seen some of the old mission village of Heckney. A total of 10 000 upwards seems more likely.

The basic plan seems to be for the Oxton people not to be removed in 1982/83 to the new site at Whittlesea North, and all the other people to Price's Dale, Heytor, Yonda and Bushby Park. These are rural closer settlements with house plots of 50 by 40 m for land-right holders - those people whom the authorities pronounce as being 'traditional farmers'. These families will also get a land strip of 4 ha under irrigation. Everyone else will get a 40 x 30 m house plot only. (ZDP) The new settlements are planned for 300 - 600 households each. An irrigation scheme is being started too, along the now-familiar lines of 'tribal farm' plus economic units for the chosen few. The Oskraal River which wanders through central Hewu provides most of the water for this Zwelethi region, an unbelievable idea when you see the trickle it is.

4 Ntabethemba ('Mountain of Hope') is the area of c. 11 000 ha curving round the north-west side of the old 1898 reserve. It is used to be bounded by the Swart Kei River, but recently other land on the far side has been added. The 17 or so farms of the area were bought out for the Ciskei in 1977/79, most of it set aside for the huge influx of around 40 000, who came mainly from Herschel district in 1976/77.

This last region is subdivided into three resettlement areas, called after the three chiefs from Herschel. In the north-west is Malefane (Baeso tribal authority); in the north-east, Bebeza (Umauvaldi tribal authority); and south of them, Hitana (Amagwati tribal authority). Further south again are the Tsowana game park and the vast livestock-fattening area of the Ciskei Livestock and Marketing Board (CLMB).

Tsowana is being promoted as a tourist feature. The game is strictly guarded from hungry poachers roundabout. The CLMB call stock - reports suggest that some animals are simply confiscated, while others are bought at a price set by the CLMB itself. We understand the CLMB are virtually the Ciskei agents of Vleissentrans who finally buy the animals after any fattening that is needed on the ranch. Better strains of cattle are also developed here.

The emphasis on profiteering from stock seems to come before attending to resettlement, to judge by this complaint in the Ciskei Assembly from Mr Mytaza, MP for Hewu, who asked the Department of Agriculture and Forestry to allow the board (CLMB) to occupy less farms than at present. About three quarters of released farms were occupied by the board, he said.

Released farms are those which have been taken over during consolidation.

Mr Mytaza said if one were to go to Hewu, poorly grassed rural areas would be found adjacent to farms owned by the board which had ample grass covering. (DD, 18.05.82)

In the same debate, Chief Hebe added that most of the people at Zwelethi had not been allocated sites yet.

Another scheme that appears to have had priority over resettlement is the large irrigation project in the north, along with Glenbrook Dam. The South African Development Trust started the work here, which Pretoria will complete. (Government Gazette No 8204 of 14.05.82, p 15)

Several resettlement sites are being set up now. The largest will be Ntabethemba Town, just north of the 'Mountain of Hope'. A water supply is being planned, notably the 27 km Ntabethemba Canal plus a total of 839 ha under irrigation - if, Pretoria adds ominously, 'water can economically be provided from the Swart Kei River in the Ntabethemba area'. (Ibid) Even if the plan is carried out, it will do nothing like support the people of the area. They may be seen by officialdom as a reserve force for the labour bureaux. The area looks like a death trap to us. It is so congested, it cannot be made viable through farming. There are no local jobs to speak of. Even the labour bureau system, the last resort for people, seems useless; the nearest bureau at present is at Whittlesea which is too far away, and the dwindling number of contracts will mean very little income if another bureau is started in Ntabethemba. We heard that many people have quietly returned to Herschel. We met one family in Sada who had moved there after six months of near-starvation at Thornhill. Now they have the rest survived, and how do they plan to carry on? This is an important question to research.

RESSETTLEMENT SITES

SADA

5 km out of Whittlesea, it has two entrances along the left of the Oxton road.

Sada is one of the older resettlement sites, dating back to 1964. About 32 000 people live here, and most of them have come here from the farms and small towns of the Eastern Cape.
Most workseekers rely on the labour bureau in Whittlesea because there are very few jobs locally. Approaching Sada from the Seymour/Oxton road junction, you pass the Shiloh irrigation scheme and the four CNDC factories on your left - all that the local development amounts to. The Shiloh scheme employs less than 200 people and has food plots for 278 families. (EPH, 5.05.82) The Sada factories employed just 580 people in 1980. They were designed to employ women on a labour-intensive basis while men went on contract work. Goods produced are of the ‘cottage industry’ type: ‘ethnic’ clothing, carpets, soft toys, uniforms. The Good Hope incentives for Sada will probably not help to boost local employment much because the place is so isolated. The nearest railway is 42 km away at Queenstown.

For further detail on Sada, please see the case study in Part 3 below.

EMADAKENI

This sprawl of informal housing lies to the left of the Oxton road almost immediately after Sada as you drive towards Oxton and the Katberg. A car can reach the site by turning into the nearest Sada entry road and then veering right.

Emadakeni is really Sada’s overflow. It began in the early 1970s and now holds perhaps 6000 people. Again, it is a fairly local population. There is terrible destitution here, and no facilities whatever. Families carry all their water from the taps in Sada and dig their own pit latrines (April 1982).

More information is given in the Sada case study below.

WHITTLESEA NORTH

This huge new site is being rapidly developed straight across the Oxton road from Emadakeni, and a turnoff is bound to be built there soon. In April 1982 we reached the site from the other side: back to Whittlesea and out the other side towards Queenstown, there is a turnoff left almost at once into the Poplar Grove road. A couple of km along on the left, a rough track leads onto the site next to the signboard of the Whittlesea Special Organisation contracted for the job.

Already there is a vast housing grid being bulldozed across this land which used to be the Shiloh commonage. Roads and waterpipes are being laid for about 4½ km to the Oxton road, and the site could spread into a square that size. Pretoria is funding this development with the Queenstown municipality as its agent. Up to 10,000 houses are to be built, possibly of varying quality. The first two dozen were the NE 51/9 type: water into the house, flush toilets, shower cubicle, water into kitchen, four rooms, internal doors, cement floor.

Who will live in these expensive houses, which cost R3500 to build? Their rental presupposes urban incomes. The place is meant for ‘the residents of Oxton, Silver City and Cikatana residents of Estebeleni’, according to the Gazette of 14.05.81 (p. 12). Anyone who has seen Oxton will know that those families lack money for food, let alone rental. If the ‘Silver City’ referred to means the Embekweni group next to Oxton, then the same applies to them. They cannot possibly be moving to these houses. We therefore assume that Whittlesea North will include areas of the cheap rural housing which costs R500 per unit, and perhaps a site-and-service scheme.

The Oxton people include some families who had tried to stay on this commonage before, when they moved there from Glen Grey in 1976/77. Despite their appeals and protests, they were pushed away to Oxton at the end of 1977 (but not with bulldozers, the magistrate at Whittlesea
assured the press) to make way for people from Milnglais township at Queenstown. Now
ironically they are to be forced back here, along with the Estebien people who, originally
from Milnglais, were the group who should have displaced them in 1977.

There could also be other resettlement direct from Milnglais. That township is losing some
areas to "coloured" families, and africans are being moved out. Costly rentals at Whittlesea
North suggest this site might be designed for at least some of the Queenstown labour force,
just as Mabantsane is a dormitory for East London workers. If so, the argument would be the
same: it is worth the transport cost to have a de-centralised work force, which is what a
bananas-based force amounts to.

In March 1982, the Dept of Co-operation and Development said two other communities were
to be resettled here: the 'badly situated' groups from Lesseyton and Goshen in the northern
end of the 'White Corridor'. There is some detail on them in Section 2.6 below.

Ciskel's Minister of the Interior also said 1 000 families needed homes in the Whittlesea
area (DD, 13.05.82, p.9), which could just refer to the terrible backlog at Sada.

Shops will be put up. Pretoria is also committed to paying for a hospital in the area. Water
is to come from Waterdown Dam which already supplies Sada.

OXTON MANOR

Continuing along the Oxton road in the direction of Katberg, Oxton Manor is signposted on
the left about 6 km after Emadakeni. Quite a few people are squatting here - some from Glen
Grey, others from recently consolidated farms in the area. This was the farm shown to bus-
loads of Glen Grey people to entice them in. Each busload assumed the place would be theirs
alone.

HAYTOR/ESIBONILE

A left turnoff between Emadakeni and Oxton Manor leads to this permanent resettlement site
in Zweledinga. We heard there is a school there, which betokens a community already in the
place, but have no other information.

EMBEKWENI/PRICE'S DALE

A little further than Oxton Manor along the road towards Katberg, on the right-hand side. This
desperately poor group came from Glen Grey in 1976/77. About 130 meagre houses are scattered
about on the very stony ground here. The main building here is the clinic.

OXTON

Continuing towards Katberg, the road to Oxton goes off to the right immediately after Embekweni.
It is signposted. You can see the mass of zinc dwellings from the Katberg road - about 3 km off.

This is the biggest Glen Grey resettlement area, now proclaimed a transit camp. At the very
least it holds 7 000 people, and some estimates go as high as 10 000.

The houses are small, many of them one-room zinc. Gardening is minimal, with the place so
congested, the ground stony and watering impossible. People buy food from Whittlesea and
Queenstown. Buses run there but they are expensive - R1,50 single to Queenstown (1981).
Some workseekers do walk over to Whittlesea c 15 km away. Sometimes huge buses call here
and round about to pick up workers for the fruit farms in Du Toit's Kloof.

The main school is Funds secondary, on the right as you enter Oxton. It has 600 pupils.
There are also two primary schools. Children also attend neighbouring schools - at Engotini,
the Moravian station a few km away on the Sada road, for example.

Most people here seem short of everything including food, fuel, water. A regular stream of
wood carrikers walk that long road to the camp, bringing the wood from nearly 10 km away.
Many families had brought stock but most died, and there are none now. The grass and bush
has all gone from a wide radius round Oxton. The residents say Whittlesea North will be better
in many ways, but it is not the choice of those who cannot afford township expenses. Oxton
camp is due to be cleared in 1982/83.

YONDA

Further along the Katberg road from the Oxton turnoff, a few km along on the right, is Yonda.
This is one of the permanent sites for Glen Grey people. At present there are about 60 brick-
and-iron houses looking very small and laid out in rows. The bricks are of local clay fired in
little kilns on the spot. This area, now virtually desert, used to be waving grass on Bold Point
farm. Like all the crowded settlements arising here, this one has its flock of goats which
quickly strip the ground cover and even cut courances down. The need for fuel also strips the
countryside. Like Oxton, this area shows the devastation of heavy settlement here. The right
stocking rate for Hewu is just one goat or sheep per morgen, and the present one is 23 per
morgen. People cannot possibly subsist here. Once denuded, the land gets worse as the rain
runs off instead of sinking in, removing the thin precious layer of topsoil in the process, which
then clogs the dams and furrows. A dam can silt up in just a few years.

We have no information from within Yonda, and last saw it in April 1982.

BUSHBY PARK

Just about a km further along towards Katberg, on the right, is Bushby Park farm, rather bare of
ground even now where one of the four Zweledinga resettlement sites will be developed. (1982)
The delay in permanent resettlement is very hard on people. Chief Hebe, the local MP, told the
Ciskel Legislative Assembly that most of the families who arrived in Zweledinga from Glen
Grey five years ago have still not got permanent sites. (DD, 18.05.82) Some people have
managed to make other arrangements: for example, quite a few moved unobtrusively into the
old mission village of Hackney which you can see from the road at Bushby Park. It is a good
few km off the road to the right, in among the hill slopes on the far side of the valley.

ZWELEDINGA

This transit camp is another couple of km further along the Katberg road on the left, with its
prominent clinic building. There were about 500 houses here in 1981, and 3 of the 6 taps worked.
It is probably the bleakest, least site in Hewu. Even Oxton people bless themselves for not
being here. From the start in about 1977 it has been a receiving area for Glen Grey people who
passed through to other parts of the whole Zweledinga district as permanent sites were allotted.
The last campful of families are waiting now, and expect to leave in 1982/83. Please see section 2.6 below for some further detail.

**SPRING GROVE**

This and the following sites listed are in the Ntabethemba area to the north. We give them in the order they would appear on a clockwise route starting from and returning to the Poplar Grove crossroads. To reach that junction from Whittlesea, take the Poplar Grove turnoff left as you leave the village in the direction of Queenstown. You soon pass the Whittlesea North site on the left. The crossroads lie about 10 km along this road. Travelling to this point from Zweelings transit camp, you go back towards Oxton on the Katberg road. It is not necessary to go all the way to Embekweni for the Oxton turnoff there, because soon after Yonda (now on your left) a slow left fork leads straight to Oxton some 5 km away. The road to Poplar Grove is the natural continuation of this angled road which runs across the front of the Oxton settlement, with Funks school on the right, and on another 9 km to the crossroads.

Coming from Whittlesea, go straight through the crossroads. (Coming from Oxton, turn left.) Continue past the Lower Didden village on the right after 8 km and the Donnybrook slow turnoff left after another km. You follow the road round left br another 9 km to the Ruttiles turnoff left. (Both those left turnoffs take you into the CLMB & Sotho-escape lands.) Continue past the Ruttiles turnoff, and the road seems to be leading straight into the‘Mountain of Hope’ which suddenly rises in front. 2 km along on the left is Spring Grove.

As in all the other Ntabethemba sites, most of the people here come from Herschel. They all arrived between about July 1976 and March 1977 and first went to Thornhill and Loudon, the two receiving farms in the north. We have no information from within Spring Grove but understand this site was started in 1978/79. We heard that quite a number of people have also come to it from the Republic, especially from 'white' farms where land was consolidated or the farmer got rid of the old and ill. They have come particularly from the Eastern Cape farms - Tarkastad area, Steynsburg, Hofmeyr and Aliwal North.

**TENTEGATE**

This site lies about 10 km further along on the left of the road. The road will have veered to the left of the mountain about 3 km after Spring Grove, and after another 5 km passes the left turnoff to Tarkastad. Tentegate lies just a little beyond that turnoff point.

This is a very much bigger settlement than Spring Grove. In fact, it stretches so far from the road that it seems to have spread onto the next farm, Sunnyside - or else, that is an adjoining site. The Sunnyside development is quite recent, from about 1980. No information from within. Apparently these people here are Basutos who had moved to Herschel and then come on to Thornhill in the great exodus. Six long buildings on the right of the road appear to be schools. We heard the site has just one borehole on the river, and there is a dam 2 km further on, on the right of the road.

**TENTEGATE No 2**

So-called by a local man, this very much larger settlement is about 4 km further on, on the left. It stretches along the road for about 5 km, and goes quite a long way back from the road. 12 long school buildings line the roadside. Most of the houses throughout the area, as here, are of mud brick, with rows and rows of zinc latrines, like a logo of resettlement. No local information, and we regret not being able to gauge the populations of these sites. Again, we heard the people here were 'from the Free State', referring to the Sotho element in the Herschel group. There are two main groups of houses (April 1982), perhaps 700 in the bigger one. Tarkastad is about 10 km west of here as the crow flies. The Vuilndels has service is the main form of transport for this and other sites in the area. Both the Tentegate sites started in 1979, weird isolated dormitories.

**ROCKLANDS**

Another 8 km brings you to the left turnoff to Waverley station. The site starts in that left fork. Roads were being laid out in April 1982, and it looked like another very big site. Presumably this place is meant for people from Thornhill.

**MITFORD**

8 km further on along the through road is Mitford on the left and its small dam on the right. This settlement was perhaps the first given to the Herschel people after they came to Thornhill nearby. The house sites are on the hillside and below there are some plots which a white farmer said were 4 morgen each (we could not check). Fences have been repaired recently (April 1982) to keep livestock in camps. This is a biggergh settlement and it looks better off than the Tentegate sites down the road. No information from within.

**THORNHILL**

This vast notorious site starts 5 km beyond Mitford on the right of the road which curves in a slow semicircle to the right around a hill. The Thornhill shacks are strewn around the shallow slopes, a shock to see. These non-dwellings look as if they are at the end of the world, on land like the back of the moon. There is nothing there, no grass, nothing. For 6 km further as you drive, the houses just keep on coming. It's a cold tract, dusty and exposed, with wind devil's going around the day we were there.

This place and the neighbouring farm Loudon have been the transit camp for the Herschel influx of 1976/77. At first there were about 40 000 people here. They streamed in, expecting the houses, infrastructure and grazing they had been promised. They found nothing except a few tents for the firstcomers, and that was in the bitter cold of July 1976. The grass soon disappeared. As the crowd grew and in the heat of summer six months later there was typhoid, enteritis, measles as well as the general starvation.

Even Pretors and Zwelitshes were shocked at their own underestimates of the move. Some food was trucked in and plans were made to improve the clinic service, as they desperately tried to contain the situation. But the main government response seemed to be to keep it all secret. Dr Seidler, the one and only doctor at the site who was doing a superhuman job there, began telling the press how many people she was seeing daily, that babies were dying at a rate of 10 a day as far as she knew, that the foodplots had been left stacked for weeks next to the starving people for lack of anyone to distribute them. She was speedily removed. The Flying Angels, a medical crisis service, were refused when they offered to immunise the whole area within 24 hours. The only link allowed with outsiders was a soup kitchen run by a small group of local women.

A lot of families have gone now (1982) - some quietly back to Herschel, some to Sade, the new Ntabethemba sites or elsewhere. The place is patchy now. Some of the mud brick homes are obviously vacant, looking slightly more derelict than the ones that are lived in. A purely
subjective sense we had of the place being vacant, not to say haunted, with hardly anyone to be seen and the total silence. What DO these people do? What do they eat? Where can they get jobs? Fieldworkers should find out how people suffered here, and how they coped. We regret giving such a meagre account of this place, which must be one of the worst cases of resettlement ever.

There is to be some development here on a low level. There are a couple of school buildings. The planners just envisage trying to reshape the remaining community so that they draw together to one or more focal points where they would have any shops or other facilities. As for housing, it is to be geared to 'what people can afford' — which probably means site-and-service. Services will be minimal.

**NTABETHEMBA TOWN**

We have no route to this site, still to be started. It is planned for the Bulhoek area a few km further along the road after Thornhill on the right-hand side. It might be a little way off the road: on the map it lies a bit north of the Mountain of Hope and west of Tentergate. It will probably have road links to the west and east, to the main tar road as it loops north via Tentergate and back through Bulhoek. (It carries on to the Poplar Grove crossroad again.)

The scheme will be on the lines of Whittlesea North although probably not quite so vast, and probably with poorer housing. These are the two sites designated as 'new towns' for Hebu. The Republic has promised R25.9 million for Hebu, especially for carrying out resettlement projects. R10 million was to be for this northern region, and a lot of that will be for this town, the large dam being made nearby and the canal scheme.

**PHELANDASA**

We do not know where this site is, but heard from the Lower Didima people in the 1913 reserve that Herschel people have been resettled there. It sounds as if they are in the Ntabethemba Town area. No further information.

### 2.2.5 Victoria East district

Although the table at the beginning of this section shows net immigration of 8,966 into this district, there is only one known resettlement camp. A possible explanation, which has not been corroborated beyond hearsay, is that the chiefs in the area have allowed people from 'white' farms in adjacent districts to settle here, on some of the numerous farms in the district which have been bought up for incorporation into the Ciskei. Squatters may also have settled on them. We should add, though, that in general the Ciskei does not permit the occupation of previously white-owned farms by either squatters or subsistence farmers. The idea is to hand the farms over to African commercial farmers.

**GLENMORE**

Glenmore is at Committee's Drift on the Fish River, on the eastern (Ciskei) side. From
Grahamstown take the East London road, 2 km along take the Port Beaufort turnoff to the left, then 6 km or so at the top of the Ecca Pass take the dirt road turning off to the right marked for Committees Drift. After 13 drifts and about 15 km you reach the Fish River bridge, and the side road to Glenmore turns off left on the far side. From Alice, Dimbaza or Peddie, go first to Breakfast Viel and then Committees Drift.

A case study of this well-known resettlement camp appears below in Part 3. Most of the families are ex-squatters from Coega and Klipfontein, but a few come from farms in other districts south-west of the Gisela. The population in December 1981 was 4,200. The whole community are under threat of removal. See also Section 2.6 below.

2.2.6 Keiskammahoek district

There is only one resettlement camp in this isolated rural district. For obvious reasons hardly any other people have migrated to the area. There is some internal resettlement due to betterment planning and more recently in the interests of the Keiskammahoek Irrigation scheme.

ELUKHANYWENI (The Place of Light)

On the road from Middledrift, about 3 km before Keiskammahoek, a turnoff to the left leads to the site. It leaves the main road just about on the ridge overlooking Keiskammahoek valley.

This camp of some 3,000 people from 'badly situated' African reserves near Humansdorp is discussed in Part 3. The level of violence during the move has no parallel in the history of recent removals to the Gisela.

2.2.7 Peddie district

Peddie is a rural area in the south-eastern part of the Gisela. During the past three years the district has suffered long spells of drought. Together with overpopulation and over-stocking this has resulted in depleting natural resources, with soil erosion a characteristic feature. These conditions have made it difficult for many people to eke their subsistence from the soil.

Like most other rural areas in South Africa, Peddie exports labour on a large scale to the mines, industrial areas and agricultural farmslands of the Western Cape and Orange Free State. The majority of families in the district thus survive on their meagre agricultural production and on remittances from migrant labourers.

During the past 10–15 years there has been an influx of people into the district (and if the census figures can be believed, an efflux as well). Most came from 'white' farms in the Eastern Cape where they had either become redundant labour, been evicted or had found conditions unbearable. Others were victims of the insecurity of tenure which blacks experience in the urban areas, and therefore found it necessary to build their own homes in the rural areas. Not a single location has been unaffected by these events.

Many, however, have suffered discrimination in their new places of settlement. The critical shortage of land has meant that, in many areas, residential rights have not been accompanied by the right to a field or to rear stock.

The incorporation of 'white' farms has also proved disruptive. Many of these now stand vacant and unused, awaiting transfer for whom knows how long, to African commercial farmers. In the mean time no-one may cultivate them, not even the ex-farm labourers.

Peddie has four resettlement spots which differ widely.

KAMASKRAAL

This, the recent resettlement camp in the Gisela, contains two separate communities. The one group was evicted from a 'white' farm near Alexandria where they had worked until the farm changed hands. They were then trucked here to this site south of Peddie. From the Grahamstown/Peddie road take the dirt road signedpost Fish River Mouth, about 10 km from Fish River bridge or from Peddie. Another 15 km down this road (keeping right at a V-fork on the way) there is a large, well-established village stretching along a hill to the left and right of the road. An unmarked turnoff left here leads to Kamaskraal after 3 km. From the coast road, turn inland on the road from Old Woman's River mouth. At the village after about 12 km, take the Kamaskraal turn to the right.

We have encountered several farm evictions that took place under similar circumstances, where the new owner brought his labour in from outside, presumably another of his farms. It seems that the process of labour rationalization on farms is often triggered by changes in management.

The other community at Kamaskraal were squatters, originally from 'white' farms, who congregated on tribal land in the Peddie district and moved to Kamaskraal under a promise of agricultural land. In fact the place is a transit camp, the people under threat of removal to Peddie where no agricultural land will be available. The people came in 1980 and in mid-1982 are still living in makeshift shelters incorporating their original tents.

Conditions in this closer settlement are discussed more fully in Part 3. The whole population, say 1,000 people, are under threat of removal. Now removed: see Stop Press in Part 4 below.

ZWELEDINGA

This settlement, not to be confused with the big Zweledings area in Hluhluwe, lies off the same Fish River Mouth road as Kamaskraal. From the Peddie side, you turn right just before Pruchoe, and the site is 1½ km along on the right. From the coast road, drive up to Pruchoe and then left.

The name Zweledings means Promised Land. The site is sometimes called Mbyebo near the holiday resort in Natal. It is a sprawling settlement with about 250 families who came from Alexandria, Port Alfred, and from the Peddie rural locations of Nyangos, Runletts and Nobombe. When they arrived in 1978 they built corrugated-iron shacks but have since built mud houses with corrugated-iron roofs - although corrugated-iron shacks have not completely disappeared. The people who came from the Peddie rural locations had originally settled there from outside the district, mainly from Alexandria, Port Alfred and Alban. These were resettled by the Gisela government and were promised land - a promise which has not been fulfilled. Another factor contributing to their resettlement on what was previously Heaton Trust Farm appears to have been the political self-interest of Chief Z Nkweni who saw an opportunity to expand his constituency. Although their accommodation is better than that of other resettlement locations, the wet conditions (due to faultlines) have given rise to reports of stiff joints and chest-related illnesses.
Where the road from Peddie joins the Port Alfred/East London coastal road, travel 5 km towards Port Alfred, and Bell is on your left.

Bell (also called Tuwa) has a resettlement area of families who migrated here from various farms in the Peddie district. About 70 families have settled here over the past five years. Some left the farms because they wanted to enjoy some freedom from what they saw as a form of slavery without any security. Some resented the farmers' demands that they should reduce their stock. Others left because of the uncertainty surrounding the buying out of the farmers by the SA Development Trust and the departure of their former masters. The new leaseholders did not want many people on their farms. Those who were evicted approached the magistrate at Peddie and he advised them to quit the farms as the owners/leaseholders had the right to evict them.

On arrival at Bell they were allowed by the titheholders to erect dwellings on their lands. Later a Mr Ekel, a shopkeeper and member of the Bell-Bodiam Village Management Board, surveyed the land and sold them plots at R4 and R8, depending on the size. The people have built houses on the plots. They are allowed to own stock but have no access to arable land. They have been integrated into the community and participate in community projects like the building of additional classrooms for the local school. Of significance is the fact that the community, previously not under the jurisdiction of any chief, have recently placed themselves under Chief K 2 Njokweni. The immigrants maintained that he had assisted them when they were stranded, and because he was in the Ciskei cabinet he could help them. (Chief Njokweni was dismissed from the cabinet in January 1982.)

BINGQALA

Coming from Grahamstown, turn right 3 km before Peddie. 6 km down the side road, turn right on the road to Falordon and stay on it for 10 km, then turn right again and stay on that road for another 4 km, and Binqqala is there on both sides of the road.

This is another area where people have resettled. About 25 families left farms for more or less the same reasons as the Bell immigrants. They joined about 15 families who had been living on the farm for many years. The Dept of Co-operation and Development provided them with ready-made one-roomed zinc houses. The people have also built their own houses, and they own stock. The arrival of the immigrants caused tension because they were wooed by Chief K 2 Njokweni to accept him as the chief of the area whereas the old residents had always recognised Chief Mmetalwa. By June 1981 relations had deteriorated to such an extent that a fight resulted in the death of six adults. Because the Njokweni supporters are in the majority, the area now falls under his control.

2.3 CATEGORIES OF RESETTLEMENT

In this chapter we look at the broad types of removal in the Eastern Cape. The migration patterns are discussed first. Then, using Gerry Mark's categories, we try to show which groups in the community are being moved, to what extent, and why.

There are huge gaps in our information. They should be quite evident and so, however incomplete the picture is here, we trust it will not be misleading.

2.3.1 Migration patterns

Only a small fraction of the African migration flows in the Cape region over the past decade have been directly due to organised GG removals. However, the position is quite different if we use the term resettlement in a wide sense to include not only GG removals but population movements which occur under the pressures created by the institutional and legal framework of the bantustan policy. Most of the people who migrate to the 'homelands' do so only because they are not allowed to go elsewhere.

Some information on the various categories of removals can be gained from population censuses. Table 1 below gives estimates of the extent and pattern of net Xhosa migration between regions of South Africa. It is clear that the only white areas with a net inflow of Xhosa people were the metropolitan regions around Port Elizabeth (10 355) and Cape Town (28 507). We may assume that these people came from all over, including the Ciskei and Transkei.

The large efflux from the East London metropolitan region is mainly due to the resettlement of people from Duncan Village to Mdantsane.

Although there are certain small towns, e.g. Grahamstown, that had a relative increase in their African population, on the whole the smaller towns of the Cape lost people (34 600). Exact figures are not available to show how many people went to this or that destination, but it seems reasonable to assume that a significant number went to the Cape Town and Port Elizabeth areas. Some definitely ended up in the bantustans.
The efflux from the rural areas of the Eastern Cape was, to say the least, torrential. In the vast majority of rural districts the African population declined absolutely. This also holds for the rural areas of the Cape as a whole. Net Xhosa emigration totalled 143 367. Most of these people went either to the Ciskei or the Transkei.

There was also positive net Xhosa emigration from the other parts of ‘white’ South Africa (41 961). Since many of these emigrants came from Natal and CFOs, we may assume that most of them from the non-Cape provinces of South Africa are now in either the Transkei, KwaZulu or Bophuthatswana.

The bantustans were of course the recipients of the Xhosa people who left ‘white’ South Africa. The Ciskei heads the list (141 898) since most organised resettlement was directed here. The Transkei, however, has a higher figure than the other bantustans. The Transkei also received additional people. 81 919 came in from ‘white’ South Africa, though with the flight of the refugees from Herschel and Glen Grey the net immigration amounted to only 49 919. Some Xhosa went to other bantustans (29 176), especially Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu.

These movements are implied in the net migration pattern of Table 1, which we can trace to some extent from people’s origins to their destinations. Table 2 below attempts to show these migration flows. It must be treated with the utmost circumspection because it is based on a great deal of guesswork, but at least it conveys some idea of the magnitude of the flows and it should be seen in that light.

For example, it shows that the efflux from the rural parts of the Cape to both the Ciskei and the Transkei was about 60-70 000 in each case, and from small towns of the Cape between 5-15 000. It also shows the possibility that roughly the same number of people from each of those bantustans, Ciskei and Transkei, managed to settle either permanently or temporarily in the metropolitan areas of Port Elizabeth and Cape Town.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Xhosa 1970</th>
<th>population 1980</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>68 344</td>
<td>39 989</td>
<td>- 39 968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth/Utzenhage metropole</td>
<td>201 427</td>
<td>275 841</td>
<td>10 395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town metropole</td>
<td>110 049</td>
<td>177 042</td>
<td>28 507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape towns</td>
<td>167 802</td>
<td>191 673</td>
<td>- 28 815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central &amp; Western Cape towns</td>
<td>66 630</td>
<td>84 623</td>
<td>- 18 791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape country</td>
<td>348 415</td>
<td>335 553</td>
<td>- 106 855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central &amp; Western Cape country</td>
<td>75 744</td>
<td>62 323</td>
<td>- 13 422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of RSA</td>
<td>679 418</td>
<td>643 162</td>
<td>- 36 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>1 857 764</td>
<td>2 492 077</td>
<td>49 919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>355 718</td>
<td>628 421</td>
<td>141 703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other bantustans</td>
<td>48 712</td>
<td>96 916</td>
<td>29 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3 988 404</td>
<td>5 228 770</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another word of caution about this table. Some kinds of migration flows do not show up in net migration tables of this kind. If at any stage between two census dates one person moves from region A to B and another person the other way, then the two moves cancel each other out and will thus be invisible in migration estimates based on data from the census. So, for example, the above tables show only a positive flow from the Ciskei to Cape Town, yet it is well known that removals from Cape Town to the Ciskei have occurred under influx control and coloured labour preference.

### 2.3.2 Farm removals

By far the greatest number of recent removals to the Ciskei have been from the white rural areas. This is clearly shown in Table 2 above (67 516). But it is also apparent from interviews. Names like Kongha and Cethcart crop up more frequently than Cape Town in conversations with resettled people.

In 1970, full-time farm workers and their families formed the bulk of the African population in the white rural areas. In what is now the Cape, squatters, tenants and freeholders in black spots have never rivalled this group for size. Hence the vast majority - probably between 75 and 85% - of recent removals from the rural areas to the Ciskei have involved ex-farm workers.

We have already discussed the underlying economic processes. A stage in agriculture has been reached where the mechanisation of production processes, the rationalisation of labour utilisation and the consolidation of farm units have all become strongly labour-saving in effect. Hence, despite sustained increases in output, employment, after a stabilising period in the early sixties, started to decline. In most of the Cape this trend was further exacerbated by the implementation of the Coloured Labour Preference policy from the mid-sixties onwards.

In a sector such as agriculture, a decreasing or even just a stagnant trend in employment, in combination with population growth, must inevitably generate a surplus population and therefore large-scale population migration.

In the Eastern Cape, much of this migration was induced by individual farmers evicting the families they no longer wanted on their land. The questionnaire surveys show that surprisingly few issues were normally precipitating all these evictions. An argument between the farmer and
one or other member of a labouring family was often the explanation given. Other common causes were the farmer explaining about a worker's 'laziness' or about the cattle he kept. Many resettled people explained that the farm was sold and the new owner brought his own staff along, presumably the 'surplus' from another operation. Many were also evicted, they said, when they could no longer work either through injury or old age.

But all these 'explanations' were mere triggering mechanisms. Underlying them is the over-supply of farm labour, a condition which enables farmers to dismiss with ease any 'cheeky' or 'lazy' worker, and especially as replacements would be available.

Exactly the same condition is ultimately responsible for the excessively harsh working circumstances and low wages on farms. Many farm labourers work a 12-hour day, and average farm wages in the Cape were estimated at R40 per month including rations in 1976 (Quail, own free will. These economic refugees often use expressions such as 'the cruelty of the farmer' or 'the oppression by the boers' to describe their existence as servants of the white employers.

Whether evicted or not, africans off white farms have no legal option to go anywhere else but to the bantustans. It is this restriction which gives the urbanization process (which occurs relatively) the opportunity of a generation which is white. In fact the stream of ex-farm workers to the Ciskei is a quintessential example of the State's strategy of relocating the surplus population in the bantustans as far as possible. It also depicts the fact that most of the unemployed in South Africa come directly from the rural sector.

Of those farm families who have been resettled in the Ciskei, a fortunate few managed to get into townships such as Dimbaza and Mdantsane. But most went to squatter camps like Ngqiyaza and the Mudimbiga, on the edge of townships where services are rudimentary or nonexistent and conditions appalling. From here in turn, the adults who manage to find jobs migrate in contract to towns and also back to farms again in 'white' South Africa.

2.3.3 Squatter & tenant removals

The word 'squatter' is used here to refer to an African living on someone else's property with the consent of the owner. For present purposes we are just discussing squatters on farms.

Unlike labour tenancy, squatting has been fairly common in the Cape. Eastern Cape squatters were excluded from the provisions of the Natives Land Act of 1913 which had been designed to root out squatting. These squatters all owed the provisions of Chap IV of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. In 1943 the Pike Commission found that there were 16,540 African squatters in the white areas of the Cacadu, Stutterheim, Komga and East London districts alone.

Some squatters constituted a kind of subsistence peasantry. These were the ones who worked the farms of white landowners who preferred 'kaafir-farming' to other forms of agriculture. Other, more proletarianised, squatters merely rented residential stands on white farms and worked elsewhere. The circumstances of the latter group varied greatly. On some farms they amounted to only a few families. The rental for them may have been nominal, and for some even a mere kinship to a settled farm worker may have been enough to gain the consent of the farmer. On other farms, especially those within commuting distance of a significant source of employment, squatters settled more densely and rentals consequently became more of a factor. Certain crown lands were also occupied by squatter communities.

The National Party, along with organised agriculture, has always been hostile to all forms of squatting. The 1954 Amendment to the Native Trust and Land Act enabled the State to put into effect Chap IV of this Act relating to the occupation of land by squatters. This chapter makes it compulsory for certain squatters to be registered - only those who had occupied the land since 1926. Any squatting that commenced after 1926 was deemed illegal, and the people involved fell under threat of immediate eviction.

The Amendment threatened squatters in other ways too. It simplified the eviction procedure, if it required landowners to pay an annual licence fee for each registered squatter, and the fine increased with time. This measure was obviously made to discourage legal squatting as well.

The motivation behind these early moves against squatting varied according to the type of squatter. (Morris, 1977) The independent squatter peasant was seen as a waste of labour tying workers to subsistence activities - and this at the very time when capitalist agriculture faced severe labour shortages. Because this type of squatting clashed with the labour needs of white farmers the organised representatives of agriculture called for its abolition. They saw clearly that the elimination of this independent peasantry which existed in the midst of modern agriculture would have the effect of pushing more people into wage labour on the white farms. The main references to the idleness of the peasant squatters in the parliamentary debates of the time, suggest that the government shared this view.

In the case of the squatter proletariat, the State's antagonism was based primarily on political grounds. These squatters avoided both the urban and the bantustan systems of control, and those squatters on the periphery of cities in effect escaped the controls over the influx of african into the urban areas. The posed a threat at least for the future because of the chance of a phenomenal increase in these squatters was very real. The prospect of large african concentrations, uncontrollable, contradicted the strategy of containing the struggles in South Africa and this the State could not tolerate.

Although some squatters were removed shortly after the 1954 Amendment, the all-out assault on them happened only in the sixties. By then the agricultural labour shortage was a thing of the past. Farmers began to see squatter communities as a nuisance rather than a potential labour supply. Henceforth the political motives underlying the drive against squatting, and the spectre of an overwhelmingly black countryside - the so-called 'verswering van die plateland', became the dominant considerations.

The application of Chap IV of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 during the sixties and into the seventies forced literally hundreds of thousands of squatters out of the white rural areas and into the bantustans. There is very little local information available, but it would seem that the Eastern Cape had its fair share of these evictions (see next section on black spot removal).

With the passing of the 1976 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act, which outlawed all forms of squatting, the pace quickened once more. In a major anti-squatting drive, ECBAC sent a growing number of labour inspectors round to enforce long-neglected regulations. They stepped up the pressure on farmers to register their workers at labour bureaux. Since this entailed a registration fee for each employee, including those who were economically inactive, the result was a spate of farmer-initiated squatting evictions. In places where squatter communities congregated, ECBAC organized the removals themselves. The settlement of the squatters from Klipfontein, Coega and Colchester at Glenmore belongs to this campaign. Their removal is considered in detail below in Part 3.

Altogether we estimate that between 10 and 15 000 squatters were resettled in the Ciskei during the seventies, and this by no means the end of the road. The Dias Divisional Council which covers the Port Elizabeth/Grahamstown area has kept reminding farmers that they can be fined, jailed, or both for harbouring squatters. In collaboration with the administration of employment boards, it has launched a plan boldly termed Prevent which was to see the establishment of resettlement camps and above all to stop the growth of the African population in the white farm areas around Port Elizabeth. The first phase was to declare the region falling under the board a prescribed area, to avoid further influx. The second phase was to house those already in the area. (Evening Post, 8.07.78) Squatter evictions since then from farms at Alexandra and elsewhere have pushed hundreds of families onto the roadside or into the Ciskei.
2.3.4 Black spot & ‘homeland consolidation’ removals

These two categories are treated together because it has not always been possible to establish whether the communities under threat of removal hold land in freehold (black spots) or on communal tenure (in which case it would be ‘homeland consolidation’). Some areas (Mgwall, Wartburg) are definitely in the first group, others (Mooiplaas) in the second. In the context of the Ciskei, at any rate, both categories are being moved for the same reason: they are ‘awkwardly situated Bantu areas’.

Why this is such a crime is not entirely clear. It has been suggested that this type of relocation has more ideological overtones than any other category of removal:

The chess-board appearance of interspersed white and black land is in contradiction to some aspects of the policy of Separate Development and it is important for the credibility of the policy both for the white electorate and the blacks committed to the Bantustans that an attempt at creating consolidated land units is seen to be made. (Baldwin, p 225)

The recent doubts expressed within official circles, mainly in response to increasing costs, seems to support the view that a cosmetic ideology was being served. But perhaps one should also not ignore some other motivations. A consolidated territory is definitely preferable from the administrative, political and economic points of view.

The attitude of capitalist agriculture to consolidation has been somewhat ambiguous. In the past, black spots were definitely convenient and important labour pools for the farms in the area. Nowadays, however, the settled farm population provides an ample supply of regular labour. Black spots now seem to be quite unimportant even as sources of casual labour, because the bulk of this is also drawn from among the settled farm population. The labour bureaux system enables those farmers who still need occasionally to recruit from elsewhere to do so quite effectively in the bantustans. The occupents of black spots, certainly in the Eastern Cape, have thus become surplus to the labour needs of the surrounding capitalist economies.

While this is often enough of a qualification for an African to be resettled to a black area, in itself it cannot explain why the State changes the boundaries of these black areas. However, it is important to note that the redundancy of a community normally serves to stop any opposition from local employers when it comes to removal. In fact, farmers close to black spots these days usually call for their excision. Uppermost in their minds are the inconveniences such as petty theft, generated by having a black spot nearby with its extra people in the area.

White agriculture benefits as a whole when this contact is reduced - which is what happens when bantustans and therefore also the surrounding white areas are consolidated. The South African Agricultural Union accepts this fully. It even goes so far as to recommend the creation of buffer zones.

On the other hand, some white farmers vociferously oppose consolidation when they have to give up their own land, when their farms are incorporated into a bantustan in exchange for black spots being excised. It is for this simple reason rather than any concern for labour supplies that certain elements within agriculture, notably the Natal Agricultural Union, still fight consolidation.

Subsistence agriculture occurs in all ‘badly situated’ black areas, but its contribution to family income varies considerably. Some communities are virtually self-sufficient in terms of food production and might even grow some cash crops. Migrant remittances then become strictly supplementary. In other areas, and especially where landowners sublet on a large scale, the level of agriculture is hopelessly inadequate. Then outside employment is vital, whether on nearby farms or in distant cities. These places in effect are really squatter settlements. Other conditions in these various areas also range very widely, in quality of housing and so on.

Two well-known instances of this type of removal have sent people to the Ciskei. In 1973 Rienwasmak, a black spot near Kakamas in the Northern Cape, was cleared and 46 of the families were moved to Welkomkraal, near King William’s Town. The 215 people involved were labelled Ciskeian Xhosa although they had lived on the other side of the country and could not even speak Xhosa - their language was Afrikaans. Then between 1977 and 1979 about 4 000 Taitsikama people from their isolated reserves west of Humansdorp were forced off their land, some even at gun point, and resettled at Elukhanywe near Keiskammahoek. Now, in June 1982, a third black spot removal has been cleared, Alasita in the so-called ‘White Corridor’ between Ciskei and Transkei, and the 26 families (200 people) trucked to Frankfort near King William’s Town. (For details of Rienwasmak and Alasita removals see Section 2.3.3 above. The Humansdorp removal is discussed in a case study below in Part 3.)

There may also have been other black spot removals in the Cape over the past two decades. In response to a question from Mr L F Wood, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development listed 36 black spots (see Section 2.7 for names) in the Eastern Cape districts of Elliot, Cathcart, Indwe, Kongha, Maclear, Stutterheim and Wodehouse. (Hansard 1969, v 25, p 325) He did not give the numbers involved. Then again in 1980 the Minister of Co-operation and Development replied with a similar list to a question from Mr H E J van Rensburg. From this it seems that over 30 black spots, mainly from the East London/Queenstown corridor - the ‘White Corridor’ - were cleared between 1970 and 1979, and 6 013 people removed. (Hansard PQ 537, 22.04.80) Unfortunately we know nothing more. It would seem, though, that most of these places were squatter settlements on either public or private white-owned land rather than actual black spots, and so we think that only a small percentage of these people from the white rural areas, about 4 000 in all, were moved from ‘badly situated’ black areas.

The process of Ciskei consolidation has not yet run its full course. A number of black areas in the ‘White Corridor’ containing almost 40 000 people are currently under threat of removal. They are discussed more fully in Section 2.6 below.

2.3.5 Urban removals

The State policy of urban relocation was officially introduced in the late 1960s in terms of a General Circular (No 27 of 1967) issued by the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Before local municipalities (and later, administration boards) in white urban areas were allowed to embark on new housing schemes for African township residents, they were required to have the permission of the department. As Smit and Booysen note:

The Department had to be satisfied that

(i) such new developments (particularly family housing) were imperative and that

(ii) it was not possible to provide such accommodation in an adjacent black homeland.

The emphasis on the construction of African housing was now to be in the bantustans. The policy has been that where towns are situated in the vicinity of a bantustan, its African workers must be resettled in that bantustan with their families, and where this is not possible, the families should be housed in the bantustans and the workers accommodated in hostels in the white towns. Thus, in terms of the urban relocation policy, urban townships have been and are being disestablished, with their residents being relocated to towns in the bantustans established and developed so as to allow for this relocation. Urban relocation has also taken the form of the incorporation of townships into bantustans through the redrawing of the bantustan border.
It would appear that urban relocation has taken place to every bantustan. The relocation has been done in a manner to which the Riekert Commission refers to as 'fully fledged' towns situated near the bantustan borders. Based on the size of the respective bantustan urban populations, it seems that KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Lebowa, in that order, have been the recipients of the greatest number of people under the policy. By 1970, 19.4% of the de facto Ciskeian population lived in urban areas in the Ciskei.

The policy has necessitated the large-scale provision of housing in the bantustans (mainly in the 'fully fledged' towns), such that 9,735 houses were erected annually in the bantustans during the 1971-77 period. Prior to 1970, the South African Bantu Trust (SABT, now Development Trust) was solely responsible for the establishment, financing and development of bantustan towns. Since 1970, the bantustan authorities and the development corporations have increasingly become involved in this work. Although the SABT's real expenditure on these towns amounted to R200 million, all three - the SABT, bantustan governments and corporations - spent a total of no less than R50 million from 1970/71 to 1979/80. The figure for the Ciskei alone from 1972/73 to 1979/80 amounted to R66,810,000. Most of this is for housing and associated services such as water supply, roads, drainage.

Baldwin (1975, p 210) estimates that 327,000 people were moved owing to the policy of urban relocation from 1960 to 1971. While Smith and Booyzen (1977, p 222) have drawn a figure of 171,259 for the 1968-75 period. Most urban relocation to the Ciskei has occurred from East London to Mdantsane, with the removals beginning in early 1964. By 1977, 82,000 former East London residents were living in Mdantsane. This drawn-out removal is still continuing and likely to go on for some time. (See Part 3 below for a case study of Mdantsane.)

In 1975, Baldwin wrote that the policy can be seen in operation throughout the whole of Natal, the Cape east of the 'Isichelan Line', some parts of the Free State (including Bloemfontein, Bethlehem and Harrismith), the Northern Cape and Western Transvaal and most of the Eastern Transvaal. (1975, p 222)

The largest scale of urban relocation has taken place from Pretoria and the Durban-Plateau area. In 1977, the Durban township of KwaMasuku was incorporated into KwaZulu, with the township population at the time being about 180,000.

Urban relocation has also involved the removal of small town locations close to a bantustan. Again most of these moves have occurred in the Transvaal and Natal. In the Eastern Cape the Mngdizi township at Queenstown was partially depopulated in the mid-seventies and some residents forced to go to eMthieleni about 10 km away in the Glen Grey district, now ceded to the Transkei. Other parts of Mngdizi may also be cleared, and removals from one section have been reported. Another Mngdizi township at Stutterheim was scheduled for removal to the Ciskei at Frankfort, but this plan has now been scrapped. Some of these communities may be spared. The apparent abandonment of the long-standing plan to move Grahamstown's Fingo Village - and along with it the idea of developing a border city for 200,000 people at Glenmore (Committee's Drift) - might well have been a signal reversal in the policy of small town removals.

In the context of the Eastern Cape it is also necessary to note that a significant percentage of the influx from small towns did not take the form of GG-type removals. There have been other forms of pressure. One was the stagnant economic opportunities. Housing facilities have been poor and limited, as a consequence of deliberate State policy. In many small towns these matters were often enough for a family to decide to move elsewhere. A good number of the people we met at Dimbaza had moved for reasons of indirect pressure. There were also those, comparatively few, families who were evicted from small towns for some or other offence such as failing to pay rent. In all these cases, though, it is the control that the State exercises over where people have to go, whether evicted or not, that makes them part of the relocation process.

According to the estimates contained in Table 1 of Section 2.3.1 above, 28,815 people left the small towns of the Eastern Cape. Although we do not know for certain, it seems quite reasonable to assume that a good proportion of these went to ciskeian areas. Some (Section 13 rights are to some extent transferable between towns within an administration board area) or as migrants. Nevertheless, many were forced into the Ciskei or Transkei - not only the victims of GG removals, but others trapped in State-controlled circumstances.

Why did the South African State introduce the urban relocation policy? It must be seen largely as a response to the State's historic inability to provide adequate housing in the townships. In both quantitative and qualitative terms. This has resulted in what has been referred to as the urban housing problem. The policy represents the State's major attempt to solve the urban housing problem. In the final analysis, the housing problem essentially involves an inadequate reproduction of labour-power (i.e., re-production of the working class) and the inadequacy which has the potential of manifesting itself in the form of working-class struggle.

The first major attempt at a solution was the 1932 Natives (Urban Areas) Act. As a result of the dynamics of capitalist accumulation in the late 19th century and early 20th century, large-scale migration to the urban areas occurred. This created an African housing problem in these areas (manifested in the form of squatter camps, for example), to such a degree that the 1932 Act was passed. By allowing for the implementation of some form of influx control, the State attempted through the Act to limit the rate of African urbanisation and thereby save municipalities from having to build so many houses. The Act did not give municipalities the machinery for any systematic control over African influx, however. From 1921 to 1936 the urban African population nearly doubled. Municipalities had the direct responsibility for providing adequate housing and services for the existing urban African population.

The urban housing problem was not alleviated in the decades after the Act. Africans continued coming into towns on a permanent basis from the reserves and rural areas and the low wages and housing shortage increased in the urban areas, partly because of the nation-wide housing problem. The squatter movement during the 1940s, the manifestation of a relatively inadequate reproduction of labour-power, posed a threat to the reproduction of South African capitalism. This is partly what lay behind the early apartheid State legislation, the second major attempt to solve the urban housing problem.

In terms of the Native Laws Amendment Act (1952) and other legislation passed during the early 1950s, the influx control system was tightened up by the establishment of district (rural) and local (urban) labour bureaux. The State also tried providing for more housing through site- and service schemes, encouraging municipalities to extend their monopoly of beer/alcohol sales in the townships (the profits of which would be used for housing), training Africans as skilled artisans for housing construction (who could be paid less than whites), etc. (See De Villiers, 1979.) These ideas were implemented in most major urban centres in the early and mid-fifties. Yet the urban housing problem continued throughout the fifties, which partly explains the intensification of the African working-class struggle during this period.

It is in the above context that one must explain the State policy of urban relocation, the third major attempt by the State to solve (in its viewpoint and that of capital) the urban housing problem. The first two efforts had been to reduce the problem by limiting influx into the urban area. The third is actually to move the problem physically away, and the new policy is closely connected with bantustan strategy. Aware of past failures, the State is, in essence, merely locating the problem in the bantustans, with future working-class struggles arising from it being directed instead towards the bantustan 'States'.

The policy is also a form of influx control, with influx from the rural areas of the bantustans being increasingly located in and around the 'fully fledged' towns as the once such as the squatter camps around the KwaMasuku towns of Umzimkulu and Ulundi, and in the squatter areas (e.g., Winterveld) near the Bophuthatswana towns of Ga-Rankuwa, Mabopane and Temba.

Whether this third attempt succeeds in solving the problem is of course another matter.
altogether. In fact urban removal, more than any other type, reveals the limitations of bantustan strategy and the attempt to shift as many people as possible into those black areas. Not squatters. With the onset of political control at its weakest in urban townships, but urban communities are very suspicious of 'homeland' leadership. It is said, for instance, that Sebe and his men have an almost pathological fear of entering Mdantsane.

The urban relocation process also affects squatters (in the usual sense of the word) within or immediately next to the boundaries of urban areas. This aspect is part of influx control removals too. We did not study this phenomenon in any detail because it is being covered by another SPP group, but would like to make a few remarks about it here.

Urban squatter communities exist throughout South Africa. They contain thousands of people. The squatter population of Port Elizabeth alone is said to be in the region of 70,000. There are many in East London too, and in small townships in the Eastern Cape.

A good many of these urban squatters have urban residence rights. The only reason why they are squatters is the acute housing crisis. But there are also many who are in the urban areas illegally, pushed them by the depressed economic conditions in the white rural areas and bantustans, and by the desire of contract workers to have their families with them, and other factors.

The recent history of the Cape Town squatter communities clearly shows the intense antagonism of the State towards urban squatters. The demolitions of Modderdam, Umbel and Werlkop; the harassment, raids and arrests at Crossroads; the deportations from Nyanga Bush - these are only some of the elements in the State’s arsenal against them. (See Volume 3, Section 3.3 of the SPP reports.)

Squatters in the Eastern Cape have endured similar experiences. In early 1979 about 1,000 squatters in Duncan Village were forced to move to the Chalumna area in the Ciskei countryside the events that preceded their 'acceptance' included all the usual features: raids, arrests, the burning of shacks. Many apparently had the necessary Section 10 qualification to be in Duncan Village.

More recently, the squatters in Soweto, Port Elizabeth, had their shacks demolished for three weeks in mid-1982 by armed ECAB officials. (See also Section 2.6.7 below on the Soweto raids.) This harassment is in a long line of bouts against squatters in the PE area where families have been pushed from pillar to post, judging by press reports. For example, ECAB moved the squatter families from Veelaap to Kleiniskoel in September 1978 to clear an area at Veelaap for housing development. (EPH, 28.09.78) Many of these families were coloured, and the Coloured Management Committee decided to negotiate with the Board to get them to stop any more of these removals. Bethelsdorp Extension 21 was planned to rehouse all local coloured squatters by the middle of 1981 (and we do not know, but suspect this has not happened). After this Bethelsdorp site, the next major coloured rehousing scheme for squatters was to be in Kleiniskoel, which was due for re-proحام from an African to a coloured group area. (EPH, 11.09.79) Yet Kleiniskoel is now the site for African squatter settlement, according to the ECAB plan for about 2,000 housing units there in a place to be called KwaDweni. Many moves seem to have been pointless, even in official terms.

Meanwhile squattine families have tried to stabilise themselves where they could. They can invoke the law to some extent (which makes a change): Section 10 people should not be disrupted until ECAB have found another place for them. This point was clearly upheld in the Jijana case in 1980/81. The case is worth outlining here to show what poor choices the squatters have, and also how a court victory for those with Section 10 rights can mean disaster for the other families who will then be botted out of the area.

Mr Jijana allowed families to settle on his 4 ha property at Veelaap, and people streamed in. They included those with Section 10 rights, who said they would rather live in an illegal squatter village than in the legal slums roundabout. More than 200 shacks had gone up by the end of May 1980. (EPH, 30.05.80) A court order allowed ECAB to clear squatters and shacks from the site after 28 June, but also said the Board had to accommodate those with Section 10 rights. In the three months following, ECAB arrested nearly 300 squatters. They were then without Section 10 rights and contract workers moving into the camp to be with their families. The 'illegals' would be fined and pushed off to a bantustan, we assume. Then on 15 October in another raid, ECAB arrested another 150 families who had come in afterwards to use the sites previously occupied by 134 'legal' families whom the Board had moved to serviced sites in Kleiniskoel. (Evening Post, 16.10.80) Households were obviously pouting in as fast or faster than they were being removed. The camp was by no means pleasant to live in, it had no toilets supplied, an inadequate water supply, and it was very congested. Nevertheless, it drew in people because as Mr Vellie Diewa said at the time of the case in May, they had nowhere else to go. (The squatters did not oppose ECAB's application formally. Some said they were 'illegally' in the area and would have nowhere to live if forced to move. Like those who replaced them on Mr Jijana's site, they were living as unbtrustfully as possible.)

Two later developments in the Jijana story are that ECAB got an interdict from the PE Supreme Court preventing Mr Jijana from taking any more squatters on to his property (EPH, 29.10.80) and that about 200 families were allowed to stay there till ECAB found other accommodation, and that meanwhile the Board had 'improved services to the area'. (EPH, 11.02.81)

This means a repleve for some of the squatters, but many more have been moved out. Any reversals seem to be rare. The brickfields squatter community seem to have won through after a very steady and united stand. They are close to the KwaDweni site and at first ECAB insisted these families should stop entrenched themselves in the brickfields area. They were making fairly solid houses for themselves out of the broken bricks and had also built a school. Which they were then told to demolish. Publicity over this put ECAB in a very glaring light and now it seems that the community have the right to stay for at least five years, or even permanently. The KwaDweni site will not overlap them but basic services might be extended to them. (EPH, 22.07.82.)

Few squatter communities can make these stands because so many 'illegal' families are involved. There seems to be a lull in the PE area now - following the incident in June 1982 when four people were shot in the context of squatter raids in Soweto. (See Section 2.6.7 below.) It looks as if ECAB will wait till the three new township sites are ready - KwaDweni, Kwa Mapazika, and Motherwell - and then, perhaps in 1983, go on an all-out binge of moving Section 10 families to these places while deporting all the others to Kleiniskoel or Transtak. Even the Section 10 squatters may not be safe by then, if they have no work and the Orderly Movement Bill allows for their removal from the area. This Bill could become law in the next parliamentary session.

The victimisation and relocation of urban squatters, and their struggle against the State, has a long history in South Africa. It is bound to continue. On the one hand, the State cannot afford to tolerate uncontrolled urban squating and is continually shaping new instruments to deal with it - e.g. the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulations Act, and now the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill. On the other hand, the forces that push so many people into erecting their shacks on any open urban property, whether they have urban residence rights or not, will if anything strengthen in future.

2.3.6 Influx control removals

This category of relocation has already been implied in the urban removals section above. It has to do with the removal of African people from what are now referred to as prescribed areas, i.e. urban areas in 'white' South Africa where influx control legislation is applicable.
Most of the removals concern Africans who are illegally in prescribed areas. Briefly, to reside in an urban area lawfully an African requires one of the following Section 10 qualifications:

(a) continuous residence since birth in the area
(b) either a continuous 10-year period in one job or a continuous 15-year period of lawful residence in the area
(c) being a dependant of those with (a) or (b) qualifications although you lack those qualifications yourself, provided your entry into the area was permitted by a labour officer
(d) being authorised by a labour officer.

One common category of illegals is the dependants of (a) and (b) qualifiers who do not have these qualifications themselves and who have not received permission to enter the prescribed area - in other words, those who value family life but are denied the Section 10 (I) (c) right. The crucial variable here is whether people have suitable housing available. As we all know, this is in extremely short supply.

Another important group is the workers and workseekers without (a) and (b) qualifications who were unable to obtain a Section 10 (I) (d). For this, people need approved accommodation and employment. Housing is difficult, but work seeking even more so because it is government policy to pitch outsiders to the back of the jobs queue. On top of that, there are the procedures which contract workers must follow to get jobs in the urban areas - these procedures hamstring all outsiders seeking work. It is very important to note that Section 10 (I) (d) is not a legal right. It is a permit to remain in an urban area which may be granted or refused by the labour officer. People registered in terms of Section 10 (I) (d) have no rights and no security, and are only legally in town while that permit for a particular contract last.

The rest of the illegals are the families of illegal workers, outsiders who try their luck in the urban informal sector, and others who come in to draw on urban services such as health and education.

There is enormous infringement of influx control, as indicated in Dr Koombhoy's admission that 42% of the Greater Cape Town African population are illegal residents (see Vol 3 of the SPP reports). Cape Town may be exceptional, but urban squattings is obviously widespread and there are many more illegals besides those living in proclaimed townships with the permanent residents. This suggests that the oft-quoted 10% figure for metropolitan areas as a whole may well be an underestimate.

Influx control has operated in South Africa throughout this century in one form or another, as is reflected in the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. The Stalwart Commission report (1922), which more or less formalised the basis of the 1923 Act, recommended that an African should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and minister to the needs (i.e. perform labour) of the white man, and depart therefrom when he ceases. (Quoted in Desmond, 1971, p 23)

The general aim of influx control legislation is to limit the sheer size of the African population in urban areas. However, the rationale underlying this general aim and thus the resultant function of such legislation has not remained static throughout the century. It can serve a changing role, for example, during the apartheid era since the National Party victory in 1948.

The early 1950s saw a tightening up of influx control, reflected in the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952. As M C Botha, Minister of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development, said in 1970, among the most striking successes we as a National Party have on our record books, I mention the tightening-up of influx control.... (Quoted in Baldwin, 1975, p 225)

We must see this in turn in terms of how South African capitalism developed during the 1930s and 1940s.

The 1930-1950 period was a time of rapid capital accumulation for urban-based manufacturing capital, with its gross value of output increasing by 140% between 1933 and 1939, and by 114% between 1939 and 1946. (Humphrey, 1977, pp 33-34) The boom in manufacturing and mining capital had a very bad effect on farm labour. The white farmers were losing their tenants and squatters because they could not compete with the higher wages offered by the manufacturers. Farm workers were leaving the land to find work in town.

Morris (1977) has given a wealth of empirical information, in the form of statements by the South African Agricultural Union and its provincial representatives, to indicate the crisis for agricultural capital. At the 1944 OFS Agricultural Union congress, for example, delegates from all parts of the province complained that it was impossible to maintain adequate labour forces on their farms. The drift to the towns would have to be stopped in some way. (Gammon-Woolf, 1938, p 4.)

During the 1940s the South African Agricultural Union exerted huge pressure on the State for it to intensify labour controls. The Union called for the division of the African working class into two sections, one restricted to working for manufacturing and mining capital, and the other for agricultural capital, with State-controlled labour bureaux preventing the latter workforce from migrating to the white urban areas. (See Morris, 1977, and Greenberg, 1980.)

This produced the new influx controls of the 1950s. These new measures were, however, also meant to solve what the State and capital saw as a problem of urban crisis and instability.

This other problem started with the large-scale African migration to the towns during the 1930s and 1940s, when people came not only from white-owned farms but also from the African reserves. Agricultural productivity in the reserves had declined steadily during the first half of this century as a result of the penetration of capitalist social relations of production in South Africa. (See Wolpe, 1972, and Simkins, 1981.) Naturally people started streaming into towns from the reserve areas. The influx control system could not cope in the form it took in the days of the United Party and earlier, when there was little control over urban movement from the white farms and the reserves. Between 1921 and 1936, the urban African population increased by 94%, with the male/female ratio decreasing from 5:1 in 1936 to 10:3 in 1946, reflecting an increase in family migration. (De Villiers, 1979)

The enormous migration resulted in mass unemployment in the urban areas. It also meant the municipalities could not provide adequate houses, either in number or quality. Both these factors helped to intensify the working-class struggle by Africans in town during the 1940s. Thus, while the new, tighter, influx control system was introduced to solve the labour shortage for agricultural capital, it also tried to limit the scale of the urban African working-class struggle.

It was only after 1948 that legislation was passed, and State Institutions formed, to solve these two problems. Under the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952, labour bureaux were set up in 'white' South Africa. They were of two kinds - local (urban) and district (rural) - and they operated under the control of a central State labour bureau. Rural residents now had to have permission from the district labour bureau before they could leave the rural area, while one of the functions of the local labour bureau was to remove illegal urban residents. (The endorsing out of illegals employed in town meant reducing the unemployment rate amongst the legal residents.)

Legal urban residents were defined in terms of Section 10 of the 1945 Urban Areas Act. Up until 1951, though, Section 10 was applied only in areas where the local municipality asked for it. Then the 1952 Act made it automatically applicable to all urban areas, referred to as proclaimed areas. Movement between proclaimed areas was prohibited unless it met moving
from an area of labour surplus to one of labour demand.

As things stood, it would not have been possible to implement the newly tightened-up form of influx control, because

owing to the absence of portraits, fingerprints and, thirdly, of fixed identity numbers and durable identity documents it has thus far not been possible to determine the movements and still less the identity of our Natives. (Morris, 1977, p 42, quoting a government official)

The Natve Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act was passed in 1952 to counter these difficulties by facilitating the registration and identification of africans. The two 1952 Acts were applied to women only in the early 1960s, according to Wilson (1972, p 223), although they were used earlier in certain urban areas.

By 1957 there were 234 local and 278 district labour bureaux, the respective figures for 1971 being 418 and 379 which indicates how strongly the system went on growing. During 1953/54, over 54 000 'illegal' africans were removed to white farms to become labourers. (Morris, 1977, p 43) By the late 1950's the farm labour shortage had more or less been solved, especially given the increasing mechanization and the transition to full-time wage labourers in white agriculture.

Then during the 1960's and 1970's the role of influx control legislation began to change. To quote Maré:

It has been said that if the apartheid period up to the end of the 1950's can be broadly characterised as that of allocation of labour, then the 1960's and 1970's are the decades of relocation of labour. (1978, p 37)

With this came the new emphasis on removals to the bantustans. As Maré notes, the people relocated have been the unemployed. The laws have been important throughout the period for enabling agricultural capital to keep up an adequate labour supply, but whereas urban removals during the 1950's were directed towards the white-owned farms where labour was needed, the 'target area' in the 1960's and 1970's has been the bantustans where employment opportunities are exceedingly limited. With the farm labour shortage pretty well solved in the 1950's, the main function of influx control legislation since then has been to limit the scale of unemployment in white urban areas and hence the intensity of the urban african working-class struggle. In this regard, J P Vorster stated in 1970, when he was Prime Minister:

The greatest danger confronting South Africa is not so much the threat from outside the borders, serious though they may be, but mass unemployment....

(Quoted in Legassick, 1974, p 28)

We must see the changing role of influx control legislation in the context of the dynamics of capital accumulation during the last 20 years.

The period since the early 1960's has been characterised by the increasing penetration of productive monopoly capital into the South African social formation. This affects the policy of relocation because the monopoly sector is more capital-intensive than the competitive sector. The absolute number of employed people may increase; but, relative to the rise in constant capital (primarily, the means of production), the growing capital-intensity in production implies that the number of employed is decreasing. In other words, the more you use machines (increasing capital intensity), the less your relative use of manpower. The following statistics help to make the point. From 1950 to 1970, african employment in the private manufacturing sector grew from 433 056 to 864 300. (Wolpe, 1972, p 443) African unemployment, on the other hand, rose in South Africa from 1,24 million in 1960 to 1,6 million in 1970, and again to 2,3 million in 1977, according to Sinkins. (Maré, 1980, p 21)

It seems clear then that influx control legislation now attempts to locate african unemployment in the bantustans rather than the white urban areas. It does this mainly by preventing the unemployed from moving into the white urban areas. But since many thousands enter these areas illegally, influx control also requires that these people be sent back to the bantustans. From 1960 to 1970 it is estimated that 400 000 people were thus removed. (Baldwin, 1975, p 210)

The key function of influx control at present is to confine the unemployed to the bantustans as far as possible. Yet it still serves to limit the size of the urban african population, whether employed or not. The State therefore makes it almost impossible for contract workers, even those with steady jobs, to get permanent urban residence rights. If these restrictions were relaxed, there would be an immediate threat of the african population doubling in some metropolitan centres. For this reason the migrant labour system, whatever its narrow economic functions, is still encouraged to the full.

This role of influx control, of limiting urban african numbers, is of course connected with its other function of limiting unemployment in town. Effective control over urban unemployment would be impossible if the permanent urban population increased so much that most jobs were filled by local people. In other words, limited urban unemployment presupposes a migrant component in the work force sufficiently large to absorb any unemployment that might arise.

In the past two decades, influx control legislation has been continually toughened and tightened. With the 1964 Bantu Laws Amendment Act, women and children residing with their male Section 10 qualifier had to prove that their original entry into the urban area had been lawful. Before, they merely had to prove that they ordinarily resided with him. (Wilson, 1972, p 161) The same Act widened the definition of an 'idle' person (as set out in the 1945 Urban Areas Act), so that Section 10 qualifiers could be endorsed out of town after becoming unemployed. The 1978 Bantu Laws Amendment Act also extended the definition to include family members who were employed in the informal sector. We should add, though, that not many people have been affected by the 'idle and undesirable' clause of the Act - during 1978, for example, only 284 people were declared idle and undesirable in the main urban centres. Yet the fact remains that the tool is there for wholesale use if the authorities so wish.

The 1968 Black Labour Regulations resulted in the establishment of tribal labour bureaux in the bantustans. Africans there were, and still are, required to register as workskcers at these bureaux, and must find work through the bureaux before leaving the bantustan areas. This is an additional attempt at entrenching the migrant labour system.

Then with the introduction of the Black Affairs Administration Act of 1971, 22 Administration Board areas were established in 'white' South Africa, with the boards becoming responsible for the administration and control of the african population. Influx control so longer came under the white local authorities in the prescribed areas but was implemented by the administration boards under direct control of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development (now Department of Co-operation and Development). A Section 10 qualifier could work in any prescribed area within the administration board area he had residence rights in. This is still the case, and now the 1980 Black Labour Regulations allow qualifiers to work on urban areas too. Both the 1971 Act and the 1980 Regulations thus allow qualifiers greater employment mobility. (Hindson, 1980) They represent an attempt at decreasing the unemployment rate amongst Section 10 qualifiers.

The ever-tougher line against 'illegals' is very clear to see in the instruments of control. While the 1968 Regulations are geared towards limiting illegal influx into the urban areas, the introduction of the R500 fine (in the late 1970's) on employers of 'illegals' in town obviously attempts to endorse out those people who have slipped illegally into the urban areas. This very aggressive response to illegal townpeople maybe still grow far more severe. The draft Orderly Movement Bill now under review by the select committee (1982) proposes raising the fine on employers from R500 to R5 000, and also finoing any household up to R500 for accommodating an 'illegal'.

* In 1979 these Administration Board areas were consolidated into 14 areas.
We have not been able to gauge how many people were endorsed out, as a result of influx control infringements, from prescribed areas to the Ciskei or Transkei during the 1970s. Census data are clearly of no use because these removals would probably be just about cancelled out by illegal entry at any particular time. It is well known, however, that tens of thousands are involved. For example, the aid centres alone throughout the country sent something like 50 000 africans to the bantustans during each of the years 1975 - 1977. (Bleekert, 1979, p 55) Aid centres hide the story of pass law offences, incidentally. Before the aid centre in Port Elizabeth started in 1973, the local Commissioner’s court averaged 17 000 convictions for all cases in January-June for pass law and other offences. The rate dropped dramatically - the total for all cases in January-June, 1989, for instance, was a mere 1 575. The difficult life of an illegal migrant is crudely implied in an official circular to aid centre workers which refers to 'the most cunning unregistered worker or layabout who even uses a forged reference book to put a spoke in officials' wheels.' [EPJ, 28.02.81]

2.3.7 Coloured labour preference removals

In 1955 Dr W W M Eiselein, then Secretary of Native Affairs, outlined the policy whereby coloured labour was to be given preference over African labour in the Western Cape, i.e. the region west of the line running from the eastern border of the Nyanga magisterial district up to Hopetown in the north. He also stated that the policy would be implemented in the following stages:

(1) removal of foreign africans
(2) freeze on number of african families
(3) restricted influx of migrant workers
(4) reduction in the number of african families
(5) replacement of african migrants by coloureds.

The ultimate aim was to remove all africans from the Western Cape.

It is quite clear that the Coloured Labour Preference policy was entirely consistent with influx control and the bantustan strategy generally. The presence of a large coloured working class in the Western Cape gave some feasibility to the goal of excluding africans - if not entirely, then at least to a significant extent - from the area. The policy may also have been developed as a kind of quid pro quo for taking away all coloured representation in parliament. It could have been an attempt to accommodate them economically, if not politically.

Eiselein's policy guidelines lay dormant for some years. The first tentative steps towards implementing the policy came in 1962 with the establishment of a variety of committees to encourage the use of coloured labour. The Eiselein Line was also shortly afterwards moved further eastwards to include districts such as Henley, Graaff-Reinet, Middelburg and Colesberg.

But it was only in 1965-68 that the State embarked on the policy very seriously. An amendment to the Black Labour Regulations empowered labour officers to withhold african labour from employers unless coloured labour was unavailable. The same amendment also enabled labour officers to ensure that permanent african labour was given preference in turn over contract labour when the use of african labour was unavoidable. These new Regulations were extended to all categories of employment including agriculture. Another measure froze the African component of the labour force. Finally the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act of 1967 severely curtailed african employment in any extensions to factories. These restrictions in the labour market were accompanied by a freeze on the provision of family housing for africans in the Cape Peninsula. The Coloured Labour Preference zone was extended eastwards yet again to the so-called Kat-Fish Line. It now included all Cape districts west of the Ciskei.

A spate of removals immediately followed the introduction of these measures. Not only were large numbers of individuals endorsed out of the Western Cape, but whole communities from small Cape towns such as Middelburg, Burgersdorp, Caledberg, Cookhouse, Credock and Moltano were uprooted. The resettlement sites of Sade and Dimbaza owe their very existence to these removals. Many people also went to Mdantsane.

During the seventies the Coloured Labour Preference policy passed through several subtle changes. At the end of the decade whole new areas were cleared out then from Hofmeyr and Nieuport. Now it would seem that, barring action against squatter communities, this side of the policy has been abandoned. It also seems that the attempt to remove the african population by 5% per annum has been shelved. This part of the scheme seems ultimately at removing all africans from the region, but giving it up did not mean at all that the policy in its entirety had been scrapped. On the contrary, some aspects of the policy have been enforced with even greater enthusiasm in the area west of the 1963 Eiselein Line, and particularly those relating to the allocation of land and provision of housing. The effect of these changes is that recently people have been forced out of the area through intensified economic pressures rather than crude GG removals.

The efflux from rural areas is fairly apparent from census material. We have already mentioned that employment of africans in Cape agriculture declined in the years 1972 - 75 whereas that of coloureds increased, and that this must at least in part be due to coloured labour preference. A glance at rural population growth rates for coloureds and africans reveals a similar pattern. In virtually all rural districts the african population either decreased at a faster rate than the coloured one or, where there was positive population growth, increased at a slower rate. Furthermore, the divergence in population growth rates was more and more pronounced the further westward the district. Altogether these observations suggest that the Coloured Labour Preference policy definitely accelerated the depopulation of the rural parts of the Western and Central Cape.

It is more difficult to gauge the urban areas in the Western and Central Cape region. An adequate set of employment figures for both africans and coloureds in all the urban areas is not available. The figures cited earlier suggest that coloured labour preference may well have adversely affected the employment opportunities for africans, but not to anything approximating the picture planned for the state. We can get a somewhat fuller picture of this if we look at the employment trends. In the urban areas of the interior parts of the Central and Western Cape, the growth of the coloured population was on the whole markedly higher than the african population's, and both rates were below the average national growth rates for each group. This seems to imply that coloured migration and the consequent limitations to the coloured labour force were such as to prevent an effective implementation of colour labour preference. Thus, although the policy may have made a small contribution to the efflux of africans from these areas, the main reason for this was simply the stagnation of the economies concerned. On the other hand, in coastal towns the coloured population grew fairly rapidly through the seventies (e.g. George 3,8; Knysna 6,0; Mossel Bay 5,5), no doubt primarily in response to the decentralisation incentives for employers of coloured labour, whereas the african population either decreased or hardly increased at all. In these urban areas the Coloured Labour Preference policy most certainly had a significant impact. The same holds for the Cape Town metropolitan area. Its african population has increased quite rapidly, but there is general agreement that it could have absorbed many more people if it were not for the discrimination against africans in matters of employment and housing.

This discrimination and the stringency of influx control generally has had two other main consequences:

Firstly, an exceptionally large number of people have been forced to enter Cape Town illegally, and as a result the area has been subjected to a mass of expulsions under the pass laws. The recent removal of the Nyanga Bush squatters is just the tip of the iceberg. The removals have been continually going on, with new people always ready to replace the ejected ones. Often the same person goes through the process several times.

Secondly, the fact that migrant workers here stand at the end of the job queue to a far greater extent than elsewhere means that fluctuations in Cape Town's economic conditions strongly
influence the number of migrants in the area. Both these migration flows are clearly of an oscillating type and hence do not show up in census figures. All we know is that many thousands have been involved. Unfortunately it is impossible to say how many people have been resettled in the Ciskei or Transkei from the Western and Central Cape through the Colourised Labour Preference policy, because one cannot distinguish between the effects of this policy and other political and economic pressures.*

We do not know where people went on leaving a particular area, or for that matter where those entering an area came from. It is known that some of the recent settlers in Mdantsane are from the Western Cape. We also came across some recent arrivals from the Western Cape in Dimbaza and Sada. But obviously people must have gone to other places as well.

The Colourised Labour Preference policy does not seem to have such a clear role in the Eastern Cape. No detailed information is available, but in 1971 the policy was somewhat relaxed in this region and in 1978 Port Elisabeth was altogether excluded from its provisions. This could suggest that it never really got off the ground in the Eastern Cape, presumably because of the relatively small coloured population here.

2.3.8 Political removals

The largest group of political refugees in the Ciskei - whom one can say were removed by pressures arising from State action - were those flooding out of Herschel and Glen Grey in 1977. The official total was 32,000, but this figure is probably too low. Chief Malema put it at 32,000 in mid-1977, with another 8,000 still on the way from Herschel. Two months later, two Ciskei ministers (Depts of Health and the Interior) talked of 43,000 at the Thornhill site alone, with small groups still arriving daily. The Secretary for Agriculture in the Ciskei, Mr Gary Godden, put the figure at 50,000 including 10,000 extra people from 'white' South Africa. This is very close to the 51,429 which the local magistrate gave as the influx from Glen Grey, Herschel, Alitwil North, Burgersdorp and Rootpoort (in response to a church enquiry in 1980 recorded in the minutes of the Border Council of Churches).

This was certainly a large proportion of the Herschel and Glen Grey populations. The Ciskei Secretary for the Interior gave this telling information in June 1977 (Charton, 1980, p 165):

That of the Ciskeian registered voters in Herschel prior to 1976, 24% were registered in the Ciskei after resettlement there up to 14 June 1977 (11,067 out of 49,019 voters): and of those in Glen Grey, 18% to the same date (US 432 out of 84,188 voters).

The political pressures evidently came from both sides, Transkei and Ciskei. Both Herschel and Glen Grey had voted overwhelmingly against joining the Transkei - the Glen Grey vote in the 1971 referendum, for instance, was 37,842 to 6,634 in favour of staying in the Ciskei. When these districts were ceded to the Transkei anyway as part of the deal before it 'went independent' in October 1976, the people who had somewhat rashly registered their disapproval knew they had to get out. Matanzima's local men in fact told people to go, according to some of the SFP questionnaires. The Herschel groups were led by Chiefs Hinana, Bebeza and Malefafe, who George Matanzima, in true Chicago style, had taken for a ride with his bodyguards and threatened with firearms.

