

# SA Reconciliation Barometer



## 2023 REPORT

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Kate Lefko-Everett



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# CONTENTS

Acronyms .....	iii	<b>6 Racial reconciliation</b> .....	28
Figures and tables.....	iv	Relationships across race lines.....	29
Executive summary .....	vii	Meaning and experiences of reconciliation .....	29
Foreword.....	ix	What prevents us from reconciling? .....	31
<b>1 Introduction</b> .....	1	Key findings: Racial reconciliation .....	31
<b>2 Methodology</b> .....	4	<b>7 Social cohesion</b> .....	33
Conceptualising reconciliation .....	4	A culture of distrust.....	33
Survey design .....	4	Strong group association .....	34
Data collection.....	5	Proudly South African .....	35
<b>3 Political culture</b> .....	8	United or divided? .....	35
Changing political landscape .....	8	Support for more unity .....	36
Looking to 2024.....	9	Key findings: Social cohesion .....	37
Parties of choice .....	10	<b>8 Perceptions of change</b> .....	39
Power to the people? .....	10	Expectations of socio-economic change .....	39
Participating in protests .....	11	Changes since democracy.....	40
Looking to leadership .....	13	Likelihood of future improvement.....	41
Long shadow of state capture .....	13	Key findings: Perceptions of change.....	41
Assessing public institutions.....	14	<b>Conclusion</b> .....	42
Key findings: Political culture .....	15	<b>Annex A: SARB hypotheses</b> .....	44
<b>4 Inclusion</b> .....	16	<b>Annex B: SARB sample</b> .....	46
Towards gender equality? .....	16	References .....	47
Respect for language and culture .....	17	Sources .....	50
Economic inclusion .....	17	Quotations .....	50
Transforming the economy .....	18	Images.....	50
Unequal opportunities .....	19	Notes .....	51
Key findings: Inclusion .....	19		
<b>5 Apartheid legacy</b> .....	21		
Knowledge of the past .....	21		
Our shared truth.....	23		
Apartheid oppression .....	23		
Forgive or forget? .....	24		
Reparations and restitution .....	25		
Memorialisation.....	26		
Key findings: Apartheid legacy.....	26		

# ACRONYMS

<b>AGSA</b>	Auditor-General of South Africa
<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress
<b>ANCYL</b>	African National Congress Youth League
<b>ANOVA</b>	analysis of variance
<b>B-BBEE</b>	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
<b>CEPA</b>	Centre for Poverty Analysis
<b>CSO</b>	civil society organisation
<b>DA</b>	Democratic Alliance
<b>EA</b>	enumerator area
<b>EFF</b>	Economic Freedom Fighters
<b>GBV</b>	gender-based violence
<b>GIZ</b>	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
<b>IEC</b>	Independent Electoral Commission
<b>IFP</b>	Inkatha Freedom Party
<b>IJR</b>	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
<b>JET</b>	Just Energy Transition
<b>JSE</b>	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
<b>LGBT</b>	lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
<b>LPI</b>	lived poverty index
<b>NEET</b>	not in employment, education or training
<b>NLI</b>	Neighbourhood Lifestyle Index
<b>NP</b>	National Party
<b>NPA</b>	National Prosecuting Authority
<b>SABC</b>	South African Broadcasting Corporation
<b>SAPS</b>	South African Police Services
<b>SARB</b>	South African Reconciliation Barometer
<b>SARS</b>	South African Revenue Services
<b>SCOPE</b>	Strengthening Social Cohesion and Peace in Sri Lanka
<b>SLB</b>	Sri Lanka Barometer
<b>SONA</b>	State of the Nation Address
<b>StatsSA</b>	Statistics South Africa
<b>TOR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>TRC</b>	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
<b>US</b>	United States of America
<b>VAP</b>	voting age population
<b>WEF</b>	World Economic Forum



# FIGURES AND TABLES

## Figures

<b>Figure 1:</b>	Dimensions of reconciliation	5
<b>Figure 2:</b>	Methodology and data collection, 2023	6
<b>Figure 3:</b>	Survey sample, 2023 (weighted)	7
<b>Figure 4:</b>	Likelihood of voting in 2024	10
<b>Figure 5:</b>	Top three preferred political parties	10
<b>Figure 6:</b>	Confidence in political parties	10
<b>Figure 7:</b>	Internal political efficacy	11
<b>Figure 8:</b>	External political efficacy	11
<b>Figure 9:</b>	Frequency of political participation	12
<b>Figure 10:</b>	Leaders are not concerned about ordinary people	13
<b>Figure 11:</b>	Leaders cannot be trusted	13
<b>Figure 12:</b>	Perceptions of corruption	14
<b>Figure 13:</b>	Confidence in select institutions, 2007–2015	14
<b>Figure 14:</b>	Confidence in select institutions, 2017–2023	14
<b>Figure 15:</b>	Confidence in institutions, 2023	14
<b>Figure 16:</b>	Gender equality	17
<b>Figure 17:</b>	Respect for language	17
<b>Figure 18:</b>	Lived poverty by race (mean)	18
<b>Figure 19:</b>	Support for racially representative workplace	19
<b>Figure 20:</b>	Resources to achieve personal goals	19
<b>Figure 21:</b>	Knowledge of history by age	22
<b>Figure 22:</b>	Apartheid was a crime against humanity	23
<b>Figure 23:</b>	State committed crimes against anti-apartheid activists	23
<b>Figure 24:</b>	Apartheid deprived black South Africans of livelihoods	24
<b>Figure 25:</b>	Forgiveness for apartheid	24
<b>Figure 26:</b>	Forgetting about the past	24
<b>Figure 27:</b>	Still important to support apartheid victims	25
<b>Figure 28:</b>	Reparations for colonialism and apartheid	26
<b>Figure 29:</b>	Wealthy people should pay compensation tax	26
<b>Figure 30:</b>	Support for renaming	26
<b>Figure 31:</b>	Interracial relationships	29
<b>Figure 32:</b>	Meaning of reconciliation	30

<b>Figure 33:</b>	South Africa still needs reconciliation	30
<b>Figure 34:</b>	Progress in reconciliation	30
<b>Figure 35:</b>	Experienced reconciliation	30
<b>Figure 36:</b>	Biggest barriers to reconciliation	31
<b>Figure 37:</b>	Trust in others	33
<b>Figure 38:</b>	Trust in groups	34
<b>Figure 39:</b>	Strongest group association	34
<b>Figure 40:</b>	Feelings about primary group association	34
<b>Figure 41:</b>	Importance of national identity	35
<b>Figure 42:</b>	Should see ourselves as South African first	35
<b>Figure 43:</b>	Want children to think of themselves as South African	35
<b>Figure 44:</b>	How divided is South Africa?	36
<b>Figure 45:</b>	Biggest division in South Africa	36
<b>Figure 46:</b>	United South Africa is desirable	36
<b>Figure 47:</b>	United South Africa is possible	37
<b>Figure 48:</b>	More unites us than keeps us apart	37
<b>Figure 49:</b>	Financial situation compared to the past	39
<b>Figure 50:</b>	Financial situation compared with that of parents	40
<b>Figure 51:</b>	Improvements in South Africa since 1994	40
<b>Figure 52:</b>	Likely to get better in the future	41
<b>Figure 53:</b>	Reconciliation likely to progress	41
<b>Figure i:</b>	LGBT support and approval, 2023	15
<b>Figure ii:</b>	Taking action against migrants	32
<b>Figure iii:</b>	Social effects of Covid-19	38
<b>Figure iv:</b>	Personal effects of Covid-19	38

## Tables

<b>Table 1:</b>	SARB hypotheses and indicators, 2003–2013	44
<b>Table 2:</b>	SARB hypotheses and indicators, 2015–2021	45
<b>Table 3:</b>	SA Reconciliation Barometer unweighted sample, 2023	46



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The South African Reconciliation Barometer is a nationally representative public opinion survey conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) since 2003. Currently in its twentieth year, it is the longest-running public opinion survey of its kind in Africa. The IJR has also partnered in the development of reconciliation barometers in other post-conflict societies around the world, including Rwanda and Sri Lanka.

The Reconciliation Barometer measures progress in reconciliation through six main conceptual domains, each with its own established indicators: political culture, inclusion, apartheid legacy, racial reconciliation, social cohesion and perceptions of change. The survey instrument consists of over 200 questions, most in the form of closed-ended Likert scales. The Barometer is currently conducted every two years, and all previous data is freely available to the public.

Following a competitive bid process, MarkData was appointed to carry out data collection in 2023. The survey instrument was reviewed, piloted and translated from English into Afrikaans, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Setswana, Sepedi and Sesotho. Data collection was conducted between August and September 2023 and a total of 2 006 South Africans were interviewed across all nine provinces of the country. As a nationally representative survey, every adult South African has an equal chance of being selected to participate. On this basis, and with the application of post-survey weighting, the data can be used to draw conclusions about the entire South African population.

Section 3 of the report focuses on survey findings in relation to political culture. South Africa's political landscape has changed considerably since the first democratic elections in 1994, including through consistently declining voter turnout and support for the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party and the emergence of the far-left Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013. As the 2024 national and provincial elections approach, Reconciliation Barometer results reveal a growing distrust in leadership, limited confidence in public institutions and widespread concern over corruption.

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Section 4 analyses Reconciliation Barometer findings assessing South Africa's progress towards becoming a more inclusive society. While women are well represented in government and the workforce, the extreme prevalence of gender-based violence (GBV) and disproportionate impact of poverty remain issues of serious concern. New survey data shows majority agreement that LGBT people should have the same human rights as everyone else in the country, but South Africans are more reticent in approval of same-sex relationships and parenting. Deep poverty and economic inequality persist in South Africa and are among the country's most significant obstacles to reconciliation.