* At best we can mention our estimate that 42,173 people left the small towns and countryside of the Western and Central Cape during the period, while 28,507 entered the Cape Town metropolitan area.

The refugees were also lured by Sebe. Chief Mabandla and others implied that he did so at least partly to get extra support for his political party, the CNIP (Ciskei National Independence Party). Sebe himself stated that Mr Inkosi coming from Herschel was his supporter and had the three chiefs Hinana, Bebeza and Malefafe in his pocket, which meant four extra votes for the CNIP. It was a significant help in the close contests before Ciskei became a one-party State. Added to this, the extra thousands of people enabled Sebe to argue the need for another chief in Zweledinga. On the basis of now having 33 chiefs in the Ciskei, and that there had to be two-thirds that number of elected members of the Assembly, two more members were added. (Ciskei Debates, v 9 (1977), pp 327-38)

Sebe could count on support from the newcomers. They were firmly guided by their refugee leadership whose political consciousness was limited to blind loyalty to the Ciskei regime, supplemented by the conviction that the Matanzima brothers would never forgive them. But he did also draw them with promises of what Chief Mabandla called 'milk and honey'. Busloads from the two districts were driven around the still prosperous white farms in Hwum to show these people how much better these parts of the northern Ciskei looked than Herschel and Glen Grey. Each touring group was led to believe they would inherit a whole farm themselves.

The appalling lack of preparation which greeted the refugees was followed by a rapid deterioration in their condition as more and more people arrived and any compensation money ran out. Even Sebe was moved to clear his image by protest at conditions at Thornhill farm:

'It is a big joke to think that over 40,000 people can be accommodated on 8,000 hectares of land. (GB, 22.01.77)

The overcrowding included the presence of 40,000 head of small stock in the early days. From the first it had been a disaster area, when the first 2,000 arrived in the bitter cold of July 1976. All people had been tents and later on some zinc huts, or the shelters they contrived for themselves out of bushes and mud and bits of plastic. Even with the pasting months, no basic needs were being met. There was no food and the water was almost non-existent. Water was critically short: milk and bread were rationed. There were no litters for the calves. Some of the women were said to be intellectually damaged by their experience. They were afraid of water, even in the dry season. They would not drink from the dam, for instance. They did not understand that it was clean. Water was collected from nearby streams.

Measles and typhoid added to the crisis. There was no sanitation. Many children died. There was no medical help, as the hospitals in Zweledinga, at Bushy Park, and at the other settlements were full. A whole family might be housed in a single flimsy room...
2.3.9 Betterment removals

Betterment schemes date back to 1936 in spirit, to the creation of the SA Trust. They really got going with the Tomlinson Commission of 1956 which suggested, among other things, means whereby bantustan agriculture could be made more viable. These schemes entail people being moved only very short distances, but betterment has probably removed more people in more places with greater social consequences and provoking more resistance than any other category of forced removal in South Africa. (See Yewitch, 1982.)

The idea behind betterment schemes is simply that unplanned land use lowers the agricultural productivity of an area, and that scattered homesteads should be replaced by closer settlement villages surrounded by rigidly demarcated arable and pastoral zones. Calculations are made of the optimum carrying capacity of the land, and ideally excess people and cattle should be removed leaving the rest of the people as prosperous peasants. The Tomlinson Commission also advised the creation of industrial employment opportunities for the evicted people in the bantustans.

In practice, though, betterment has amounted to little more than the culling of cattle, the consolidation of homesteads and a re-allocation of a reduced arable land area among the people. Both the available grazing and - more important - the unused land area were expanded at the expense of the arable component. On the whole the surplus population successfully resisted the attempts of the SA Trust to move them off the land altogether. Certainly no jobs were created for them, nor did a viable class of peasants emerge. De Wet (1980) in a study of a betterment scheme in the Ketsekammahoek district concludes that the condition of most people deteriorated as a result of betterment and that

in real terms the betterment scheme has drastically reduced the amount of land available for cultivation (however poor it may previously have been). By implication this has rendered the people even more dependent on migrant labour than they may have been before. (p 12)

The programme as conceived by Tomlinson may have had some justification, but since a main point of the plan - i.e., significant industrial development in the area - was never taken seriously, it has made betterment as nightmarishly illogical as a Kafka novel. To most of the people concerned it represents a totally inexplicable, oppressive bit of intervention by officialdom which has disrupted their life and left them materially poorer.

Unfortunately no figures are available for those moved in the Ciskei by 'the Trust', as it is known. But it would seem that most of the rural areas have been 'bettered'.

The irrigation schemes being developed by the Ciskeian authorities are rather like betterment schemes in their effect on people and land allocation. Whatever the agricultural virtues, they do involve moving people off land and a loss of land for some people. For example, the Tyefu irrigation scheme set up by LTA is divided into three parts:

(a) the misleadingly named tribal farms, which are in fact farmed by LTA 'to meet the costs of competent management and to generate profits to be used for community development farms'
(b) 4 ha 'commercial farms' allocated to men 'selected through the traditional channels', which in this case means the Sebe government
(c) ¾ ha 'food plots' going to the people who were expelled from their land to make way for
2.4 TRANSKEI RESETTLEMENT

2.4.1 Introduction

As the SPP has carried out no fieldwork in the Transkei, we are unable to make a definitive statement on relocation in that area. Early in the project, the Eastern Cape group decided to concentrate on the Ciskei, as there had been a large number of forced removals to that area, while the Transkei authorities have, with a couple of well publicised exceptions, refused to accept people moved en masse. They have had less success with the thousands of people endorsed out of the urban areas and sent 'home' to the territory every year. This short section on relocation and the Transkei is intended only to point out certain trends, to emphasise the need for further research and to highlight the close relationship between South Africa and its progeny.

2.4.2 Resettlement camps

Ilinge was one of the three notorious camps - the others were Sasa and Dimbaza - exposed in the 1960s for their lack of facilities and appalling conditions. It lies in a bleak valley in the Glen Grey district, 18 km east of Queenstown, and when Cosmas Desmond visited it in May 1968, he estimated that there were 1000 houses there. Ten years later there were about double that number, and the camp is still expanding.

There are four types of housing at Ilinge. The majority of the houses are the original one-room brick units with an extra tin room added to the back. There are also newer standard 'location' type houses, two rows of attached rooms for workers at Ilinge's handicraft factory, and a few large multi-roomed houses belonging to shop owners and officials.

In 1973 the population of the settlement was estimated at about 12,000 people. (SAIRR Survey 1973, p.164) Most of them had been evicted from 1962 onwards from farms or endorsed out of urban areas such as Uitenhage, Colesberg, Oredok, Cathcart, Molteno, Queenstown, Jamestown, and from the Western Cape, particularly Cape Town. Many men returned to the jobs they had held before, but this time as migrant workers, leaving their families in Ilinge. Some 40 former political prisoners, mainly members of the banned ANC from Port Elizabeth, had been virtually exiled to Ilinge, according to reports in 1969.

Problems then were much the same as they are now - lack of fuel, no land for ploughing or grazing, extreme cold in winter and heat in summer, with the biggest problem being the lack of employment. One young man interviewed recently had managed to find work on the Kaiskamahoba dam site. He was lucky, as there are already thousands of unemployed people in the Kaiskamahobo area. About 300 handicapped people are employed in making handicrafts such as mats in a factory at Ilinge itself.

There are six schools at Ilinge, and a clinic which was built in 1968 and costs 20c a visit. There is a post office, a police station, a couple of shops (including a bottle store) and three churches. The bus fare to Queenstown was 70c each way in 1968.

When the Herschel and Glen Grey districts, formerly part of the Ciskei, were included in the Transkei in 1976, some Ilinge residents moved to camps in the Ciskei's Whittlesea area such as Zweledinga and Oxton (see Section 2.5.4 above).

Similar to Ilinge, but smaller, is the settlement of Onjefontein on the outskirts of Herschel village. This consists of about 190 tin huts occupied by people moved from white farms in the OFS and NE Cape in the late 1960s. All of these houses have tin latrines. Residents draw water from a tank in Herschel. Apparently they applied in the late 1970s to be given arable land but were told there was none available.

2.4.3 Urban relocation

At one stage the South African government planned to abolish the Queenstown location, Muungisi, and move the people a few kilometres to the newly built eZibeleni, from where they would commute to Queenstown. eZibeleni lies just within Glen Grey, though, and when that district was ceded to Transkei it became obvious that a community largely defined as Ciskeian could not be forced to go there. The plan was therefore abandoned. Some people from Muungisi who had already been moved to eZibeleni elected to stay. The place has become an industrial growth point, and people hope for jobs there. But people could freely choose to return to Muungisi, and some have done so.

A large number of Transkeian migrants live in East London's Duncan Village (described in more detail in Sections 2.4.3 and 3.2 below), the residents of which are gradually being moved to Mdantsane, in the Ciskei. However, the Transkei government wants the African population of Duncan Village to remain outside the Ciskei, because this residential area also serves a considerable number of Transkeian migrants. Transkeians there have been removed to Mdantsane along with Ciskeians as one area of Duncan Village after another is cleared.

According to the Daily Dispatch (4.01.82), in March 1982 Transkeian authorities expressed 'extreme displeasure' to the South African government through diplomatic channels when Transkeians were arrested for illegal residence in Duncan Village. The Transkei Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Mutuzile Luthuli, said that while Transkei could not interfere in South Africa's internal affairs, if it decided to 're-establish a place ... we have to look after the interests of our nationals. We object most strongly to our nationals being forced to live in another state either by compulsion or by implication, and we will take the strongest possible action if this is to happen'. (BD) Former MP and TNIP activist Mr J J Masotle is resident in Duncan Village, and is fighting its demolition. Becking for the Transkei stand has also come from the East London city council. However, Koornhof and Morrison made it clear in 1992 that Duncan Village would not be given a reprieve.
2.4.4 Influx control

As has been mentioned, thousands of people are endorsed out of the urban areas every year and sent to the Transkei. They arrive in ones and twos and are either absorbed into tribal villages or, desperate for work, make their way back to the urban areas. In the late 1970s, the South African authorities began to demolish the large squatter camps - Modderdam, Ubhele and Wergenoet - on the outskirts of Cape Town, and tried to disperse the inhabitants to their 'homelands'. Few went. In October 1977 the press reported Transkeli's refusal to accept the squatters, and in January 1978, when South African officials claimed that there had been consultation on the issue, the Transkei ambassador, Prof M Njimsane, denied that any agreement had been reached.

Next in line for demolition was Crossroads, where in 1979 the Transkei authorities again blocked attempts to acceptists' squatter families saying that although they were given a list of 3 000 families, only 20% of them were found to have any links with the Transkei. (See, 2.11.79) The year before, the South African government had planned to move Crossroads people to Bridge Farm in the Bolton-Gwetry area where the South African Bantu (now Development Trust had bought 20 farms for future consolidation into Transkei. The farms were to be handed over six months later, one full of relocated squatters, Kaiser Matanzima, who had been given a farm in the area by the South African government, was aggrieved, and demanded a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr P J Botha. An agreement was reached that Transkei would be consulted over land later to be transferred to the territory.

Meanwhile, back in the Western Cape, after a prolonged campaign to save the Crossroads community, a final position was reached which actually intensified influx control but which in the short term meant that most of the Crossroads people would remain, not without complications, in Cape Town. (See SPF v 3.) Plans for mass relocation were therefore no longer needed for this group.

2.4.5 The Nyanga Bush deportations

Between August and December 1981, the South African authorities used Section 40 (5) of the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act 59 of 1972 to deport to the Transkei thousands of people arrested at the Nyanga Bush camp near Crossroads. (See SPF v 3 for details.) While Transkei authorities protested, and claimed no part in the deportations, they were powerless to refuse to accept the people.

Mr Colin Eglin, PFP member of parliament for Sea Point, said the dumping of Transkeians who had squatted at Nyanga was in conflict with the Status of Transkei Act which gave Transkeians the right to enter South Africa. (Star, 25.08.81) A large part of the protest which followed the maladministration and deportation of the squatters centred around numbers of children left in Cape Town when their parents were deported. Responding to a parliamentary question (PQ 25, of 7.10.81), the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Botha, said that 10 deported mothers had left children in Cape Town and that they, together with 40 others whose children might have been left, were to be transported from Umtata to Cape Town at State expense. He went on to say:

After all the arrangements had been made and the bus was ready to leave, spokesmen of the crowd assembled there, claiming to speak for the women also, (and) rejected the use of the bus. The crowd thereupon demanded that the whole group of five hundred who had been removed from Cape Town and were still in Umtata should be taken back.

2.4.6 Land consolidation & black spots

A dispute over the acquisition of more land for the Transkei was supposedly the main reason for the territory breaking off diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1978. Chief Matanzima said in 1976 that 'We want to be free but will continue to press for land to be transferred to Transkei from South Africa'. (To the Point, 21.04.78) According to the Daily Dispatch (9.03.77), the Transkei claimed Elliot, Maclear, Kokstad, Harding, various farms in the Cedara area, Matsielo, Mount Currie and parts of Port Shepstone. Transkei has also proposed amalgamation with Ciskei to form 'one Khoese nation' but Chief Sebe has consistently refused to participate in the debate.

Removal of black spots and 'badly situated areas' has not been a major issue for Transkei. At the beginning of 1982 there were eight black spots under threat of removal in the 'White Corridor' between Transkei and Ciskei, but, as is explained elsewhere in this report, these are due to go, or have gone, to the Ciskei.

2.4.7 Betterment planning *

Although the Transkei authorities have resisted mass removals of the sort so common in the Ciskei, and have waxed indignant over issues such as Duncan Village and the Western Cape squatters, they have had no qualms about implementing forced removals within their own territory.

* This section is heavily indebted to an article by Prof M C O'Connell, 'Resettlement and development in Transkei', Africa Insight, v 1, 1, 1981.
The type of internal relocation which perhaps affects most people in the Transkei is betterment planning. Betterment is a general term for agricultural development in the territory. We have touched on the subject in Section 2.3.9 above, but to repeat: the programme is designed to arrest and reverse the destruction of natural resources, improve agricultural production, and raise the standard of living in the rural areas. It is said that betterment will reduce the rate of labour migration and that it will allow a family to feed its family and earn an income through agricultural production. However, the forced resettlement which forms an integral part of betterment schemes - the consolidation of scattered homesteads into small, compact villages surrounded by clearly defined grazing and arable land - and the accompanying loss of privacy and distortion of kinship and neighbourhood relationships, has led to determined resistance. In 1971 residents of the Pepene area of Brookesek formed an association called the Anti-Soil Conservation Scheme Section of Brookesek which, in the same year, threatened to kill officials or local residents who supported the government's betterment scheme. From then on, agricultural officers operating in the area were accompanied by escorts of armed South African police. At Joxana, in the Henschel district, where betterment planning began in the early 1960s, people cut the fences as soon as they were erected, saying that once the land was fenced it was not theirs. Eventually police were sent to guard the fences, and one man was allegedly shot by them when the people attacked the police. In another area, people burnt the house of a headman who refused to oppose the betterment schemes.

A study by Transkei anthropologist Prof M C O'Connell of a betterment scheme at Nqongela, near Mount Ayilif, indicated that the disruption of pre-betterment social relationships had led to a marked increase in crimes such as rape and burglary, and the incidence of adultery. The study also showed that although betterment was intended to reduce migration, during the 19 years between the time that Nqongela was resettled and the study was done in 1979 migration had increased steadily: between May and June of 1977 over half of all men between the ages of 18 and 65 were absent from Nqongela. Said Prof O'Connell: 'It is not just the increase in migration and the corresponding drop in agricultural production that force one to rethink betterment. It is also the general discontent, decline in morality, and other social problems which indicate a decline in the quality of life - both in the economic and in the spiritual sense... Betterment might conceivably work if it is implemented only with the peoples' consent. Forcing betterment on Nqongela has caused resentment... The people of Nqongela, like people everywhere, should have a right to choose their own life-style.'

2.4.10 Banishment & deportation

Tribal authorities control access to resources at the local level and therefore have total control over almost every aspect of people's lives, including the most important: access to land and its corollary, survival. The right to allocate and withdraw land defines security of tenure, and is a highly efficient means of maintaining real power over the people. A common punishment for those who dare to challenge those authorities is another form of relocation - banishment. In terms of the territory's emergency regulations, the authorities have complete power to move anyone, anywhere, at any time. A whole location - Mpek - was once moved because the residents were supporters of Chief Sebenza Dlindulwana, King of the Thembus and a long-standing opponent of the Matanzimas and of the bentustan policy.

The authorities even have the power to deport their own citizens, as Mr Marcus Ngati, a reporter for the newspaper Post, discovered, when he was thrown out of the territory in 1980. (Streak & Wicksteed, 1981, p 353)

2.4.8 Infrastructural relocation

People have been dispossessed of their land and forced to move elsewhere to make way for projects including a tea plantation in Pondoland, an irrigation project near Gamata and a couple of other schemes, one of them near Kaiser Matanzima's farm. Most of the schemes have failed, causing even deeper resentment.

2.4.9 Squatter demolitions

On July 12, 1978 the Daily Dispatch reported that 40 shanties were demolished on the outskirts of Umtata, and that no alternative accommodation had been provided. 'The squatters were given notice to move out two weeks ago,' Umtata's town clerk, Mr J Sacke, told the press.
2.5 GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES

2.5.1 The attitude of the Ciskei

Mass resettlement in the Ciskei undoubtedly originates with the South African government (except in the cases of betterment schemes and political exiles). It is the South African government which evicts people from the prescribed white areas and has forced them directly or indirectly onto land controlled by the SA Development Trust. It is only when the Trust land is already packed with resettled people that it is handed over as the future responsibility of the Ciskei government.

The official stand of the Ciskei authorities is clear. According to President Lennox Sebe (speaking then as Chief Minister):

"We do not support resettlement, but if resettlement is to take place then the Republican Government is responsible to see that its policy is carried out, but once these people are settled in the Ciskei, they are not stones, they are people, and for humanitarian reasons we have to give assistance to them, not that as some say we encourage resettlement. (Ciskei Legislative Assembly Debates, v 11 (1979), p 62)"

Ciskei ministers wax eloquent on the subject. Vice-President Xabe once said, "If they (the whites) remain so cruel to us they will leave the country in their pyamas.... These farmers have been made rich by our people, they suck out their blood, and now they throw them away like a dead thing." The bantustan leaders use the resettlement programme to back up their demands for more land and more money.

Sebe has called resettlement the factor causing the greatest friction between the Ciskei and the Pretoria government. There is no reason to believe that he was not telling the truth. The Ciskei wants the land held by the Development Trust, but it does not want to receive it already swarming with uprooted and destitute people. And yet the Ciskei authorities cannot be exonerated from their share of the responsibility.

Privately, the Ciskei authorities have been somewhat less than humanitarian. Sebe commented that tents would be good enough for the Wooldridge people (moved at the Ciskei's own instigation!) and that they did not need rations. (See Kamaskraal case study in Part 3 below.)

Moreover, surprising as it may sound, resettlement offers distinct short-term advantages to some individuals. Minister Njongeni used the plight of the landless to expand his local influence in Peddie district, and actually asked that Kamaskraal be sited near his bottleshop. Chiefs and headmen aresalaryed according to the number of people subject to their authority (apart from the usual unofficial kickbacks). Sebe himself has benefited in this way. In addition to supplying him with the chief title to a non-existent chieftain, the Pretoria government also supplied Sebe with land for his chiefly domain (the Trust farms along the Mount Coke road), and subjects in the form of the evicted farm labourers resettled at Ndevale. He has visited "his people" once in four years. But far more serious for the resettled people is the policy of agricultural development pursued by the Ciskei. Instead of pursuing a broad-based approach attempting to uplift the Ciskei population as a whole, the authorities have chosen to follow "a highly focussed approach which selects a few promising areas where a fully modern agricultural system is introduced under the umbrella of a comprehensively managed scheme". (Quail, p 72) This is probably in the interest of the Ciskei GNP and definitely in the interests of Loxton Hunting, an engineering firm specializing in agricultural projects which is managing the giant Tyafu irrigation scheme and is said to have the ear of the Ciskei authorities. The Ciskei participation in such projects will be limited to a small number of 'progressive farmers' - a euphemism for a group which will be, at worst, favourites of the Sebe clique, and at best a kulak support group for the Ciskei status quo. It is a major preoccupation of the Ciskei authorities that as much land as possible, including all the best land, should go to the big schemes, and as little as possible be wasted on the resettled people. It is clear that the pattern of the Tyafu irrigation scheme is being repeated in the newly released areas: at least half under the direct management of the (South African-based) commercial company setting up the project; a kickback for "progressive farmers" (friends of the Sebe regime), with a small residue for the remainder (who will be available to work as labourers for a few pence a day). Let us take for example the 55 000 ha of white farmland handed over to the Ciskei in 1979. It was to be 'developed under economic agriculture with meaningful participation by uneducated Ciskei farmers'. Some of the land was to be handed over to the local 'Tribal Authorities' but not too much since there is a good chance that they would "squander and fragment the land to utter uselessness" (i.e. use it for subsistence, not for commercial agriculture). Sebe's notion of economic development helps to explain his apparently erratic behaviour with regard to resettlement. For Sebe is capable of sudden outbreaks of energy on the resettlement question, which contrast sharply with his usual apathy and seeming complaisance. For example, he successfully blocked the attempt by Pretoria to settle evicted Cathcart farmers on Farm D in Middledrift (then earmarked for development under Page's National Plan for the Ciskei). People are not allowed to build at places such as Kamaskraal where the Ciskei authorities planned moving them again. The whole camp at Glenmore is to be moved because Sebe wants the area for Tyafu. Rather than put up an adamant front against resettlement, Sebe as a pragmatist politician tried to get the best deal possible for the Ciskei regime, which should not be confused with the Ciskei people, much less the resettled people. There can be no doubt that Sebe accepted the eviction of Herschel and Glen Grey to Tshukela: that he accepted the creation of camps in the Whittlesea area to house the refugees (though, to be fair, he did not think there would be quite so many); and finally, that he did this as a deal with the Pretoria government in exchange for the purchase of the 55 000 ha of white farmland for the Ciskei. Now Kwelele, Mowali and the other "awkwardly situated Bantu areas" are due to be moved, Sebe and Jongilanga are playing a major role in ensuring compliance. People in these communities suspect that Sebe has sold them out in a deal (possibly connected with the transfer of the fertile Kat River valley still due to be bought out).

Finally the Ciskei authorities bear a heavy burden of guilt with respect to compelling the obedience of the resettled people. The wretched camps at Gobitolo, Welcomewood and Twee Tawels (King William's Town district) are surrounded by empty land owned by the Ciskei or the Development Trust. The people believe that they will be allocated plots once the land is surveyed. The chances are that they will stay where they are, and that commercial agriculture will take over. Meanwhile, the released land is patrolled by mounted police and rangers to keep the people and their stock out of the empty land. Sebe has announced that 'quarantined communities with herds of livestock' will be removed by force from South Peddie - presumably in the
say that it is not from my doing that those promises were not kept’ - as if this excused anything), reposted:

I am sure that, out of the 3,6 million rand that I have been allocated, assistance for the purpose which the Honourable Chief mentioned should also be available.

But is this correct? In the list Koornhof gave, there is only R32 000 of the tribal authorities’ discretionary money which might possibly go to the people themselves. The South African government deludes itself that it rectifies the situation by spending a large sum of money, just as the Ciskei deludes itself that by increasing the Ciskeian GNP LTA-style, it uplifts the people forcibly resident in Ciskei. New clinics, new schools, new Tribal Offices, new buildings of any kind, cannot benefit people without shelter dying of cold. An irrigation scheme has been started at Sasa: surely it would be better to resettle people where irrigation exists rather than attempt to irrigate existing resettlement camps. All the clinics in the world cannot cure the diseases of malnutrition which could easily have been prevented simply by allowing the people to stay in their homes. The South African government cannot alleviate resettlement evils, because they have caused the resettlement of which all the evils are only symptoms.

2.5.2 Reactions of the South African government

The South African government’s political and economic imperatives drive on its continuing programme of resettlement, but it does not have a vested interest in the continuing suffering of the resettled people. Moreover, it is sensitive to the tremendous damage resettlement is doing to its overseas image, particularly in its present virulently phase.

Quite typically, its immediate response is to try and suppress all information concerning resettlement camps, to bar people and publications from airing the issue, to deny access to resettled people. Secondly, however, it realises that something must be done for propagandistic and, possibly, humanitarian reasons. Clearly an effort has been made during the resettlement campaign of the late 1970s not to repeat the debacles of the Limehill - Dimbaza era. Sites are much better prepared to receive the resettled people. Glenmore, for example, was intended to be a model city: people were supposed to want to go there. The appalling conditions at Thornhill and Zweledings (which are said to have elicited a tear from Koornhof) motivated Pretoria to fork out a massive R104 m for these two areas. It is worth looking at this in some detail, since it demonstrates the inscrutable fallacy of South Africa’s position.

The R3 600 000 in the first year (1980/81) was made up mainly as follows:

- Clinics 120 000
- Health (5 Type 2 clinics, 2 mobile TB units (7 vehicles) 425 000
- Tribal administration incl. office bldg 252 000
- Classrooms 210 000
- Infrastructure, drinking water etc 650 000
- Development of Ntshethembu 1 789 000

This allocation was announced in 1980, four years after the influx of resettlement. Shortly after Koornhof announced it, Chief Malelane of Thornhill spoke, saying:

Now, because of all the promises that were made - that is why these people moved over to the Ciskei - and for four years none of these promises have been fulfilled... There is no shelter for many people, no work, no water; people are not yet resettled. They do not even have poles to put mud around to make some sort of shelter, and another winter is here. ([Ciskei Legislative Assembly Debates, v 14 (1980), pp 524-8])

Koornhof, after first exculpating himself (‘I was not around four years ago so I can honestly
2.6 FUTURE RESETTLEMENT

2.6.1 Farm & squatter removals to Ciskei

Incredible though it may seem, an acceleration in the rate of rural removals to the Ciskei may be expected during the 1980s.

Despite the vast emigration in the 1970s, the African population in the white rural areas who are surplus to the labour needs of agriculture is larger now than a decade ago. The table below illustrates the point.

Table 1 RURAL POPULATION AND AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>African farm pop.</th>
<th>Regular farm employ</th>
<th>Dependency rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Corridor</td>
<td>93 639</td>
<td>80 383</td>
<td>13 377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(excl. black spots)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Eastern Cape</td>
<td>245 326</td>
<td>224 888</td>
<td>35 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Cape</td>
<td>41 736</td>
<td>27 728</td>
<td>5 912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>48 260</td>
<td>39 387</td>
<td>18 002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although this table should be treated with caution, because the estimates of agricultural employment are based on the 1972/73 trends, the general picture conveyed by it is certainly correct.

In the Central and Western Cape there is an increase, but it is only a marginal one, in the number of the dependants of regular farm workers who live on the farms with them. Rather, the emigration pattern of the rural population seems to have been fairly closely linked to the level of employment in agriculture. This relationship is strongly reinforced by certain aspects of the coloured labour preference policy and will moreover persist in the future as well. Thus the movement from the rural areas of the Central and Western Cape will depend on conditions in agriculture. Whether total African and coloured agricultural employment in the area will fall even further is not clear. Nor do we know if there is additional scope for substituting coloured for African farm labour. But at least it seems highly unlikely that African employment in agriculture will increase. Thus any net increases in the African population due to natural growth will be forced to move. However this figure is unlikely to be large because many farmers rely on migrant workers, especially in the Western Cape where the coloured labour preference policy is actively enforced, and so most of the population increases associated with the farm workers occur in the reserves where their families are based.

Here it is perhaps also worth mentioning that the State may in future try to enforce the migrant labour classes of the coloured labour preference policy on farms in the Central Cape. An aspect of this policy aims at turning settled African farm labour into migrant labour and removing the families involved to the reserves. It is clear from the above table that this has not yet occurred in the Central Cape, and it is doubtful that it ever will. But the 20 000 people concerned cannot be certain.

In the Eastern Cape the experiences of the past decade have been very different. Employment in agriculture has decreased at a much faster rate than the population, and hence the number of farm people per fulltime wage-earner has risen from 7 to 9.4 in the East London/Queenstown corridor and from 7 to 8.6 in the rest of the Eastern Cape. To some extent this simply reflects an increase in the average household size as a result of a relative influx of children from urban areas. But the main cause is the presence in the area of a large number of families without any member in fulltime agricultural employment - in other words, people who are surplus to the labour needs of agriculture. Assuming that the average household size equalled 7 throughout the past decade, the rural surplus population in the Eastern Cape was calculated to have grown to some 60 000 by 1980. This figure falls to 50 000 if we allow for shifts in household composition.

The exact residential status of this surplus farm population has unfortunately not been investigated in any detail. Some people live in dense squatter settlements on parts of white-owned farms. For example, ECAB estimates that there are about 3 000 squatters in the Addo and Coega areas still. (ECAB, 24.06.79) There are also some squatters on five farms in the Sundays River valley. They pay R4 per month for the right to stay on the properties. (UPPE, 27.01.79) On the other side of the Ciskei, a hostile farmer estimated that the Stutterheim/Kubus area alone housed 4 475 squatters. All these communities are obviously highly susceptible to removal. There is considerable official concern about the extent of squatting, for instance in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage area. In early 1979 the Dors Divisional Council started an investigation into squatting on the land of absentee owners in the area.

In addition, a large number of squatters reside on farms in a relatively inconspicuous fashion. Many farmers have a policy of extending residential rights to a few families over and above those who are engaged in fulltime labour on their farms, provided that at least one member of each family is available for casual labour services when required. The other working members of these households are free to find employment elsewhere. There are also many farmers who allow the extended families of farm workers to live on their properties. Though this particular category of surplus people has the consent of farmers to be in the white rural areas, in effect it constitutes a squatter population albeit of a dispersed and covert type. The law certainly recognises them as such and provides for their elimination. Whether the State will, given the difficulties of enforcement, act against them effectively in the near future, is of course another matter. Nevertheless they are under threat of removal.

The existing surplus population will moreover expand during the 1980s. Although we cannot be sure that employment in agriculture in the Eastern Cape will continue to decline, there are indications that the agricultural labour force has not yet reached a stable state. It will not increase in any case. This implies that at least 50 000 people, a number equivalent to the net natural growth of the rural population, will become marginal to the needs of the rural economy in the area in the current decade.
The total number of people who will thus come under a threat of removal from farm lands during the 1980s in the Cape is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing surplus population</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging surplus: Eastern Cape</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western and Central Cape</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For many of those the threat will become a reality. The pattern of their resettlement will be similar to that seen in the 70s. There will be many farmer-initiated evictions. Others will move of their own accord. Still others will go through a GG-style removal. One way or another, almost all who go will end up in either of the already overcrowded Xhosas bantustans. Most will simply go there immediately, but some will join squatter settlements within a reasonable distance of some town in the hope of finding employment. But these squatter settlements are high-risk territory anyway. With the aid of the new Admission Act, ECAB can deport squatters forthwith to the Ciskei or Transkei, and will do so. Only a select few might be absorbed into new township developments such as Motherwell near Port Elizabeth. In short, we have every reason to expect a ruthless and dedicated continuation in the policy of forcing the rural surplus population into the bantustans. (This shows up clearly in the Stutterheim Mlungisi case below.)

Finally we should mention the contemplated controls over working conditions on farms, through minimum wages etc. If they are implemented, these may also have a significant impact on rural resettlement. Necessary though improvements are in farm working conditions, they could induce additional mechanisation and labour rationalisation programmes in capitalist agriculture and thereby swell the ranks of the rural surplus population even further. This may in fact be one of the intentions of the proposed controls. The really ominous part is that they may also be formulated in such a way as to compel farmers to evict the existing marginal population from the rural areas.

Here we should remember that the demographic discontinuities arising from State-induced improvements in farm working conditions are ultimately due to a large extent to the whole system of influx control which has already been responsible for much of the demographic turmoil in the rural areas generally. This system has induced a bad imbalance between the urban/rural distribution of the population and the economy, and it has laid the foundations of the current explosive rebalancing process. The added horror is that the imbalance between demography and economy is now being reproduced between the urban areas and the bantustans.

### 2.6.2 Black spot & homeland consolidation removals

So far, there have been two completed black spot removals in the Eastern Cape, with the Tsitsikama people being moved to Elukhanyweni in 1977/78 and those from Alsetia in the 'White Corridor' moved to Frankfort in mid-1982. This last removal is the first of eleven which have been projected under the euphonious rubric of 'consolidation of the Ciskei'. Their crime is that they are located in this so-called 'White Corridor' which separates the Ciskei from the Transkei. When Ciskei independence was plotted in 1972, the 'Commission for Co-operation' (as it is now described) decided that these 'badly situated black areas' could not be included and that 'they would therefore have to be made white'. More recently, the 1979 Van der Walt Commission into the boundaries of the Ciskei recommended that the white areas of King William's Town, Berlin and the Hogsback should go to the Ciskei and that the 'black spots' should be given up to the Republic. In the event, what has happened is that King William's Town, Berlin and the Hogsback will remain white but the black spots will still be removed.
Ndovena 1981 - sick man

Elukhanyweni 1979
father next to children's bed

Ndovana 1981

Phakamisa 1981
Ndevana 1981 - old woman

Ndevana 1981 - home provided for resettled family

PooLae 1961 - prefabricated housing
Kammaskraal 1982 - widow's home after the move to Peddie

Kammaskraal 1982 - waiting for the GG lorries

Kammaskraal 1982 - moving to Peddie

Kammaskraal 1982 - GG lorry loading up
Mgwali

Mgwali (official population 4 700), about 35 km from Stutterheim, is the most publicised of the threatened areas due to its unique historical associations. It was established on land granted to Tiyo Boga, the first fully ordained Xhosa missionary and great composer of Xhosa hymns, by Sandile, last chief of the independent Rharabe (Ciskei) Xhosa, in the midst of the horrors of the Nongquase cattle-killing of 1856-7. When Sandile was killed in the last Frontier War and his people expelled across the Kei (thus creating the so-called 'White Corridor'), Mgwali mission was permitted to stay on account of its loyalty. Sandile's mother, Suthu, is buried within its confines.

Mgwali is thus representative of a genuine nationalist tradition, of the sort that Sebe purports to maintain. He has not, however, been able to incorporate Mgwali into his bogus Ciskei nationalism (see above) because the Sandile family under the late Paramount Bazindhlovu Sandile (d 1976) always rejected him and ridiculed his claims to chieftainship. The last chief of Mgwali, Dumalithona Mpangule, was a Sandile loyalist, and was consequently detained under R525 for his part in the regency struggle which followed Bazindhlovu's death. He was released after something more than a year in prison and deported to the Transkei. Sebe is said to hold a personal grudge against Mgwali, and this may account for his actions in support of the removal.

Deputy Minister Wentzel visited Mgwali during February 1981, in the wake of the Van der Walt Commission. He seemed sympathetic, and the Mgwali people felt that they had made a positive impression. Imagine their surprise when their Prime Minister, L. E. Sebe, visited them in June 1981 and quite unexpectedly asked them to accept removal 'in principle'. They protested that they did not want to move. Sebe assured them that to agree in both house removals was the same as to agree to move, but when the Mgwali people remained sceptical Sebe turned nasty. With a dramatic disregard for geography, he told them that Mgwali was a gateway for terrorists to enter the Ciskei. Any further objections were met with the question 'Are you a terrorist? Why are you supporting terrorism?' with its clear overtones of detention under R525. Sure enough, in August 1981, six prominent opponents of the removal were detained under R525 and interrogated by Charles Sebe.

The first legal step towards the removal of Mgwali has not yet been taken (July 1982): the titleholders have not yet received notice of their expropriation. But the removal process has already commenced. The people of Mgwali are being conditioned to believe that their removal is inevitable, that there is nothing to be done, that the only possible course of action is to go quietly and hope that they will be rewarded for their obedience. The South African authorities have played a part in this. They have continually affirmed that Mgwali is to be moved.

Unnamed 'men from Cape Town' moved about the settlement in January 1982 numbering houses and counting property and livestock. Then in June three property evaluators from the Department of Co-operation and Development spent two weeks there, again going from site to site. A model of the two-room prefabricated 'plank house' has been displayed outside the headman's offices, and similar plank houses are sprouting like thornbushes at the site in Fraktorp district which the Mgwali people have been told is earmarked for them, and for the people at Wartburg and Alsatia. Now that the Alsatia people have been moved there (June 1982), the other removals are made to look more inevitable.

The sole source of official information to which the Mgwali people have access is the Planning Committee, composed mainly of teachers and civil servants, set up by Sebe after his visit. Opponents of the removal have publicly stated that its members have been promised the well-constructed houses vacated by the former white community of Fraktorp. Members of the Planning Committee assert that they are negotiating with the government to get the 'best deal' for the people of Mgwali. They go off to Pretoria for 'top level discussions' and return, dropping hints but never fully relating what they were told or how they replied. The people know that the question of compensation is under discussion and it is widely believed that if one does not co-operate with the Planning Committee, one will not get compensation. The people are never
told that compensation is their legal right. Indeed, they are never told of their legal rights, and they were discouraged from consulting a lawyer on the grounds that they would 'only be throwing their money away'. The latest rumour sweeping Mgwali is that Mgwali pensions are to be paid at Frankfort, and that persons who do not accept the move to Frankfort will not get their pensions.

The situation is somewhat complicated by divisions within the Mgwali community. There are 152 titles at Mgwali, of which some 100 have been claimed. The only large landholder is the Reformed Presbyterian Church, which decided at its December 1981 synod held in Umtata that it was prepared to sell its land. The core of opposition is among the other landholders and the long-term tenants. The squatters - recent immigrants to Mgwali who have no rights to arable land - have supported the move so far, but they have lately heard that they will not be getting garden plots at Frankfort either, and this may change. One problem is that there is no public discussion of the removal in Mgwali. The Mgwali Residents' Committee, which opposes the move, has not been permitted to hold a meeting, and the Planning Committee closes its meetings at the first awkward question. The opposition has had to keep very quiet to avoid R550, but it seems the authorities are still trying to crush all resistance. The South African security police detained Mr Wilson Fanti, chairman of the Residents' Committee, in July 1982. According to one report, Mr Fanti was deported to Transkei, as a nominal Transkeian. People fighting removal in Mgwali and elsewhere in the 'White Corridor' are in a very delicate position since Ciskei 'went independent' in December 1981, which has made them all technically aliens in South Africa. They can be summarily deported either to the Ciskei or the Transkei.

This will not necessarily stop resistance, especially where there is so much at stake. Unlike Mgwali, which is watered by the perennial Mgwali River, there is no surface water at Frankfort. There is no sign of garden plots at the site of the plank houses, and the white farmers who formerly lived in the area were never able to grow crops. It was rumoured in January that the Mgwali people would have to sell their livestock, though this has not been confirmed. Frankfort is some 40 km from Mgwali, and within the ambit of Zweltsha rather than Stutterheim. The Mgwali people will have to compete with thousands of other resettlement victims for jobs and pensions at Zweltsha instead of making use of the easier facilities at Stutterheim. But this is nothing compared to the loss of their old home. 'You could build me a four-roomed house', said one man, 'and I would still not want to leave the house of my fathers.'

See also Soweto section in Part 4 below.)

WARTBURG

Wartburg (population 3 400) is a Lutheran station, also in the Stutterheim district. Its residents have not yet received any official notification of removal, but they are aware that they will be moved to Frankfort with the Mgwali people. One representative from Wartburg serves on the notorious Mgwali Planning Committee. Other invited residents have refused to join. The people of Wartburg are reported to be very much against removal, and it is rumoured that they chased government officials away from the mission farm in January 1982. (See annexure on p 156 below.)

GOSHEN

Goshen (population 1 200) is about 15 km from Cathcart. It is a Moravian station founded, like Mgwali, in the middle of the cattle-killing. All the residents are landowners and the titeldheads have been carefully preserved. The area is rocky and stony but it is watered all year by the Waguru River, and the community seem prosperous. Several are market gardeners who sell their produce in Cathcart. They are members of the Cathcart Dairy Co-operative to whom they sell their cream. Houses are solidly built out of brick or stone.

Residents have long been aware of the plans for their removal. On 12 December 1981, the
magistrate of Cathcart (who is also the chairman of the Goshen Village Management Board) called the people and told them they would be moved. He was deliberately vague about the date, 'maybe next month, maybe ten or twenty years'. In February he summoned all the people and told them to hand in their title deeds. The people were reluctant, but after three successive visits they were induced to hand them in, in exchange for unstamped revenue receipts. The magistrate told them the title deeds would be returned 'next week', but more than a month later they were still in Pretoria for 'photocopying'. The next report was that the magistrate said it was not possible to photostat all the title deeds because some were 'old and brittle'. He explained that they were in safe-keeping under lock and key in his office. (EPH, 19.04.82) The Goshen people are very alarmed about this. They are scheduled for removal to the new resettlement camp at Whittlesea North, along with the people from Lesseyton and the existing camp at Orton. (See below.)

LESSEYTON

This Methodist station (population 4 500) is about 10 km north of Queensownt. There is a potentially exploitable social division between the 32 titleholders, most of whom live in fine European-style houses, and the rest - called 'squatters' indiscriminately although some are clearly long-term tenants - who live mainly in close-packed mud houses.

Initially the people were told that removal would be voluntary, for those squatters who wanted land of their own. Now it seems they will all be moved. The magistrate at Whittlesea, who administers the area, addressed the people on 15 December 1981 (It is not clear what a Ciskeian official was doing in the Republic after Ciskeian 'independence'). He read them a government notice to the effect that they would be moved, though he did not know when or where. When the people objected, he responded that 'This notice does not require an answer', and left the meeting.

The government plans moving the Lesseyton people to Whittlesea North, to 'compensatory land', Dr Koomhof told Parliament. (EPH, 9.06.82) What this phrase amounts to we do not know.

KWELERHA

This area consists of four villages some 20 km east of East London. Many families have squatted there after the farm evictions of the later 1970s, and the chances are that the population is the official estimate of 4 900. It appears that many residents had some kind of title (they are convinced it was freehold title) until 1959 when they were made to hand in their documents and move into closer settlements under a betterment scheme. They were issued with 'certificates of occupation', without compensation. It is not clear what the legal status of these 'certificates of occupation' is, with regard to expropriation and compensation. One unconfirmed opinion is that Kwelerha was mostly owned by one man who sublet to other families. Papers were taken in in the late 1950s to regularise transfer. (If it is true that there were other freeholders and their papers were confiscated, this would not affect their status as titleholders. They would still need formal notice of expropriation and full compensation for their land.)

The Kwelerha people first heard of the removal in 1975 when the Mdantsane magistrate told a Mrs Rapt that she was wasting her time expanding her shop because they were all going to be moved. In 1980, they heard they were going to be moved to 'Chalumna'. Officials have kept reiterating this with variations: they amount to saying that all those from Kwelerha, Newlands and Mooiplaats are due to go to the Chalumna-Kidd's Beach area about 30 km west of East London.

The chief of Kwelerha is D M Jongilanga, for many years an influential member of the Ciskeian cabinet until his demotion to a junior post in December 1981. People's reaction to the resettlement proposals has been very much channelled through and conditioned by the chief. People trust Jongilanga, and credit him with resisting removal to even more unsuitable locations such as Frankfort and Peddie. Jongilanga has told them that they will not be moved until there is the same provided in the new place as they have already got at the old place. They are therefore to continue improving their land, building dams and so on. The people of one village, Tuba, have built another side onto the school and enlarged the Methodist church, for this reason. Jongilanga has also promised them that they will go straight into proper brick houses, not into temporary accommodation. The people assume that they will be given grazing and arable land, and that they will be allowed to take their livestock.

The Kwelerha people are opposed to removal.

It won't be the same as here, whatever they give us. People were born here.

Hundreds of people in Kwelerha are working on white farms. They will have to move with Chief Jongilanga, and they must be given land.

Some few people without arable land hope they will get land to plough at Chalumna, and so they want to go. But if we have to go, if we have no choice, we must try and get the best we can.

The people of Tuba (one of the four villages) seem aware of the need for unity, and insist that there should be no preferential treatment for individuals: all of them will move, or none. They will insist on a place close to Mdantsane - with the object of making the move more difficult. They intend making an independent assessment of their property for compensation. They do not believe that the new facilities they are promised will equal the ones they are to lose. (See also Stop Press section in Part 4 below.)

MOOIPLAATS

This is a large area with an official population of 12 600 under tribal trust immediately west of the Kei River in the southern end of the 'White Corridor'. They also come under Chief Jongilanga and are due to be moved to Chalumna-Kidd's Beach west of East London along with his other people from Kwelerha and Newlands. (EPH, 9.06.82)

KWENKURHA

The Kwenukura area lies between Kwelerha and Mooiplaats (population is included under Mooiplaats) and it is made up of land purchased by the SA Native Trust under the 1936 Act after 1940. One headman here said the people had heard nothing about moving, and would not want to leave. Quite a few people here had already been moved from other places - for example, the settlement of Soto began in 1958 when people were sent there from nearby farms. There are about 300 families in Soto now, and the place has over the years grown to feel quite settled.

NEWLANDS

The official population is officially 6 900, but the real figure is probably much higher because this old Anglican mission (estd. 1858) is in a very popular area, just on the other side of the national road past Mdantsane. This community also falls under Chief Jongilanga, and is scheduled for removal with the rest of his people to Chalumna-Kidd's Beach.
GUBU DAM

This small area near the Pirie forest north of Dimbaza is unique among the black spots of the 'White Corridor' in being actually contiguous with the Ciskei. It seems to have been promised to the local white farmers' association in return for their consent to the buying up of certain white farms for the Ciskei. This cannot be verified.

KEANCYIA

People at Kea Ncoya near Izeli north of King William's Town are to be moved to Braunschweig. General Charles Sebe said in July 1982. The exact site is not known. The people were originally moved here from farms in the Komga district.

KUBUSI etc

Kubusi, SW of Stutterheim, has some 4 500 people on smallholdings. Many appear to be under threat in the context of local removal plans (see Mungusi (Stutterheim) below) and according to the eviction agreement between South Africa and Ciskei they are to be moved to the Frankfort/Braunschweig area near King William's Town. This Frankfort/Braunschweig area is also to receive people from 'TUTUYU, SKOBENI, QALASHE and portions of PELTON in the areas in the District of Zwelethes', according to the agreement. The Pelton area is on the 'White Corridor' side of the railway line, with Frankfort literally over the road from them. We do not know where Tutyu, Skobeni and Qalashe are.

3 QUEENSTOWN FARMS

These farms - Bambani 62, Tabata 63 and Xuma 77 - are named in another resettlement agreement between South Africa and Ciskei. (Government Gazette No 8204 of 14.05.82, p 75)

Tabata is just north of Lesseyon. These farm clearances may be seen as part of the Lesseyon removal plan, in which case the residents may be destined for Whittleless North.

At the time of writing (July 1982), the South African government remains committed to resettling the black communities of the Corridor. In the same week that Nationalist MP Volker came out against 'black spot' removal and some Transvaal removals were stopped, a letter from P W Botha to T Louw, Nationalist MP for Queenstown, was made public. In it Botha committed himself to buying out the areas under threat. (ID, 23.04.82) Roombrof's reply to a parliamentary question on 8.06.82 was further confirmation.

The Eastern Cape 'black spots' are more vulnerable than those in Natal and the Northern Transvaal for the following reasons:

1 They are relatively small and few. It would not be too expensive to buy them out.
2 For the same reason, it is feasible (as it is not, with Kwezulu and Lebowa) to consolidate the Ciskei into one single territorial bloc - the ideal of geopolitical apartheid.
3 Land for resettlement - the main consideration in calling off the Transvaal removals - has already been purchased.
4 As the Mqwalli case shows, the bantustan government, far from supporting the threatened communities or even remaining neutral (as is the case with Kwezulu), is actively promoting

the resettlement.

Nevertheless, the circumstances of the removal of the Tsitsikama people and their present plight have erupted into a major embarrassment for the government and, at the very least, this is going to make them more circumspect in future. This may just amount to saying that officials will be more careful about procedure, not that plans are likely to be scrapped or conditions at the new site made more viable. The removal of the Alstia community to Frankfort in June 1982 was very nearly done. The agreement was sealed beforehand, the removal squad used no overt force, compensation was paid. Yet those 26 families have lost as much as the Tsitsikama people did, now that they have no subsistence base and have been uprooted from their home. They are dislocated, have no local work for income, must join the crowds competing for jobs at the Zwelethes labour bureau, and will be under still greater strain as other families are moved into the area.

2.6.3 Township removals

Some uncertainty surrounds the policy of deproclaiming and removing townships close to the Ciskei. At present it seems the State will not try relocating all such townships in the Ciskei. Grahamstown's Fingo Village has had a reprieve, which is particularly valuable because this area contains freehold land. Hillside location at Fort Beaufort survived a threat of removal in 1979 and is still there. The plan for a massive 26 million township at Glenmore on the western border of the Ciskei has been scrapped, which suggests at least that there are no actual plans to move any townships west of the Ciskei into the bantustan itself. In the Corridor things are less certain. Duncan Village is to be cleared and perhaps a few of the smaller locations, yet there does not seem to be any comprehensive plan.

Even the declared plans may change, of course. ECAB announced a R542 million plan in February 1981 to upgrade and develop the townships of the Eastern Cape, concentrating on what they described as 8 crisis points. Zwarte housing which Walmer residents in Port Elizabeth would be forced to occupy: Mdantsane housing for Duncan Villagers; Mlungisi township in Queenstown being upgraded for Africans who would not after all have to move out for 'coloureds'; Fingo Village in Grahamstown; the main township in Fort Beaufort; a new township for Africans in Seymour; Ginsberg township in King William's Town; and Mlungisi township at Stutterheim. Zwarte housing has been delayed, and the Walmer families may have a slight reprieve. In fact they may end up fighting removal to Motherwell instead. Duncan Village will certainly not be cleared by the end of 1982 as was originally said (EPH, 6.02.83). Seymour is now scheduled for the Ciskei by the end of 1982. A new R155 has been spent in Ginsberg, and nothing in Stutterheim. (Rand Daily Mail, 3.06.82) We understand that part of Mlungisi township in Queenstown is the scene of removals after all, with Africans being replaced by 'coloureds'. There are therefore some apparent shifts in policy, or at least in carrying out policy. Some temporary upgrading in Walmer and Duncan Village, however, should not be taken as a sign that those communities are now free to stay.

These eight crisis points were so-called by ECAB after the Lindie report to describe areas felt to be in such bad condition as to lead to violence, strikes and disruptions, and the motive in the plan seemed to be to remove or settle 'problems'. ECAB have also committed themselves to moving some townships that would not come under this heading: Bathurst to Fort Alfred; Kenton, Bushman's River and Cannon Rocks to a new township at Kenton. The reason they give is usually that it simplifies administration. This whole subject needs to be closely watched and analysed. Meanwhile, as far as removals to the Ciskei are concerned, these relocates that ECAB have planned suggest an easing up on urban clearances to the Ciskei - at least for some groups of people.
DUNCAN VILLAGE

Removals from Duncan Village to Mdantsane have been going on steadily since 1964. Up to 1982 an official 80 000 people have been moved (though the SAND in East London puts it at more like 110 000).

Pretoria's policy is to clear Duncan Village completely of Africans and then in the name of Group Areas turn the place over to coloureds and Indians. The clearance is being done by sections, Dr Morrison for the Dept of Co-operation and Development had said it would be done by early 1983. But in fact the population is far too great for that to happen. The official figure in February 1982 was between 37 000 and 40 000 (unofficial estimates vary between 60 000 and 90 000). The Development Trust would have to build another 7 000 to 8 000 housing units to accommodate those in Mdantsane. Morrison said, (PP, 27.02.82) adding:

Depending on the availability of funds, the removal is expected to be completed within the foreseeable future.

But the time lag does not mean a change of government plan. In fact Morrison's comments were made in reply to the East London city council's sudden plea that the Africans in Duncan Village should be allowed to stay. Meanwhile nearly 2 000 'coloured' families are on the waiting list for houses in the area (PP, 23.12.81) and are being moved in as sections are cleared. It should be recorded here that some coloured opinion is strongly against the scheme:

We are entirely against the removal. The blacks are our brothers. We have lived with them, played with them. We grew up with them and now the Government wants to separate us. We won't move into their houses if they are moved. (PP, 23.12.81)

The removals have actually made very little headway all these years in reducing the population of Duncan Village:

1. The seapage back from Mdantsane is sizeable. With no work in Mdantsane, people there seek jobs in East London - and stay in Duncan Village nearby in order to avoid the high Mdantsane bus fares. Whether people get jobs or not, it is far easier and cheaper to settle down in Duncan Village;
2. Natural increase in Duncan Village has in itself replaced a whole generation since the removals began in 1964; and
3. Ndende Street in the Village is in a terrible slum state. Although this drives away families with higher incomes who leave voluntarily to get a decent house in Mdantsane, it also draws in the more numerous poor.

The only Africans legally in Duncan Village are the Section Tenants. There are many of them, lots of them now squatters. So many houses have been pulled down, and natural increase has raised the numbers so high, that people cannot be housed formally. For 19 years the houses have declined. Planning permission has been refused for any extensions or improvements, and illegal work on houses is not included in the compensation value when people leave and so most houses are left to degenerate. In the general areas living conditions are very bad, and some Mdantsane people have said it is dangerous to live in the Village. People are cramped together. Ndende Street is very unhealthy, with water and toilet facilities quite inadequate for the needs of this dense area. Yet many people still choose this dangerous, filthy place because it is cheap, close to East London, and above all, outside the Ciskel.

Before Ciskel 'independence' people had tended to hope that Sebe would object to this endless stream of people being forced on Mdantsane once it became technically foreign soil on 4 December 1981. Their hopes have faded now, since it is clear that Sebe and the Republic have sealed their agreement to the move, on the basis of the Republic providing 10 000 dwelling units in Mdantsane for the inhabitants of Duncan Village. (Government Gazette No 8204 of 14.05.82, p 12) This is what the authorities wanted. Pretoria wants to get rid of Africans from Duncan Village, and Sebe will be happy when the place has gone, since it will mean one less base for opposition - notably trade unionists - on the edge of the Ciskel. Mdantsane is being curbed at present as far as the powers of R25 can be made to work. Ultimately, though, and perhaps quite soon, the rising anger and solidarity there must burst forth beyond Ciskel's control. Sebe has good reason to want the East London workers bound under his regime as soon as possible before they mature any more, and to keep them as isolated as he can.

There is one group in Duncan Village that Sebe certainly does not like to accept: the Transkeians. Several hundred of them live in the migrant worker hostels, and there are many more besides. It is said that as much as 60% of the african population of the Village are Transkeians.

The Transkei regime have vociferated very loudly in 1982 against the removal of Transkeians to Mdantsane. As their foreign Affairs Minister said:

People working in another state on contract cannot be compelled to stay in a third state. In this case our nationals are the responsibility of South Africa. . . . We object most strongly to our nationals being forced to live in another state either by compulsion or implication and we will take the strongest possible action if this was to happen.

(PP, 4.03.82)

Sebe would gladly see all the Transkeians sent 'home', and their jobs going to Ciskelans instead. Local management may be playing the two groups off against each other.

Duncan Villagers have been lulled off resistance somewhat, through a false sense of security because they have escaped final removal for so long. What alertness there is, is encouraged through public meetings and good press coverage. The people face a very determined policy: R1 500 000 has already been spent on resettling Duncan Village, and a further R5 800 000 has been budgeted for it in 1982. (Rand Daily Mail, 3.06.82) (See Stop Press section in Part 4 below.)

MLUNGISI (QUEENSTOWN)

Residents here have had a long running battle to stay in MLungisi. There seems to have been a definite plan to move everyone out to Effebeli, 10 km east of Queenstown. Some people were actually moved there against their will, but then it passed into the hands of the Transkei because it lay just within the borders of Glen Grey, and so the scheme had to be scrapped. There was also the idea of moving the MLungisi people to Shikishik commonage outside Whittlesea, and with this in mind the Whittlesea magistrate insisted that the Glen Grey people who were already camped there should move on to Oxton. That was in late 1977.

The MLungisi people were in a tricky position because they were fighting removal and resisting rent rises at the same time. In one single press report (PP, 22.12.79), the community council were appealing to the Minister of Co-operation and Development not to disestablish the township, and also finding out that ECAB planned to serve 900 summonses for non-payment of the higher rents.

The whole scene was further complicated by the fact that the MLungisi residents' representative committee accused ECAB of forcing a community council on the township against the wishes of the people, who regarded the councillors as stooges. (PP, 6.06.79)

MLungisi was faced with a plan to relocate the african residents and move coloureds into the area instead. The split in the community - for and against the council - has made solidarity difficult even though there is a strong general wish to fight removal. The council turned to the Queenstown town council for its support in December 1979, only to learn that the whites were actually asking for the africans to be moved and replaced by 'coloureds'. (PP, 22.12.79)

The next step reversed everything: the african residents were to stay, the government said

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and not only that, but a further 300 ha would be set aside for any former residents who had been moved to eZibeleni and who wished to return. They would be able to build on this land under a site and service scheme. The old township, which had been proclaimed a 'coloured' area, would not only be reinstated for Africans, but houses would be repaired and upgraded as far as possible, so the statement went. (DP, 6.02.81)

The reversal happened because Mlungisi had been defined as one of the so-called crisis points to be contained in the Eastern Cape. The planning was on a big scale - the site and service area alone was to cost about R4.5 million. Yet this huge emergency programme does not seem to have borne much fruit. A mere R3 876 was spent in the first year on 'general planning', and in the present financial year, 1982/3, R57 000 has been set aside for buying land.

Lack of funds may be the reason. There may be another change of plan again, though. We have heard that 'coloureds' have started being moved into the Buda area, a section of Mlungisi which had been very well established. Africans are said to be very bitter here, being pushed out family by family. They had hoped they were safe, having survived the 'slum clearance' of the early 1970s when the old section called Stikiti was deliberately emptied. (These were the people, perhaps 5 000, who had to go to eZibeleni.)

Another section is earmarked for 'coloureds', according to this account - the part called White City, a tomato name which may derive from the fact that this is the 'oosh' area. Over the road from here is the main 'coloured' community, the source of those who are apparently moving in now.

Mlungisi contains many thousands of people. Some estimates are around 11 000. How many are really threatened with removal we do not know. Nor do we know where evicted families are going. One guess is that some might after all be pushed to the Shiloh commonage, to the new Whittlesea North site.

MLUNGISI etc (STUTTERHEIM)

Policy has switched a few times on the Stutterheim Mlungisi township from 1979. Compared with the earlier plans, it now threatens relatively few people with removal. It is not necessarily in its final form.

This old township (population c 5 200*) has been in a very bad state for years. In 1979 there were just 636 houses and only 24 taps in the place. ECAB's idea was to scrap the site and move everyone to Glenhaven 5 km outside Stutterheim. But Glenhaven turned out to be good arable land - not to be squandered on African relocation, in other words - and then Frankfort near King William's Town was suggested for the site instead.

Where's idea was Frankfort? Sebe said it was being imposed on the Ciskei (DP, 23.05.80), and Morrison for Co-operation and Development said the Ciskei had suggested it (DP, 6.02.81). The clash of statement is trivial in the sense that Ciskei exists by virtue of Pretoria policy and will presumably always oblige it. We mention it just for the record. No doubt Frankfort was in line with the general plan of removing 'surplus' Africans and pushing the labour supplies just over the hantzana border.

There was a huge outcry in Mlungisi. People were appalled at hearing they were meant to be uprooted and sent off somewhere 32 km away from Stutterheim. White employers in the town protested too, at how the removal would damage their labour supplies (DP, 23.05.80).

Then came the Linde Commission into township development. It reported in early 1981, and its verdict was a reprieve:

It has now been decided that Mlungisi will remain as a township for black inhabitants of Stutterheim and that efforts would be made to upgrade the houses within five years. (DP, 6.02.81)

Formally, therefore, Mlungisi is not under threat of removal. It is not listed in the removals section of the Ciskei expulsion agreement.

But with the Linde report the question broadens out. Originally removal had been for the sake of improving living conditions in the township (at least ostensibly), but even at the time in 1979/80 people pointed out that the existing site could be upgraded: removal was not needed at all. The true purpose behind Frankfort was more probably to get Africans out of the 'White Corridor'. The Linde report ended up by talking about removing ALL the local africans apart from the township people:

... the 15 000 people living as squatters on the (Stutterheim) commonage are to be moved... 'As far as the squatters are concerned they will have to be resettled in other areas as soon as possible', (Dr Morrison) said. (DP, 6.02.81)

The squatters had just been fervently denounced in evidence to the Van der Walt Commission. They were described as the farmers' greatest problem by Mr N McMaster, speaking on behalf of the local white farmers' committee:

He told the commission about 80 farmers wanted to move out of the area where farming had come to a standstill because of the 'thousands of squatters located within this area'. (DP, 21.01.81)

From 4 475 squatters in the Stutterheim area at the time of the 1943 'squatters' commission, he added, numbers had soared to an estimated 22 000 in 1980, half of them in the Kubusi where they crowded especially onto white-owned unoccupied farms. Theft, trespass and harassment, and an appalling dog menace, had all grown to alarming proportions. The white farmers wanted all the squatters moved. Either that, or they wanted the whole area bought out for the Ciskei.

It seems from other parts of the evidence reported in DP, 21.01.81, that this large squatter estimate probably included people in the Wartburg/Mgwali area. Although the farmers' argument extended there, we limit discussion here to the immediate Stutterheim area.

ECAB set up a planning committee into the whole Mlungisi/squatters question in August 1981. The people being discussed were not represented. The bodies invited were: Co-operation and Development; Health, Welfare and Pensions; Education and Training; ECAB itself; the Town Council of Stutterheim; and the regional CPA medical superintendent. This planning committee decided who should be allowed to stay in Mlungisi:

- those employed in Stutterheim, or
- those with Section 10 (1) (a) or (b) rights, or
- landowners.

All others were to be moved.

Professional planners then surveyed the local populations and their standing in the area. Their report finds that the 5 200 africans in the present Mlungisi should be included in the new township plan. They will stay. Another 5 200 also qualify to stay because they are employed in Stutterheim too even though they do not live in Mlungisi. Finally they found 111 africans
landowners who with their families should stay. The survey gave a final total of 11 141 for the population of the new Mlungisi, which at a growth rate of 3% a year would reach a projected 20 000 by the year 2000.

Plans for the new Mlungisi appear firm although they are still being approved. The government has earmarked R3 million for it, according to the mayor of Stutterheim, Mr N James. (Mercury, 26.08.82) The proposed site is north-east of Stutterheim on about 180 ha including the present Mlungisi and Cenyu.

If the plan goes through, those 11 000+ people will just shift locally, possibly many of them willingly and for the better. But the survey put the overall local population figure for Africans at 16 500. This means about 5 400 are due for removal out of the area. These people under threat are scattered about: it seem a lot are in Kuhusi, some in Cenyu and Cenyu Lands, and a few perhaps from Kelogha and from Ohsens.

According to the extradition agreement between Ciskei and South Africa, Pretoria is to move these people to the Frankfort/Braunschweig area. (Government Gazette 6204 of 14.09.82, p 12)

We have not heard what the threatened families think. Perhaps some do not even know what is afoot. A lot of field work needs doing in the Stutterheim area.

2.6.4 Influx control & ‘coloured labour preference’ removals

The Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill was recently referred to a parliamentary select committee. This Bill is a revised version of one first tabled in 1980 and then withdrawn. The new Bill will have high priority in the coming session of parliament. In its present form, with provisions differing slightly from the recommendations of the Riekert Commission, it deals with urban residence rights and influx control.

It proposes to raise the penalties on employers of illegal labour. The maximum fine will soar from the current R500 to a massive R5 000, which would make it wholly uneconomic for anyone to employ workers illegally. In addition, anyone providing accommodation to 'illegal' will face a fine of up to R500. This may deter permanent urban Africans from subletting rooms to anyone unlawfully in the area. In effect, then, the main burden of administering influx control will shift from the State to employers and permanent African householders in town. The State will then keep up or even increase its control simply by threat of fining, while saving effort and expense by being able to cut down on pass raids and court cases.

In fact the State's role will be simplified still further. Another clause in the Bill integrates it with the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act which provides for the summary eviction of any African with ties to an independent bastuist. Any African with these ties can be simply ordered out of the Republic area by any passport control officer - these officials have been granted the status and powers of influx control officers. Thus influx control removals will be streamlined. Offenders will be subject to swift deportation to a bastuist without recourse to the courts, saving delays and cost to the State. The Admission Act has already been used against influx control offenders in urban squatter settlements (e.g., Nyanga Bush) and will probably become the standard tool used by the State to deal with them.

The Quall Commission (1988, 79) estimated that 68 500 Ciskeians were living illegally in the urban areas in 1980. This figure seems a bit high and may well include most illegal Transkeians as well. Whatever the case, the threat of removal to the Ciskei (or Transkei) will reach a totally new level of intensity if the new law is passed. Already, under the Admission Act, the State can move effectively against the more inconspicuous illegals too - not only the squatter settlements but those who live among the permanent residents of normal townships. In the light of the Orderly Movement Bill, one wonders what Dr Koornhof makes of his own claim that

Squatting ... occurs all over the country and the world. The problem can only be
solved if sufficient work and accommodation is provided in the Black States.
(Die Burger, March 1980)

Other aspects of the Bill may also have a bearing on removals. A controversial proposal in the Bill is the repeal of Section 10 of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act. Section 3 of the Bill allows Africans to stay in an urban area only on condition that they are authorised to do so by a designated officer. Section 5 gives automatic authorisation to Africans who had their Section 10 rights before, but there is the possibility that this provision may lack the statutory thrust of Section 10 qualifications. In other words - but it must be emphasised that there is uncertainty on this point - the Bill may enable designated officers to withdraw permanent urban rights. If this interpretation is correct, this part of the Bill is probably aimed at urban squatters with permanent residence rights, because the key criterion is the availability of approved accommodation, lacking which the urban rights may be withdrawn. The State may incidentally be planning to solve the acute accommodation crisis by deportation rather than by building more houses.

The Bill also makes it more difficult to get permanent urban rights. A 10-year period of continuous lawful residence will usually suffice, but not necessarily. Ultimately, the decision rests with a designated officer. Variables such as availability of housing and employment will affect the decision.
The future of Coloured Labour Preference is much less certain. The policy is definitely under review in government circles. The very poor growth record of the Western Cape in the past decade compared with the rest of the country is one factor which militates strongly against Coloured Labour Preference. This is not to say that restriction on the employment of Africans was the main reason, but it was contributory. The State’s attempt to use the policy only insofar as the economy of the region went unhurt could not possibly have been entirely successful. Evidence also suggests that coloureds no longer ‘require’ the policy’s protection, which is why the Bureau of Economic Research advised against the policy in 1981.

Although we cannot be sure, it seems unlikely that the policy as a whole will be abandoned in the near future. But very probably there will be a toning down, particularly in removing the discrimination against Africans with permanent residence rights. This will obviously relieve the pressures which force some people from the area.

On the other hand, the Nyanga Bush experience suggests that a Crossroads reprise will not happen again. After all, this is what the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill is all about.

2.6.5 Removals within Ciskei

In the future we can expect a quickening migration within the Ciskei to the south and east where all the industrial development in the region is concentrated. This will lead to an even greater squatter population in districts such as Mdantemane and Selwitsha. The exact responses of the Ciskeian authorities cannot be anticipated for certain, but they would have to involve substantial resettlement, quite possibly to the remotest parts of the Ciskei.

The agricultural policies of the Ciskeian authorities are also bound to generate more internal resettlement. Irrigation schemes ineffectively mean some resettlement. As these schemes increase – and this is where most agricultural funds go – so will resettlement. Glenmore is a fairly dramatic example; where pipes for irrigation are being laid even before the people are moved out, and even before the area has been formally consolidated into the Ciskei.

The policy on dryland farming is to encourage large-scale capitalist agriculture. This poses a direct threat to communities resettled by the South African State on land previously farmed by whites. The Ciskei is opposed to turning these farms, which are often valuable agriculturally, into subsistence areas for the communities settled on them. Instead the aim seems to be to get rid of the communities and generate a class of African capitalist farmers based on this good land. These considerations may underlie the projected relocation of Kammaskraal.

Hardly any assistance is given for dryland subsistence farming, so the policy is apparently to discourage it.

As conditions in subsistence areas deteriorate further, more and more people will be pushed out of the rural areas and towards the urban centres of the Ciskei. It is only the threat to the security of the Ciskeian State, if this process becomes too explosive, that stops the authorities accelerating this trend. At present they are covertly eliminating subsistence agriculture as far as possible, and resettling the subsistence population in closer settlements. They cannot afford to make this their overt policy, for fear of a dangerous stampede towards the towns.

The chiefs also have a strong vested interest in population movement within the Ciskei. It profits them personally to get more people in their area, both financially and in terms of their political status. Their lobbying will probably go on affecting decisions about where people should be moved.

The Ciskei is already so overfull, the natural population movement would be for people to move out of it en masse. Artificial control by law not only keeps people cooped up in the area but goes on forcing more into it – a trend which, as we have said, may yet prove if the Orderly Movement Bill is passed. Already a quest 10 000 (Mr. Godden’s estimate) have seen into the reception areas of Ntshembe/Zwelilisings from the Republic. Influx into the Mount Ciskei area, being closer to places of employment, has been enormous and will go on increasing.

Removals from very congested areas can be expected – but to what? The SE Development Trust is to fund several resettlement projects within the Ciskei, under the South Africa/Ciskei extradition agreement. Ciskei has budgeted to develop and maintain Ntatemazi, Sade, Mdantemane, Illitha, Dambaza, Zwelitsha, Masincande and Phakamisa, but otherwise it seems there is no money for facilities elsewhere, even at the humble Ciskei level.

It is not just a matter of housing. (Ciskei stopped paying for new houses – except for the few elite families – in 1981.) From now on, housing in the Ciskei will be almost entirely informal, and people can cope like that. But the services and facilities, on which the basis for subsistence, are the crucial items that thousands of families will lack. The Ciskei has been advised that up to 283 000 additional housing units would be needed in the next 20 years, which implies a huge outlay on infrastructure. In this context, relocation sites are likely to be the barest of dumping grounds, and internal removals purely for control, the security of the Ciskei regime, the personal interest of the chiefs – in other words, for everything but helping the families themselves.

Most of the removal projects we have heard of are those involving the Development Trust.

KAMMASKRAAL

This transit camp south of Peddie has existed since mid-1980 when 1 000 people were brought here from Wooldridge near by and from Alexandra towards Port Elizabeth. As the census study in Part 3 shows, at first the Wooldridge group were actually barred from building shanties to replace their tents, and deterred from planting, by government officials who told people to expect their next move at any time. Slowly the realities took over, though, and now the shanties and crops satisfy at least some of the basic needs.

The people are scheduled for removal to a new resettlement site on Peddie commonage, and they don’t want to go. As one person said,

We are settling down now. At least I have some land of my own, although we were promised much more. I’ve worked hard to get this garden going and I am having good results now. It will be hard to start fresh at Peddie, where I hear there is no land.

They will be moving to a densely populated part where they will have no land apart from house plots, and jobs are virtually non-existent. They will be resettled as newcomers to that poor, congested area. They will have to scrounge for migrant contracts in a large, growing body of relocated workseekers.

The Trust is responsible for providing housing at Peddie and also the basic infrastructure. Temporary housing of the tomato-box type is being built there now, mid-1982, and perhaps this is all that people will get. The removal is imminent. Wooldridge families are due to go first, one report claimed. It is rumoured that this group (about 175 families) might be used to put up permanent houses for the Alexandria group who will come only when their places are ready, and after they have harvested the crops from their small gardens. We have had no confirmation of this, but if it really is the plan it will create tremendous extra bitterness, especially as the Alexandria people had been favoured before, being given housing and not tents when they came to Kammaskraal.

The Kammaskraal community has been split from the start by this favouritism. The two factions
have a flimsy bond at present, in agreeing that they do not want to move although they also feel helpless about the issue. They also share in a bulk-buying scheme started by local churchmen. This has helped to unite them somewhat. But any community spirit will probably evaporate in Peddie under the strain of another displacement, certainly if there is unfair dealing.

Stop press: The Kammaakraal people were moved to Peddie in Sept/Oct 1982. See 4.1.2 below.

GLENMORE

This camp on the Fish River west of Peddie holds about 4 200 people. The SA Development Trust bought the land and in April 1979 started moving families in, the idea being to build up a large resettled population who would then be 'consolidated' into the Ciskei along with the land. (See the case study below in Part 3.) It has still not been handed over (August 1982).

Veanted as a R26 million model township plan ('the best in Africa') when it started, Glenmore was never more than a cheap dumping ground with tomato boxes for housing. Nearly 3 500 people were forced to go there in 1979 until public outcry stopped the removals. In late 1981, with consolodation just around the corner, another 700 were shoved in from farm areas nearby. As one resident said, 'If you go off to P.E. on Monday, there are new people in your house by Friday.' Now they are meant to go to Peddie.

Glenmore's case is very like Kammaakraal. Both communities have two main groups of people - in Glenmore it is the Klipfontein/Kenton people from the coast and those from Coega/Colchester near Port Elizabeth. In both, the split has (perhaps deliberately) kept the community at loggerheads with itself where it could otherwise have fought together for its own interests.

Consolidation is expected at any time, and the move to Peddie immediately afterwards. The South Africa/Ciskei extradition agreement commits South Africa to funding the move, at least as part way of basic preparations on the Peddie site. Sebe also argued in December 1981 that South Africa should pay the transport costs too, since it was responsible for pushing all those people into Glenmore in the first place. South Africa might oblige, although there is nothing the Ciskei can do to insist on it. Now that 'Independence' has been bestowed on the Ciskei, the group at Glenmore can't be returned to their places of origin, and the Ciskei values the Glenmore land far too highly for an extension to the Tseufu irrigation scheme to leave the people on it. Ciskei is so keen on clearing the land for Tseufu, in fact, that pipes are already being laid in anticipation of the people going.

Some people at Glenmore have said, 'We would rather die than go to Peddie.' Most of them would rather stay, and for the same reasons as those at Kammaakraal, especially the sense of having to start all over again just when they have begun to take root a bit after their first move. The Glenmore people also object to Peddie because it means moving further into the Ciskei. On the border, they feel closer to the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage complex where some have found work. At Peddie they and the Kammaakraal workseekers will have to compete with thousands of the rural poor for jobs in King William's Town and East London.

Some other people can't wait to get to Peddie. They want facilities at hand and trust the labour bureau will help them. It is hard for Glenmore people to discuss the move together because the main Coega-Kenton split makes meetings, representative committees and public statements almost impossible to achieve. Besides, the very mention of moving away from Glenmore makes people return vociferously to their constant theme - that they want to go back to their places of origin or, failing that, to anywhere else in the Republic. And this theme of returning to Coega and Kenton heightens the faction feeling once again.

Pensions urgently need fixing up before the next move, assuming it must happen. The horrific fact emerged in December 1981 that some people had never even had their pensions transferred to Glenmore since their arrival in April 1979. Others had received a few payments and then nothing more. The payout clerks are accused of embezzling. Some members of the community are taking the matter to court. Glenmore has an exceptionally high proportion of pensioners, and this bad aspect of the camp has ironically done more to unite people than anything else - because of the pension issue, which is urgent and affects such a big group.

Trouble over pensions is another fear that people have about the next move to Peddie. They expect delays, even total stoppage of pensions. The payments are being handled by the Alice magistrate already - that is, by the Ciskei - but technically the pensions are still the responsibility of South Africa because Glenmore has not been consolidated yet. As Mr Tutu Gqikani, one of the Klipfontein elders, said:

'If we are having this much trouble with pensions after nearly three years at Glenmore, imagine what will happen when our pensions have to be transferred to the Ciskei.'

The delays, stoppages and gaps in pension payouts at Glenmore must reflect what happens in camps throughout the country. The injustice is all the more grim because people are at the mercy of the clerks, and the disruption of a move makes pensions more invaluable than ever.

OXTON

This transit camp in the north, in Hewu district, has been going since late 1976. The people came mainly from Glen Grey one way and another, some via Zweledingsa camp, some from Emadakeni next to Sada, some from Silver City on Shhlolom commonghe, also next to Sada. The population now is at least 7 000 and some estimates go as high as 10 000. (DD, 2.06.82 puts it at 1 600 families.)

Oxton always has been a very poor dumping ground of a site. It is dusty, stony, bare and crowded. Food must be brought and gathered from up to 10 km away. It is far from Whiteheats, the local administrative centre. Food must be bought as well as a school in Oxton, and some must walk to other schools, anything up to 6 km away. We understand the only water supply is from the nearby dry stream bed nearby, and some boreholes.

It was so bad even in 1977 that the Mplalo relief committee, who were feeding children in the Thornhill and Zweledingsa reception areas, also worked here. People resisted coming here, and some were forced. The families from Ilinge who came to Shhholom commonghe were told to move to Oxton, and 75 of them tried to stay, saying they were urban and not rural people. They refused, and the Whittlesa magistrate still insisted. (DD, 4.11.77) The details of their removal are not known but they were definitely moved to Oxton against their will - even though the Whittlesa magistrate assured the press, in the report quoted above, that the removal would be within the framework of the law and without bulldozers.

Now the Oxton people are to move again - to Whittlesa North, the very site that those Ilinge people were forced to leave in 1977. For many families it will be their fourth move within a generation. Ilinge was a resettlement camp itself, dating back to the late 1960s. The people had come from farms and townships nearby, and also from further afield, particularly the Western Cape. Along with Sada and Dimbaza, Ilinge was notorious as a place for banished politicians - ex-Robben Islanders, ANC members etc. Then in 1976 the next move began as Glen Grey people including those from Ilinge poured into Hewu. Most did not come straight to Oxton, but were sent on from the Sada and Zweledingsa receiving areas during 1977/78.

Whiteheats North will definitely be a better place in many ways. It will have more water, streets will have lights, it is close to Whittlesa where the labour bureau and other offices are. On the other hand people will have to pay rent there, and so for many people in Oxton who have not even got enough money for food, it is not a place they would choose to move to.

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The SA Development Trust is organizing the removal regardless of what Oxtorn people want, apparently, and is paying for development of the new site. At least some of the houses are the relatively grand NE 5½/9 ones with water plied into them, flush toilets, 4 rooms and internal doors, concrete floors. There will be shops, perhaps also a hospital. Oxtorn people will share the new place with thousands of other families - the site is planned for up to 10 000 house sites, say 60 000 people.

Altogether, the Oxtorn story reeks of coercion. People were pressured into coming to this site by factors including the Glen Grey deal itself. It is not an easy place to live or even survive in. Now they are required to go to a site few can afford, whatever their views.

Whittleses North still in the early stages. Building began this year, 1982, and the first families will arrive in late 1982 or 1983.

ZWELEDINGA

Another transit camp in Hewu district, people have been passing through here ever since the first arrivals from Glen Grey in late 1976. It never was intended as a place to settle in, being terribly cold and exposed. People find life an ordeal here. It is bed place even for temporary settlement, and has got more difficult as sparse wood supplies grew less, for example. It has a clinic (like Oxtorn). Water is supplied through a few communal taps (only three worked when we visited in late 1981). The only legal fuel now is costly paraffin or coal, and people collect wood too at the risk of arrest. There are some goats and chickens - the place feels less of a township than Oxtorn - but hunger is possibly as bad here as at Oxtorn. (Children were seen having hunger fits, indicating the problem of worms too.)

The final resettlement plan for the Zweledinga area - as opposed to the site of the same name - envisages permanent sites at Hatoyi/Esbonile, Price's Dale, Yconda and Bushby Park.

Families from the transit camp of Zweledinga were moved off to other sites in the early days, notably to the Price's Dale settlement called Embekweni and to Oxtorn nearby. Now they are being allocated permanent house sites, and the last few hundred families are waiting to go.

This last group of about 3 000 - judging population from about 500 houses seen in 1981 - has a very good community spirit indeed. Obviously they want to move out, but only on terms they all accept. Meetings are held as issues arise, minutes are taken, and people say they work together. With Irish logic it was said that three people in particular set this democratic tone, and perhaps this was why they were the first to be offered permanent sites - which the trio refused, saying they would stay in the camp until everybody else had been resituated. Our informants told the story with pride. The community, they said, had flouted an attempt by the authorities to siphon off the most articulate people first.

Their local chief, Hebe (Sebe's cousin) might prove a problem. The people have already been thwarted by him, when they planned a bulk-buying scheme to run through the schools. He quashed it, saying that the government cares for its people. Nevertheless, the community will show pressure on security, and support itself through the reposal programme. The people want to know beforehand that all the promised facilities have been installed, and that every single individual has been properly provided for. They expect to move in late 1982 or 1983. The whole project is the responsibility of the SA Development Trust which is preparing the sites.

THORNHILL AREA

Another SA Development Trust project is to finish its modest settlement plans for the Herschel

PEDDIE SOUTH AREA

Apparently a large number of people - again, many thousands - are to be cleared off to a new site at Wesley, down towards the coast near Hamburg. All we know is that the Ciskei intends this site to house a mass of people very cheaply indeed, and in fact to use the project to explore ideas for this kind of rural-based settlement. It is meant to work out some self-help housing procedures, for instance, which may then be applied in Ntabethina and other areas. It would be like a blueprint for rural settlements, probably relying on traditional technology. This may be where the squatters at Chalumna are going. We do not know for sure, but they are scheduled to be moved and no other site has been mentioned for them.

PHAKAMISA

South Africa is committed to providing a basic infrastructure in what will be the proclaimed town of Phakamisa, to accommodate the 473 families, say 1 000 people, who are at present living in a squatter settlement there. The agreement mentions a rudimentary water reticulation system with stand pipes and a proper sewer reticulation system and gravel roads. It sounds like the usual unadorned site and service scheme at the cheapest level, suggesting the squatter group is being catered for here. Yet strong rumours persist that they are going to be cleared out, perhaps to Frankfort, to make way for some prestige development at Phakamisa.

MADAKENI

Another local resettlement project for squatters is an extension to Dimbaza to take in the 760 families in Madakeni squatter settlement nearby. Each family is to have an NE 5½/9 house - these are better quality, urban style houses with four rooms, flush toilets, internal doors etc. There will also be two primary schools and one Type I clinic. Water and sewer systems and roads will be provided throughout the site. This scheme is also under the South African segis
as part of the agreement with Ciskei.

BLUE ROCK

A squatter camp, Blue Rock, near Arnoldton in the vicinity of East London, may be cleared. This comparatively small group of 60 families came here for lack of anywhere else to stay and they would like to remain but feel 'unsettled', they say, because of rumours that they will be moved.

There are no facilities at Blue Rock. A stagnant pool gives water for washing, and people rely on their white neighbours for fresh water. Most men in the camp have local jobs, though, and between the shanties are some flourishing gardens. Many of the families have been here more than two years. They say they are happy here except for the water problem.

The divisional council inspected the camp in July 1982, unaware that it fell within the Ciskei. The place could soon become a health hazard, according to the inspector, who also said that whites in the area were complaining. Blue Rock must be one of many overflow settlements near East London - some residents said they had come for lack of housing in Mdantsane and Ewetaths. As far as the Africans are concerned, they have just had to perch where they could.

The camp lies just within the Ciskei. The Ciskei Health Dept debated this point, which added to publicity about the place. Its removal could well be arranged now through sheer embarrassment.

2.6.6 Removals from Ciskei

The consolidation of Ciskei has meant that farmers in those areas given to Ciskei have to be moved. All these farmers in the Whittlesea, Victoria East, Peddie, Frankfort and Chalumna areas have been white, and although their forced removal has caused a great deal of bitterness amongst them, the pill has been sweetened by the enormous sums they have received as compensation - for example, 56 farms in the Chalumna area were bought out for a total of R7.8 million.

The situation is very different in the district of Stockenstrom, known as the Kat River valley. In 1899 this was turned into a settlement for 'Hottentots', as there was no place in the whole of the Cape Colony where they could legally own land. The settlement ceased to exist as such in 1853, after the Kool went into rebellion in support of the Xhosas, but individual Khois remained in the district ever since, inhabiting small villages such as Hertzog, Phillipion and Readsdale. The white farmers of the Stockenstrom district have been bought out, but the coloured farmers are kept in ignorance of their fate.

'Nobody will tell us what is happening ... are they going to buy us out or what?' (PP, 4.06.82)

Government officials have recently (May 1982) moved about the district making estimates of property and investigating individual title claims. There is talk of the government buying up white farms for the coloured community west of the Ciskei, and the people have been asked their opinion concerning this alternative, but no concrete site has been proposed. In the mean time, many residents have asked relatives to look out for houses in the coloured areas of King William's Town and East London, and are moving as these become available.

The land is due to be transferred to the Ciskei government on 1 January 1983. Given the fact that the government has not yet instituted any proceedings, the coloured farmers could almost certainly ensure, by legal means, that they are still in occupation of their lands by that date. But this would mean that they fall into the hands of the Ciskei 'national State,' which could easily decide by Act of Parliament to evictopolate them without any remuneration whatsoever.

2.6.7 Removals west of the Ciskei

WALTER TOWNSHIP

A unique situation exists here, where 4 - 5 000 Africans live in the midst of white Port Elizabeth. The township existed for many years without question but came under threat of removal in 1961 when the government decided to consolidate all the black suburbs around the city in one single area. For years nothing happened, but the place was not maintained either. Over the past 20 years it has become very degraded.

In 1979, ECAB declared that all the residents were to move to Zwide 4, part of the New Brighton complex. They were to go in June 1980. The township protested. A non-racial Save Walter Committee formed. As it turned out, and announced that the removal would be delayed until January 1981. Nothing happened then either. One month later, in February, the government said they would not force Walter residents to move. 774 houses would be built for them in Zwide and they would just be 'encouraged' to go there.

Zwide has not been an encouraging prospect itself for Walter people. There would be far higher, for houses which are 'shells without ceilings and floors'. Instead of walking to work, people would have to queue long hours for buses and pay for the 22 km ride into town.

Some workers fear they might lose their jobs if they ask for an increase to cover the extra transport costs. People are also loth to leave Walter, which they consider very safe, for other areas where 'there are many isotis and it is dangerous to walk in the streets after dark'.

One resident seemed to express the general view: We've been told we're to be moved to better pastures but to go to Zwide would be to go from bad to worse. Families have lived here for decades. We have electricity here in Walter and we are near our labour market and shopping centres.

Residents also particularly resented the overbearing way in which the original removal scheme was declared:

We are more important than airports and roads. We are people. We are not to be shifted about like sacks of potatoes.

The Urban Foundation entered the lists and surveyed the township with the idea of trying to persuade the authorities to upgrade it. In fact there are some improvements being made this year, 1982, but ECAB said firmly that this does not mean fostering the place. It is clear, in fact, that ECAB are just keeping minimal facilities going and that removals are going ahead pace still all the time as houses are demolished in the name of slum clearance. Dr Morrison for the Dept of Co-operation and Development put it like this:

What we are demolishing are not houses, they are slum dwellings. Only shacks in slum areas in Walter are being pulled down. (PP, 26.01.82)

He added ominously that there were no plans at this stage to demolish sound houses.

The removal is therefore on the go already. It is being kept deliberately low-key, aimed at families one by one instead of wholesale clearance, the idea of which had united residents
so strongly before. Superficially Morrison could claim that only people ‘willing and anxious’ to move were being provided with housing elsewhere - but where houses are being knocked down right into this frame of mind. It is the only form of ‘voluntary’ people to move. Once the numbers in Welmer have been whitewashed down far enough, it is more likely that ECAB will rationalise their own promise away, arguing that it is not worth keeping a township for so few. Residents would be justified in holding them to their promise.

The removals have been slow because ECAB ran out of funds for Zwide housing. An extra R7 million, allocated for development in the ECAB area in mid-1982, will ensure that Zwide gets built. Then, if the Welmer community carry on fighting, they will have to dig their toes in. 760 houses in Zwide were under-construction in July 1982. ECAB 13.07.82 The place was also being electrified.

OTHER TOWNSHIP RELOCATION IN PORT ELIZABETH

Less contentious is the project to extend housing for africans with three new sites in the Port Elizabeth/Ultengnaga area. Even since the Linde Commission investigated township conditions in 1980, ECAB have been trying to improve things before the situation exploded. As it is, the density in Soeto in P.E. is 700 persons per hectare (1982) instead of the 200 it should be. The P.E. townships were short of 15 000 houses in May 1982, and the three new townships would offer 21 000 sites. These new sites must be started simultaneously and as soon as possible, ECAB director Louis Koch said. (EPH, 12.05.82) They are for older families in the existing townships, the squatters in the brickfields, and then 'we'll still have quite a few sites to play with', Koch added. This comes after years of very little building - only 216 new houses were built for blacks in P.E. in 1980, for instance. (EPH, 20.01.82)

The three sites are KwaMxakhi which lies between P.E. and Ultengnaga on the lower end of Veepaas; KwaDwesil on the outskirts of P.E. at Knysnaal on the right of the road to Ultengnaga; and Motherwell on Marken Common between Swartkops and Grahams in the Grahamstown side of P.E.

KwaMxakhi will have about 3 000 housing units, and the infrastructure will include roads, electricity and waterborne sewerage. KwaDwesil will have about the same. Both these sites are being developed now. The other one, Motherwell, is to be far bigger with 16 000 houses, some of them on self-help sites with a lower standard of services than for conventional housing. Work is to start on this township in February 1983. There has been considerable delay, not to say an upsurge, over Motherwell. The Coega River Farmers’ Association fought bitterly against it, saying it was on good agricultural land, the purchase price was too low, and they did not want a huge new population alongside their farms. Others have tried stopping the plan too. The site could not be properly drained, some said. It would ruin the Swartkops ecology, said others. Prestigious white housing areas at Redbush, Swartkops and Bluewater Bay also produced objections. The authorities have steamrolled through, however, and notices have been served on the present landowners. Motherwell is definitely going to happen. As a concession to affected whites nearby, perhaps, Koch assured those at Swartkops River that

The township will be divided into three types of housing with the higher standard of house on the river bank side. Next in line will be scheme housing and furthest from eight will be the serviced sites. (EPH, 12.05.82)

Soweto families will be going to Motherwell. Overall, at least half will be relocated there - subhumanly defined as ‘approximately 2000 persons a hectare from the Soweto township’. (EPH, 11.05.82) We have no information about what residents think about it, either in Soweto or any of the other congested areas. There is certainly no affection for ECAB, though after its boastful efforts to out-squatters in Soweto. In early June 1982 about 135 shackles were demolished, and the policy was declared that “illegal” structures would be broken down as they came up. Many former shack owners put up shelters again as best they could, and the bitterness mounted. ECAB officials carried rifles on the job. Then on 8 June a group of about 200 people gathered at a tense moment of demolition in which a shot had been fired. Suddenly there was a bit of shooting which one of the P.E. community described as ‘purely accidental’. A white ECAB official explained the matter, saying he was holding a 12-bore shotgun which he fired by mistake. Four people were hit, apparently with birdshot. (EPH, 9.06.82)

As far as we know, nobody has sued ECAB, but the official tough line against squatters has been toned down. The P.E. City Council’s Policy and Resources Committee put out a long statement (EPH, 22.07.82) emphasizing that squatters should be moved only when conventional housing was available or if and when the squatters were prepared to be relocated in an authorised area:

The community concerned must indicate that they are prepared to move voluntarily.

The committee warned against 'authoritarian methods which give rise to general discontent and are followed by adverse publicity'.

Thousands are undoubtedly living in total squatter around P.E. They include those at Fitches Corner, a temporary transit camp for Dias Divisional Council employees and their families. About 400 people live here in terrible conditions. The camp was started 16 years ago, and families have to pay R7 a month for pit latrines, insufficient water which is delivered by tanker, and no refuse removal. Belatedly the council have said they will put in mains water, adequate toilet and ablution facilities, garbage bins at every home, on-site refuse disposal, appoint a fulltime caretaker, and fence the camp. They will also give 'top priority' to a plan for permanent resettlement of these families. (EPH, 30.07.82)

There is also Red Location, a 'stinking ghetto' in Elundini township. Some idea can be gained from the EPH account (29.07.82):

Rows of corrugated iron buildings which, according to senior residents, were baracks for British soldiers during the South African War are now home for thousands. The buildings are eight- to 10-door blocks which have been divided into separate dwellings each with a bedroom and a sittingroom-cum-kitchen. The partitions, where tenants can afford them, are so thin that there is no pretence at privacy. . . . For every six baracks, there are two toilets which are now in an appallingly insanitary condition. One is for men and the other for women. Each has three nightsoil buckets. . . . For every six blocks (60 dwellings) there is one communal tap. The water pressure is so low that the waiting is incessant.

Not surprisingly, some residents felt they should not be paying at all for such conditions, let alone the present rental of R16.27. This area is due for demolition, the plan being to make about 800 new sites out of it, and provide accommodation for the extra people in some other place.

For settlements like these, anything would be better than life as it is now. That is the gist of the residents' opinions as reported in the press.

One very enterprising group of people have built up a settlement of their own and have done everything to stave off being moved. In the brickfields area, they erected solid houses for themselves of brick, and a school building too. The families here would certainly not want to move without a lot of discussion first. The authorities had tried to stop their unusually independent community, for example by requiring the people to dismantle the school they had put up. But the group were so patently admirable, the publicity this caused resulted in them getting the right to stay for at least five years. It now seems they might stay permanently. The brickfields site, judging by the EPH report of 22.07.82, will not actually be taken away from the brickfields, and the community council might accept the idea of spending just over R13 000 to extend the basic services to them.

We have no overall figures for those likely to be moved. Some rough estimates are very large
- for instance, for Soweto's population which Mr Savage, MP for Walmer, puts at 60,000+. Obviously the housing bill on the new sites would be vast. ECAB seem to be trying to shed the load in two directions: by appealing to the interests of management in the private sector, so that Volkswagen, for example, invests over R1 million in 99-year leasehold sites in KwaNobuhle in Umtata; and by concentrating on site-and-service schemes. (At least 3,000 of the Motherwell sites will be for people to build on themselves - perhaps along the Zenzele lines started in Grahamstown where traditional wattle and daub are used. KwaDwesi may also be a site-and-service area.)

The chairman of the community council, Mr W M Maku, said of the Motherwell programme: the people will realise they have a future in this area and are to be catered for - another proof that urban blacks are here to stay. (DD, 6.05.82)

There is no doubt that relocation will relieve some of the worst degradation. But the reasons for expanding the townships are not so much to cater for a population as to ensure that that population caters for local labour requirements. Certain minimum standards are needed for it, on the lines of health and control, child-rearing, and also of course to promote calm. It is true that some Africans will be settled here. But these technical aliens will be herded only in limited numbers. Those without jobs may not get sites, especially if the recession deepens and workers are being laid off. Then the squatter removals may turn into deportations instead for many families.

ADDO

Local removals are planned for this area 30 km north-east of Port Elizabeth. About 2,000 families will be removed to a new coloured group area totalling 2,150 ha, the rest of the local area having been proclaimed white. (Government Gazette, 7.05.82) The coloured area lies east of the railway line and north of divisional road number 51. At present there are just 14 houses there, inhabited by about 100 people.

The Winterhoek Divisional Council plans to develop the area:

We hope to improve the living conditions of the people by providing housing and services, including refuse removal, sanitation and water. In our planning we also provide for a school and recreational facilities. (EPH, 15.05.82)

Negotiations over the site started in 1974. The timing of the scheme now suggests that local authorities will be funded for projects to improve living conditions at least to a level where they do not court epidemics. Only two months earlier, in March 1982, plague broke out at Coega nearby. A man died, and after two weeks the community of about 80 people were let out of quarantine. The army had set up camp on the outskirts to enforce their isolation. It was clear to everyone that plague could have gone like a bushfire through the whole region.

Here, as in the townships and squatter areas of Port Elizabeth itself, people are living in the most degraded way. Basic services are either inadequate or do not exist at all. New Brighton boycotted ECAB liquor outlets in mid-1982 in protest against high rentals when services were so appalling. Shanty dwellers roundabout live in rubbish-dump conditions. The enormous financial boost to ECAB in June 1982, which is speeding the removals programme outlined above, is probably the larger version of what Addo is doing. In January 1982 the ECAB plans had been frozen for lack of funds - this was reversed in June, just three months after Coega. There has been bubonic plague before in the Port Elizabeth area: it broke out in New Brighton in 1966. Coega has certainly been taken as a warning. The cholera epidemic which moved into the Eastern Cape in early 1982 will also have shown the hazards of debased communities. Limiting the underdevelopment of the Eastern Cape, whether on the grand scale of Port Elizabeth or in smaller terms as at Addo, is likely to entail a lot of removal to relieve density or bring people to serviced sites. We can only hope it will not also send another wave of families into the Ciskei. It is quite capable of doing so.

RIEBEEK EAST

This tiny settlement lies 35 km NW of Grahamstown. The neat, pleasant white part is adjacent in South African fashion by a black area so rudimentary it can hardly be called a formal site. It is a densely inhabited hillside with many bushy patches where households have already been removed. There is one tap at the bottom, another further away.

About 900 people lived here in the township, only about 48 with any local jobs, when in mid-1981 ECAB announced their removal to Alicevale, another small dorm 18 km away. The Board stressed that if any of the families did not want to move 'we will just leave them there' (in Riebeek East). But it also said that if anyone wanted to stay to keep their local jobs, their families would have to go to Alicevale anyway. And it added that once the numbers at Riebeek East dropped below a certain level the removal would be mandatory:

'We can't keep, say, five families in Riebeek. It isn't an economic or social proposition', said Mr Koch (ECAB director). (EPH, 14.05.81)

It all added up to what is now becoming a familiar technique in the Eastern Cape: a 'voluntary' removal enforced by irritation of the community - as seems to be happening in Walmer (Port Elizabeth) and Fingo Village (Grahamstown). The method is harder to resist and less newsworthy than crude mass removals of the community in one clean sweep.

In fact a few families wanted to go. The community councillors were happy with the plan and went in July 1981 with some others who either shared their views or were somehow pulled into the momentum. By the end of August about 60 families had gone to Alicevale and 'there were no problems', Mr Meintjies said for ECAB:

Asked if any of the families had expressed a desire to remain in Riebeek East, Mr Meintjies told: "A few did give us the impression that they would like to stay on in Riebeek East, but the board has not looked into that yet because there is still not enough accommodation at Alicevale. Furthermore, the board is forcing nobody to move."

(RPH, 29.08.81)

However, Mr Meintjies added, the Riebeek East area had been depopulated. Residents would have to leave at some stage even if they were reluctant. About 40 families were left when he spoke.

This same press story mentions that earlier in 1981 some Riebeek residents said 'they were strongly opposed to the move, but they feared their homes would be bulldozed if they chose to stay.'

By March 1982 when we visited Riebeek there were about 30 families, the strongest resistors. They and several families we met on the Alicevale side all said the same thing: there is no work in Alicevale, nothing to go to except high rents which make poverty far more difficult. At Riebeek the rental is R2.80. At Alicevale, it is R18.96 up - and nobody is exempt despite ECAB's assurances before the removal that residents who could not afford rent would just be allowed to pay what they could manage. Rentals must be paid in full, we heard from everyone we met.

Some of our informants were in a very tough position over the rent. One householder in Alicevale, a woman with no husband and with children to educate, has a part-time job earning R20 a month. Out of this she must pay R18.96 in rent. 'I just ask for food.' She was forced to leave Riebeek, she says, and wants to return. She had had a job there part-time for R8 a month, but with only R2.80 rental she was better off. Pensioners told a similar story.

Some men get contract work in Port Elizabeth from Alicevale ('They send a lorry in') and some work on the SAP. Those on the goods yards in Port Elizabeth wake at 2 a.m., wash and dress and walk for 20 minutes through the pitch dark to catch the 3 a.m. train at Alicevale station. They start work in Port Elizabeth at 7 a.m., finish at 4 p.m. Then they catch the train back, getting in at about 9 p.m. They walk home, get to bed by 10, sleep until they wake again at
2. Some of these workers have taken to camping on the train and they do not go home at all during the week.

This incredible lifestyle indicates how desperate some people are for jobs. One observer has suggested people might have been deliberately resettled in Alice Dale to work on electrifying the railway line in the near future. Whatever the case, this project will generate some jobs but of course only for a time. Now and later the employment scene is very bleak.

High rental, lack of work - the resisters in Riebeek feel all the more determined to stay as they hear these stories from Alice Dale. As we understand it, the Board has been trying to "encourage" them out. At the end of 1981 officials told the township that with so few families left in Riebeek it would not be worth having a school any more. For the first three months of 1982 there was no schooling. The school reopened in April with a teacher paid from private funds, although of course the government should have been providing for the needs of the last 30 pupils. (EP, 24.05.82)

There seems to have been a full in ECAB pressure, perhaps for lack of houses at Alice Dale. Now in September 1982 the Board have applied for another 40. The plots still have to be surveyed, the funds for building are still awaited. Officials have not given a date for the final removal they are planning.

The families in Riebeek feel very isolated in their stand. In March 1982 they said they knew perfectly well that they were being squeezed out, that their only strength lay in not dropping their numbers anymore or giving the Board any other chance to write them off as a mere remnant. For some people it will certainly be a very basic confrontation when and if the Board insists they must go. "They can take me to prison instead of Alice Dale", one man said.

Grahamstown - Fingo Village, Coloureds & Indians

This removal by ending a community, as it were, appears also to be happening or at least a possibility in the case of Fingo Village.

Fingo Village, one of the last African urban freehold areas in white South Africa, is a very small tract of land crammed with about 6000 people. Davenport gives a very detailed account of its history in Black Grahamstown (SAIRR, 1980). Briefly here, all we need say is that there have been many efforts to get rid of it between 1957 and 1976, by crudely zoning it out of existence or just threatening to clear it - and each time the attack united the Villagers in opposition:

- In 1957 the government wanted to demolish a part below Cramond Terrace (the present Indian area) to create a buffer strip between the African and white areas. The community fought back and the plan was dropped.
- In 1964 there was a new plan, to resettle most of the Village for whites. Again, the resistance broke the scheme.
- In 1970 when Group Areas was introduced into Grahamstown, the government ruled that all the Village above the railway line was to become coloured.
- A few months later in 1970, the lower part of the Village was allocated to Indians.
- From 1969 to 1976 the government kept pushing for the Africans in the Village to be moved to Committee’s Drift (the Glenmore area).
- In 1976 it tried to get a plan going to resettle them at Glenmore.

There was loud and concerted protest every time which staved off most of these schemes.

Finally in August 1980 Koornhof announced that African freehold in Fingo Village would be allowed to continue.

Yet the abortive attempts to reszone the Village had already encouraged on that land. While the plans were still alive it was compulsory for land to be sold to a coloured or Indian or to the Department of Community Development if the owner wished to sell his site or if the owner died. When the plans were scrapped, sites lost to the African community in this way were not made available to them again as freehold land. Instead, ECAB negotiated with the Department of Community Development for the land, bought it, and recycled it to Africans on a 99-year leasehold basis. Land that was lost as freehold has been returned to the community as leasehold, in other words, and the amount of freehold land is thereby whittled down.

The same thing is happening in other ways. The Village is being replanned, sites and streets being regularised. ECAB told the Grahamstown Advice Office in 1981 that where a site is too large, the owner must sell the extra land to the Board, and that land will then be leased out to another African family on 99-year lease. The Board also said that where a site must be expropriated for the sake of the development plan, the owner will be compensated with a 99-year-leasehold site elsewhere. Again, these seem to be devices to whittle away the extent of freehold land in the Village.

Koornhof’s reply to a parliamentary question confirms this in slightly different terms:

Yes, (a final decision has been taken regarding freehold title in Fingo Village) under the following conditions:

(i) Blacks having freehold title in Fingo Village may retain such rights should their properties not be required for public purposes, such as, undeveloped buffer strips, public open spaces, streets, schools and church or trading sites when the township is replanned.

(ii) Properties not transferable by Blacks in terms of (i) above as well as properties owned by Coloureds, are to be purchased by the Administration Board for public purposes.

(iii) Blacks not to be allowed retention of freehold title in terms of (i) above, may require (sic) sites in Grahamstown’s other Black residential areas, namely, Makanaakop and Tantyi, in terms of the 99-year leasehold system regardless of whether they qualify for leasehold or not.

P.O.4, 1809.81)

The policy of (ii) in this statement is now being applied apparently. On 25.09.82 the DD reported ECAB as writing to 39 non-African landowners in Fingo Village asking them to sell their properties to the Board. These letters went to coloured and Chinese people, and to church bodies. A community group wrote to Koornhof asking what one of the letters meant, and he replied in October to the effect that the letter had been a mistake. There is no other news yet.

Community feeling has shot up with this latest development, but the question is whether community response will keep pace. Freehold is being lost piecemeal - far harder for people to mobilise against, and far less noticeable, than the old rezoning approach. The switch of tactic involves changing the definition of 'a freehold area'. Before it meant a tract of freehold land. Now it is taken to mean an area containing some freehold sites - 100, then 50, then 20 ... until no freehold remains.

A complication in debates on the Village was the wild scheme to reroute the main road to East London. This road runs through Fingo Village as Raglan Road. After the police raids, gas attacks, and deaths by shooting during the 1980 school boycotts, hostility against whites
rose, and some stones were thrown at passing cars. The idea of a bypass was mooted in some incredible euphemisms during 1981. It all seems to have blown over now, but for about a year the subject distracted many people from the basic freehold issue in the Village.

People have also been inhibited somewhat by the fact that houses are like gold in overcrowded Grahamstown townships. A Villager remarked that individuals will not so easily refuse the offer of alternative accommodation. The housing crisis is slightly helped by the new ‘self-help’ housing which is now permitted by ECAB - who simply don’t have funds for help. The community would like to see more houses built and they are encouraged to build for themselves. But at present the 40,000 houses are only 3,000 houses plus backyard and kitchen shacks, and there is an immediate need for 4,000 extra houses. (Goonoo’s Mail, 19.10.82)

There may be some removals in the sense of Group Area shifts for Grahamstown’s coloured people. The 7,000 in the present township are actually short of houses. Twelve years ago this group were to have moved into Fingo Village, then the plans were frozen, and nothing has happened since. Meanwhile the families have been cooped up in the old section. Of the 900 families there are now 443 lack houses and must double up with other households now. The community sees housing as a basic demand, yet it has not been the subject of much attention. There is a bound to be a coloured housing plan sometime, but the families will have to organize themselves more strongly if they are to have any say in it.

From 1970 the 200 Indians in Grahamstown have lived in a small part at the bottom of Fingo Village. This area has been declared an Indian area. Another Indian area is likely to be finalized by the end of 1982, quite possibly in a part called Cheddar Hill near the prestigious white housing of Somerset Heights. The Grahamstown Indian Association and the City Council have agreed on it. But there is no agreement on the location of the new houses. The Council is to be making a killing here. There is a gully through the area, and some houses will have rainwater flooding down on them after storms - ‘and nobody would want to invest in that’, said a spokesman. Meanwhile the Association is trying to get the plan through and soothe the ultra-white element in Somerset Heights after an outburst of race and class vituperation:

‘To allay the fears of the objection, we will negotiate with the relevant authorities to build houses in such a manner that they blend in with the overall development and appearance of the area.’ (Goonoo’s Mail, 10.12.82)

The trading Indian families mostly live next to their shops which are scattered through the central part of Grahamstown. The plan was to spot-zone them as individual free-trade areas under Section 10 of the Group Areas Act, and if this happens these families will be able to keep their business. But whether they will be able to go on living on these sites is not known.

BATHURST

The township at Bathurst, south of Grahamstown, holds 2,000 people. Most were born there (72% according to a survey done in 1982) and many of the others were born there by marriage. They had been moved before from the old location area where they had apparently held land rights, and these rights had been lost as a result of removal. It had been a forced move.

In 1979, Co-operation and Development mooted the idea of moving the community to Port Alfred, but removal to Port Alfred would never happen. Other bodies (e.g. Bathurst Welfare Society) were told the same.

Then in a shock announcement in parliament on 4 June 1982, Koomhof declared that the move to Port Alfred would happen after all. The African township residents bitterly opposed the plan. They recalled their previous forced removal. Few could afford to give their houses (mostly wattle and daub) with new ones which the ECAB scheme cost about R1,900 in 1982. The objections continued. Many residents have local jobs in Bathurst, unemployment is low there but high in Port Alfred. Bathurst township is poor but at least has enough land for small-scale subsistence farming, unlike the cramped yards of Port Alfred, and there are four grazing camps to take up to 150 head of cattle. There is a primary school in Bathurst with 14 teachers - in fact, Port Alfred pupils have already overflowed into the Bathurst school. There are two churches. There is ample firewood and building wood from the surrounding bush. Bathurst is also a very quiet place, free of crime. Then the less tangible things: the very fact of being uprooted; that people’s forebears lived and are buried there. Township facilities like taps are shocking everywhere, so they are not a factor.

Bathurst whites also protested. They would lose their local labour: about 350 township people work in the village, 60 at the agricultural research station, 45 at the Department of Forestry, and 36 with the Bathurst municipality. As the Bathurst mayor rather artlessly said, ‘Must we then transport these people up and down from (Port Alfred) in the face of rising fuel costs?’ (EPH, 5.06.82)

He added a warning that a squatter camp would emerge at Bathurst of workers staying close to their jobs.

Bathurst whites include a very vocal Mr Archie Archibald who is hard for officialdom to ignore because he was Director of Housing in Johannesburg and the architect of Soweto, and therefore quite a name in the township world. His big argument is that Bathurst township has the makings of a model rural development. Even as it stands, he says, its advantages far outweigh its disadvantages. Besides, ‘there has for a long time been a move to arrest the urban drift. This proposal is encouraging an urban tide wave.’ (EPH, 31.08.82)

The Port Alfred township people also resent the removal. They are already terribly congested; facilities are appalling - only 14 taps for the whole community of 10,000, for instance. Crime is rife, along with the unemployment. Another 2,000 coming in would make things far worse.

White Port Alfred are opposed too, for similar reasons: the unemployment rate of about 56% (1982) would increase, and crime with it; and the township should not get even more of a problem.

It is quite unique, locally, to have such heartfelt accord among different races and places. Nobody wants the removal. All these groups have sent memoranda to Co-operation and Development. The Bathurst township added a petition to theirs.

From the sidelines it is truly surprising that the plan is to move the Bathurst people to Port Alfred rather than to the Ciskei, in view of the policy of relocating small towns within 70 km of the border into the bantustan. Koomhof’s announcement was deliberately enough. Residents would be moved as soon as the necessary infrastructure could be provided, and this depends on the availability of funds. Adequate sites for all the people being moved would be made available, but they would have to build their own houses on a ‘self-help’ basis. Schools, water and clinics would be provided by the authorities. Compensation would be paid.

One must assume a compelling purpose behind this. Dr Morrison for the Department said the plan was planned for reasons of ‘economics’. This suggests the government was bothered by the cost of keeping up two townships instead of one. Yet Bathurst residents say ECAB have spent money on the township since they took over from the Bathurst municipality, apart from putting in some toilets at the school earlier in 1982 during the cholera scare. And according
to the DD, 26.09.81, while ECAB earned R376 501 from the 9 658 blacks living in the Port Alfred township in the four years of administration to then, it did not spend any money on housing in the time and only R30 815 on anything else - and that was for a beerhall and an office building.

Dr Morrison argued that the Bathurst people should move because 'only eight miles away at Port Alfred there is a full infrastructure for them.'

When asked what infrastructure he was referring to, since the 10 000 blacks of Port Alfred have only 14 water taps between them and the township is chronically overcrowded, Dr Morrison replied: "But you know we are going to improve the whole bloody system when funds are made available."

The Bathurst move should not be seen as part of a long-term strategy for all small-town locations in the Eastern Cape, he added. "There is no such strategy at the moment and we will consider each case on its merits." (EPH, 10.06.82)

For lack of anything else, perhaps, one wonders if this is not a Freudian statement, an exact description of policy. It could be for contil, if so. Pulling the scattered African groups together would tighten that hold. It is reminiscent of Riebeek East being pushed to Aliceadale - it can't just be the cost of administration, where facilities hardly exist anyway.

It is hard to say what the government's real line is now, in late 1982, because officials have made so many contradictory moves. Koch, the ECAB director, said he was advised on 21 October 1981 that the removal had been approved in principle. Yet just six weeks before Koornhof announced it in June 1982, Koch assured the Albany and Bathurst Farmers' League that the Bathurst township would not be moved. The mayor of Port Alfred pointed out that the removal plan cut across a promise ECAB made to the Port Alfred municipality. When ECAB told over a township five years ago there was talk of removals, and the municipality was assured they would never happen, there would never be these influxes to Port Alfred. Now, "... we are negoatiating giving the Eastern Cape Administration Board an area of more than 100 ha between our township and the old aerodrome where there is the black school. But a condition of the handover is that we will accept no 'foreign' blacks. ECAB is now breaking that condition, or will be if the move is effected." (EPH, 21.06.82)

Morrison said the government was determined to go ahead despite the general opposition to the move. Less than a week before, Koch had said: 'We will still make representations from ECAB against this move.' And in further contradiction, he went on to make the obvious point that as an instrument of the Department, ECAB would not oppose its policy. (EPH, 10.06.82)

The last official word so far was Morrison (EPH, 27.08.82) saying the Department were considering a report from their local officials on conditions in Bathurst's black township before deciding finally on the move.

Koch appears to have been trying to cool down the issue, assuring people that if the removal did finally happen it could not be for the next two years at least. ECAB would have to upgrade the Port Alfred township first. This depended on funds for infrastructure which they hoped to get in 1983.

It gives time for opposition groups to organise themselves. So far the residents under threat have had some varying reactions, judging by findings in a survey done in June 1982 by the Rhodes Anthropology Department. 17% of the sample said they would go to Port Alfred if they were forced to. 10% were considering alternatives e.g. going to friends or family in Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown or Peddie. About 10% also hoped to stay in Bathurst somehow - at their place of work or on nearby farms with sympathetic families. Opposition is unanimous, but the forms of it would still be developing.

KENTON

A new african township is planned for Kenton, only about 20 km along the coast west of Port Alfred. Like the policy on Bathurst, this has been in the wind for some years, shifting back and forth.

In 1978 there was a tussle over whether to have an african or coloured township in the area. The Cape Midlands Administration Board wanted one for africans from Boknes, Kenton, Bushman's River Mouth and Cannon Rocks - the coastal region, in other words. But then the blacks were more or less discounted. Instead a coloured township was proposed by the local ratepayers' association, the Department of Forestry and the Dits Divisional Council. This was at a time when farmers were hotly warring against african squatters. Finally the coloured township plan won. (EPH, 25.04.78)

There could not be two townships, it was argued, because there would not be enough water and besides (officials added) the coloureds and africans would fight. Some 3 800 african squatters living in pockets throughout the Dits Divisional Council area would be moved to Glenmore, starting with those at Klipfontein farm where they had recently poured in so that their numbers had gone from about 500 in August 1977 to 1 200 by March 1978. (It is possible that many came in hope of getting a site in the proposed township.) The township would be on that same Klipfontein farm, the Council was negotiating with the usufructuaries, and the 150 or so coloureds on the farm could perhaps stay while the township was being built. (EPH, 30.06.78 and Evening Post, 26.06.78) The general aim of the Board was to reduce the african population to the barest minimum required for the labour needs of the Kenton/Bushman's River area. They would move the unproductive and the unemployed.

Removals to Glenmore began in April 1979 but were halted shortly afterwards, probably because of the general outcry. On the Kenton side the whole subject seemed to drop out, or at least out of the newspapers, until Dr Morrison's announcement for Co-operation and Development:

A decision has already been taken to consolidate the black populations of Kenton, Bushman's River and Cannon Rocks in a regional site and service scheme at Kenton. (EPH, 19.06.82)

Somewhere along the line the coloured township had been overlaid. With Glenmore, it seems all effort to remove africans to the Klipkel had stopped. The terrible irony is that if the africans on Klipfontein had managed to stave off removal until the policy change, those with work in the area would have qualified for sites on the farm, which is where in all probability the township will be.

ECAB told the EPH some details in November 1982. Their acting chief director, Mr Dick Matter, says the Kenton township is designed for the 1 088 permit holders and 101 lodgers in the Kenton emergency camp nearby. This camp is finally going to be cleared and closed down. There will also be 128 people from Bushman's River, Boknes and Cannon Rocks. All these individuals are in the rural area, working, and have permission to be in the prescribed area. What will happen to the unemployed? We do not know but guess the Board plans removals out of the area along with relocation to Kenton township, and that these removals would be to the Klipkel.

This could happen next year. Matter says the Department must still negotiate to buy Klipfontein. Talks may start after the next ECAB meeting on 6 December 1982, assuming the Board will approve the plan then. Matter expects that ECAB will get the land during 1983.

* It should be recorded that ECAB's neglect of Kenton camp has been phenomenal even by local standards. In the four years 1977-81 the 1 463 households in the camp paid ECAB a total revenue of R38 440. In that same period ECAB spent only R141 there - on 'infrastructure'. (DD, 26.09.81)
Dear Sir,

I was very glad to receive your address from one of my church elders in Bethel/Wartburg Parish, in the Pastor in charge of this place which include Stutterheim, we are in difficult situation, the South African Government want to remove us to a barren place Frankfurt where our people will die of starvation, because this place is far from any town, and there will be no employment provided from there, and this removal is totally against their will, we are not prepared to move, we need anybody who can help us from this disaster, we are trying to resist this removal by all means, please help us.

Yours on behalf of Wartburg

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2.7 SUMMARY OF RELOCATION (EASTERN CAPE)

2.7.1 Known removals 1948-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inverwhames (Cathcart) (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Our only source of information for this period is Assembly Debates, v 25, cols 324-326 (1969), a reply to a PQ listing 'black spots cleared since 1948', with no other details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nubble (Cathcart)</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Winkel (Cathcart)</td>
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<td>Armoed (Elliot)</td>
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<td>Arisig (Elliot)</td>
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<td>Donnachadh (Elliot)</td>
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<td>Mtansakloof (Elliot)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nqumenikloof (Elliot)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunart (Elliot)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek (Elliot)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rondabaschviter (Humansdorp)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delville (Indwe)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lichfield (Indwe)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauwpoort (Indwe)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roodehooge (Indwe)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stilfontein (Indwe)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lot 19 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lot 21 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lot 48 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwelanes commomage lot II (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto lot 32 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>Pop. estimate</td>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwelerha commonage lot 35 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto lot 46 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto lot 47 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm 211 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm 245 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm 356 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm 358 (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Kei Drift outspan (Kongha)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craigmore (Macleod)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sogo (Stutterheim)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grootboom (Uniondale)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prunksberg (Wodehouse)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waschbank (Wodehouse)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portion 1 of farm 247 of Farm 19S (East London)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paardekraal Sections 15 and 15A (East London)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand 1 of XXXIV (East London)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paardekraal (East London)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulls Run (Stutterheim)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rietsfontein (Uitenhage)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1971 contd**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antelope (Stutterheim)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bromley (East London)</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

**1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stand 10 of Farm 16 and 22 S (East London)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 28 pf Paardekraal (East London)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand 18 of Farm 37 S (East London)</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dunville (Cathcart)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ditto, col 615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwood (East London)</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section B of Stand 11 of Farm 19S (East London)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remainder of Stand 11 of Farm 19S (East London)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand 17 of Paardekraal (East London)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craven (East London)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stand 16 of Paardekraal (East London)</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ditto, cols 615-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand 43 ditto (East London)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 11 ditto (East London)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 12 ditto (East London)</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 13 ditto (East London)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 18 ditto (East London)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 22 ditto (East London)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm X19/21 S (East London)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 8 Kommietjesbelegte Commonage (East London)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>Pop. estimate</td>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand No 3 (Kongsha)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand No 35 Kwelerha Location (Kongsha)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towerwater (Uniondale)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washbank (Wodehouse)</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1975**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 18 of Farm 198 (East London)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ditto, col 616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand 8 of Farm 198 (East London)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rievmasask (Upington, N Cape)</td>
<td>215 (1)</td>
<td>Welcomewood</td>
<td>Agricultural, small plots; community all Afrikaans-speaking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1976**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976-78 Duriskraal Location, Fingo Location, The Gap, Palmietville Location, Snyskloof Location, Witte-kliefbosch Location, Witte-Els Bosch (Humansdorp)</td>
<td>2 800 (2)</td>
<td>Elukhanyeni</td>
<td>Illegal removal to closer settlement, regularised 12.06.82. Compensatory land to Transkei, in the plan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Klipfontein (Alexandria)</td>
<td>1 460 (5)</td>
<td>Glenmore</td>
<td>Due to go to Peddie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellowwoods (Stutterheim)</td>
<td>1 057 (6)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wooldridge (Peddie)</td>
<td>550 (7)</td>
<td>Kammaskraal</td>
<td>Removed to Peddie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 040 (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1982**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alsatia (Cathcart)</td>
<td>200 (9)</td>
<td>Frankfort</td>
<td>First White Corridor removal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**URBAN / SMALL TOWN LOCATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964 +</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duncan Village (East London)</td>
<td>1964-72 48 258 (10)</td>
<td>Mdantsane</td>
<td>Continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-79 83 025 (11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-82 110 000 (12)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>60 000 (13)</td>
<td>Mdantsane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1967 - 73**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape &amp; local</td>
<td>12 000 (14)</td>
<td>Illovo (Glen Grey)</td>
<td>Incl. banishments &amp; some farm people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1968 - 72**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middelburg, Burgersdorp, &amp; other farms and NE Cape removals</td>
<td>30 000 (15)</td>
<td>Sada Dimbaza (formerly Mvumela)</td>
<td>Incl. banishments, both camps declared 'self-contained Bantu towns' in 1969.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1970 +**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mungrisi (Quenstown)</td>
<td>1970-79 10 127 (11)</td>
<td>eZibeleni (Glen Grey)</td>
<td>Ceded to Transkei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South End (Port Elizabeth)</td>
<td>1970-73 10 200 (16)</td>
<td>? elsewhere in Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>Area cleared for prestige white development, still pending in 1982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fingo Village etc (Grahamstown)</td>
<td>100 (17)</td>
<td>Glenmore</td>
<td>Due to move to Peddie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvertown (Zwelitsha)</td>
<td>3 000 (18)</td>
<td>Phakamisa</td>
<td>Due to move again?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 000 + (19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zweilitsha</td>
<td>1 500 (20)</td>
<td>Ndevane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1981 - 82**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riebeek East (Albany)</td>
<td>480 (21)</td>
<td>Aliqudale</td>
<td>Continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walmer (Port Elizabeth)</td>
<td>702 (22)</td>
<td>Zwide 4 (Port Elizabeth)</td>
<td>Continuing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### SQUATTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975 +</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth (coloureds and africans)</td>
<td>Some thousands (23)</td>
<td>Bethelsdorp etc in the PE area, and elsewhere</td>
<td>Continuing and likely to increase especially in Soweto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London (coloureds and africans)</td>
<td>Some thousands (24)</td>
<td>Chalumna, the Trenkeli border and elsewhere</td>
<td>Continuing especially in Ndebele Street (Duncan Village)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gndega, Colchester, Cannonville and Alexandria</td>
<td>1 500 (25)</td>
<td>Glanmore</td>
<td>Due to move to Peddie</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### RELOCATION AS RESISTANCE

| 1976 - 77                      |               |                                  |                                              |
| Herschel                       | 40 000 (26)   | Ntabelhembes (Thornhill etc) & Zweledzings (Oxton etc) and Sada | Thousands still to be finally 'settled' i.e. moved again; others have already been moved again |
| Glen Gray                      | 51 429 (1)    |                                  |                                              |
|                                | 65 000 (27)   |                                  |                                              |

### FARMS

| 1958                           |               |                                  |                                              |
| White farms                    | 1 066 (1)     | Kyaletu (Alice)                  |                                              |

| 1964 - 69                      |               |                                  |                                              |
| West & Eastern Cape farms (e.g. in 1969, 20 770 to Sada from Boland, Karoo and Midlands (20) ) | Thousands | Sada, Ilinge, Dimbaza | Farm families continue coming, but on a more voluntary basis |

### FARMS contd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Corridor/Coastal</td>
<td>5 000 (28)</td>
<td>Potsdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 +</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Corridor/Inland</td>
<td>60 000+ (28)</td>
<td>Ndevana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Corridor/Inland</td>
<td>3 000 (28)</td>
<td>Gobitjolo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tharistor area/OS</td>
<td>10 000 (26)</td>
<td>Ntabelhembes &amp; Zweledzings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape farms</td>
<td>20 000 (20)</td>
<td>Chalumna</td>
<td>? to be moved again - area needed for people to be moved from Kwelera, Mostplaats and Newlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 +</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape farms</td>
<td>6 000 (28)</td>
<td>Tsavo (formerly Oora)</td>
<td>Continuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape farms</td>
<td>1 200 (29)</td>
<td>Glanmore</td>
<td>Moving again to Peddie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(date unknown) Komha</td>
<td>? (30)</td>
<td>KeaNotya (nr King Wet's Town)</td>
<td>Due to be moved on to Braunschweig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornhill farm (Alexandria)</td>
<td>450 (28)</td>
<td>Kammaskreal</td>
<td>Moved to Peddie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local farms</td>
<td>? 600 (28)</td>
<td>Braunschweig</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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## SECONDARY REMOVALS (THOSE REMOVED FOR THE SECOND OR FURTHER TIME)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origins</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td>Silver City camp</td>
<td>A 'resistance' move from Glen Grey, incl. in that item above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 200 (28)</td>
<td>Whittlesea and Sasa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oxtong transit camp nearby</td>
<td>Due to be moved to Whittlesea North, on the old Silver City site (the commonage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some group: Silver City</td>
<td>500 (31)</td>
<td>Final sites in Ntshethemba</td>
<td>Originally from Herschel in 1976/77, this vast group is still being resettled on final sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and possibly some from Sasa</td>
<td></td>
<td>e.g. Tentergate, Spring Grove,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Milford</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornhill/Loudon farms</td>
<td>Many thousands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Final sites in Zweledinga</td>
<td>People originally from Glen Grey, as above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>e.g. Baytor, Yonda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zweledinga/Favet area</td>
<td>Some thousands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paddie commonage</td>
<td>To be joined by those from Glenmore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kammaskraal</td>
<td>1000 (28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NOTE

This list indicates the scale of removals but is certainly not complete. The main gaps are in the areas of farm and squatter removals. Figures tend to be conservative. Some alternative estimates are given where we cannot assess them, or they look significant.

2. SPP estimate based on questionnaires and observation
3. **Assembly Debates**, 22.04.80, cols 617-8
4. **EPH**, 27.12.78 - 11.11.82
5. **EPH**, 19.05.79 and 25.06.80
6. **Assembly Debates**, 22.04.80, col 619
7. SPP estimate based on 85 families said to have been moved
8. **Evening Post**, 10.10.80, said 172 families, an overestimate
9. **DD**, 14.07.80 (26 families)
10. Wilson, 1972, p 61
11. **Assembly Debates**, 22.04.80, col 620
12. Estimate in February 1982 from the Border region of the SAIRR
13. Gordon, 1980, p 15. The government plan to move 10 000 families to Mdantsane from the Western Cape seems to have been carried out and also catered for (cf **Star**, 9.09.67, reporting that 5% of future Mdantsane houses were to be for families from the Western Cape). The big gap here is in not knowing where the others came from. Quail estimated Mdantsane's 1980 population as 250 000. Assuming most of the 110 000 from Duncan Village had arrived by then, and that 60 000 had come from the Western Cape, and even allowing for a large natural population growth, this still leaves many thousands of people unaccounted for, and some of them may have come under pressure.
15. This includes 203 families from Middelburg, 67 from Burgersdorp, and 39 from Cape Town (Bantu Administration and Development statement in parliament on 4.03.69). The overall figure is from Charter, cf (1) above.
16. 1 540 coloured families were moved, plus 326 Asian and 133 white (**SAIRR Survey** 1973, p 12).
17. **EPH**, 24.04.79, a move of 13 families later confirmed in Grahamstown
18. 473 families, according to the **Government Gazette** 8204, 14.05.82, p 16
19. **EPH**, 5.03.80
21. **EPH**, 29.08.81 and 24.09.82
22. PFP estimate for removals between December 1981 and June 1982 when they stopped for lack of houses in Zwide 4. Observers discount the removal figure of 2 348 given in the **Weekend Post**, 6.11.82.
23. e.g. **SAIRR Survey** 1983 reports (p 347) that 410 squatter hats (say 2 500 people involved) were demolished 2.10.75 - 30.09.79 in the coloured sector alone. Many african squatters have been ratted too, certainly more than coloureds. The press has told of demolitions at Veeplaa, Guguletu, Dustpan and many other squatter settlements, and in 1982 in Soweto particularly.
24. Numbers unknown even to local observers. The two main waves of removal - roughly August 1978 - February 1979 and November 1979 - early 1980 - were intended to clear some squatter settlements especially from Duncan Village's Mpuku Street, Parkside and the Tip, and others in the surrounding East London hush.
26. **DD**, 13.10.80, quoting Gary Godden, agricultural adviser to the Giskele, who presumably accepted the Bantu Administration and Development figure of 21 000 for the Herschel group (**Sunday Express**, 16.01.77).
27. **DD**, 27.06.80
28. SPP estimate. In the case of Potsdam, we understand the firstcomers were from areas being cleared for Mdantsane - the 992 people who came between 1969 and 1972. Another 1 750 followed from Kongha etc (cf (20) above). Where the others originated we do not know.
29. **EPH**, 28.11.81
30. **DD**, 10.07.82
31. **DD**, 4.11.77
### 2.7.2 Removals pending

**SECONDARY REMOVALS (THOSE REMOVED FOR AT LEAST THE SECOND TIME)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Glenmore (Victoria East)</td>
<td>4 200 (1)</td>
<td>Peddie commonage</td>
<td>Imminent (Nov 1982) - as soon as Glenmore is consolidated into the Ciskei. To join Kammarkraal group on the Peddie site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phakamisa (Zwelitsha)</td>
<td>3 000 (2)</td>
<td>? Frankfurt</td>
<td>Rumoured, despite plans for permanent settlement in extradition agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxton (Zwelitsha)</td>
<td>7 000 + (3)</td>
<td>Whittlesea North</td>
<td>First group expected to be moved to this new site, ? end of 1982 or in 1983. To share it with many others. The 4th move for some.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 000 (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 000 + (5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zweledinga transit area</td>
<td>3 000 (3)</td>
<td>Bushby Park, Price’s Dale, Yonda and Haytor/Estbonile</td>
<td>Permanent sites, for the last of the Glen Grey group who like Oxton have been waiting since 1977. Expecting to go end of 1982 or in 1983.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornhill area</td>
<td>Some thousands</td>
<td>Rocklands, Ntabethamba Town and perhaps other sites in Ntabemthamba</td>
<td>Final settlement of the last of the Serahele group. Nt. Town is called one of the 2 projected ‘cities’ of Hews. (Whittlesea North, the other)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foa Noliya (Zwelitsha)</td>
<td>? (6)</td>
<td>Braunschweig</td>
<td>A general reception point for many squatter groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### BLACK SPOTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mgwall (Stutterheim)</td>
<td>4 700 (7)</td>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>Includes 152 title holders. Wide opposition heavily suppressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartburg (Stutterheim)</td>
<td>3 400 (8)</td>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>Includes title holders. Also heavily suppressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goshen (Cathcart)</td>
<td>1 200 (9)</td>
<td>Whittlesea North</td>
<td>Includes title holders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesseyn (Queenstown)</td>
<td>4 500 (10)</td>
<td>Whittlesea North</td>
<td>Includes title holders &amp; squatters. ? some to get agri land.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### BLACK SPOTS contd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mooplaats</td>
<td>12 600 (10)</td>
<td>Chalumna</td>
<td>Tribal land also under Chief Jongilanga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newlands</td>
<td>6 900 (10)</td>
<td>Chalumna</td>
<td>? all tribal land, under Chief Jongilanga. These 3 areas not under imminent threat, as Chalumna would still need to be cleared of squatters and prepared. Area seems to have been promised to local white farmers (unverified).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubu Dam (Pirie)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### URBAN / SMALL TOWN LOCATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stockenstrom</th>
<th>7 000 (3)</th>
<th>Unknown even by Community Development.</th>
<th>Coloured freehold area due to be consolidated into Ciskei in Jan 1983. Total uncertainty on this group.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duncan Village</td>
<td>37 - 40 000 (11)</td>
<td>Mdantsane</td>
<td>Continuing (since 1964). RS 800 000 budgeted for removals in 1982 (RDM, 3.06.82). NU 15 &amp; 16 are being laid out now, Nov '82.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60 - 90 000 (12)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coloureds were moved into Braelyn, now to vacate the area for Indians to move in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braelyn Extn 6 (ex Duncan Village)</td>
<td>3 000 (13)</td>
<td>Buffalo Flats Extns 2-7 (East London coloured area)</td>
<td>c 21 families due to move to Extn 4 by end of 1982. Rest as planning funds permit. North End rezoned for light industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most to Braelyn Extn 4, some ? to Extn 5</td>
<td>Mixed feelings: some want to go for better house, others fiercely oppose move. The last resisters out of about 600 people. Move delayed for lack of houses in Aliedale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North End (East London)</td>
<td>700 (14)</td>
<td>Zwide Exta 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walmer township</td>
<td>6 000 (15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Port Elizabeth)</td>
<td>3 200 (16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ribebok East</td>
<td>120 (17)</td>
<td>Aliedale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From</td>
<td>Pop. estimate</td>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethurst</td>
<td>2000 (18)</td>
<td>Port Alfred</td>
<td>So badly opposed by all, it may be being reconsidered, otherwise, plan may be for c. 1985.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenton emergency camp</td>
<td>1088 (19)</td>
<td>Kenton Township</td>
<td>Only 1088 permit holders allowed in new township, +101 lodgers. c. 400 may be dumped in Ciskei.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grahamstown</td>
<td>200 (20)</td>
<td>New area in Grahamstown</td>
<td>Divided interests among the families as to the site which may be fixed by 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillside Location</td>
<td>250 (21)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Won through a threat in 1979 but still uncertain for and uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Part proclaimed coloured, africans being cleared out. Numbers unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mungisiz (Queenstown)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SQUATTERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bushman’s River</td>
<td>128 (22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Klipfontein Farm?), Boknes &amp; Cannon Rocks (Alexandria coastal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addo area (nr Port Elizabeth)</td>
<td>2000 (23)</td>
<td>Addo Township - new</td>
<td>Only workers/Section 10 holders allowed. Unknown number of others may be pushed to Ciskei. In late 1983/1984?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelumna</td>
<td>20000 (24)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Rock/Arnoldton (nr East London)</td>
<td>400 (25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madakeni (Dimbaza)</td>
<td>5000 (26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kubusi, Cenyu, Cenyu Lands, Kalooha, and Ohiens (Stutterheim)</td>
<td>5400 (27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FARMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>Pop. estimate</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peddie South</td>
<td>Many thousands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesley Township</td>
<td>(nr Hamburg)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Apparent to clear area for Peddie South agricultural scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bambani 62, Tabata 63 and Xuma 77 (Queenstown)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>? Whittlesea North</td>
<td>Tabata is near Lesseyton, so they may be part of that removal plan. Unknown, resettlement mentioned in Gazette 8204, p 75.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing surplus Cape farm pop.</td>
<td>50000 (3)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Direct and indirect pressure likely on many.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging surplus farm pop. in Eastern Cape</td>
<td>90000 (3)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging surplus farm pop. in Western and Central Cape</td>
<td>10000 (3)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figures here are, if anything, underestimated. The main gaps seem to be in the areas of squatter and group area removals in towns, especially on the Port Elizabeth/Utshabo side, and groups being shifted around inside the Ciskei.

1. EPH, 28.11.81
2. 473 families, according to the Government Gazette 8204, 14.05.82, p 16
3. SPP estimate: 1982
4. DD, 2.06.82
5. EPH, 7.10.80
6. DD, 10.07.82
7. DD, 23.04.82, quoting Botha in parliament. But the Mgwali Residents' Association say this figure is far too low for the five villages of Mgwali proper. On top of that, they add, it omits the people of Heckel (described as a Trust farm nearby) which the MNA say has about 28 landed families (say 150 people) and a mass of squatters.
8. DD, 23.04.82. Again, the MNA say the figure is too low. They explain that the officials who counted in early 1982 were actually driven out of one of the villages and so their total is definitely incomplete.
9. DD, 23.04.82. Freeholders apparently handed in their title deeds in February 1982 under great pressure from the Cathcart magistrate, to be returned after photostating within a week. They were given unstamped roneoed receipts. The magistrate was then reported as saying he was keeping the deeds safe in his office and that he could not photostat some of them because they were 'old and brittle'. EPH, 19.04.82 Koornhof later said the deeds had been given willingly. We understand the people had been acutely reluctant to part with them, and last news (mid-1982) was that they were alarmed about not getting them back.
10. DD, 23.04.82. The Moolplats figure may include Kwenxurha, not listed here.
11. DD, 27.02.82, quoting Morrison's official estimate
12. Unoffical estimates
13. Estimate of the Border region of the SAIRR (498 families)
14. Ditto (c 110 families)
15. PFP estimate (Nov 1982) calculated from the remaining 390 houses and 1 431 shacks in Wolmer Township
16. ECAB estimate (Nov 1982)
17. EPH, 24.09.82
18. EPH, 5.06.82 etc - the mayor of Bathurst's figure
19. ECAB statement to EPH in Nov 1982
20. Grocott's Mail, 19.10.82

41 families according to DD, 25.04.79, understood in mid-1982 to be still there

21. EPH statement to EPP in Nov 1982. This group may include a few families who resisted going to Glenmore in 1979.
22. EPP, 15.05.82
24. 60 families, according to DD, 15.07.82
25. 760 families, according to the Government Gazette 8204, 14.01.82, p 16
26. Estimated by planners of new Mlungisi Township, Stutterheim
27. 4 522 registered squatter huts due for clearance in 1980 (SAIRR Survey 1980, p 347). Some have been cleared by now, but we guess many more had not been registered and give a round figure based on the official 1981 total to indicate the rough size of this group.
28. Numbers are vast and nebulous. Squatters in backyard dwellings in the established townships are said to number many thousands. Savage (for the PFP) put the squatter population of Soweto at 60 000 in 1982, and Louis Rive, government adviser on the housing crisis, later put it at 90 000. As well as this huge squatter settlement, there are many small ones.

2.7.3 Total estimate 1970-1982

We offer a tentative list of totals here, based on the two lists above despite the gaps and many vague items, to suggest the scale of relocation in the Eastern Cape. The table here differs from estimates in Chapter 2.3 above which are drawn entirely from census statistics. Moreover, this table refers to all relocation into and within the Eastern Cape, whereas the earlier one concentrates on relocation into the Ciskei and Transkei.

MINIMUM ESTIMATE OF KNOWN RELOCATION & THREATENED REMOVALS, EASTERN CAPE, 1970 - 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Known relocation</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Pending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 000</td>
<td>Black spots, private locations, homeland consolidation</td>
<td>38 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121 000</td>
<td>Urban/ small town locations</td>
<td>86 000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>Squatters (mainly urban)</td>
<td>170 000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>Relocation as resistance</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109 000</td>
<td>Farms (incl. some squatters)</td>
<td>150 000 +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>Secondary removals</td>
<td>33 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>331 000</strong></td>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>477 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART 3

Case studies
3.1 INTRODUCTION

We studied six resettlement areas in some depth. Three were older townships dating back to the 1960s: Mdantsane was chosen as the great urban resettlement, and Dimbaza and Sada as rural ones that contrasted with each other because Dimbaza was deliberately developed unlike Sada where relatively little has been done. These older settlements were especially interesting for showing what happened or didn't happen over a period of time. The other areas were new. The other three areas were true closer settlements. Elukhanyeni grew from removals in the name of homeland consolidation; Glenmore from the clearance of squatter areas mainly; and Kammas kraal from farm removals, partly as a result of the consolidation plan. In these three it was the removal itself or the circumstances surrounding it that we wanted to focus on as much as on life in the site afterwards.

We regret omitting some places that really cry out for investigation. Thomhill is one, with its background of political removal, the dreadful logistics of the site, the delays and what people did through the years waiting for the basic promises to be met (a continuing state of affairs), the huge question of these rural barracks existing at all. Another is Ndevana near King William's Town which reflects influx from the farms. People have been coming here for years now, in a continuous and totally organised seepage: they are channelled to the site. Again, this place is vast, and poses vast questions as many of the families are marginalised almost out of life itself, their position is so bad. Surveys need to be done in these and many other areas.

Most of our fieldwork was done between December 1980 and February 1981. The sampling was as random as we could make it. In Mdantsane we had to opt for just two zones but tried to keep a balance by choosing one old and one new. Questionnaires were administered on the basis of house numbers. The interviewers were reasonably carefully trained. They met the household head where possible, otherwise some senior member of the family. A copy of the questionnaire is included in SPP Volume 1, and our originals are to be lodged with Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.

A major deficiency was that we did not get specific information on income. Later we felt we should at least try to have some idea of the level and spread of per capita incomes. Estimates were based on employment figures together with household composition. Wages and pensions per month were roughly rated on a point system thus:
Local male wage  80
Local female wage  40
Migrant male remittance  100
Migrant female remittance  50
Pension  40

All the incomes in a household were totalled; then the members (2 points for an adult, 1 for a child under 18 years); and then the first total was divided by the second to get a sort of per capita rating. It was rather a crude procedure and the conclusions at best are very rough. Still, it did help to show up the extent of poverty in some areas and also the distribution of income.

There was an error in programming the educational data. The first year of the matric course is Standard 9. By inferring it was Standard 9 we have not included in our figures those people who had gained Standard 9 level. This would be a small fraction of the whole because very few people manage to go beyond Junior Certificate, and of those presumably it is proportion would have been at the level of Standard 9+.

The reports were written up separately by six individuals. There are some differences of interpretation which we could not resolve.

3.2 MDANTSANE

3.2.1 Introduction

Mdantsane is situated in the Gisela about 20 km from East London. It has a population of over 200,000 people. It was established in the early 1960s, and has been developed since then, to allow for the relocation (i.e., resettle) of African residents from the East London (EL) townships. Most employed Mdantsane residents in fact work in EL. Besides relocation from EL, African people from other areas of 'white' South Africa have also been moved to Mdantsane. Furthermore, African people have moved freely to Mdantsane, both from within the Gisela and from 'white' South Africa, including EL.

However, the establishment and development of Mdantsane must be understood in the context of the South African State's policy of urban relocation. Briefly, this relocation involves moving people

through the resiting of their urban township in the neighbouring reserve (in some cases this may have involved no removal but rather a redrawing of the boundary). (Baldwin, 1975, 216)

In the case of Mdantsane, African people have been physically relocated from the EL townships. The removals still continue, with the present EL African population officially being c. 35,000 in 1980. This physical shift contrasts with the case of the Durban township KwaMasu, which was simply incorporated into KwaZulu in 1977 through the redrawing of the KwaZulu border.

In terms of government propaganda, Mdantsane is defined as 'a model town with all the amenities of comfortable living'. (Banu, May 1976) The town has been planned so as to have a central business district (CBD) surrounded by neighbourhoods or socio-administrative zones (comprising about 1,800 houses) in which can be found administration offices, schools, shops, clinics, recreational facilities, etc. The main bus terminal to EL is set in the CBD, with the road to EL providing the only access to Mdantsane. Roads lead from the CBD to the zones, of which there are 13 at present (1982). While the quality of life of Mdantsane residents is better than in the other Gisela resettlement areas, Mdantsane is certainly not a town with 'all the amenities of comfortable living'. This is reflected in the objective socio-economic conditions present in Mdantsane and by such attitudes of residents as these:

There is no work here, only starvation.
I have no house, I am still a lodger here.

We are living far from town (EL), so we have to use those expensive buses to go there.
This report on Mdantsane is divided into three main sections. Firstly we try to explain the removals from EL to Mdantsane. This involves a brief descriptive account of the State policy of urban relocation and its original application to EL, and an examination of the EL housing situation before the establishment of Mdantsane in the early 1960s. Secondly, the actual movement of EL African residents to Mdantsane is outlined, including such issues as resistance to the relocation policy and conditions on arrival in Mdantsane. Thirdly, the socio-economic situation in Mdantsane is examined, focusing on demography, employment, housing, dietary patterns etc. The report ends with a general summary and conclusion.

3.2.2 Background to the removals

**URBAN RELOCATION**

Urban relocation policy is related to the urbanisation of the reserves. Since the late 1960s, before local municipal authorities (and later Administration Boards) in 'white' urban areas were allowed to embark on new housing schemes for the African township residents, they were required to have the permission of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Referring to the department's General Circular 27 (1967), Smit and Booyens note:

The Department had to be satisfied that:
1. such new developments (particularly family housing) were imperative and that
2. it was not possible to provide such accommodation in an adjacent black homeland. (1967, 10)

The explicit policy has been that where a town is situated in the vicinity of a reserve ('homeland'), its African workers must be resettled in that reserve with their families, and where this is not possible, the families should be housed in the reserves and the workers accommodated in hostels in the 'white' towns.

From 1 January 1968, Africans living in urban townships were encouraged to '... build houses in Black towns in homelands of their own national unit.' (Smit and Booyens, 1977, 10, quoting the above-mentioned Circular)

From the same date, leasehold tenure was suspended in 'white' urban areas, with the African population only being allowed to rent houses in the future. Even though the 99-year leasehold scheme was introduced in the late 1970s, it has not been applied to urban townships such as Duncan Village in EL, which are to be or are already in the process of being disestablished.

While the urban relocation policy received official South African State recognition in the late 1960s, EL African residents were being relocated to Mdantsane from the early 1960s.

Earlier, in 1957, the EL municipality was instructed by the central State to submit an application for establishing a new township site for its African residents. A committee including representatives of both the municipality and the central State was founded to investigate possible sites for a new township. According to municipal records, the new site would become a magnet ... to draw away blacks from East London, not for work, but for dwelling purposes. (Quoted in Gordon, 1980, 5)

In April 1977 the Minister of the then Department of Native Affairs announced that the Umdanzezi forms were to be site of the new township.*

* The spelling of 'Umdanzezi' was later changed to 'Mdantsane'.

On 20 February 1962 the Minister of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development announced that the entire East London African population was to be moved to the new site, Mdantsane, with the central State assuming all responsibility for the creation of a black city in the Ciskei. (Gordon, 1980, 8) In terms of Government Gazette 240 of 11 May 1962, the land was reserved for the sole occupation of Africans. In late 1963 the first houses were built at Mdantsane, with the removals from EL beginning in 1964. Mdantsane officially became a proclaimed 'homeland town' on April 7, 1966.

**HISTORY OF THE EAST LONDON TOWNSHIPS**

EL began in the mid-nineteenth century with the construction of a trading post and military post at the mouth of the Buffalo River. Since the early decades of this century, it has been the fifth largest industrial centre in South Africa, although its contribution to the national gross manufacturing output has been relatively small, about 2%.

As agriculture deteriorated in the pre-capitalist mode of production in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, African people moved permanently to EL in the hope of finding employment. By the late 19th century, three locations had been established in EL with an African population of about 40,000. By 1921, the population was over 12,000.

Large-scale migration of Africans to the urban areas of South Africa was widespread at this time. In an attempt to limit this migration, the 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act was passed, allowing for some form of influx control. By limiting this migration it was also hoped that the municipalities, including EL, would be able to provide adequate housing for the urban Africans. By 1923 there was already a tremendous housing shortage in EL. The Act also stimulated house building for the EL African population, with 451 houses being built in the mid-1920s.

However, the 1923 Act failed to solve the housing problem in EL. From 1921 to 1936, Africans there increased by about 100% to over 24,000, while continuing to build their own shacks as they had done even before 1923, adding a considerable area of sordid and ramshackle dwellings to the already noisy and overcrowded nucleus of the (East Bank) location. (Reader, 1961, 17)

Then, as in later decades, most employed Africans worked in the manufacturing, commercial and State sectors in EL itself. Beyond this, a substantial minority were employed as migrants, mainly on the Witwatersrand. As well, EL had a relatively large migrant labour force whose permanent homes were to be found in the rural areas of the Eastern Cape.

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s the EL municipality tried to alleviate the housing shortage for Africans. Two commissions, the Thornton Commission (1937) and the Welsh Commission (1949) were appointed to investigate the housing position in the EL townships and make recommendations for improvement. Their recommendations, or at least the ones accepted by the EL municipality, did not succeed.

Meanwhile, agricultural production in the African reserves was declining, resulting in continual migration to the urban centres. By 1946 the EL African population had grown to nearly 33,000. In 1949 the mayor's minutes read:

The lack of adequate and suitable accommodation in the East Bank Location has been the subject of a great deal of criticism during the year under review. (Quoted in Reader, 1961, 22)

The number of houses built for Africans in the EL townships during the late 1930s and throughout the 1940s was totally inadequate.

After the 1923 Act, early apartheid legislation immediately after the 1948 Nationalist victory
was the second major attempt by the South African State to solve the urban African housing ‘problem’. Influx control was tightened up, for example through the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act. As well, more direct measures were taken to allow for more houses to be built. Site- and service housing schemes were introduced. Municipalities were encouraged to extend their monopoly of beer/liquor sales in the townships. Profits from that would be used for housing. Africans were trained as building artisans. (See De Villiers, 1979.)

These measures were implemented in EL during the early 1950s. A site- and service scheme involving 1,548 houses was established in 1953/54 on an extension to the East Bank Location, while skilled African artisans were locally trained for township housing construction – they built 276 suburban houses in 1952.

However, the EL African ‘housing problem’ was not solved. The EL African population increased substantially throughout the 1950s from 39,850 to 56,120, with the EL township manager saying in 1957:

> It has been established that prosecutions for entering the locations under the pass laws have no detrimental effect. (Quoted in Mayer, 1971, 58)

According to Reader’s study conducted in 1955, out of a total of 3,760 dwelling units in the EL townships, 1,930 (just over 50%) consisted of wood-and-iron shacks, with the remainder being municipally built houses. The overcrowding in the shacks, relative to the municipal houses, is reflected in the fact that 30% of the population lived in shacks. 32% of the shacks accommodated at least 5 people each.

Although we lack sufficient empirical data to completely validate the argument, it seems quite clear that the urban African ‘housing problem’ continued throughout South Africa during the 1950s. The early apartheid legislation providing for housing was in part a response to the ‘housing problem’ during the 1940s, a ‘problem’ which was responsible for the extent for the intensity of the African working class struggle then. Such legislation was an attempt to limit this struggle by providing more adequate housing and thus decreasing the discontent of the urban African population.

Similarly, the urban relocation policy was a response to the African working class struggle during the 1950s. With the initial establishment of the policy of separate development in the early 1950s, the South African State saw urban relocation as a means whereby working class demands on housing could be redirected to bantustan governments. The policy would also redirect protests about transport cost increases and struggles in the labour field to the bantustan governments. In the case of Ciskei, the latter conflicts are exemplified in the one between SAMWU and the Ciskei State.

On the EL ‘housing problem’ and the removals from EL to Mdantsane, the Welsh Commission of 1949 had suggested that a satellite township be built for the relatively wealthy EL Africans. In September 1953, the Minister of the then Department of Native Affairs rejected the idea, saying the EL municipality should search for a new township site that could absorb further increases in the EL African population – the existing township sites were totally inadequate in this respect. This project was also not implemented.

In terms of the separate development strategy, the central South African State was to provide the EL municipality with more adequate means for dealing with the local ‘housing problem’. The urban relocation policy represents the third major attempt by the State to solve this ‘problem’ in the interests of South African capitalism.

3.2.3 The removals

Although Mdantsane was established so as to hand on to the Ciskei the ‘housing problem’ of the EL African labour force, the sheer size of the Mdantsane population cannot be understood merely in terms of the movement of EL residents to Mdantsane. The Deputy Secretary of the then Department of Bantu Administration and Development said in August 1962 that 10,000 families in the Western Cape would be resettled to Mdantsane in the near future (Gordon, 1980, 15). All the households in the SFP survey that were forcibly removed came from EL. A small minority also moved voluntarily from rural mission land at Mooiplaas, trust land at Pelvile and tribal land at Middletreff and Mount Coke. Any ‘Ciskei’, whether inside or outside the Ciskei, may apply to the Mdantsane Town Council for a house in Mdantsane. (Officially 85% of these houses are allocated to former EL African residents, but in practice this is not the case. Patron-client relationships appear to operate, the patrons being Ciskei State officials.)

The African population in EL is a long-established community, as we have seen. Even though the vast majority of households had lived in EL for more than 20 years, this did not deter the South African State from disestablishing their ‘townships’, and moving them to Mdantsane.

Not all former EL households now living in Mdantsane were forcibly removed from EL. According to the SFP survey, about 49% of the households were evicted from their houses and brought to Mdantsane, while 60% moved ‘voluntarily’. (This is discussed below.) These percentages stand for very large numbers of people: it was found that 83% of Mdantsane households came from EL. It is estimated that 48,258 former EL residents were living in Mdantsane by 1971 (Wilson, 1972, 61) and 82,000 by 1977. (DD: 7.39.79) Officials said in 1971 that the EL townships would be ‘cleared’ by 1976. Now in early 1982 Dr G de V Morrison, Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development, has said that all EL African residents will be in Mdantsane by the end of 1983. The West Bank Location has been entirely cleared, and is now the site of an industrial area. As areas in the East Bank Location (i.e. Duncan Village) have been cleared, housing schemes have been built for coloureds and Indians.

The EL households who were evicted and brought to Mdantsane were told to leave by the EL local authorities, chiefly the East Cape Administration Board (ECAB) since the early 1970s. Sometimes these authorities did not tell the people why they were being evicted. However, most households were told that their area in the EL townships had been declared a coloured or an Indian group area.

It was said that we should move out of the area because it was for coloureds.

They recognised the authoritarian nature of this decision:

We used to hold meetings asking whether they (ECAB) declared the coloured area with our people and the coloureds, or just decided to do so themselves.

With their historical roots in EL, they were simply not willing to move to Mdantsane after receiving their eviction notices. They tried to stay:

We knew that we had to move but we did not, waiting to be moved. Eventually they reached our houses, so we had no alternative but to move.

Any attempt at resisting removal was met by threats from the State authorities.

We formed a group and endeavoured to ask what the reason of our eviction is, but they promised to take us to jail and eventually we were brought here.

The evicted people were carted off against their will on GG trucks. They could load their belongings on the trucks, but nevertheless lost a great deal because their houses were demolished to make way for the coloured and Indian housing schemes. No compensation was offered.

Other households have moved voluntarily. However, there has been tremendous indirect and direct pressure on people to do so. This is particularly true of EL people who lived in shacks instead of municipal housing. EL people were told that Mdantsane was a paradise:

We were made to expect a paradise of a homeland in the urbanised form.

We were given to believe that it was to be a wonderful model township for our freedom.

(Quoted in Mayer, 1971, 299)
It was not just the lure of a better life there, Objective township conditions in EL 500
pressured them into moving. Because the 99-year leasehold scheme does not apply in EL, the
maintenance and further improvement of existing services has been withheld. There are
no facilities in the surrounding area. (Udada, 23.05.80) The South African State’s argument was
and is that as all EL africans are due to move to Mdantsane, there is no point in spending money
on ‘township’ services. The same applies to family housing, which has been restricted in terms of
the previously mentioned General Circular 27 of 1967. While the leasehold scheme has not
been applied to EL, Mdantsane residents are allowed some form of home ownership. All these
pressures have induced people to move.

I moved because the one-roomed house (in EL) was too small for my family.
We came to purchase a house in Mdantsane.
We came here to look for a bigger house.
We wanted at least a four-roomed house, not that one-roomed house of ours.

In the early days at Mdantsane, the facilities offered to people on arrival were fairly typical of
those in any Ciskei or other homeland relocation area. By May 1964, when about 1 000
houses had been built, there were few facilities. Water was available only from standpipes in
the streets, and the only toilet facilities were pit latrines. Nevertheless, people were being
moved in from EL, notably 500 families from the Juluwe emergency camp adjoining Duncan Village.
(SAIRR Survey 1964, 224) By mid-1965, about 1 200 families had been relocated from EL.