Examining collective memory and attitudes toward the legacy of apartheid, Section 5 discusses South Africa's resilient shared truth about the history of the country, despite the passing of time. Reconciliation Barometer results show lower levels of knowledge about the past among younger people, highlighting important gaps in history education and the curriculum in schools. Most South Africans support the idea of forgiving one another for what happened during apartheid and moving forward together as a country, but agreement is moderate surrounding issues of reparations, restitution and memorialisation.

Section 6 analyses public opinion on progress in improving relationships between South Africans of different races after apartheid. While daily interactions have increased, the pace of change has been slower in terms of forming closer social relationships. Most South Africans believe that more reconciliation is still needed, but identify economic inequality, racism and corruption as the biggest barriers to further progress.

Focusing on the domain of social cohesion, Section 7 reveals that South Africans remain deeply distrusting of others. Survey results show that migrants from other African countries continue to be among the least trusted groups in society today. Many people continue to associate most strongly with others who share aspects of their identity such as language or race, and view these associations as a source of affirmation, importance and security. Yet strong group associations have not dampened consistent majority support and enthusiasm for a shared national identity. Although many South Africans view the country as divided, most support the idea of a united country and agree that this is possible in the future.

Finally, the Reconciliation Barometer hypothesises that reconciliation requires that people perceive change to be under way since the end of conflict. In 2023, survey results show low levels of agreement that there have been improvements in key areas since the transition to democracy, including in economic inequality, employment and personal safety. At the same time, there is moderate optimism about prospects for future improvement, particularly in terms of social relationships.

The report concludes that after two decades of research, the Reconciliation Barometer has found evidence of both profound challenges and progress in reconciliation. The IJR has begun planning for the next decade of the project, including through further review and validation of the survey's conceptual framework, indicators and instrument. The survey results also point to key areas for intervention by government, civil society organisations and citizens, including urgently increasing economic equality and participation, rebuilding public trust and supporting the next generation of active citizens.

# FOREWORD

This year marks two decades since the fielding of the first round of the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) survey in 2003. Launched three years after the founding of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, the survey represented one of the Institute's first noteworthy countrywide endeavours to understand and make sense of the way and degree to which national reconciliation was unfolding in post-apartheid South Africa. Following the conclusion of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC) public hearings in 1998 and coinciding with the release of the Commission's final report in 2003, the SARB survey represented an initiative to keep the pursuit of post-apartheid justice and reconciliation relevant and alive amongst South Africans.

A quantitative measurement instrument, this nationally representative public opinion survey became the first study of its kind to track such processes over time in a post-conflict country. Today, by virtue of this, it is the longest-running study of its kind in the world. As has been the case with several subsequent studies that have used the SARB survey as a template – some of which the SARB team provided direct assistance to – the project recognised from the outset that the quantification of a concept as complex and fluid as reconciliation will never provide a full and comprehensive picture of its subject matter. To do so would require complementary qualitative studies to contextualise the data – something that the Institute has done and supported others to do by making its data publicly available. Yet, in instances where key concepts and constructs are measurable in numbers and percentages, the SARB survey emerged as one of the most reliable and consistent indicators for the direction and intensity of reconciliation processes in South Africa.

This report contains the findings of the 19th round of the SARB survey, conducted from mid-August to mid-September 2023. Twenty years on since the first round, it allows for some comparison over time. At the outset, it is necessary to underscore that the South African socio-political landscape today looks vastly different from the early days of our democracy. In 2003, South Africa was entering an economic growth phase, unemployment



*Prof. Cheryl Hendricks*  
*Executive Director*

was declining, and government, with the fiscal space to do so, was rapidly expanding the country's social welfare net through the extension of grants and pensions to the country's most vulnerable. As a result, hope and expectation prevailed. In 2023, however, South Africa finds itself in the midst of an economic and social crisis. The culmination of years of slow global growth, poor governance, and the lingering impact of a devastating pandemic has brought the country to a tipping point. Amid crumbling infrastructure and weak political institutions, it is running out of resources to stem the tide of growing desperation. The SARB's findings on trust in public institutions and leadership illustrate that many are losing faith in the state's capacity to address the country's plight.

While everyone in South Africa is affected, some are more vulnerable than others. This distinction largely still runs along the country's historical racial categories. It would therefore be fair to assume that the present circumstances would have an adverse impact on reconciliation between these groups. And yet, as Kate Lefko-Everett, the report's author, shows, high levels of support for the idea of a united and reconciled country have remained resilient since the first round of the survey. More than two-thirds of survey respondents indicated that reconciliation remains an achievable ideal and that there is more that keeps us together than keeps us apart.

This by no means suggests that South Africa is immune from the fallout of social fragmentation and polarisation. Intergroup trust remains low, particularly towards migrants from other African countries. We need to remain vigilant to ensure that malevolent actors do not exploit these historical and emerging fissures, especially in the run-up to what promises to be a closely contested general election in 2024. What it does point to is a basic consensus around the pursuit of an inclusive state that accommodates all who live in it. If we look around and witness the multiple conflicts currently prevailing in Africa and elsewhere, it should be apparent that such broad societal agreement cannot be taken for granted. This is the positive news that the SARB offers. It is the task of our state, the private sector and civil society as a collective to protect and nurture this consensus by aligning their efforts to create the conditions for a truly inclusive society to emerge.

I would like to congratulate the Reconciliation Barometer Project, headed by Kate Lefko-Everett, and managed by Jan Hofmeyr, for the production of this noteworthy survey report. The Institute continues to view this flagship project as a public good that represents its contribution to the understanding and building of our nation. As such, it is our hope that this report will be read and engaged with widely.

# INTRODUCTION



The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) has been tracking South African attitudes toward reconciliation for 20 years. The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) project was among the IJR's founding initiatives in responding to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC) call for civil society to join in actively working towards a 'society free from racism, xenophobia and related intolerance'.<sup>1</sup>

Over the past two decades South Africa has achieved progress that might have seemed unimaginable after the systemic violence of colonialism and apartheid and the tenuous years of political transition. The democratic government has successfully held six rounds of multiparty national and provincial elections, deemed to be free and fair and with a high degree of credibility. The economy remains among the largest on the continent. Once considered an international pariah and subject to sanctions, South Africa is now an important member of BRICS, with growing influence in global governance and multinational institutions.<sup>2</sup> Confronted with widespread energy insecurity and disproportionately high vulnerability to climate change, the country is set to benefit from billions of dollars in international financing to support decarbonisation and climate resilience through the launch of the Just Energy Transition (JET) partnership.<sup>3</sup>

South African society has also changed significantly in the 20 years since the start of the Reconciliation Barometer. The recently released results of the 2022 Census show that the so-called born-free generation<sup>4</sup> is now estimated at over 30 million people, and in fact outnumbers older South Africans with lived memories and experiences of apartheid.<sup>5</sup> More than ever before, we live in integrated communities, learn in multilingual classrooms, and build friendships and families across historically defined racial lines.

Together, we celebrated the World Cup victory of the national Springbok rugby team, which credits diversity as the source of its strength rather than an obstacle to overcome.<sup>6</sup>

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racial lines

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‘We are very diverse, just like you are outside there and we just wanted to show that diversity is our strength in South Africa ... and we need to use our diversity a bit more.’

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*Siya Kolisi,  
Springbok Rugby Captain*

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Amid glimpses of national *gees*,<sup>7</sup> however, most South Africans also endure daily reminders of the many ways in which little has changed. Despite its relative size and performance in the region, the national economy holds little space for young adults entering the job market, and almost half of all youth between the ages of 15 and 34 are not in employment, education or training (NEET).<sup>8</sup> Nearly half of the country lives in poverty, and in what has been described as ‘the slow violence of malnutrition’, around 27% of children under the age of five still experience stunting due to chronic undernutrition.<sup>9</sup>

In 2023 alone, the country experienced more days of electricity cuts – referred to as ‘load-shedding’ by Eskom, the government-owned national power supplier – than in any other year since the intermittent blackouts first began in 2007.<sup>10</sup> Public opinion about government performance overall has been tarnished by years of corruption, maladministration and state capture.<sup>11</sup>

Frustration and discontent have placed added strain on social relationships, democratic institutions and scarce resources, at times leading to conflict and violence. More than 300 people died in riots and looting sparked by the imprisonment of former president Jacob Zuma in 2021.<sup>12</sup> In the same year, Operation Dudula spread xenophobic rhetoric and led attacks on migrants, brandishing the slogan #PutSouthAfricansFirst. The group plans to contest as a registered political party in the upcoming 2024 elections.<sup>13</sup> More recently, five people died during eight days of a minibus taxi strike in Cape Town, during which vehicles were attacked and vandalised, businesses looted and infrastructure destroyed.<sup>14</sup>

We may ask what keeps South Africa together and how long the centre can hold. These questions have shaped the Reconciliation Barometer over 20 years, and our findings are presented in the following sections of this report.



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‘Load shedding affects all types of households but creates higher risks and poses threats to low-income households that are the most vulnerable in the South African economy.’