Mdantsane
was started before necessary amenities such as police stations, streetlights, clinics
and shops were available. (SAIRR Survey 1965, 183)

In the SPP study, Mdantsane residents were asked, from a given list of facilities, which ones
were available on their arrival. The responses should be seen as the subjective perception of
the residents. Of those interviewed, 35% had arrived in Mdantsane in either 1966 or 1967, and
43% in 1980. Most of the people we met had come in either 1966/67 or 1980, but that was
because most interviews were done in two particular zones. The socio-economic situation in
these two zones may differ slightly from Mdantsane as a whole. Most residents said that
latrines, water and roads were there on their arrival, but fuel, clinics and shops were not.

3.2.4 Mdantsane - an overview

The Rekert Commission distinguishes between three types of urban areas in the reserves,
calling them fully fledged towns, rudimentary towns, and closer settlements. Mdantsane is an example of a ‘fully fledged town’, these
being provided with full services and are developed mainly to replace the urban Black
residential areas (i.e. ‘townships’) of White Towns or cities situated near the borders

The establishment of ‘fully fledged towns’ is clearly connected to the policy of urban relocation,
Dimbaza is an example of a ‘rudimentary town’, while ‘closer settlements’ in the Ciskei would
include Iikhanweni and Kammaskraal.

Mdantsane is the third largest town in the reserves, KwaMashu in KwaZulu being the largest.
The only township in ‘white’ South Africa which is larger than Mdantsane is Soweto in the
Transvaal. Just as Soweto is a labour pool for Johannesburg, so Mdantsane serves the centre
of EL. According to EL municipal records, the ultimate planned size of Mdantsane is 450 000
residents living in 30 socio-administrative zones. (Gordon, 1980, 14) The South African State
intends moving africans from Belina as well as EL.

GEOGRAPHY

Mdantsane lies north-west of EL along the King Williams’s Town road. It is close to the railway
line. The actual land area is 2 883 ha, considerably larger than the 300 ha of Duncan Village.
The Mdantsane site
consists of a series of valleys and ridges running generally in a north-south direction.
The land slope varies between 1:4 and 1:20, with an average of 1:12, draining south-
wards towards the Buffalo River. (Gordon, 1980, 8)

While the northern boundary is the King Williams’s Town/EL railway line, the southern one is
marked by Bride Drift Dam. The chief feature of the site is its hills. The CBD is on top of a
hilly with housing scattered about it. The place is spread fairly wide because some slopes are
too steep for housing.

DEMOGRAPHY

The preliminary census figure for Mdantsane in 1980 was 148 621, but this is almost certainly
far too low. By contrast, the Qual Commission gave an estimate of 250 000 (1980, para 82)
At the end of 1980 an official in Mdantsane gave us his personal estimate of about 185 000.
Today the evidence strongly suggests that the de facto population alone is well over 200 000.

The de jure populattor by sex and age is composed thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>DE JURE POPULATION OF MDANTSANE, BY SEX AND AGE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>18,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>13,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>6,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>4,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>4,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The masculinity rate (92) in Mdantsane is only slightly lower than the national african average,
suggesting that the de jure population consists in general of family households. This point is
confirmed by the fact that the age distribution is similar to the national average. Most family
households are nuclear, although about 30% are three-generational, extended ones.

According to the ‘quality of life’ study done in 1980 by the Institute of Social and Economic
Research (ISER) at Rhodes University, the average household size in Mdantsane is 7,3, a figure
which would include family members, relatives and lodgers who are not relatives. Over a third
of the households have at least nine people.
Since most workers commute, the de facto figure is quite close to the de jure one, although the percentages of young and old are somewhat higher for the de facto population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 46.0 54.0 100.0

The de facto masculinity rate (86) is much lower than the de jure one. While only 1% of the total de jure population is migrant, 72% of migrants are male, thus lowering the masculinity rate for the de jure population.

The percentage of people aged 25-64 who work as migrants (21%) is lower than in most other Ciskei resettlement areas, particularly the 'closer settlements'. Only 10% of female adults migrate, as opposed to 33% of males.

In the de jure population, over 60% of household heads are male. While nearly 25% of male household heads migrate, hardly any of the female ones do. Assuming that a woman always takes charge of a household whenever a male or female household head becomes a migrant, just over 50% of de facto household heads would be female.

**Agriculture**

Living in an urban centre, Mdantsane residents do not have access to grazing and arable land in the form of fields. They can grow vegetables on their house plots, most of which measure 15.24 x 21.34 metres (i.e. 325.2 square metres).

Nearly 60% of the households produce food from their gardens. Maize, potatoes and beans are grown by about 65% of these households, and some have spinach, onions, cabbage, tomatoes and carrots. A few people keep poultry, for meat and eggs. 10% of all households sell some of their produce, mainly vegetables, primarily through the informal sector. Employment in the formal economy is a far more important source of income than agricultural production. However, the garden produce does help families to save on food money.

**Labour**

Residents are employed in Mdantsane itself, or else as 'frontier' commuters or migrant labourers. There is a large commuter work force compared with other Ciskei resettlement areas. Most of them work in EL - in fact Mdantsane was created to house the EL work force. As the EL municipal records of the late 1950s say, it was hoped it would eventually become a magnet ... (to) draw away blacks from East London, not for work, but for dwelling purposes. (Quoted in Gordon, 1980, 16)

In 1979 the Mdantsane commuter work force numbered 29 400, 28 900 of whom worked in EL and 500 in Berlin. According to the SPP data, 53% of all those employed are commuters, and 33% are migrants. Only 15% work in the Ciskei, the vast majority in Mdantsane itself.

The activity rates for all workers in the de jure population are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average 39 38 38

The average activity rate (38), being the percentage of adults aged 15 years and over who are employed or searching for work, is near the national average for Africans (37). However, while the Mdantsane male activity rate (39) is much lower than the national one (49), the female rate (38) is much higher than the national one (26). The need for more than the luck of the driven is great in Mdantsane. Women have a fair chance of getting jobs in the large domestic service sector in EL, and it is wives in particular who go off in search of work. The relatively low male activity rate is not true for all age groups, but is confined to the young (15-34 years) and the old (65+).

The dependency rate for Mdantsane is 26.2%. Given that the average household size is 7.3 (based on the IGER survey), this means that on average a household has 1.9 people in employment.

As noted above, only a small percentage of employed residents actually work in Mdantsane. This reflects the fact that relatively few jobs are available there. In 1977, employment opportunities amounted to 7 060. The largest employer then was the Cecilia Makiwane Hospital, with 2 700 posts. Local government took on 1 296, the education sector was the third largest employer with 647 employees. Most employment therefore was, and is, to be found in the State sector. Jobs in manufacturing are incredibly limited, only 408 in 1977 (Gordon, 1980).

Industrial growth in the Ciskei has been concentrated at the growth point of Dimbaza. Mdantsane people complain about this:

*Work is scarce here.*

Job opportunities should be created in Mdantsane.

Open as many factories here for work as possible.

With so few jobs going in Mdantsane, people are forced to seek work in the EL area as 'frontier' commuters. In fact many who moved from EL to Mdantsane were able to keep their EL jobs. However, by being permanently relocated in Mdantsane, people have lost their Section 10 (1) (a), (b) or (c) rights, and are now defined as Section 1 (d), even though, unlike migrant labourers, they are not restricted to being employed on the basis of one-year contracts. Up to 1981 at least, Mdantsane workers had to report to the labour bureau in EL for a workseeker's permit. Only then could they try to find work do-to-door. If they found work, they then had to return to the labour bureau to have their employment officially ratified. An Mdantsane workseeker indicates what problems this can cause:
Nowadays: am sent to a madam by the labour office and when I get there she will say she has engaged somebody already. I am left to pay the return fare for nothing.
(Quoted in Mayer, 1971, 297)

But now it appears that people must get their workseeker's permits from the labour bureau in Mdantsane itself.

Many Mdantsane people (32% of those employed) have had to get work further afield as migrant contract workers. This means going through the Mdantsane labour bureau where the contracts are limited to one year. The well-known social problem arising from the migrancy system is evident in Mdantsane.

Our problem is family disunity as a result of migratory labour.

Almost all migrants are male, half of whom work in Johannesburg on the mines.

This is where their jobs are:

Fig 1 WORK PLACES OF THE MDANTSANE EMPLOYED (%)

The table on the next page shows what industrial sectors the people are in, differentiating between migrants and locals (i.e., those employed in the Ciskei, and commuters).

The service sector employs most, 40% of the total. Mining comes next with 17%, and then manufacturing (16%). Construction and transport are the next largest employers.

The main sector for females is services. Over 70% of their jobs are of this kind. Most local service workers are employed privately as domestic servants in East London. The only other significant sector for females is manufacturing, with EL firms taking advantage of the fact they can pay women less than men.

Men are more evenly distributed among the sectors. Mining takes most (27%), and manufacturing, construction, services and transport are all of more or less equal importance (13-17%). Male migrants are overwhelmingly employed in mining, where wages are relatively low. All of them go to the Witwatersrand mines. The mining sector obviously does not effect local workers. Most of these are in the manufacturing, transport and State service sectors. The bulk of them work in EL, with employers in these three sectors relying heavily on Mdantsane for their labour.

The occupational structure of all jobs is shown here:

Table 5 OCCUPATIONAL LEVELS OF MDANTSANE WORKERS (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Local employment</th>
<th>Migrant employment</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male Female Total</td>
<td>Male Female Total</td>
<td>Male Female Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>16 21 19</td>
<td>6 16 8</td>
<td>12 20 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>19 35 27</td>
<td>0 42 12</td>
<td>11 37 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>28 6 16</td>
<td>39 16 33</td>
<td>32 8 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>37 38 38</td>
<td>55 26 47</td>
<td>45 35 40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over 60% are labourers, more of them migrant than local. The emphasis on the migrants here is because most migrants work in mining, manufacturing and construction, where they have little chance of getting white-collar jobs. More males (77%) than females (43%) are at the labouring level. This is particularly true of migrants, where males have much less chance of white-collar and service jobs.

Nearly 25% of workers are in skilled jobs (32% of males and 8% of females). Interestingly enough, the percentage of skilled work is greater for migrants (33%) than for local workers (16%). No doubt this is partly because many local workers are in the service sector.

The skilled/unskilled rate is much higher for migrants than for local employees, and higher for males than females. The lower ratio for locals is possibly because their jobs tend to be labour-intensive, a feature of EL employment compared with other industrial centres. The ratio for men does not differ significantly between migrants and locals, but is much lower for local females than for migrant females.

The unemployment rate is quite high: 38.2% for females, 24.2% for males, and 31.5% overall. This has caused strain:

We are still unemployed here.
We are living in poverty here because of unemployment. All of us were working in Duncan but here we are sitting helpless because there is no work. Starvation is here, caused by unemployment.

The unemployment rates look like this in terms of sex and age:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45+</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The female unemployment rate is higher than the male rate throughout. The highest rate for both males and females is amongst the young. Unemployment is highest for female youth, and lowest for males aged 35-44.

Clearly then, people do not have enough jobs in Mdantsane, whether on the spot or at 'frontier' commuter points or migrant.

INCOME

The formal sector, which we have just examined, is the most important source of income, but there are also informal sector activities and social welfare benefits such as old age pensions.

Unemployment forces many people into informal activities. They are required to get a licence from the Mdantsane Town Council for any hawking. Not everyone succeeds. One of the requirements for a licence is explicit support for the Ciskei National Independence Party. Many people therefore carry on informal trading illegally, which causes much friction with those who do have licences. The latter accuse the others of cutting into their consumer market.

A 1975 survey in Mdantsane found that of all earners, formal and informal, 14% depended totally on informal sources of income, while others in the formal sector were also involved in informal activities. (Block, 1980) In the SPP study, it was found that 16% of households have some form of informal sector involvement, usually selling vegetables from the market or grown in their own gardens, but also jerseys, paraffin, table mats, beer, meat, etc.

Informal income aside, 90% of all incomes are from the formal economy, 8% are old age pensions and 2% disability grants. Of all adults including migrants, 40% earn an income in the formal economy, while nearly 5% receive some form of pension.

Pensions and informal sector activities are thus of some importance for income. While most incomes are from the formal economy, these two other sources are vital to some households. There are problems though. Those trading illegally are subject to police harassment, and so on. Pensioners do not always get their money regularly. Some find the two-monthly payout system very hard to cope with and would far prefer being paid every month.

It appears that all migrants remit regularly to their families in Mdantsane.

The ISER survey of 1980 gives us fairly recent data on income levels in both the formal and informal sectors, and on pensions, even though it does not differentiate between the three sources. This pattern emerges:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per capita income*</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Household income</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R0 - 25</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>R0 - 100</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 80</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>101 - 250</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81+</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>251+</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (PCIN)

The PCIN figures mean, for example, that in 31% of households, the average monthly income yields R26 - 80 per member.

POVERTY

Turning now to poverty levels, the better-off households (R81+ per month) tend to be small, their mean size being 3.7 people. The dependency ratio is probably quite small, with perhaps one or two wage-earners. The poorest households (R0 - 25 per month) are generally large, with an average of 8.6 people. Their dependency ratio would be quite high, with many children and elderly people. Quite a few are of extended, three-generational families.

In the ISER study, residents were asked how their present financial position compared with that of three years ago (1977). 61% said it was worse. Only 13% were positive, while 26% felt there had been no change.

An income survey conducted in Mdantsane in 1975 (see Block, 1980) found that the average household monthly income amounted to R174, with the average monthly PCIN being R31. The median income was R107/month, meaning that 50% of households earned less than R107/month and 50% earned more. In 1975 the EL Poverty Datum Line (PDL) was R105/month. Using this as our defining line for poverty then, we can say that more than 50% of households lived below it in 1975. The figure is certainly more than 50% because, while the PDL is based on an average household size of 6 people, the average in Mdantsane is more than 7.

Comparing monthly household incomes for Mdantsane in 1975 and 1980 with the PDL results for those two years, the economic position of households has definitely deteriorated in real terms. Comments cited above illustrate how people feel.

In 1980, 49% of households had an income of R0 - 100/month. The EL PDL for 1980 was R165/month. Given that 33% of households had a monthly income of R101 - 250/month (see Table 7), it is clear that well over 50% of households lived below the PDL in 1980.

Mdantsane households are subjected to some degree of poverty. It manifests itself in a number of ways: the inability to buy enough food, to pay high transport costs and house rentals, to pay for school uniforms and books (all of which will be noted later in the report). Clothes are another problem:

Clothing the children is our difficulty.
Clothing is our problem - we have no money to buy new clothes.
DIET

As for dietary patterns, 67% of households eat three times a day, 28% twice a day, and 5% only once a day. Food items occurred as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food items</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Twice weekly</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Less than weekly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carbohydrates:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proteins:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitamins:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea/coffee</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fat</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The normal diet is heavy in carbohydrates (maize and bread) with tea/coffee and sugar. For vitamins, both milk and greens are used regularly by about a third of households, the others having greens more regularly than milk. Proteins, in milk and eggs, are irregular features. It amounts to a very inadequate dietary pattern.

People talked about starvation:

When I wake up early in the morning, I do not have tea because of starvation.

We are starving and some have died of starvation.

Starvation - I think all of us are not going to survive the coming years because of starvation.

We are staring here more than we were in Duncan.

More starvation here - we are suffering more than words can say.

A survey done by Dr Trudi Thomas in Mdantsane in 1978 showed that one out of every ten children dies before the age of one, and that 75% of eight-year-olds are malnourished.

SERVICES

HEALTH

Health facilities in Mdantsane include the Cecilia Makwane Hospital. This is a Ciskeian regional hospital where many people from all over the Ciskei are admitted, and so in that sense Mdantsane does not have a hospital to itself. Two dozen or so permanent and temporary clinics are scattered about the zones.

The ISER survey found that 39% were dissatisfied with health services in Mdantsane, primarily because of the 'bad standard'. Many go to EL instead. Whatever the health services are like, malnutrition will continue if people cannot earn enough to buy nutritious food.

COMMERCe

The CBD in Mdantsane houses the main firms such as clothing shops, general dealers, butchers and bottle stores. A large Checkers supermarket is being built now. There are also banks. Many of the businesses are in the Lennox Sebe shopping complex. Each socio-administrative zone also has a small business centre, which includes its own administration office, Schools and clinics are scattered throughout each zone.

The business sector in Mdantsane is incredibly underdeveloped - it cannot cater for local needs. For example, a small survey in the mid-1970s showed that 53% of the residents' total expenditure was spent in EL. (Gordon, 1980) With the new Checkers supermarket, the situation will improve, but even then the money is essentially leaving Mdantsane through the chain store. In fact the supermarket will draw custom from the small local shops, so the outflow of money will increase. It will save on transport costs to EL though, once people can buy locally.

Compared to the EL townships, the situation in Mdantsane is an improvement:

There are more shops, butchery, bottle store and a market.

HOUSING AND ASSOCIATED SERVICES

Prior to 1970 the South African Bantu Trust (SABT, now Development Trust) was solely responsible for the establishment, financing and development of 'homeland' towns. Since 1970 the 'homeland' governments and the development corporations have increasingly become involved. From 1959/60 to 1969/70, the SABT's real expenditure on these towns amounted to R120 million. All three - the SABT, 'homeland' governments and development corporations - spent a total of no less than R550 million from 1970/71 to 1979/80. The figure for the Ciskei alone from 1972/73 to 1979/80 amounted to R68.01 million.

Most of this is for housing and associated services such as water supply, roads, drainage. Increasing expenditure on 'homeland' towns over the past two decades reflects the urbanisation of the 'homelands', due in large part to the policy of urban relocation. The bill for developing Mdantsane amounts to about R50 million so far.

The standard houses built in the 'fully fledged towns' (Mdantsane etc.) are the NE 51/9 and the NE 51/9. The 51/6 houses are the older type, and consist of four rooms with no ceilings, and outside sanitation. Walls are unplastered, painted concrete blocks and roofs are of asbestos sheeting. Floors are of uncovered concrete.

(Gordon, 1980, 15)

The newer type, the 51/9 house, is adapted to allow for an inside toilet and shower. Based on the ISER survey, the rental charges (which include a service charge for services such as street maintenance and refuse removal) in 1980 for these two types of houses were respectively R15.45/ month and R16.00/month. Residents are also allowed a form of home ownership, although they may only sell their 'purchased' houses back to the Ciskeian government. In 1982 the purchase price of a 51/9 house is c. R2 600, which reflects a considerable subsidy on the actual cost of R3 500.

The actual physical construction of housing (and services) is done by the Mdantsane Special Organisation established by the EL municipality, which consists of labourers, builders and
The municipality acts as agent of the SADT, with the Department of Co-operation and Development as controlling body. Africans have been trained locally as skilled artisans for the Special Organisation. The Ciskei Department of Works is responsible for maintaining the houses and services.

In addition to this building programme, there is an owner-finance housing scheme where a prospective home-owner can have the Special Organisation build a house, either a 51/9 or an improved version of it. These houses, bought at cost price (e.g., at R3 500 for a 51/9 house in 1982) are financed by personal means or a loan from the Ciskei National Development Corporation (CNDC). By mid-1978, after the scheme had been going for 18 months, the CNDC had invested R55 000 and residents R250 000.

By 1980, 18 828 houses had been built in Mdantsane. The ISER study shows that 69% were of the 51/9 type and 31% of the 51/6 type. It also gauges that about 25% of households have bought their houses. The others rent them, mostly from the local authority. About 10% of households pay rent as lodgers. In 1977, about 4,000 families were on the waiting list for permanent houses, and the shortage is still severe, even though the 120 houses completed in 1981/82 brings the total of housing units to 21,433. In 1982 there are some 2,000 privately built houses with another 500 on order, and private sources have invested about R6 million in this scheme.

(DD, 2.06.82)

In 1980, 15% of houses had electricity. Now in 1982 a new electrical distribution centre at Fort Jackson adds to the supply. Two further reservoirs are also under construction. Compared to what they had in EL, the residents in general are fairly satisfied:

There are many people who did not have houses there but have houses here.

We have toilets inside the houses.

We used to have one tap on every street but here the taps are in the houses.

In Duncan Village there was a shortage of houses and filthiness.

Similar feelings had prevailed even in 1970:

Here I have four rooms which belong to me. The house is airy and light, compared to the brick houses we lived in at Duncan Village. I have my lavatory. Altogether it is a pleasant place to live in.

It is like four houses in one. I have got a garden and everything to myself.

We are no longer crowded and all on top of one another. The nearby gutters are not full of rotten food and human droppings. (Quoted in Mayer, 1971, 296)

But this does not mean that people are totally satisfied. In 1980 the ISER asked residents what they thought of housing and services. On a scale of one (very satisfied) to five (very dissatisfied), the mean score for Mdantsane on both housing and services was 3.5. Thus in general there is a lot of dissatisfaction with housing and services.

Houses should be built for lodgers.

Bigger and better houses should be built.

We would like to have our streets tarred.

In the ISER survey, 98% said that their housing costs were too high, considering the income they received and the quality of the house.

Residents rated their housing conditions thus:

Table 9 OPINIONS ON MDANTSANE HOUSING (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing factor</th>
<th>Verdict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation comfortable</td>
<td>42 NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation enough space</td>
<td>70 NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation well ventilated</td>
<td>49 NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter temperature inside</td>
<td>55 VERY COLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer temperature inside</td>
<td>54 VERY HOT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quite a serious negative response here. Residents were also asked if specific services were available in Mdantsane. Including paved roads, proper pavements, stormwater drains, water to houses, streetlights, refuse removal, wastewater drains. More than half said that these services were available, except for proper roads and pavements which most people felt were lacking.

How these services help Mdantsane is only part of the story. Huge concentrations of people are bound to strain the environment - the long-term pollution of the Buffalo River, for example, may build up to very serious levels in future.

Housing and services are far worse in Duncan Village than in Mdantsane. In February 1981, Duncan Village was identified by a central State inquiry as one of the eight crisis points in the Eastern Cape for priority action. As we have said, the policy of urban relocation of EL has stopped the local authorities from improving conditions in Duncan Village - and conversely the worsening conditions have been welcomed in some quarters as a direct means to get people to move more willingly. This has also been true of the other townships such as West Bank, where maintenance stopped while they were being cleared.

Duncan Village township includes what is called the Duncan Village emergency camp, where an estimated 50% of EL Africans live. This camp consists of shacks all on top of each other. The ISER survey only covered State-provided housing, not the emergency camp. Even in terms of State-provided housing, residents there were far more negative about standards than people in Mdantsane. On the scale of one (very satisfied) to five (very dissatisfied), the overall scores were 4.3 and 4.6 on housing and services, a quite damning result. Despite that, Race Relations in EL observed in 1982 that some poor people were actually seeking back to Duncan Village from Mdantsane. They were prepared to put up with very bad living conditions for the sake of avoiding conventional rents, or transport costs to EL for their jobs or work seeking.

TRANSPORT

This is an important issue because most Mdantsane workers must commute to EL some 20 km away. People voiced their long-held grievances:

We pay expensive buses to carry us to town.

We used to go to town (when living) in Duncan by foot, but here we pay 60c to go to town.

We would like transport costs to be reduced.

Buses should be regular and not cost very much.

Buses do not enter the area and you have to travel to reach the bus stop.

From the EL townships, the trip to and from work had been relatively quick and cheap. Now in Mdantsane, the situation is completely different. People go to EL by bus or train if they don't
have their own transport. The buses are more popular than trains because the three railway stations nearby are still too far away for most people. However, the road network in Mdantsane has not been designed to let buses pass around easily. Instead all roads tend to lead to the main bus station situated in the CBD, where all the buses leave for EL. The internal road network has therefore been designed with the interests of EL employers in mind rather than to serve people within Mdantsane. (Matavers, 1980)

On average, a worker spends 1½ hours getting to EL by bus. This includes walking to the nearest bus stop, waiting in bus queues at the CBD, and the actual bus trip to EL. It amounts to 2-3 hours every working day. Those whose employers contribute to the Transport Levy Fund have their transport costs subsidised. For these workers, the daily round trip cost 27-43c in 1977, depending on how far the worker lived from the CBD, while others were paying 78c. (Matavers, 1980)

EDUCATION

At present schooling facilities are fairly adequate in purely quantitative terms, with about 50 schools in all: lower primary, higher primary, junior secondary and senior secondary. In the ISER study, local attitudes to education scored an average of 2.4 on the one (very satisfied) to five (very dissatisfied) scale - an opinion between neutrality and satisfaction. People certainly find the situation better than EL had been:

- There are many schools here but in Duncan there were few.
- What I like are the many schools here.
- But many found school expenses too high to bear:
  - Some of our children had to leave school because we had no money.
  - Books and school uniforms are very expensive.

The education levels of the de jure population are as follows, for everyone over 6 years:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower primary</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher primary</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 9+</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is better than the national figure for Africans. Over 40% have completed lower secondary school or higher, with little variation between males and females.

OTHER SERVICES

By 1977 public recreational facilities amounted to eleven tennis courts, three rugby fields, two soccer fields, one cricket pitch and one swimming pool. (Gordon, 1980, 18) There was also a cinema and three community halls. This is not nearly enough. In 1980 people seemed fairly displeased, their response being 3.3 on the range from one (very satisfied) to five (very dissatisfied).

The attitude to welfare services was slightly worse, with a score of 3.5. Welfare services in Mdantsane include a school for mentally handicapped people.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Mdantsane is administered by a Town Council, and a township manager and staff. The council has a mayor and deputy mayor, and the councillors are elected by residents, with some also nominated by the Ciskeian government. The functions of the council include:

- the allocation of residential, business, religious and educational sites, management and control, maintenance of law and order, social welfare... (Gordon, 1980, 16)

The township manager and his staff see to the economic and social progress of the Mdantsane community. The manager is employed by the Ciskeian Department of the Interior. The post will be abolished in the not-too-distant future, according to Gordon. (1980, 18)

COMMUNITY RELATIONS AND CRIME

According to the ISER survey, most people feel their neighbourhoods are friendly and cohesive. This is a change from the late 1960s as recorded by Mayer (1971):

- Mdantsane is a place where a cow misses its calf. Those who love each other miss each other greatly.
- The people I stayed with live quite far from me now.

It seems that the removals to Mdantsane resulted in the scattering of well established EL neighbourhoods, with relocated households having to go where they were put. With the passing of time, though, true neighbourhoods have apparently grown up.

Despite a great deal of cohesiveness and friendliness amongst neighbours, people feel insecure through fear of crime:

- More recreational facilities should be built to curb the youth from violence.
- The ISER study found that 58% of residents did not feel safe in either their home or neighbourhood.
- The crimes worrying them most were assault, rape and housebreaking.

3.2.5 Conclusion

This report was presented in three main sections. Firstly, an attempt was made to explain the removals from EL (as a specific application of the State policy of urban relocation) in terms of the EL 'housing problem'. Secondly, the actual removals from EL were examined, and the conditions on arrival in Mdantsane. Thirdly, the socio-economic situation in Mdantsane was presented.

In the first section it was argued that urban relocation from EL to Mdantsane is an attempt by the State to guarantee the conditions for the reproduction and development of South African
capitalism. The means whereby the State has facilitated the removals was noted in the second section, in terms of both forced and 'voluntary' movement.

In the past the State tried to resolve the contradiction between capital accumulation on an expanding scale and the urban 'housing problem'. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 was one such attempt. Yet the State was aware of failing to find a solution, and is now, in essence, merely locating the 'housing problem' in the reserve areas at places such as Mdantsane.

It is important, however, to recognize that the State, through its policies, reproduces the contradictions of South African capitalism. Working-class struggle in the reserves poses a threat to the reproduction of the entire South African social formation (including the reserves themselves), thus potentially limiting the success of the urban relocation policy. As noted in the third section of this report, the dissatisfaction in Mdantsane with a wide range of socio-economic conditions may lead to increasing opposition to the Ciskei State, which is already manifesting itself in the activities of SAAWU.

3.3 DIMBAZA

3.3.1 Introduction

Dimbaza is about 15 km from King William's Town, on the road to Alice. The first people resettled there arrived in December 1967, but the main influx occurred between December 1968 and February 1969. By May 1969 there were an estimated 90 graves, 70 of which were for children. Dimbaza became a byword for the cruelty of resettlement when British ITV shot the notorious and aptly named film, 'Last Grave at Dimbaza'.

It was precisely this notoriety that seems to have prompted the South African and Ciskei governments to turn the squalid resettlement camp into an industrial showpiece. For instance, when foreign journalists covering the Ciskei 'independence' celebrations asked to be taken to a resettlement camp, the officials grinned all over - they had been expecting this - and said, 'Yes, we understand your concern. We'll take you to Dimbaza.' Their nonchalance was understandable. As Charles Simkins of SALDRU has written:

Notorious in the early 1970's, Dimbaza has been greatly upgraded and improved, to the point of being rebuilt. It has factories, shops, churches, a beerhall and a police station. Different grades of housing exist; telephones are relatively easily obtained. A toy-making project and making of school uniforms takes place in the town hall. A steel foundry and new wool factory are being built... Dimbaza is, in fact, no longer a closer settlement but qualifies, in the phrase of Government circular 25 of 1967, for the title of 'self-contained bantu town'.

The official population figure for Dimbaza in 1978 was 14 562. In mid-1979 (EPH, 17.07.79) Sebe announced that 25 of the 30 factories built or under construction in the Ciskei were at Dimbaza. Apart from those mentioned above, they include Microsteel (bicycles and auto components), Black Forest Clocks, Sotho weavers, Alpha (owned by the Dutch Reformed Church) leather goods, plus other furniture and plastic concerns. Some of these concerns are West German in origin and all have benefited substantially from Ciskei National Development Corporation funding. The transformation of Dimbaza is, it might be argued, a microcosm of the transformation of Ciskei as a result of South Africa's homelands policy. How valid is this claim?

This section will attempt to answer that question. We will begin with a description of the origins of the people of Dimbaza and the reasons for their removal. We will then look at the demographic composition of the town, at its agricultural capacity, at the work people do and the wages they get. We will consider where they live, how much they eat and what they think about their situation. Then, perhaps, we will be in a position to venture an answer.
3.3.2 Origins

The Minister of Bantu Administration told Parliament in May 1969 that 2,897 people of whom 2,041 were children had been moved to Dimbaza. Of these, 203 families came from Middelburg, Cape, 67 families from Burgersdorp and 39 families from Cape Town. Most of them had been forcibly evicted and brought to Dimbaza by truck. They were victims of the decision to move the coloured preference area from the Eislein Line to the KatFish Line. The pattern did not change much subsequently, although after 1971 most of the removals were voluntary. Most of the people of Dimbaza originated in small town locations (43% of the sample) and white farms (30%). 76.6% of Dimbaza residents had lived in their previous places of residence for more than 10 years, and 40.7% had lived there for over 20 years. It is also believed that many Robin Island in-prisoners are sent to Dimbaza so that the security police can keep an eye on them.

Although the statistical information is incomplete, it would appear that most Dimbaza residents were unskilled workers employed in the service sector before the move to Dimbaza. Many of them were unemployed, though this may have been because they were too young to work before the move took place (about 70% of the early resettled people were children).

3.3.3 The removal

Forced removals mostly took place in the period from 1967-71. During this time 15 of the 94 households sampled were evicted and forced to come to Dimbaza, and 8 evicted households came to Dimbaza out of choice. 18 households left their earlier residences for Dimbaza voluntarily. After 1971, with the upgrading of Dimbaza, this picture changes completely - the overwhelming majority of households (37) arriving voluntarily, and only 5 coming as a result of evictions.

14 of the evicted households were brought to Dimbaza by train, and 7 by truck:

*After the superintendent had been door to door in the township (Middelburg) asking heads of families where did they come from originally, we were evicted.*

*We tried to ignore the endorsement but the following month the house was locked and my clothes and furniture were locked outside.*

*We went to the Superintendent to know the reason for the move. Afterwards we were told the trucks are waiting for us and if we resist we would pay train fare.*

*The Republic sent us here. We had a special train to take 200 of us to this place.*

*My husband and myself were given a couple of days to pack and leave Bethulie. We decided to defy the day because we thought about the hardship we will experience at Lady Ferre where we originally came from. That resulted in the arrest of my husband twice.*

The reasons given for eviction varied:

*We were told that we were old and not working. Therefore we were not entitled to a house at Middelburg.*

*My husband was told that since he was not born at Middelburg, he was not entitled to a house of local resident right.*

*They said that was not the place for black, our place is Transkei (sic).*

*The magistrate said the Xhosas have their own country namely Transkei. The Xhosa chiefs are in need of their people.*

Others were evicted from farms, as a result of personal differences or change in ownership. He disallowed us from keeping livestock after he took over ownership from his father. Because my family disobeyed that order he evicted us. Others were allowed to stay because they were not keeping livestock, and many of them were young couples.

Evicted because there was not a single family member worked for Van Niekerk... The owner needed the house so that he can get new people.

The farmer sold the farm. The household did resist but the farmer told us that the newcomer would bring his servants.

A household member had a fight with the owner's son. Then the farmer evicted us.

The head lost sight and they could no longer live there without someone working for the farmer.

12 of the households said that they had sold their stock before the move. Only three of the households said they had received compensation.

The first arrivals were put into wooden huts with zinc roofs. These were followed by two-roomed cement and asbestos houses without ceilings or floors. It took a year before running water was provided.

After dumping, the houses were full of ground inside. They used to leak on rainy days.

Water was fetched from tanks which were far away. There were no street taps.

People used to queue at the offices for a gift of wood per family.

On our arrival, there was too much starvation. There is even now, but not so critical like before.

3.3.4 Demography

The average household in Dimbaza has 7 members. 79% of residents in the sample lived in households of 5 persons or more, and 39% in households of 8 persons or more. 38.7% were children of 14 or under, and 4.1% were 65 or over. These figures are very close to those for the urban areas of the Ciskei, and indicate that the demographic pattern in Dimbaza conforms to the town’s hastily acquired urban status. The substantial numerical superiority of females to males (1.22:1) shows that despite its supposed industrial base, Dimbaza operates very much as a dormitory suburb for commuter and migrant labour. Only 37% of the permanent residents, including children and old people, are male. Females married and living permanently at home outnumber males 2:7:1.

Just over a third of the 60 households who responded to the questionnaire reported infant mortality since their arrival in Dimbaza. 15 households had lost one child, 4 households had lost two children, and two households had lost three children. 39 households had not suffered from infant mortality. The sample indicates an infant mortality rate of 169 per 1,000 live births.
3.3.5 Agriculture

24 households indicated that they had kept 'some' cattle or small stock before the move, but only 11 that they had had access to fields. 8 households had goats, 6 had kept pigs, and 3 had kept horses. 5 households had sold produce. 6 households reported that they had produced much more in their old places than they did in Dimbaza. This page of the questionnaire was very irregularly filled in, so it seems difficult to attach too much significance to these figures. They seem low, but this might be due to the fact that a high proportion of Dimbaza residents come from small town locations rather than from white farms or tribal land.

Out of 77 households questioned in Dimbaza, 55 produced some agricultural products, mostly maize, beans and potatoes. None kept cattle though a few kept small stock and fowls. This compares poorly with pastoral production prior to the removals, when 29% reportedly kept cattle. The result in terms of nutrition will be discussed later on.

3.3.6 Labour

Possibly the most revealing figures in the Dimbaza survey relate to the rate of employment. It should not be forgotten that Dimbaza is the industrial showpiece of the Ciskei, the place where the Ciskei National Development Corporation has spent perhaps R35 million (i.e., 5/8ths of the R63 million spent on industrial development by February 1980), for the benefit, so we are told, of Ciskeians. Yet even here, in a small town, containing only a minute fraction (16 + 17,000) of the Ciskei's total population (600,000+), the sample showed an unemployment rate of 35.1%, with unemployment rising as high as 48% in the crucial male age bracket of 15-24 years. Unemployment is much worse among females (45.5% of total economically active) than among males (23.3%). This is probably due to the fact that occasional domestic service (charring, taking in washing) is not available in Dimbaza as it was in the small town locations. Not much is known about wages received in Dimbaza. Effective incomes mentioned for unskilled workers were of the order of R2 - R3.50 a day and 35c an hour (men), and R6.16 a week (women). Low wage rates were commented on by several respondents, and it was felt that problems would be solved if fair wages were paid.

Although there are more factories, one needs to do something else (in addition) for living.

In Burgersdorp we were certain of our earnings but here it is not the case because we now earn according to our production. When there is no cotton we do no work and we get no pay.

The only problem here is that, although factories are here, people are paid very low wages. We do not think that the Government knows that people are less paid by the factories. If they know they should force the factories to pay us. They must not cheat us.

The factories were, however, regarded as preferable to unemployment, which was mentioned as a major problem by 36% of households.

After work opportunities were created, people no more die due to hunger.

There is not enough work here than on the farms, even though we get low wages there.

If the children who are out of school could get work and be well paid, that can be the solution.

I expect some of my children to work and help me educate the young ones, but there is no work here.

3.3.7 Income

The questionnaires yielded no direct information with regard to the income in terms of each household interviewed. It was possible, however, to make an estimate on the basis of number of earners in each household, and the type of work they did, modified by details of the household diet and comments on the questionnaires. On this basis, it was possible to divide the
surveyed households into four categories: those with no apparent source of regular income, or with such low income that it was clearly inadequate to maintain the household in the basic necessities of life ('destitute'); those with a regular source of income, but apparently barely sufficient ('breadline'); those whose income apparently met their needs ('moderate'); and those who seemed relatively comfortable ('upper'). Though this is admittedly a rough categorisation, almost all the respondents fell squarely into one of these groups.

In Dimbaza, then, 11 (13.4%) of the households surveyed were apparently destitute; 40 (49%) were on the breadline; 27 (33%) were moderately well off; and 4 (4.8%) were in the 'upper' category. 9 of the 11 destitute households arrived in 1971 or earlier. 4 were headed by former Robben Island prisoners who survive entirely on charitable grants and informal activities; there are no jobs for such men in the Ciskei. The other 7 were all from small town locations or 'white' farms. (There was one household from each of Alfreddale, Aiwal North, Bedford, Burgersdorp, Dordrecht, Middelburg, Port Alfred and Stutterheim. 5 of these had never recovered their equilibrium from the initial dumping, and 2 had been disappointed in their hopes of better things. The Port Alfred family was described as follows by a usually phlegmatic interviewer:

This family is starving. When I visited them there was nothing to eat and the day was rainy. There was no fire, six people of the family were on beds. People shared two beds, others lie on the cold floor.

The family is survived by maintenance grant which is received by Nomakhaya and Thembeka. The house head is trying to get another grant for Sindile who's got chest trouble and Buleliwa her baby. A1 to A9 never worked here, and are looking for jobs.

Five adult members of the Dordrecht household (arrived 1974) have died since 1977.

Of the 38 households who arrived before 1972, when the upgrading of Dimbaza began, 20 households fell into the 'breadline' category, 9 into the 'destitute' and 9 into the 'moderate'. The later arrivals tend to be better off, and several households came to Dimbaza to get a job or a house that they could not get elsewhere. Of the 9 households who moved to Dimbaza from urban or tribal areas after 1975, 5 (56%) were in the 'moderate' or 'upper' categories.

Two of the 'upper' families were employed in education, and the other two in the church. There are no obvious differences in composition between 'moderate' and 'breadline' families. Size of household and number of employed were among the variables affecting the prosperity of the household, but did not consistently push in one direction: for example, a large household with three sons away as migrant labourers was clearly better off than a smaller household without adult males. 10% of all households had one member employed as a migrant, and 32% had one member employed locally. 32% of all households had two earners and 16% had more than two earners. 29% received some form of transfer payment. Most earners, both migrant (76%) and local (84%) regularly transmitted remittances to their households.

One effect of the passage of most Dimbaza residents from the rural economy to Dimbaza has been that they became fully proletarianised, that is (apart from the garden plots) entirely dependent on a cash income. This has caused great difficulties to people unaccustomed to paying cash for housing, transport and, to a great extent, food.

The difference is that money is used on everything here.

It was better on the farm - we had stock, no rents, we had fields, and the farmer helped us whenever our children got sick. No transport expenses.

We understood the last one but I do not understand this one... There are no ways of cutting wood and selling here as on the farm. If we could return back to the place where we used to live before, we would be very glad.

When I was on a farm I used to eat every day because I was rationed food.

Even for those not actually destitute, life for many in Dimbaza is no more than a matter of hanging on from month to month.

The family solely depends on a salary of the head's wife. A3 sends money which carry the family throughout the month.

The family survive by buying food which can last until the next pension is available.

3.3.8 Housing and diet

The first people at Dimbaza were literally dumped. Then plank houses were put up, and later concrete two-roomed houses without floors or ceilings. Later the more sophisticated houses typical of townships everywhere in the Republic ('matchbox') were erected. Some of these are four-roomed and others five-roomed. It seems that in one part of the town, the older houses are still standing and that their tenants do not pay rent. Of the 20 households (25% of sample) who did not pay rent, 14 were early arrivals, some of whom were still living in temporary accommodation. 4 were ex-Robben Island prisoners, one seems to have been a special case of indigence, and one had been given permission to erect his own shack. 13 households (16%) were or had been sub-tenants. Others obtained houses by taking over the lease from someone who could not pay the rent.

A1's sister-in-law gave us one room and we shared a kitchen with her.

A1's sister got another house then we occupied her first house.

We pay R5 for a room to the landlord. We are still living as lodgers. (Arrived 1969.)

The landlord asked us to keep his land because he is working in Uitenhage. He left us with his shack, so that we could live while still looking for a house.

Rents in Dimbaza seemed to range from R4 to R8 a month in 1980. Frequently a four-roomed house would be unofficially divided between two families who split the rent. Nevertheless, access to housing remains one of Dimbaza's greatest attractions.

Here I have got my own place whereas in Zwelitsha I did not live comfortably. Even though rent is very high. We were lodgers in Zwelitsha. We got a house in Dimbaza. (Family of 10 in two rooms)

The difference is that on the farm, if the Basa does not want you at work, you lose place of living. But here you can stay even if you are fired from the factory.

It would seem from an examination of nutrition patterns that most Dimbaza residents suffer from serious protein deficiencies. Whereas 70% or more of Dimbaza households ate maize, bread, tea/coffee and sugar, only 14% drank milk daily, and 72% drank it less than twice a week. Consumption of eggs (5% daily, 85% less than twice a week), fish (4% daily, 88% less than twice a week) and cheese (5% daily, 90% less than twice a week) was even lower. 27% of households eat meat less than once a month and 48% drink milk less than once a month - devoting figures for a people with a stock-farming tradition.

3.3.9 Services

As we have already mentioned, Dimbaza qualified as a 'self-contained Bantu town'. It possesses many facilities unknown to long-established rural communities, never mind resettlement camps. It has a shopping centre, a market, a post office, a butchery, a clinic and a police station. The
3.3.10 Attitudes

All residents said they got on well with their neighbours, although one early (1966) resident commented that in the beginning 'the children used to fight with children from other places, but now we live at peace'. Dimbaza is far too big, too built up and too diverse in its origins for cliques and home-area factions to form. When asked about their leadership 45 households (53%) named either the community council or their locally elected ward councillor. 16 households (18%) mentioned the Ciskei government or Sebe, 12 church minister, 7 teachers and 4 Mondola. The majority of households (57%) belonged to no organisations or associations at all. 18 households belonged to burial societies and 4 had life insurance. Only 3 households mentioned membership of the ruling party, the Ciskei National Independence Party, fewer than the 4 households which mentioned membership in church women's auxiliaries.

Not surprisingly, most of the later arrivals and some of the earlier ones found good things at Dimbaza. 34 households mentioned the presence of factories and employment, and others commented the post office, schools, shops, market and butchery. 14 households specifically referred to the absence of whites as a positive good. Most of these were from small town locations:

- In Hofmeyr we were under Boers but here someone is not instructed to do this and that except at work.
- This is a location under blacks, and the last place (Cathcart) is a farm under a white farmer who does not take blacks as people but as tools to be used to make him rich.
- We don't experience police raids of passes and liquor like it used to happen at Bethulie.
- In Dordrecht we were under hard rule of whites, but here at least attention is paid to our grievances.

Such comments do more to illuminate the misery of their previous existence than to extol the virtues of Dimbaza. 7 households mentioned security of tenure in their own houses as a benefit of life in Dimbaza - another sad commentary on their earlier experience.

The most commonly mentioned worry was shortage of money (29% of households), followed by unemployment (38%) and shortage of adequate accommodation (29%). 19 households complained of the lack of a hospital, 13 of the cost of educating their children, 9 of high rents and 7 of transport costs. 5 households complained that they were unable to keep stock, and 2 that they had no fields. 5 households lobbied for the pre-cash economy:

Here we buy everything but we do not buy everything in the villages.

4 households praised their former employers for providing them with goods and services they did not get in Dimbaza. 9 households said unemployment and living conditions were much worse than

in their previous home:

- In Hermanus there was no starvation.
- 5 households explicitly complained of the Ciskei government:
  - Here there are always people who look for Government Donations, which was not the case in Middelburg... the Government should stop sending people to collect money from poor people like us.

- It must be emphasised that the figures in this paragraph should not be taken as statistically significant, since not all households expressed themselves equally fully to the interviewers.

- Asked from whom they expected help, 49 households replied that they expected help from the Ciskei or the local authorities. This should be taken as a sign of apathy rather than trust, as the following comment indicated:
  - I have no faith in the Community Committee but if I could trust it I would like to forward my problems to it.

- 26 households did not expect help from anyone at all. 8 households thought that employers might help by offering employment or raising wages. Only 4 households mentioned members of their family.

3.3.11 Conclusion

It is clear that Dimbaza has come a long way since 1971, and that for many people it is not an unpleasant place to live in by comparison with their alternatives. But with unemployment running at 35%, obviously Dimbaza is not a solution for the problems of Ciskei nor a vindication of South Africa's policy of resettlement.
3.4 SADA

3.4.1 Introduction

Sada lies in the north-east border of the Ciskei on the bleak uplands of the Queenstown Basin, 5 km from the tiny administrative dorp of Whittlesea. It is the driest part of the Ciskei and also the coldest, being 1 000 m up and with four months of frost in the year. Days are often sunny and windy. The land becomes arid if it is strained at all. Then there is dust everywhere, and dust spirals move across the countryside.

Sada is the biggest settlement in the Hewu district which covers the whole Ciskei area north-east of the Winterberg and Amatola ranges - bigger than Oxton or Zweledinga or even Thornhill in its population. It is also the oldest of these resettlement areas. It now has about 40 000 people, one-sixth of them squatting next to the formal area.

The squatter grid of streets and housing is the size of a small town. Little houses have spread over the flat land and quite far up the huge hill behind. They are all exposed to wind, heat, cold and dust. Down on the flat it is the same, but the best established side to the south has an elegant edge. Houses there, including some examples of Ciskei Moorish, stand elegantly among 15-year-old trees and look out over a grey waste of industrial land, bare but for 4 small factories, and the early stages of the Shiloh irrigation scheme. Shiloh itself is an old Moravian mission which lies over the tar road beyond, a road running east into Whittlesea and on up to Queenstown in one direction and off into the hills on the other, down to Seymour.

Sada has grown in the fork of the Seymour road and another road branching off it immediately outside Whittlesea. That road goes west to Oxton, Zweledinga and the Katberg Pass. Where the roads divide you look over the industrial and irrigation land to the few fine houses and the bad housing which extends back along the flats and up the hill. Then on the Oxton road you bypass Sada's third side, and through the fence running on your left you see first the mass of planned sites and then about 1 000 mud shacks crammed together on very hard-beaten ground. This long desolate corner is the overflow from Sada known as Emadakeni (The Muddy Place) or the Village of Tears.

The South African Bantu Trust (now &A Development Trust) bought the Sada land from Shiloh mission for a resettlement camp which started in 1964. The place had been Shiloh's cattle post. Xhosa people were brought or sent or directed here, mostly from Eastern Cape farms and townships. The name SADA is a contraction of 'At last we have found a home' in Xhosa. Officials said it was for people who had nowhere to live. Families came here voluntarily, they added, and here they could at least have a base for themselves and try to find work roundabout or get migrant contracts through the labour bureau. The government planned to bring work to the area, so the assurance went on. By the time Sada was 'full' in 1972, with 25 000 people, border industries would have arrived. It did not happen.

All this was said of other places too that started at the same time in the Eastern Cape, like Ilanga ('Try') near Queenstown, and Mngqensa ('Work') near King William's Town. Only Mngqensa, later called Dimbaza, eventually became anything like a growth point for industry, and even then it is said to have been developed more as a propaganda piece against exposed on the place than for real reasons of growth planning.

All these places were dumps for 'surplus' families. A few were 'surplus' politically. Their household heads were ex-Robben Islanders or known ANC supporters who were banished to Sada or Ilanga. The other families were mostly unwanted as labour, especially after 1967 when the coloured preference area of the Western Cape was extended to most of the Eastern Cape. This affected Xhosa workers east of the old Estein Line (Kimberley - Colesberg - Humansdorp) right over to Alwal North - the Fish River.

Not only were these workers being uprooted, but whole townships were to be cleared - completely, as with the 203 families from Middelburg, or else gradually whenever people were in arrears with rent. This was part of reversing the flow to the towns, which the government had tried to do before, but now in the 1960s it was a really determined move. The policy was 'Out of town, back to reserve land', and it overrode urban residential rights. The fact was that people were not homeless as the officials had said, but were made homeless. If they then went voluntarily to Sada, it was because they had nowhere else to go - and that 'voluntary choice' was only because other places were 'illegal'. Everything about Sada including the position of the people who came there was a white construct.

White farmers also took the opportunity to clear unwanted black families off their land, especially the old or unfit for work. These evictions also amounted to forced voluntary removal. The fence around Sada, and the rigid control which went with it, set Sada in Hewu with permission from the Whittlesea magistrate, were to keep people out as well as in. It was not that Sada attracted people, but that they were desperate for a place after eviction. The myth of local development at Sada was upheld through 1969 when it was declared a 'self-contained Bantu town'. In fact it was nothing but a slowly growing sprawl of the poor or destitute, and 45% of the population were on rations of R1,70 a month per adult and R1,40 per child. Facilities were very bad, and still are. Even now in 1982, for instance, Sada has no hospital for its 40 000 people. Nor has the whole of Hewu district, come to that.

Without land for subsistence, without any decent local industry for wage incomes, the Sada people could only try for jobs on local farms or migrant work through the labour bureau in Whittlesea. The main income has always been from migrant wages. This is where a grim picture has got still worse, because in 1976 a massive influx of political refugees from the Transkei swamped the whole of Hewu. Those from Herschel went mostly to Thornhill, while the Glen Grey people headed mainly for Zweledinga, Oxton and Sada too. Altogether about 50-70 000 people arrived within 3 months, by April 1977, all needing houses and jobs. Sada and the labour bureau were crowded out.

To make matters worse, the Riekert recommendations have drastically cut down the number of migrant contracts for the homelands since 1980 by giving preference to workers in the 'Republic' area. The teeming workforce of Hewu now queue for fewer and fewer jobs. This terrible trend is likely to continue.

Sada in 1982 is badly under-housed, lacks proper facilities, cannot support itself locally, and shares a dwindling migrant labour market with all the other thousands in Hewu. The place has never developed in morale either. It was always too degraded to get run down. All you can say is that the misery of 1964 has multiplied without reducing the sense of isolation -

We cannot do anything on ourselves without money. We live to die - slow death.
3.4.2 Origins

Most of the Sada people came from surrounding areas in the Eastern Cape. Our sample might be slightly overstating the case, but it had 92% from these parts. 74% came from less than 100 km away, and 45% from less than 50. Whittlesea and Queenstown have always been the main sources but there were many others too - the sample picked up 30 places of origin.

Those who came from further afield were from the Western Cape, the Orange Free State, and Transvaal. This very general range shows how 'surplus' families were being pushed out from everywhere in the Eastern Cape and beyond. The removals were certainly not isolated or arbitrary events.

A few more people came from urban than rural places (53% and 47% in our sample). This was to be expected since the towns were the main areas where labour would be replaced, and where there was the 1960s drive to get blacks out of town.

THE TOWNSHIPS

Some townpeople were given these explanations direct or else they found out later -

They said the area is for coloureds so we had to move to Sada.

We were told to move because better houses for us have been built. The area is now used for coloureds.

For the few Cape Town people, of course, it was that they decided to drop their long 'illegal' effort to stay. The sample families had come quite recently, from 1978 -

The police (at Crossroads) said we had to leave because we had no right to live there. When our shacks were destroyed we rebuilt them. For several times we were fined. When we heard that there is a place that we can settle on we came here.

We were fined several times so we decided to leave.

For some families, especially in the 1960s, eviction came simply with township offices turning the screw on rent arrears, a perennial fact of life -

We were accused of being in arrears with rent by the local police. We begged them to give us 3 months to try and cope with as little as we could but they would not listen. The next afternoon they came and took our clothes out of the house.

The municipality said we were too far behind with rent. And that we could no longer be tolerated.

People were being moved out after many years of settled town life. Of those we interviewed, 96% had been in their last home for over 4 years, and 79% for 10 or more. 79% had been there for more than 20 years, and 10% for over 40.

Being so well established, they had got all the work on offer. The town families we saw had all had at least one member in a paid job, with only 4 exceptions, and 23% had two wage packets. Of the jobs held, 30% were migrant and therefore not immediately affected, but 70% were local and the loss of these jobs increased the dismay some people felt about Sada -

We could all get employed in Adelaide but it's hard to get employment here in Sada.

There was more employment in Hofmeyr than here. (A former domestic worker)

The income was lost with the very move to where things cost more -

Things are very expensive here including transport costs to the hospital in Queenstown or East London.

When people compare Sada with the township they lived in before, almost everybody says it was better there. The origins are so scattered it is hard to build up a picture of any one place, but comments suggest the sort of things people remember with such feeling -

Taps were not so far from each other.

Prices of goods were not as high as they are here.

We were not used to borrowing money or food there.

The differences are that this place is far from the central business district. There is no nearby hospital. Houses are very small here. Not enough street lights.

In Queenstown we could sell something to earn a living.

We used to buy sour milk from nearby farms but here we are isolated and starving.

Bus services are regular in Queenstown.

The toilets were of good condition than these toilets here.

We occupied a 4-roomed house in Queensdale - here we are put in a 2-roomed house which even leaks when it rains.

It was much better there because we did not buy everything but here we've got to buy even wood.

A few people did not feel their move a loss -

I can see no difference between here and there.

There are no differences according to the community.

We have not yet got a better house but the fact that we have our own house satisfies us.

A few others felt life was harder before they came -

Port Alfred is not well arranged. Water is better at Sada because it is enough and not salty. Houses are better off here compared to self-built houses in Port Alfred.

We couldn't get employment in Tarkastad but there's a difference now. In Tarkastad we were harassed now and again for reasons known to the police only.

Most had rented houses before. In our sample half the rentals were from the government or municipality, and half from private owners. Several people favoured the move to Sada because they had had enough of being other people's tenants or lodgers and wanted a home of their own -

We no longer stay as lodgers but pay rent for our house. We are no longer under threat of being evicted.

We lived there as lodgers so we decided to come here.

Even in Sada this is only relative security -

I have to pay rent under threats of eviction which was not the case in the previous place.

We can go freely wherever we want to go, as long as we pay rent, without the threat of being evicted.

Some find this safety-rental too expensive after their old arrangements -
There was no rent there but here the rent is high.
Life here is very expensive because we pay R4,15 rent but there we paid 20c for our self-built houses.

For others the price is fair compared with what they paid before - R5 in Molteno, 1974; R4,80 in Queenstown, 1976.

Some township people had not even paid rent before. They were the 3 families who had owned their own place, two of them 'illegal' shacks in Cape Town, and also an intriguing minority of 12% who had occupied housing free in Whittlesea and Queenstown, apparently from private owners. Unfortunately we do not know how those arrangements came about.

TRIBAL LAND

Of the rural people we met, 13% came from tribal land. They were all from Glen Grey district except for one family who had come on in despair from Thornhill after half a year in 1976. Most had come at the time of Transkei 'independence', which cannot be seen as voluntary removal any more than the moves made by people deciding to come after township eviction. They had voted against Transkei going independent, rather rashly, and so they could not expect any kind of future there when 'independence' happened all the same. In fact it seems that some of them were just kicked out.

We voted for Sebe not Matanzima so we had to move to the Ciskei.
We voted for Sebe not Matanzima so before independence day we had to move.

The local head there (Codimvaba) told us to leave. The reason is that we were against being recruited to vote for the independence that was forthcoming in Transkei. We stressed that we did not want to move as we had nowhere to go but we were forced out by a number of people called amaMfungu.

Of all the people coming in, those from tribal land were most appalled at Sada's limitations. Their reactions give an idea of what they had had before: stock, agricultural land, access to a hospital, and also something closer to subsistence life.

We did not worry that much about work because we had a field.

We can also see what they losted before -
We are no longer exploited by headmen.

In Codimvaba we were to paying a sheep and a sum of R5,00 when Matanzima was to visit there and never ever did anyone get compensated - instead it left us bankrupt.

Ironically they were moving into the same practices all over again. Sada may be worse, come to that. The collection we heard of in 1981 was for a party for Sebe (who never came) and for Ntaba kaNdo, Ciskei's pop-up national shrine. Sada people say these receiptless fund-raising are regular and so do people elsewhere in the Ciskei. If you don't pay you get evicted, so it is strict extortion. Of course people feel outraged, especially as nothing is being done to improve Sada.

We expect the Ciskeian government to help us because we pay for poll tax. Instead of improving our conditions they ask us to donate some money for the building of Ntaba kaNdo, Ciskei monument.

We expect Sebe and his government to help us because we donate money now and again for parties catered for government ministers. Instead of building more houses and factories here they are busy building a monument at Ntaba kaNdo.

The real change for people from tribal land was the loss of farming and the implications about how the family then lived. They had all been settled for more than a generation, the families in our sample. The one that lost most had had two medium fields producing mealies, sorghum, potatoes, beans, tobacco, sweet potatoes, spinach and carrots. They had grazing rights in Codimvaba, and their stock was of cattle, goats, pigs, poultry and horses - which meant they had meat, milk, hides and eggs. They also sold some of their produce. Then on removal we lost our land and had to sell our stock.

They did not get a fair price, they said. Now in Sada they have one garden plot producing mealies, potatoes, beans, cabbages and onions. They have no stock. They still eat well and earn a bit through selling, but it is nothing much and no longer their own agricultural produce -

We buy sugar and make some sweets. We sell each sweet at 3c price.
We sell sour milk - 10c a pint.
The worst-off of the families from tribal land had had one small field for growing mealies, beans, cabbages and pumpkins. They too had lived in Codimvaba and had grazing rights, and they owned cattle yielding meat and milk. They had sold their produce. On leaving they also had to undersell their stock. Now in Sada the family eats twice a day, their staples being mealie meal/soup and bread, with tea/coffee and sugar. Fat is used twice a week, and milk only once a week. They do not eat greens, potatoes, eggs, meat, cheese or anything else.

We do not know what formal incomes these families had before moving, if any, but otherwise the inference must be that the families from tribal land are all more precariously based after the move, more dependent on wage incomes. The poorer ones have certainly cut down their diet a great deal in ways affecting their health.

WHITE-OWNED FARMS

These produced 87% of the rural families we met. Again, families off these farms had gone from very well established bases. Those we interviewed had stayed for anything between 3 and more than 70 years in their first place, in these proportions: 51% had been there for over 4 years; 74% for over 9 years; 46% over 10; and 26% over 40. This is to say that nearly half of them had been there a generation, and a quarter of them for two or more. Most of them (79%) had left nominally of their own free will, but here again the pressures to leave were so great one hesitates to use the term.

The broad theme of their life on the farm was familiar: terrible wages, with rations, to one or two of the household in return for work from many more; service every day throughout the year from the paid workers and by demand from the others; fields for a few, and permission to run stock for a few more.

Their wages ranged from R2 to R40 a month. No less than 51% of the workers got R6 or less; 76% less than R15; and 95% less than R21. These appalling figures are slightly modified by the fact that 68% of the workers also got rations of various amounts (which were not geared to the wage scale to compensate particularly for the worst wages). But they are modified again by the huge family effort that seems to have been summoned in the name of just one or two paid workers. EVERY farmer used the family's labour although 46% of them employed only one man. Another 30% hired two, and the rest hired up to six. The extraneous work included milking, shearing, working in the farmhouse kitchen, ploughing fields, looking after sheep and cattle, irrigating, chopping wood, and so on.

For this the family also had a place to live - the main feature. It was rent-free in the strict cash sense, and that was another important thing. Only 11% had no land to plough and had
no livestock at all. Of the rest, 31% had a field and 97% had stock even if in some cases it was just poultry. Most people had other creatures too - pigs were quite common, many had cattle, and some had goats and donkeys as well. The eggs, milk and meat, and the green vegetables, were vital additions to the rations diet which appears to have been mainly bulk carbohydrates (samp and mealie meal).

Those in formal service worked the year round, for long hours every day -

The difference between Sada and the farm is that you can rest here but on the farm you worked from 6 a.m. - 6 a.m. (7 p.m.)

There was no day off on the farm but here I can rest.

On the farm we never got satisfied because of the hard labour we performed.

Not one response indicated any warmth of feeling towards their landlord-employers. On the contrary, 27% of those interviewed gave views ranging from general dislike to hot indignation. The composite picture of the white farmer is of a cruel man who holds the threat of eviction over you constantly to back up any demands, makes your children work instead of letting them go on with their education, and leaves the family with no powers of decision about their own life. Undoubtedly there was a lot of truth here. Whatever the case, it is certainly the image their workers held.

We are no longer under the cruel farmer.

We are no longer threatened with evictions by farmers.

We are no longer under white farmer.

We are entitled to own our own house here in Sada more than being kicked up and down by a white farmer.

Here there is the chance of educating children. On the farm the maximum was Standard 2 and then work for the farmer.

Here I can depend on my own, not on a person who will force me to do what I don't want.

What these families do remember with longing, though, is the fact of secure food -

We are starving here - we got rations and other commodities.

Starvation in this place is abundant because you stick to one type of food but on the farm you could enjoy milk every day.

We have just realised that a farm life is better than the one led in township because we don't get rations here.

We are starving because we don't get ration.

The last two quotes have extra force because those people actually left the farm through being so badly paid -

We could not get enough money from the farmer. (a man earning R4 monthly plus samp and mealie meal)

The farmer paid us very low wages. (a man earning R15 monthly plus the same)

This indicates Sada rather than praises the farms. Still, people recall those rations with wonder - and see them as valued food, and not at all as an endearing side of any human bond.

Memories of the relationship are not glossed over.

Other good features of farm life were mentioned.

We are forced to rent here but didn't rent our former dwelling.

The houses we built on ourselves on the farm were better than what we are staying in here. They are small and expensive.

At least we had a tank of clean water but not here, (a man now living in Emakente)

Most of all there was the precious fact of being able to keep some stock. This loss is often cited bitterly, and also the loss of reasonable housing for the poor cramped quarters in Sada -

There is no right to keep stock because this is said to be a township - but an undeveloped and non-development township. People are scuttled in very small 2-roomed houses.

Why families moved from the white farms is not always clear in the sample, but the main categories seem to be two. First there are households wanting to escape exploitation and get a place of their own to settle in and organise their own lives.

We wanted to be our own bosses by having our own house in our own land.

When the farmer died we moved because the new farmer was cruel.

We wanted to be secured in our own house.

The farmer was very cruel so we decided to leave him.

By implication also, people left to seek other work, and the only legal course was to head for a labour bureau in a 'homeland' area.

The other main group are families thrown off as being unfit for work.

Because the household head was deat, and injured himself by a machine i.e. cut two fingers, the farmer evicted us. We were taken from De Aar by train and arrived in Queenstown and taken by GG trucks to Sada. (The family had been there 38 years)

The white farmer said we are no longer fit for work so we should leave the farm as soon as possible. We came here on removal trucks. (They had been there 50 years)

The farmer said the household was too old, so he had to come here. The white brought us on a train - fund supplied by the government. (After they had been there 28 years)

When my husband got sick we left because there was nobody to work. (After they had been there 50 years)

Some families were just trucked away, and it is clear that government transport was made available to private farmers because these evictions were in line with government policy.

Farmers also replaced people they didn't like, apparently, or the farm changed hands either by consolidation or sale to another white farmer -

The farmer panicked since my father had attended a funeral on a Saturday.

The farmer left for urban areas for they were very old. The new farmer brought his many people.

The new farmer of the farm said they were going to locate people of their own choice.

The farmer said we should leave because he was selling the farm to the government.
3.4.3 First removals & early days at Sada

The question of force behind a move is very hard to gauge, as we have seen. In formal terms, 13% of sample families were evicted (12% from townships, 7% from the country), and of that group 56% were physically carted off to Sada, about a third of them from town.

Occasionally the pill was sugar -
A white government official said they have built houses better than those we were living in. They really are better but small and expensive. We were brought here on GG trucks.

Otherwise they heard more matter-of-factly -
They said the location there would be demolished and new accommodation was available in Sada. We were brought on trucks of S.A. government.

Apart from what sounds like a bag of groceries (bread, jam etc.), which was described as ‘compensation’ from a farmer, none of the families we met had been compensated at all for removal. Nobody mentioned asking for it either.

Only four families in our sample tried to stay. The Crossroads people resisted police raids until finally they decided to give up. Other Capetonians put up with fines for a while. Elsewhere others pleaded for time to make up their rent, or that they had nowhere to go. No Eastern Cape people showed anything like the firmness of Cape Town resistance, nor were there any group stands against removal as far as we heard. Maybe the 1960s lacked some of the assertions of the next decade: for example, 78% of the people brought to Sada arrived in the 1960s, and they might not have accepted this if it had happened a decade later. It could also be that the small Eastern Cape groups were more isolated and unprepared for trouble than those in Cape Town.

Trucks were used for Eastern Cape removals, but people from further off came by train as far as possible. Where people arrived on their own initiative they had hired a truck or lorry, or a friend had helped them with transport.

The Whittleseas people came first in 1964, from just a few kilometres away. The whole town - ship was being cleared, and this suggests there were at least 200 families involved. The township had been an old one - some families had been there 60 years and more - and the people had been able to keep livestock including cattle, using the grazing nearby. They came to the site on what had been Shiloh land, the mission’s old cattle post, and local feeling ran high against their going there at all.

We are not sure, but understand some 10 000 at It sites had been marked out and rough roads made before the people came, and that a few water taps were in. They went straight into temporary housing allocated by the Bantu Affairs man in charge, Mr Brechter. These were the familiar tomato-box huts. Each had one room without ceiling or floor, with one door and two windows, one at each end. Apparently there was a pit latrine for each household. For fuel they cut down the bushes roundabout, a supply that virtually dwindled away within five years. Facilities were very poor, with rudimentary roads, water supply and sanitation; and also remote in the case of the clinic and shop, both of which were off the site. Going into this resettlement camp, families had to lose their stock because there was no question of grazing. This was one of the strong objections people had to moving.

Before the end of 1964 the Whittleseas group had been joined by the first arrivals from the farms - those evicted from Fairview, Adelaide and so on. Some had to go into a terrible emergency batch of housing: one-roofed asbestos structures which were worse than the tomato boxes for staying hot through summer nights and cold through winter days. Some may also have been in tents.

The rest of the 1960s saw a steady rise in population but not in facilities or opportunities for local work or community spirit. The place was just a larger dump than before. There were over 8 000 people in Sada by the time it was proclaimed a ‘self-contained Bantu town’ in 1969, and houses were going up at a rate of 60 a month at one stage, yet there was still no clinic or formal shop. The Shiloh clinic, 3 km away, held a Sada session once a week, with a ‘health officer’ in attendance. There was no qualified midwife in the camp. People had to walk to the shop in Whittlesea 5 km away for all bought goods and for rations. Altogether it was clear that these were the most expendable, ignorable units of the unwanted, in the eyes of the administration, and that meant a high proportion of the old, disabled and very young.

A gamish of 6 000 trees had been planted along the roads (if that’s what you could call them - only the one leading into the camp was worthy of the name) and some of these survived.

Meanwhile no plot could be watered by hose ‘because they waste water’, the superintendent of the time, Mr Kirsten, said. Fuel had grown so scarce even before 1969 that it sold for the enormous sum of R $ a load of thornbush which could last two months if used sparingly. This was quite beyond most of Sada’s means, where 45% of the people were desperately trying to keep going on rations to the value of R $ per month and R $ per child. To cook any food there was, was an acute problem. Few of those tiny sheds were heated either - and Sada is 1 000 m high, with a 4-month frost period. Bouts of gastro-enteritis killed many people in those early years, as still happens today. Many more and then lay curled up starving in the bare rooms until they died. The number will never be known.

Details of income, diet and the other sides of life covered by our survey will be considered in turn. To complete the early general picture, however, we should add that local employment has always been low and badly paid, but that the early years when Sada was being built gave more jobs locally than now. In 1967 the government started a brickworks too, doomed to failure because Sada lies 42 km from the nearest railroad at Queenstown, and the cost of bringing clinkers from there to fire the kilns was more than the railguns all the way from Witbank in the Transvaal. It was never a commercial venture but a way of reducing the housing bill in Sada.

The brickmakers seem to have been largely women, since 100 were employed at the quarry and 100 at the kilns. For this strenuous full-time work they earned R 4 a month, and in fact took home only R 30 a month because the rest had been deducted off for rations for the family. These workers therefore paid for their own rations with nearly two weeks’ fulltime work; or to put it another way, they amounted to being a concentration camp workforce which is kept fed enough to do work for the administration and cut government costs. The same rate and reduction for rations applied to another 500 women, mostly pensioners, who cleaned the camp, picking up rubbish by hand, and planted and watered the trees.

There were many more women than men in Sada, but the men who go: work were a bit less outrageously exploited. They earned R 6,50 a month on construction work like building the houses. This was far below the level of wages offered at Boskor, the State sawmill nearby - at that time they paid R10 a week plus food, which was still a very bad rate. Local farms hired some Sada men, and Boskor occasionally did too. The main assumption and fact was that men went off on migrant jobs contracted through the labour bureau in Queenstown until another bureau was set up in Whittlesea.

Since those early days, at least another 30 000 people have come. They rely almost entirely on the labour bureau in Whittlesea for jobs, and must seek them because there is no way out of the proletarian lifestyle. The SPP survey picked up some aspects of their life in the early 1980s - 95 households were interviewed in March and April 1981. The questionnaires are the basic source for most of the following profile.
3.4.4 Demography

POPULATION GROWTH

The population growth rate has been very unsteady. Two big waves arose in 1969-70 and 1975-76 when tremendous numbers came to Sada. Official figures confirm this kind of pattern.

The first wave is quite a puzzle. It came after December 1968, doubling the population by March 1971 from 7,000 to 14,000. The arrivals during those 24 years were from the local townships and farms as usual, and the pressures to leave do not appear greater than before.

Perhaps it was that more people capitulated to those pressures, though, because of the housing programme at Sada which had picked up speed and kept going full tilt through 1969-70. A thousand houses went up then, doubling the total from about 1,000 in December 1968 to 2,000 in March 1972. In the absence of any external reason that we can see for the influx, we feel this internal one could be the cause. In fact the slump in arrivals after this period coincides with the end of the building boom. A mere 126 houses were built in 1971, 6 in 1972, none in 1973. That again seems to suggest a link with housing.

The second wave included the exodus from Glen Grey as Transkei 'went independent' in October 1976 – but again it is a puzzle because BENRO figures show a strong inflow from 1973/4 before the one from Glen Grey began, so there must have been other factors.

There had been an official increase, counting only legal residents, of just 667 people from 1971 to 1973. Then Sada suddenly grew by 2,482 in 1974 and 3,006 in 1975. The arrivals still appear to be from the same local sources and for the same reasons, but this time they could not possibly have been drawn by the lure of housing – if that is what had happened before – because officially only one house was built in March 1973 - March 1975, and 339 the next year. We cannot offer any explanation for this strong inflow.

A third, smaller, wave of arrivals occurred in 1978/9. Again we do not know why. That is the latest information we have on Sada's population growth.

A caution on population figures here. Families outstrip official houses from the early 1970s. The overflow area Emadakeni began then, a random section which is really hard to gauge. The swelling numbers there are elusive because mud houses get built or extended as the need arises without any formalities like planning permission or rent. The rate of arrivals is vaguer still because one cannot even infer it from rising population. People tend to slip away again from Emadakeni more than from Sada proper, and the outflow is a completely nebulous factor. Any guess at inflow therefore has to add a total unknown, the outflow, to a wild surmise about numbers past and present.

PRESENT POPULATION

Population estimates do seem to vary somewhat. Sada had 22,000 legal residents in 1980, according to the Minister of the Interior. Then the Quill Commission said the actual number amounted to 8% of the Ciskei's de facto size, which they gauged at 686,000. That means about 53,000 in Sada. (Ciskei Legislative Assembly report, vol 13, p 262)

We took the preliminary BENRO figure for de facto residents in 1979 as our starting point. This was 28,966. Allowing another 10% – since official figures are sometimes a bit low and there will have been an increase in the last 2 years – we put the total up towards 32,000.

Then there are 6-7,000 people in the overflow area, Emadakeni, in over 1,000 houses there. This raises the total again to 38-39,000. As far as we can see, therefore, 40,000 would be the absolute outside figure.

GROUPS WITHIN THE POPULATION

The age groups at Sada are very different from the national black averages, as this graph shows:

Fig 1 SADA'S DE JURE POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX COMPARED WITH THE NATIONAL AVERAGE FOR AFRICANS, 1981 (%)

Here we see the very low proportion of children, 25.6%, under 15 years. This is by far the lowest figure from the six resettlement areas that we surveyed. The highest figure came from Glenmore, 48.3%. We do not know for sure why this is so. The infant mortality rate was highest at Sada (31/1000 births), second highest at Mdantane (30/1000) and low at Glenmore (14/1000), which suggests a sombre reason. Analysts tend to discount death as a factor sometimes, arguing that bereaved parents often try to compensate by having another child when one dies, but the correlation here is fairly emphatic and so child deaths could partly explain why there are so few children at Sada.

If child deaths are to blame, we should add that our sample shows 33% of Sada families lost one infant since they arrived and 2.1% lost two. Families live so close to starvation, many of them, and the death rate follows this pattern of underfeeding through the questionnaires, that this seems to be largely why children die. An example is a household where two children died under the age of 2. This was a family of five with one member in a construction job and the others unable to find work but still too young for a pension. They eat once a day
on samp/mealie meal with tea and sugar; bread every second day; fat once a week; a green vegetable less than once a week; and no other items.

The age groups 15-44 years are average, rising slightly in the older brackets.

Sada has far more old people than the other places we investigated. Nearly a quarter of its population (22.6% of de jure) are over 44 years old. This contrasts very strikingly with Dimba, for instance, a camp established shortly after Sada in the 1960s. There we found only 12.2% over 44 years (8.1% to 64, and 4.1% above). All these figures are far higher than the averages for rural Ciskei or anywhere else. Sada’s 15.1% for 45-64 years is enormously high, and its 7.7% over 64 is phenomenal - well over twice the national black average. The figures here and also at Dimba could well reflect the 1960s policy of evicting old people, and there may still be a disproportionate number moving to these places now.

The ratio of male to female varies through the age groups from the near-parity of 101/100 up to 14 years, rising to 111/100 in the 15-24 year bracket. This slumps to 91/100 between 25-34 years, no doubt from some permanent male outmigntion which one would expect to be far higher than the female. Then it stays steady until 45-64 years when it falls to 71/100 reflecting how many men die before women in Sada. After that age it seems the surviving men are sturdier than the women, raising the final proportion to 113/100.

These variations through life spans are wider than the national average which starts at 101/100 like Sada, but then drops slowly to 98/100 by 64 years and then droops to 88/100. An impressionistic view is that many men return to die, worn out by migrant work, and the old women who survive beyond 64 then succumb to their own lifetime strains. The switch at the end between the sexes happens in the other surveyed areas too, but it is more marked in Sada perhaps because there are so many more very old people there, as we have already seen. It could also be that old men move to Sada more readily than old women. This is sheer guesswork, but maybe old women tend to stay put, especially in rural areas.

Here we should look at the de facto age pattern to see what vast migrancy is implied by the male/female ratios. The graph below, on the next page, is still more eloquent when contrasted with the de jure graph already given.

The male figures for 15-64 years are very low, especially to the age of 44. A glance at the very different de jure figures shows that most migrants are youngish men. Overall, 31% of all Sada migrants are males between 15 and 24 years. This is a huge proportion, far higher than anywhere else we surveyed.

Migration levels are high in Sada. 47% of all males aged 15-24 are migrant, a vast number. 56% of all adults aged 25-64 migrate. Here again it is mostly male migrancy. Of females in that same range only 17% migrate.

The vast male migrancy at Sada is good news in a sense, since it means that so many people have managed to find employment, but inevitably too it shows a far more fractured society - we are divided, with our children far away, coming to see us annually or monthly.

Migrant earnings are at a high price in terms of family life, while yielding vital but small remittances. It has often been said but stays very true that migrancy is the price people must pay for survival when they have no other option left.

This life style (if that's the word) affects marriages. In our sample a 6.7% divorce rate, split equally between male and female migrants, contrasted with 1.7% among commuters and 1.9% among permanent residents. (Commutes had the most marriages, at 49.1%.)

Families tended to have 6 or 7 members: 5% had 3-4; 20% had up to 5; 75% had up to 7; 98% had up to 10. We had two exceptionally big families in the sample, of 13 and 15 people. Most households live in two very small rooms, which crams all but the smallest families, even allowing for migrant members.

The household size implies close family relationships on the whole. Our data show 44% as nuclear families of parents and children; 40% extended families with grandparents; 6.5% including aunts, uncles and first cousins; and then 10.5%, quite a large amount, having more extended families. It would be interesting to find out what range of housing the various sizes of families have, as it seems by no means automatic that the biggest get the biggest houses. Among general complaints about how small the houses are, if people can get them at all, a heartfelt cry came from a family of 10 occupying a 2-roomed house.

The houses should be extended to 4-rooms house to accommodate large families.

The household heads of our sample were mostly men (71%). Predictably, male heads were far more often migrant than female ones - 42% as opposed to 3% of females. Taken all round, 22% of the households had absentee heads, which is fairly high, but the reason is obvious - a lack of local employment. Sada contrasts remarkably with Dimba in this respect, in our survey, where only 6% of the heads were absent, presumably because of the industries nearby.
Among the 95 families we saw, there were only two cases where people had left the households to get their own plot. Marriages removed one man and five women from the home. There seemed very little movement away, in other words. Maybe people sit tight and rationalise their other concerns rather than risk losing their place in a house. Death might be the only departure with impunity. That is the other category of household leavers. Our sample showed 17 men, 9 women and 33 children dying in these families, and most deaths were from 1974 onwards, as the families we met were mounting up at Sada.

Child deaths have already been mentioned. The sample is too small to predict survival rates for babies, but so far they seem low. In our sample, 31 children were still alive in March/April 1981 of those born 1976-80, and 15 had died. To find the infant mortality rate we would have to know how many of the 31 children reached the age of 2. The fact that they lived through to the age of 1 augurs well for their survival, though, and so the rate is not likely to rise much. But the present rate is very bad as it is, at 326 deaths within five years of every 1,000 live births.

3.4.5 Formal employment

**AGE AND SEX OF WORKERS**

Men held most (66%) of the 180 jobs in our sample. Overall for both sexes, 31% of jobs were held by people up to the age of 24; then 26% to 34; then 41% to 44; and 2% thereafter. Local work for men ended abruptly after the age of 24 and rose again from 34 - an inversion that complemented their migratory figures. Women on the other hand seemed to work locally on the whole.

How steady people's working lives really are is another matter, of course. We do not know how much chopping and changing there is, how sporadic or constant work is in an individual's lifetime; what moves are made throughout a life from one kind of work to another; how many people can develop and use skills, and how many must stay at the same level of skill throughout their working life. These kinds of insight would bring us far closer than we are now to seeing how actual lives are spent and what the fact of employment means through the years to a worker and the people around him. Regrettting this total blank in our review of lives at Sada, we turn to abstract breakdowns of local and migrant work.

**LOCAL WORK**

Counting local work as that found in Sada, Shiloh, Whittlesea and Queenstown (which includes some commuters on a weekly basis), we can say that 38% of the jobs in our sample are of that kind. Women have 58% of them, a large number, and the main sectors are manufacturing at Sada and to a lesser extent at Queenstown, agriculture mostly at Sada, and services mostly in Whittlesea and Queenstown.

Over half the women's jobs (57%) are in Sada or just outside at Shiloh, Whittlesea or farms nearby. Sada's 4 factories offer the most jobs - 485 in 1980. The Chikanian National Development Corporation (CNDC) started them in 1972-74 at a cost of R2m, and they were designedly of the cottage industry type which would employ women - the idea being that men should be sent out on migrant work. Carpets are made here, wall hangings, school uniforms, jerseys, 'ethnic clothing', beadwork and soft toys. Almost all the staff are women. A sizeable 80% of the local female workers in our sample worked there. The figure is just a shade above the average, which shows what little work there is for women locally - only about 1,000 jobs in all, including the meanest ones.

Another 15% of local work for women was in agriculture, we think at the Shiloh irrigation scheme. What little we heard of wages sounded abysmal. A woman skoffling fulltime in 1981 got R5 a month, and another this year gets R6. The highest we heard for this year, 1982, was R7. A few women also have construction jobs in Sada, probably also very basic work at bad pay.

Local agriculture also employs men, of course. There is the Shiloh scheme, and some white farmers in Hewu send trucks around each week picking up casual workers for maintenance jobs - clearing furrows, fixing fences and so on. Quite a lot (20%) of men working locally had agricultural jobs. In contrast only 20% were in construction, which shows how the building programme has gone down from the days before 171 when most of them used to work in it and only a handful in agriculture. Local men also have a few jobs in manufacturing, some in the Sada factories. In all, 48% of all local jobs for men were in or around Sada.

Some Sada people do find work in Queenstown, mainly women in domestic jobs. A few people get into manufacturing, but with Mungitzi township right there the competition is heavy. The Queenstown factories offered 832 jobs in 1980, mostly in food, drink and tobacco production but also in wood and wood products and to a lesser extent machinery and non-metallic mineral products. The few from Sada in these jobs were women, in our sample.

Everyone wants local work -

We would appreciate it if more factories would be built so that people can find work here.

Here there are not enough job opportunities as a consequence of transport costs to Queenstown to look for work. We would like more factories to be built, and pay weekly.

This last quote shows that for many people even a development in Queenstown would not be close enough.

**MIGRANT WORK**

Of all the male workers in our sample 70% were migrant. Very few women migrated. As we saw earlier, almost all migrants were men - they had 81% of all migrant jobs.

The places of work made a striking pattern, as the pie graph on the next page shows. Johannesberg has the largest slice (39%). It is mainly men who go there, almost all to the mines and a few to manufacturing, construction and other still smaller areas of work. Some women find domestic work there. Cape Town comes next with 23%, again a huge quota, interestingly, a third of all the workers going there. In our sample, have jobs in electricity, gas, water supplies. It seems that the Cape Town municipality has tended to draw on the Whittlesea labour bureau for its work force. Men also go into agricultural jobs in Cape Town, and women into domestic ones.

Port Elizabeth and East London's tiny portions show how oversupplied these industrial areas are. They have vast settled communities to draw on for labour. On a very small scale, the same applies to the little towns in the Eastern Cape, places like King William's Town and Alice. People have found a job here, a job there in many of these places. This suggests people have been scouring the Eastern Cape for work and getting very little. Most jobs would be snapped up by those on the spot.
Fig 3 PLACES OF WORK OF SADA EMPLOYEES 1981 (%)

Migrant work is prized for income, hated for its disruption of life, especially on top of the first disruption in moving to Sada. We did not meet migrants of course, but we did hear from those they left behind. They were clearly distressed.

We would appreciate more factories so that members of our families can come back and work here.

We want more jobs to be created for our husbands and sons to come back and work here.

We are divided, with our children far away, coming to see us annually or monthly.

There are no jobs here. We would like job opportunities to be created because we have family division. We would like to be a united family.

SECTORS OF EMPLOYMENT

This table includes all the paid jobs in our sample, local and migrant, set out to the nearest percentage:

Table 1 SECTORS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR SADA WORKERS 1981 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>LOCAL</th>
<th></th>
<th>MIGRANT</th>
<th></th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical/gas/water supplies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mining, manufacturing and services are the biggest employers. Mining (19%) takes men to the Reef mainly, also to Durban and Kimberley. Manufacturing (18%) is exactly divided between men and women, most of them working at Sada, while the men work more elsewhere. Women have most of the service jobs, another 18% group, and are mostly local workers.

Construction (13%), electricity/gas/water supplies (10%) and agriculture (10%) are minor categories; transport (6%), commerce (3%) and finance (3%) are marginal.

OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE

The job levels work out like this on our sample:

Table 2 OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ALL EMPLOYMENT, FOR MEN AND WOMEN 1981 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>% of all the jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled and semi-skilled</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

labouring category
This is a very skilled pattern compared with Dimbaza and the other areas, with 41% skilled workers in the labouring category. Evidently Sada has more skilled people than usual in the most thankless labouring contracts - the mines, construction, municipal supplies etc. They would not be doing the very worst jobs but would probably feel frustrated and exploited. White-collar migrant jobs are scarce, which again means no scope for skills.

Overall, 84% of men are skilled/unskilled labourers. This contrasts with women who mostly (73%) work in the service and white-collar categories.

Other figures also show that migrants have the same proportion of skills in their work as local wage earners do.

There was far more self-employment indicated at Dimbaza. That could mean they have more initiative in that community, although some Sada questionnaire show how resourceful people can be, even in acute depression. Perhaps it is that Sada has less opportunity to build up enterprises in a very impoverished area.

RECRUITMENT

How people found work is clear. Sada people evidently rely almost entirely on the labour bureau, judging by our figures which show that 91% got their jobs there. The labour bureau system at Whittlesea seems to be very fully developed. The Sada people got jobs in many different areas in all the provinces. Our sample picked up 17 places of migrant work scattered all over South Africa. They were in all the basic sectors: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, electricity/gas/water supplies, construction, commerce, transport, finance and services. It shows how sophisticated the labour referral system can be, casting people into such a range of jobs in so many places - an intimation of the total labour control that may lie ahead.

Some other people got jobs from the employer direct, and just a few found them by themselves, or were recruited by an agent, or heard of them through their network of family and friends. Those ways of finding work are typical anywhere. Again, the one really noteworthy feature of Sada here is the enormous part played by the labour bureau. It was far more important in Sada than in any of the other resettlement areas we studied. To us this suggests a deliberate policy of giving the Whittlesea bureau quite a large quota of the contracts, seeing that Sada started so long ago that most people have lost their link with jobs in their places of origin, and are now exceptionally isolated in an underdeveloped area.

3.4.6 Family incomes

Although we lack data on exact wages, some idea of family incomes can be gleaned from the various sources they draw on: gifts, the informal sector, remittances and pensions. In order to arrive at some measure of average incomes we distinguish between gifts and the informal sector on the one hand, which are essentially redistributive mechanisms, and remittances and pensions on the other, which actually bring money into the community. In our sample, the remittances and pensions average out at 0.6 local earners per family, plus 1.3 migrant earners and 0.6 pensioners. This means the average family of 6 or 7 people has about 2 earners, a rate which if evenly spread would guarantee survival. Since this does not happen, though, it means a real struggle for many of the households.

GIFTS

Gifts to help support the household were made to 26% of our sample. This very high rate suggests that a complex social structure has grown up to cope with extreme poverty. In Emadakani most of all, the very poor section of Sada, it is a key strategy for survival to borrow and help out.

Starvation is our problem due to scarcity of work. We have to buy things on credit or borrow them in order to survive.

We get on very well with our neighbours because when food is finished we are helped by neighbours. We also help them sometimes.

This is quite customary, but there is a lot of it at Sada where so many people cannot get by on their own.

INFORMAL SECTOR

About a quarter (24%) of the families we met earn what they can on the side by informal selling. Some of them buy and then resell paraffin, also fruit and vegetables. One still sells wood. Others make sweets and vetkoek. One family grows and sells tobacco.

The profit margins are very small for a lot of effort, just a couple of cents per item:

- We buy paraffin in Whittlesea and sell it at a 40c cost a bottle. (price in 1981)
- Buying milk from the dairy and making sour milk to sell at a cost of 8c a pint. (1981)

Some seem to be building up an order business:

- My wife knits jerseys and scarves and sells them.
- We buy pigs from nearby farms and sell meat monthly.

These informal schemes may be at the mercy of personalities or management in the form of Sada's committee. There was this thwarted effort:

The fact that I sew for a living is declared undesirable by authorities. I have already asked permission for sewing and selling to the community but Mr Modi (a committee member) has refused that totally.

AGRICULTURE

Here we found great frustration bursting out of hungry people who wanted to keep stock and couldn’t, and wanted to grow vegetables but lacked space or water.

We can’t keep stock and have fields because it is said to be a township.

There was the possibility of keeping stock in Whittlesea but that is against the law here.

We would like the permission to keep fowls or something.

We would like to have the right to keep stock and have fields because there is a big space of bare veld.

Some families do manage to produce vegetables for themselves, although it seems to be rather a small contribution. We discuss this later in talking about diet.
3.4.7 Unemployment

There would be more income if all who wanted jobs could get them. This missing potential is high in Sada - at least one worker for every three people with jobs. The unemployment rate among the economically active is 28.7%. Most of these workers were at home when we arrived, and most were women. In our sample, women workers outnumbered men by more than two to one: men had an unemployment rate of 18.9% and women 43.4%. This is actually not as high as Dimbaza and some other places.

Unemployment through the age groups can be summarized thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 - 24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 64</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see here that one out of nearly every two females failed to find a job. Also, most young men do manage to get jobs, which surprised us. It seems this is because they go straight from school to the mines.

The unemployed are distributed fairly evenly throughout the age groups:

- 20% were between 15 and 24 years
- 27 25 - 34
- 24 35 - 44
- 30 45 and over.

The last figure is a very large proportion indeed, and we cannot offer any explanation for it.

Most of the unemployed (64%) are out of work for over a year at a time. More than a quarter (28%) of workers have never held a job - many of these people are young women. There must be a great number at Sada who feel by now that a job is an unreal goal, as this man did:

I expect to find a job so as to overcome this burden but due to high unemployment rate that seems impossible.

Obviously being out of work is all the more demoralizing for people in families that urgently need more income, which is often the case at Sada.

3.4.8 Poverty

We do not know exact incomes except for pensions, but gauged roughly what households would get from various kinds of job, local and migrant, at different levels of employment. Together with other information - the number of dependants, informal activities, general comments on the questionnaires - this gave a clear enough idea for grouping households on a poverty scale. It runs from an abyssal state to that of financial security, in four stages. Most households were in the bottom two: 80% of them lead a very harsh existence, always struggling for food and a few other basic needs such as fuel.
30% were in the bottom group. These are destitute families where there was one wage packet or one pension, or two very meagre sources of income, and several dependants to feed. Some households were small, but the overall fact was a lack of income. Three families had no visible income at all. People in this category live virtually on porridge, are always hungry, struggle to get fuel for cooking. Their aspirations are very theoretical for anything costing money, like school books. They cannot afford fuel for heating, are underdressed. Winter is an ordeal.

50% of households were on or just below the breadline. Their lives are also very deprived and uncomfortable, as can be imagined with a per capita income of R15-R25 monthly. There is no spare money for clothes, for example, and even food is quite severely limited. Porridge and samp are still the staple diet. The recent price rises for these bulk foods in 1962 must be a terrible strain on the thousands in Sada and elsewhere who live like this.

15% in the third group, have enough money to keep free from hunger although price rises for food may in 1962 have put some families in a precarious position. At the time of the sample, these households carried on a spare life which did not involve struggling for survival. In that sense they were comfortably off. The households tended to be small, up to 5 people.

The top 5% were financially secure. They have the leeway for transport expenses, schooling, some new clothes - things which seem luxuries to the rest of the community. The sample families had several wage earners in better paid jobs, supporting smallish households. They include a minister of religion and some other white-collar workers. It is another world from the very poor.

In fact the breadliners and the destitute told similar stories. Their priorities were the same, just more or less intense. Sometimes people fluctuate between the two groups. As we saw in considering pensioners, the rhythms of family income can strain people to the utmost, and waiting for a migrant’s remittance also brings some into destitution:

We go as far as to ask food from our friends in the neighbourhood. We even borrow money to buy paraffin, then my husband repays the people or I do when he has sent some money.

We starve and have to beg for food.

The neighbours help and must be helped in turn. It is a vital part of coping with hardship. There were many references to borrowing, and some even to giving shelter:

We get on very well with the people here because we help together people who are left destitute after falling to pay rent, by trying to accommodate them.

We met the owner of the house, so he allowed us in.

There were 37% of the sample where families had just one wage earner or none. Then it is even more critical if members qualifying for pensions do not get them -

My blind son can’t get any grant, we have been told to wait, now it has been so long. So far Mr Myetaza has promised - there’s nothing we can do but wait.

The priority is the fact that the household head has tried over and over to obtain pension but all in vain.

My disabled grandson is crippled and all attempts (for a grant) are in vain. The government had promised now for 5 years. I am still trying but I soon will give up.

I’m unemployed and I hardly cope with living costs. Rent is a problem - now and again I’m threatened with removal. Since I am not a healthy person I’ve consulted the municipality about pensions but nothing had been taken seriously.

This description about pensions is itself a sign of how hard things are in those families. Then people cannot even afford the cost of searching for a job on the side.

We have not enough job opportunities as a consequence of transport costs to Queenstown to look for work.

When people are so hard-pressed, with pensions the only source of income, then the harm done by bad bureaucracy is very serious indeed. Families may starve and their babies die. Our sample includes quite a few families who would be less hard-hit now if a clerk had simply sent off their form or lifted a ballpoint pen. Most protests to authority had been ignored, and none had succeeded.

For the very poor in Sada, survival becomes like a job -

We are trying by all ways and means to make ends meet only for survival. We live on bad conditions and see ourselves destroyed bit by bit.

One can hear how deeply this battle for survival is hated for being imposed and for being a waste of life and freedom. It is in engulfing in the worst sense, a monotonous problem for every day:

The only helping money is that I get from the pension. By that time I borrow paraffin or something to keep us moving.

Getting up not knowing what to eat. Even if you have something to cook, you may not have paraffin.

The last speaker is a 38-year-old woman who depends on irregular remittances from her 42-year-old husband in Johannesburg who has a 28-month contract on the mines. There are three children aged between 9 and 18 years who live in the mud room in Emadakeni with their mother, while the 10-year-old daughter has gone to stay with a grandmother. Emadakeni is the area of mud houses, Sada’s overflow where the homeless build shelters for themselves. These must be among the very poorest people, judging by appearances and also the fact that Sada people themselves call this place the Village of Tears. This woman we have mentioned is probably typical of many. She was looking for a job at the time of the sample, and had been out of work since they left Queenstown five years before, in 1976. At least there was no rent to pay in Emadakeni. They got their house from a man ‘experienced in mud houses’. and have kept it ever since. After a while she settled down into the neighbourhood -

I became used to being a friend of them in a while where she now shares in the universal calculations about borrowing. She and the children eat once a day. They have mealie meal, tea and sugar. Twice a week they have a green vegetable and bread. They never have fat, jam or anything else. The other Emadakeni families in our sample had the same kind of life, so it may be typical of the area.

Emadakeni has grown a lot since this woman came in 1976. It seems there were about 80 shacks then, and now (1982) there are over 1 000. This means a population of over 6 000. They are poor not only in terms of income but in lacking facilities. The incredible fact is that there are none whatever provided for this part of Sada. There is no water. Every drop for all these people must be carried from street taps in the informal housing area which is a long walk away, even for the closest. The only sanitation is the holes some people have dug for themselves. Living like this, and with no streets or lighting, with no fuel for heating and hardly any for cooking, with jobs very scarce.

We starve and have no workplace. To get meals we borrow food or money from neighbours.

An emblem of need at Sada is the tall security fence guarding the Shirah irrigation scheme nearby. Cash crops of food can only be grown here if the hungry are kept out.
3.4.9 General conditions

Diet

Most of the Sada families we met had a very poor food supply, some were down to nearly nothing, and a few ate well. The best diet was kept by a household that ate only twice a day but had a very good range of food every day, of green vegetables, potatoes/rice, milk, tea/coffee, sugar, eggs, cheese, bread and butter/margarine/fat. They also had meat and jam every second day and fish and mealie meal/samp twice a week. The worst diet came from an Emadakeni household also eating twice a day, but they only mealied twice a week at their meals, with bread twice a week and a green vegetable once a week, and that was all.

The main bulk food is mealie meal/samp. Everyone in our sample ate it, 97% of them every day. This is the highest daily rate of all the surveyed areas, the lowest being Dimbaza at 75%. The other main daily items are sugar in 91% of households, tea/coffee at 90%, and bread at 80%. Less regular items are fat at 39% and jam at 27%.

Several families have these things just occasionally, less than once a week: 2% have bread less than weekly, 4% lack sugar in this way, 4% tea/coffee, 32% fat and 64% jam. As these items are the ones usually chosen first after samp, the figures here show how limited funds are for food.

Food rich in proteins and vitamins is a luxury on most of the diet tables, however vital for health. Milk is used daily in only 18% of households, greens in 8% (presumably this varies with the season, according to what can be grown), eggs 4% and cheese 3%, meat and fish 1% each. The families who have these items less than weekly — and we should add that this means very rarely or never, in many cases — amount to 46% doing without milk, 19% without greens, 74% eggs, 94% cheese, 67% meat and 90% fish.

Carbohydrates in the form of potatoes/rice appear daily in only one household, and 56% have them less than once a week.

One group of our surveyed areas has a spectacularly better diet. They were the families in Mdantsane, Dimbaza and Elkubwane — the Haves, relatively speaking: the Have Nots, with a very impoverished majority, characterised Sada, Kammas Kraal and Glenmore. The following table shows the percentage of families in these two groups eating various items daily and less than weekly.

Overall, the diet at Sada is among the worst we found in the areas surveyed. The other two very malnourished areas were Glenmore and Kammas Kraal. They were the Have Nots compared with the other three areas, Mdantsane, Dimbaza and Elkubwane. The table on the next page shows how different the two groups are. Group 1 (the) represents the areas with better diets — Mdantsane, Dimbaza and Elkubwane — and Group 2 (the) more deprived ones of Sada, Glenmore and Kammas Kraal. First we record the percentage of families who eat certain items every day, and then the percentages who have them less than once a week. Each entry gives the smallest to largest percentage for the three areas of that group. For example, 19-34 under DAILY (1) for greens reflects the fact that greens were eaten daily by 19% of households in one area of the group (Dimbaza), by 34% of households in another (Mdantsane), and that the third area of the group (Elkubwane) lay somewhere inbetween (27%).

The most distinctive daily contrast is for greens, followed by meat, potatoes. Cheese is a luxury for everyone, but even there the contrast is clear.

The other half of this table shows how many families ate these items less than weekly — which as we have said amounts to meaning very seldom or never. Again greens are far more rare for Sada families and others in group 2. The list is emphatic throughout in showing how badly nourished those families are.

Table 4 DIET IN SADA, GLENMORE & KAMMASRAAL (2) CONTRASTED WITH MDANTSANE, DIMBAZA & ELKUBWANE (1). SHOWING DAILY AND LESS THAN WEEKLY CONSUMPTION 1981 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>(1) Daily</th>
<th>(2) Less Than Weekly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>19-34</td>
<td>4-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margarine/fat</td>
<td>40-54</td>
<td>27-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>33-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes/rice</td>
<td>9-15</td>
<td>27-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>74-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>60-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>83-98</td>
<td>1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea/coffee</td>
<td>84-99</td>
<td>79-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese</td>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>45-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>14-34</td>
<td>66-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jam</td>
<td>9-18</td>
<td>46-72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second consideration on this table is to see how many families ate these items less than weekly — which as we have said amounts to meaning very seldom or never. Again greens are very telling, but the list is emphatic throughout in favouring the first group. It spells serious malnutrition for Sada and the others in the second.

About a third (32%) of the Sada families eat three times a day, 63% twice a day, and 5% once a day. All families have something to eat every day, with perhaps the odd exception in a few of the worst-off, but these figures are rather misleading in that they look like meals instead of the cup of tea which they often are. A glance at the daily rates for the various items of food, quoted above, will give a good idea of what people actually sit down to.

Nearly half the families (47%) manage to grow vegetables, which accounts for a lot in their diet especially when it comes to greens. The chief crops are peas, spinach and beans, cabbage and beetroot, and onions and tomatoes, with carrots, pumpkins and turnips mentioned occasionally. People also grow potatoes and mealies. The main thing is to grow food quickly, and with as little water as possible. A few families also keep fowls. It is hard to do this, as one can see, especially as the plots are not fenced: according to the questionnaires, hens either move quarters with neighbours or they are eaten by them.

Why doesn't everyone grow food? The answer is clear for most Emadakeni families: no water and no space. Watering is hard for other Sada people too because every bucket must be brought from the tap, which is many houses away for some families. No doubt there are other reasons too. Theft is a problem. The long 4-month frost period in the year also inhibits growth, and drought too. Obviously diets fluctuate with the season — mealie meal is always there, but other vegetables come and go. When they are out then diets suffer, and the poorer families have no spare funds to buy extra food from the shop.

Housing

Various types of houses have been tried at Sada. The ones that look most permanent are in the 'best' area where the elite of Sada have built or extended their own houses. They are all single-storey but mark themselves off as superior in every other conceivable way — they are spacious,
overwhelmed with a sense of design, and seem to occupy another world from the main township house, as their TV serials proclaim. The anxiety of people to prove their economic position is quite noticeable.

The more regular thing, the usual township house, evolved after several kinds had been tried out. After the early tomato-box and asbestos ones of the 1960s, both temporary, there was an abortive attempt to mould houses from the local earth by stamping into wooden moulding frames and then plastering these frail walls. They were literally washed away by the rain. Then came the one-room zinc huts, so hot in summer and cold in winter, which are still often found in other more recent resettlement areas too - Oxton is full of them, from 1977, and so is Zwele- dinga. Some of these early houses still exist in Sada, with extra rooms of brick or concrete added on to them.

The main township house is a 4-roomed unit which is treated sometimes as one house but more often as two. Then the families live back-to-back with a dividing wall between them, each in two rooms, and share the plot. Some of these 4-roomed units are subdivided yet again, to take three families, one in two rooms and two in simple rooms. Logically they could even be shared by four families, though not in the cases we met.

Some of these houses are of brick, and these might still be produced - there is still a brickfield on the hill at the back of Sada. On the whole, though, they now seem to be made of cement blocks. Most are badly substandard. They are called permanent houses but more critically they should not be seen as anything other than bad provisional shelters.

In fact, with rising costs the planners seem to be trying out worse kinds of housing again. In what looked like a reversal to the sandpit efforts of the 1960s, some builders in September 1981 were assembling sun-dried bricks of earth into walls which they then smeared with a poor cement plaster, knowing all the while that they were following some mad official rationalisation that would never work. They said as much, scraping scornfully at the surface with a fingernail.

Whatever the materials, the rooms are very small, there are no internal doors, the roofs tend to leak and the outside doors and windows to work loose. The houses are therefore congested, stuffy or draughty, uncomfortable and unhealthy. This is why nearly everyone talks about their terrible house, along these lines (for 'expect' read 'want') -

Accommodating so large a family in a 2-roomed house breeds diseases.

We need a bigger and better house than this 2-roomed leaking "matchbox". We expect the government of the Ciskei to help us because we are their subjects.

The rent officers are useless because for several times I have been reporting this matter of my leaking house but no action is being taken.

Doors of houses difficult to close after rains.

Houses are very small. We would like better houses to be built because these are leaking.

Size of the house can't accommodate the lot of us.

Some people have managed to take over the whole unit -

When the people who were using the other two rooms left we took the two rooms upon our shoulders. We are using four rooms now.

and this is the short answer to overcrowding. The idea stems all these congested families in the face while they go on, day after day, resenting and perhaps quarrelling with their twin households. The overcrowding is a strain in itself, but it is made worse by a natural tendency to regard the OTHER family as occupying half of YOUR house.

We would like to get the other two rooms which are occupied by another family at the back.

Our problem is quarrels with the family occupying half (2 rooms) of the house.

Quarrels with neighbours sharing a yard.

We would like that the 4-roomed houses which are given to 2 families be of one family. It's a problem sharing 1 yard between 2 families.

In Middelburg we had a big house in good condition compared to this small toolbox-shaped house we are occupying. We would like the extension of these 2-roomed house into 4-roomed house.

It seems that people cannot get permission easily for extensions or additions to rented houses, or perhaps the investment is too precarious on those terms. People have also tried building a bit themselves and then had to take everything down.

Accommodation for the family in a small house like this is unbearable. About accommodation, we built an additional house, but we were ordered to get rid of it.

We will eventually buy this house, and when that is done we will do what we like on it.

Six of the sample households had bought their houses. The price ranged between R200 for a very humble place bought when a friend left Sada and R1 651 paid direct to the superintendent in Whittlesea in 1979.

The others in the formal housing area all paid rent. The rate in 1981 varied from R4 upwards for a 2-roomed house to between R8 and R10 for a 4-roomed one. This was the total amount due to the rent office each month. Unfortunately we could not find out by the time of writing how much of this total was in true rental and how much in service charges. What is clear, though, is that rents rise from time to time, and without warning. People actually pay the rents should be decreased, not increased, because the houses are getting so bad. Yet they cling to their houses, equal as they are, and even while hating them, because of the housing shortage. There seems to be very little leeway given to families in arrears.

The increase of rent with no previous warning is part of my problem.

My problem is accommodation - when we failed to pay rent our furniture was taken out and the house was locked.

Most people feel safe if they keep paying, but apparently one or two in the sample did fear eviction despite that -

Rent is escalating now and again, yet there are times when we were threatened of being kicked out. I've made contact with our representative but we are still waiting for promises.

With accommodation so scarce, the rent office quickly threatens removal if people do not pay promptly. It can also ignore the complaints about bad housing.

Rent is the problem - now and again I'm threatened with removal.

Our house is leaking. We are doing our best to attract the attention of the rent office to our accommodational problems. It seems we are wasting our time without bribery.

In fact the rents at Sada came as a shock to many people either because they had been promised free housing if necessary and then been told to pay -

We are forced to pay rent here but didn't rent our former dwelling. The government promised that old-age people won't pay rent.

or because the rent was far higher than they had paid before. This was the case with many we met. Families also felt the rent was high when they saw the very meagre houses they were getting.
Families sometimes double up, even in these pokey rooms, to solve their rent and housing problems. Housing is at such a premium, you even have arrangements like this:

There is a man from Lady Freser who sublets us from his income since he has no place in which to live and is staying with us.

People cram in together, like the woman we met who with her family of six had moved in with another family — all in two rooms. The general feeling is that everyone is waiting in hope that there will be a new building programme. Houses have been promised —

We are in one man's house. My problem is that I have no house of my own, because I can be moved out at any minute. We would like to have our own house so as to settle. We have asked the government to accommodate us and it was said more houses are to be built.

The shortfall is vast. BENRO's figures give an idea of it. They say that just 384 housing units went up in Sada between 1972 and 1979, while in the same period the population rose by 14,739. It averages out at 38 people a house. To that crazy we must add arrivals since 1979 and natural increase of perhaps 0.2% a year. Meanwhile the temporary shacks and the jerry-built 'permanent' houses go on ageing.

After this delay of years, Whittlesea North is being developed over the Katiba road. The new site will have anything up to 10,000 houses and it will be far larger than Sada. Queenstown municipality are now handling the building programme under the Whittlesea Special Organisation scheme whose signpost marks the site (April 1982). They say the place is for newcomers and for local rehousing. Some homeless will settle here, certainly those who can afford rental for the urban-type NE 51/9 houses being put up now. The housing question still remains for those who cannot afford rental for four rooms, flush toilets and shower cubicles. The site is straight over the road from Sada, and it is huge — 4 km deep. Roads and water pipes are being laid, the first 24 houses have been done up, and the first families should be there in before the end of 1982. Some Sada people will certainly be going there in the next couple of years.

Our sample suggests about a fifth of the Sada families need housing. Of the households we met, 81% were in the so-called permanent houses. The proportion for rehousing might be even higher if the community accepts the fact that many households are very congested as they are and need to spread from two rooms into the whole 4-roomed unit. Other families still have temporary houses (zinc and tomato- box huts) — 8% in our sample — or else like our remaining 11% they have made some other arrangement. This could mean staying with another family or making out in Emadakeni.

Emadakeni is where people go if they are evicted, cannot pay rent, cannot get lodging, or have to leave a household because it has become crowded past bearing. We know very little about the place, but it deserves a section on its own: it is large, a crisis area, the very image of Sada's degeneracy, and also something of a place apart.

EMADAKENI, THE OVERFLOW AREA

This overflow from Sada began in the early 1970s when homeless people began building their own small houses of mud nearby. The name means The Mud Place. It is an extension of Sada, and yet separate in various ways. Physically it lies about 150 m from the formal grid of Sada's sites. There is a separate headman who does not seem to have much sway. Unlike Sada proper, there is no question of rent or eviction at present. On the other hand, as we have seen, it does not have even Sada's meagre facilities.

The first people to build in Emadakeni had sites allocated them by a committee. Today, people asking for a place will get one from the headman, and the two families in our sample who did so said they paid him R20 in a lump sum. But most people just move in informally without applying to anyone. They either attach themselves to an established household — with a friend or relative — or else get a shelter of their own.

Once the place was somewhat established, people began coming in direct from areas outside Sada. In 1974, for instance, people arrived straight from Macibini township in Queenstown. One family we met had just been dumped on the roadside at Emadakeni by the farmer who was evicting them. Some Glen Grey people seeped in in 1977. It went on growing steadily so that by September 1981 we saw houses numbered up to 945, and there were a good many more than that. The population would be over 6,000.

Their homes are the most basic imaginable: very low mud walls, a small door to bow through, a few zinc strips for the roof. Even with very poor materials, some of them are expertly made. You build for yourself, or hire someone for about R3 to build for you, or buy a place as one of the sample families did for R1.2. Most have just one room. A few are quite large, and two we saw have murals on them, of monkeys and a lion. The houses are crowded alongside each other, mostly without garden areas or spare ground. The mutes between them have been beaten into paths and roads by all the walking in the last 10 years. There are no formal streets, and no street lighting.

This sprawling area was among the places investigated by the Wentzel Joint Committee (South African and Christian) at the end of October 1980 "to assess and report on the needs and financial implications of meeting those needs." The only sign of upgrading we can report was the noisy load of water pipes standing in the midst of Emadakeni in April 1982, suggesting that water was at last going to be laid on. The families may be told to move over the road to house in Whittlesea North, but judging by what we met they will not be able to afford rent, especially if all the houses are like the first ones built which have four biggy rooms, flush toilet, and water also piped to a separate shower cubicle and to the kitchen.

Meanwhile Emadakeni has no facilities, as we have said. To stress the shocking facts again, there is no system of sanitation provided. Some people have built pit privies near their houses, others use the hand of a little gully to the west. With no water in the place, over a thousand households fetch every drop they need from the Sada taps —

We fetch water from the Sada community and that means 30 minutes to and from.

Taps were within easy reach there (Queenstown) but I have to walk 200 m or so to the tap here.
Everyone sees the danger to health -

The toilets are a source of diseases. It is necessary that they be changed into the bucket system. Some meetings were called and we were promised about the toilets and accommodation. We expect help from the government.

Toilets are just holes - health in jeopardy.

We would like toilets be made in such a way that they prevent diseases than encouraging them.

Bad systems are worse with overcrowding, which is mostly the case. Diseases spread in the families because houses are congested and the whole group miles on one inadequate pit or bucket.

The medical services have hardly stirred from the 1960s when 7 000 people had to make do with one weekly session at the Shiloh clinic nearby. Now there is a Type II clinic at Sada with 2 day beds, plus a sub-clinic. It is hopeless understaffing for a malnourished, badly housed mass of 43 000. People complain that the clinics are helpless in time of illness, and that a hospital is urgently needed.

There is no permanent doctor in Sada. The district surgeon in Whittlesea is theoretically on call, but he is hard-pressed because he and three other doctors serve the whole of the Hewu district. The main clinic work is very low key, only the simplest of diagnoses and treatment. Referrals are not to the nearest hospital, the Frontier Hospital 42 km away in Queenstown, because as the local representative Mr RBDR Myataza told the Ciskeian Legislative Assembly (CILA) back in 1977.

If you were to go to Frontier Hospital, you would see a pitiful affair to see a person told to go back home and only given medicines, in spite of the fact he is seriously ill. You request that he be not be admitted (sic) because you have no way of nursing him/her when he/she is so ill. All that does not help. What you are told, is that that is not a Non-European Hospital. (CILA report, v 9, p 306)

That being so, the four Hewu ambulances, none of which seem to be in working order the whole time, must take patients 280 km to the Cecilia Makiwane Hospital in Mdantsane, near East London. It is a 31-hour drive. Dr C Bikitsha, medical consultant to the Ciskei government, pointed out the delay and expense involved, which for years has been utterly clear to everyone.

The Daily Dispatch of 19.06.80 reports him saying that one ambulance did 35 000 km on these transfers in a 10-week period.

We were told that many people cannot get the ambulance whatever their condition. They have no phone, or the phones are out of order, or the call is not answered, or the ambulances are out, or they will not come without medical authorisation. In 1981 we heard of a man who died after a two-day wait for an ambulance.

When ambulances fail, people may in desperation hire a car for the long trip to Mdantsane. It is a huge expense -

Transport costs are a problem because there is no hospital here for emergency cases.

Obviously a community this size should have its own hospital. The case is even stronger for the whole Hewu district. The preliminary black figure of 74 065 for Hewu in the 1980 census will probably turn out to be far too low, but even so it proves the need for much more than a few scattered clinics. Since Sada began, the area has received perhaps 100 000 resettled people. Some have seeped away, especially from the Ntabathamba region on the NW border of the Ciskei, but many are still there. They would need at least one hospital even if they were in prime health, which they most emphatically are not.

The necessity of a hospital, which had been a glaring truth from Sada's early days, got to desperation point after the influx from the Transkei in 1976-77 when gastro-enteritis and measles and typhoid spread far more seriously than usual, especially in the huge Thornhill encampment. At least in May 1978 it was mooted that a hospital be built near Poplar Grove, near the present Whittlesea North site over the road from Sada. A year later the Republic undertook to pay the whole bill for it. It has not been started yet (April 1982).

Good medical services are vital, but of course health depends first and last on how people live. Hewu is recognised as a very bad area. In July 1980 the Ciskeian Secretary for Health said 50% of the children in Hewu had marasmus (wasting away with starvation) and 33% of adults had pellagra (a clinical stage of malnutrition). Others believe that over 80% of the children here suffer from malnutrition. Hunger fits are a commonplace - these occur when children infected with worms are badly deprived of food.

This undernourishment leads to further ills. Pellagra easily leads to psychoses, and the blood pressure and general hypertension problems have apparently grown as people carry on unequally trying to cope for their families. To quote from the Sunday Tribune, 8/10/78, a nursing sister at the Thornhill clinic said:

These people exist on mealie meal - nothing else. They eat only porridge. We get complications from the malnutrition and have a high incidence of psychoses - particularly schizophrenia. This could be caused by the depressing conditions under which people live.

The district surgeon at Whittlesea confirmed this, adding that there was a lot of psychosis throughout the district. Our Sada informants did not mention anything like schizophrenia to us, but many of them talked about the strain of keeping going and their 'high blood'.

People also have far less resistance when they lack proper food. Measles and gastro-enteritis crop up regularly throughout Hewu, TB and typhoid are endemic. The flams-ups of measles and typhoid tend to make news, but TB has become an ordinary fact of life that is not curbed in any of the settlements. Gastro-enteritis goes around regularly in the hot months. The babies are the very vulnerable ones.

As we have noted, diseases quickly spread where houses are congested and toilets substandard. The remarks already cited show that Sada people know this all too well. They feel themselves trapped as a prey to disease, living as they do.

Hewu is the driest part of the Ciskei, and predictably it has come off worst in the long 3-year drought, the last one, which is only now perhaps going to break in this year of 1982. This spell has meant very depleted water and therefore supplies which are more contaminated than usual; and also fewer vegetables being produced, a direct hit at people's diet. It has thus been a two-fold problem.

The lack of wood also affects health, not least in Sada. The land roundabout lost most of its thornbush years ago, in the early days of the camp. This is a severe strain on people - they rely mainly on mealie meal, which needs to be cooked, and now they must use food money on paraffin for their fuel, or else buy expensive bundles of wood.

Fuel is a problem as paraffin costs are high.

Here we've got to buy even wood.

Our problem is fuel. When fetching wood near the hills we are chased away by government elements.

Fuel is a problem. We have to buy wood. If one is found looking for wood in the bushes you get beaten by the police and possibly fined.

People obviously were prepared to scout around far from Sada and risk reprisals in order to get free fuel. Paraffin cost 40c for 750 ml in 1981, and wood R2.05 a sack.
Cold is another basic problem for health, especially here with the 4-month frost period in the year. Many in and around Sada cannot afford to use fuel for heating at all, and even succumb to it, because they are malnourished.

EDUCATION

By "education" is understood the nominal schooling process laid on for blacks which they and coming is an acute priority in Sada, as in many other areas. Families therefore do their best problems, as here -


because there is no hospital here for emergency cases.

In all the responses we saw, schooling came before rent for these families.

Parents want to give their children the best start they can towards job security. The general feeling seems to be that schooling will help young people in the queue for jobs, and that this mentioned rather like an investment parents make for security in their own old age. Nowhere was this more evident than in the real idea that school will develop the lives of children, except in their potential for running.

My problem is educating my two children as they depend on me for their needs. Educating my two daughters is the problem which is right on my shoulders. I expect my daughter to find work if she can pass her Std 10 and work for a decent wage.

Schooling is a problem because of the high costs of books and uniform, all compulsory. No parent can escape bills of about R100 per child even at primary level. In high school, the fees are about R90, sometimes more. Books cost R40 and upwards (1981). It is quite more than one child goes to school. It is clear from the responses we had that families even spend money on these items. Where would like to see the government help these students.

I can't educate my three grandchildren and they are likely to leave school, yet I think they need a higher level can be reached.

Bursary funds are the remaining hope, as this comment shows. Sada families apparently African Scholars' Fund in Cape Town, for example. Keep them informed about these sources, drawing on help from us for as far as help.

There was some comment about lowering the cost of the annual bill for schooling, or as this householder added, raising wages to cover cost -

We would like improvement in education - expenses to be lowered or to be given enough money on our jobs.

It is noteworthy that nobody even mentioned improving the substance of tuition, or compared lie at the end of it. Some parents hope for jobs for their children, others demand -

- We expect the Government to help us by providing more jobs so that when our children go out of school they can find jobs.

The officials' line seems to be that schools keep the youth under control and off the streets, that these all want their children to attend but the family can't afford it, they are told

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We expect the government to help us because they spread the word that if any children are found not attending school the parents would be in trouble.

We did not hear of any action being taken against parents though. Still, it sounds like a very negative situation.

Here unfortunately we do not know about student opinion in Sada. Interviews were with householders on the whole, and certainly always with adults, which left this side of life unexplored. It certainly would be well worthwhile to assess the younger age groups too for an inside into community life generally, not only schools.

Parents spoke of quite a strong community sense among students. It was a solidarity with the nation, not just village awareness. Yet other comments also suggested that this consciousness was not strongly progressive and that on the whole the students were rather passive, even while rejecting the school system and syllabuses they lived with through the year.

One dramatic event in 1980 has certainly hardened resistance both ways between students and the control system. On 11 September the students walked in a gathering band through Sada, in protest against the discriminatory regime and to commemorate Steve Biko's death. They were moving up the road from the Masibulele teacher training school when the police came for them. The group moved on together, refusing to divide, and continued up through Sada and further up on the hillside behind it, singing freedom songs all the time. Then the police came with some reinforcements - the press report says 15 police to the 800 students - and charged the singers who by then had settled on the hill. They used teargas, quirts and guns. The students retaliated with stones before they scattered. A constable was killed, so was a 14-year-old boy and two children aged about 12. One child was totally blinded, others had bullet, quilt and teargas damage. About 50 were injured in all. The formal aftermath was that the police students. In court case against 427 students, who were then tried for public violence. The families of the dead and maimed children did not try suing for damages. Some of the students are permanently injured or disfigured. As a result, it sounded to us as though sympathies had drawn together among the students, and parents also had grown more alert to what students said and felt. Sada has always been heavily controlled, but has not seen anyone like such a grim confrontation before or since. In a politising sense, quite possibly the 11 September 1980 was the most educative day in the life of Sada for everyone. Its long-term effects are by no means over.

Some 2 400 people attend school in Sada. They go to four primary schools, one secondary school, and the Milothoana High School, after which some may carry on to train as primary teachers at the Masibulele training school over the Oxton road. The schoolgoers were 62% girls in our sample, of those attending in Sada.

Quite a high proportion (25%) go to school outside Sada. This group is mostly boys (70%), as we found. It could be that families prefer investing in their sons instead of their daughters - or there may be other factors, such as lack of boarding space for girls or greater fears for them living away from home. Why do so many pupils go away to study? It could reflect on the condition of Sada's schools, or perhaps more families sent their children elsewhere in 1981 after the clash with the police in 1980. We did meet some parents who had had to form out their children to grandparents because the household in Sada was too congested, and this accommodation problem could be another reason too.

Quite a few children (14%) at the lower primary level study outside Sada. In higher primary, the rate rises 35%. Then it drops slightly to 30% for those in lower secondary, and soars again to 42% of the students in Standard 9 and up. We do not know which schools the Sada students go to, but this shift to places outside is very emphatic, as the following diagram shows:

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Here we also see the nearly total fade in schooling after Junior Certificate: 41% of schoolgoers were in lower primary, 35% in higher primary, 22% in lower secondary, and only 2% in Standard 9 and up. It also means that only one person in four goes further than primary school, and about that early stage if people do not keep using them. With many people dropping out of school so soon, the illiteracy rate would actually be far higher in Sada than appears from the schoolgoing rate, since for quite a few people their skills will be lost again in a year or two.

In terms of mere labour training, the pattern is actually too good. Poor as it is, it overshoots the skill requirements for the very crude labouring jobs that many Sada people get. A Standard 4 or 5 pass is superfluous, Teba officials say, for miners who only have to read the danger example, Teba accept Grahamstown men with no schooling at all, for there.

Whatever the jobs really amount to, many parents do everything to keep children at school -

Here there is the chance of educating children. On the farm the maximum was Standard 2 and then work for the farmer. But my problem is the educating of children on a small wages, since my husband is away for the whole year. I have to struggle for food. So far there is no help or anything to expect but to try and help myself.

Whether it was that parents could not cope or that the children themselves chose to leave off schooling, it seems there are a lot of young people out of school. Our sample shows that nearly one in five (19%) aged 7 years and up do not go. What they do, and whether their rate of employment is later affected, we do not know.

WATER

Concrete reservoirs on the hill behind supply water to Sada, drawing on Waterdown Dam. The water is led to street taps about 100 m apart, which many people found worse than they had had before:

There were taps at a 50 m distance but here you have to walk a long way to the tap.

In Queenstown taps are inside the yards.

People did not complain about the quality of the water, and in fact one person praised it for not being salty - this was after the water at Port Alfred.

Gardens may never be watered by hose, which disperses of many of them. All water is carried away to the houses, and in the case of Emadakeni people this entails a long, heavy trip, as we have seen. Water may be reticulated to Emadakeni in the near future, if the pipes seen there in April 1982 are put in.

STREETS AND LIGHTING

One route in Sada is tarred, mainly for the buses perhaps. Apart from that, there are dirt roads. They are fairly wide and better than many township roads elsewhere. Hewa is very windy, though, and Sada has a bad dust problem which makes touring quite a priority. Emadakeni has broad and narrow walkways, some of which can take cars. They obviously need grading to turn them into true roads.

Emadakeni has no street lighting, and the main section has far too little. In the opinion of those we met. People want lights for safety as well as light to walk by.

One householder neatly summed it up -

Streets should be tarred and electrified because of dust and violence.

This is the gist of most of the comments we received.

TRANSPORT

Just about the best service is the buses which run past Sada, from Zweledinga to Queenstown, three times during each morning and twice each afternoon. Complaints are that it is an expensive fare (R1.50 one way in 1981) and not always regular. The cost cuts out some jobs and a lot of work seeking, and the irregularity makes people fear losing their jobs - some grim mention was made of this in 1981. The position may be much better now. The Queenstown town clerk said in April 1982 that the buses between Sade and Queenstown run every 20 minutes during the week. There are also Sada buses, too costly for anything but emergencies. The nearest railhead is at Queenstown, 42 km away.

POST

Nobody mentioned reminiscences going astray. People have to collect their post themselves -

Post - this is one problem we face because you have to go to the factory for post.
SHOPs

In the 1960s people had to shop entirely in Whittlesea or Queenstown, apart from buying the odd item from hawkers. Queenstown was favoured then, and still is today, because prices there are so much lower. The RI return bus fare needs to be made worthwhile, though.

Sada now has about four general dealers, we heard, although only the Sada trading store is several shekels. There are a good many informal traders too. This is how some people spoke of it, mentioning the supply of vegetables and liquor in almost the same breath.

Meat is in very short supply. Only one butchery exists and there is some informal meat-dealing, but nothing like what Sada needs.

3.4.11 Local affairs

NEIGHBOURLINESS AND ORGANISATIONS

This section is based uncritically on the families’ views as they were given to us, because we could not evaluate such things as how candid people were about neighbour relationships or their allegiances to various organisations.

First we shall record how families in the sample got on with their neighbours, and the organisational patterns and general interests they support. Then we turn to their main problems and aspirations, what people expect to do about them, and whom they expect help from.

Several households felt the social strain of moving to Sada. Some quickly felt at home with their neighbours, especially if they were helped to settle in -

We get on very well with them because when we arrived as ‘newcomers’ they accepted us.

We get on very well with them because they helped us in our plight to get a house.

I made friends very quickly and easily.

Others took longer -

After some weeks I began to make friends.

We did not get on very well until we came to know them better.

At first we had difficulty in making friends.

One would expect this in any relocation, but it is far worse where people come from many different places - the disruption of the move comes at the very time you are leaving the established community was transferred intact. We assume that people who come to Sada

We get on very well with them because we come from the same place.

Very well - some we have known before arrival.

Almost everyone says they get on well nowadays with their neighbours, but there are more muted replies too -

Well - we never had a fight.

I have never quarrelled with them since I came here.

Families have been strained by being too close together. Let alone the clashes within a family, neighbours have to be very circumspect about not getting in each other’s way or, if they share a plot, to foster good feelings -

We do get on well with them because the plot is not divided.

We get on very well with them because we don’t engage ourselves on people’s private/family affairs.

We get on very well with people. In some instances the occupiers of the front of the house get cross with us when we tell them that their poultry get into our garden.

We get on very well yet there are some misunderstandings due to the fact that the yards have no fences.

People have very warm ties too, of course, and appreciate each other -

We get on very well with them because they are friendly.

They are nice to us.

We get on very well insomuch as we exchange visits and invite each other for supper.

Common problems also draw people together. We have already noted the strong borrowing mechanism at Sada, and that families even accommodate each other if a household is thrown out for not paying rent. Quite a few said they got on together -

because we have the same needs.

because we are all under the same living conditions.

because we help each other with food.

In context, the following aforesounding comment does in fact convey the tone of many families we met -

We get on well together because we speak the same language and are of the same class.

Being ‘all Ciskeian together’ did not give this kind of togetherness, though, except in a negative sense -

We all get on well because we are all suffering under the common government.

We get on well with them because we are all under the same rule.

But organisations in Sada certainly do strengthen the bond with neighbours -

We get on well together because we have formed groups e.g., burial society.

We get on well with them because we attend church services and meet at functions together.

Many families mentioned belonging to the same church as their neighbours. The churches are by far the biggest and best supported organisations in Sada. The Moravians predominate, as is only natural in this area of Shiloh Moravian Mission. Others that we met were Zionist, Dutch Reformed, Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist, Full Gospel, A.M.E. and Ethiopian. Altogether, 65% of those we met were church members.

Burial societies had a 32% membership in our sample, and so did the Ciskei National Independence Party. There was one mention of the Sada Mothers’ Union, another of the Moravian Church choir. No sport or other leisure clubs were listed, although some sport is played - the field with rough posts lies over the Oxton road from Sada. The teams apparently give concerts to raise funds for themselves, so there is some organisation involved.

Churchgoing seems to have a sense of rivalry to it, among the denominations. It draws more women than men, has a traditionalist conservative appeal, is valued for its moral support and
also in some cases for material help - members may apply for particular bursaries, use the hall for their functions and fundraising etc. It may be on the wane.

Burial societies are said to be an index of poverty. The honourable end matters all the more after a lifetime under par, and where living is hand-to-mouth people have to provide for the expense of a funeral in this way.

The CNIP is popularly seen as the one way to get ahead materially. It is a precondition of just about every job in the Ciskei. People in Sade even felt that CNIP membership helped them to get pensions, housing or anything else where they had to apply to officials, even if they had an absolute right to get the thing they were asking for. Sade's administration is through headmen and committees acting as intermediaries between people and State offices. This double-thick process has thwarted most of the applications we heard of. Democratic pressures are tried -

A meeting was called for we have too few houses.

Some meetings were called and we were promised about the toilets and accommodation. Basically, though, it all boils down to appealing to the Ciskei government, to authority, as the source of everything. People therefore tend to try for things through a chain of influence. It makes for very complex relationships which get more complicated still as key people cannot produce the goods. Promises work for a time, but then leading figures find their own power base eroded by failure of the administration to supply what Sade needs. The regime seems to turn everyone into suppliants, and it must all be in the name of the CNIP. There may well be an upswing in CNIP status at present, with hopes rising of benefits from the new Whittlesea North development. But comments even from people with party cards show plainly that they regard the CNIP as a dunnging outfit -

We expect the Ciskei government to help us because we pay poll tax and donate money to the party. It seems as if they are interested on the party more than on human lives.

CNIP membership thus strikes us as political rather than political. Another feature of it in Sade is that it is urged on everyone as a populist movement - or at least a token support for Sebe as 'the nation's leader'. Yet it is the one way for people to climb into elitism, and so the way it works is divisive and hierarchical. The tangle of local figures at the bottom of this hierarchy may well get more complicated as thousands more people will soon be resettled in the area. For everyone, whether they are in the power game or not, the CNIP and Ciskei regime mean very much the same thing. People are indignant at having to pay to go towards NtakazaNtontolo monument, 'parties cracked for government ministers', gifts for Sebe and so on, as we have mentioned. Many comments throughout the questionnaires imply that Sade keeps having to pay, for nothing in return. It is rent, for houses never repaired. Or poll tax, or CNIP collections, for nothing but promises. The fact that a third of our sample belonged to a party with such a record shows how strongly the Ciskei authorities push the need for membership.

LEADERS

Nearly all the households named Mr Mystaza, MP for the area, as a community leader. Other comments also show that he is seen as the most effective link with the central authority -

The government will help as Mr. Mystaza promised.

Sometimes the faith people have in him sounds like no faith at all, but just the only option -

I've made contact with our representative but we are still waiting for promises.

Most people include at least one community councillor's name on their list. About a quarter mentioned teachers and/or ministers of religion. No leaders were named other than these establishment figures.

ATTITUDES TO PROBLEMS

As the sections above have shown, people have many pressing needs in Sade. It is pensions, housing, all work, better pay, help with education, guaranteed jobs for school leavers, also the longing for land and the chance to have stock again. There is sanitation too, and better street lights, and proper water supplies, and tarring of roads, and decent health facilities including a hospital, and a butchery that can cater for Sade.

Virtually all the questionnaires show people relying on the Ciskei authorities for everything. How much they really expect is hard to say. A few people sounded really hopeful -

The above - post and sanitation - had been what the Govt. promised to do something about. The Govt. has given us much hope so we are looking forward to its help.

Most made strong but neutral statements to the effect that their problems were the Ciskei's responsibility.

We expect the Govt. to help since housing problems are catered by it.

We expect the Ciskeian Government to help us because we pay poll tax and we are under their regime.

We expect the Government (Ciskeian) should help us because we cannot do anything without their intervention for they brought us here.

We expect the Ciskeian government to help us because we are their responsibility.

About a third mention government help without really expecting it. Their remarks convey anything from doubt to anger.

We would like the Ciskeian Government to help us. We old people expect death to redeem us because this white civilization has brought shame to blacks.

We expect the Ciskeian Government to help us because they want independence, a sign of being economically viable.

We expect the Ciskeian Government to help us because we are really dying.

There is nothing we can do about our problems but wait for what the government's promised. The government is our hope.

I can do nothing but wait what the authorities should do as they always promise. The headman who represents us is the hope to raise our needs.

We expect the Government to help us because we do know that we are exploited instead of being protected.

We expect the authorities to help us because when it comes to financial matters they are the first class to collect money.

A few, including some cited in earlier sections of the report, have written off any idea of help from the authorities.

We expect help from nobody but God. The government does not want to hear from our cries.

We cannot do anything on ourselves without money. We live to die - slow death. We expect any kind of help from anywhere because the Ciskeian government has shown less interest on our side.

These comments arise almost entirely from the question, 'Who do you expect to help?' They show deep dependency and despondency, which perhaps form a vicious circle. The threat of detention under Proclamation R252 may also deter people from working on community problems independently of the government.
3.4.12 Conclusion

The very fact of families coping day after day, year after year, at Sada betokens huge resourcefulness and endurance by many people. They contend especially with cold in winter, epidemics in summer, broken families, congestion, hunger, and all the restrictions on full life common to imposition on the people who were moved either against their will or with legalistic barriers on any other move: and who, once in Sada, have had to live in proletarian style but deprived of proper housing, proper services and in almost all cases, a living wage.

Beyond the daily effort, it is difficult for Sada people to achieve more on their own. Many are very poor, most have their family life sheltered by migrancy, all are forced to stay isolated and they could do anything at all themselves to improve things. Nobody mentioned any community for sports functions, and the borrowing mechanism - all of them important, but just as day-to-day strategy, not for development.

Sada contains firm neighbourhoods. Perhaps they could have done more if the people had arrived together from one established community rather than in fragmented groups of strangers. Yet the general tone is not as passive as the previous section suggests. A good many comments felt that they could do so only if they had some leeway given them to start with.

We expect to get better jobs so that we can find solutions.

We expect to do something like getting work with higher salaries so that we can find solutions for most of our problems.

We expect to get rid of such problems as family division, scarcity of jobs, and small accommodation. We can help ourselves through unity and street competitions on various things. The government should have a solution to most of our problems.

The changes happening now in 1982, with massive resettlement over the road, will bring some benefits. Housing will be eased, at a price. Infrastructure will improve in the Whittlesea area, to suit the wishes of those in Sada: migrancy, minimal wages, minimal facilities for rural.

But the basic troubles for people are part of the regime's ongoing design and will not be changed dormitories. Negatively again, there will be greater congestion, pollution problems, maybe more of a battle for jobs at the labour bureau when anything up to another 60 000 people move into the Whittlesea area.

Overall, it looks as though many people will still have to squander their life energy just on survival. They lack freedom, and some people have cried out against this great indignity and waste of life at Sada.

We are trying by all ways and means to make ends meet only for survival. We live on bed conditions and see ourselves destroyed bit by bit.

3.5 ELUKHANYWENI

3.5.1 Introduction

Elukhanyweni lies on a hillside in the beautiful Kaiskamahoke valley. The area is fertile by local standards, but Elukhanyweni itself is dustland, not a tree, not a blade of green grass, a few withered mealie plants, a few shrivelled cabbages, and row upon row of wooden box houses, counterpoised by row upon row of corrugated iron toilets. A typical closer settlement.

In 1976 the first of 400 families from a number of small reserves near Humansdorp in the Lower Tsitsikama Forest arrived at Elukhanyweni. By all accounts life in the Tsitsikama was preferable. There was arable land for everyone and some local employment opportunities. The people lived in permanent houses. They had strong cultural links with the area and had been there for more than a century.

By contrast, at Elukhanyweni, 'the place of light', they have no land. Earning a living requires long-distance migration. Their homes are untempered, filmy wooden boxes. They are culturally out of place. They are poorer. Some are starving.

They were resettled as a consequence of a policy of consolidating the bantustans. They resisted and argued, but eventually in the face of guns they capitulated and moved.

For these people resettlement has been a most savage process of proletarianisation. They have emerged, at the end of a brutal experience, as a rightless and landless migrant labour force.

The bitterness and frustration is immense. The depth of demoralization in the community is palpable. They want only one thing, to return.

3.5.2 Before the move

We had a better life.

In the Tsitsikama the people lived as people do in rural reserves. Some left their families to work in the towns, and from time to time returned to rest. Others stayed to farm the land, tried...
to squeeze enough to eat from a few morgen.

Yet:
We had fields.
We had work.
We had food.
We had a better life.

HISTORY

The ties of the Tsitsikama people to the land at Humansdorp went back to the sixth frontier war of 1835. During this conflict between Colonialist and Xhosa, groups of refugees from the wars generated by the expansion of the Zulu state, collectively known as the Mfengu, rose in spontaneous rebellion against the position of inferiority they had come to occupy in Xhosa society and sided with the British. In return they were granted land rights in parts of the Eastern Cape. Some of them, about 2,000 in all, were moved 200 miles westward into the Tsitsikama. There, on a thinly populated inaccessible strip of country between a mountain range and the sea, they settled.

At the request of the Governor, the Moravian Brotherhood established the mission station of Clarkson in the area. The station itself was subsequently turned into a settlement for coloureds from the surrounding district. The Mfengu occupied other bits of mission land, some pieces of crown land and six tracts of land known as Fingo Reserve, Witteklebosch, Witelsbos, Snyklip, Doriskaal and Palmietriver. The latter areas were given reserve status in 1958. The deeds of registration stated that the land would be held in trust by the State for the descendants of the first settlers.

Under the Natives Land Act of 1913 the six reserves were scheduled for exclusive African occupation. The Act was designed to draw a sharp segregation between the land available for African occupation and the land available to whites. The mines wanted more labour and thus constraints on the land available for expansion to the independent African peasantry were imposed. At the same time they wanted migrants. This called for restrictions to white encroachment on African land so as to preserve the partial subsistence base of the worker in the reserve. The division of the land, while maintaining intact the ties of Africans to the reserves, destroyed all hope of economic independence for these areas, and thereby ensured their status as labour reserves.

There was little opposition from local whites to the scheduling of the Tsitsikama reserves for blacks. The farmers 'found them well behaved people'. Furthermore it would seem they did not appropriate agricultural land that white farmers particularly desired. Moreover the reserves served as small generators of labour for the adjacent districts. A steady stream of people, more or less equivalent to the net increase in the population, left the reserves and settled on local white farms or elsewhere in the districts as wage labourers. Of those who remained, a small number worked on public construction projects and on farms during peak times.

On the other hand, the inhabitants of the reserves were far from satisfied with the extent of the scheduled areas. Not only had there been pressure on the land from the very beginning, but in the years immediately preceding the Act they had experienced a steady encroachment upon the land at their disposal. In addition, the schedule to the Act ignored certain mission and crown land which was still available to them for grazing purposes. In response the Beaumont Commission, established to review the schedule to the Act, recommended that these lands be released to Africans. The quality of the released land was extremely poor and of no use to white farmers.

However, these Beaumont recommendations were not enacted until the Natives Trust and Land Act of 1936 was passed. As a result the total land legally available to the community increased 5,700 to 9,741 morgen. The total population was in the region of 1,500. This meant that the average family had 40 morgen of land at its disposal. Although most of this was grazing land, some families cultivated up to 8 morgen.

A unique characteristic of the Cape Province at this stage was the coincidence of a variety of tenure arrangements, often in the same district. The bulk of the Tsitsikama reserve lands were held under tribal or perpetual quitrent tenure. By contrast, in the released area Trust tenure applied since under the 1936 Act all crown lands in African areas were vested in the Trust. It would seem that hardly any families held their land in freehold.

In 1952 the area was subjected to some aspects of betterment planning. The betterment program was initiated by the government in the late ’30s in an attempt to reclaim and rehabilitate the agricultural land in the reserves. In the main, measures aimed at curbing soil erosion and exhaustion were introduced. Restrictions on the number of livestock and the quantity of cultivated land were imposed. In the Tsitsikama the total amount of arable land was reduced and subdivided into 3-4½ morgen fields. Measures aimed at stock reduction were also introduced.

AGRICULTURE

On the eve of the move most households still had access to a piece of arable land of approximately 4 morgen. Just about everyone had grazing rights and the grazing area per household came close to 30 morgen. In all this does not amount to much, nevertheless it is considerably
more than the 1/2 morgen of cultivable and 1/2 morgen of grazing land available to the average rural Ciskeian.

The quality of most of the land seems to have been fairly good. The carrying capacity was in the area of 6 hectares per large stock unit, which by average South African standards, and certainly Ciskeian standards, is quite respectable. In its attempts to sell the land recently, the government was asking between R200 and R300 per hectare, which again is indicative of reasonable quality agricultural land.

To this land the Tsitsikama people were intensively attacted. In their memories the land, the fields, are permanent. They dwell on it, everyone, obsessively. In their recollections, a refrain of sorts, 'one had fields'. For them, 'without fields there is starvation'.

Even prior to their arrival in the Eastern Cape the Mfengu were enthusiastic cultivators of the land. For more than a century this tradition was maintained in the Tsitsikama:

We grew many things.

We used to get up early to plough our fields.

From the land they derived their food - according to many, enough to satisfy their needs. In part this may reflect a romanticising of the past. The crop yield per morgen in reserve agriculture is in the region of R70 per annum. About a further R30 per family is derived from livestock production. So even if the yield at Humansdorp was 50% higher and even if they cultivated all the available land, both of which are fairly unreasonable assumptions, then the average family would only have derived the equivalent in food of about R60 per annum (R7 per person per month) from agriculture. This is not enough to provide a family of seven with a fully balanced diet, but it will suffice for an adequate supply of carbohydrates and vegetables.

More realistically, we may assume that the per capita return from agriculture was about R5 per month. Not much, but nevertheless a substantial proportion of a subsistence family's food requirements. And very significant to a people who are living in poverty. A sentiment that finds common endorsement:

Starvation, it happens when you don't have fields.

About every household (93%) produced a crop composition that provided the basis for a fairly balanced diet:

Where we came from we grew many things in our fields....

We had fields to grow what we liked and what we needed.

The crop mix typically included maize and potatoes to provide carbohydrates, beans to supply vegetable protein, and two or more of a variety of other vegetables such as cabbages, carrots, onions, tomatoes, peas, pumpkins, sweet potatoes, wheat and beetroot, some of which are rich in vitamins. Some even grew fruit trees.

The extent of the crop range is fairly wide in comparison to subsistence agriculture elsewhere. This suggests a very respectable level of cultivation.

Livestock was common, by reserve standards, even plentiful. The vast majority kept cattle, poultry and pigs. Just under half the families had goats and sheep. At least 25% of the households owned horses. Although the average number of animals owned by each household is not known, most families claimed they had many. One family, for instance, owned 1 horse, 7 head of cattle, 20 sheep, pigs and poultry. Another had 20 head of cattle, 27 goats and 2 horses. From their livestock the community derived, albeit variably, supplies of meat, milk and eggs, hides and wool were also produced.

The level of livestock production seems to have been high in comparative terms. This much can be gleaned from a comparison between the pattern of livestock ownership in the Tsitsikama

and that found by a recent socio-economic survey of the relatively well-off agricultural region of the Amatola Basin:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stock type</th>
<th>Amatola Basin</th>
<th>Tsitsikama reserves</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from the above table that each kind of animal was owned by a larger proportion of households in the Tsitsikama area than in the Amatola Basin. Moreover, casual evidence suggests that each earning household had more stock in the Tsitsikama.

A surprising number of families (67%) sold a part of their agricultural produce. Some of this was peddled locally to neighbours, some was sold on the market in Humansdorp. A family even claimed that 'we used to get orders for tomatoes from Jo'burg.'

LABOUR

Although agriculture was central to the lives of the people in the Tsitsikama, they could not, and never had, lived by it alone. Many, the percentages are unknown, had to find employment in the formal sector of the economy. Some held jobs, mainly in the construction sectors, at Humansdorp. Some laboured on the farms in the district. Some worked for the Department of Forestry on the plantations in the area. Others went to Port Elizabeth where they worked in manufacturing, construction and the services.

Although all these jobs involved some temporary migration, most people returned home on a weekly or monthly basis. Migration over long distances and demanding an absence from home for periods as long as a year or even a shorter time of three months occurred infrequently. Very few, for instance, worked on the mines.

There are no systematic data on the incidence of unemployment in the community at that stage. Casual interviews suggest that jobs were fairly readily available. This is moreover confirmed by a superficial comparison of population and available official employment statistics for the district in the aggregate.

INCOME, POVERTY, NUTRITION

Not much is known about incomes and poverty before the removal. No doubt most people were fairly poor. However, it is clear that on the basis of subsistence agriculture and formal sector employment most households were able to feed, clothe and house themselves adequately.
The houses in the Tsiitsika, though they varied substantially, were on average permanent and relatively high quality brick, solid brick or wattle and daub structures. Some families owned spacious five to eight bedroomed dwellings, others had three or four rooms at their disposal. Most people, it would seem, were satisfied with housing conditions.

Educational facilities, however, were rather poor. For instance, there was no secondary school within easy commuting distance of the reserves.

We have no information on the quality of the other services to the community. Nevertheless we may safely assume, in view of the relatively developed state of the Humanandorp district, that these were superior to those currently supplied at Elukhanywet.

CONCLUSION

One can only reiterate that the land, and the security and income it provided, the permanent homes and the fertilite with the local labour market, enabled the Tsiitsika people to lead a dignified, albeit harsh, existence. They had been in the area for generations. They were culturally and economically rooted, as firmly as can be, in the region.

3.5.3 During the move

The Black Administration Act of 1927 provided for the administration of black affairs. It marked a shift in government policy towards enforced retribalisation of the African reserves. Section 5 of the Act deals with the removal of blacks. It empowers the State President to order, subject to the approval of Parliament in some cases, the removal of any black community and the excision of any black land from the scheduled or released areas.

On 21 April 1975 a parliamentary select committee on black affairs dealing with homeland consolidation recommended:

- in terms of the provisions of section 5 of the Bantu Administration Act, 1927...
- the withdrawal of Bantu tribes, Bantu communities, and Bantu persons residing in the...
- District of Humanandorp...

comprising the following properties:
- Dutsela Location, Fingo Location, The Gap, Palmietrivier Location, Nklyklip Location, Witteelbosch Location and Witte Els Bosch. (SC 9-75)

On 14 May 1975 these recommendations were adopted by the House of Assembly. On this occasion the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development said:

- it is an historic day today, since today we have come to the last round of the Parliamentary work in connection with what is called the consolidation of the Bantu areas.... There are actually four aspects in connection with this work: In the first place, the definition of the areas within which released areas for the Bantu peoples may be declared; in the second place, the clearing of Bantu freehold land; in the third place, the excision of poorly situated Bantu reserves or parts thereof; and in the fourth place, the attempt to consolidate the scattered areas of the Bantu homelands, by the aforementioned three actions, into single units... here we have proof of the will of the Government and the National Party to carry out this task of honour actively and to meet the difficult challenge. (Assembly Debates, 14.05.75, our emphasis)

The consolidation of the bantustans emerged as an aim of the State during the sixties and has since become an important component of the bantustan policy. There are a number of reasons why this trend occurred. Determined attempts have been made by the State to make the reserve areas work administratively, politically and to a lesser extent economically. From the point of view of administration, political control and economic development a unified area is clearly preferable. Furthermore, as part of its divide-and-rule strategy the State has encouraged and stimulated the development of ethnic nationalities located in separate territories. The consolidation of the homelands is important to the stabilisation of such ethnic and ideological identities. However, neither of these explanations show that homeland consolidation is a necessary prerequisite for the bantustan policy. Finally, one should not ignore the incompatibility of fragments of independent bantustans and the strains that this placed on the ideology of independent black States. The latter is perhaps even the most important cause of 'homeland' consolidation. The recent rethinking within government circles on the whole question of consolidation, mainly as a consequence of the increasing costs, seems to indicate that even in the eyes of officialdom, the feasibility of the bantustan policy does not rest on comprehensive consolidation.

Be that as it may, the pace of consolidation accelerated during the seventies and especially the late seventies. It was therefore inevitable that reserve areas as 'badly situated' as the Tsiitsika reserves would be moved sooner rather than later. They are over 200 km from the main body of the Ciskei.

Following the Act of Parliament the communities were informed of the impending move. Promises of agricultural land and decent accommodation were apparently made and a delegation visited Keiskammahoek. The Ciskeian authorities were also drawn in to announce the move as enticingly as possible:

Two white guys asked us to move. They said that the Chief Minister had built for us permanent homes.

A South African Government official asked us to leave. He said that the land belonged to whites and Mr S***, then Ciskei Minister of *****, was encouraging us to move saying that land was available for us in the Ciskei.

Mr S*** and other black agriculturalists told us to move. They said that land was available to us in the Ciskei.

Some Ciskeian Cabinet Ministers told us to leave. They said that we have our own place in the Ciskei, land of plenty.

The whole thing started in the 70s. There used to be meetings where people were asked by Mr S*** to vote for Ciskei. We didn't. They said Ciskeian government was in need of us.

A meeting of those according to the move was called and about 50 people turned up. As reward, the inyakazi as they are called, were offered agricultural land. Though most of them received dryland fields, 14 fortunate families were incorporated into the Keiskamma irrigation scheme. They all moved before the rest of the community and although some initially resisted in the resettlement camp they all now live close to their fields. In a sense these collaborators are no longer part of the Elukhanywet community and many view them with contempt.

The bulk of the Tsiitsika people, however, refused to move. On 12 September 1976, Pretoria responded. The State President issued an Order for the removal, as provided for in the Bantu Administration Act of 1927. At the same time an order went out to the South African police to arrest and detain any person who refrained or refused to move. (3)

On 5 October a magistrate and a representative of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr K***, convened a meeting of residents from the various reserves. The magistrate read out the contents of the Order issued by the State President. The meeting was also addressed by Mr K*** and he informed them that the date for the move was set for 15 November.
The police and the army told us to move. The only reason was the point of a gun, no other reasons were given.

We endeavoured to ask the cause but the answer was to be thrown in prison.

We were not even given one reason, but brutally evicted at gunpoint.

The police told us to move. They gave no reason, but to point us with guns which terrifies us.

We formed a group and asked the police the cause of our eviction, but the answer was to be pointed with guns.

No reason for the move was given except promise to shoot us or take us to prison.

Some claim that they did receive an explanation:

The police who said that they were sent by the South African Government said that bastards would emerge if blacks kept on staying near whites.

The boers and police answered us that our kings in the homelands were in need of us.

The police said we had to move because we have a special Canaan in the Ciskei.

The boers told us through police to leave. The reason they give is that at this side we could educate our children better.

They said we have our land in Kaiskammahoek where we could get anything.

The government sent police to kick us out. The police said the government was in need of the place. We asked various questions and we were told that we would get houses here.

Here and there, resistance turned into acts of desperation:

Some took big stones and put them across the street to prevent the trucks from coming to this side and some were imprisoned.

The community also sought legal means to fight the move, albeit in terms of technicalities.

On 21 November the headman gave notice of an application on behalf of the community for a legal injunction against the removal, on the grounds that the Resolution approving the removal was not consistent with the conditions for authorising such a removal as set forth in Section 5 of the Bantu Administration Act 1927, because although the resolution specified the places from which the community had to withdraw it failed to specify the place to which the community had to withdraw to. Judgment went in favour of the State.

An appeal was begun, but was withdrawn. There are conflicting claims as to why the appeal was withdrawn. Other members of the community tried to start their own appeal but permission for this was refused on the grounds that only the man in whose name the case was initially fought could appeal.

The community fought to the end. Then when overwhelmed, the people accepted the fact while keeping their bitter antagonism to the move and the way it had been brutally forced:

It was the police who told us to move. They gave us no reasons, but we were driven out like dogs.

We could not do anything because even those who tried to resist were jailed and immediately after their release were sent straight to this place.

The soldiers just said that we were leaving at that moment and pointed us with guns. Other households were still refusing and the soldiers promised to shoot them.

We tried to stay. But an official commanded his messengers to demolish our houses. Then we were evicted at gunpoint.

The day we were moved the people were crying - they had no right to take us like that. (E.P. Herald, 28.08.79)

Some people had the extra indignity of having to pretend they wanted to go, being asked their opinion for the official record at gunpoint:

we were told to move on 5 October. We refused to go. On 16 December there arrived 14 bakkies with soldiers carrying rifles plus 22 trucks. The soldiers asked us in Afrikaans whether each person wanted to be removed or not. Many residents replied positively.

At the time of a court application to have the removals stopped, one man described his experiences in an affidavit:

He had been on his way home after hearing that lorries were near his house and was stopped on the road by police.

They had his name on a list and told him he was one of the people influencing others not to move. He denies this allegation in his affidavit.

He accompanied the police to his house but refused to hand over the house keys, which would enable them to move him and his effects, because his children were at school and his wife was not at home.

He alleges the door to his house was broken down by the police and his belongings damaged in the removal.

Thereafter he was taken to the Humansdorp police station and allegedly told to sign a document without being allowed to read it and then paid R740 in compensation. He was asked whether he wished to stay in the bus or in a cell until he was moved to Kaiskammahoek at 10 that night. He elected to stay on the bus which was guarded and no one was allowed to leave it. (E.P. Herald, 24.03.82)

The removals took place over a period of two months:

We stayed when others were moving. The boers came back after some weeks and forced us to move at gunpoint as well. Other households also tried to resist likewise but were also evicted and brought here later.

Other households were left behind when we moved because of the shortage of transport. But they eventually joined us for nobody could resist the barrels of the guns.

During this period the police often arrived while the people were still asleep, surrounded their houses, forced them from their homes and shunted them onto buses and trucks early in the morning (E.P. Herald, 24.03.82). Then finally by the end of January 1978 the Tslitskame reserves were empty.

Once evicted they made their way in convoys of overcrowded buses, for the women and children, and open trucks, for the men and furniture, towards Kaiskammahoek. The people say:

We were like animals on GG trucks.

We were brought by trucks some with our properties, but much were damaged.

We were taken by the trucks with our damaged property.

We were brought on GG trucks like cattle.

We were brought on overloaded buses with children and men were on GG trucks with furniture.

Their passage was supervised by the police, Eastern Cape Administration Board officials, and troops. Zulu truck drivers from Natal were specially employed for the job. South African brute force and Ciskeian collusion were grimly recognised:

We were brought by the police of South Africa... by the boers... by the boers of the Republic...
GG trucks were driven by Zulus and some few clerks sent by South African Govt. The South African Government reached an agreement with Ciskel.

The South African and the Ciskeian government brought us here.

On arrival, after the slow 300 km journey, they were given a tomato-box house or a tent:

The government labourers took us to those clustered houses.

They pushed us each to his own house.

The beasts gave us tents. Later we got houses.

The police allocated us this land and order us to erect tents.

We were brought by the trucks and ordered to erect your tent.

Thus the reality of life at Elukhanyweni dawned on them. The first of a number of promises was shattered - there were no good houses. They were bitterly disappointed in what they saw.

But the greatest shock was land. Before the move, it seemed, they were promised equivalent land, but the great majority ended up with just a house plot. Although everyone without exception had land at Humansdorp, no-one had freehold title and as a result no compensation for the land was paid. Nor was anyone compensated for the unripped crops they left behind. Another outrage was being stripped of their livestock. They were told to sell some of their animals before the move. It was a cavalier demand to make of a community where virtually everyone had cattle and most had both pigs and poultry, not to mention the householders who had not only goats but sheep and even horses. Not being free to decide about selling, they could not even set their price. They just had to let their animals go cheap, accepting any offer. Not one person felt satisfied with the price. Where the removal squads arrived unexpectedly, some people did not even manage to sell because their animals disappeared into the bush and were lost in the confusion:

People who sold their stock had to give them away to the white farmers who bought them for R16 or R20 a cow. If you didn't sell, they said, well then we'll fetch them up off the road after you have gone.

Stock were sold at low prices.

We sold the stock with less money because we were in a hurry.

Stock were lost because we sold them cheaply caused by our eviction.