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*Prof. Roula Inglesi-Lotz,  
University of Pretoria*



### Tracking reconciliation in Sri Lanka

The Sri Lanka Barometer (SLB) was launched in 2018 to deepen understanding and track progress in reconciliation, after 26 years of civil war that ended in 2009. The SLB initiative includes qualitative research, outreach, and a nationally representative survey – with data collection for the third round currently under way. The IJR has supported the implementation of the SLB since its inception through methodological and technical expertise, training and as a member on a consortium of partner organisations, which includes the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) and the Strengthening Social Cohesion and Peace in Sri Lanka (SCOPE) Program that is co-financed by the European Union and the German Federal Foreign Office and implemented by GIZ, in partnership with the Government of Sri Lanka. More information about the SLB is available at <https://www.srilankabarometer.lk>





# METHODOLOGY

# 2

The South African Reconciliation Barometer is the longest-running national survey tracking public opinion on post-conflict reconciliation in Africa. The IJR has partnered in the development of reconciliation barometers in Rwanda and Sri Lanka and peer projects have been established worldwide, including in Australia, Colombia and Canada.<sup>15</sup>

## Conceptualising reconciliation

Reconciliation is a complex social concept that is challenging to measure. Since the first round of the Barometer in 2003, the IJR has defined reconciliation in terms of multiple related concepts or 'dimensions', each with distinct indicators that are tracked through the survey. These dimensions and indicators have been periodically reviewed, confirmed and updated, for example, through data analysis and psychometric validation, qualitative focus groups and expert consultations over the 20 years of the project.

The six dimensions of reconciliation measured through the Barometer are shown in Figure 1 (for full hypotheses, see Annex A).

## Survey design

The Barometer is a time series survey that currently consists of over 200 closed-ended questions – more than double its original length. Most of the survey questions are in the form of 5-point Likert scales, which has allowed the IJR to develop composite indices constructed using multiple indicators.

The survey has evolved and expanded over time, while still retaining its core conceptual dimensions, indicators and methodological approach. The changes include:

- **Reducing the frequency of iteration:** In 2003 and 2004, immediately following the release of the final volumes of the TRC Report, the Barometer was conducted twice

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Six dimensions of  
reconciliation:  
political culture,  
inclusion, social  
cohesion, apartheid  
legacy, racial  
reconciliation and  
perceptions of change

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annually in order to monitor attitudinal trends in a dynamic and transitional socio-political environment. The survey was then conducted once every year between 2005 and 2013, and thereafter every second year between 2015 and 2023. At the outset, the longevity of and support for the project were unknown – as indeed for the reconciliation process as a whole. The transition from a biannual assessment of short-term change to a study of the long-term, big picture of reconciliation is also evident in some survey questions. These have been adapted from their original formats of assessing change over a period of months, to over several years.

- **Strengthening the survey questionnaire:** The IJR has continually worked to strengthen the Reconciliation Barometer as a robust research instrument, and one that is regularly validated, replicable and that generates high-quality results that are available for secondary data analysis by researchers, students, academics, civil society organisations (CSOs), government officials and practitioners worldwide. This process has included periodic

revisions and updates to the survey questions, as well as increasing the consistency and reliability of the indicators and scales used.

- **Adapting with changing demographics:** With the passing of time and an increasingly born-free population, some survey questions have been revised and adapted to ensure their continued relevance for all respondents.


## Data collection

The Barometer is conducted through in-person interviews with adult South Africans in all parts of the country. In previous rounds, data collection was conducted by Ipsos and Kantar Public.<sup>16</sup>

In May 2023, the IJR advertised a Terms of Reference (TOR) inviting bids from qualified service providers. Following a competitive process, MarkData was appointed to conduct data collection for the current survey round.<sup>17</sup>

The draft questionnaire was developed comprising a combination of new and legacy survey questions. It was piloted across all nine provinces of the country,

**Figure 1:** Dimensions of reconciliation



and the results were subjected to psychometric validation testing. The questionnaire was then finalised and translated from English into Afrikaans, isiXhosa, isiZulu, Setswana, Sepedi and Sesotho (Figure 2).

The Barometer is nationally representative, meaning that every adult South African has an equal chance of being selected to participate. On this basis, and with the application of post-survey weighting, the data can be used to draw conclusions about the entire South African population.

The sample frame was developed based on Census enumerator areas (EAs) and using the following key variables:

- **Urbanisation**, including 60% metro area respondents, 25% in non-metro urban areas and 15% in rural areas;
- **Province**, with national coverage and oversampling in less populous provinces such as the Northern Cape;
- **Race**, with oversampling of minority race groups (coloured, Indian/Asian and white) to ensure sufficient representation; and
- **Neighbourhood Lifestyle Index (NLI)**, based on a multidimensional income segmentation model.<sup>18</sup>

Data collection started on 14 August 2023 and concluded on 5 September 2023, and a total of 2 006 South Africans were interviewed (Figure 3). The full sample is included in Annex B. All previous survey data and documentation is freely available through the IJR and descriptive analysis can be conducted through our dedicated online portal.<sup>19</sup>

**Figure 2:** Methodology and data collection, 2023





Figure 3: Survey sample, 2023 (weighted)



## Notes on reporting

The following relate to the presentation of all data throughout the remaining sections of the report:

**Margin of error:** The margin of error using a 95% confidence level is 1.09%.

**Weighting:** All data are weighted, allowing for conclusions about the entire national population.

**Rounding:** Due to rounding, reported values may not always total 100%.

**Sex:** Participants were asked whether they described themselves ‘as a man, a woman or in some other way’ but no responses were received other than these binary categories.

**Race:** The IJR continues to use race as an important variable in analysing Barometer results, given its historic relevance and continued importance in relation to redress, socio-economic transformation and personal and group identity, among others.

For specific queries or assistance accessing Barometer data, please contact [info@ijr.org.za](mailto:info@ijr.org.za).

# POLITICAL CULTURE

# 3

In the early years of national democratic consolidation, and as the design of the first Barometer was under way, the IJR hypothesised that progress in reconciliation would require South Africans to be tolerant of diverse political views, and to believe in the legitimacy and authority of public and political institutions.<sup>20</sup>

Political culture remains one of the six core dimensions of the Barometer and is measured through indicators including political and civic participation, efficacy, trust in leadership and legitimacy (Figure 1). As South Africa plans for national and provincial elections and the commemoration of 30 years of democracy in 2024, how far has the country come in terms of political beliefs, attitudes and evaluations?

## Changing political landscape

South Africa's political landscape has changed substantially since the transition to democracy, and more shifts are expected at the polls to come.

Nineteen political parties appeared on the 1994 ballots, with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) winning 63% of votes, followed by the now-disbanded National Party (NP) with 20% and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in third position (11%).

The ANC's majority deepened over the decade that followed, and the party won close to 70% of votes in the 2004 elections. Although 21 parties took part, the opposition overall appeared small, disparate and in decline.<sup>21</sup>

The ruling party's electoral fortunes changed after 2004, however, and its share of the national vote dropped in each successive poll, reaching only 58% in 2019. The Democratic Alliance (DA) was formed through a multiparty merge in 2000 and assumed the second-party position, nearly doubling its support from 12% in 2004 to 22% a decade later in 2014.<sup>22</sup>

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Political culture  
remains one of the  
six core dimensions  
of the Barometer and  
is measured through  
indicators including  
political and civic  
participation,  
efficacy, trust in  
leadership and  
legitimacy

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South Africa appeared set on a path towards a two-party dominant system, as smaller opposition groups struggled with resources, support and staying power. This trajectory was fundamentally disrupted when ousted former ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema founded the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013. Despite questions surrounding its prospects for success – particularly given the party’s far-left positions and disruptive tactics – the EFF won 6% of the national vote in 2014 and grew this to 11% in 2019. DA support, in turn, plateaued at just over 20% over the same period.<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, voter turnout at elections has steadily fallen from a peak of 89% in 1999 to 66% in 2019. Moreover, less than half (49%) of the eligible voting age population actually cast a ballot in this latest round.<sup>24</sup>

Major political shifts have also occurred within local government. Following local elections in 2021, around 70 councils lacked a clear majority, ushering in what has been termed the era of coalition governments.<sup>25</sup> Despite significant challenges in multiparty leadership, including in metros such as

Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni, seven opposition parties including the DA announced the formation of a coalition aiming to unseat the ANC in the national elections in 2024.<sup>26</sup>

The ANC itself may be looking for coalition partners if it fails to win an outright majority, although so far President Cyril Ramaphosa has firmly rejected any such alliance.<sup>27</sup>

## Looking to 2024

As we consider the status of national political culture, questions arise around prospects for participation in next year’s polls. Will turnout remain on its downward trajectory, or will voters take a more active role in selecting their leaders at this critical juncture?


The 2023 Reconciliation Barometer asked South Africans how likely they are to vote in next year’s elections. In response, 70% answered that they are likely or very likely to do so. Only 11% were unlikely or very unlikely and 15% were unsure (Figure 4). These



results suggest the potential for higher turnout than at the 2019 polls, although interest and intent are not necessarily predictors of action on election day.

Ten years ago, the Barometer similarly asked South Africans about voting in the 2014 elections. At the time, 62% answered that they were likely or very likely to vote – a lower percentage than the official turnout rate of 73%.<sup>28</sup>


**Figure 4:** Likelihood of voting in 2024



## Parties of choice

Successive national election results have shown declining votes for the ANC, alongside a small but growing base of support for the EFF. Recent Barometer survey results further confirm this trend. In 2023, 18% of South Africans answered that they felt closer to the EFF than any other political party – up from 11% in 2021. Those who reported feeling closest to the ANC dropped from 43% to 37%, while the DA remained unchanged at 13% (Figure 5).

**Figure 5:** Top three preferred political parties



The Barometer also measured public confidence in political parties, alongside a range of other institutions (see also Figure 14). Overall confidence levels are low, yet shifting patterns are also evident. As shown in Figure 6, confidence in the EFF increased from 20% in 2017 to 32% in 2023. Comparatively, confidence in the ANC remains higher than for either of its main opponents, but only marginally so at 37%. Twenty-five per cent (25%) of South Africans expressed confidence in the DA in 2023, and this has remained largely unchanged over four survey rounds.