Stock went out of sight when GG trucks arrived here.

Land were lost and stock disappeared into the bushes.

Many however took their stock through to the Ciskel, only to lose them there. Some died in the drought. Some were sold. The rest were simply stolen:

When we arrived with our stock there was a drought here and so some died.

We had 27 goats and 20 cattle which we brought here. They all died.

We sold our stock when we found there is a shortage of grazing land here.

Because of problems with grazing we sold our stock cheaply.

Our stock was stolen the second day we live here.

Many people brought stock, and have not even got one head now.

Compensation for the loss of their homes was paid to a third of the household. One person who had an eight bedroomed wattle and daub house received R390. Another who owned three houses = one stone, one brick and one soilbrick = was paid R500 for the lot. But most compensation ranged between R80 and R180. One man received only R70 for his soilbrick house.

3.5.4 After the move

INTRODUCTION

During the mid-sixties the current resettlement programme began to receive high priority. As the tempo accelerated and the numbers involved increased it became imperative to have some form of cheap and basic accommodation for the mass of resettled people, the families of landless migrant workers, the surplus people from white urban and rural areas. Hence closer settlements.

Closer settlements are normally situated in rural areas, often isolated backwaters. They are not rural villages - agricultural land is never available. At best the inhabitants have small urban sized plots on which their houses stand. But they are not urban townships either. Only rudimentary services are provided. Houses, where they are provided by the state, are of an inferior type. Local employment opportunities are generally severely limited. In short, closer settlements are deliberately designed so as to accommodate large numbers at minimum cost. They are the new breeding grounds for the South African migrant labour force.
GEOGRAPHY

The Keiskammahoek district is fairly mountainous, and large parts are covered by tree plantations and natural forests. The Keiskamma River runs down the centre.

Elukhanyweni lies against a hill that marks the point where the Keiskamma River valley opens up into the Keiskammahoek basin.

Towards the middle of the basin is the tiny town of Keiskammahoek. It has a few general stores, a number of churches, a labour bureau, a police station and the like.

Dotted all over the district are small mud villages. But only a fraction of the residents are engaged in agriculture. There is widespread landlessness (30 - 35%) and considerable pressure on the land. Arable plots measure less than 2 morgen on average. As a result, a steady stream of migrants flow from these villages each year in search of formal sector employment.

Three or four small factories are located in the area. Two of these, a saw mill and a furniture producer, have been established under the agency system. In all, about 260 females and 260 males are employed in these industries.

The centrepiece of Griekel agriculture, the R2.2 million Keiskamma Irrigation scheme, is situated in the basin. The main farming activity is milk production from pastures. Each of the 175 families involved in the scheme has a 4 ha plot, of which 3 ha is devoted to irrigated pastures and 1 to cash crops from which, provided at least one family member is engaged full-time, they derive an annual cash income of R2 400 plus home-grown food. The settlers on the scheme were selected by a board appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. Employment for 200 outsiders is also provided.

However, these isolated pockets of development cannot satisfy the employment needs of the 38 000 inhabitants of the district.

Map 2 KEISKAMMAHOEK DISTRICT

DEMOGRAPHY

The de jure population of Elukhanyweni is between 2 500 and 3 000. The composition of this population according to age and sex is close to that of the black South African population as a whole.

Figure 1 COMPOSITION OF THE DE JURE POPULATION (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-24</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The marginal discrepancy between male and female numbers suggests that permanent outmigration of males occurs on a small scale. Likewise, and for similar reasons, old people are slightly overrepresented.

The household structure is also relatively standard. The average household, as in most rural areas, has 7.1 members. However there are a significant number of large families with between 8 and 15 members. About 68% of the households are male headed.

In all the demographic structure of the de jure population is fairly normal, reflecting the fact that a whole community, regardless of age, sex and economic status, was resettled at Elukhanyweni.

The structure of the de facto or permanently resident population, on the other hand, reveals all the severe imbalances associated with extensive temporary migration. (A figure showing composition of the de facto population is given on the next page.)

The old and the young are greatly overrepresented. Contrariwise, those between the ages of 25 and 44 are heavily underrepresented. There is a severe sexual imbalance, only 78 males for every 100 females.

Over 20% of the total population is temporarily absent from Elukhanyweni. A half of the adult males aged 20-64 and a staggering 35% of the adult females migrate. This gives an overall
Judging by appearances, the shrivelled crops, the stunted growth, it seems a figure of R25 is more reasonable. In short, the contribution of agriculture to the subsistence of the people at Elukhanywani is just about insignificant. In cash terms the contribution to household incomes is utterly irrelevant.

The state of livestock production is even more precarious. Though a third of the households have some form of grazing rights, only 10% actually own any cattle. There are a few pigs about. No more than 30% of the households keep poultry. Sheep, goats and horses are entirely absent.

The table below compares agriculture before and after removal. It speaks for itself. There is no need to mention the relative quantities involved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of households</th>
<th>Elukhanywani</th>
<th>Tsitsakama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>with land rights:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fields</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardens</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grazing</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that cultivate:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that own stock:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that sell produce</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One can begin to understand the outrage and bitterness in the community. They have lost their arable land. They have lost their stock. One after another they comment:

There we had fields, now we have none.
We had so much stock, now there is so left.

At Humansdorp agriculture acted as a cushion against starvation and malnutrition. Now their independent subsistence base has vanished:

We used to take something from the garden, but now I have to spend much money buying vegetables which we didn’t do before.
There is more starvation here. At Humansdorp we used to take something from our fields as we needed it.
We need fields because without food people easily get diseases.
We have no fields and as a result we have to buy everything dear.
But proletarianisation has other costs as well. It renders agricultural skills redundant, upsets the domestic division of labour, leads to a loss of security, the disappearance of a way of life:

I am the agriculturalist, but I have no fields to grow.
I want to plough, but there are no fields.
We had fields for the future of our children, now we don't.
We need fields for our lives depend on the soil.
We have no fields and that is why we despise this place.

As a result they preferred life at Humansdorp:
We had a better life there because we had fields and rain was not so scarce, even though we had no work.
There is no way to lead a better life as we did in Humansdorp because we have no fields.

Understandably there is a craving for land, and an expectation:
We need fields as an alternative to unemployment.
We want fields so that we can grow crops.
We want to plough, we need fields.
We expect to be given fields so we can eat healthy food.
At least we may be given fields so as to get food like where we came from.
People should be given fields so that they can survive.
We want our permanent fields.

But as one realist adds:
We want fields, but we do not know where they can be created.

INTRODUCTION

We can summarise the activity rates found among the adult population of Elukhanywenti as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 - 24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 34</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 44</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 64</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Though most males are economically active, that is, employed or searching for employment, the percentages are marginally lower than the national averages. The female rates, on the other hand, are substantially above the national female rates. In turn, the rates for the old and the young are extremely low. The high female rates may be due to a combination of factors such as the pressure of poverty, the absence of agricultural land and the availability of service sector jobs. The low rates for young people may reflect a commitment to education and a demoralisation associated with high youth unemployment. Early retirement is an obvious consequence of the migrant labour system, hence the low rate for old people.

The dependency rate in the camp is 26.8%. This means that more or less a quarter of the total population is employed. This figure is surprisingly high. In concrete terms it means that the average family of 7.1 members has 1.9 of them in employment.

Employment as a percentage of the population according to age and sex is presented below. The rate for adult males is average, but the female rate is very high. Both youth rates are low.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 - 24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 64</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Roughly 40% of all jobs are held by females. This is unexpected, considering that Elukhanyweni is essentially a settlement of migrant workers. It has been estimated that females constitute only 10 - 20% of the migrant labour force in the country as a whole. However in Elukhanyweni they form about 40% of all migrants.

Migrant labour is the dominant form of employment. An incredible 70% of the labour force migrates over distances in excess of 200 km. The rest have jobs within daily or weekly commuting distance.

LOCAL EMPLOYMENT

There are some local employment opportunities available, though not a great many:

Work is so scarce here that we have to travel far away from this land seeking work.
We don't find work here. People should get work where they live.
There is a scarcity of work here. There ought to be a factory or something where we can at least get work.
Because of unemployment here the head is working in Humasdorp.

These comments basically reflect the fact that the Keiskammahoek district is essentially an isolated rural region, more or less devoid of industries and capitalist farms. Only 23% of the Elukhanyweni work force have jobs in the basin itself. These are equally divided among the sexes. Domestic work, especially as far as women are concerned, is the dominant form of employment. Other service sector jobs such as teaching and nursing are also important. Males tend to work on local construction projects or in the handful of small manufacturing firms in the basin. A small number labour on the irrigation scheme.

Wages in the area, and in fact in the Ciskei as a whole, are extremely low, certainly much lower than in white South Africa. Some manufacturing firms pay as little as R60 a month. An artisan explains the position:
I am a qualified bricklayer. I get R15 a day in Humansdorp. Here I get only R5. I build on the Retokamma irrigation scheme. On the other irrigation scheme too, at Tyelula. If I try to get work elsewhere, at Dumisa, I won’t get better pay anyway because the government fixes the scales. If I try going off they’ll see on my passport I’m from Humansdorp and know I should be in Elkanyweni. They’ll send me back. We are dead here. We are dying here. You must do something now, otherwise we will all be dead. I have 5 children. How can I have them on R5 a day and not growing food? If you want to buy any children you can have some of mine.

The rest of the community share these sentiments:

At Tsetskamma I used to get R120 per month, now I don’t. I get R40. I cannot afford to educate my children on such a salary.

People here are being underpaid. Wages should be increased so that we can support our families.

Even those who are employed are being underpaid.

My wages are too low for subsistence.

The scarcity of local employment has raised the intensity of competition for jobs between the resettled people at Elkanyweni and the old inhabitants of the rural villages in the area to the level of conflict. The reproaches have flown both ways. The locals view the resettled community, the ‘sodbusters from Humansdorp’, as intruders and allege that they receive preferential job treatment because they are better educated. The resettled people contend that just the opposite occurs. It is a no-win situation, a breeding ground for conflict. When two separate, easily identifiable groups are located in an area where too many people compete for too few resources, then mutual recriminations invariably arise. Although no violence has emerged as yet, verbal clashes occur regularly.

MIGRANT LABOUR

The vast majority of jobs for both males and females involve temporary migration. No fewer than 71% of the employed males and 64% of the employed females migrate.

The age and sex distribution of the migrant labour force reflects a somewhat unbalanced pattern of migration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sexual division: 61 male, 39 female, 100 total.

Migration is clearly age specific. Most migrants - an excessive number - are concentrated in the 15-34 age range. The female share of the total migrant force is also extremely high and unusual.

It is a great irony of the removal that a large number of people have returned to their place of origin in search of employment. Some never even changed jobs during the move. No fewer than 27% of the total labour force, that is more than a third of all migrants, work in Humansdorp and surrounding district. The males are employed in a variety of sectors. Construction, especially road construction, is the most important. Others work for Boskor, in manufacturing firms and a few on farms. The females are almost exclusively domestic servants.

The ties of the Elkanyweni community to Humansdorp are the greatest of all:

Figure 3 LOCATION OF EMPLOYMENT (%)
work and therefore most female earnings fall within the fairly narrow range of R40 - 60 per month. Male migrant wages vary considerably. A family stated:

Our problem is that the head is the only one working full-time. He works at Humansdorp and only gets R40 per month.

Other male migrants receive incomes of anything between R100 and R200 per month. The average male migrant wage is probably somewhere between R120 and R150 per month.

It is clear that people now earn less as migrants than they did while at Humansdorp, but the extent of the average decline in wages is unknown. In some cases the decrease has been savage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>LOCAL Male</th>
<th>LOCAL Female</th>
<th>MIGRANT Male</th>
<th>MIGRANT Female</th>
<th>TOTAL Male</th>
<th>TOTAL Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT (%)

Although male employment is more evenly spread across the various sectors than female employment, it is nevertheless heavily concentrated in the two great male migrant industries, construction and mining. Respectively 38% and 24% of employed males are in construction and mining.

There is a lack of employment opportunity for Elukhanyweni residents in manufacturing and trade. This is because in the Eastern Cape these two industries do not recruit migrants on an extensive scale.

The position with regard to agriculture is more complex, for although it draws large numbers of migrants from the Ciskei as a whole, very few from Elukhanyweni work on farms. This may reflect a reluctance on their part to enter agriculture. But it may also be due to the pattern of recruitment. There seems to be a conservatism in agricultural recruitment, a discrimination in favour of existing networks, and since they have bypassed Elukhanyweni in the past they continue to do so.

There is surprisingly little difference, mining aside, between local and migrant employment patterns.

OCCUPATION

The occupational structure of the labour force is summarised here:

Table 7 OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>LOCAL Male</th>
<th>LOCAL Female</th>
<th>MIGRANT Male</th>
<th>MIGRANT Female</th>
<th>TOTAL Male</th>
<th>TOTAL Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The white-collar occupations form about 13% and service jobs about 29% of all employment. The rest (58%) are labourers.

In a clear sexual division of labour, males are mostly labourers (81%), whereas females
are mainly in the domestic services (60%). For reasons similar to those discussed in the previous section, the degree of concentration in the latter case is rather extreme.

The level of skills is relatively modest, only 1 in every 5 workers is skilled. This may on the one hand be a consequence of the agrarian background of the work force, or on the other it may be just a function of the structure of employment opportunities in the area.

Migrants are incorporated into the economy at marginally higher levels of skill than non-migrants. The skills are mainly found among the workers in manufacturing, and to a lesser extent those in transport and construction.

RECRUITMENT

The overwhelming majority (72%) found their present jobs through their own search activity. How they managed to have their jobs registered at the relevant urban labour bureaux is not clear. It is possible that exceptions have been allowed, especially to those who work in bantu-owned enterprises. In the case of an African from a labour bureau, an employment agency or a call-in card, otherwise a job cannot be registered by being in possession of a firm offer of employment that was obtained through a registered firm and is therefore illegal. Although this regulation has not always been strictly enforced, in the registration of their employment, there are nevertheless complaints about harassment and this question should also be related to the efficiency, as an employment agency, of the system bureaux are ineffective in providing employment to bantu-owned workseekers. This is borne out by the fact that only 2% of the jobs held by Elukhanyenini residents were obtained through public employment. People maintain that it is almost impossible, with or without a labour bureau, to find employment through the official labour bureaux.

Table 8 RECRUITMENT (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour bureaux</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The network of family and friends was not entirely irrelevant in finding local employment. About 10% of all the jobs were found in this way.

JOB LENGTH

The next table summarises information on job turnover, and especially the effects of this on a community.

Most people have had their current jobs for a period of less than two years. This trend is especially pronounced in the case of local employment and jobs in Cape Town and East London.

It is clear that the resettlement has had a considerable effect on job turnover. About 20% of all employment dates from the period commencing with the removal. Some people, though, and especially in the case of those with Human sewage jobs, have managed to retain the jobs they had prior to the removal. But it is also significant, noticeably in the instance of Human sewage, that people have managed to find employment in centres since the move.

INFORMAL SECTOR

The informal sector is significant at Elukhanyeni. Only 7% of the families are engaged in such activities. The position is summarised by one woman:

I have a knitting machine but business does not go well here.

Quite simply, an informal sector cannot thrive in the absence of a formal sector close by.

UNEMPLOYMENT

The unemployment rate in Elukhanyeni is 12% for males and 22% for females. This gives an overall unemployment rate of 16.2%. By any reasonable standards these are high unemployment figures and the community is acutely aware of the problem:

We are starving here because we have no money which is caused by lack of work.

Our problem is that we have not got enough money as a consequence of scarcity of work.

We are not working because jobs are scarce.

And the consequences of social problems:

We are not working so some of us are just wanderers.

We are unemployed and so some of us are wanderers.

We are wanderers for there is no work for us.

There is not enough work here, thus there are loafer here.

We have a problem with thieves, people are stealing because most of them have no fields and work.

Table 9 JOB LENGTH ACCORDING TO PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less than 2 years</th>
<th>Since removal</th>
<th>Before removal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local employment</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant employment</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humansdorp</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All employment</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are people here who drink too much because they have nothing to do.

The tables below enable us to construct a profile of the unemployed:

### Table 10: Unemployment According to Age and Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
<th>% of unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male aged 15-24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-64</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female 15-24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-64</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 11: Unemployment According to Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous work experience</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
<th>% of unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In agriculture</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mining</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manufacturing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>service</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No previous work experience</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 12: Unemployment According to Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous work experience</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
<th>% of unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>white collar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>service</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skilled</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unskilled</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total excl. * in Table II</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Females and school-leavers, and especially young females, run a considerable risk of being unemployed. Agricultural, mining and service sector workers have an above average chance of becoming unemployed, and so have service and unskilled workers. On the other hand, it is unlikely that an adult male working in manufacturing or construction and holding a white-collar or skilled job will become unemployed for any length of time.

The typical unemployed person is female and/or young, and with either no previous work experience or with experience as a service or unskilled worker.

The duration of unemployment is in 90% of the cases in excess of one year, and sometimes much longer.

Although unemployment is widespread in Elukhanyeni, in comparison to other resettlement areas and the reserves in general the level of unemployment is low. The reason for this is the special relationship that exists between the community and the Humansdorp district. Many people, both males and females, have either retained the jobs they had prior to the removal or been able to find new jobs in the area. Without this headstart the unemployment rate would be much higher. If for example we assume that half of those currently employed at Humansdorp would be unable to find employment elsewhere, then the unemployment rate could rise to 27%, which is similar to other such black unemployment figures.

However, despite the persistence of the link with Humansdorp, there is now, according to 65% of the questionnaire respondents, more unemployment in the community than before the removal:

We could get jobs there, here there are no jobs.

There was more work in Humansdorp, but here it is scarce.

Work was not as scarce as it is here.

These subjective views seem reasonable in the light of the fact that the community was more favourably situated with respect to the labour market before the removal. The Tsitsikama is much closer to Port Elizabeth and Cape Town, and the district itself is not so densely populated with potential labourers as Elukhanyeni. About 65% of presently occupied jobs could have been more or less easily obtainable before the removal. Additional employment, over and above substitute jobs for the 35% of currently held jobs which would have been unobtainable from the Tsitsikama, would we may assume have been readily available.

There is naturally a yearning for more and better jobs:

If only there could be more work.

Wages of workers should be increased.

### Income and Living Conditions

#### Income

As was stated earlier, the dependency rate at Elukhanyeni is relatively high. On average there are, 4 local earners, 1.5 migrant or commuter earners and 4 pensioners per family.

Unfortunately no reliable information on average family incomes is available. Nor do we have accurate data on the various types of earnings. Although most migrants (93%) send remittances to their families at regular intervals, as can be expected under the circumstances, the exact amounts involved are unknown.

Nevertheless some estimates of family incomes can be developed. If for example we assume that the average local male worker earns R80 per month and local females R40, that the average male migrant or commuter earns R150 and remits R100 per month and female migrant earns R80 and remits R50, and that the average pensioner receives R30 per month (1981), then the average monthly cash income for a family of 7,1 members amounts to R213,93 inclusive of migrants and of the 5,6 nonmigrant members comes to R153,10.

These figures should be treated with great care because the incomes imputed to the different categories are mere estimates. They cannot be used for instance to compare living standards between, say, closer settlements and rural villages. To give an idea of the sensitivity of the
estimated family incomes to the assumptions regarding wages and remittances, we may for
instance revise all earnings up and down by 10%. In the former case the family incomes become
respectively R232, 62 and R171, 79, while in the latter they are R195, 24 and R134, 41. The
actual figures are probably somewhere between the high and low estimates. To get some feel for
these estimates it may be worth noting that the 1980 Household Subsistence Level for a family of
6 living in the Peddie district was calculated at R179, 66. It is quite likely that the average
household in Elukhanyweni would find itself somewhat below this level.

It is furthermore significant that, in terms of our estimates, only 16% of the total cash income
at Elukhanyweni is derived from local services. A further 8% comes from transfer payments.
The rest, 76%, is generated by migrant and weekly commuter wages. The dependency of the
community on migrant earnings is therefore nearly total.

POVERTY

Average family income is, however, an unreliable indicator of poverty in an area because the most
immediate determinants of poverty, household income and household size, are unequally distrib-
uted across a community. To measure the incidence of poverty, the sample of households was
subdivided into four poverty equivalence classes. The focus is exclusively on the permanent
resident component of each household.

The most affluent group consists of families who are better off than a family of 6, consisting of
say 3 adults and 3 children, with an income of roughly R240/R270 per month. This group includes
18% of the sample. Typical examples are a family of 5 with a teacher as a breadwinner, or a family
of the 5 remaining members receiving remittances from 3 migrant earners. Among this
family group are a few households which might be described as comfortable. The salient character-
istic of the households in this group is the relatively small number of children attached to them.

The next group, consisting of 31% of all the households, are those who are worse off than the
first group, but somewhat better off than a family of 6 with a monthly income of around R150/
R180. These households usually have between 2 and 3 earners who contribute towards the family
maintenance. They are probablyable, in a fashion, to make ends meet.

Thus about half the households seem to manage. The rest live under much harsher conditions.

The third class (27%) consists of decidedly poor people. A typical example would be a family
of 6 with between R60/R90 and R150/R180 per month. A couple with few children with the male
in migrant employment would be another. In fact many of these households are average-sized
families with a single, normally male, earner. Clearly many of these people will be short of
what is commonly called the necessities of life.

The rest, about a quarter of the people at Elukhanyweni, are the destitute. Examples: family
of 7 with one female in domestic service, family of 4 with a single pension, family of 9 with
the remittances of one male migrant, family of 8 with no cash income.

For most of these families, meat is a rare monthly occurrence. They live on a diet consisting
of maize, dry bread, tea or coffee and the occasional green vegetable. Below is the diet table of
one such family. It is completely representative. (This table must go on the next page, for
lack of space here.)

One can only guess how these people survive. Sometimes kinship relations come to the rescue:
My sisters who are married support us with food as well as money.

Otherwise they beg and borrow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Twice weekly</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carbohydrates:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proteins:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitamins:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea/coffee</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidently the diet consists mainly of carbohydrates such as maize and bread. Very few families
eat protein-rich foods on a regular basis. In general meat and eggs are eaten on a weekly or
monthly basis. The vitamin content is slightly better, about 70% of households eat some greens,
typically cabbage, twice or more than twice a week. However, milk is rare, and so is butter.
MALNUTRITION AND MORTALITY

These inferior diets have taken their toll in terms of child deaths and diseases, especially during 1979:

There were terrible child deaths in 1979, at times the people were burying 10 children a week. It started with stomach trouble and the passing of blood, but it was caused by starvation.

From a press report (EPH, 28.08.79):

According to the sister in charge of the clinic ... 90% of the children were malnourished .... She often sent cases of kwashiorkor to the nearby hospital ... the death rate from malnutrition was higher inside E Bukhanyeni than in the rest of the area, and though it was difficult to estimate the number of deaths, the clinic might hear of three a month.

Our sample reveals a mortality rate for children born between 1976 and 1980 of 220/1,000 births. Although things have improved since 1979 there is still high infant mortality and malnutrition in the settlement.

People are dying here.

The community is fully aware that the malnutrition and starvation are caused by lack of fields, scarcity of employment, low wages and high food prices, and that improvements in these areas are the conditions for a better diet:

We do not have fields, so we have poor feeding.

If only we had fields we could have something better to eat.

Our problem is feeding. Everything is bought because we have no fields.

People should be given fields so that they can survive.

We should be given some work in order to survive because some children faint of hunger.

We have inadequate feeding. My husband is the only breadwinner. More work opportunities should be created.

We are starving. If our wages can be increased some of our problems will be solved.

We expect our wages to be increased so we can support our family on food.

HUNTING

The state of accommodation has improved marginally since the removal. There are no longer any families who live in tents. There is now a recent development, in 1982, of replacing the old temporary tomato-box houses with small two-roomed brick ones. By February 1982, about 50 families were permanently settled in these new houses. The other families had mixed feelings about transferring to them when their turn came. It meant moving into a substantial house at least, but becoming far more cramped after the three-roomed tomato-box houses where the rooms are also larger and many people have added extensions of corrugated iron.

Yet these temporary structures are very inadequate. They have earth floors. Overcrowding remains. And as shelters, they fail disarmingly:

My house is built of planks. So when strong winds occur my cubs get broken because the planks are only for the reduction of wind speed.

These houses easily get damaged by strong winds. They shake when a hurricane occurs.

We do not want to get damaged as Glenmore people did.

Our house is built of planks, so when strong rain falls our house leaks.

This house is of planks, so it gets very cold when it is cold.

The system of sanitation, those lines and lines of pit latrines clustered in groups of four at the back of adjoining gardens, the hallmark of a resettlement camp, is a health hazard, especially now that serious epidemics have become a recurrent threat in South Africa:

These pit toilets are terrible. They are still the same as when we came four years ago. This is not healthy.

The toilets give us problems. They are too close to the houses and are of the hole system.

The toilets are holes. Some are full, but there is no one willing to clear them.

Water is pumped from the river, purified through the addition of jik and piped across the camp to taps shared by about 12 households each. The supply is rationed by a variety of devices. All water must be taken away by bucket. No hose pipes may be used, and no clothes, for instance, may be washed at the taps, 'otherwise you will be in jail at once', the people said. Occasionally the taps are even disconnected on a rotational basis, and at times no water may be used for gardening purposes.

We do not get good and balanced meals because of food prices.

Unfortunately no significant improvements in dietary patterns are likely in the foreseeable future.

In short, the Humansdorp - E Bukhanyeni removal has condemned a community to a state where there is less land, and fewer jobs, lower wages, poorer diets. And thus:

We are starving more than we did in Humansdorp.

SERVICES

Although the quality of services has improved since people arrived at E Bukhanyeni, and in some spheres, in comparison to Humansdorp, even better services are now being offered, they are still, in terms of any humane criteria, utterly, hopelessly and grossly inadequate.
expensive. The initial outlay for a senior student on fees, books and clothes amounts to R140.

The raising of this sum produces an annual crisis in the community around January. One firm seems to have a monopoly over the sale of school uniforms throughout the Ciskei. There are claims that this monopoly extends so far that there is a prohibition on home-made uniforms.

The cost of education is a very common complaint heard in the settlement:

- We have no money to buy books.
- Books and uniforms are too expensive.
- Sometimes my children do not pass because they do not have a uniform.
- We expect to get free and compulsory education for our children.

OTHER FACILITIES

The settlement is served by a clinic staffed by full-time African nurses. There is a hospital nearby at St Matthew’s. The clinic and the hospital both had a bad name among the people we met. Some families even go to the huge effort and expense of taking the sick to a trusted doctor in Humansdorp rather than waiting in the local clinic. They added that they would far rather be referred to hospital on the Humansdorp side where treatment would be quick and good.

There are several illegal and informal shops in the camp, but prices are high. A loaf of brown bread costs 35c (February 1982), 1 kg of sugar 65c. People also buy at the shops in Keiskamma-boo. Apparently even there the prices are high.

Wood, which was readily available in the Tsitsikama, is virtually unobtainable in Elukhanyweni. Repeatedly people complained.

In Humansdorp there was plenty of wood, but it is scarce here.

A permit from the headman is required for cutting any bushes or trees around the camp. The nearby forests are nature reserves and it is therefore illegal to take any wood from these areas. Yet some people do risk collecting illegally and as a result there are occasional arrests. In the main, people resort to buying paraffin:

- Here we must buy paraffin because of lack of wood.

Other facilities include temporary churches, a ‘sports’ field and a regular bus service to Keiskamma-boo.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

We did not investigate community relations in any detail. The CNP has a presence and is forever collecting money for the national monument at Ntaba kaNkolela. We do not know how strong its presence is.

There are very definite divisions within the broadly defined Elukhanyweni community. It would
seem that the few who co-operated in the move right from the start received land in the Keiskamma-basal. Some of these, including the headman, are even members of the irrigation scheme. The headman, not surprisingly, now feels that the move on the whole was a good thing.

Most of the community stand in opposition to this group, known as the inywaki (collaborators). They resisted the move as much as they could, received no compensatory land, and want to return. Some researchers in the area picked up scathing comments about the inywaki.

The potential for conflict has been defused somewhat because the land group have moved out of Elukhanywenti itself in order to live closer to their land. On the other hand, the landed group seem to occupy many of the positions of local authority in the community. The headman is the obvious example. It is only to be expected that his appointed councillors share his outlook. As a result some people feel their complaints are not taken seriously and that the economic allocative function of the council is used against them. Unfortunately we do not know how extensive these feelings are, how the ensuing conflict is expressed, or for that matter whether the council has effective control and a debilitatingly divisive effect on the community.

3.5.5 Conclusion

The Elukhanywenti people basically want one thing, and that is to return to the Tsitsikama.

I don’t want any improvement. I don’t know about the others. I just want to be escorted back to Humansdorp.

If only they can return me back to Humansdorp to stay there I will be like a fish in the river.

On several occasions they have tried reversing the removal. In 1979 they wrote a letter to Dr Koomhof in which they mentioned some grievances and asked to be allowed to return. A blunt refusal from the Department followed.

In early 1982 the removal captured public attention again. The FFP, who had received requests for assistance from the people in their struggle to return, after a series of probes demonstrated in parliament that the proposed sale of the Mfengu’s land at Humansdorp to white farmers, which was about to take place, contravened a number of laws, in particular that the land had not yet been formally excised from the schedule to the 1913 Land Act. Such excision requires a resolution of parliament. The resolution must also specify the compensatory land. After initial denials and a claim by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries that reports in the press were 'extremely malicious', Dr Koomhof announced that a select committee would be established to make recommendations to parliament on the excision.

In June the select committee duly reported, not surprisingly to recommend the immediate excision of the land. Then at the final sitting of parliament, after a heated debate, a resolution was passed in the early hours of Saturday, June 12, regularising the excision of the land. During the debate Mr Moorcroft (FFP, Albany) highlighted one of the most bizarre aspects of the consolidation process. In terms of the Development Trust and Land Act of 1936 no african land may be excised from the schedule to the 1913 Act unless compensatory land is awarded to the SADT. But this compensatory land need not go to the people involved. In fact the law only specifies that it must be in the same province. The resolution compiled with this easily enough. It handed over the land which was originally destined for the Crossroads squatters to the Trust. This land in turn is earmarked for inclusion into the Transkei. In other words, the State did not even compensate the bantustan that received the Tsitsikama people, much less the people themselves.

The sale of the Tsitsikama land, which a representative of the Department of Agriculture called potentially the most productive in the country, the New Zealand of South Africa, could therefore proceed. The intended selling price, which has been described as a gift, exceeds R1 million.

During this period the Elukhanywenti community mounted a last-ditch attempt to return to the Tsitsikama. A delegation was sent to meet Dr Koomhof. He refused to grant them an interview and instead referred them to the Ciskei Department of Foreign Affairs as they were now citizens of an Independent State. What this meant can easily be deduced from the response of the Ciskei authorities, who had already previously refused to assist the community. The Rev Xaba could only say that the leader of the delegation wasn’t even a Fingo and that the real problem with the issue was that white political parties made blacks their political football. The delegation was thus left with no other option but to sit and watch from the gallery as parliament put the final seal on the removal.
3.6 GLENMORE

3.6.1 Introduction

Glenmore is a farm located on the eastern side of the Great Fish River, about 40 km by road from Grahamstown. It is directly opposite Committee's Drift - the place originally chosen in the early seventies to hold over 100,000 displaced people.

Work on Glenmore began in September 1978 after the decision was taken to relocate the residents of Grahamstown's Fingo Village. Fingo Village was, however, 'saved' in August 1979, when it was announced that any further relocation to Glenmore had been frozen. By the beginning of 1979, though, 500 'temporary' wooden dwellings with asbestos roofs and mud floors had been built. These 'temporary' houses were to accommodate the work-force for the $500-house 'model town' which was to be well supplied with a social and economic infrastructure. 'My heart beats warmly for that area, there are things that must be done for that area,' said Dr Piet Koomhof.

Two years later these words were to ring very hollow indeed.

The nucleus of the removals occurred in the middle of 1979. The vast majority were resettled from the Kenton-on-Sea/Klipfontein area, Coega and Colchester settlements near Port Elizabeth. The Fish River valley and the rich, lush farming lands of Coega and Colchester.

The removals, especially those from Klipfontein, were preceded by a very unusual legal battle. In the end, the majority of the people were left with little option but to move rather than face continued harassment and intimidation from the authorities.

They all arrived to find a place that was worse in every respect than their original localities.

The quality of the land was poor, there were pitifully few employment opportunities and privation was their only companion as they suffered the consequences of enforced relocation, many lies and empty promises. Most lived dangerously close to starvation.

3.6.2 Historical background

FINGO VILLAGE & COMMITTEE'S DRIFT

The government’s initial decision to build a new ‘town’ in the Eastern Cape was made in the early seventies. Committee’s Drift, a patch of land on the Ciskei’s side of the Fish River and directly opposite Glenmore, was the site chosen to hold displaced Ciskeian nationals. It would be the finest black town in South Africa, said Dr Piet Koomhof in 1972. It was only in April 1975 that the decision was clarified by government minister Punt Janson. Fingo Village, one of Grahamstown’s three black townships, was singled out for future relocation. ‘Conditions in Fingo Village are very bad’, said Janson. ‘These people must be housed properly. That’s the first step, then it depends on future developments and the need for housing others who can commute from Committee’s Drift to their places of employment.’

However, in October 1975 future plans for the resettlement camp at Committee’s Drift were shelved. The Bantu Affairs Administration Board was allegedly dissatisfied with the site, but ironically ‘a lack of finance’ was the official reason forwarded. The reprimand was, however, shortlived. Later that month Mr Janson said that, although resettlement could not occur on the scale originally intended, Fingo Villagers and others who needed to be settled because of ‘overcrowding’ would still receive priority attention.

In 1976 Glenmore was chosen as a replacement. Grahamstown’s black townships had not yet been forgotten. In November 1977 the Department of Bantu Administration and Development informed the town clerk of Grahamstown that ‘in view of the fact that Grahamstown is less than 50 km away from the Ciskei, policy dictates that Bantu families residing there should eventually move to the homeland concerned.’

Although the fate of all three of Grahamstown’s black townships was uncertain at the time, the threat to Fingo Village was especially outrageous for historical reasons. This township had had fiefdom tenure since 1955 when the Mfenug were granted the land ‘in the name of Her Majesty Victoria with full power to possess the same in perpetuity’, for services rendered to the British by the Mfenug against the Xhosa. (Berger, 48) (The Village today is one of the two last areas in ‘white South Africa’ where Africans have freehold rights in an urban area, the other being Alexandra near Johannesburg.) The position remained unaltered for just on a century until a Coloured Group Areas Board in 1957 proposed a reallocation of the township to coloureds, Indians and Chinese. Widespread opposition saw the shelving of the plan.

The uncertainty was further aggravated in 1979 when Fingo Village was proclaimed a Coloured Group Area and a government proscription on any additional building followed. The Village was at this time characterised by extreme overcrowding and slum conditions which, given the government’s oppressive housing policy, can be attributed to the high incidence of subtenancy exercised by those with freehold rights.

The deterioration in physical and environmental conditions in the township together with the declaration of Fingo Village as a Coloured Group Area were the official reasons for the Village being singled out for removal. They were, it seems in hindsight, mere fronts for the chief aim of clearing out the Village freeholders and dispossessing them of their legal and historical rights. (Health hazards are invited to justify removal, but are ignored year after year otherwise, as anyone can tell from the reeking, suppuring rubbish left to rot in the bad roads of all three townships in Grahamstown. The dangerous and inadequate bucket toilet system is a hazard in itself. As for the group area plans, they were shelved when seriously opposed.)

To facilitate the removal to Committee’s Drift, the government had to expropriate land from the Village titleholders, and the next few years saw much official activity in this regard. An unprecedented visit was made by Koomhof to Grahamstown’s black townships for a first-hand view of the housing situation. A clash of views between the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for the Eastern Cape and the Bantu Affairs Administration Board ensued over the Committee’s Drift scheme, and Sebe met Vorster in Cape Town to urge the Republic government to cancel the scheme. (Davenport, 1980, 33-37)

Matters started coming to a head on 29 April 1975 when an angry meeting of Village freeholders and residents expressed themselves ‘totally opposed to the loss of our lands and title deeds’
and to removal to the barren and jobless environs of Committee’s Drift’. (Ibid., 37) Shortly afterwards the suspension of the Committee’s Drift project was announced and a referendum was held in Fingo Village on an imminent removal to Glenmore (a farm next to the old Committee’s Drift site). In a 20% opinion poll the proposals were defeated and the bid to split the tenants from their landlords consequently failed. (Ibid., 40)

Deadline for the Fingo Village removal to Glenmore still stood, however, at some time in 1981. At this stage in 1976 a town of corrugated iron shacks – euphemistically named ‘Silvertown’ – was developed as a transit camp for Villagers due to be resettled at Glenmore. ‘Voluntary’ removals to Silvertown were suspended during the nationwide struggle of that year, and Silvertown instead became inhabited by renegade occupiers and squatters from the Dead Horse Kloof area rather than by Fingo Villagers.

In May 1978 the government stance took yet another peculiar turn when it was stated that Glenmore was not designed for Grahamstown’s black population. Dr Connie Mulder endorsed this view when he stated that Glenmore was not intended as a dormitory suburb for Grahamstown, but ‘would be a normal town incorporated into the Ciskei’.

In August 1979, when the initial 500 houses at Glenmore had been occupied, further relocation to the area was frozen. Fingo Village and its estimated population of 10,000 had been granted a stay of execution. It still remains the position at the time of writing.

Back to Glenmore: when this farm was expropriated from its white owners in 1976 it was proudly announced that a R26 million township would be built there over 5 years. Suddenly the lack of funds that had reportedly torpedoed the Committee’s Drift scheme had been forgotten, or so it seemed. The scheme was, to say the least, grandiose: 500 houses, 5 schools, 3 clinics, 2 halls, workshops, a police station and sports facilities were to be built. Provision was also to be made for roads, electrification, sewerage and water reticulation. The money, however, was to be used solely for the development of the town. Besides hollow mutterings about irrigation schemes and agriculture-oriented industries, no provision had been made for any long-term infrastructural development.

The construction of 500 temporary houses began at Glenmore in September 1978. These wooden dwellings with asbestos roofs and mud floors were to house a vanguard of 500 families who would provide the labour force required for the construction of the township. It was at this time that Koormhof was quoted as saying in Parliament that only R75 127 had been spent at Glenmore – less than a sixth of the R6.1 million set aside for the year ending August 1979. No reason for the shortfall was proffered, (EPH, 13.06.79)

**KENTON-ON-SEA: A SHIFT IN FOCUS**

Despite the attention that had been focussed on the precarious future of Grahamstown’s townships, and Fingo Village in particular, it was elsewhere in the Eastern Cape that the first targets for relocation to Glenmore appeared.

On 22 March 1979, 35 families from the Kenton-on-Sea Bantu Emergency Camp received handwritten notices informing them of their imminent relocation and the cancellation of their site permits. ‘Take notice that you and your family are being moved to Glenmore, district Peedie. The move takes place from April 2, 1979’, read the notice.

The Kenton location was established in 1956. Since 1963 the location had been declared an emergency camp ‘for the purpose of accommodating homeless Bantu’. (Cincott’s Mail, 3.04.79)

The location remained a ‘temporary emergency’ camp for the next five years, since it was considered a hindrance to the development of the white vacation resort. This was not the causative factor behind the threatened removals however, since only a section of the population were under threat of removal. The rationale was explained by an Eastern Cape Administration Board (ECAB) official in 1978 who said that the move was intended to reduce the black Kenton population to

To implement this plan, however, required the destruction of another black settlement in the area, a squatter camp of 1,200 people at the Klipfontein farm across the river from Kenton. As the Black Sash pointed out, the 35 Kenton families to be removed had been ‘selected from the Kenton emergency camp residents to make way for an equal number of fortunately employed residents presently living at Klipfontein’. (EPH, 31.08.79)

The plan was as rational as it was simple. Clear Klipfontein completely, transfer 35 municipal workers and their families to Kenton and shunt the ‘surplus people’ in both areas to Glenmore. An ECAB spokesman put it in a nutshell:

It was planned to remove only the unproductive and unemployed squatters to Glenmore. We have a responsibility to the permanent African population which is indispensable to our economy. (EPH, 3.04.79)

Map 1 ORIGINS OF THE GLENMORE FAMILIES
Klipfontein

At the time of the impending removals some of the Klipfontein residents had been there for about 30 years. Most, however, indicated that they had only been there for a few years. This, in turn, is mainly due to evictions off white farms in the area. Evictions occurred for a variety of reasons, such as arguments between farmers and labourers, old age and so on. For instance, it has been customary among Eastern Cape farmers to evict their farm workers if they have not reached the age of sixty. Whatever the particular incident that precipitated the eviction, the underlying structural cause is the general reduction in agricultural employment. The increase in the population at Klipfontein was ultimately a manifestation of this process.

The questionnaires reveal that the Klipfontein community was fairly cohesive, renting the land together from the coloured owners. The land was owned by all accounts not unhappy with the situation at the time. Almost all the squatters were living in huts or shacks, and the majority of the families were dependent on their own efforts for subsistence. Some inhabitants were employed on the nearby pineapple and citrus farms while the elderly and children were largely self-sufficient, productive and active. However, apparently there were a number of reasons why the Klipfontein squatters were declared an undesirable presence in the area. Firstly, most of the squatters found seasonal employment on the surrounding farms during the pineapple and citrus seasons. In between they sustained themselves with domestic employment and small-scale agriculture. Thus, these squatters appear to have had an ambivalent position in white farming interests. On the one hand they served as a local pool for seasonal labour on the citrus and pineapple fields without the farmers having to take on the permanent reproduction of their labour - a decided advantage for the farmers. On the other hand their presence led those farmers who complained that a 'valuable grazing land was being destroyed by stock kept by more than 1,000 squatters'.

The ambivalence was further manifested by the high incidence of petty theft and trespassing for firewood and water. The theft occurred on a relatively large scale, and farmers alleged that it was costing them a great deal of income. It would seem that in this instance the repulsion effect was stronger, hence the farmers' support for the move.

These causative factors aside, there also emerged contributory factors which led to Klipfontein being first in line for removal to Glenmore. The desire of the Alexandria town council to use Klipfontein as a coloured township was also advanced, as was a ludicrous reason by the Nationalist MP for Albany who claimed that the coloured people were being terrorised by African squatters and wanted help. And, of course, the perennial reason that Klipfontein constituted a health hazard was also proffered.

3.6.3 Relocation

PRESSURE AND RESISTANCE

After the issue of the eviction notice (see above) to the 35 families at Kenton-on-Sea and significant press coverage by Eastern Province newspapers, opposition to the imminent relocation was growing steadily. Both the Black Sash and the PFP took up the issue. The Black Sash argued that the statutory 30 days' written notice had not been given and that many of the people under threat had Section 10 (1) (a) and (b) rights - legal grounds to remain in the area.

The Sash also noted that most of those under threat were 'the old, disabled, unfruitful, unemployed and their dependents and families'. This was interesting in the light of former EGB statements that those moved to Glenmore would form the work force there to build the rest of the township. The Sash made this point in a number of letters:

Contrary to official assurances it appeared that a large number of these retired people to be resettled at Glenmore would be unable to serve as the proficient labour contingent in the construction of further houses on the site. (EPH, 31.03.79)

The reactions of the Kenton residents threatened with relocation were as bitter as they were poignant. One man who had received a notice was a blind pensioner. He had lived at Kenton since 1954 working for one employer for 15 years. Most registered their opposition to the move. Some threatened to refuse to board the trains. One old age pensioner wrote:

I have not committed a crime. I have trusted the Christians all these years, but now I have lost my trust. (EPH, 3.04.79)

A 66-year-old woman who had lived there for 25 years was more damnable:

They make us work like donkeys and then they throw us out. (DP, 3.04.79)

Following an outcry by various sectors the Kenton removals were temporarily halted after EPP representations to Koornhof. EGB also felt obliged to check whether any unregistered but employed residents had been issued with notices. The Klipfontein removals were, however, to go ahead. Klipfontein squatters had a history of fighting evictions through the courts. After being told to move in 1976 they were allowed to remain after a successful court case. In March 1978 charges of illegal squatting were deferred on the grounds that there was no alternative housing available. (Berger, 51)

The Klipfontein squatters received no written notice at all. They were simply informed by a police sergeant that they were to be moved within a week. Despite reports that Koornhof had instructed that only those willing to leave Klipfontein should be moved to Glenmore, EGB, it would appear, had other ideas. The school at Klipfontein was closed down and teachers and pension payments moved to Glenmore. A pensioner at Klipfontein was adamant:

If they want to take the roof off they will do it themselves. If they force us to leave we will telephone our lawyers. (DP, 2.04.79)

A few days later six Klipfontein residents made a round trip of more than 200 km to collect their pensions which were being paid out at Glenmore. One 60-year-old pensioner said they had to hire a van to Glenmore which cost R11 each. His pension paid out every 2 months was R45. He said he was told by a policeman at Alexandria that the money would be paid at Glenmore:

I was angry at this. They shouldn't put my money where I am not. It's hard to come out on my pension money. (DP, 6.04.79)

The Klipfontein squatters were adamant. They were not moving to Glenmore. The EGB response was to threaten people with prosecution if they continued to resist:

As far as we are concerned there has been the necessary consultation over the move. We met them and so did the Ciskei Minister of the Interior, Chief Lebone. The Klipfontein people indicated they were in favour of the move. (EPH, 3.04.79)

This statement was soon to be exposed for its blatant falsehood. In March 1978 Chief Makgoma denied that the Klipfontein squatters wanted to move. His opinion was later endorsed by the ensuing legal battles. What did emerge, however, was that some of the residents were indeed consulted about the impending removal and taken to visit - not Glenmore but the nearby Tyfosa agricultural project - a political showpiece on irrigated land. (Berger, 51)

Louis Koch of EGB reiterated that no one would be forced to board the trucks or treated as
undignified manner. ‘There are other ways of dealing with these things, he was reported as saying. (EPH, 3.04.79) He was probably referring to the charges deferred from the year before. At this stage both Glenmore and Klipfontein were sealed from the press. The Chief Plural Affairs Commissioner for the Eastern Cape, when asked about the press bans, retorted, ‘There is nothing to hide’, but he did not want photographs taken ‘because there was too much interference at this stage’. (DD, 4.04.79)

Despite the claims of Koch and Koombhaf that squatters would not be forced to move, newspaper reports and statements by squatters gave a radically different picture. One man, a father of three, said the removal squads had arrived at his two-named house and ordered him to break it down.

I told them I would not do it. The man in charge then told the others to take my furniture out and they broke the house down. (WP, 7.04.79)

A 30-year-old mother ‘returned to her home at Klipfontein for a visit earlier this week and found it levelled and her family gone.’ (WP, 7.04.79) Her employer reported that she had then left to try finding her aged mother and two children. They were at Glenmore, more than 100 km away.

Affidavits made at the time confirm that the community felt itself under pressure:

That on or about 21 March 1971 a Sergeant ** called a meeting and informed the residents that they will have to move on the 2nd April 1971 as the lorries were coming on that day. This European Sergeant told me that he was acting on the instructions of a Judge from Grahamstown. I questioned this instruction in view of the fact that a Court case was pending during May 1971. On the 2nd April I saw these Government lorries arriving driven by black drivers. These drivers then fetched the furniture from the house and the children assisted them. I did not assist with the loading. This happened on the 9th April 1971. I was presented with a form to sign which I refused to sign. I was very worried and disturbed and I cannot say how my children or grandchildren will survive. On the 11th April Sergeant ** came back and told me that they were going to break the house down. I was further told by the European Sergeant that I was still going to be moved whether I like it or not.

That on the 3rd April 1979 a European Sergeant asked me when I would be leaving for Glenmore. I replied saying that I would not be going anywhere. The Sergeant then told me it would be wise to move to Glenmore as I would not be able to collect my pension in Klipfontein any longer but that I could only collect it in Glenmore. That on 10 April 1979 Sergeant ** came to me and asked me when I intended to leave for Glenmore. I told him that I would not leave until I had spoken to my lawyers. Sergeant ** then told me that we are wasting our time as our lawyer had lost the case and that we would have to leave.

That on the 5th April 1979 the officials of the Eastern Cape Administration Board came to my house and told me to move. I persist in my attitude to not move. That on the 9th April I was told by the ECAB official that “Kaffrans must breakdown your house, failing which you must arrest you.” On the 10th April 1979 a number of white officials came to my house, and instructed me to break my house down. There were about five officials including those from the ECAB. I demolished my house and shall not move.

That on 11.4.79 I noticed that our house was demolished. I saw my sister who told me that my mother and the children were on their way to Kenton-on-Sea. I never saw my mother or the children. At the time when my house was being demolished I was waiting along the Bushman River-Alexandria road for my Attorney to consult counsel. I have no idea where I am going to stay.

* Accounts of coercion come from the press and affidavits made on 11.04.79 by 26 Klipfontein residents. It has not been possible to verify the facts of the removal in any greater detail. Officials insist that, as Dr Koombhaf said, people left only of their own free will and signed accordingly. In view of these conflicting statements of events, the following account should be read as an attempt to reflect the subjective interpretation of the community, rather than as fact.

That the authorities came to our home on the 3rd April and that my mother informed them that we could not move because my father was in hospital. The authorities again came on Wednesday the 4th April. The officials from the Eastern Cape Administration Board then informed my mother that they were going to break the house down. When I returned to my house I found my mother on the truck and that all our personal possessions were on another lorry. My wife and children have been transferred involuntarily to Glenmore.

That I heard from friends about our pending removal on the 2.4.79. The ECAB officials came on the 3.4.79. They came again on 6.4.79. I saw Sergeant ** in the township and I said that I shall not be leaving and he replied that we could not remain in Klipfontein. ** took a piece of paper and asked me to place my thumb print thereon. I refused and further said all the people must leave. Sergeant ** took my hand and placed my thumb on his book. This was a blank piece of paper. My name was written on this paper in my presence. Sergeant ** took my thumb on the ink stamp pad and thereafter he placed my thumb print on this blank piece of paper on which he had written my name.

Allegations of forced removals accompanied by the levelling of homes were denied by Koch as ‘not the truth’.

All we used was persuasion. How 6 whites can force 1 400 people to board trucks is beyond me. If we had tried there would have been incidents and there were no incidents yesterday. (EPH, 5.04.79)

ECAB also denied the use of bulldozers. They apparently forgot to mention that once the school, teachers and pension payments have been moved, even with legal action pending, there exists very little need for bulldozers and the accompanying publicity.

LEGAL STRUGGLES

Following years of threats and verbal intimidation the relocation to Glenmore began to materialise on April 3, 1979 when government trucks arrived at Klipfontein. The press was subsequently barred from the area. The following day it was learnt that the first 18 families had arrived at Glenmore. On the same day 250 of the threatened squatters met an attorney to discuss the possibility of obtaining a Supreme Court interdict to halt the removals. The removals continued the following day under a blanket of secrecy. The next day the removals were temporarily halted following the hearing of the urgent application to the Supreme Court. The basis for the settlement was an order from an Alexandria magistrate against 150 people, on the grounds that the settlement was a health hazard. It was declared that the eviction orders were irregular since legally 3 days’ notice was required and only 2 had been given. The eviction orders were thus declared invalid.

The chairperson of a committee representing all the families on the farm denied in an affidavit that the removals were voluntary. He also claimed that the families had the consent of the owner to live there. This was later endorsed by one of the four usurious families of the farm who stated in an affidavit that the 180 families living on the farm did so with the consent. At the same court case ECAB announced that 95 families had already arrived at Glenmore.

The Deputy Minister of Plural Relations, Dr W L Vosloo, then announced the completion of ‘fruitful talks’ with the Ciskei cabinet 3 months before the removals. At the same time Vosloo said that people would not be settled where work could not be provided. Later the Chief Minister of the Ciskei was reported as saying:

We have had enough of this phasology about voluntary removals. Now we insist that officials have a letter of consent before squatters’ possessions are removed. (WP, 7.04.79)

This is interesting in the light of earlier statements by the Ciskei government threatening to ‘move heaven and earth’ to stop ‘another dumping ground like Dimbaza’. Legitimacy had now been given to the removal by both governments.
On the 12 April it was reported that Glenmore housed 385 families, the vast majority of whom came from Klipfontein. Most of these families evidently capitulated in face of official pressure after losing hope of any success in the legal battle. There were still 28 families at Klipfontein -17 were waiting to move to Kanton, the other 11 were resisting.

The resumption of the court case on the same day saw the temporary halting of removals when the irregular eviction order was set aside. The Supreme Court also ruled that squatters who had been moved to Glenmore were now free to return to Klipfontein. The State had lost Round 1 of the legal struggle but were soon to retaliate. Less than a week later it was reported that the resisting families would be prosecuted under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 'if they had not changed their minds by the end of the month'. At the same time definite signs of solidarity appeared amongst the remaining families at Klipfontein when the 17 families due to be relocated at Kanton joined the 11 resisting families by refusing to move.

The first court case took place 3 weeks later when a 78-year-old Klipfontein resident who had lived there for 29 years and was gainfully employed by one of the 4 manufacturing was tried. Interestingly he found to be living on the farm illegally because he was not a bona fide registered full-time worker. He was convicted - not under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, but under the more watertight Bantu Land and Trust Act. He was sentenced to a fine of R90 or 100 days (suspended for 3 years) and ordered to leave Klipfontein within a month.

More than two weeks passed before the State took action against the remaining families at Klipfontein. On 19 May papers were served on the resisting families notifying them that an application was to be made to an Alexandria magistrate for their eviction under the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act which provides that squatters may be moved from an area if the health or safety of the squatters is endangered. On the same day 10 people were arrested including the vice-chairman of the committee elected to represent the squatters, and they paid admission of guilt fines for trespassing on the farm. The Kanton police alleged that they had received a complaint from one of the usufructuaries.

When the application for the eviction was heard, the magistrate dismissed it on the grounds that the evidence did not conclusively prove that conditions at Klipfontein posed a health hazard. Counsel for the squatters accused the Alexandria police commander of misleading the magistrate by claiming that Klipfontein had no water supplied by taps, no sanitary facilities and that crime was prevalent there.

ECAB responded by reverting to the Bantu Land and Trust Act again. On 6 June, 22 heads of Klipfontein families appeared at a Bushman's River Mouth court on charges under the Act. One married father of two children was convicted since it was alleged that he was not registered as an employee of the owners of the farm. He was fined R100 (or 90 days) and ordered to leave within a month despite the evidence of a Kanton-on-Sea building contractor who claimed that the accused was a registered employee of his.

Two days later it was reported that a former squatter who had been evicted to Glenmore had moved his furniture back to Klipfontein, saying

Glenmore is not a happy place. They can shoot me if they want, but I won't go back.

I'd rather die. (EPP, 6.06.79)

THE REMOVALS SPREAD

While the legal struggles over the fate of the Kanton and Klipfontein removals occupied the main focus of attention, ECAB and its officials were being far from sluggish. In the intervening period people in at least three other areas had been threatened with removal. As one observer put it,

It emerged that ECAB had a fairly well worked out and comprehensive plan to rid the Eastern Cape of as many 'economically inactive' people as possible, as well as many economically active people. (Berger, 56)

On April 14 Koeh confirmed that ECAB had switched its attention to squatter settlements at Coega housing about 50 families. This was to disrupt some 180 families eventually. At the same time it was announced that notices of removal had been served on 27 families at the Hill-side location at Port Beaufort, and on families at Middledrift.

Coega is a small settlement almost 20 km to the north of Port Elizabeth. Most of those threatened with removal were squatting on white-owned farms in the area. Approximately 20% were employed on the farms while the others found employment as shop assistants on farm stores and in hotels. A significant number were employed in the brick-manufacturing concerns in the area. According to the questionnaires the vast majority of those moved had spent at least 3-4 years in the area, with significant numbers having spent up to 20 years there. Most of the people however were squatting on land wanted by the white farmers who subsequently demanded that ECAB do something to remedy the situation.

Most of those questioned were involved in horticulture on a subsistence scale and of those who had fields and grazing rights, cattle, pigs and poultry were their most popular choice. It was this latter group who were the most bitter after removal:

We sold our stock there (Coega). So we do not have any here. We have only a dog here. We sold our stock and lost our land.

It was reported on 23.04.79 that ECAB would begin moving 180 families from Coega and resettle them at Glenmore. The Board admitted that despite the finality of the decision, not all the squatters had been contacted at the time of the announcement. Of those contacted only 15% refused to be relocated at Glenmore. The vast majority of those interviewed, however, did not want to leave. Commenting after their removal, they insisted they had left Coega against their will. A 35-year-old mother of four children said:

I was told that it was illegal for me to live there and that the farmer wants his land for other uses.

The same was said by a man who had been living on the farm for 18 years:

They said the farmer needed the land desperately for farming purposes.

For the 15% who had initially refused to move, resistance had not been ruled out. Some entertained the idea:

We tried to stay but the government officials told us we would be taken to court.

Others opted for some organisation. There was an official crackdown:

We convened a meeting discussing resistance, then some of us were arrested.

One man hit on a less conventional plan of action:

The first day of the removals I hid away. We were told we would be arrested if we resisted. I gave up.

Their accounts suggest that ECAB behaved conventionally in their eyes:

We resisted but they cut the water supply. People were arrested for walking around at night.

We tried to stay but our houses were demolished.

In the end they all moved save for a small group of 15 families who had been living on Roman Catholic church property at Coega. They were granted a last-minute reprieve by the Deputy Director of ECAB who was reported as saying that these families would definitely not be moved
until permanent accommodation was available at Glenmore.

While ECAB were still investigating the Coega families it was suddenly announced in the press that 32 squatter families living in the Colchester area north of Fort Elizabeth were due to be shifted to Glenmore. All the threatened families were living on privately owned land and 'in all the families had given their consent to the removal. Yet again this proved to be somewhat untrue. One woman, a regularly employed mother of four children, refused to sign the letter of consent because she had the papers to prove that his family had bought the ground about 45 years before. He left.

They feared they would go to jail for 6 years if they did not leave. He did not mention how that particular fear occurred to them.

As with the Kanton - Klipfontein removals it was interesting to note the class interests operating at Colchester. Two cases exemplify the point. One woman was reported as saying that her husband wanted to build a motel on the land occupied by the squatters. On the other hand, a moved, complained that the removal would cost him and many other employers their servants.

Barely a week before the Colchester squatters were moved, notices of removal were served on families at Hillside and Hillside were determined to face prosecution for illegal squatting rather than be compelled and wanted them moved to the Tsakane - only 300 metres away. The families on the other hand claimed that the settlement was historically black land. This was supported by a Rhodes University historian:

Whatever the subsequent legal niceties, the basic claim is here.

Ultimately these families were not moved to Glenmore. Apart from a few who went over to join Chief Lent Mqoma at Healdtown, they are all still in Hillside at the time of writing (May 1982). Earlier it was announced by ECAB that three Grahams town families had voluntarily moved to Glenmore as well as ten families from Thornhill in the Alexandria district.

On 25 May it was reported that the Deputy Director of ECAB had confirmed that almost all the 500 temporary houses built at Glenmore were full. 'Large-scale removals' would only begin in September. A little over ten weeks later, continue when employment could be provided. The same time it was announced that the possibility of a settlement at Peddie was being investigated.

Before continuing with the conditions experienced during the initial weeks at Glenmore, it would be both interesting and useful to note the responses to the 'Glenmore syndrome' by two groups in academia at Rhodes University. One group, the Glenmore Action Group, constituted largely of liberal, removal and were instrumental in organising funds from the World Vision organisation, an ecclesiastical body for giving aid in crises such as famine relief at Glenmore whether or not it had seeing the removals as the working out of bigoted social ideology'.

The second group consisted of about 40 Rhodes University students who staged a symbolic protest by erecting a mock squatter camp in the university quadrangle. They too provo-aim of the squat was to focus attention on relocation and highlight the inadequacy of the South too:

A counter demonstration at the time was put on by 5 law students who, in bosters and stripped blazers, played bowls on the lawn and reclined in deckchairs sipping tea brought by an obnoxious African in white clothing. One student later said he was now 'not so sure'. Good colonialism was not a world away from the real thing.

INITIAL CONDITIONS AT GLENMORE

Conditions suffered in the initial weeks at Glenmore were nothing short of critical. Complaints of unemployment, hunger and cold were rife. The reticence provided by the government were pitifully inadequate and many who had been Gainfully employed in their places of origin were now 'asking and borrowing' to stay alive.

A survey written up in June 1979 by a Rhodes University academic found that in 25 households there were 30 workseekers, but only one case of a family member employed at Glenmore. It also found that the average income of 25 households had fallen from R60 a month to R27 a month, and that several households had no cash income at all. (Berger, 56)

The fall in income was attributed to the high number of men that had lost their jobs, forcing them to migrate to Port Elizabeth in search of employment. It was also claimed that many women who previously worked part-time had lost their sources of income. It was also reported that of the 507 men who had sought employment at Glenmore only 10% had been successful.

There were complaints by the residents that the brackish water from the Flath River was making people ill. The water was tested and found to be passable by South African standards although some elements were very high - the saline trace was above the limit allowed by some other countries, for instance. There were numerous complaints of diarrhoea, vomiting and bloody stools and children covered with rashes. As the first rations began to run out there were increasing reports of children with swollen feet and stomachs. When approached, a spokesman for the clinic said there had been no complaints of hunger and only one case of kwashiorkor. The spokesman was quick to add that the case 'couldn't have started at Glenmore'.

Agriculture in the initial weeks was understandably nonexistent. Many who had supplemented their incomes at Coega and Klipfontein with livestock and crops were now denied this source with little or no compensation. No-one had, at that stage, been able to cultivate maize and other vegetables. Some of the Klipfontein people had brought their cattle but these quickly succumbed to the ticks and the tulp, a poisonous iris in the area. Newspaper reports indicated that stock deaths were averaging two a day, and by 18 June it was reported that a quarter of the cattle had already died. Officialdom ruled out compensation.

Begging, borrowing and sharing were the only avenues open to many to eke out a precarious existence. Rations dried up after the first few days and many pension payments had not been transferred to Glenmore at that stage, necessitating costly trips to collect the money. The Glenmore Action Group organised the World Vision to sponsor 2 000 kg of food each week for eight weeks, to be distributed to 200 families. This helped ameliorate the crisis in the short term.

The total of all these conditions materialised on 7 June when newspapers reported there had been 11 deaths at Glenmore - 9 were children. Gastro-enteritis, kidney inflammation, kwashiorkor and bronchial pneumonia were among the causes.

This critical state of affairs provides a sharp contrast to the words of ECAB Director, Louis Koch, in his press statement:

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We believe that in moving the squatters here we have succeeded in bringing dignity to the lives of people who have been living in very unfavourable conditions. (SPP, 13.04.79)

### 3.6.4 Glenmore profile

**DEMOGRAPHY**

The demographic aspects of Glenmore are in no sense unusual and, in fact, are strikingly similar to those of other closer settlements in the Eastern Cape.

The de jure population of Glenmore is slightly in excess of 4 000 with the age and sex composition bearing a close resemblance to that of the South African black population as a whole.

![Graph showing de jure and de facto populations](image)

**Fig 1 DE JURE POPULATION, 1981 (%)**

The household size, although relatively standard, does deviate slightly from the national averages. The average household at Glenmore has 7.3 members, and is the highest of the six SPP case studies in the Eastern Cape. Although this would seem to imply an acute housing shortage, the problem appears to be helped by migrancy to the metropolitan areas. Nevertheless Glenmore is characterised by a significant number of large families: 27% of all households interviewed have 5-7 members and a massive 54% have between 8 and 12 members.

A more than marginal discrepancy between male and female members is evidence of temporary migration from Glenmore to other centres. This is supported by a number of complaints in the questionnaires concerning migration.

My husband's work is too far from this place.

There are no job opportunities here. My grandchildren only see their mother once a month.

The town is too far from this place. Travelling costs money.

The presence of migrancy is further illustrated by a comparison of the de jure and de facto population data.

**Fig 2 DE JURE AND DE FACTO POPULATIONS COMPARED, 1981 (%)**

The severe imbalances associated with temporary migration are however not as blatant at Glenmore as at Hammarskraal and Etukhanyweni. The latter closer settlements boast migrancy rates of 18.5% and 20.2%, respectively while Glenmore has a migrancy rate of 10.5% - well below the average of 14.6% in the areas studied by SPP. It is worth noting that this latter average includes Dimbaza and Mdantsane which have low migrancy rates of 7.6% and 8.8%, respectively, attributable to their close proximity to industrial complexes.

Despite these somewhat low migration rates which serve as a preliminary indicator of income and poverty levels, temporary migration is virtually the only option for employment. Just under half of all males between the ages of 25 and 44 migrate at least on a monthly basis to their places of employment. The migrancy rate for males between the ages of 15 and 64 is 39.1%. The total female migration for the same age span is 27.7% which is significantly lower than that of other closer settlements in the Eastern Cape. This is probably best explained by Glenmore's geographic isolation and the limited and expensive transport services to surrounding towns which inhibit employment for females in the services sector.

The migrancy rate also has the deleterious effect of exacerbating the age imbalance in these closer settlement communities. The low numbers in the 25-45 age range endorse this with severe over-representation of young and old people.

The magnitude of the problem is further illustrated by the significant number of household heads involved in temporary migration. The problem is particularly acute at Glenmore where 27% of all household heads migrate. The figures for Sads, Etukhanyweni and Hammarskraal are 22%.
23% and 21% respectively. The 27% of household head migrancy at Glenmore is made up entirely of males. This figure is put into perspective when it is realised that 70% of all household heads are male.

The adverse impact of migrancy on family life is well documented. I am a widow. I haven't seen my sons for a long time. They seldom send me money.

My husband works in Port Elizabeth. He only sees us once every two months because it costs so much to travel. The money he sends us is not enough.

For a community living in such adversity the irreplaceable loss is of the young people in the prime of life. One of the community leaders puts it in perspective: We cannot afford to lose these young people. Their families need them. The community needs them to help us make something of this terrible place. We need their muscles and their leadership.

AGRICULTURE

The state of agriculture at Glenmore is nothing short of critical. It represents one of the greatest sources of frustration and bitterness for those who were promised prosperity only to experience subsequently both the poverty of the promises and the land.

The data speak volumes:

| Table 1 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION: HOUSEHOLDS INVOLVED (%) |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Maize | Potatoes | Beans | Other |
| 70    | 63     | 54    | 30    |

Table 2 ANIMAL HUSBANDRY: HOUSEHOLDS INVOLVED (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Pigs</th>
<th>Poultry</th>
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<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>85</td>
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The large percentage that kept poultry accounts for the high (85%) production of meat and eggs. All those that reared cattle and goats were rewarded with regular milk and hides and skins. Half of those interviewed claimed they had 'much more' land at their previous locality than Glenmore; 40% claimed they had 'more' land before; the other 10% said they had equivalent portions of land at both places.

At Klipfontein, Colchester and Coega some kept stock and many grew vegetables—often on a scale large enough to supplement their incomes via limited commercial activity. 43% of those interviewed produced enough in the way of vegetables, milk, eggs and hides to sell to friends and neighbours. This is particularly interesting in view of the clamp-down on selling rights at Glenmore. The low agricultural yield probably inhibits this anyhow.

People arrived at Glenmore to find a 'hot, barren, inhospitable wilderness founded on shales which yield scanty water from underground'. (DD, 30.03.79)

We need fields. We want to have stock, but this place is too dry. This place cannot be compared to Klipfontein in any way.

At Klipfontein we used to plough. This land cannot be ploughed. It is too stony.

For those Klipfontein residents taken to visit the Tyefu irrigation project prior to the removal, the reality must be all the more harsh, the lies all the more fraudulent.

In comparison with other closer settlements Glenmore does have some land available for grazing purposes. 27% of those interviewed have access to grazing rights. Most of the land is, however, of extremely poor quality with little grass and infected with the deadly tulp plant. 43% claimed at least one garden plot available for agricultural production while 37% claimed access to at least two or more plots. The average size of these plots, however, lends itself to only the meanest subsistence production. This is borne out by the production figures for those interviewed, as shown in Table 1.

Although 70% of those interviewed claimed to be involved in agricultural production to some degree, the small quantities and poor quality of the crops make this figure somewhat less impressive. Minute plots, infertile soil and little water give scant cause for optimism and there appears little hope for an increase in the supply of agricultural implements and fertilizers.

The majority of those interviewed, despite bemoaning their lack of selling rights, realise that even given this 'privilege' the aforementioned characteristics would prevent any significant improvement in production.

We sold our stock and lost our land. There is not enough land here. Even the available land is infertile.

How can we sell when nothing will grow.

I would like to have land for planting.

Our pension money is not enough. We need land to grow our food. Otherwise we might starve.

The critical state of agriculture at Glenmore is well illustrated by the data on animal husbandry as in Table 2 above. These figures represent a significant decline in the number of animals owned before the move and the natural habitat of the area offers no prospect of forthcoming relief.

We sold our stock at Coega. So we do not have any here. We have only a dog here.

We sold our cattle before we were moved. It was the right thing to do. They would have died here.

All our cattle died in the first two months. Now we only have a few chickens.

Thus any livelihood from agriculture at Glenmore is not likely to be more than marginal until a fully implemented irrigation scheme with reasonably sized holdings has been realised. At one stage there was hope of water from the Orange-Fish scheme being directed there. Most of the people have realised that this will never materialise. Even if crop and vegetable production does achieve reasonable proportions, there is no local market for the produce and the locality is served by substandard roads to Grahamstown, Alice and Peddie. The matter is probably academic anyway, as the Glenmore people are on the verge of being moved again to Peddie at the time of writing (May 1982) and there seems to be a firm intention among officials to carry out the removal, with no great factors that might deter them.

LABOUR

It must be stated at the outset that the SPF data for Glenmore on labour-related phenomena must be treated with a small degree of caution. This is due mainly to reliable evidence that the employment rate has increased somewhat since the data were compiled and collated.
The figures for the adults at Glenmore who are either economically active or seeking employment are remarkably low. These activity rates are consistently lower than those for the other StPP case study areas in the Eastern Cape and well below the national averages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Mdantsane</th>
<th>Dimbaza</th>
<th>Sasa</th>
<th>Etkhanyweni</th>
<th>Kamaskraal</th>
<th>Glenmore</th>
<th>Av</th>
<th>National</th>
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<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: These figures represent a percentage of the whole population, not just those of working age.)

The main reasons for the high unemployment and inactivity rates are difficult to pin down but one reason does suggest itself: the newness of the camp implies that people were still adjusting to their new environment at the time of the survey and so had not fully acquainted themselves with the existing labour channels and prospective employment opportunities.

Of the male population 53% are employed and 19% unemployed. The female figures differ significantly with 27 unemployed and 20% employed.

Of the employed male population about 12% work locally while the other 88% migrate on either a monthly or a yearly basis to their place of employment. The migration rate for employed females is slightly lower, with 83% migrating and 18% being employed locally. Most of those who work locally are either at the Tyfs irrigation scheme or in the services and agricultural sectors at Peddie. It should be noted that the incidence of local employment has, by all accounts, increased somewhat since the survey was taken.

Migrant labour and employment opportunities for the Glenmore population are mutually inter-dependent phenomena and will remain so unless the Ciskei and South African authorities embark on massive labour-intensive agricultural schemes. The likelihood of this is, needlessly to say, negligible. Thus, as odious as the present employment situation in the Glenmore area is, there is little hope of change. The bitterness of the people on the issue is clear, as some comments show:

- We were close to a town where we were staying at Coega. Therefore we could find jobs easily. Here travelling expenses eat so much money.
- The government should help us because they took us away from our well-built houses and our work. Here we are starving without work.
- We were promised jobs here. I haven’t been able to find work for two years. They lied to us.

Others interviewed are far more acquiescent about their fate and seem demoralised to a point beyond bitterness.

I am a farmer. There is no good land here. How can I work in factories in the cities? I have no training.

We are helpless. My husband has been searching for work for two months. We are starving.

There are no jobs at Glenmore. There are few jobs in the cities. What must we do to survive?

As we can see from the figure on the next page, the main place of employment for those involved in temporary migration is Port Elizabeth: 37% of all those interviewed are employed in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage industrial area. This is not surprising since it is the largest industrial conurbation in the Eastern Cape and is very close to the places of origin of most of the Glenmore people.

Ironically 12% of those employed are working at Coega. Before the removal the 12% had had employment on their doorstep; now they must travel 200 km to keep the same job.

The temporary migrants can be divided into those who migrate on a yearly basis and those who migrate on a monthly basis: 44% of migrants return to Glenmore only once a year while the remaining 56% migrate monthly. The 44% comprises those employed in the mines and a significant percentage of those employed in Port Elizabeth who cannot afford the exorbitant travelling costs each month.

Of the temporary migrants, 76% submit regular remittances to their dependants at Glenmore. The remaining 24% either remit on an irregular basis or not at all. The irregularity of remittances to some households is an obvious cause of hardship and distress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age span</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>23.25</td>
<td>34.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I haven't seen my son for 18 months. He never sends us money. I don't know if he is dead.

My husband earns so little that he cannot send us money every month.

We turn now to the sectors of employment. Those employed in the transport, services and construction sectors are mainly located in Port Elizabeth. Needless to say, all those involved in mining migrate to the Reef. Employment in the agricultural sector is well spread over the Ciskei and Eastern Cape towns, as is the services sector. A significant percentage of those employed in agriculture are employed locally at Tyfus and Peddie.

Table 6 SECTORIAL COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, storage, communications</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, gas, water</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table shows that employment is spread relatively evenly among the different sectors, given the rural background and low levels of training and education prevalent among the adult population. Indicative of these low levels is the disproportionately small share of employment for the manufacturing and commercial sectors. No one interviewed was employed in the financial sector.

The share of employment in agriculture is relatively high. This can be attributed to Glenmore's favourable geographical position vis-a-vis agriculture in the Eastern Cape. This is due to Glenmore's proximity to the Ciskei and to many Eastern Cape farmers who are able to recruit labour there without much difficulty.

The services sector which is dominated by female employment is also under-represented. Amongst rural and semi-rural blacks in the Eastern Cape the two chief sectors providing employment for females are agriculture and services. The enforced proletarianisation of the people has severely curbed opportunities in the former, while Glenmore's geographical isolation and the general excess labour supply amongst domestic workers is the main cause for the services sector's low share.

An interesting figure which is indicative of Glenmore's many adverse characteristics is that none of the people interviewed are self-employed. 33% are employed in the government sector and the remaining 67% in the private sector.

The following table reflects the occupation structure of the labour force:

Table 7 OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF GLENMORE'S WORK FORCE COMPARED (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Glenmore</th>
<th>Malentane</th>
<th>Dimbaza</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Elukhanywengi</th>
<th>Kamnaskraal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is this table which represents perhaps the most scathing evidence (other than the employment figures) of the plight of a people proletarianised under duress. It none of the other areas considered in the Eastern Cape case studies is the unskilled component of the work force so disproportionately large and the white collar, sales and skilled components so disproportionately small.

Only 56% of those employed at Glenmore are on a signed contract. This is further evidence of the low levels at which Glenmore people are incorporated into the labour market and the inaccessibility of the labour channels to most of Glenmore's population. There is no labour bureau in the immediate vicinity.

Amongst those employed 52% found employment on their own steam. Just 16% were recruited via the labour bureaux, 11% used the family-friend network to find employment, and another 11% were recruited either directly by the employer or by a recruiting agent.

On this evidence Glenmore appears a classic example of a people the vast majority of which are doomed to unemployment as a result of their relocation. Even if they were not employed, it is the institutional sense of the term, previous to their relocation they were at least involved in small-scale agriculture. Now even that has been largely denied them.
INCOME

There is unfortunately very little reliable data available on the average family income at Glenmore, and estimates based on presumed earnings had to be used.

Before continuing with these estimates it is useful to note the extremely high dependency rates at Glenmore which serve as a very basic indicator of income and poverty levels. On average there are 1.06 migrants per family, 0.3 local earners and 0.5 pensioners.

Average family income was estimated in the following way. We assumed that on average a male migrant earns R150 a month remitting R100, and a female migrant R80 a month remitting R50. It was also assumed that male locals earn R80 a month on average, female locals R40 a month, and that pensioners receive R60 every two months (1981 income).

On this basis the average family at Glenmore receives a monthly cash income of R145 exclusive of migrant earnings. This figure would rise to a little under R200 if migrants were included. Despite the fact that a variance of about 10% can be imputed to these figures, they must nevertheless be treated with caution since the employment rate for Glenmore has apparently risen since the survey. The dependency rate will then have decreased, thereby increasing average family incomes.

It is, however, worth noting that the 1980 Household Subsistence Level for a family of 6 living in the Pedi district was calculated to be R170.66. This is significantly higher than the average monthly cash income for a Glenmore family of 5.7 estimated to be in the region of R145.

POVERTY

Average family income is, however, a relatively unreliable indicator of poverty in Glenmore. This is due to the fact that household income and household size, the two most immediate determinants of poverty, are unequally distributed across the community. Consequently, the incidence of poverty was measured by subdividing the households into 6 different poverty levels as indicated here:

Table 8 INCIDENCE OF POVERTY (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Average income per member per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>R40 - 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>30 - 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>20 - 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>10 - 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>less than R10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>rations and gifts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is based exclusively on the permanent resident component of each household, and gives poignant evidence of the high incidence of poverty and subsequent privation experienced by well over 70% of Glenmore’s de facto population.

The relatively affluent families who earn between R30 and R45 per member a month constitute a small proportion of the population. Typical examples of this group are a family of 9 with 4 migrant earners, and a family of 15 with 6 male migrants and one pensioner.

NUTRITION

Table 9 EATING FREQUENCY IN GLENMORE HOUSEHOLDS (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Less than weekly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carbohydrates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proteins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitamins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea/Coffee</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margarine</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

60% of those interviewed ate 3 times a day; 34% twice a day; and 6% ate only one meal a day.

The table indicates that carbohydrates dominate the diets of most of Glenmore’s people. The survey shows a critically low protein intake although the vitamin intake is substantially better with 62% eating vegetables at least once a week.

Many people recorded their distress along these lines:

There are no jobs and no food at Glenmore. We are starving.
We have no money. Friends give us food. Otherwise we would die.
My baby is ill because there is so little food for him. We have no money.
I would like to join the burial society but cannot afford to.