## Power to the people?

The Reconciliation Barometer also measures attitudes towards political participation beyond voting and party preferences.

One of these sub-domains is internal political efficacy, which is people’s belief in their own ability to understand and take part in politics.<sup>29</sup> Barometer results suggest that levels of internal efficacy are moderate, which may provide some context to declining voter turnout. Nearly 30 years after the transition to democracy, almost half of all South Africans (47%) feel unqualified to participate in politics. A further 51% believe that they do not have a good understanding of the important issues affecting the country, and 52% that they are less informed than other people (Figure 7).

**Figure 6:** Confidence in political parties








Figure 7: Internal political efficacy



External efficacy measures people’s belief that they can influence the government and is often linked to satisfaction with democracy and trust in public institutions.<sup>30</sup> Barometer results show low levels of external efficacy, with close to three-quarters (74%) of South Africans agreeing that the people and not politicians should make the most important policy decisions. Most also agreed that citizens should have the final say on important issues by voting directly in referendums (77%); that politicians should always follow the will of the people (76%); and that ordinary South Africans can only rely on each other rather than on elites (73%). Agreement has increased across all four indicators since 2021, as shown in Figure 8.

These results make for an uneasy mix: citizens simultaneously lack confidence in their own abilities as political actors, are distrusting of elected representatives,

Figure 8: External political efficacy



parties and elites, yet aspire for greater influence and more responsive leaders and institutions.

## Participating in protests

Taken together, low levels of internal and external efficacy can sometimes cause citizens to opt out of politics, voting and civic participation. They can also lead to social fragmentation, polarisation and forms of political action such as protest.<sup>31</sup>

Collective actions in the form of strikes, protests and demonstrations are not uncommon in South Africa. There were more than 200 service delivery protests in 2018 and 2019, respectively, and these are forecast to continue and even increase, particularly in response to load-shedding and water insecurity.<sup>32</sup>

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‘If people don’t understand the spectrum of political rights, it’s very difficult to isolate the right to vote on its own. People should know that actually they have a right to form their own political parties and contest for elections. They have a right to participate in the existing political parties and to campaign for the activities of those political parties. They also have a right to stand for election, they have a right to participate in a free and fair election environment ... If they are not politically conscious, they are not politically active in general.’

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
*Mbali Ntuli, Founder and CEO, Ground Work Collective*

The Barometer has included questions on protest since the first survey round in 2003, although early measures tested South African attitudes on the justification of demonstrations, strikes and more violent actions, specifically under conditions in which the government was ‘disregarding, violating or going against people’s human rights’. Justification was low to moderate over the first decade of the Barometer: 34–54% of South Africans agreed that demonstrations and strikes were justified between 2003 and 2013, while agreement about the use of force or violence was consistently lower, at 9–20%.

More recent survey rounds have instead measured direct participation in a variety of collective actions – and this is low overall. As shown in Figure 9, less than 15% of South Africans frequently participated in any of the activities mentioned between 2017 and 2021, including getting together with other people to raise an issue, contacting a leader or the media with a complaint, or using force or violence. Self-reported participation declined in 2021, consistent with other

research and data sources and likely the result of lockdowns during the Covid-19 pandemic.<sup>33</sup> Participation remained low in 2023, although 19% of South Africans attended community meetings often or very often over the past year, surpassing pre-pandemic levels in 2017 and 2019.

Figure 9: Frequency of political participation




## Looking to leadership

The Barometer tracks public opinion about leadership, and this year's survey results reveal dramatic changes.


In 2003 and 2013 just over half of all South Africans agreed that the people running the country were not really concerned about what happens to ordinary citizens. By 2023, eight in ten South Africans felt this way – an increase of 24 percentage points since the first survey round (Figure 10).

Results related to the perceived trustworthiness of leaders are even more concerning. In 2003 and 2013, only about a fifth of South Africans agreed that it was difficult to trust leaders to do the right thing. As shown in Figure 11, this figure has nearly quadrupled over the past decade, with 79% of South Africans agreeing in 2023 that leaders are untrustworthy.

**Figure 10:** Leaders are not concerned about ordinary people



**Figure 11:** Leaders cannot be trusted



## Long shadow of state capture

The deepening distrust of leadership shown in Barometer results is concerning for reconciliation and follows on a decade of pervasive corruption.

In 2022 the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, after four years of investigations, found evidence of widespread corruption within the South African government and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), involving Cabinet members, senior officials, private management consultancies, and influential business figures, such as the wealthy Gupta family.<sup>34</sup> President Ramaphosa lamented this corruption as a betrayal of democracy that robbed South Africans of 'resources that should have led to the development of our country and improved livelihoods'.<sup>35</sup>


Despite promises of swift action, observers – among them Chief Justice Raymond Zondo himself – have raised concerns about chronic underfunding of investigative bodies, inadequate protection for whistle-blowers, the slow pace of state capture prosecutions and how few of the Commission's recommendations have been included in the new Public Procurement Bill (18-2023).<sup>36</sup>

There is also evidence of ongoing underperformance and mismanagement within the public sector more broadly. According to the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA), only 30% of national and provincial entities received clean, unqualified audit results at the end of the 2021/22 financial year. The AGSA estimated financial losses of R12 billion in that financial year, and highlighted 'continued poor outcomes in key service delivery portfolios and state-owned enterprises' and 'substantial harm to public sector institutions'.<sup>37</sup>

The Reconciliation Barometer has measured public attitudes about corruption since 2019, and results across three survey rounds show consistently high consensus and concern. In 2023, eight in ten South Africans (82%) agreed that corrupt officials often get away with it (Figure 12). Three-quarters (74%) agreed that most politicians have no real will to fight

corruption, and 84% that corruption affects ordinary people more than it affects decision-makers.

**Figure 12:** Perceptions of corruption



## Assessing public institutions


Perceptions of legitimacy and confidence in public institutions have always formed part of the Reconciliation Barometer's core measures of political culture.

Democratic institutions are more than the sum of officials they employ. Yet in keeping with distrust of leadership and concerns about corruption, public confidence in institutions has clearly worsened over time.

Early survey rounds found that more than half of all South Africans expressed confidence in a number of key institutions, including parliament, national government, the Constitutional Court and the legal system in general. These levels of confidence remained moderate overall between 2007 and 2013 (Figure 13).


By 2015, confidence had dropped across all institutions included in the survey, and these have never returned to the levels first recorded in 2007. In 2023, less than 40% of South Africans reported having a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in any of the institutions included in the Barometer (Figure 14 and 15), with only two exceptions: the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) at 57% and the South African Revenue Services (SARS) at 46%.

**Figure 13:** Confidence in select institutions, 2007–2015




*Note: In 2017, these items were updated from a 4-point to a 5-point Likert scale.*

**Figure 14:** Confidence in select institutions, 2017–2023



*Note: In 2017, these items were updated from a 4-point to a 5-point Likert scale.*

**Figure 15:** Confidence in institutions, 2023



## Key findings:

### Political culture

**High interest in voting.** Seven in ten South Africans say they are likely to vote in the 2024 elections. If this intent translates into action, it could signal a break in the pattern of declining voter turnout since 1999.

**Growing support for the EFF.** Confidence in and identification with the ruling ANC has declined, while support for the far-left EFF has grown from a small base.

**Low political efficacy.** Close to half of all South Africans feel they do not understand enough about politics and are unqualified to participate themselves, but even higher percentages agree that important decisions need to reflect the will of the people.

**Distrust of national leadership.** The Barometer has documented a dramatic increase in distrust of leadership over the past 20 years, coupled with declining confidence in most major public institutions.


**Concern about corruption.** There is a high degree of consensus that there is little political will to address corruption, and that its perpetrators are able to operate with impunity.

## LGBT inclusion

For the first time in 2023, the Reconciliation Barometer included a series of questions\* on attitudes towards LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) people and same-sex relationships.

Results show that 76% of South Africans agree that LGBT people deserve the same human rights as everyone else in the country (Figure i).

**Figure i:** LGBT support and approval, 2023



Agreement was lower, however, in response to questions on same-sex relationships. Sixty-six per cent (66%) of South Africans agreed that they would be accepting of a close family member in a same-sex relationship, and 63% that a same-sex couple was as likely as other parents to successfully raise children.

Just over half (55%) agreed that LGBT people are accepted in their culture or tradition.

*\* Survey items were developed following a review of and with reference to items included in the South African Social Attitudes Survey as well as internationally. See Other Foundation and Human Sciences Research Council 2016, Ipsos 2021, Parker et al 2022, and Gallup online.*

# INCLUSION

# 4

The system of apartheid was built around principles and practices of exclusion, separation, differentiation and intolerance. With an entire state architecture created to institutionalise exclusion, apartheid divided communities, broke apart families, entrenched inequality, fomented ethnic tension, exploited women, stigmatised LGBT people, and fanned fears about migrants from neighbouring countries.

The IJR maintains that reconciliation depends on tolerance, inclusion and the creation of a society in which all people experience equality of rights, resources and opportunities. How far has South Africa progressed towards this vision of equality and inclusion?

## Towards gender equality?

Democratic South Africa has taken a number of important steps towards gender equality. Women are well represented in some spheres of government and leadership, making up almost half of all members of parliament (MPs), Cabinet members and deputy ministers.<sup>38</sup> In 2023, the World Economic Forum (WEF) ranked South Africa 20 out of 146 countries in its Global Gender Gap Report, which takes into account economic participation, educational attainment, health and political empowerment.<sup>39</sup>

Yet men have also perpetrated what President Ramaphosa has termed a 'pandemic' of gender-based violence (GBV), giving South Africa the 'shameful distinction of being one of the most unsafe places in the world' for women and girls.<sup>40</sup> Men continue to participate more in the economy while women experience higher levels of poverty, earn less and are more reliant on social grants.<sup>41</sup>

Barometer results from 2023 show that 59% of females and 65% of males agreed that people of different genders have the same rights in South Africa (Figure 16). Around six in ten males and females agreed that people of different genders receive the same legal protection and equal opportunities to earn an income.