By far the largest group of families (47%) are decidedly poor with the average income of each member being a miserly R10 - 19 per month. This barely enough to feed someone for a month, let alone provide for clothing, education and health needs.

The final 25% are the most destitute of all. 12% of this group’s members receive a monthly income of less than R10 - enough to supply bread for the month. The last 13% survive on government rations, which last on average for 2 weeks of the month, and gifts from friends and neighbours. Very little stands between them and starvation.

I cannot afford to buy food because I depend on a monthly remittance from my son which doesn’t always come.
I cannot afford to buy basic things and pay my child’s education.
SERVICES

In comparison with other resettlement camps in the Eastern Cape, Glenmore’s services are of a relatively high standard. In comparison with the services they were offered prior to the removal, however, the situation is woefully inadequate. The people were promised 5,000 permanent houses, five schools, three clinics, two halls, workshops, a police station, sports facilities, local employment, and water from the Orange-Fith River scheme. Pitifully few of these have materialised. Most never will, especially as Glenmore now has the status of a transit camp.

HOUSING, SANITATION, WATER, ROADS

The accommodation situation has shown no improvement since the people arrived in 1979. All are still accommodated in the 500 temporary houses provided before the removal. Each house comprises a three-roomed wooden shed lined with chicken wire and roofed with asbestos. These houses are bitterly cold in winter, scorching in summer, and must leak during the rains.

The houses we live in were said to be temporary. But it is after such a long period that we are convinced they were always meant to be permanent.

I would like the houses to be plastered with cement to protect them against the rain. We cannot afford to buy cement.

Accommodation is a big problem. The house leaks when it rains. That causes damage to the walls inside.

We expect to get a well-built house.

We need a permanent well-built house to keep the children from getting sick in winter.

Each 10 x 20 m plot has a bucket toilet, with one tap serving 20 houses. The taps are located at 80 m intervals down the dirt roads. Some people complained about the dirt roads which created so much dust. Others were more hopeful and demanded that the government tar the roads. Many of those interviewed complained about the brackish water, saying it caused the children to get sick. It would appear, however, that the sanitation system and the purification of water is better than at the other closer settlements in the Ciskei such as Elukhanyeni and Kammaskraal.

EDUCATION

The following table presents the educational level attained by Glenmore’s population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>% of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower primary</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher primary</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 5+</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are very bad and perhaps help to explain the critical unemployment situation at Glenmore. Less than 30% of the population have completed a Std 5 course. Most have no education at all or only lower primary education. The presence of only one primary school at Glenmore is doing little to ameliorate the situation. All pupils who wish to attain higher standards must commute to schools elsewhere in the district. Those attending the primary school must continually suffer from the overcrowded classrooms with few books and a high teacher-pupil ratio.

The figures indicate that the poor educational services at Glenmore are only helping to perpetuate the plight of the inhabitants and at the same time ensure that the children suffer the same oppressive, jobless fate that their parents are enduring.

I can’t afford to pay my child’s education.

We need a high school to educate the children.

We can do nothing without an education. Now our children must also go without an education. They will also be poor.

HEALTH

Of the three clinics promised to the people, only one was completed at the time of the removal. The others have never been built. The clinic boasts a few trained nurses and a doctor who pays a weekly visit from Paddo to attend to the more serious cases.

We need a hospital here. Many people are sick.

We want to have doctors all the time otherwise people will die. The doctors only come once a week. It is not enough.

PENSIONS

In December 1981, a great number of cases, 51 in all, came to light of pensioners at Glenmore who were not receiving their pension payments. The issue was taken up by the Grahamstown Advice Office who immediately wrote to the Chief Commissioner of the Department of Co-operation and Development in Port Elizabeth, the local MP and Dr Kokkonen on behalf of the pensioners.

Some of the pensioners had not received any payments since mid-1979, apparently because a transfer had not been effected after the removal from Klipfontein. Others experienced lapses in payment. Many of the pensioners suspected the clerks of embezzlement.

The Advice Office was also concerned as to who was responsible for future payment, as Glenmore was still trust land at the time and its consolidation into the Ciskei had not been gazetted. The outgoing Commissioner in Grahamstown apparently left a directive that pension payments were to become ‘a matter for the Ciskei’ from December 1981.

The Chief Commissioner replied to the Advice Office query in January 1982 saying that the Alice magistrate was attending to the matter. He claimed that some of the pensioners had, in fact, been receiving pensions, and cited photocopied vouchers as proof. These vouchers, however, were no proof that the money had in fact been reaching the pensioners. He then went on to explain that some cases were receiving the ‘personal attention’ of the Alice magistrate and that applications had been submitted in respect of others.

After another round of correspondence between the Commissioner and the Advice Office, the latter decided to ask legal advice on the pensioners’ behalf. At the time of writing (May 1982) a court action is in the offing. Meanwhile, three pensions have finally been transferred from Port Alfred to Glenmore, 2½ years after the removal.
TRANSPORT AND SHOPPING

Another source of discontent among the people is the expensive and infrequent bus service. A railway bus runs to Grahamstown six days a week in the afternoon, once a week in the morning, once a week in the afternoon, the buses travel through Glenmore and on to Debe Nek most days, giving people transport eastwards too. The single fare between Glenmore and Grahamstown is R1.40 (1982), which is obviously a very awkward limitation, not least on getting jobs.

Buses should cost less so that people can go to town easily and every day to work. There should be a bus every day.

Paying R2.80 return puts shopping in Grahamstown beyond most people's reach, so that they have no choice but to buy from the one shop in Glenmore. This is a main point of discontent because by all accounts the prices are exorbitant.

The shop is exploiting us. More shops should be built.

There should be more shops and a public telephone.

The shopkeeper should be put in jail. Few people can afford to pay his high prices.

Despite the imminent move to Paddo, the hopelessly inadequate provision of services at Glenmore seems to be improving, if only marginally. Six new classrooms were completed towards the end of 1981, and sports and social clubs are on the increase. 'Disco' evenings sometimes take place, and there is a regular soccer and rugby league. There are also a boxing ring in the middle of the warehouse, provided by the new camp superintendent, and the boxing club intends converting the floor and providing seats with the money it collects from spectators and the sale of cool drinks. This is strong evidence of the community's initiative and capacity for organisation.

SOCIAL RELATIONS AND ATTITUDES

It is difficult for outsiders to gauge the social relations at Glenmore. After three years of hardship and adversity, attitudes vary from house to house. Some are activated by religious conviction, others by a deep but ambivalent repugnancy for the authorities, many by a stoic, impassive acceptance of the situation. However, despite an awareness of the common malaise, there is some uncertainty as to the exact nature of social relations. The questionnaires, on the hand, imply a surprising degree of solidarity and common empathy; on the other, observers noticed a definite rift between some of the people.

Most of the antagonism appears to be between the Klipfontein people and those from the Coega/Colchester area.

It is not easy to get on with them. Conflicts arose resulting in faction fights among the men.

There were some conflicts. One resulted in the death of a young man who was originally from Coega. He was stabbed by one who came originally from Klipfontein.

We do not get on very well. There is some rivalry between some of the Coega people and some of the Klipfontein people.

Many of the interviewees, however, did not mention any divisions or polarisation in the community.

We get on very well with them because we knew some of them before we moved to this place.

We get on very well with the other people. The fact that we come from a different place has no role to play in our relationships.

We were the first group at Glenmore but we live in peace with those who arrived later.

We relate very well to the other people. We attend the same church as some of them. We are trying to make ends meet for a common cause.

Even though there appears to be a significant incidence of antipathy towards those from other localities, some remained preoccupied with improving the common lot by sharing their problems.

We get on very well with our neighbours because we try and share with people what little we have.

We have common problems. We understand one another.

We would not have survived if our friends and neighbours had not shared with us and helped us.

The chief cause of internal strife appears to be the somewhat dubious actions of the so-called Peacemakers - a group more proficient at antagonism than pacification.

The Peacemakers should respect us. They treat us very badly.

We get on very well with the people excluding the Peacemakers who are very rude. Once they kicked my door when I did not open it in the middle of the night. I was afraid because my husband was not there. They slapped me and drank one of my bottles in front of me.

The people predictably saved most of their rancour for the government which still holds its oppressive vigil over them. No less than 75% of those interviewed identified the government as the main cause of their predicament. All thought it the responsibility of the government to redress the problem.

We expect no one else to help except the government of the Republic of South Africa. The government has so much money. They should build houses and find jobs.

The government should build houses and factories. We didn't choose to come here. They sent us in their trucks.

The government should help us but it seems as though they have forgotten us.

Despite the dissatisfaction with Glenmore and the antipathy towards the South African government most of the people are adamant that they wish to remain under the South African government rather than be moved to the Ciskei.

I am used to being under the white government. They have not treated us well but I grew up under them and I know what to expect from the whites.

Their experience of the past few years has made the people acutely aware that nothing they say or do will ultimately have any effect. The Klipfontein experience is still very fresh in their memories and few wish to repeat the pain and expense of lengthy proceedings, intimidation and fines. Through their democratically elected leaders they continue to protest to ECAB, to little avail.

The administration is very rude. They do not want to listen to our problems.

The authorities take no notice of us when we ask them to do something about our situation.

The one issue the community may have affected was in the matter of rents. The Klipfontein group had been told they would have to pay R6 per month rental after their first month at Glenmore.
The two elders went to the ECAB office soon after they arrived, and explained that the Klipfontein people had never wanted to move to Glenmore, and had not wanted the houses there, and would therefore not be paying any rent. They conveyed the message as it was a matter of interest, not whatever has been demanded or paid at Glenmore in the three years since it began. As we have in vain, 

A few laid the blame for the situation squarely on the shoulders of the local authorities, and to the Action Group for not responsible for the government or the local authorities, but of Prof. Whilson of the Glenmore Ciskei, the attitude of the people have not changed. Many bitterly oppose the new move, Others disagree with the prospect of moving to a congested area where they will have to share the site. They also point out that they have established gardens at Glenmore already. Above all, they want to return to their original homes. Their second concern is to stay at Glenmore; housing, the high prices, the death of job opportunities, but weighted against telling them it is considered by most people to be the lesser of two evils. A few even feel Glenmore is viable, like these two pensioners.

Now can we start from scratch all over again? We have just started settling down here. We have gardens now and new classrooms, some are even getting jobs. (EPH, 28.11.81)

We are settling down now. At least I have some land of my own, although we were promised much more. I’ve worked hard to get this garden going and I am having good results now. It will be hard to start afresh at Peddie, where I hear there is no land.

In their dissatisfaction at the move they echo the sentiments of hundreds of their fellow residents.

3.6.5 Conclusion

Following weeks of intimidation and legal battles, eventual removal and three subsequent years of poverty and privation, Glenmore’s 4 200 residents face yet another move in the near future. It was reported in the Eastern Province Herald (19.11.81) that they are to be resettled once more at a camp currently being laid out near Peddie in the Ciskei.

According to the Ciskei government, Glenmore’s 500 temporary houses are situated on valuable arable land wanted by the Ciskei for extensions to its Tyefu irrigation project. The impeding tractors can be seen driving in and out of Glenmore where the equipment has already been stacked. However the Tyefu scheme will not approach Glenmore’s houses until the people have been moved, according to the deputy project manager, Mr. A Stone. Then the houses will be pulled down and the land on which they stand used for crop cultivation, he added. (EPH, 28.11.81)

Thus the Glenmore people are now being administered by the Ciskei government in spite of refusals in the past by the same authorities to accept responsibility for the people. The Ciskeian Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Rev. W M Xaba, denied however that there was anything inconsistent about the present policy.

We objected in principle to the move to Glenmore and refused to take responsibility for the place. But we want the land and do not mind the people moving to Peddie as long as the South African government provides houses and job opportunities. (EPH, 19.11.81)

But of course Mr. Xaba realises that once in Peddie, Glenmore’s 4 200 people will no longer be the responsibility of the South African but his own government. Who will then provide them with houses and employment? An Anglican church minister in Peddie said:

Job opportunities are exactly nil. We have absolutely no industry or jobs here. (Ibid)

At the time of the report an interchurch group, alarmed at the prospect of over 5 000 people from Glenmore and the nearby Kamaskraal resettlement camp being relocated at Peddie, were busy fundraising a garden project on church land which, it was hoped, would enable them to grow their own vegetables.

A spokesman from the Department of Co-operation and Development stated that the people will have toilets and a temporary water supply and will be employed in the installation of the infrastructure before the other groups are moved. Temporary prefabricated houses and other basic facilities would also be provided, he said.

So they have to begin all over again against a background of the same utterings and promises that were made just three years ago. As one young mother of three said,

We will never get used to one place. We lead the life of a bird.

She speaks for 4 200 surplus people wanted neither by South Africa nor by the Ciskei, and doomed, it seems, to a future as grim as their immediate past.
3.7 KAMMASKRAAL

I have trusted the Christians all these years, but now I have lost my trust. (Billy Mani, threatened with removal from Kenton-on-Sea, *DD*, 2.04.79)

White South Africans seem to be more concerned about the rising meat price than about the pitiful plight of people near starvation in the human dumping grounds of Ciskei. (Mike Chandler, *DD*, 13.10.80)

When I look a black child in the eye I want to tell them that they have a future in South Africa. (Dr P J Koomhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development, *DD*, 17.04.81)

3.7.1 Introduction

The past 20 years have witnessed an increase in the number of people resettled in the bantustans in pursuit of 'white South Africa', and are only tolerated there as long as they minister to the needs in both urban and rural areas have been affected by this policy. The government has used the spokesmen have always protested that the people have 'voluntarily' agreed to be resettled, are either non-existent or very poor. A lot of resettlement has been generated not only against the appalling conditions in the resettlement camps. The resettlement policy lends credibility to the description of apartheid as the most vicious system since the Nationalist government's 'fluous' africans. Kammaaskraal is, like many other similar areas in the Eastern Cape and the rest of South Africa, another dumping ground where hunger, disease and despair are rife.

3.7.2 Origins

There are two different groups of people at Kamaskraal. One came from a place called Wooldridge near Peddie, and the other from Alexandria towards Port Elizabeth.

THE WOOLDRIDGE PEOPLE

Wooldridge is situated in the SE part of the Peddie district near the Batsha River. It is an area occupied by titleholders whose land varies between 5 and 25 morgen. For a long time these landowners have given refuge to the landless who have been allowed to keep some stock, and have either helped the landowner till his land or have been given small plots to plough.

In 1974 the Wooldridge headman was approached by people evicted from farms bought by the South African Development Trust. The new lessees of these Trust farms did not need much labour, or they wanted the tenants to reduce their stock. It appeared there was general insecurity among the tenants, coupled with a desire for independence from 'bullying' farmers. After consultation with his people, the headman granted these people plots of about 80 square metres on land that was used as a commonage. The immigrants built houses ranging from corrugated iron shacks to mud brick with corrugated iron roofs. They also laid out small gardens where they planted vegetables. They were allowed to keep their stock, but they could have no arable land - not because the titleholders objected to that but because land was limited. In fact, the landowners had already sacrificed part of their commonage.

News seemed to have spread rapidly that the Wooldridge freeholders were saviours, for by 1976 a new location, known as Zwelithsa, had sprung up. A few people who had earlier come from the Albany district had settled in the old Peddie locations, moved into Zwelithsa where they could at least keep stock.

The newcomers soon became dissatisfied with their disadvantaged position: they wanted to enjoy full citizenship rights like other Ciskeians. They approached the local members of the Ciskeian Legislative Assembly and visited the Ciskeian government headquarters to plead their case. They did not keep the titleholders informed about their negotiations and their attitude to them was: 'These titleholders are unlike us, they have no problems.' This attitude of the immigrants was interpreted as a sign of ingratitude. The headman was informed by the Ciskeian government only three days before the removal to Kammaaskraal.

The removal began in May 1980 and took about three weeks. According to the headman the people were not forced to move, and as a result about ten families remained. The houses were not bulldozed and the people were helped to pack their belongings which were then loaded on Department of Co-operation and Development trucks. Much of the furniture was broken, though, and promised compensation had not yet been received by the time of the SPP survey in 1981.

The Wooldridge headman thought the people looked forward to the new place: there was excitement about possibilities of land and houses. About 85 families were involved. An informant who spoke to one of the officials involved in the removal and dumping of these people said he had described them as 'the worst-off of all the people he had moved in his long service with the Department of Co-operation and Development'.

The Wooldridge people had worked mainly on the mines and in East London and Port Elizabeth. Others, mainly women, had worked as casual and seasonal labourers on the neighbouring pineapple farms.

During interviews with these people, it emerged that promises of a better life had been made to
They (the officials from Pretoria) said we should leave because we were living in a common, and the time for us to live there had expired, and there was land available for us in Kammaskraal.

We were told that our land was available and houses had already been built for us. That was said by a Ciskei cabinet minister after we had said we wanted our own land.

At Wooldridge we were living as tenants; we did not have our own land.

They (the Ciskei officials) said we were going to live on our own land, get employment and good houses.

Later they were to remember Wooldridge as a place where conditions had been better than at Kammaskraal.

There was enough grazing land at Wooldridge.
We had gardens there.
There were possibilities of work there.
We had houses at Wooldridge.
We led a better life at Wooldridge because we had a house.

At Wooldridge the people had houses which they had built themselves - they had pride in them, land, work, and low transport costs as some of the things they had valued at Wooldridge. On that the Wooldridge people had been living 'under terrible conditions', hence the decision by the media to treat issues such as this sensitively because the reports would be sent overseas and could do great damage to South Africa's image.

THE ALEXANDRIA PEOPLE

These people were evicted from Thornhill Farm, Alexandria, in June 1980 after the death of their landlord Mr E Reed. They had worked on a chicory farm, some permanently and others as seasonal labour. While it is legal to let full-time workers and their dependants live permanently on a white-owned farm, this is not strictly allowed for those families who are only seasonally labour tenancy is allowed to persist, which explains the disproportionately large farm populations on those who had worked permanently had received between R15 and R20 a month plus rations of mealie meal and milk.

The new owner served eviction notices on the families. When asked who had told them to leave, the people said:

The farmer who bought the farm told us to leave.

He said we were criminals and that we had killed the previous owner although we didn't.

He said we should leave because our 'beaas' had been killed, and we would hire other people to kill him.

He said we should leave because the old farmer was dead and he wanted to have his own people.

The farmer who bought the farm.

The people mentioned that the previous owner of Thornhill Farm had been killed by thugs from another area. The people had nowhere to go, and when eviction notices were served on them, they pleaded with the farmer to let them stay. It is not clear who initiated discussions between them and the Eastern Cape representative of the Ciskei government. However when the representative visited them, plans to resettle them in the Ciskei were set in motion. They were promised land but were told that houses were not yet ready. Allegations have been made that the Ciskeian Marketing Board bought the livestock of the Alexandria people at give-away prices, and most of the people interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the prices they had received for their stock.

When the removal took place, Department of Co-operation and Development buses and GG trucks accompanied by police vehicles came to load people together with their belongings. Because eviction notices had been served on them, and because they knew that the farmer did not want them, the people did not offer any resistance. They had heard of people being resettled at places like Glenmore, and hoped that the place where they were going to be dumped would not be very bad.

Dr Morrison was later to claim that these people had lived 'like rats', without water and proper sanitation, and that their school had been 10 km away. It should be noted that government spokesmen have always found justification for the removal. Yet the people moved, who are voiceless politically in South Africa, have a strong subjective impression of utterly callous treatment.

Both the Wooldridge and the Alexandria people were resettled on the grounds that they were squatters. The farmer were squatters on public land, while the latter were squatters on private land. What is significant about the Alexandria people is that the death of the farm-owner changed the status of some from full-time farmworkers, and for others from something resembling labour tenants, to squatters. The tenuous link between farmers and tenants highlights the insecurity that farmworkers experience. More often than not their stay may be terminated at the whim of the farmer.

3.7.3 After the move

Paddie is an area with a low and irregular rainfall. The produce from the fields is hardly enough to meet subsistence requirements. In 1980 when the Alexandria and Wooldridge people were dumped at Kammaskraal, the whole of the Ciskei was having a terrible drought and Paddie was one of the hardest-hit areas.

The boreholes are dry, the rivers have stopped running and the people of Paddie in the Ciskei face starvation unless it rains soon. (Weekend Post, 3.05.80)

Rain had not fallen since October 1979, and was not to fall until September 1980. An agricultural extension officer at Paddie echoed the concern.

If it doesn't rain soon we are going to have big problems. This is an agricultural area.

The Ciskei Secretary for Agriculture described the situation as 'dreadful'. The Department of Co-operation and Development seems not to have considered the fact that this was a bad time for removing people to a desolate area. Moreover it was during the chilly winter months of May and June.
GEOGRAPHY

Kommanskraal lies some 40 km from the small town of Peddie, to the SW. It is surrounded by farms except on its northern side where it borders on Ngqowa location. The actual settlement consists of shacks (formerly tents) and tomato-box houses dotted on the hills and spreading into vegetation. Agricultural farming does not seem a feasible proposition because of the terrain - these together with the steep slopes would make it very hard to lay out fields. But stock farming could be practised if more land were made available.

DEMOGRAPHY

Kommanskraal held about 1 000 people in 1980: 72 families from Alexandria and 85 from Woold decided to return to Wooldridge or sought shelter in some of the more viable communities in the going to be given indefinitely, moved into the camp. Others who thought that the plank houses try their luck at Kommanskraal. A social worker who visited the camp in July 1980 gave the following age breakdown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age span</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 5</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 -14</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 20</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 -40</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 65</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When 83 households were interviewed between November 1980 and January 1981, it was found that 53% had 4-7 members and 35% had 8 or more members. The table that follows on the next page shows the de facto, migrant and de jure population as it was reflected in the 83 households that were interviewed. Out of a total of 579 people, 47% were males and 53% females. The percentage of those in the 65+ group (7%) is far higher than the national average of 3%. In therefore, one out of every three adults was a migrant. In the age bracket 25-64 the migration rate rose to 64% and 26% respectively for men and women.

73% of the households were headed by males while 27% were headed by females. 18.5% of the members of the households were migrants.

AGRICULTURE

There was virtually no agricultural activity at Kommanskraal because no land was available for it. The people had been promised agricultural land, but this was not fulfilled. Instead, they were told that they were in transit to a place near the town of Peddie. To an African community in the rural areas, the importance of agricultural land is vital. Fields lessen the dependence on money for survival. Even when the crops have failed, there is usually something at least to feed the pigs and fowls with - otherwise these domestic animals will depend on the vegetables bought from the shops and will therefore become an extra burden on the meager means of survival. Besides, wild edible plants obtained from the fields are often used to prepare some traditional dishes with a high nutritional value. Lack of fields therefore makes people depend almost entirely on remittances, pensions and employment. It is not surprising that respondents time and again complained about not having fields.

We have no fields here.
We have no fields to grow anything here.
We could live without work, but not without fields.
Life in Alexandria was better because we had fields.

The Alexandria people had small gardens in their yards, and most of them had planted vegetables such as spinach and peas. Most of the Wooldridge people missed the fertile gardens they had had at Wooldridge because now they had none, not even the small vegetable patches of the Alexandria people, being on hard higher ground and far from the dams.

We were agriculturally active there.
We had gardens there but here we have none.
The soil was good for planting, but here it is hard.

The Friends of the Ciskei and some welfare people wanted to help the Kommanskraal people to be independent and self-sufficient. A proposal that there should be a community garden was welcomed by the community until officials of the Ciskei government and the Department of Co-operation and Development visited the area and informed the people that they were going to be resettled again. The state of uncertainty about the future frustrated whatever individual and community initiative there was in Kommanskraal.

Although most of the Alexandria people had to sell their stock before the removal, the stock held...
by the whole community was estimated at 100 cattle, 80 goats, 50 chickens and 10 donkeys. A number of families did not have any stock.

LABOUR

Nobody had jobs at Kamaskraal apart from two nurses and six teachers employed by the Ciskei government. The lack of jobs was frequently mentioned as one of the major problems in the community.

We are sitting helpless here because of lack of work.

There are no jobs here, as a result we are starving.

Life in Alexandria was better because jobs were available.

We are unemployed here, but in Thornhill we were employed.

For the Kamaskraal people, local employment is close to nil - unlike some other resettlement camps where there were opportunities for domestic work.

Here is a summary of the activity rates among the 83 households interviewed:

Table 3 KAMASKRAAL ACTIVITY RATES, BY SEX AND AGE (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age span</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that 25% of the people were either employed or looking for work. The rates for males and females were 34% and 25% respectively. The picture given here may distort the actual situation unless it is realised that only 18.8% were actually employed, whether locally or as migrants. Many people were employable but could not find work. This also means that unemployment for the economically active, according to age and sex, is not as high as the above percentages suggest. For example, among the adults in the 15-34 age group, 60% were employed, and among the adults in the 35-44 age group, 76% were employed. Overall, 73% were employed.

The dependency rate was high too, because an average family of seven members had 1.33 wage earners. The meagre earnings were used to maintain large families, hence the lament that people were starving, as well as the traditional practice of helping a needy neighbour cannot be fulfilled under these conditions of abject poverty.

The rural areas in South Africa are the exporters of labour to metropolitan areas and the mines. Kamaskraal and its surroundings could provide only 17% of the jobs shared by all workers in the mining sector. These jobs were mainly in services and the agricultural sector. For Kamaskraal...

Table 4 COMPOSITION OF LOCAL AND MIGRANT WORKERS, BY SEX AND AGE (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age span</th>
<th>LOCALS Male</th>
<th>LOCALS Female</th>
<th>MIGRANTS Male</th>
<th>MIGRANTS Female</th>
<th>TOTAL Male</th>
<th>TOTAL Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 COMPOSITION OF THE UNEMPLOYED, BY SEX AND AGE (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age span</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, the push factors exerted more pressure than the pull ones. 88% of the employed males and 73% of the employed females were migrants.

The migrants found employment in various sectors of the economy. Their distribution was as follows:

- Mining: 38%
- Transport: 7%
- Services: 12%
- Construction: 5%
- Agriculture: 15%
- Trade: 2%
- Manufacturing: 11%

Male employment was largely concentrated in mining whereas female employment was mostly in services. 33% of the migrants were doing skilled work, while 38% were in unskilled jobs.

The Kamaskraal migrants worked all over South Africa. The figure on the next page illustrates the areas where they found jobs.

The workers in Johannesburg were mainly in skilled and unskilled employment in the mines. Although no information was gained on the wage levels in the various sectors, it is reasonable to believe that most of the workers were earning low wages. Moreover, because of the push factors in Kamaskraal, they probably had very little choice in deciding what jobs they would accept.

In 1980 the migrants, through the Employment Bureau of Africa, were employing about 2,000 people from Peddie, but in November of that year 17 people were turned down because they were underweight. Jobs were also obtained through the magistrate's office, friendship networks, and individual initiative. It is significant that more than half of the workers claimed that they had found jobs through individual initiative. The biggest source was the Employment Bureau of Africa. Only about 24% had been in their jobs for less than 12 months - which would indicate that most of the people kept their jobs if they had had before resettlement. More than 20% had been in their jobs for 3 to 5 years.

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Thus some people were caught in a vicious circle that would be hard to break. Many felt that their situation was worse than before they had moved:

We are starving here.

There is starvation here more than at Wooldridge.

**Income and Poverty**

Although the actual income of the residents could not be ascertained, it is clear that in most cases it was either very meagre or non-existent. Of the households interviewed, 121 people said they had regular earnings, and 37 received old-age pensions, disability grants or unemployment insurance benefits.

In effect, every cent received had to be shared among about four people.

Local and migrant sources of income formed the following pattern:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6</th>
<th>Frequency of Remittance of All Incomes (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although no objective assessment was made of how frequently money was remitted, the respondents' perception may not be far off the mark. In those terms, 91% of local earners and 86% of migrants supported their families regularly. Migrant remittances every two or three months would be regarded as regular. We could not ascertain the actual average amount remitted, but since most workers were unskilled labourers the figures would not be high. Disability grants and old-age pensions were R60, paid every two months, at the time of the survey. Now in 1982 they are R80 every two months.

An attempt was made to ascertain the degree of poverty in Kammersaal by analysing family size and the number of wage earners. Of the 81 households interviewed, 67% fell into the average category of 0-2 workers; 15% into that of 2-3 workers; and 18% that of 3 or more workers. (The overlap in numbers here was to serve other considerations such as the number of dependents.)

The first category was the poorest. Four families here - with 3, 5, 9 and 9 members respectively - declared that they had no source of income at all. The 67% reflects the group in Kammersaal who are destitute, a very high proportion. Where these families have income, it must support an impossible number of people: either the income is too meagre for a small family or a larger family overwhelms a slightly better income. Our figure suggests that two-thirds of the community are constantly struggling just to survive from day to day.

Next come the 15% who managed to keep on the breadline. These families still had to rely on credit, generally to keep going, but with a little more income in relation to the size of family or absolutely they were better off than the first group. They would not necessarily have an adequate diet, for instance, they might be quite malnourished, but would eat enough to survive without a sense of daily crisis.
The last 18% were not only sure of food but could afford a better diet. They also had some slight leeway financially, to cope with other expenses. Generally, they had more people earning, and smaller families. About one in every six households were in this more stable position, the most secure in the community.

Most people interviewed did not carry on any informal sector activities, and produced no agricultural goods. The total stock count for the whole community was estimated as 100 head of cattle, 80 goats, 50 chickens and 10 donkeys.

Although we cannot know exactly the degree of poverty in the Kammaskraal resettlement camp, the fact that the people were dumped there during the drought, had no agricultural land, and probably had to spend the little they had on ‘improving’ their appalling accommodation, suggests that there was very little to live on. With high dependency and unemployment rates, the struggle to get food must have been the struggle for survival from the day they arrived until now. As has already been indicated, respondents repeatedly referred to starvation as one of the problems facing the community.

SERVICES

HOUSING

When the Wooldridge people arrived, they were accommodated in canvas tents. Each family was given a tent - only one tent, even for extended families which were treated as one unit. Privacy was obviously something that the people could not even dream of. To the people’s surprise, the plank houses at the bottom of the site near the dams were not for them. Some of these houses had already been completed when the Wooldridge people came, but they were reserved for the Alexandria people who were going to arrive a month later. This differential treatment strained relations between the two groups right from the outset. By June 1981 the tents had either been blown down by the wind or had holes caused by fire. We heard that the tents were often blown down in the middle of the night, and families had to cover themselves with what they could lay their hands on until the following day when they would fix the tent. There was this pathetic account:

A mother who had just delivered a healthy baby under these conditions found herself, baby and relatives, exposed to the cold. People had to use cupboards, tables and other furniture to provide shelter for the new baby and mother.

Dr Morrison, Deputy Minister of Co-operation and Development, had described the conditions at Wooldridge as ‘terrible’, but the conditions at Kammaskraal were worse. After the March/April 1981 heavy rains, the situation became so serious that a senior social worker, in a memorandum to the Ciskei government, captioned his plea for immediate help: ‘Disaster at Kammaskraal’.

As we have already said, the Alexandria people were accommodated in three-roomed plank houses. Because some were still being built, not all the people could get them straight away. Some people were in tents to begin with. The houses themselves were rickety. The gaps between the planks (which gave rise to the name ‘tomato-box houses’) meant that the people had to plaster them with mud on the inside.

The fact that the Wooldridge people were given tents whilst the Alexandria people were given plank houses was ascribed to the point that the Department of Co-operation and Development regarded the latter as its responsibility whereas the former were seen as the responsibility of the Ciskei government. An informant reported that when the Chief Minister of the Ciskei was asked what provision should be made for the Wooldridge people, he (Mr Lemnox Sebe) replied that the Department of Co-operation and Development should not worry about them, and could just supply them with tents.

Many people expressed dissatisfaction with the accommodation provided for them, and pointed out that they had been informed that they would find houses ready at Kammaskraal. They complained that the plank houses were very cold in winter and very hot in summer. The tents were extremely cold, yet the people had to be very careful when they made fires. The fear of the fire confined the parents to the tents as they could not leave children alone. At the same time, people’s belongings were not safe as the tents could not be locked.

Frustration at Kammaskraal intensified when people were told that they could not build their own houses because they would soon be resettled again. Corrugated iron shacks were built informally, nevertheless, to replace the worn-out tents. By about March 1981 every household had put up some other kind of shelter. A number of respondents expressed shock at the prohibition on building proper houses. A 28-year-old, found repairing his car and trailer before returning to the mines at Welkom, moaned:

If only they could give us permission, I would build my own house. I have already submitted a plan to building contractors in King William’s Town so that when permission is eventually granted, my parents won’t have to wait for me.

(This man had a sentimental attachment to Kammaskraal, previously a farm where his father had been born.) Another informant commented:

It is unfair that the authorities should, after promising us houses, deny us the opportunity to build our own. How can a man be expected to live in an envelope with his family.

Most of the households interviewed (65%) lived in tents when they first arrived. By November 1980, 42% were living in tents, whilst the rest were living in shacks or what they described as temporary housing. The great majority (93%) had brought building materials with them from their old place. The general cry was for proper houses to be built or for people to be allowed to build for themselves.

Permanent houses should be built for the houses in which we live are made of planks.

We had better houses in Alexandria.

We would like to have better houses.

We led a better life at Wooldridge because we had our own house.

The inhumanity of the resettlement policy manifests itself clearly in the provision of such bad accommodation. One must remember that the people placed in plank houses or tents had their own accommodation before removal. It might not have been of the best but it was theirs and sometimes suited both their tastes and their pockets. What pride could one have in a tent? What privacy could one expect under these conditions? A home is not just a shelter: it is a place where the family meet in a spirit of togetherness; it is a place where parents bring up their children; and where ancestors are worshipped and appeased. Uprooting people from their homes and dumping them in plank houses and tents shows a callous disregard for their feelings, let alone their health.

EDUCATION

The dumping of the Wooldridge and Alexandria people at Kammaskraal took place not only in winter but also at a time when the school-going children were almost halfway through the academic year. Their schooling was therefore disrupted, and they had to adapt themselves to new teachers and a new environment. Needless to say, this change must have had a traumatic
effect on the young minds. All the Wooldridge children in the primary standards moved with their parents, but most of those in secondary school stayed on with the permanent residents and continued attending the local high school some 5 km away.

Corrugated iron buildings were erected by the Department of Co-operation and Development to serve as a primary school for about 350 pupils from Sub A to Standard 5. In 1980 there were six of these classrooms and six teachers - giving an average of 58 pupils per classroom and per teacher. Some children were not attending school because their parents could not afford books and school fees. All the children were required to pay school fees of 10c per quarter. The headmaster described the school buildings as 'terrible' because they were either icy or oven-hot. However, he felt the main problem was malnutrition among the children.

They try to work, but because they are malnourished, they soon lose interest, due to hunger.

Children in post-Standard 5 classes had to walk some 8 km to get to the nearest high school, or lived with families in the neighbourhood of the high school.

Over a quarter (27%) of the permanent residents interviewed had no education at all. More females (60%) than males had no education. Among the migrants 14% had no education at all, but 13% had passed Standard 8 or higher. The lack or low standard of formal education is understandable if we consider the conditions on the farms from which the people came.

The educational levels at Kammakræal were found to be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>LOCAL Male</th>
<th>LOCAL Female</th>
<th>MIGRANT Male</th>
<th>MIGRANT Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower primary</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher primary</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 9+</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HEALTH

Officials of the Ciskei Department of Health visited the camp three days after the first group arrived but were frustrated that they could not use the farmhouse as a permanent clinic. In September 1980 two nurses were stationed permanently at the farmhouse. Although they were involved in health education, they offered no curative treatment. A doctor with a mobile clinic visited the camp once a week from the central hospital for the area, Nompumelelo Hospital in Peddie. This was the referral hospital. Conditions have since improved with a permanent nursing staff who can treat minor ailments. Serious cases are still referred to Nompumelelo Hospital some 40 km away. Patients are charged 50c for treatment at the clinic established in the farmhouse.

Although mortality and morbidity figures could not be obtained, it is believed that the latter would be high in view of the fact that people were resettled in tents and tomato-box houses in winter. Several people said there was a lot of illness in the community:

There are a lot of TB cases here as a consequence of the cold people are subjected to. However inaccurate that might be medically, it is true that many people could not keep healthy in those conditions. About nine people had died by May 1981.

No money, no food, no blankets. The people live in tents - it's wet, damp. It's very cold here. They are dying here.

Several informants related the health problems of the community to lack of proper sanitation and a polluted water supply. Sanitation consisted of holes in the ground under a zinc shelter. Water was obtained from a muddy dam that was subject to pollution: when heavy rains fell, the toilets became full and the sewage was washed off down to the dam. During the first few months water was also delivered in tanks once a week and strict measures were taken to see that it was not 'wasted'.

OTHER SERVICES

Kammakræal is a camp that is remote, desolate and almost hidden from anybody who might ask What, When and Why. Being so far off the beaten track, its nearest shop was about 10 km away and prices there were generally 5% higher than those at Peddie. There were no churches or recreational facilities of any kind. There was no post office, and transport to Peddie was very expensive, by bus. The Wooldridge and the Alexandria people both mentioned that they had had better access to town before their removal.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Community relations tend to be determined by both material and non-material considerations. On the material side, the degree to which people see themselves as sharing in the allocation of scarce resources will influence their attitude towards the distributor and the other recipients. Where the distributor is an outsider, resentment will not be directed against him only, but also against the local favoured individual or group. In Kammakræal the nature and allocation of accommodation sowed the seeds of dissension between people who had not known each other before. Although the Wooldridge people had arrived earlier than the Alexandria people, they were informed that the plank houses were reserved for the latter group. Then they were supplied with tents. They maintained that the principle of "First come, first served" should have been applied. Frustration and anger ran high when they were informed that since they were in a transit camp, they should not build permanent houses. As an informant from Alexandria said:

The people from Wooldridge were very angry with us because we got houses before them, although they arrived earlier than we did.

Anger seems to have erupted into violence culminating in the death of a young man from Alexandria. Most informants were reluctant to talk about this incident and stressed harmonious relations between the two groups. Some informants commented that they had realised that it was in the interests of the authorities that Kammakræal should be a divided community.

Differences existed over the leadership of the camp. Each group wanted to have its own headman as leader but it appears that a compromise was reached whereby each section had its own headman. Since Opposition politics have virtually disappeared in the Ciskei, aspirant local leaders seemed to be jockeying for favours with the Ciskei government.

Another source of differences was the temporary nature of the camp. The Wooldridge people were not keen to get involved in any community project as they thought removal to a permanent
settlement was imminent. The Alexandria people on the other hand tended to regard the camp as a permanent settlement, and probably feared jumping from the frying pan into the fire. Welfare organizations found it difficult to enlist the co-operation of the Wonderlidge people to start a community garden. However, a representative committee was elected to look after the interests of the community, including liaison with health officers and social workers. Both communities were also represented on the school committee.

Kammskraal falls under the chieftainship of Chief M Njokweni. However, the female Chief Matomela also claimed the area as the Wonderlidge people had been under her jurisdiction before their removal. A complicating factor was the imperialistic tendencies of Chief H Z Njokweni (formerly a minister in the Ciskei cabinet) who apparently wants to extend his empiric throughout the whole of South Peddie from east to west. In fact, a reliable informant claimed that Chief H Z Njokweni had asked that the people should be resettled at Kammskraal so that his business interests could benefit. These claims for jurisdiction over Kammskraal were another divisive factor in the community - and more so because Njokweni’s membership of the Ciskei cabinet placed him in a more influential position.

3.7.4 The Ciskei government & Kammskraal

The Ciskei government by its very existence is both directly and indirectly involved in the resettlement of people in the Ciskei area. When the Wonderlidge people appealed for land of their own, Ciskei officials promised them arable land and houses at Kammskraal. The Alexandria people had also held discussions with the Eastern Cape representative of the Ciskei government, and subsequently sold their stock to the Ciskei Marketing Board. One informant said that a senior official of the Department of Co-operation and Development had informed him that the Wonderlidge people had been moved at the request of the Ciskei government, and his department had agreed to this on condition that the Ciskei government agreed to the resettlement of the Alexandria people in the same area. This would probably account for the differential treatment of the two groups as regards accommodation. According to this source, Chief Sebe (then Chief Minister) had told the Department of Co-operation and Development that it would not be necessary to provide the Wonderlidge people with rations, and tents would suffice as accommodation.

The relationship between the Ciskei government and the South African government on the resettlement question sounds like hide-and-seek. The Ciskei authorities sometimes appear helpless as acceptance of apartheid invariably implies acceptance of some, if not all, of its aspects. Protests by the Ciskei seem to be more of a public relations exercise than a serious attempt to prevent an abominable and genocidal policy. Gary Godden, then Ciskei Secretary for Agriculture, declared:

“It is totally incorrect to create the impression that the Ciskei Government is not concerned about the plight of these people... These people and their miserable circumstances are the problem of South Africa.”

Chief lent Maqoma, then Minister of the Interior, added that the problem of resettlement is an exercise for the South African Government.

Sebe himself is quoted as saying thus on the conditions at Kammskraal:

“Words fail to express our feeling about the horrors, and one wonders if the question of colour has not hardened people in this country over the years.”

On the other hand, the Ciskei government has declared that it is under moral obligation to help resettled people:

out of humanitarian considerations his (Bebe’s) government could not drive Ciskeians away when they had nowhere to stay.

It is not surprising that Sebe should regard all these people as Ciskeians. Not only has he accepted the South African government’s definition of a ‘Ciskeian’, but agents of his own government/party have been visiting farms in the ‘white’ rural areas to persuade people to identify themselves with the Ciskei by joining the Ciskei National Independence Party and taking up Ciskeian citizenship. A numerically strong Ciskei does not only strengthen Sebe’s political base (such as it is), but also enables him to bargain for larger subsidies from the South African government. When a hue and cry was raised over conditions at Glenmore, ECAB Director, Louis Koch, remarked:

“As far as we are concerned, there has been the necessary consultation over the move. We met them, and so did the Ciskei Minister of Interior, Chief Lent Maqoma. The Klipfontein people indicated they were in favour of the move. This indicates that people are never really dumped in the Ciskei without the tacit or express connivance of the Ciskei government. The agreements regarding resettlement signed between the Ciskei and South African governments prior to independence highlight the extent of this collaboration.

A certain measure of chicanery and dishonesty seems to have characterised dealings between the Ciskei authorities and the people resettled at Kammskraal. Why were these people promised houses, arable and grazing land, if it was never the intention to provide these? Why were they not informed that they were going to be resettled at Kammskraal as a temporary measure and would have to await another resettlement? As one informant observed:

‘Nobody seems to be interested in taking responsibility for these people. Everyone seems to be passing the buck while the people are suffering. The whole scheme is an example of bad planning and a big lack of communication.’

In spite of the treatment received from both the Ciskei and the South African sides, the Kammskraal people were still hopeful that the Ciskei authorities and the ‘whites’ would rescue them from the quagmire. When asked, ‘Who do you expect to help?’, informants cited ‘the government’, ‘the Ciskei government’ or ‘the whites’.

The Government has hidden us here, so we would appreciate any help to bring our plight to the attention of the authorities.

We expect the whites to help us because they took us to this place and dumped us like animals.

The fact that the promises of land and houses had not materialised did not appear to have dampened their spirits, nor did it make them agitate against the proposed resettlement near Peddie (fear of detention under Ciskei’s notorious Proclamation R252 may have restrained any thoughts of agitation). Most of the people tried to ingratiate themselves with the Ciskei government by joining the Ciskei National Independence Party and acquiring Ciskeian citizenship. They voted for recognition by having their own collection when special contributions were called for, e.g. during Sebe’s numerous overseas trips: to prepare for a CNIP rally; or for the Ntebo kaNtoda monument.

Although the resettlement camp was visited by cabinet ministers, officials of the Ciskei government and the Department of Co-operation and Development, it appeared that the people were left in the dark about plans afoot for them, and apparently accepted vague and unwritten promises of resettlement near Peddie.”
3.7.5 Conclusion

The condition of the people at Kammaskraal highlights the suffering to which African people are subjected by a government that claims to be based on Western values and Christian principles. However, it is obvious that, no matter how much denial there may be from the apologists of apartheid, the herenwijkstra mentality makes the Nationalist government treat Africans like "lesser breeds". The relationship between the Ciskei government and the South African government can be seen as one of political promiscuity. The facilities provided at Kammaskraal show the inhumanity of the policy of resettlement. It is unfortunate that Kammaskraal is not the last resettlement camp in South Africa, and, as the people are going to be moved nearer Peddie, the same misery, hunger and despair are going to recur.

3.8 COMPARISONS*

In this section we compare some aspects of life in the six areas we surveyed. A few things stand out sharply: migrancy is extensive, unemployment widespread and agriculture insubstantial. All areas contain a class of people who live in very poor conditions. In Glenmore and Kammaskraal this includes most of the community. (These two are perhaps entirely representative of rural removals to the Ciskei.)

3.8.1 Origins

Most people in Mdantsane came from Duncan Village in East London (83%). This accords with the official policy of allocating 85% of all new houses to families from Duncan Village. All but one of the other families came from a variety of places inside the Ciskei, in our sample. During the 1960s some people were moved from Cape Town to Mdantsane, but no reliable estimates exist of the numbers involved. In our sample only one family came from Cape Town. Although our sample was biased in favour of recent arrivals, and therefore families from Duncan Village, the virtual absence of anyone from the white areas of the Western Cape and the Cape Midlands is puzzling. As a result we cannot really throw any light on the question of estimating the numbers who were moved from Cape Town. The move from Duncan Village to Mdantsane has been going on since the early 1960s to the present at a fairly steady pace, the bulk of the 15 110 families said to have been relocated in Mdantsane between 1964 and October 1979.

(Supplement to Race Relations News, August 1982, p. 5) Most people lived in Duncan Village for at least 10 years prior to the move. The majority (67%) moved of their own free will, the reason being that Duncan Village has been left to deteriorate to such an extent that conditions at Mdantsane are vastly superior despite the increased commuter distances involved.

The origin of Dimbahle residents is striking. No less than 33% came, "of their own free will", from urban areas, large and small, all over the Cape throughout the 1970s. This seems to show that a substantial fraction of emigration from white urban areas during the '70s was not

* There are some small discrepancies between the tables in this section and those in the individual reports because those here rely entirely on computer tabulations (which contain small processing errors) while the earlier sections used some hand-tabulated results.
part of the government resettlement programme proper. Very little is known about the reasons for this emigration. Further research is needed here, especially on the role of the State, e.g. housing policy and influx control. Employment in small towns also needs to be considered, and black political attitudes.

A further 16% were evicted from small towns, e.g. Middelburg, Burgersdorp, Grabouw, Beaufort West, Hermanus and Tzompers, west of the 1971 Eisleben Line, during the late '60s. These were mainly first residents of Dimbaza. A few small-town urban evictions, e.g. Section 10 offences and failure to pay rent, occurred during the '70s. Some families (5%) were banished from Port Elizabeth for political offences. The rest came from rural areas. About 8% of families came from tribal land in the Ciskei and Transkei during the late '70s. A further 31% moved off white farms from all over the Cape throughout the '70s. The majority (69%) said they came of their own free will. All of these had members who worked on the farms. It would appear that they emigrated as a result of conditions in white farms - that much can be gleaned from the fact that most household heads were in their 30s when the move occurred. The other 40% were evicted. Prominent among the reasons was a change of ownership of the farm. Age and conflicts with the farmer were also cited. A number were squatters. The rest of the inhabitants of Dimbaza (7%) were evicted off mission or Trust land in white areas during the late '60s. Most families lived in their previous place for more than 10 years (80%).

The overwhelming majority of families (92%) in Sada came from the Eastern Cape neighbourhood. Those few from further away came from Cape Town, the OFS, the Transvaal. Some people have been banished here for political reasons, and in the early days of the 1964-68 period families were trucked in from farms sometimes, as farm evictions and the old style of GC forced removals went hand in hand. Nearly half (47%) came from rural areas. Most of these families had been evicted or had given up their places on white farms for various sombre reasons, but quite a few also came over from Glen Grey in the 1974/77 flight from independent Transkei. Both rural and urban people had been in their previous homes for many years, on the whole; three out of four had been there for 10 years or more. Sada started with people being cleared out of the old Whittlesea township nearby, and other township families followed from all over the area and especially Queenstown. Many had been evicted for not paying their rent.

All the people in Eulahwayeni were evicted from 'badly situated' rural black areas around Humansdorp during 1976-78 and brought to Eulahwayeni. They had been engaged primarily in subsistence agriculture, and 93% had been there for over 10 years, many of them much longer.

Of the people at Kammaaskraal 39% were evicted off a white farm in the Alexandria area when the farm changed hands. Many were non-rent-paying squatters and worked on the farms in the area. The other families at Kammaaskraal came from tribal land at Wooldridge, a place close to Peddie, where they were squating. Prior to staying at Wooldridge they lived and worked on white farms in the area. Although they moved to Kammaaskraal 'voluntarily', they did so only because they were promised agricultural land.

Finally the people at Glenmore: they came exclusively from rural areas, 65% came from a white farm at Coega (near Port Elizabeth) where they were evicted in 1979. Some worked on the farm, others on other farms in the region, still others at a brick yard in the area. Most of those who worked on the farm stayed, the others were evicted as squatters. A further 16% were squatters on unfructified farmland at Klipfontein in the Kenton-on-Sea area who were evicted when that part was declared 'a coloured area'. Some worked on farms there, others simply engaged in subsistence agriculture. The other residents at Glenmore came from other white farms in the Alexandria/Port Elizabeth area, and a few came from the Kenton emergency camp. 55% were evicted for reasons ranging from age to 'laziness', while the rest left of their own free will.

To summarise: during the '60s urban resettlement predominated. Almost all were evicted and brought to their current place of living. The picture became more complex during the '70s. A certain amount of 'voluntary' emigration occurred from small towns. Most of these people went to the established resettlement areas. A further group, relatively small, were expelled under influx control. Only one instance of government-supervised urban relocation occurred, that from Duncan Village to Mdantsane. Rural resettlement took four forms. Firstly, some came voluntarily off white farms. Secondly, an equal number of separate families were evicted from white farms because their labour was no longer required. Both types went to a variety of resettlement areas, both old and new. The selection procedure often involved the government directly, i.e. the family concerned approached the nearest administration board with a request for accommodation and is advised to move to one or other of the resettlement areas. Thirdly, towards the end of the '70s a number of black spots were cleared. Finally, also towards the end of the '70s, non-rent-paying squatter areas were attacked and cleared. Both types were government-supervised removals.

3.8.2 Demography
DE JURE POPULATION (INCLUDING MIGRANTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Mdmt</th>
<th>Dtm</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Eluk</th>
<th>Kxraal</th>
<th>Glen</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-24</td>
<td>61,1</td>
<td>65,5</td>
<td>53,1</td>
<td>63,5</td>
<td>60,5</td>
<td>69,7</td>
<td>61,5</td>
<td>62,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>24,2</td>
<td>22,3</td>
<td>24,1</td>
<td>17,6</td>
<td>21,4</td>
<td>15,9</td>
<td>21,4</td>
<td>23,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>15,1</td>
<td>13,5</td>
<td>10,7</td>
<td>8,1</td>
<td>11,3</td>
<td>10,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>7,4</td>
<td>6,3</td>
<td>5,8</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample pop</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>271</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The age composition of the population in resettlement areas differs from the national average only really in the greater predominance of old people among the resettled. This is particularly true of Sada, Eulahwayeni, Kammaaskraal and Glenmore. There are also variations in the other age groups from place to place, but they seem almost random and inexplicable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Mdmt</th>
<th>Dtm</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Eluk</th>
<th>Kxraal</th>
<th>Glen</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-24</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>65+</td>
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<td>108</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>115</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly there are far fewer males for every 100 females in resettlement areas than for the whole South African black population. This is especially pronounced in the 25-64 range. However, the data above should be treated with caution. The masculinity ratios of particular resettlement sites vary widely from age group to age group and from place to place. Moreover, there is a certain randomness within the variations.
Even so, it seems appropriate to consider whether our demographic information lends any support to the popular contention that resettlement amounts to the dumping of young, old and female persons in the bantustans. First it must be decided whether this view relates to the resettlement or a migration process. This view contains a great deal of truth, but here as far as young people are concerned, we found no evidence to bear out the view. On the other hand, there are relatively more old people in these areas, and the bantustans in general, than in the country as a whole, and so it appears that there is a certain amount of dumping of an important cause of white-farm evictions. But the numbers resettled on account of age must be small compared with total resettlement, and so by no stretch of the imagination could it be that the proportion of females among the resettled can be explained in terms of a differential mortality rate. There is no permanent out migration among men after resettlement, suggesting that resettlement selects female-headed households in slightly more proportion of females. In this case there is dumping of females.

**DE FACTO POPULATION (EXCLUDING MIGRANTS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Mdants</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Eluk</th>
<th>Kkaal</th>
<th>Glen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-24</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
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<td>7.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a strong similarity between the age structure of Mdantsane - Dimbaza and Urban Ciskei, and between the other resettlement areas and Rural Ciskei. This is basically due to the age category 25-44. From 45 people seem people of rural resettlement areas and the rural Ciskei.

**DE FACTO POPULATION, BY SEX (MASCULINITY RATIOS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Mdants</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Eluk</th>
<th>Kkaal</th>
<th>Glen</th>
<th>Urban Ciskei</th>
<th>Rural Ciskei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impact of migration is also clear in the sexual composition of the permanently resident population. In the rural resettlement areas and the urban Ciskei there are barely 50 males to every 100 females. In the urban areas migration also takes its toll less emphatically.

Turning to household size, the following Table 5 shows the average is 7 and the mode is 6, of large households. On average 20% of households contain 9 or more members. In every family has access to a bit of land it is invariably cultivated. But the scale of production is very small because hardly anyone has a reasonable piece of agricultural land. In some places, large numbers do not even have a small plot available (especially in Sada where 57% have no land whatever). Nevertheless, the typical family has one or two urban-sized plots under cultivation, and here there a family may cultivate several plots at the same time. A range of crops is grown including maize, beans and various greens. There is almost no livestock kept, and even poultry is uncommon. The produce is not usually sold but is meant for direct consumption. It is hard to say how far it helps in the subsistence of resettled people, but no doubt it is very important. By itself, though, it cannot give an adequate supply of starches and greens, let alone a balanced diet. Periodic water shortages, the general infertility of the soil, and the threat of another move are other things that severely limit the scope of

**EDUCATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Mdants</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Eluk</th>
<th>Kkaal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower primary</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher primary</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard 9+</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mdantsane and Elukhanyweni contain the best educated people here, where very few people have none and over 70% have a higher primary pass or better. (Mdantsane’s educational facilities are probably better than the others. Elukhanyweni people had a close association with a mission station in Rumandorp.) Glenmore’s people are very poorly educated: a third have had no schooling and over 70% lower primary or less. (The rural background of the people seems to show through.) The other three areas are fairly alike with roughly half the population having a higher primary pass or better.

**3.8.3 Agriculture**

Agricultural production occurs in all the resettlement areas of the Ciskei. Where a family has access to a bit of land it is invariably cultivated. But the scale of production is very small because hardly anyone has a reasonable piece of agricultural land. In some places, large numbers do not even have a small plot available (especially in Sada where 57% have no land whatever). Nevertheless, the typical family has one or two urban-sized plots under cultivation, and here there a family may cultivate several plots at the same time. A range of crops is grown including maize, beans and various greens. There is almost no livestock kept, and even poultry is uncommon. The produce is not usually sold but is meant for direct consumption. It is hard to say how far it helps in the subsistence of resettled people, but no doubt it is very important. By itself, though, it cannot give an adequate supply of starches and greens, let alone a balanced diet. Periodic water shortages, the general infertility of the soil, and the threat of another move are other things that severely limit the scope of
agriculture in resettlement areas.

The diets of people in areas close to shops and where agricultural activity is more limited rely noticeably less on typical home-grown goods.

There is some informal-sector activity although it is not very widespread. In Mdantsane, where the scope for this kind of service is greatest, only 17% of families are involved. This is not really surprising because an informal sector usually thrives only when it is close to a well-developed formal sector. With the distance between the two sectors, and with a high incidence of poverty and unemployment, it is unlikely that the informal activities will grow into much more than illegal small-scale backroom retail trading.

3.8.4 Employment

PARTICIPATION RATES

Table 7 POPULATION EMPLOYED (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mdant</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Eluk</th>
<th>Kkraal</th>
<th>Glen</th>
<th>National african</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By national standards, male participation rates are low, whereas female rates differ from place to place and exceed the national rate in Mdantsane and Elukhanyweni. These don’t seem to be any one explanation for these rather surprising findings.

The overall participation rates are also slightly below the national average, and far down in Kammaaskraal and Glenmore. Variations between the resettlement areas depend mainly on access to labour markets. Mdantsane is on the doorstep of East London. Dimba has its own industries, Sada is particularly favoured in its allocations for contract work, and Elukhanyweni still has a very close tie with Humansdorp. Kammaaskraal and Glenmore, on the other hand, do not have anything to help them. They are also relatively new and so the communities have probably not found their feet in the labour market yet.

AGE & SEX

Table 8 EMPLOYMENT, BY AGE AND SEX (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Mdont M F</th>
<th>Dim M F</th>
<th>Sada M F</th>
<th>Eluk M F</th>
<th>Kkraal M F</th>
<th>Glen M F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>10  2</td>
<td>15  18</td>
<td>26  5</td>
<td>19  8</td>
<td>16  5</td>
<td>19  17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>34  30</td>
<td>35  18</td>
<td>30  19</td>
<td>26  21</td>
<td>36  21</td>
<td>38  12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>14  12</td>
<td>10  4</td>
<td>12  7</td>
<td>13  12</td>
<td>13  8</td>
<td>12  0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>1  1</td>
<td>0  1</td>
<td>0  1</td>
<td>1  0</td>
<td>2  0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>55  45</td>
<td>60  40</td>
<td>69  31</td>
<td>58  42</td>
<td>66  34</td>
<td>71  29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the areas where migrant work is the main option (Sada, Kammaaskraal and Glenmore - but not Elukhanyweni which is a special case), females are for obvious reasons discriminated against and hence the small percentage of them in employment. But in both Mdantsane and Dimba there are firms nearby with a decided preference for female (cheap and docile) labour.

The age distribution of employment means unexceptional. Migrant employment tends to drop off after 45, but is compensated for by local employment.

LOCAL / MIGRANT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mdont</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Eluk</th>
<th>Kkraal</th>
<th>Glen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Local work is available in Dimba, the focal point of industrial investment inside the Ciskei, and Mdantsane, the main labour pool for the East London industrial area. Elsewhere there are very few jobs on the spot or even within weekly commuting distance, and hence migrant labour predominates. In Sada and Elukhanyweni 67% migrate, in Glenmore 76% and in Kammaaskraal a staggering 83% of the labour force migrate. Migrancy rates are high even among females in Elukhanyweni and Kammaaskraal. It is also worth noting that migrant labour is by no means absent in the Mdantsane and Dimba returns. At the heart of much resettlement there is no a "migrantisation process".

INDUSTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Mdont</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Eluk</th>
<th>Kkraal</th>
<th>Glen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table is revealing in a number of ways. Just about no-one works in agriculture, which is consistent with the nationwide decline in agriculture's share of employment over the past two decades and confirms that resettlement amounts to a form of displaced urbanisation, a shift out of agriculture.

The service sector is the largest employer, with some 20% of the labour force engaged in it on average. Among women it dominates completely. Although a number of female teachers and other professionals are included in the category, most are undoubtedly domestic servants, cleaners and the like. In the commuter towns the majority commute to the nodal town in the area (although some 'live in'), while in migrant towns they often migrate. A few travel as far afield as Johannesburg and Cape Town, but Port Elizabeth and the small towns of the Eastern Cape are the main centres for these workers.

Mining is important. In two places, Sada and Kammaaskraal, it is a main employer (20% and 35% respectively). About 15% of the labour force in Eukhanwenti, Glenmore and surprisingly Mdantsane are employed in it. As one would expect, mine workers are primarily male, unskilled or semi-skilled labourers who migrate to the Reef. Construction and transport are two other big employers of male migrant labour. Together mining, construction and transport make up about 40% of total employment and the lion's share of male employment in those resettlement areas where migrant labour predominates. Construction and transport workers migrate to just about every place in the Eastern Cape, to other metropolitan areas and especially to Port Elizabeth. They are typically male, unskilled (66%) or semi-skilled (33%) workers.

The importance of the manufacturing sector varies considerably from place to place. The manufacturing industries in Dimbaza are the big employer in the area. Many from Mdantsane work in the manufacturing firms of East London. Manufacturing is also important in Sada, but in the places far from industrial towns manufacturing is insignificant. From all the migrant workers taken together, manufacturing employs no more than 10%.

The evidence on the sectorial composition of employment casts some doubt on the view that resettlement is a way of consilating labour to particular sectors. The individual variation between places is sometimes explicable in terms of obvious factors such as the presence of industry in Dimbaza, for example. But otherwise they probably vary mainly because of the community's historical links or the mechanism of work-seeking.

### Table 11: Employment, by Occupation (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Mdant</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Elk</th>
<th>Krael</th>
<th>Glen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled/semi-skilled</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relatively few people have white-collar jobs, but this is entirely in accord with the country as a whole. The really surprising point is the prominence of skilled and semi-skilled work (excepting Glenmore). The national ratio of skilled to unskilled African workers is 1:3. In four out of the six areas here it is above this, and in all but Dimbaza the ratio for migrants is even higher. This seems to fly straight in the face of the belief that resettled people have access to only the worst categories of occupations and that migrants cannot acquire skills.

### Places of Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of work</th>
<th>Mdant</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Elk</th>
<th>Krael</th>
<th>Glen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOCAL</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walking distance</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MIGRANT</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27(7)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Cape &amp; Ciskei towns</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East London</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Elizabeth</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annotated figures refer mainly to (1) East London, (2) King William's Town, (3) Queenstown, (4) various, (5) Peddie, (6) various, (7) Humansdorp.

There are considerable differences in the main centres of employment for the six communities. Location is crucial: Mdantsane is close to East London, Dimbaza to King William's Town, Glenmore to Port Elizabeth, and so on. Port Elizabeth employs very few people from the Ciskei side (except in the case of Glenmore) because its industry uses mainly settled labour. East London (except for Mdantsane) and Cape Town (except for Sada) are also very underrepresented. On the other hand, the attraction of mining on the Reef is clearly reflected in the extent of migration to Johannesburg.

### Table 13: Employment, by Recruitment Procedure (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment</th>
<th>Mdant</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Elk</th>
<th>Krael</th>
<th>Glen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt labour bureau</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private recruitment</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer direct</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Mdantsane and Dimbaza most people find their jobs by going straight to employers. In the closer settlements this method is still important but less so in view of the distance from the employment centres. The officially recognised recruitment procedures therefore start to predominate, although certainly less than we had expected. The government's tribal labour bureaux are really only significant in Sada and Glenmore. (Sada seems to have a fairly
special association with the labour bureau system. This points to the basic inefficiency of the government agencies in most parts of the Ciskei. Private recruitment is done mainly through TBA, the Chamber of Mines agency. Very few agents seem to operate in resettlement areas. Altogether the results suggest that resettled people have very definite obstacles to entering the labour market, for which the official recruitment system fails to compensate. The findings also militate against the view that resettlement is a simple labour-allocation mechanism.

### 3.8.5 Unemployment

**Table 14** UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mdants</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Eluk</th>
<th>Kkaal</th>
<th>Glen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unemployment is a serious problem throughout the Ciskei, and particularly in the resettlement areas. Whenever resettled people talk about their problems they invariably mention the lack of jobs.

The table mirrors this. There is an unemployment rate with a norm of 30%. In Mdantsane 32% of the economically active population are without jobs. In Glenmore the figure is 38%. Only in Elukhanyweni, with an unemployment rate of 16%, does it fall significantly below 30%.

It is risky to compare the unemployment rates of these six places because except for Elukhanyweni the spread is rather narrow. Sada's unemployment rate of 29% is the second lowest. The highest rates were found in Kwaatsel and Glenmore, and figures for Mdantsane and Dimbaza lay between. These trends are amplified in the unemployment rates among females and the youth (aged 15-24). Unemployment rates are lowest in the somewhat older areas in which migrant labour predominates and are highest in the newer communities of mainly ex-farm labourers that also mainly on migrant labour. Unemployment rates for the commuter towns fall between and are surprisingly high.

Although we cannot draw a detailed profile of the unemployed, a few observations are possible. The vast majority of the unemployed (60-80%) are without jobs for periods of over a year. This is true of those with previous work experience as well as of recent entrants to the labour market. Females are far more likely to be without jobs than males. On average about twice as many females are unemployed as males, and their share of employment is way below half. About half (43%) of the females who try to find work are unsuccessful. Another group particularly prone to unemployment are those between the ages of 15 and 24. They comprise about 40% of the unemployed, whereas they form only about 20-30% of those with jobs. The average unemployment rate for this group is 40% although the spread is wide, ranging from 20% in Sada to 65% in Mdantsane. Finally, the unemployment risks for a service sector worker or unskilled labourer are relatively high.

A key question is whether the high unemployment in resettlement areas entitles us to say that resettlement is just part of a marginalisation process. It is certainly true that the State is trying to put as many as possible of the unemployed into the bantustans. This leads to a strong link between resettlement and unemployment. (It should be added, though, that so far the State has only partly succeeded here because there is considerable unemployment in the prescribed areas too.) But it cannot be argued convincingly that this is the only or even the primary strategic consideration in the resettlement programme. Most resettled people are still active in the labour market and indeed make an important contribution to the labour needs of capital.

Marginalisation also connotes a class of people becoming permanently excluded from the labour market. There is no evidence of this happening. The profile of the unemployed given above is entirely unreconstructed. Whatever unemployment occurs, it is the women and school-leavers who are always struck first and hardest. Next come service and unskilled workers. Besides, there is no reason to believe that employment and unemployment do not rotate within resettlement communities, albeit somewhat slowly and biassed.

### 3.8.6 Living conditions

**INCOMES**

The surveys did not try getting exact estimates of household incomes. But some idea may be gained from the distribution of employment across families (and a rather more accurate but elaborate technique was used in the individual case studies above).

**Table 15** DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earners/family</th>
<th>Mdants</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Eluk</th>
<th>Kkaal</th>
<th>Glen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No earners</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One earner</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two earners</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More earners</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two things stand out in this table.

Firstly, the 1,7 jobs per household are unequally distributed across families. Some have three or more incomes, while others have none. On average, 46% of the families have two or more incomes. This probably gives a total income close to or over R250 a month (1980 prices). This is followed by a large group (41%) with one person employed. With an average family income in the region of R80-120 a month, they doubt lead a very precarious existence. At the bottom is a group (on average 15%) of families with no income earners. About one such family an interviewer said,

This family is starving. When I visited them there was nothing to eat and the day was rainy. There was no fire. Six people of the family were on beds. People shared two beds, others lay on the cold floor.

Roughly half the families from this group receive one or more transfer incomes such as pensions and maintenance grants. The rest must make do with the little they are able to grow on their plots. It shows up in a diet completely lacking in protein. We encountered seven families with no apparent source of livelihood. To survive,

...we beg from our neighbours and they help us because we Africans believe in sharing. When one has something you share it with your neighbours.

Secondly, the distribution of employment is just as unequal across resettlement areas. Conditions in Mdantsane are the best. Then come Sada, Dimbaza and Elukhanyweni. All
these places have relatively high participation rates in the labour market. At Kammaskraal and Glenmore conditions are dreadful. Up to a quarter of the families have no employed member. In other words, in Glenmore over a hundred families live in abject poverty. A significant number receive no transfer incomes.

DINETS

Table 16  DIET PATTERNS OF HOUSEHOLDS (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Mdent daily ltw*</th>
<th>Dim daily ltw</th>
<th>Sada daily ltw</th>
<th>Elk daily ltw</th>
<th>Kkraal daily ltw</th>
<th>Glen daily ltw</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>80 2</td>
<td>75 8</td>
<td>97 0</td>
<td>93 0</td>
<td>90 0</td>
<td>89 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>34 4</td>
<td>19 12</td>
<td>8 15</td>
<td>27 5</td>
<td>9 28</td>
<td>8 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>5 50</td>
<td>6 33</td>
<td>1 67</td>
<td>4 44</td>
<td>2 78</td>
<td>0 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>34 45</td>
<td>14 55</td>
<td>18 46</td>
<td>23 60</td>
<td>15 72</td>
<td>30 46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* less than weekly

The table shows poor starchy diets. Starches are a daily item in most households. Greens are more scarce, although most households have them at least once a week. Meat and other protein-rich foods are a rarity in about half the households.

The diets of Kammaskraal and Glenmore and Sada are far worse than elsewhere, and the first two are especially bad. The other three places have better diets, Mdantsane in particular, but even there one finds poorly fed families.

HOUSING

Table 17  HOUSEHOLD DWELLINGS (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mdent</th>
<th>Dim</th>
<th>Sada</th>
<th>Elk</th>
<th>Kkraal</th>
<th>Glen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shack</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary house</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent house</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most families in the old established resettlement areas have permanent accommodation, but in the newer closer settlements people must make do in wooden pre-fabs or even tents as in Kammaskraal. (Many families in Kammaskraal had obeyed necessity rather than the authorities and replaced their tents with illegal shacks even at the time of the survey in early 1981. By mid-1981 everyone had done so.)

3.8.7 Conclusion

To conclude, we should set some of our findings from the six places surveyed in the context of other resettlement areas. We shall also contrast conditions among resettled communities with those of other groups.

Mdantsane and Dimbaza stand apart from most resettlement areas. Zwelitsha is the only other sizeable place in the Ciskei with similar conditions. They all have some industry close by and hence their labour forces are essentially settled (though migration is by no means entirely absent). In this respect they share some of the characteristics of metropolitan townships in prescribed areas. The level of housing and other social services is probably also on a par with prescribed areas. For income and employment, however, the bantustan towns must compare poorly. Unemployment, even though it occurs among africans in metropolitan townships, is nowhere near the 30% levels found in Mdantsane and Dimbaza. Moreover, wage levels in prescribed areas are significantly higher (roughly 50% higher than in Mdantsane and 100% higher than in Dimbaza). One can therefore also expect a far higher incidence of poverty in the latter.

Sada seems to be something unique. It is fairly well established and along with Mdantsane, Dimbaza and Zwelitsha carries the status of a fully fledged town. This basically means that the people have permanent houses. But unlike the others, Sada has no industrial centre nearby. Migrancy is therefore extensive. However, it occupies quite a favoured position within the migrant labour market, as one can see from the high incidence of recruitment through the tribal labour bureau. Labour market participation and unemployment rates therefore compare favourably with those in Mdantsane and Dimbaza. On the other hand, income levels are likely to be somewhat lower than those in Mdantsane because migrants can remit at most only a fraction of their incomes to their families.

Conditions in Mdantsane, Dimbaza and even Sada are however much better than those in Glenmore and Kammaskraal. In the latter they are simply appalling. There is good reason to believe that these poorer places may be representative of most resettlement sites in the Ciskei. Their people, along with most resettled people, have a rural background. This usually implies a low level of skill and education, a lack of industrial work experience, and therefore a disadvantaged position in the labour market. Another characteristic that Glenmore and Kammaskraal have in common with most other resettlement areas, and this is even more important than the individual traits mentioned above, is distance from the labour market. This is obvious enough in the case of the numerous resettlement sites such as Oxtone and Thornhill in the Hewu area. Hewu is literally the end of the Ciskei - a backwater - and its people have to compete for migrant jobs, with the huge recent settlements trying to rival Sada and established residents of the area.

In the Peddie district, although it is a little closer to Port Elizabeth and East London, there is also intense competition for jobs.

The resettlement camps such as Ndevana and Gobithyo in the Zwelitsha district are in a more complex environment. Having East London and King William's Town nearby means some local job opportunities, and no doubt some of the people from these sites have managed to find jobs there. But it is also true that Mdantsane and Zwelitsha residents are favoured in the East London/ King William's Town labour market. This must mean that migrant labour is also the only real alternative for resettled people in the Zwelitsha district. But here again they compete with a very large established population.

One can probably safely assume that resettled people tend to be passed over in favour of the better established people in the migrant labour market. If this is correct, then one can expect to see the low participation and high unemployment rates found in Glenmore and
Kammaskraal in most other resettlement areas of the Ciskei. This must in turn lead to widespread poverty and deprivation. The poor housing conditions of Glenmore and Kammaskraal can also be generalised to most resettlement areas.

A word of caution on Elukhanyweni. It is a closer settlement like Glenmore and Kammaskraal, but its people are significantly better off in terms of employment and therefore incomes. The reason is that the Elukhanyweni people still have close ties with Humansdorp and have been able to find or keep jobs there. Quite possibly some of the other unsurveyed closer settlements are in a similar position, though this phenomenon is unlikely to be common.

Finally it is worth pointing out that the position of rural Ciskeians, though somewhat different, is not necessarily much better than that of Glenmore and Kammaskraal residents. While many have access to agricultural land, the returns of subsistence agriculture are small, as we have already said. (And to repeat: this should not be taken as a denial of its importance to poor and insecure people for whom every source of income matters.) Yet a sizeable proportion of the rural population is entirely landless and therefore on this score in the same boat as resettled people.

Landless or not, most rural Ciskeian families need to send some members into migrant employment. As the migrant labour market is saturated, unemployment in rural areas is also extensive. But in contrast to resettled people, there is probably slight positive discrimination in favour of established rural people on this market. This is a result of the official recruitment machinery which favours them and the fact that established rural communities have had more time to develop unofficial routes to employment. Supportive evidence for this contention comes from the somewhat lower unemployment rate found by the Amatola Basin survey as compared with our surveys of Glenmore and Kammaskraal. But while rural people may have it slightly easier on the migrant labour market (and it should not be forgotten that it is very difficult for everyone), the incomes of the families staying behind in the country are not necessarily much higher than those in resettled areas. There is reason to believe that migrants from resettled communities remit more conscientiously than those from rural communities. In other words, the incidence of poverty among rural communities in the Ciskei is in all likelihood as high as among the mass of resettled people.
4.1 LIFE HISTORIES

4.1.1 Sipho Booif

Sipho Booif says he was born during the Boer War. Looking extremely old and frail, he is touching, almost childlike in the way he relates his life history. He believes that he has had a good life, an easy life, for which he is grateful. His wife though, thinks differently. She's a very articulate, handsome woman, much younger than Sipho, in her early forties, a sed, bitter woman. She makes use of the interview to air quite a few grievances concerning not only life in general but life with Sipho in particular. Whenever she contradicts him, Sipho seems tired and disbelieving, blaming Kammaskraal for her bad temper. When asked why there is such a big age difference between them, Sipho proudly says that she married him for love and he married her for love. She shrugs however. She had to. She was forced to. He could pay lobola. He paid seven cows and her father was greedy for the seven cows. And so... But Sipho denies it. Women have changed, he mutters. It is this place that isn't good for women. At first, when they got married, she said it was for love. Now that they are both old she says she had to. He says his life was good and he gave her a good life. It is only now, in this place. But his wife says life was always bad. It is worse now, but it has never been good.

Sipho was born in Pondoland, near Umata, in the Transkei. There were three sons and two daughters in the family. His father worked in the mines in Bulawayo, so he didn't see much of him, nor did he see much of his mother. As a domestic worker she spent most, if not all day-light hours at her place of employment. She left home at 6 in the morning and usually did not come back before 6 or 7 o'clock. They did not mind that too much. They did not know her well and his eldest sister looked after them, cooked and cleaned the house. And there were many interesting games to play, the most popular of which was the Boer War game. Sipho said that unfortunately he always had to be the Boer because he was small and the other children thought he wasn't so very clever. Here his wife interrupts to tell us that he indeed is not all that clever and that is the reason why he thinks he has had such a good life when it was in fact a miserable life. Sipho looks distressed and points out that he went to school and had passed Standard 3 - and in those days it was not possible to go beyond Standard 3. He was however very happy that times and circumstances had changed and that it was now possible for a black man to enjoy the same kind of education as a white man.

He then proceeds to tell us about a visit the councillor of the chief minister, Mr Xaba, paid Kammaskraal. He had heard that Mr Xaba was a very learned man and he believed that he would

* A pseudonym is used here, as in all the other life histories, for any identifying names.
help them. He himself spoke to Mr Xaba. He told him that they were hungry and that the children were dying of hunger, and Mr Xaba promised to help. Although this happened many months ago he trusts that Mr Xaba will indeed help them.

Sipho says that as a child he was never hungry. It is only now that he is old that he knows hunger. His wife however says that all her life she has felt that there never was enough food.

Sipho did not work when he was a child. His father thought that children should not work, that a black man's work took away his courage. He got his first job when he was sixteen, when the whole family moved to Wooldridge. Sipho explained that they moved to Wooldridge because his mother was from that place. It creates strife with the mother's family and then a woman thinks she the right to dominate her husband and sons. Thus they moved to Wooldridge where the whole family found employment on a pineapple farm called Samnaby. They had three huts and earned good money. He earned three pounds a month, * and by eating most of his money he eventually possessed five cows. Sipho says it was a good life. They had three acres of land and his father was happy and relaxed because he did not have to work in the mines any more. And he, Sipho, was happy and grateful that he did not have to work in the mines because he was scared of working underground. Thus even if the farmer was strict and perhaps not so very kind a man, he was still grateful for the good job and worked hard to show the farmer that he was grateful.

He got married when he was about sixty years old, and had six children. Life then became even better because the farmer gave him an additional two acres of land. When his mother and father died, his brothers left the farm but the farmer did not take away the three acres that originally belonged to the whole family, so that he then had five acres. He grew maize, beans and watermelon and pumpkin on his farm. It was clear that Sipho dearly loved his watermelons. He tried to describe how big they were, eventually he drew a picture of an enormous watermelon in the sand, looked at it, and then decided that his watermelons were perhaps even bigger. However, his wife said that they were not that big at all, they were just ordinary watermelons. On the farm there were dams, tanks, windmills. Their rations consisted of a bag of mealies and tea and coffee. His wife and daughters worked as domestic workers on the farm, and they earned 8c per month. Life was good then.

But his wife says life was unpleasant, harsh, painful. They, the women, were forced to work in the kitchen as well as on the land. Children had to work on the land from the day of their tenth birthday, and they were not paid anything before their thirteenth birthday. A child did not look forward to his tenth birthday on Mr Ramil lion's farm.