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Men continue to  
participate more in  
the economy while  
women experience  
higher levels of  
poverty, earn less and  
are more reliant on  
social grants

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**Figure 16:** Gender equality



## Respect for language and culture

South Africa has 11 official languages, and the Bill of Rights prohibits discrimination on the basis of language, ethnicity, culture or religion.

The Barometer tracks perceptions of whether or not South Africans believe that their mother tongue language, culture and religion receive the respect they deserve in the country today. In 2023, three-quarters of South Africans (75%) agreed their religious group is respected, up from 62% when the question was first asked in 2007.

Overall agreement about respect for mother tongue languages has increased comparably over time, from 63% in 2007 to 75% in 2023. Figure 17 shows that

agreement has also increased within all language groups except for two: first-language Afrikaans and Ndebele speakers.

While at least two-thirds of South Africans across ten language groups agreed that their culture gets the respect it deserves, agreement was once again lowest among mother tongue Afrikaans speakers (54%).


## Economic inclusion

South Africa's history of colonialism and apartheid created an economy that is one of the most exclusionary and unequal in the world. Government aims to reduce the national Gini coefficient to 0.60 by 2030 from its last recorded measure at 0.65 in 2015 as part of the National Development Plan (NDP).<sup>42</sup>

The Barometer uses a series of survey questions and composite indices to measure people's experiences of poverty, their financial situation and their relative household well-being. The Lived Poverty Index (LPI) asks how often people go without basic necessities: food, water, medicine, fuel for cooking, cash income, electricity (excluding load-shedding) and, for the first time, internet access.

Consistent with national poverty data, levels of deprivation are high: a quarter (25%) of South Africans answered that they or their family members have gone without enough food to eat in the past year (several times, many times or always). Forty-four per cent (44%)

**Figure 17:** Respect for language






have gone without a cash income (several times, many times or always) during this period.

Experiences of lived poverty continue to differ significantly between South Africans of different races. Analysis of LPI data from 2023 shows that average lived poverty scores are highest among black South Africans (2.3) and lowest among white South Africans (1.6) (Figure 18). Statistically significant differences are also evident in how South Africans of different races evaluate the living conditions of their households and their personal financial situation relative to others in their communities and the country as a whole.

**Figure 18:** Lived poverty by race (mean)




Note: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA),  $p < 0.01$ .

## Transforming the economy

Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) is one of the main policy instruments used to bring about an inclusive, representative economy. Research points to some success, including in the areas of black ownership of enterprises and companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), as well as in the transfer of wealth to black investors.<sup>43</sup>

Progress has been slower in areas such as the establishment of new black-owned businesses and representation in senior and executive management.<sup>44</sup> B-BBEE has also faced harsh criticism, including that it has mainly benefitted elites, failed to reduce income inequality, inhibited growth and ultimately has brought about little transformation.<sup>45</sup>

The gazettement of racial and gender quotas following the Employment Equity Amendment Act in early 2023




provoked a new wave of backlash, particularly in relation to regional demographic differences.<sup>46</sup> Retail pharmaceutical chain Dis-Chem faced a public outcry and legal action after an internal memo instructing managers to stop hiring white candidates was leaked in 2022.<sup>47</sup>

B-BBEE opponents may find fuel for further criticism in looking to the United States, where the Supreme Court struck down affirmative action and the use of race in admissions to higher education institutions in June of 2023.<sup>48</sup>

Notably, in spite of these controversies, the Barometer has found relatively consistent majority support for workplace transformation (Figure 19). Following some fluctuation in 2011 and 2013, over 80% of South Africans in 2023 agreed or strongly agreed that it should be a national priority to make workplaces racially representative – with minimal differences according to race. Seventy-seven per cent (77%) of South Africans also agreed that gender representation should be prioritised.

**Figure 19:** Support for racially representative workplace




## Unequal opportunities

While so many youth are NEET, men out-earn women, boardrooms remain predominantly white and almost seven in ten black children live in poverty, equality remains an elusive aspiration in South Africa, not the reality.<sup>49</sup>

It is not surprising, therefore, that there are significant differences in people's abilities to reach their personal goals.

The Barometer asks South Africans if they have access to the financial resources, education, people, and mobility or proximity needed to reach their personal goals. In 2023, average agreement differed significantly between people of different races. Comparative analysis of this composite index found that white South Africans were most likely to agree they had access to the resources to achieve their personal goals, while black South Africans were least likely (Figure 20).

**Figure 20:** Resources to achieve personal goals



Note: ANOVA,  $p < .001$

## Key findings: Inclusion

**Persistent, profound inequality.** Data from both the Barometer and other sources confirms that South Africa is still profoundly unequal, and this inequality has both racial and gendered dimensions. This poses a fundamental threat to reconciliation.

**Gendered rights and experiences.** There is moderate agreement that people of different genders have equal rights, opportunities and legal protection, although the GBV 'second pandemic' challenges these perceptions of equality in practice.

**Language and cultural inclusion.** There is moderate to high agreement that different languages and cultures are respected in South Africa and this is a positive finding for reconciliation, although agreement tends to be lower among Afrikaans first-language speakers than others.

**Sustained support for workplace representation.** Despite some criticism of B-BBEE, most South Africans still support the idea of a workplace that is representative according to race and gender, and this has remained relatively consistent over successive survey rounds.

**LGBT rights.** Most South Africans agree that LGBT people deserve the same human rights as everyone else in the country, but agreement is moderate in

terms of family and cultural acceptance of same-sex relationships and parenting.



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‘History must be told from multiple perspectives, and there is a need for multiple voices to be heard, which means it is not just politicians but also ordinary people.’

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*Cecyl Esau, 1955–2021*

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# APARTHEID LEGACY



Over the past 20 years the Reconciliation Barometer has tracked public opinion surrounding the country's uneasy relationship with the past. Collectively, South Africans continue to contemplate how much should be remembered and what it may be best to forget. We debate the merits of removing or replacing the symbols of apartheid and colonialism – and weigh these costs against competing needs such as food security, clean water and safe schools.

As South Africa becomes a majority born-free country, how do we understand the past and its legacy in the country today?

## Knowledge of the past

The first round of the Reconciliation Barometer was conducted in the same year that the TRC released its final report. The survey asked South Africans about their experiences of apartheid and their opinions on some of the pressing concerns of transitional justice, including questions about prosecutions, amnesty and conditions for the release of convicted perpetrators. Over time, the Institute has worked to ensure the continued relevance of these items, especially for younger South Africans.

The youngest respondents in the 2023 survey were born almost a decade into democracy. Further, many likely received limited formal history education at school, given that the subject is an optional elective at secondary level.<sup>50</sup>

The public education system and the modes and curriculum of history teaching are important contributors to preserving the work of the TRC, strengthening national identity and encouraging active citizenship.<sup>51</sup> A dedicated ministerial task team recommended in 2018 that high school history should be compulsory but the status of this possible change as well as planned updates to the curriculum remain unclear.<sup>52</sup>

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
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This year’s survey included a series of new questions aimed at gaining a baseline understanding of knowledge about the past. South Africans were asked how much they felt they knew about the TRC as well as about colonialism, apartheid and the democratic transition. As shown in Figure 21, self-reported knowledge was generally lowest among young South Africans and highest among older people. Only a fifth (21%) of those aged 18–24, for example, answered that they knew quite a lot or a great deal about the TRC, while 45% of South Africans aged 45 or older answered in this way.

The Barometer also found that most South Africans (72%) agree that children should be taught about the country’s history of colonialism and apartheid in school.

Figure 21: Knowledge of history



‘I see South African History as a revolution that is brewing. I feel that we are currently living in a Historical period for South Africa and that the revolution is coming.’

*South African student narrative*  
*Dr Kate Angier, University of Cape Town*


# Our shared truth

The TRC sought to investigate and determine the official truth of ‘what happened’ in South Africa between 1960 and 1993. This process was used as the basis for documenting the trauma of survivors, granting conditional amnesty, securing lasting peace and ultimately setting the country on a path towards healing.<sup>53</sup> As time passes, how resilient is this official truth about South Africa’s past?

Remaining largely intact 20 years after the first survey round, Barometer results show moderate to high agreement about South Africa’s past.

The United Nations declared apartheid a crime against humanity in 1966.<sup>54</sup> When asked about this in 2003, most South Africans (87%) agreed that it was certainly or probably true that apartheid was a crime against humanity, although fewer white people (70%) answered in this way than other groups. In 2023, the majority of South Africans (79%) still agreed with this characterisation (Figure 22) although this percentage has declined among coloured people in particular.

**Figure 22:** Apartheid was a crime against humanity




*Note: In 2003 and 2013 these questions were asked using 4-point Likert scales with the following response categories: certainly true, probably true, probably untrue, certainly untrue. In 2017 these were converted to 5-point Likert scales, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.*

In 2023 there was also continued majority agreement that the state committed terrible crimes against anti-apartheid activists, at 82% overall. The percentage

of white people who answered in this way was once again lower than other groups but increased from 56% in 2003 to 67% in 2023 (Figure 23).

**Figure 23:** State committed crimes against anti-apartheid activists



*Note: In 2003 and 2013 these questions were asked using 4-point Likert scales with the following response categories: certainly true, probably true, probably untrue, certainly untrue. In 2017 these were converted to 5-point Likert scales, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.*

## Apartheid oppression


Continued consensus over the truth of what happened during apartheid is also important in understanding how over 40 years of official apartheid government policy – preceded by hundreds of years of colonial occupation and rule – continues to impact on the country today. This agreement provides firm grounds for legislation, policy and programming that aims to reverse apartheid’s legacy and bring about equality, for example through B-BBEE and land restitution.

Overall, in 2023, 80% of South Africans still agree that the apartheid government oppressed the majority of people in the country, an important confirmation of consensus about the past. The same percentage (80%) also agree that black South Africans – a term that includes all people historically classified as African, coloured and Indian – were subjected to violence because of their race.

Most also agree that apartheid deprived black South Africans of the opportunity to earn decent livelihoods (74%) (Figure 24), access quality education (76%) and own property and land (81%).



Figure 24: Apartheid deprived black South Africans of livelihoods



## Forgive or forget?

The Reconciliation Barometer has also measured attitudes towards forgiveness over its 20-year lifespan, given that apartheid subjected most South Africans to violence, deprivation and oppression.


The late Archbishop Desmond Tutu, TRC Chair and patron of the IJR, believed forgiveness was central to restorative justice and consistent with ‘the spirit of *ubuntu*’ and traditions of African jurisprudence, which encourage the ‘healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, [and] the restoration of broken relationships’.<sup>55</sup>

Most South Africans (74%) agree that they are trying to forgive people who hurt them or their families during apartheid (Figure 25).

The Barometer also gauges support for the idea of ‘forgetting about the past’ and moving forward – a question that sometimes provokes emotive responses and debate. Tutu himself cautioned against a ‘national amnesia’, instead advocating for truth-telling, collective healing, reconciliation and abandoning retribution.<sup>56</sup>


In 2003, more than seven in ten South Africans of all races agreed that they wanted to forget about the past and move on with their lives. Agreement was particularly high among coloured (91%) and Indian/Asian (88%) South Africans (Figure 26). Agreement declined by 2013 but increased once again after the second decade of the survey.

Figure 26: Forgetting about the past



Note: In 2003 and 2013, this was asked as, ‘I want to forget about the past and just get on with my life’; in 2023, it was asked as, ‘South Africans should try to forget about apartheid and just move forward together as a country’.

Figure 25: Forgiveness for apartheid



Note: In 2003, this was asked as, ‘I am trying to forgive those who hurt me during apartheid’; in 2013, as ‘It is time to forgive those who hurt others during apartheid’; and in 2023, as ‘I am trying to forgive those who hurt me and my family during apartheid’.

# Reparations and restitution

Part of the work of the TRC included compensating apartheid victims, mainly through the dedicated Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee. Around 17 000 people who suffered gross human rights violations received once-off grants of R30 000.<sup>57</sup> Additional government policies and programmes were introduced, for example focusing on land restitution and redistribution.

The overall impact of these initiatives has been limited. Cash grants ultimately benefitted a small proportion of South Africans oppressed by apartheid. The 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act also established the President's Fund to finance additional reparations but despite accruing nearly R1.9 billion by 2022, only around R98 million in reparations had been paid out in the previous five years.<sup>58</sup>

Parallel land reform and redistribution processes have also been slow. In 1994 the new democratic government aimed to redistribute 30% of 77 million hectares of white-owned farmland within its first five-year term. This target remains unreachd and has been shifted to 2030, in line with the NDP.<sup>59</sup>

There have been periodic calls to reconsider additional reparations in ways that could more effectively counteract entrenched inequality, deprivation and multigenerational poverty. However, these have often provoked controversy and Tutu himself was criticised for resurfacing the notion of a wealth tax targeting white South Africans in particular.<sup>60</sup> This public response was consistent with early rounds of the Reconciliation Barometer, which found an 'unexpectedly low association between the concept of reconciliation and issues of socioeconomic justice' through reparations or redress.<sup>61</sup>

Yet momentum is also building in calls for reparations after gross human rights violations in other contexts. Earlier this year a historic bill was tabled in the US calling for \$14 trillion for black Americans as compensation for slavery and hundreds of years of

racist policies. About a dozen cities have worked towards introducing local reparations programmes.<sup>62</sup>


Germany pledged over a billion euros in funding to Namibia in 2021 after taking responsibility for the genocide of 75 000 indigenous Herero and Nama people between 1904 and 1908.<sup>63</sup> Britain also agreed to pay £20 million to more than 5 000 Kenyan survivors of the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s but has stopped short of apologising or proposing further reparations.<sup>64</sup>

With the rise in these global debates, the Barometer once again asked South Africans their opinions on reparations and restitution in 2023.<sup>65</sup> Consistent with many of the other indicators in this domain, there was majority agreement (76%) that it is still important to support victims of apartheid human rights abuses. Agreement was highest among Indian/Asian South Africans (81%) and lowest among white South Africans (61%) (Figure 27).


Similar response patterns were evident in other questions of this sub-domain, with agreement generally lowest among white South Africans.

Overall, 70% of South Africans agreed that black people should be repaid in some way for colonialism and apartheid, but only about half (49%) of white people answered in this way (Figure 28). A moderate 59% of South Africans agreed that wealthy people should pay a tax into an apartheid compensation fund, and agreement was highest among black South Africans (62%) and lowest among white (45%) and Indian/Asian South Africans (46%) (Figure 29).


**Figure 27:** Still important to support apartheid victims



**Figure 28:** Reparations for colonialism and apartheid



**Figure 29:** Wealthy people should pay compensation tax




## Memorialisation

South Africans still encounter symbols of apartheid and colonialism in daily life, from street names to statues, memorials and even the old flag, although any public display of the latter has now been ruled as hate speech.<sup>66</sup>

Support for changing these symbols appears moderate, however, perhaps due to the many other competing priorities in the country. Overall, 58% of South Africans support renaming public places to reflect the values of democracy, with lower agreement among white (45%) and Indian/Asian South Africans (41%) (Figure 30).

Just over half (56%) of all South Africans support the removal of memorials and other symbols of colonialism and apartheid, with somewhat higher support among black people (58%) when compared with coloured (49%), Indian/Asian (46%) and white (45%) South Africans.

**Figure 30:** Support for renaming



## Key findings: Apartheid legacy

**Fading knowledge of history.** Knowledge and understanding of foundational periods and events in South African history are fading over time and with the passing of older generations who lived through the events. Historical knowledge is important for preserving the truth, building national identity and encouraging active citizenship. The slow pace of amending history curricula and making it a compulsory high school subject are missed opportunities for keeping this history alive.

**South Africans still agree about the past.** There is still moderate to high consensus about the truth of South Africa's apartheid past, and this is a vital foundation for reconciliation.

**Forgive and forget.** Most South Africans support the idea of forgiving those who hurt them or their families during apartheid, and many also agree that they want to forget about what happened in the past and move forward together as a country.

**Mixed support for reparations.** Although there is majority consensus that apartheid inflicted violence and deprivation on black South Africans, support for reparations is moderate – and such measures are generally opposed by about 30–40% of white people.

**Support for renaming/memorialisation:** There is moderate support for renaming and removing symbols of apartheid/colonialism.





‘I have never been particularly persuaded by the efficacy of name-changing or the removal of statues; these gestures have always seemed to me to be place-holders for material shifts, sometimes even a political sleight of hand – a circus when what is needed is bread. The afterlife of all these colonial relics only matter, only retain the trace and force of their power, because the country itself remains untransformed...

I feel safe and settled in my conclusions until I see the bust. It is astonishing, breath-stealing... Eyes gone, he can no longer look out at the place that he insisted – beyond all reason and decency – belonged to him.

He can no longer look, and he can no longer be looked at.’

---

*Associate Prof. Nadia Davids*  
*The Beheading of Rhodes in Cape Town, 2020*



# RACIAL RECONCILIATION

# 6

Apartheid was designed to keep South Africans of different races separated from one another. Racial segregation was entrenched in all aspects of daily life, from residential neighbourhoods to public amenities, schools, marriages and families.

Although South Africa remains an unequal and exclusive society in some respects, have relationships between people changed over time?

Racial segregation  
was entrenched in all  
aspects of daily life



# Relationships across race lines

Before the transition to democracy, systemic segregation dictated that South Africans of different races had little opportunity to interact or form relationships with one another. This history was reflected in early Barometer findings, and the first survey round found that in 2003 only 15% of black South Africans answered that they always or often interacted with people of different races – far lower than coloured (45%), Indian/Asian (60%) or white (63%) people (Figure 31). At the time, many South Africans still lived in racially homogeneous suburbs, townships and rural communities.

A decade later in 2013, a quarter (26%) of black South Africans frequently interacted with people of different races, and by 2023 this had reached 37% – more than double the original figure, yet still lower than other race groups.

In comparison, coloured South Africans reported a moderate frequency of interaction in 2003 (45%) and this has fluctuated only slightly over time, reaching 48% in 2023. Indian/Asian South Africans reported among the highest frequency of interaction in 2003 (60%) and this increased to 68% by 2023. White South Africans, comparatively, reported the highest levels of interaction in 2013 (70%) but this dropped considerably to 52% by 2023.

Increased interaction over time is a positive and expected outcome, as communities, workplaces, schools, retail centres and public spaces have democratised and diversified. Deeper personal relationships, however, have remained a challenge.

In 2003, only 6% of black South Africans frequently socialised with people of other races in their own homes or the homes of friends, although this increased considerably to 30% by 2023 (Figure 31). For coloured and white South Africans, frequent socialisation increased over the first decade of the survey but remained almost unchanged between 2013 and 2023, while it declined for Indian/Asian South Africans over the past ten years.