Nor did she like the house they lived in. It was bare and old. They were not allowed to furnish it because the farmer did not like them to have furniture. He told them that only whites have furniture. She wanted cutlery, crockery, proper beds, chairs. Once she bought a bed from her sister's husband's father and the farmer was extremely angry. He said that only whites slept on beds. Sipho looked surprised and told his wife that those things did not matter. She should have been grateful that the farmer gave him a job, that he did not have to work in the mines, that they always had enough to eat. Not like now when there was never food, when they were always hungry. His wife however insisted that those things mattered, that things like that did matter a great deal.

Then the farmer sold the land to the Ciskei government and told them that they had to leave the farm. Sipho said they were worried and sad and they did not know where to go and that they loved the land. He did not want to leave his five acres, he could grow such big pumpkins, such huge watermelons. They protested and refused to leave the farm. Then the headman of Wooldridge came to the farm and called a meeting. He told them that everyone had to leave the farm the next day. Those who refused to leave would be chased off with guns and sjamboks. But he was an old man, and wanted to keep his dignity, so he decided to leave without further resistance.

The Monday morning they left for Wooldridge. They did not have any money. There were no dams in Wooldridge, no water and the spring was far away. If they left early in the morning for the hike they would only be able to get to the valley by about 5 p.m. It was a long dusty journey to the spring. The cattle died. There wasn't any food in Wooldridge, no land to plant watermelons or pumpkins on.

Of the the seven families that lived on Samnaby, five went to Wooldridge. Two families went to other farms and found employment there. Sipho's father-in-law, who had wanted to work with pineapples anyway, didn't want to start from scratch again. He had been a farmer for a long time and couldn't now imagine taking orders from another man, perhaps even one younger than he.

The headman told them not to build proper houses as they were not going to be allowed to stay on at Wooldridge. They lived in shacks. The little money Sipho had he spent on his children. They had to go to school, his son wanted to get married and he had to help him with the lobola, his daughter had to dress so that she could get a husband. His wife's brother had left his four children with them. They too had to be fed and dressed. Sipho said that for the next four years his wife and his wife were hungry every day and went to bed hungry every night. When given the choice of going to Kammaakraal, they imagined that life could not be worse there, it could only be better. Furthermore, they were promised land, and Sipho wanted land.

In May 1980 Sipho, his wife, his brother-in-law's four children, four of his daughters, and his daughter-in-law and her child set out for Kammaakraal. They had to walk there and the journey took a whole day. Sipho said he became very tired but when he thought of the watermelons he was going to plant he did not mind the long journey or the cold. The Ciskei government sent lorries to bring the watermelons to Kammaakraal. They sent their twelve goats, a pig and three cows with the lorry, but four of the goats, the pig and two of the cows died during the journey.

They arrived at Kammaakraal late at night. The tents were already pitched up, rows and rows of tents. All their possessions were dumped outside their tent and everything was soaked through with rain. The tent was wet and muddy inside, it was shaking in the wind and the rain came in. Sipho's wife says that that night she did not take any supper. She was too tired and she knew then that life was not going to become any better. They huddled together for warmth but in the early morning hours the wind blew the tent away. They were too tired to pitch it up again so they just waited in the rain for morning to come. Sipho's wife said she knew then that the old man was not going to plant his watermelons. She knew they were all going to die here, at this Kammaakraal.

### 4.1.2 Nombulelo Mpati

Nombulelo Mpati was born in 1926 in Alexandria. Both her parents were born there, so were her grandparents. They had lived for generations on a farm called Longdale, owned in Nombulelo's time by the Fine brothers. Nombulelo's father's father worked on this farm, so did his two sons, Nombulelo's father did not have any formal education as a child, but later, when an adult already, his father sent him to the school on the neighbouring farm, Rock Spring. Nombulelo's father got married when he was twenty. He and his wife were married in the traditional way, with eight cows being paid as lobola. After the marriage, her parents left Longdale and went to work on Rock Spring where the eldest daughter was born. Shortly after the birth they returned to Longdale where the other five children, two sons and four daughters including Nombulelo, were born.

* This was not his starting salary. This amount was probably earned after about 20 years' service.
The family lived in a big hut that Nombulelo's father had built when he got married. They did not have any Western furniture. All the children attended the school at Rock Spring. Nombulelo passed Standard 4 and then left school.

Things had begun to turn sour when Nombulelo's 16-year-old sister had an argument with the farmer's wife. The sister apparently had a talent for needlework and the farmer's wife wanted her services as a seamstress on a full-time basis. The sister rejected the offer (for rather the demand) as the farmer's wife did not plan to pay her for her services. She considered it such a 'pleasant job' it did not justify payment in money. As three full meals a day would be provided, the demand for money was considered 'cheeky'. The sister did not agree, an argument ensued which resulted in the farmer giving her five lashes with the whip. As a result of this argument, the whole family moved to Rock Spring. On Rock Spring, as on Longdale, Nombulelo's father got paid R2 per month, plus rations which included mealies, mealie meal, and brown flour. On both farms the workers were allowed to use the farmer's implements for ploughing. When married, a man had the right to two acres of land; if unmarried he only had a right to one acre. All the farmworkers had cattle and goats which they bought with money saved from their wages.

Before she got married, and for a while afterwards, she was fat and happy, Nombulelo said. Not yet an old woman, she now thinks of herself as old and useless. Pointing at her spindly limbs she described herself as old and shrivelled. She then pointed to the garden where the dusty sunflowers stood knee-high. 'Like them,' she said.

She was married in 1946. The marriage was arranged by her parents and her husband's. She did not know her future husband at all but liked him well enough just before the marriage took place. He paid lobola, seven cows, which she considered a fair price. The ceremony took place at Endeavour farm where her husband had grown up and his parents then lived. After the marriage they moved in with her husband's brother and his family.

During the early years of the marriage, her husband worked for the municipal council as a road-worker. He worked a six-day week earning 20 cents a day for his labour. Nombulelo said that although those years were good in many ways she gave birth to two healthy sons, she had a good relationship with her in-laws, she enjoyed the authority her new status as mother gave her, she was continually worried about her husband and this marred her happiness. His work entailed long hours and backbreaking labour, he looked frail and thin. He had never been a robust man, but his health declined to such an extent that she feared she would not have more children. His ill-health became a threat to her position as mother and so she persuaded him to go back to Longdale.

Her husband got a job at Longdale as general handyman. He received R3 a month and they owned two acres of land, plus ten cattle and five goats. Nombulelo said they were rich then. They had a zinc house and a big hut, two more children were born, they grew peas, beans, tomatoes and cabbage in their garden. For breakfast they had porridge with milk. For lunch and supper, mealies, samp with peas and beans and sometimes meat the farmer gave them. Their rations consisted of coffee, tea, sugar, mealie meal. They were never hungry and the money they earned was saved for the buying of clothes and cattle and goats.

Nombulelo said that the farmer was, on the whole, a kind man. At least he never spoke harshly to her or her children and he had given her husband a job. The children went to school at Rock Spring and her husband seemed much stronger and healthier. Those were happy years, good years.

Then the two Fine brothers died, one at the age of 77, one at the age of 75, and their brother-in-law took over the farm, running it with the aid of a foreman. From that time onwards, things went wrong. People were restless. There was a bleakness in their lives, they felt weary. The brother-in-law was a hard taskmaster. Nombulelo said they felt disaster coming. When she was pressed to explain this premonition, she thought about it for a long time. Then she simply said that they during that time felt that their lives were hard, whereas before they did not think about their lives.

At Christmas 1979 a meeting was called by the foreman and they were told to find another place to live because the farm had been bought by someone else. They couldn't understand his words. They had nowhere to go, and therefore they could not make plans. They didn't even discuss it among themselves, they did not ask the foreman any questions.

Early in 1980 a BAAV car arrived and they were all called together by the foreman. There were two men in the van. The one asked questions, the other wrote the answers down. They wanted to know the history of each family. They were counted, and were then told that they had to leave the farm as someone else had bought the land, a Mr. Howe, the son of the Rock Spring farmer.

Nombulelo said they felt very sad while standing there, listening to this man. They knew it was 'all over'. They did not think of resistance. They just felt worried and frightened and said to each other that it was all over.

They were told that they were not wanted on the farm any more because their cattle were destroying the grass. Nombulelo said they could not understand this. They asked each other if the grass was then more important than they were.

The BAAV official gave them seven days to sell all their cattle and to leave. Before he left, they were given eviction orders. Nombulelo still had hers and went to fetch it. It read:

On inspection it has come to notice that you have erected an unauthorized structure for residential purposes on Longdale land. Please note that this is a contravention of Section 3 of Act 52 of 1951.

In order to obviate legal proceedings being instituted against you, you are requested within seven days from date hereof to demolish the shack referred to above falling which action will be taken against you in terms of Section 3b of Act 52 of 1951.

The new owner then took possession of the land. Nombulelo, her brothers and sisters, friends, her husband and children, watched them move in. Nombulelo said they did not feel bitter toward them. She said africans had never owned land. Only whites had land.

The new owner ordered them to sell everything. They sold their cattle for very low prices. Some were sold for as little as R10. When they argued about the prices they were told to put their cows on their heads and walk away with them. Everything was sold, except the poultry. They kept their poultry because they felt they had to keep something.

The new owners told the children not to go to school any more. They said that africans did not need education and moreover they were leaving soon. They were not allowed to get water from the dam and one night when they felt sad and gathered together around the fires to sing, the new owner put his dogs on them. They did not feel bitter towards them, she said. That's the way it was, she explained. No-one could have changed it.

At first the people from Rock Spring and Longdale were not removed but the first Tuesday in June, early in the morning, just after breakfast, eight lorries came, one after the other. They stood in front of their houses and watched the lorries. Nombulelo was worried and she felt sad. Was she angry? No! Bitter? No! Africans were landless!

The lorries took their furniture, clothes, poultry. They sat in front of their empty huts and then two buses came and they left the farm. The new owner did not make an appearance. The journey took the whole day. They did not know where they were going and already they were missing the farm.

They arrived at Kamaskraal at 9 o'clock that night and were shown their houses. The houses were bare and damp. It was a dark, windy night, most of them did not have candles with them, nor food. They spent the night in darkness, slept on the floor, and that first night they thought the wind was going to blow the house away.
Nombulelo’s husband died in August of that year. December of that year saw her youngest son die. In July 1980 her only daughter died. Nombulelo said that she was very alone. She asked other people for food and when they had, they shared it with her. When they did not have, she did not eat. She thought that perhaps she was entitled to a pension but she needed a card. In order to get a card, she had to go to Peddie and for that she needed R2. She did not have R2. All she had was a garden but it did not produce much.

Nombulelo does not think that the future will bring any changes. She once again pointed at the shrivelled sunflowers in her garden. ‘They are dead, aren’t they’, she said. ‘Nothing grows in this land.’

4.1.3 Michael Welle Ntlanjeni

Mike is still a young man, short and frail-looking, Afrikaans-speaking. The Sunday morning we met him, he was leaning on a not too sturdy gatepost, watching the steady stream of women on their way to church. It had rained the night before and his little garden was reduced to a uniform miniature mud valley. He came to help us across this mud, all the time mocking the plump women in an almost friendly tone of voice, stopping to ask them whether they really believed God would ship them across the mud back to Humansdorp. Because if they really believed it, it ‘was stupid, man’.

He was born in Humansdorp in 1955. There were eight children in the family, three boys and five girls. He was the eldest. His father worked in the sawmill and earned very little but they did have land on which they grew vegetables and melons. Mike and the others were big, ‘grand’ house, and they never went hungry. They did not have much money, however, and after he had completed Standard 5, his parents asked him to leave school and find a job. They reasoned that if he could find a job, the other children could be kept at school. Mike agreed with them but he said that he bitterly regretted leaving school. He thought that the moment he left school his childhood would be over. (He was then fourteen.) He found employment with a firm of building contractors, earning between R6 and R7 a week. This money was given to his parents, and at the end of every month he received R2 pocket money. After a year he left this firm to work for another firm where he was assistant to a plumber, earning R10 a week, and the increase in wages meant an increase in pocket money. He then received R5 a month pocket money, and his memories of those years consisted of colourful dances, music, women and his first introduction to the delights of liquor.

When he was twenty, he left for Plettenberg Bay with the plumber to whom he was assistant. During those years 1975-1977 work was scarce and many of his friends were unemployed, his father was unemployed. He earned R30 a week, however, and as he lived with his employer he could thus save a substantial part of his wages to send home. In 1977 his employer moved to Pretoria. He was asked to go with him, wanted to go, but his parents refused permission. They thought Pretoria was too far away from Humansdorp and much too close to Johannesburg. Although they had been in Johannesburg they had heard stories of its decadence and danger, and thought Mike was far too young to resist the beerhalls, women and general atmosphere of evil. Mike thus went back to Humansdorp. At the time of the interview, Mike still thought that this decision of his parents marked the biggest disappointment of his life. If they had let him go, he felt his whole life would have taken a different course. He brooded about it endlessly, and more than once during the interview he compared the dashing young man he would have been in Pretoria with the man he was now, a man without a future.

For a few months after going back to Humansdorp Mike did not try to find employment. Although he dented it, it seemed from his conversation that he had remained in his room for a couple of months, sulking, only emerging at night to visit a woman he used to know. Even that he did not find very satisfactory. The women in Plettenberg Bay apparently were sophisticated and fun-loving. Compared to them the Humansdorp women were just ‘little girls’.

Eventually, he found employment as a plumber at Kay spa Park. He lived at the park through the whole of 1977/78 and part of 1979, and went home at weekends. It was on one of these visits that he first heard of the threat of removal. He heard it from one of his friends but when he asked his father about it, both his parents dismissed it as a rumour without any substance. He did, however, get the impression that they were worried but they refused to discuss it with him. The rumours became more frequent, meetings followed, people spoke about little else. Still his parents did not discuss it with him. After a particularly heated meeting he confronted his parents and asked them what they were going to do. Both his parents said that they were not going to move. They could not leave their ancestors’ graves. The land belonged to them. His mother had grown up in that house, her father had grown up in it. They could leave neither the house, the graves, nor the land.

Mike, though, understood what his parents did not. He said that he knew that they did not really have any kind of choice, that their time for making decisions about their lives was over. He said he did not tell them that because it is not the kind of knowledge old people can cope with.

One morning in 1977 he got a message from his parents that there was trouble and that he had to come home immediately. Mike said that he put down his tools and left. He did not try to give any kind of explanation because he knew he would not come back.

There was chaos in the town. Women were crying, children were crying. Some men had climbed on the roofs of their houses, refusing to leave or to come down and were shouting insults and threats from the roofs. ‘Soldiers’ were busy demolishing some houses, some women were dragging furniture out in an attempt to save some of the pieces, others were running in and out of houses in the process of being demolished. His father had resisted and was taken away, and his mother was piling up books and crockery and clothes on the opposite pavement. He helped his mother to drag out a few pieces of furniture before the house collapsed. His younger brothers and sisters were huddled together in the furniture and books and clothes. He then went to look for his father but could not find him. He later found out that he was in jail.

Mike did not say much about the journey to Ekhanyweni. It was cold, the people were silent, the people were sad, they were worried about his father, his mother did not speak one word the whole trip, the crockery was broken, they had left the poultry behind, they could not sell the cattle, the sheep died. When he related the first sight of the house they were to live in, it was with anger, even outrage: ‘It’s not a house, man. It’s not even a pigstye, it’s just a thing. Two rooms. Two rooms for eleven people. What do they think we are, do they think we are animals? They won’t even put eleven animals in two rooms. We need privacy too, even if we are black. It makes no difference. A man’s skin colour makes no difference. Black or blue or white, a man needs privacy.’ They asked the drivers of the lorries if they were supposed to live in these structures. The drivers did not say anything, did not answer any of their questions. They unloaded and drove away, and people slowly started moving their furniture into the houses, re-arranging furniture, trying to fit it into the two rooms. Mike said he thought his heart would break when he watched his mother that first night in that house. The house in Humansdorp was large and cool with wooden floors, and the kitchen was big and comfortable. His mother unpacked the crockery and everything was broken. She sat in front of the box with the broken crockery and then he left the house because ‘then I wanted to smash things, man. I wanted to smash every whitely in the world.’

Mike stayed with his mother till his father came back. Then he found employment through the labour bureau in Cape Town, at the nuclear power station. He left for Cape Town in August 1979 and came back in September 1981. His contract was not renewed because he had had an accident in which his leg and arm were broken two months before the contract expired.

Everything was still the same when he came back, a bit worse. There was drought, the gardens
were shrivel ed, his father was not speaking to anyone, his younger brother had died.

He found employment at the Ciskel Sawmill. He earned R80 a month and his father received a pension of R80 every second month. Two children were still at school, his married sister's husband then died and she and her two children moved in with him. He supported all of them. He said that he was determined to put the children through matric but did not know how because the money he earned went straight from his pocket to the shop. A bag of flour cost R21. That left R19. Mike said that he would never tell them to leave school. He maintained that a child needs school because it is an important part of childhood, perhaps the most important part. Children should not worry about money or the earning of money and he never discussed money problems with the children.

Mike started work at 7 am and came home at 6 pm. He then washed, had supper and worked in the garden for a while. Then he went to sleep. Saturday he went to town, Sundays he visited his friends. They talked, played records, played cards. Mike said that Sunday was simply another day to pass. And then Monday again. He said that there were young women in Elukhanywoni but that he was not going to start a relationship. He could not get married because he had too many people to support. Moreover, he did not want his children to inherit his world.

When asked whether he wanted to go back to Humansdorp, he said: 'We were born at Humansdorp but we can't go back. But you can go anywhere you like. You can go to Humansdorp now and live there all your life if you want to. To hell with it, I don't understand it."

When asked about the future he said: 'I will die in this place. I won't have a wife, I won't have children. Ag, to hell with it, man. You ask too many questions.'

### 4.1.4 Edith Faltein

Miss Edith Faltein is a huge, moon-faced woman in her early forties. She sits with folded hands, speaking in a calm monotone. It is February 1982 and the women of Elukhanywoni talk about the school fees and the money they have to pay for books and uniforms. These are compulsory and in all come to about R150. For people who seldom have enough to eat, this sum is astronomical but at the same time they are determined to keep their children at school. A steady flow of women come to discuss the problem with Miss Edith. It is clear that her role in the community is to reassure and console. Discussing each woman's problem in detail she points out ways and means of earning and saving money, always speaking in the same reassuring tone. This is her story.

'I was born and grew up in Snyklip. We had land - three morgen - and although we were eight children we always had enough to eat and we had money, not much but enough. We sold some of our produce and yes, I think life was good then. We had plenty of food and we all went to school and yes, I think we had a good childhood. How shall I put it... I don't remember sadness... They aren't hungry all the time and in winter they are cold and ill and so many of them have died already. Ag, miss, so many of them have died. In winter, every day almost there is another grave. I have stopped crying about the children now. I don't have any more tears left. But my childhood was different. I remember... oh I cannot remember that I was ever hungry or cold or frightened. I was just a child, I did not know about grown-up things. But these children... ask any of them, even the smallest and they would tell you what every article in the shop costs. It is not good for children to think about prices and money and food the whole time. You know miss, actually, I think there is not a child in this Elukhanywoni. There are just big grown-ups and little grown-ups.'

'Well then, when I was fifteen, I got married. The man was, oh, I think...nineteen. Perhaps twenty, Yes, I wanted to get married. I loved the man but I wasn't happy. He wasn't a good man. He had a relationship with his own sister and when I found out about it I told him to leave. I must choose between me and your sister. This is wrong. He chose his sister. But still I did not leave. I was married to him, and... how shall I put it... I wanted to be a good wife. I did not want to disappoint my parents. And of course there were children by then. I had two children by the time I found out about him and his sister. We were living with his parents and of course his sister. Actually they were all very strange people. No, I don't know, I can't remember. They were all very just different from my people. Then his sister fell pregnant and of course he was the father. Then I couldn't go on. It was evil, it wasn't a good marriage. I went back to my parents. I found a job. I looked after a white farmer's children and my mother looked after mine. I earned R40 a month and I was quite happy. Not altogether happy though, how shall I put it... I felt hurt, miss. Even now I can still remember how hurt I felt then. Yes. And, so after a while, I decided to leave. I went to Cape Town but left my children with my mother.

'I lived and worked in Cape Town for twenty years. There was a man in Cape Town, I had three children with him. No, we weren't married. A woman needs a man, she needs to love a man, she needs to look after a man. You know, miss, most men are just little children. Not all of course, but with most men... there's really not all that much difference between a man and a child. And we women are made that way. We must love a man and look after him and we must have children and love them and we worry about them the whole time. But marriage, it's another thing altogether. But isn't it strange though, all my adult life, up to now, I had looked after other people's children, and my mother had looked after mine. Isn't it strange. As soon as a child of mine was born, I took the child to my mother. I would stay for a few months and then leave again. In Cape Town I looked after other people's children. There was one child, a little girl, I brought her up. Her parents were never at home. I lived in the house and she was my child real, more my child than my own children ever were. Because even with the first two... I was unhappy. But I don't know what has become of her.

'But even though I was happy the letters from home worried me. My mother was worried. In 1962 already she wrote that whites were often seen in Snyklip and that they asked strange questions like why their houses were not built in rows and why didn't everyone plant different kinds of vegetables so that they could buy from each other. Now, why would the whites want them to build their houses in rows and why should they buy vegetables from each other if they could produce them themselves. My mother was scared but my father said there was nothing to be scared about, he said the whites were only trying to be helpful and didn't know any better. Then my mother wrote that the whites had chosen a few men and had given them a year's supply of guano and land and instructions of what to sow. They were conducting some kind of experiment but she did not really know what it was all about. But she was worried. She said the people were willing because they thought they were all going to become very rich. But they did not like the land or the things they were told to do so they gave it up. Then my mother wrote that the whites wanted to build a clinic but the people did not want it. No, I don't know why the people didn't want a clinic. My mother said many people did not like the whites and wanted them out of Snyklip. They did not trust them. My father never wrote but my mother said he wasn't against the clinic. She was, though.

'And then I became really worried because my mother wrote that they were told that they would be given other land. I couldn't understand it at first. Why should the whites want to give them other land? And my mother wrote, what's my problem? She worried about the clinic but she did not worry about this thing. And it was this thing...'

'Well, I couldn't understand it. I wrote her letter after letter but she did not answer my questions. She did not think it was important. Then she wrote that there was a meeting and that the whites had told them that they would have to go to another town. The whites said that they would be given land and that there was ample water and work in this town. You see how they had lied to us. Well, my mother did not believe them. She wrote that they would not leave Snyklip. I wrote to my father, and I wrote to my mother and I wrote to our neighbours. I was so worried. But they all wrote back not to worry, that they were not going to leave Snyklip. But I worried, I worried.'
It must be remembered that Maria has no education and that her life has been limited to the boundaries of a specific farm. Her story has been included to show what resettlement means to people who are old and confused, with no education and no intellectual means with which even to begin to understand their position. Maria simply does not know why she is in elukhanyeni or how it all happened. To her it seems that one day her life was still whole and familiar, intact, and the very next day it was broken and she does not understand any of it.

Maria speaks an idiomatic rural Afrikaans. When thus used the language has a powerful emotional impact. For those readers who understand Afrikaans, an Afrikaans copy is included. The English copy is more or less a direct translation of the Afrikaans.

In translation:
I was born in the Tsetsiba. Now see, if I must say how old am I will be a lie. I was born, I was born there by the Boer War. We lived on a farm, on Schoemanswyk, my father worked the lands. We liked living there. We had our own land, our ancestral land on this land. We planted vegetables, potatoes, mealies, beetroot we planted. Now see, I can tell you nothing about Humansdorp, the things about Humansdorp I can't tell you. Now when I am in Humansdorp I go to the shop and then I go home and then it is finished. I can say nothing about Humansdorp. When I was a child, I knew nothing. I am a child now, what do I know, I am small now I can't know. No, I did not go to school, I helped my mother in the kitchen, I washed the dishes and I swept the house. No, I was but one, yes the only child. Yes, I married at Humansdorp, I stay around because I don't know places, places are not known to me. I was as old as the child here when I got married, yes fifteen, say fifteen when I got married, yes, I loved my husband, but my man has no good man. No, he was a good man, he was a good man. He worked the lands. For a white man, yes. The white man was good to us. My man worked the lands and chopped wood for the white man. I worked in the house. Yes, I liked the work. I get four rand in the month for the work, the white man was good to us, it wasn't these people's fault that we had to go. Now when we hear this, that we must go away from this place, then the white man says to me, Old woman I hear you must go away, now you must be satisfied. No, the white man was good to us. From there then, my man got sick and then he gone and died. He was sick for long, here in this hospital in Humansdorp and then he died here. Yes, we then left the farm with his sickness. It's been a long time we were married. Yes, I had children. I had two daughters, they had gone and died also. It is now only this one, she is my daughter's daughter.

No, this thing that we are here, this thing came so sudden upon us that I cannot tell you what happened, this thing came so sudden upon us, yes. We did not know that we are coming here, we did not know where we are going to. Because we like our place, we plant and we sow and we go on. Here we cannot plant and we cannot sow. No, we cannot. Here there is just a little place in front of your door, put here a thing and put there a thing, and that is all. More I do not know, the morning when we saw we were here. We don't know where we are. Yes, they did tell us but it took so long before they came to us. When they came to us, they stalked us. They stalked us because they did not say to us which day or which day.

When they came to us, they came with guns, with guns and police and with all sorts of things that we don't know. And then we see that we are here. They still have no choice, then we are behind us. They did not say anything, they just threw our belongings in and they broke off as they went. There is nothing to say or the gun is through your head. If I just talk, the gun is through my head. Soldiers and everything were there. We don't know now we are not used to these thing. Then we have to get in, what can we do. They shout us deaf, then we have to get in, what can we do. No, they did not say anything, they just said get in, just said get in so that we are here today. We did not know, we still do not know this place. Yes, we still do not know this place. And when we came here, they dumped our things, dumped our things so that we are still here. What can we do now, we can do nothing. We can do nothing. What can we do now?
Then they bring us to this sad place, this is now no place to live. Here we are at this place where we do not know. They take us away from our place. No, how do I know who bring us here. I do not know. Now, when I saw, there were the guns, and get in, get in. It must be the Boers, or the Zooloes it must be the Zooloes, yes, well, I don’t know, maybe the government. Maybe, I don’t know. I just know that here we are away from our place. Here the land is like stone, one can’t even try to maybe work this land. Here it is only death. Only death in this place and this place we do not know. Many people have died. We are used to the sea but here there is no sea. Chickens, cattle, sheep, today they are sick, tomorrow they are dead.

Here there is not enough food. No, I don’t get a pension. Nights I go to bed without food. One got to go and die then. People get tired of you. You are still coming, then they say there she is coming again. I am hungry now, as I am sitting here.

Everybody has died. My man has gone and died and my daughters. They took my land away. The Lord has also gone, yes, I suppose He has also gone. He also has left old Maria. Yes, that is what I say because there is food in this place, this place is just like stone, nothing lives here, there is just sand here. The animals too, yes, the animals too, they don’t want this place, they rather die. The children die. The animals and the children, they just die. Just die, Today they are sick, tomorrow they are dead. No, I don’t understand it. I understand nothing. In this place, a child wakes in the morning and he sits and he sits and he looks and tomorrow he is dead. No, the lord is gone from this place. He is not here any more. Yes, in this place there is only death. Here I will also die in this strange land. Animals die, everything dies.

Children. The children die. My daughters. Ag nee, how will I know, so many of them are dead, I don’t know any more, they just died here.

In her own words:

Eik is gebore in die Tatsalakane. Nee, kyk, as ek moet sê hoe oud ek is, moet ek lieg. Ek is gebore, ek is gebore lie die boermeleg. Ons het gebyl op Schoemanwyk, my pa het op die lande gewerk. Ons het die gebly daar. Hy het ons die groen gehad, ons voornemen bly daar-op. Ons het die groente, appels, meloen, beet ons het ons geplant. Kyk, ek kan jou nie sê, gene het ons nie, van Humandsorp nie, van Humandsorp se dinge nie, ek het nie, ek kan jou nie vertel nie. Weet ek wat ek in Humandsorp is, gaan net winkel toe en ek gaan huis-toe en dan is ek klaar. Ek kan niks van Humandsorp nie. Toe ek ‘n tong gewees het, want ek nie niks nie, want ek is ‘n tong, wat weet ek, ek is nou klein, ek weet niks nie. Nee, ek het nie skoolgegaan nie. Ek het my ma gehelp in die kombuis, skotelgoedies gewe en die huis uitgeve. Nee, ek was maar een, ja, die enigste kind. Ja, ek trou toe op Humandsorp, ek draal daar, want ek ken nie niks nie, ek is die plekke onbekend. Ek was so oud soos die kind hier toe ek getroud is, ja vyftien, sê maart vyftien jaar toe ek getroud is. Ek was lief vir my man, hy was ‘n goeie man. Nee, my man is my jare al afgestuur. Wat het hy gedoen? Nee, hy het in die lande gewerk. Vir ‘n wittens, ja. Die boer was goed vir ons. My man werk op die lande en kap hout vir die boer. Ek het in die huis gewerk. Ek het vir die werk gehou. Ek kry vier rand in die maand vir die werk, die boer gooi ons, ons, die niese die se toedat dat ons werf is nie. Toe ons nou boor van die dat ons van ons plek moet weeggaan, toe sê die boer vir my, hy sê vir my oma, ek hoor julie moet weeggaan, julie moet maar trevred wees. Nee, die boer was goed vir ons. En toe daarvandaan toe word my man nou nie seik en toe stef my nou af. Hy was lank siki, hier in die hospitaal in Humandsorp en ek bly toe ook hier. Ja, ons is toe van die plaas af weg met sy skute, Dis jare wat ons getroud was, ja, ek het kinders gehad, ek het twee doorgesters gehad, hulle het ook afgestuur. Dis nog net hierdie een, sy is my doorgester se doorgester.

Nee, die ding van dat ons hier is, die ding het so skielik op ons gekom dat ek jou nie kan vertel wat gebeur het nie, die ding het so skielik op ons gekom, ja, ons het niks geweet dat ons hier toe kom nie, ons weet ook nie waar gaan ons neen nie. Want ons bly lekker op ons plek. Ons seker dit, ek van ons gaan aan. Hier kan ons nie saai en plant nie, Glad nie. Dis net so ‘n plekke vir jou deur, maar sit hier ‘n dingeitje en daar ‘n dingeitje, dis al. Verder weet ok nie, dis mòre toe ons ons kry toe is ons hier. Ons weet g’waar ons is nie. Hulle het voor af gese, ja, maar dit het so lank gedraai voordat hulle gekom het na ons toe. Toe hulle na ons kom het hulle ons bekrup. Hulle het ons bekrup want hulle het nie vir ons ges wat dager dag of watter dag nie.

Toe hulle nou by ons kom, toe kom hulle met roers, met roers en polis en enige ding kom hulle by ons aan. En hulle deur ons nog nie ons dat ons hier kom. Toe het ons nie keuse nie, die roers is agter ons. Hulle het niks ges nie, hulle laai net. Hulle laai net en hulle breek af. Daar is niks te praat of die deur is open, die deur is open. Soldier en al is daar en van. Want kan ons sê, ons is mos nie gewoon die goedte nie. Toe moet ons maar ophink, wat kan ons doen. Hulle skiet ons dood dan moet ons maar ophink, kan nie anderste nie. Nee, hulle het niks ges nie, hulle het net gese klim, net gese klim dat ons hier is vandag. Ons was onbekend, ons is nou nog onbekend. En toe ons hier kom, toe laai hulle onse goedte af by elke huis, laai hulle onse goedte af dat ons nou nog hier is. Wat kan ons nou doen, one kan mos nou niks doen nie. Ons kan mos mos niks doen nie. Ons kan mos nou doen nie. Wat kan ons nou doen.

Toe bring hulle ons na die treurgeple, dus mos g’n plek vir mense nie. Hier sit ons nou op die plaak wat ons nie ken nie. Hulle vat ons weg van onse plek af. Nee, hoe weet ek wie ons hier gebring het. Ek weet nie, toe ek sien toe is dit net roers en klim klim. Dis siere die boere maar van die Zooloes, die sier die Zooloes, ja, ek weet nie wie of die goewer is nie. Seker ek weet ook nie, wat ek weet hier is ons weg van ons plek af. Hier kyk die grond mos net klp, hoef nie eers te probeer spit nie. Hier is dit net doof. Net doof in hierdie plek en die plek is vir ons onbekend. Biste mense het al doodbegaan. Ons is gewoon seeteg, hier is nie soe nie. Hoenders, beeste, skape, vandag is hulle siek, mòre is hulle doof.

Hier is nie genoeg kos nie. Nee, ek kry nie ‘n pension nie. Aande gaan slaap ek sonder kos. Mens moet dan mos doodbegaan. Mense maak moeg vir jou. Ty kom nog aan dan sê hulle deur kom al weer. Ek is hongerig soos ek hier sit.

Almal is dood. My man het afgesteur en my dochters. Hulle het my land weggevat. Die Here is seker ook nuuiaan weg, ja, hy is seker ook nuuiaan weg. Hy het ook vir ou Mariel gesey. Nee, ek sê so, want hier is g’n kos in die plek nie, die plek is soos klp, niks geest hier nie, dis net sand. Die diree ook, ja, die diree ook, hulle wil ook nie die plek hò nie, hulle gaan liweerste dood. Die kinders gaan dood. Die diree en die kinders, hulle gaan sommer net dood. Sommer net dood. Vandag siek, mòre dood. Nee, ek verstaan dit nie, ek verstaan niks. In hierdie plek word ‘n kind waakker in die goegde en hy sit en hy sit en hy kyk en mòre is hy doof. Nee Die Here is weg van die plek, Hy is nie meer hier nie, ja, in die plek is dit net doof. Hier sal ek ook doodbegaan in die vreemde plek. Diere gaan doof, alles vrek. Kinders. Die kinders gaan doof. My dochters. Ag nee, hoe moet ek weet, so baie is al dood, ek weet ook nie eers meer nie, hulle is sommer net dood hier.

4.1.6 Sakiwo Shode

Sakiwo Shode says he is twenty-eight but he looks at least forty-five. He is a man who has been completely democratized by the forced removal to Euikhanwini. He not only misses his land - "aches for it"; he says, but feels that by not resisting on the day they were moved, he had given up any claim to being a man. He admits that he was scared of the guns. He says: "That day, with the guns pointing at me, I thought better be alive and in a strange place than dead. Now I know I was wrong. I wasn't a man then, I wasn't even a woman because some women spit on the guns but I did nothing." He is restless, sometimes he gets up and walks to the door, hits the door with his fist, turns back, circles the room. His mouth twitches and he looks at the ground during the whole of the conversation. He gives a
people complained about it and they were told to take their complaints to court. Most of their furniture got broken on the way to Elukhanyeni, and all their crockery. The cattle were left behind. They were promised compensation but never received any. A few of the men resisted and they were put in jail. Their wives and children were taken to Elukhanyeni but were not given houses on their arrival. They moved in with other people and were only given houses when the men were let out of jail. Sakhwi says that the wives of the men who were in jail were discriminated against in many ways and suffered more than anyone else during those first months.

Sakhwi does not live with his parents any more. He says that the threat of removal had kept him a child for a very long time. Now that it has happened he is a man at last, but a man without land and without a wife and without children. And he is a man who has allowed the whites to treat him like an animal. He is not a man. The whites took away his childhood and now they have taken away his manhood. He cannot even marry. He says: ‘How can I marry? I cannot support a wife. If a man cannot support a wife she will certainly leave him. How can one live with a woman if you know, you know in your heart of hearts that she does not respect you and she will leave you? It is better then to live alone.’

All Sakhwi’s brothers and sisters are in Elukhanyeni. Sakhwi says he doesn’t have much to do with them because it makes him feel sad to see them. ‘They all live in their own little cages, just like animals in a zoo.’ When I look at them I think, this is my brother, he is an animal in a zoo, so I must be one as well.’ His father, who is sixty-six, applied for a pension, but was told that he is too young. Sakhwi works as a bricklayer at the irrigation scheme and receives R150 a month. He keeps R10 and the rest is given to his parents. Five of his younger brothers and sisters are still at school but he thinks they would have to leave at the end of the year.

When asked whether he has any plans or hopes for the future, Sakhwi says that he does not have a future, that to him the future means death, ‘I cannot talk about the future. To me the future means nothing. I don’t have a future, you can see for yourself. When one says that you mean, you mean you have a job and it means children, you see your children growing up and everything, and then again your children, your grandchildren. So you see, I don’t have a future, it’s just death. Many people have died already, we must die as well now. People younger than me, my friends, my brother, two sisters, all dead. We cried. In the beginning we cried but now we have stopped crying. It doesn’t help. No, this place isn’t my life. I would have been better if I were an animal. You can send an animal here and there but you cannot do it to a human being. A man suffers when he is taken away from his land. In this place people die, sometimes three people die on a single day, in the winter there is a funeral every weekend, sometimes even two, three. Then after a while you stop crying and you think that God must take you as well. It will be better, yes.’

4.1.7 Mrs Y

Mrs Y was initially not prepared to talk to us at all. She said that she did not trust whites, nor did she like them. However, she changed her mind when we had already left and called us back. She was not prepared to give her name and she abruptly ended the conversation after only half an hour. This is her story as she told it to us.

I am fifty-two years old. I was born and grew up in Karedorp. I did not have a father, or if I had one I never knew him. My mother had ten children. She did the washing for Dr Steyn in Karedorp. I went to the school at Assegaibos. When I was fifteen, we moved to Nwuplaas — my mother and all the children and the man she was living with then. I can’t remember who he was. I don’t remember anything about the move, I don’t remember much of my childhood, there were all the men and the children. Oh yes, yes I remember the eclipse of the sun. It was in Karedorp. It wasn’t dark but one could see the difference. I remember that.

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Then I got married. I can’t remember how old I was. We were married for twenty years, we were happily married for twenty years. When we got married we moved to Doriaskraal, my husband worked on the roads. He was a bit older than I was, we married in church. I have nine children, the eldest is thirty-one, the youngest is twelve years. We were very happy in Doriaskraal. The only thing that was not so very good was that my husband was ill most of the time. He suffered from asthma. All the years he suffered from it and he worked on the roads, he never gave in. He went to work every morning and some mornings he could hardly breathe. My husband was a good, brave man. A good man. He looked after us, he provided for us all those years in Doriaskraal, he never gave in. Here, in this place, he gave in. That is why I don’t want to talk to you because if you think about it, it is your people who did it. Here in Elukhanyweni he just gave in and stayed in bed the whole time and then he died – last year, in July, the 19th of July, early in the morning he died.

It happened like this. The white people from the government came to us in Doriaskraal. There were meetings in which the white people from the government told us that we had to come here. Oh, they made big promises. They made big promises but we did not believe them. We had heard that Elukhanyweni is a dry place, we did not want to move. They promised us land and houses but we did not believe them. Since when have the whites given Africans land and big houses? It was all a pack of lies and they knew it from the beginning. At another meeting they said that Doriaskraal belonged to the coloureds but when you look at it, when you look at history you can see that we Africans were here first. We were bitter, yes, very bitter, and the fear was always with us. It took years. Some people gave in because of the fear and the threats but we thought we had not harmed anyone and we thought if you had to be killed simply because you wanted to stay on your own land then you had to be killed.

Some of our leaders stood up in these meetings and told the whites that we did not want to go. But then they came with soldiers and police and dogs and guns and lorries and people were put in jail and beaten up. The police packed our things and demolished our houses and we were pushed into the buses, guns in our backs. The people cried. They weren’t even angry any more.

We came here late that afternoon. That was in 1977. Our things were off-loaded and each family was given the number of a house. We looked for a place to sleep because you see we were given houses which consisted of two rooms. We were eleven people and we had to sleep in two rooms. Now, I don’t know what you people think of us. You lie to us, you cheat us, you make promises which you never fulfill, you take away our land, you murder our husbands and children, yes murder. I say murder because that is what you do and you treat us the same way you treat your animals. You put eleven people in two rooms, you put grown-up men with their grown-up sisters and then what do you expect? I can understand why my husband died. He died of shame and sorrow.

My husband couldn’t find work here, and he was ill. My sons found jobs, but they got so little money. And that is another thing. You people told us that it will be easier for the children here. They said that the young people wouldn’t suffer here because they have many opportunities and jobs for them. Well, they suffer, they suffer. There are no jobs, the children die.

Now I don’t want to talk to you any more. Nothing can take me back to my land, nothing can bring my husband back. Leave the past now, it is over.

4.1.8 Kaaleben Ngeju

Kaaleben Ngeju is a man who is much concerned with freedom and with personal dignity. He has massive shoulders and a very calm, very beautiful face. He sits in a small, dark room, on an iron bed, and talks in a gentle monotone. His child crawls past him and he picks him up and strokes his hair, then puts him down again. Two of his children had died in Glenmore, this child is the youngest, and the last and perhaps the best loved. They live in fear that he too would die.

Kaaleben was born near Port Alfred, the youngest son of a very big family. His father had three wives and they and their children, his father’s brother and his two wives and their children, and his mother’s brother and his wife and their children lived together on Cowley farm. Kaaleben says it was a big family and they all lived together and that was good and proper. Now it is only he and his wife and their children and this is lonely because where can they go to for help? However, his children at least had food while he never had one. At Cowley, when a boy turned twelve, he had to start working for the farmer, he had to become a ‘headboy’, and then his childhood was over. His day started at five in the morning when the cows had to be fetched and milked. At eight o’clock the cattle had to be taken back to the camps. They then worked on the fields till three in the afternoon and then the cattle were fetched from the camps, milked and taken back to the camps. Then the day was over.

On Sundays they did not have to work on the fields, but they still had to fetch the cattle, milk the cows, take them back, fetch them again, milk them, take them back. Kaaleben says that even as a child he ‘lived to work’. There wasn’t time left to go to school or to play or to dream or to do nothing. His children, although they don’t have enough to eat, at least can go to school. They help on the farm and although they bitterly resented it they could do nothing about it. They couldn’t leave the farm. They had nowhere to go to and the country is too far away, nowhere to go to and the country is too far away, nowhere to go to and the country is too far away, nowhere to go to and the country is too far away. They were allowed to stay on the farm was that their sons worked for the farmer. Without payment, seven days a week. He is grateful that he doesn’t have to watch his children get up at five, doing the kind of labour no child should do.

His father died just before he (Kaaleben) was due to take a wife. His father’s wives and unmarried daughters stayed on, and so did he. He doesn’t know why he did not leave like his brothers did, but he is a man who finds it difficult to leave a place. Kaaleben says the farmer was a cruel man who did not see them as human beings, and in all his years there he never received a kind word from the farmer nor from his son. Even so, Cowley was his home. He was born there and he got married there and all of his children were born there. He got circumcised when he was about thirty-five and then he got married. His wife was fifteen when they got married, and he gave six cows for lobola. But now he thinks the lobola was too small because she has proved to be a good, faithful wife, the kind of wife all men want but few men have. There are two things he is grateful for. He is grateful for his wife and he is not ungrateful to say that no man could have had a better wife and he is grateful that his children never had to work on the farm because even the children who grew up on the farm – he sent them away. His brothers went away to work on different farms and he sent his children to stay with them. And, Kaaleben smiles, his sons never got circumcised, and never will. No boy and no man should go through that kind of pain, it is not necessary, it is unnecessary.

Life on the farm was hard, a black man ‘lived to work’. Every day was the same so that there is not much he can tell about the almost sixty years he spent on the farm. His children were born there and that was good – ten children, two of whom died in Glenmore – and all of them wanted and much loved. The white child whom he had watched growing up, took over from his father and like his father he was a cruel man who ‘drove the black men on his farm like they drove his cattle’. So that one day, after forty-five years of labour without dignity, Kaaleben being struck through the face by the farmer, struck back. He then had to leave Cowley. He
does not like to talk about it. He was born and bred there, his relatives lived there. All the people he knew lived on Cowley. He did not know anyone who did not live on Cowley, except his brothers and sisters and their children. Only on Christmas Eve did he go to town for the day. As a child he went, but he never liked Port Alfred. It was too big and too noisy. As a young man he did not go any more, but when he got married he went again for his children not to speak to the people in Port Alfred because one could not trust their houses, day was further than Port Alfred. Cowley was his home. But then he had to leave and if we did not mind, he would prefer not to remember the day he left.

He left but he did not know where to go to. And then - they were walking and a man on a bicycle came past them and stopped and got off his bicycle and asked them where they were going to. Kaasbenn warned him and said no, they did not talk to the man, but his wife had never first time in all his life that he had set down to talk to a man who had not lived with him on give them land. They went because they had nowhere else to go. At Klipfontein the coloured landowners gave them land and the land was free. He built his own house - he and his son built their house. The coloured landowners did not employ them, they did not want money from them, they did not interfere with them in any way. Kaasbenn says that he still finds it difficult to believe that once upon a time he could live in his own house, on his own land, that he could live his own life. He says that for the first and last time in his life he was free. At Klipfontein he was a free man who could live his life the way a man should live his life.

The years at Klipfontein were good years but all the time he knew that it would never last. Then municipal officials came to knock on the door of his house and on the doors of the other houses and asked questions: where were they from, why did they come here, and were they planning to stay on at this Klipfontein. They answered yes, they were planning to stay on at this Klipfontein. Then they heard that they would be moved. The coloured people refused to order them to leave the land, so they knew it was the whites, not the coloureds, who took away their land. Kaasbenn says that he was full of anger when he was going to be a man without freedom. At Klipfontein he knew freedom and dignity and he could not think that he would be without it again. And his wife cried and he wanted to go away from her because he was a man who could not give her the kind of life she deserved. Then the blacks people of Klipfontein elected two men who went to Port Elizabeth to get legal help. They went to a lawyer, a Mr. Fisch, and this Mr. Fisch told them that they had to leave their houses and all their belongings on the day the lares came but that they had to take their clothes. They had to wait in the bushes and not go with the lares, and when the lares had left, they had to go back to their house, and he had a barn and a mill house, a carpenter and a chair for him and a chair for his wife. But then the owner died and his son took over the farm. This son did not like goats and they had to sell all their goats. He did not want the children to go to school, they had to work on the fields. So they had to leave. They left for Colchester. In Colchester they lived in the township with coloured people, there was no-one above them, they did not always have to be at their best, and thus they felt happy. They lived there for thirty years. Jamangile worked as a gardener. Life was fairly good, they had enough to eat, they were friends with the coloured people. When they arrived at Colchester they had six children, by the time they left they had twelve.

4.1.9 Jamangile Tsotsobe

Jamangile Tsotsobe is a small, neat man. Everything about him is tiny, neat, controlled. He sits quietly so there is no talk about him. He answers questions but seldom offers any additional information. His grandchild of ten sits on the floor at his feet. Unathi Tsotsobe is very shy, with thin, stiff limbs, an epileptic. Jamangile Tsotsobe says many trucks came to fetch them at Colchester and brought them here but he cannot remember how many. Unathi Tsotsobe spreads her hands on her knees and says, 'Ten. The trucks and noise, much noise and then the flames and people.' We asked: 'What did the people do?' 'The people scream,' she says and runs away. Jamangile Tsotsobe says she is a great sorrow to him because she is clever and can talk many languages, but she is different from other children. Then when the trucks came, she ran between them and screamed and waved her arms and broke a leg. He tried to hold her but he is an old man and that day there was a devil inside her. There weren't any flames, we must not believe this child because she is so different. There were many trucks but she saw flames. Perhaps the flames were inside her head? He would like to know if such a thing is possible.

Jamangile Tsotsobe was born in 1911 in 'Stenkelbos', a little village not far from Alexandria. His father worked on a farm near the village, milked cows and chopped wood. Jamangile Tsotsobe was the eldest son. He had three younger brothers who are here in Glenmore with him and two sisters. Jamangile never went to school. When he was twelve he was a 'headboy' on the farm. This was against his father's wishes but there was not much he or his father could do about it. For many months his father was angry and his parents talked about moving away. His father went to the farmer more than once and asked him if he wouldn't do his son's work, work double-time because he did not want his son to work, he wanted him to play. But the farmer said that he could leave the farm if he wanted to be cheeky. Jamangile says life was hard. This man, this farmer was cruel, he did not see them as human beings. The children who worked on his farm did not get paid, they did not get time off for lunch and breakfast. Once his father went to the farmer and said to him that his son had to eat and that he would do his work. And while he was having lunch. But the farmer was not satisfied with the arrangement. But they had nowhere to go to. So in the end they did not say anything more but his father always was full of anger against the white man.

Jamangile stayed on the farm and eventually became a tractor driver. He got married when he was thirty-two, and he says, then for him too there were no more thoughts of leaving the farm. The farmer's name was Dirk and he was a cruel man. He worked for Dirk for nineteen years, and till his sixteenth birthday Dirk did not pay him at all. Then, when he became sixteen, Dirk paid him ten shillings a month. After working ten years for ten shillings, he got a raise of another ten shillings. He now earned a pound a month. His wife worked in the dairy and got ten shillings a month. Dirk gave them a quarter bag of mealies a month but they had to supplement their diet by buying mealies from the shop. Then, when he was thirty-seven and still earning only a pound a month and had three children, he went to Dirk and asked him for a raise. Dirk like his father before him said he was cheeky and dismissed him.

He then employed himself with a Mr. Beale, at a farm called Hugheorden. Mr. Beale initially paid him four pounds a month but every year he got a raise of one pound. His wife earned three pounds a month, so that he was happy and satisfied on this farm. His children were not forced to work on the fields at this farm but could go to school. At this farm he was allowed his house and his garden, and he had a large coolhouse, a carpenter and a chair for him and a chair for his wife. But then the owner died and his son took over the farm. This son did not like goats and they had to sell all their goats. He did not want the children to go to school, they had to work on the fields. So they had to leave. They left for Colchester. In Colchester they lived in the township with coloured people, there was no-one above them, they did not always have to be at their best, and thus they felt happy. They lived there for thirty years. Jamangile worked as a gardener. Life was fairly good, they had enough to eat, they were friends with the coloured people. When they arrived at Colchester they had six children, by the time they left they had twelve.
Then they were informed by the police and BAAB that they were going to be moved to a place called Glenmore. They were told that there was enough work at this place for everyone, many industries and good houses they could have for free. But they did not know this place so they did not want to go there. They were happy enough where they were and they did not trust the police and they knew that the BAAB men would give no black man a decent house for free. But, while they were still discussing these things, they were given seven days' notice and suddenly they simply had to leave. It was so sudden, he still cannot believe it or understand it. Sometimes he wakes up at night and he thinks about it and he cannot understand it. He thinks about his life and he cannot understand how it is possible that a man is forced to leave his house and his work and his friends, that he is put in a truck, he and his wife and his children and his furniture and his pigs, and that his pigs die and his furniture gets broken. He can only understand it if he says to himself that he is not a man. But then what is he.

That day when they were taken to Glenmore the trucks came very early, when they were still asleep. They had to collect their pigs. Some people lost all their belongings behind because they were so full of grief that they could not pack their belongings. The officials were loud, angry men who shouted at them to get out. There were buses for the women and children. There was so much confusion - the houses were demolished before they could get all their belongings out. The men had to ride on the back of the trucks. The furniture was broken. They left the place unhappy and came to this Glenmore. The houses in this Glenmore were bare, with plank walls and they had to secure the walls with mud.

Janangile says that now there is so hope. When he was young, he wanted to give his children and grandchildren a different kind of life. Now he sees that there is no hope for his children and grandchildren. There is no hope for him and his wife and he does not understand why he has to live at all. He is now seventy-one and he cannot say: This is my life and I have given my sons an education and they are now wealthy men and my daughters are married to good men and my grandchildren are well looked after. He can say nothing.

4.1.10 Vukile Sephton Beyi

Vukile Sephton Beyi is twenty-four years old. He was born at Seven Fountains where his father worked as a labourer on the farm. He could not continue with his education after he had made Standard 5 because the high school was too far away and his parents had very little money. He thus became a labourer on the chicory fields, which he did not like, but it was better than having no job at all. He disliked the farmer but he really did not have any option because he and his parents lived on the farmer's property and he thus had to obey him. He very much would have liked to continue with school in order to get a better job, and at one time he had dreams of becoming a doctor because he wanted to help people and relieve them from pain.

He left the farm with his whole family in October 1981. His father had been very ill and the young farmer considered him redundant so he had to move. He moved with his family. He felt very helpless, but 'if a tree is uprooted then the branches must leave as well'. He hated the farmer for the treatment of his father but he had to accept it.

The whole family came to Grahamstown and Vukile consulted the ECAB officials about moving the furniture from the farm to Glenmore. An official organised a removal truck from Beacon and Rice and that at least did not cost them anything.

Vukile feels that the farmer was milking his father dry and he and his family were unhappy on the farm. Even so he prefers Seven Fountains to Glenmore. At least they were all employed on the farms but in Glenmore no-one is employed. Vukile tried in vain to find work in Glenmore and Grahamstown, and now he is simply waiting for the recruiting officers to come to Glenmore and offer them some work.

He is not certain who is specifically responsible for their present situation, but he sees ECAB as part of the government, and thus is part responsible.

He feels that the future offers very little hope - it seems that he has been in Glenmore for ever and the situation is hopeless. He knows he can't stay in Glenmore and starve but he does not know what to do. He thinks that he can perhaps find a job in Port Elizabeth but he is worried about not being able to take his wife and child with him because the government might not give them passes, and he feels that he cannot leave them in Glenmore.

Vukile thinks that even in Peddie conditions will be the same. Even so they will not resist if they are to be moved to Peddie because resistance won't change anything. They are people who cannot change their condition or control it.
4.2 LEGAL RESISTANCE
The Klipfontein case

Tutu Gqqukani and Gunguza Zake v Eastern Cape Administration Board and Chief Magistrate of Alexandria

The two applicants, residents of a farm called Klipfontein in the Eastern Cape, acting in their capacities as chairman and vice-chairman of a committee of eight members representing some 400 families living on the farm in the district of Alexandria, brought an urgent application before the Eastern Cape Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa on April 5, 1979, in which they sought an order against the Eastern Cape Administration Board (ECAB) and the Chief Magistrate to prevent them from removing any further families from the farm, and allowing those families which had already been removed to return to the farm, as well as for further ancillary relief.

The applicants alleged in their founding affidavit that they had been specifically delegated by the representative committee to instruct an attorney to bring the application and that the representative committee "had the full backing of the residents of the farm" and the attorney was therefore acting on their behalf.

When the matter was called on April 5, both ECAB and the Chief Magistrate of Alexandria asked for a postponement to enable them to answer the applicants' allegations and, after they had assured the court that no more families would be moved in the meantime, the matter was postponed to April 12. The respondents then filed lengthy answering affidavits, but when the matter was again called on April 12, the parties had reached an agreement and by consent an order was made setting aside the removal order made by the Chief Magistrate and ordering him to pay costs.

4.2.1 Basis of the case

The case of the Klipfontein residents rested on affidavits by Mr Tutu Gqqukani, chairman of the residents' committee; Mr Gunguza Zake, vice-chairman of the committee; Mr Silas Nkanunu, who translated the affidavits into English; and affidavits by the officials of the farm who said that the families lived there with their consent, free and at no charge. The main affidavit by Mr Gqqukani, made the following points:

1. That the deponents were elected as chairman and vice-chairman at a mass meeting of residents of the farm in September 1977. At the same meeting a committee of eight was elected to represent the residents whenever necessary. Since that meeting the committee had functioned regularly and had also from time to time met with residents to discuss important issues.

2. That the 400 families living on the farm comprised persons of all ages who had lived on the farm all their lives and knew no other home. The vast majority of the families had lived in homes which they had erected themselves over the course of time and they were living there with the consent of the owners.

3. That they were told by a sergeant of the SAP on March 22, 1979 that they were to start moving on April 2 despite the fact that a court case in which 161 residents had been charged with trespassing and/or being illegally on the farm was due to be heard again on May 2. They were told that the move had been sanctioned by a judge of the Supreme Court. The people told the sergeant that they were not prepared to go until after their trial had been completed. The sergeant replied that anyone who did not leave "would have to see the consequences with his own eyes".

4. That sometime on the morning of March 28, the residents noticed three documents and an attached list of names posted on the door of the school on the farm as well as in a farm road with a stone placed on them so that they would not allow away and a third nail to a pole on the western boundary of the farm. The documents were in English and Afrikaans only, while the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the farm were Xhosa-speaking. The documents informed the people that they were creating a health hazard and their move had been sanctioned by the magistrate at Alexandria.

5. That a number of people living on the farm did not pay rent for living there and that a number of people living there were employed in the towns of Bushmanrivar and Kenton-on-Sea in the nearby vicinity and on white-owned farms and in other commercial ventures nearby.

6. That on April 3, trucks belonging to ECAB arrived on the farm and officials of the Board, assisted by the SAP, started to pack the belongings of the farm dwellers onto the trucks and told people they were now being moved from the farm. In a number of cases the inhabitants' homes were broken down and corrugated iron and other building material was loaded onto the trucks. They were told they were being moved to Glenmore. Eight families were moved that day. The removals continued the whole of the following day, the applicants were unable to say how many families were moved on that day.

7. That the families were removed from the farm against their wishes.

8. That an urgent application was being brought because

(a) the removals were continuing unabated despite protests and that families on the farm were suffering prejudice of having their homes broken up and their goods and themselves taken away;

(b) once families on the farm had been removed, the representative committee could lose touch with them and it would be impossible to bring proceedings to have these people reinstated in their right to live on the farm.
4.2.2 ECAB's response

The Chief Director of ECAB in his affidavit claimed that the Board was not responsible for moving the people, breaking their houses down or packing their belongings on the trucks but was merely there "as observers to see that good human relations existed between the people who were being moved to Glenmore and the police". He said that according to surveys done on the farm, the population had greatly increased and most of the people there had moved in recently. Their buildings did not comply with standard building regulations. He also said that if the people living on the farm worked in a place other than the farm, they would be living there illegally.

He added that he (Mr Louis Koch), Deputy Minister Vosloo, and Chief Minister of the Ciskei Lennox Sebe and members of his cabinet had visited Glenmore. They asked people there whether they had been moved against their will, and the reply was negative. The people told them they were very happy in their present state. "There was a jolly atmosphere and people were busy altering their homes for their needs."

Another Board official, the superintendent of the Board in Bathurst, said in his affidavit that he had witnessed the removal. No people protested against the removal, and the people he visited were already packed and were content and eager to go." On April 4, only one person said he would not be moved. But he returned after a meeting of inhabitants saying that he too wanted to be removed to Glenmore. He (the superintendent) was present at the meeting on March 22 to ensure good race relationship between the parties'. He denied that the sergeant had stated that the move had been sanctioned by a judge of the Supreme Court, that there was an overwhelming majority of the residents present at the meeting, and that the sergeant had threatened the residents by saying that anyone who did not leave would have to see the consequences with his own eyes.

They supported their affidavits, and those of two other Board officials making the same points, with statements from people taken after the urgent application was brought before the Supreme Court on April 5. On April 6 there were 17 statements taken in Afrikaans, all alike except that the handwritten wording has mistakes and repetitions in some cases (see the sample on the facing page). In English they read:

DECLARED UNDER OATH

I am an adult black man and at present live on the farm Klipfontein in the Alexandria district.

I choose of my own free will and without any undue influence to be removed to Glenmore.

1) I am satisfied with the contents of this statement and understand it.
2) I have no objection against taking the prescribed oath.
3) I regard the prescribed oath as binding on me and my conscience.

On April 7 and 9 a further 25 statements were taken. Typed three to a page, they are in English and simply say:

As it is my desire to be removed to Glenmore I request that transport be provided to take me and my effects from Klipfontein to Glenmore.

All the deponents were Xhosa-speaking.

4.2.3 Points arising

The Klipfontein residents won their case on technicalities: that the notice informing the
residents about their eviction were not served three days before the removal as required by law; and that, being in English and Afrikaans only, they could not be understood by the residents, all of whom were Xhosa-speaking.

Winning the case did not stop the flow of removals. Families were being trucked over to Glenmore at a great rate even during the period when further removals were prohibited by the Supreme Court. On April 5, the court ordered that all removals be halted while ECAB prepared their case, to be heard on April 12. A Board official stated that 95 of the 180 families affected would have been moved to Glenmore by the evening of April 5. (EPH, 6.04.79) By April 12, ECAB estimated that 140 families were at Glenmore. (EPH, 13.04.79) The press publicised this, but it should have been raised in court.

All removals after April 5 were on the basis of a 'letter of consent'. Householders were forced to sign these letters of consent in various ruthless ways. Threats and even physical force were used to get thumbprints on these declarations. (See Section 3.6.3 above; and for more detail, the 26 affidavits made on 11.04.79 by coerced Klipfontein householders and now lodged in City Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown.) The Klipfonteinners held out against these pressures as far as possible: they avoided signing if they could, and otherwise some of them recorded how they had been forced to sign.

The pace and pressure were part of the removals strategy. Klipfonteinners could respond with the legal case because they were already an organised community. They also won this round in court because the very haste of the Board had made for errors in the eviction procedure. These points may be important for other groups under threat of removal.

In the rush to move the Klipfonteinners, officialdom was actually working against itself at times. Invoking the 1976 Illegal Squatting Act (point 3 of affidavits by Mr Qukukoni and Mr Zake, see above) complicated the move to evict families in other terms. Some Klipfonteinners won time while the Board failed to prove that the health and crime hazards on the farm would justify removal. It is clear, though, that the Board could have mounted their attack more efficiently. With the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act and the 1936 Land and Trust Act at their disposal they had plenty of ammunition. One must assume that a certain expertise in removals is being built up all the time, making them harder to fight in some ways.

The case was settled out of court. This indicates a reluctance on the part of the authorities to invite a legal precedent laying down precisely what constitutes a legal settlement. Without this precedent we cannot make definite conclusions, but informal discussions with lawyers suggest that ECAB settled out of court for two reasons:

- The eviction notices were not adequately displayed. The placing of notices under a stone in the road, or on a fence post, would obviously not be acceptable to a court. But it is interesting that the posting up in a public place (on the school door) may not be adequate either. A case could be made for each family to receive individual notice. Notices of expropriation certainly must be served on individuals where possible.

- The notices were only in English and Afrikaans. 'Adequate notice' appears to mean notice in the vernacular that the community could reasonably be expected to understand.

After the urgent application of April 5, the activity of ECAB and other authorities does not seem to have affected the case, although this was not tested in court. ECAB collected 42 affidavits. The point of this exercise was to undermine Mr Qukukoni and Mr Zake’s legal standing, apparently, by showing that they had no basis for claiming to represent the community. Lennox Sebe and Vosloo toured Glenmore with some of their Ciskei cabinet and ECAB adjuncts, in an attempt to defuse any negative propaganda which the resettlement and court interdict were likely to spread. Any leadership that emerges in an embattled community will have to face strategies of this kind from the authorities. Communities have to try to stay firm and united, so as not to undermine their legal standing or their organisational and political effectiveness. The Glenmore case suggests that families should sign short affidavits which affirm those made by their representatives before any legal action is taken, for example.
4.3 STOP PRESS

4.3.1 Tswele Tswele

Our thanks to Mike Whisson for this report (November 1982) on Tswele Tswele, south of Zwelitsha, a site which is still growing.

Tswele Tswele is a ‘closer settlement’ near Mount Coke on the road towards Kidd’s Beach. It covers an area of some 8 sq km and is bounded by black-owned farms for two-thirds of its perimeter and white-owned farms scheduled for appropriation on the rest. It was bought in 1965 when plans were drawn up and in part executed to create a rural village with a water supply and surveyed plots. The dam, water tower and linking pipeline survive, the surveyed area has vanished beneath rough grazing land as the project was stopped in 1968 following objections from neighbouring white farmers.

From 1979 to 1982, when further influx was brought to a virtual halt, the population rose from some 25 families to about 1,000 families. They came believing that they could obtain secure tenure, freedom to graze their stock and hoped for water, housing and other amenities in due course. Some were encouraged by assurances that such developments would take place, many came as a result of rumours, a few from further afield were told that this would be a good place to live. For the most part they came from farms between Hamborg and the Kei or in the ‘White Corridor’ which have changed hands in the last decade as a result of consolidation, urbanisation and changes in the scale or mechanisation of farming in the region. As the headman put it, ‘When a family is put out in the road, we cannot refuse to take it in.’ Others have left Mdantsane in order to retire or live more cheaply in a rural area.

All housing is self-built, there are no refuse or sanitation services. Apart from two rooms in an old farm house which accommodates 120 Sub A children, the nearest school is 2.5 km away and many have to walk 4 km away to another school. Water is obtained from the uncontrolled dam about 2 km away, wood is cut in and around the farm. The nearest licensed shop is at the school but the bulk of food purchases are made by migrants and commuters working in East London, or from the informal traders who have sprung up in the settlement area. Most people have some livestock, if only a few fowls, and some have flocks of up to 30 goats. Many of the plots are too small for proper cultivation but a few of the earlier settlers, and more of the recent ones (who were allowed more freedom in choosing a place), have fields of up to a couple of morgen. A very large field has been cleared and ploughed for cultivation under the Ciskei drought relief programme and will be administered by a committee of local residents.

Most income is generated by employment in the East London area, where many of the people of working age had jobs before they came to Tswele Tswele. The Ciskei bus company runs a special service for the weekly commuters on Monday mornings and Friday evenings.

The people, coming in from so many places, have little sense of community as yet. They complain of theft on a wide scale, have no voluntary organisations apart from a rugby club and an officially sponsored women’s group. The elected local committee advises the headman and the tribal authority of the needs and complaints of the community but neither body has the resources or authority to respond – beyond passing on requests to join the flood of others which flow into the central government in Zwelitsha.

4.3.2 Kammaskraal moved to Peddie

The Kammaskraal people had known since their arrival in mid-1980 that they would be moved again. They knew it would be to Peddie to communaal. Finally they had just one week’s warning before 2 September 1982 when removals began. The move was supervised by ECGB, and most of the people were taken over to Peddie by 5 September. Eight families were left behind at Kammaskraal because there were not enough houses on the new site, and it was only after a grim isolated wait of five weeks that they eventually got to Peddie on 13 October.

To begin with, though, the move seemed to go without a hitch. People had to dismantle the shanties completely at Kammaskraal and burn everything that was not taken. Their belongings were incredibly meagre – the odd bed or kist, a few pots, some building materials. It seemed that more firewood was taken than anything else, gathered in the week beforehand for sale and use in Peddie. The smoke of the fires, the hammering off of zinc sheets, revving trucks, shouting parents, bellowing cattle – the whole valley was a din. People loaded their stuff on the trucks lurching along the tracks on the hillside. Households were cleared line by line. The men rode on the trucks with their belongings, and the women and the children went in buses.

The Alexandra group of 72 families, being along the upper part of the valley hillside, were the first to go. It drizzled a bit the first day of the move, things like mattresses got rather wet, but people did not seem to mind. They wanted to go. The women got off the buses at Peddie singing.

Then it was the turn of the 85 families from Wooldridge. They resent the move. At Kammaskraal they had had 3-roomed tomato-box huts and would be moving into much smaller 2-roomed ones. The Alexandra people had eagerly awaited getting into some temporary houses at last, after two years of no formal housing at all.) They had been closer to the farms and quite a few households had cultivated good gardens. They did not want to move the little livestock they had. But they did not resist the move, simply because they felt helpless.

Along the bottom row of houses, eight before the end, the removals stopped. The houses at Peddie were all full. The 50 people left at Kammaskraal had wanted to stay, but with the rest all at Peddie they were now very anxious to join them. They were soon desperate to go. People from outside the camp area were understandably in to take doors, window frames
4.3.3 Update on Mgwali

Mgwali has survived the 1982 parliamentary session which, despite contrary expectations, did not order its removal. The most significant movement in support of the community has come from the synod of the Reformed Presbyterian Church, which resolved at its 59th general assembly that it opposes the removal of the stable community of Mgwali and has pledged to do everything within its power to cause this undesirable removal to be cancelled. (DD, 4.10.82)

This strong statement reverses the formerly more equivocal stance of the church, which is the only large landowner in Mgwali. On the other hand, Mr. Wilson Fatsi, a leading member of the Residents’ Committee, was detained in July by the South African Security Police. After some months of uncertainty as to his whereabouts, he finally appeared in court in Umzata under the Trenskei security laws. Details of the charges are not available, and it remains unclear to what extent his arrest is linked with his opposition to the Mgwali removal. (DD, 7.10.82) On 27 October J. Oosthuysen, an official of the Department of Co-operation and Development, announced that overall planning on the Mgwali removal had been completed, assuming the government had not been swayed. An unconfirmed report said that the extra delay was caused by South Africa and Ciskei bickering over who should do the moving.

Meanwhile up at Peddie the other 950 people had been settling in. The houses are minute - two rooms each measuring 7 x 9 ft. Each plot has a pit latrine, the usual ‘sentry box’. Houses are about 14 to a block, three blocks share one tap. Water comes from the Feni Dam on the other side of Peddie, pumped via Nompumelelo Hospital up to a reservoir recently built at the top of the comnongage.

The main anxiety for the newcomers is: no jobs. As well, there is friction with Peddie town. Peddie is a tank and borehole area, and the residents are outraged at these new people getting water on tap while everyone else is bypassed. Then there is the matter of livestock. Peddie townspeople may receive a grazing fee for each head of stock they put on the comnongage. Now not only is the grazing area partly built over, but within a week of arrival the Kammskraal people were chasing off the town stock, saying the comnongage was theirs. Some observers suggest stock was not even chased off but made to disappear. (The Kammskraal people are hugely resentful anyway because Peddie has been swamped with new arrivals recently; the jobs squeeze is quite impossible now, and crime is soaring as a result.

4.3.4 East London

Our grateful thanks to Eileen Lambie, research officer of the SAIIR Border region, for the following report (November 1982).

DUNCAN VILLAGE

The first known africans to stay in what is now Duncan Village were families who settled on what are now the sports fields in Duncan Village Ext 1. This was in about 1871.

The Duncan Village situation is complex. Part of what remains as Duncan Village is now officially referred to as Brebly Ext 6, indicating that it is earmarked as a future indian area. This part of Duncan Village has been depopulated of its african population. There are now about 489 coloured families living there. The official plan is to rehouse these families in the future Buffalo Flats Ext 2-7. The other half of the original Duncan Village area is partially depopulated and proclaimed coloured, i.e. the coloured areas of Pefferville, Parkridge, Charles Lloyd, and Charles Lloyd Ext.

The disemblie areas of Duncan Village occupied by africans are:
- Duncan Village (or Duncan Village proper). Also referred to as Old Duncan Village. It is bounded by the Duncan Village coloured community of 498 families who fall under the East London municipality, and the coloured areas of Pefferville, Charles Lloyd, and Charles Lloyd Ext.
- Duncan Village Ext No 1. Here there is a group of 972 "site and service" houses with gardens, most of which are leased for 30 years or more but rent is payable.

The community are investigating new ownership of the land and working for their ambitions (this issue is less complex than in many other cases of removal because Kammskraal had already been within the Peddie pensions area). The bulk buying scheme is helping those with pension delays meanwhile. Part of the church land at St Peter’s rectory is being ploughed and fenced now to provide some 30 food plots for families on the comnongage. The great aim is to develop the community spirit and assets in every possible way, and to smooth the relationship with the town too, before the next great crisis: when the 4 200 from Glenmore are moved onto Peddie comnongage with the Kammskraal people.
are better than some of the houses built in Mdantsane in 1973 which are now showing cracks. People here are apparently installing electricity. A lot of Africans were moved by the East London municipality from Duncan Village proper to Duncan Village Ext and were told they would not be moved again.

- The Emergency Camp. Originally it had two sections, B and C. People staying in Section B were moved to Mdantsane and Section B was demolished. In Section C there are one- and two-roomed houses built originally with an intended lifespan of 10 years. Section C is now 22 years old. All the houses there are therefore in a poor condition. These houses were in fact the last to be built in Duncan Village, as far back as 1969, to overcome the congestion then.

- The Nndede Street area. Here there is a mixture of permanent and temporary housing. There are a large number of shacks housing mostly 'illegal' squatters. It is here that the shacks are being numbered and as people are being moved to Mdantsane they are being demolished.

There are squatters in the Emergency Camp where there is both municipal-built housing and self-erected 'illegal' squatter house. There are illegal backyard squatters in most cases in Duncan Village proper and Duncan Village Ext - i.e. there is more than one household living on an erf. There are also squatters in the Nndede Street area. Not all the squatters erecting their own dwellings are 'illegals', though most are.

A respected town planning expert and head of the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of the GFS stated in a report in 1981 that

... the proposed demolition of Duncan Village eliminates sound housing, destroys private initiative and drives out a stable population. THE SOCIO ECONOMIC COSTS ARE TOO HIGH, WITHOUT ANY MATCHING BENEFITS....

COLOURED AND INDIAN HOUSING

Aside from the coloured areas already mentioned, the others are Parkside, Buffalo Flats and Buffalo Flats Ext 1, none of which were formerly part of Duncan Village. There are official plans to extend Buffalo Flats from Ext 2 - 7 and money has definitely been granted for this. This will cater for 3,000 houses and 401 serviced erven.

In the case of the Indian areas, Braelyn Ext 2 was formerly part of Duncan Village. Approximately 110 Indian families are still living in another part of East London known as the North End. North End was formerly a mixed area housing all population groups. 17 of the 110 families are relatively recent arrivals from other parts of South Africa. Official plans are that only the older residential families in the North End will be allocated housing in Braelyn Ext 3. This amounts to 93 of the 110 families mentioned. Braelyn 4 is a new area which is adjacent to the future Braelyn Ext 5.

Another new area available for both North End and Braelyn 2 residents is Braelyn Ext 5 where there is provision for 73 home ownership plots. About 5 families from North End and Braelyn 2 so far have taken up residence there. Significantly in mid-1982 the East London Housing Action Committee (a ratepayer-type association formed to represent North End residents), the Indian Management Committee and the Indian Association of East London seemed agreed in a stand that no-one should be forced to move from North End to Braelyn Ext 4 until a specific adjacent area had been upgraded, i.e. the future Braelyn Ext 5, the part of Duncan Village where the 498 coloured families are living. 

The adjacent area has not been upgraded but about 58 North End families have moved to Braelyn 4, possibly in the expectation of improved housing conditions there. When Braelyn 4 is complete it will make provision for 81 single three-bedroomed houses, perhaps by the end of 1982. All 81 houses have apparently been allocated already. There are plans for more houses to be built in Braelyn 4. Braelyn 4 also makes provision for 37 home-ownership plots. All of these have been sold and at least 4 have occupied houses on them. About 21 North End families are to move to Braelyn 4 by the end of 1982.

There is also a certain amount of internal rehousing occurring in North End itself. For example, if a house in a particular zone has been vacated and is still habitable, another family from a house in a priority demolition zone could be housed there temporarily.

The full development of Braelyn Ext 6 will depend on the rehousing of the 498 coloured families in Buffalo Flats Ext 2 - 7. Braelyn 6 could be developed in perhaps two to three years' time.

Since 1980, 59 North End houses have been demolished by contractors commissioned by the Department of Community Development. As of 10 November 1982 there are 98 houses, 12 flats, and one hostel accommodating 4 families in North End.

4.3.5 Kwelerha

A new plan has been announced in late 1982 for Kwelerha. It came from three sources, all in the month of October: a Co-operation and Development official who visited Kwelerha especially to announce the scheme; from the magistrate in East London; and on the Ciskei side, from the community’s own Chief Jongilanga. We understand the plan was finally confirmed again at a tribal authority meeting in Kwelerha on 29 October.

Landowners are to develop their land as much as possible in the next five years. The CNCD will support them with cash grants, seed etc. The people will own everything they produce. They are urged to grow commercial crops along with food for their own households. The only stipulation is that they must sell any produce in the Ciskei (e.g. Mdantsane market) and not in East London.

An agricultural extension officer has already been appointed to the area. If in his opinion a landowner has not 'done justice' to his land after five years, that land will be 'taken away from him' and given (still under tribal tenure) to another member of the community who has not had land.

Altogether the plan suggests now that Kwelerha is not to be cleared for the next few years anyway. The idea of passing land on to others if the present farmers 'fail' is perhaps high-handed, but it does imply that Kwelerha people might be meant to stay on in this area after all. The whole thing is a mystery at present, but this impression is slightly reinforced by a central spokesman being reliably quoted as saying that things were happening which would be a great surprise even to sanguine people. It is also noted that some school building has been done in Kwelerha by the Ciskei Department of Education.

We do not know how many African farmers there are, and if those without land are any safer now than they were before. And does the new scheme extend to Moolplaat, Kwenukha and Newlands, all of which also fall under Chief Jongilanga and the Chaiumwa removal plan?

General feeling in the area in November 1982 is that this part of the 'White Corridor' could be incorporated into the Ciskei. It is argued that local white farmers mostly use their land more as a commuting base and not so much for production, and are therefore not expected to oppose any plan to expropriate them.
4.4 Sources for tables based on census statistics

1.2
Table 1. Adapted from Simkins (1981), table 1

1.3

1.4
1. Income & Expenditure, Patterns of Households in Ciskei, 1981, BMR, table 13
2. BMR, table 13
3. Adapted from Survey of Black Development, 1980, Benso, table 53
4. BMR, table 14 (b)
5. Benso, table 38
7. BMR, table 28
8. Benso, table 111
9. Benso, table 107

2.2

2.3
1. See previous note.
2. Ditto.

2.6

Apart from tables 7 and 9 in Section 3.2, drawn from the ISER 'quality of life' survey of 1980, all other tables are based on results from our survey.

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By courtesy of Mr. Oakley West, cartographer in the Department of Geography, Rhodes University, who added our information to an earlier form of this map which appeared in the D.C., 30.10.81.
LECTURE EXAMPLE 11B : DEPRECIATING ASSET SOLD INTER-COMPANY

Assume the same information as in lecture example 11A, except that now S Ltd recorded all the entries on the sale of plant, i.e., total depreciation to date of sale was recorded and necessary entries were passed by S Ltd to record the profit/loss on sale in the books.

REQUIRED:

(a) Pro-forma journal entries necessary to reflect plant correctly in a consolidated balance sheet as at 1 April 1903

(b) Consolidated balance sheet disclosing plant at 1 April 1903