## Meaning and experiences of reconciliation

Reconciliation is a complex and multidimensional concept. Since 2015, the Barometer has tracked how South Africans understand the meaning of the term.

Figure 32 shows that over the four previous survey rounds from 2015 to 2019, the highest percentage of South Africans associated reconciliation with forgiveness, comprising between 14% and 19% of responses. In 2023, the leading response was that reconciliation means peace (22%).

**Figure 31:** Interracial relationships






Figure 32: Meaning of reconciliation




Figure 33: South Africa still needs reconciliation






Figure 34: Progress in reconciliation



The Barometer also asks about both demand for and progress made in reconciliation. In 2023, more than three-quarters (76%) of South Africans agreed that the country still needs reconciliation and this has remained relatively consistent since 2015 (Figure 33). There is majority agreement across South Africans of all different races, although results show that this demand is highest among black (79%) and Indian/Asian South Africans (78%) and lowest among coloured South Africans (65%).

There is also moderate agreement that the country has made progress in reconciliation, at 62% overall in 2023, with little difference between South Africans of different races (Figure 34). Overall, just over half of South Africans (54%) agreed in 2023 that their friends and family had experienced reconciliation since the end of apartheid. Agreement was highest among

Figure 35: Experienced reconciliation




coloured people (60%), followed by black (54%), white (54%) and Indian/Asian South Africans (46%) (Figure 35).

# What prevents us from reconciling?

Looking to prospects for further progress, the Barometer also asks South Africans to identify what they believe to be the biggest barriers to reconciliation. In 2023, the highest percentage of black South Africans (40%) believed poverty and inequality to be the biggest barrier, followed by racism (21%) (Figure 36). White (31%) and coloured (25%) people identified racism as the biggest barrier, while equal percentages of Indian/Asian South Africans answered that it was poverty and inequality (29%) or corruption (29%).

Figure 36: Biggest barriers to reconciliation




# Key findings: Racial reconciliation

**Interaction outpaces socialisation.** As apartheid has been deconstructed and shared spaces democratised, regular interactions between South Africans of different races have increased. However, only about a third of South Africans seem to have formed closer social relationships across historic racial dividing lines.

**Reconciliation means peace and forgiveness.** Most South Africans associate reconciliation with peace and forgiveness, echoing some of the core principles and messages of the TRC.

**Progress has been made, but reconciliation is still needed.** There is moderate agreement that progress has been made, but more than three-quarters of South Africans feel the country still needs reconciliation.

**Obstacles to reconciliation.** South Africans consider poverty and inequality, racism and corruption to be the biggest barriers to reconciliation.






## Focus on migration

Democratic South Africa has struggled to effectively manage migration and anti-migrant sentiment has periodically turned into xenophobic violence, including with the 2021 launch of Operation Dudula. Migrants' basic human rights are protected by the Constitution regardless of their status in the country, although Home Affairs minister Aaron Motsoaledi is aiming for a 'complete overhaul' of the current system – starting with a new White Paper released in November of 2023.<sup>67</sup>

Successive survey rounds since 2017 have found migrants from other African countries to be among the least trusted groups in society (Figure ii). In 2017, 40% or more of South Africans indicated that they would be likely or very likely to take action to prevent African migrants from moving into their neighbourhood, operating a business in their area, or accessing jobs or government services.

Figure ii shows declines across all four items, yet the percentages remain high. In 2023, more than a quarter of South Africans still agreed that they are likely or very likely to take these actions.

**Figure ii:** Taking action against migrants



# SOCIAL COHESION




For the first time, this year's Reconciliation Barometer uses the term 'social cohesion' in its conceptual framework. Social cohesion is a complex multidimensional concept in its own right yet provides a relevant lens for exploring what holds South Africans together – or keeps us apart – after 30 years of democracy.<sup>68</sup>

## A culture of distrust

Apartheid cultivated deep suspicion and distrust between South Africans, spreading racist propaganda, encouraging community surveillance and exacerbating divisions within the country.

South Africa remains a highly distrustful society today. In 2023, as reported in previous sections, this is true of attitudes towards leadership and public institutions as well as in relationships between people. As shown in Figure 37, only a third (34%) of South Africans describe themselves as trusting or very trusting of others, a decline from 39% in 2019.

**Figure 37:** Trust in others



The Barometer has measured attitudes towards a range of different social groups since 2017 and found South Africans to be generally distrustful towards all of them. In 2023, less than a third had a great deal or quite a lot of trust in people of other

Social cohesion  
is a complex  
multidimensional  
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us apart

racers (27%); those who speak a different first language (32%); or with a different sexual orientation (32%) (Figure 38).

Migrants from other African countries have been the least trusted group over four survey rounds. Relatives were previously the most trusted at over 60% between 2017 and 2021, but even this declined to 45% in 2023.

## Strong group association


Despite deep distrust in others, many South Africans associate strongly with people who share in aspects of their own identity. Continuing a trend established

in 2007, the highest percentages of South Africans associate most strongly with others who speak the same first language (37%) or are of the same race (16%) (Figure 39).


More than eight in ten people ascribe positive feelings to these associations, including that group belonging makes them feel good about themselves (85%), important (84%) and secure (82%). These are among the highest levels of agreement since 2007 (Figure 40).

Comparatively, in 2023 only 13% of people associated most closely with others who see themselves as South African first, despite peaks in this response category in 2019 (19%) and 2021 (20%) (Figure 39).


**Figure 38:** Trust in groups



**Figure 40:** Feelings about primary group association



**Figure 39:** Strongest group association



Note: The category 'ethnic group' was removed after 2013.




# Proudly South African

While the Barometer has always found strong group identity association, this has not detracted from a deep affinity and support for South African national identity.


In 2023, 87% of black South Africans agreed that being South African is an important part of how they see themselves – the highest rate since 2015 (Figure 41). Eighty-three per cent (83%) of Indian/Asian, 79% of coloured and 78% of white people also answered in this way, confirming a high degree of consensus that has changed very little over five survey rounds.

Eighty-three per cent (83%) of South Africans also agree that people should see themselves as South Africans first, before other groups they belong to, and that they want their children to think of themselves as South Africans. Once again, despite some fluctuation, majority consensus has remained high across all race groups (Figures 42 and 43).


**Figure 41:** Importance of national identity



**Figure 42:** Should see ourselves as South African first



**Figure 43:** Want children to think of themselves as South African



## United or divided?


Although most South Africans share in their support for national identity, there has been considerable internal contestation, polarisation and even conflict since the transition to democracy. In the past year alone, minority political groups have renewed calls for the Western Cape province to secede from the rest of the country. EFF parliamentarians continued a tradition of disrupting the president's annual State of the Nation Address (SONA). The August taxi strike led to entire parts of Cape Town shutting down for almost a whole week, with roads closed and businesses and other transport providers unable to operate. Clashes recently broke out between opposing sides during a protest over the Israel–Palestine war.<sup>69</sup>

Many South Africans agree that the country is fractured at present. As shown in Figure 44, cumulatively, 49% of people described South Africa as either somewhat or very divided, while only 30% viewed it as somewhat or very united.

South Africans also identify three leading sources of division in the country, and these have remained fairly consistent since 2003: socio-economic class, or the gap between rich and poor, remained in first position at 36% in 2023. The second biggest source of division identified is that between members of different political parties at 19%, followed by race at 13% (Figure 45).



Figure 44: How divided is South Africa?



## Support for more unity

Although half of all South Africans view the country as divided, overcoming this remains a common goal. Three-quarters (75%) of all South Africans agree that a united South Africa is desirable, and this includes a majority across all race groups (Figure 46).

There has been some fluctuation over the 20 years of the survey, including the 2013 downturn in public opinion that is evident in many time series indicators. Agreement about the desirability of a unified country has since recovered and even increased among black (75%) and Indian/Asian South Africans (87%). Agreement among white South Africans was moderate at 57% in 2003 but reached 75% in 2023. There was also majority agreement among coloured South Africans at 71% in 2023, but this has not returned to recorded levels of 84% in 2003 (Figure 46).

Seven in ten South Africans (72%) also agree that it is possible to create a united country that includes all of the different groups of people (Figure 47). Agreement that a united country is possible is slightly higher overall among black South Africans (74%) than Indian/Asian (68%), white (67%) and coloured (66%) people. There has also been considerable overall growth in agreement that unity is possible among white South Africans, from 50% in 2007 to 67% in 2023.

Altogether, 77% of South Africans believe there is more that unites us than keeps us apart, up from 70% in 2019 and 69% in 2021 (Figure 48).

Figure 46: United South Africa is desirable







Figure 45: Biggest division in South Africa



**Figure 47:** United South Africa is possible



**Figure 48:** More unites us than keeps us apart



## Key findings: Social cohesion

**Deep distrust.** South Africans continue to be distrusting of others and even trust within families has declined in recent years.

**Strong identity groups.** Most South Africans associate strongly with identity groups based on language and race, which make them feel secure, important and good about themselves.

**Resilient national identity.** National identity has been and remains very important to most South Africans.

**Income inequality continues to divide us.** Half of the country believes South Africa to be a divided society, and the gap between rich and poor has always been identified as the biggest source of division.


**Hope for a more united country.** Most South Africans still believe that a united country is both desirable and possible.



## Recovering from the Covid-19 pandemic


More than three years have passed since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. When asked about the state of the country following the pandemic, just over half of all South Africans agreed that society is stronger (55%), more caring (55%) and more united (52%) than before (Figure iii).

**Figure iii:** Social effects of Covid-19



However, South Africans were less positive about their personal circumstances as the country works towards recovery. More than half (51%) answered that their employment situation had worsened over the past year, and 43% that their financial situation had worsened. About a third answered that they were worse off in terms of hope for the future (35%), health and well-being (32%), social life (31%) and family life (30%) (Figure iv).

**Figure iv:** Personal effects of Covid-19



# PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE

## 8

Since the first round of the Reconciliation Barometer in 2003, the IJR has hypothesised that in order for reconciliation to progress, it is important for people to believe that positive change is occurring in society and to hope that the future will be better than the past.


## Expectations of socio-economic change

As discussed throughout this report, the slow pace of economic change remains a significant challenge for South Africa. Inequality is persistently high, youth in particular are excluded from the economy and poverty is widespread. The gap between rich and poor is viewed as the biggest source of internal division in the country.

Unfortunately, less than half (40%) of South Africans believe their financial situation is better than it was a few years ago, while just under a third each feel it is worse (31%) or the same (29%).

It is important for people to believe that positive change is occurring in society and to hope that the future will be better than the past

**Figure 49:** Financial situation compared to the past



Note: In 2003 and 2013, this was asked as 'compared with 12 months ago'. In 2023 it was asked as '2–3 years ago'.

Black (32%) and coloured (32%) people were slightly more likely to answer that they are financially worse off than a few years ago, when compared with white (25%) or Indian/Asian people (28%) (Figure 49).

Similarly, only 41% of South Africans felt their financial situation was better or much better than that of their parents, while 29% felt they were worse off and 30% about the same. A higher percentage of black South Africans (30%) answered that they were worse off than their parents when compared with people of other races (Figure 50).

## Changes since democracy

The Barometer also asks South Africans about the extent of change that has occurred in the country since the transition to democracy in 1994.

Assessments of improvement have generally been low from the outset, with less than a third of South Africans agreeing in 2007 that personal safety (32%), job opportunities (22%) or inequality (22%) had improved or improved a great deal (Figure 51).

Figure 50: Financial situation compared with that of parents





Figure 51: Improvements in South Africa since 1994



Note: Personal economic situation was added to the questionnaire in 2011.

Opinion on changes since democracy has remained relatively consistent. In 2023 less than a third of South Africans believed personal safety (28%), job opportunities (25%) or their own economic situation (26%) had improved or improved a great deal (Figure 51). A lower percentage of people agreed that inequality had improved in 2023 (17%) than when the question was first asked in 2007 (22%). Although more than half of South Africans (54%) thought in 2007 that relationships between people of different races had improved, this fell to 40% by 2023.

## Likelihood of future improvement

With many South Africans believing that their financial, safety and job situation has not improved, how much optimism is there about the future?

When asked about how they see the coming years, about half of all South Africans believe that respect for their mother tongue language (51%) and culture (48%) are likely to get better or much better (Figure 52). In 2023, the lowest percentages of people believed there are likely to be improvements in the areas of corruption (19%) or economic inequality (21%). Finally, 59% of people agreed that reconciliation is likely to progress in the future (Figure 53).

Figure 52: Likely to get better in the future





Figure 53: Reconciliation likely to progress



## Key findings : Perceptions of change

**Slow pace of economic change.** Less than half of all South Africans believe they are financially better off than they were a few years ago, and only about a third believe that their personal economic situation is likely to improve in the coming years.

**Limited perceptions of improvement since democracy.** Less than a third of people believe that there have been improvements in key areas including job creation, personal safety and inequality since the transition to democracy, and perceptions of improvements in relationships between people of different races have declined.

**Optimism about relationships, not governance.** South Africans are moderately optimistic that the future will bring continued improvements in relationships between people, including in areas such as reconciliation and respect for languages and cultures. Expectations of improvement are much lower, however, in key governance concerns such as inequality and corruption.



# CONCLUSION

After 20 years of rigorous public opinion research, the South African Reconciliation Barometer results show the country continues to face many complex challenges, but also that significant progress has been made.

Never before in the course of two decades has the Barometer found such profound distrust in leadership, coupled with little confidence in the critical public institutions that form the foundation for a functional democracy. South Africans have endured years of state capture and most remain deeply concerned about the consequences of corruption. There is widespread belief that perpetrators operate with impunity as well as doubt over the political will required for change.

Intransigent economic inequality continues to exclude most people from the chance to find decent employment, provide for themselves and their families and reach their personal goals. In this context, it is difficult to hope that the future will be better than the past. South Africans continue to believe that inequality is among the biggest threats to reconciliation and unless it changes, prospects for a more stable, safe, peaceful and cohesive society hang in the balance.

So far, the Barometer has found relatively low levels of civic and political participation – although service delivery protests are a mainstay of public life. However, survey results from 2023 do suggest greater interest in voting in the 2024 elections. Taken together, low political efficacy, weak institutional confidence and desire for change may result in the greatest electoral challenge to the ruling party majority to date.

Many of these issues underscore the finding that many people still view South Africa as a divided

country, in which limited progress has been made since 1994 and general distrust prevails.

Yet even amid these serious concerns, there is also evidence of resilience, positive change and reconciliation. Increasing numbers of people believe their diverse cultures and languages are respected in democratic South Africa and that this will continue into the future, deconstructing apartheid's discriminatory narratives, policies and values.

Most South Africans continue to share a common belief in the truth about the past and support teaching this to younger generations. This consensus provides an important foundation for the country to continue to grapple with ongoing questions about justice, equity, reparations and restitution.

A majority also believe in forgiving each other for what happened during apartheid and moving forward together as a united country. Strong positive associations with different identity groups have not dampened consistently high pride and enthusiasm for a shared national identity.

While there are unquestionably deep fault lines and critical areas for improvement, there is also optimism about continued reconciliation and better social relationships.

The IJR has begun planning for the next decade of the Reconciliation Barometer project. This will involve additional analysis, archiving and sharing of our historic data on this unique period in South African history. We will continue to review, validate and strengthen the Barometer's conceptual framework, measurement domains and indicators. We look forward to continuing

and establishing new partnerships in other post-conflict societies, expanding our evolving understanding of reconciliation and producing new theory.

The Barometer results after 20 years also point to key areas for urgent work by government and elected representatives, as well as CSOs, advocacy organisations and citizens.

Importantly, progress in reconciliation depends on creating a more equitable and inclusive economy, and this is an urgent governance priority.

Considerable work is needed to rebuild trust and confidence in the government and leadership. The clear starting point is decisive action showing that the state capture era is over, the rule of law prevails and corruption will no longer be tolerated.

Finally, this is an important moment for South Africa to recommit to its next generation of engaged, active citizens. Universal history education and an improved curriculum can ensure that the lessons learned from the past endure even as time passes, and that together we commit to continued and lasting solutions.



# ANNEX A: SARB HYPOTHESES

The following tables contain the Reconciliation Barometer hypotheses used during the first and second decade of the survey. Work is currently under way to review, revise and validate these hypotheses for the next phase of the project.

**Table 1: SA Reconciliation Barometer hypotheses and indicators, 2003–2013**

Hypothesis	Indicators
<b>Human security:</b> If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with each other and the larger system.	Physical security; economic security; cultural security.
<b>Political culture:</b> If citizens view the institutions, leadership and culture of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	Justifiability of extra-legal action; legitimacy of leadership and Parliament; respect for the rule of law.
<b>Cross-cutting political relationships:</b> If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	Commitment to national unity; multiracial political parties.
<b>Historical confrontation:</b> If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	Acknowledgement of the injustice of apartheid; forgiveness; reduced vengeance.
<b>Race relations:</b> If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	Interracial contact; preconceptions; tolerance.
<b>Dialogue:</b> If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely to be advanced.	Commitment to more dialogue.
<b>ONLY 2003 ROUND Commitment to socio-economic development:</b> If citizens are able to commit themselves to transformation and redress, the national reconciliation process is more likely to progress.	Willingness to compromise.

**Table 2: SA Reconciliation Barometer hypotheses and indicators, 2015–2021**

Hypothesis	Indicators
<p><b>Power relations:</b> Unjust/unequal power relations between social groups (e.g. race/class) hinder progress towards reconciliation. More just and equitable power relations would create a more fertile environment for reconciliation. Limited to perceptual data, we have chosen to measure this by asking about access to economic, social, cultural and spatial resources within society. This concept is measured through these sub-indicators, each of which demonstrates difference perceptions of access to realms of power in society.</p>	<p>Economic access; social access; cultural access; spatial access.</p>
<p><b>Democratic political culture:</b> Reconciliation is more likely to thrive in a society where there is a growing democratic political culture. This is evident when citizens feel part of an inclusive nation, participate in the political process, feel the government is legitimately elected, respect the rule of law, and support democratic political institutions.</p>	<p>Political community; political efficacy; the rule of law; confidence in democratic institutions.</p>
<p><b>Apartheid legacy:</b> In order for reconciliation to take root in South Africa, it is necessary, firstly, to acknowledge and deal with the legacy of direct, structural and symbolic violence and oppression suffered under apartheid, and, secondly, to support initiatives aimed at the redress of this legacy.</p>	<p>Acknowledging the injustice of apartheid; acknowledging the legacy of apartheid; support for redress and transformation.</p>
<p><b>Racial reconciliation:</b> Progress towards reconciliation cannot take place without the opportunities and willingness to engage in meaningful connection between different race groups in South Africa.</p>	<p>Willingness to tolerate; willingness to confront racism; formal opportunities to engage; spontaneous opportunities to engage.</p>
<p><b>Improvement in reconciliation:</b> For reconciliation to advance, South Africans should feel connected to the concept (i.e. they can understand and articulate the meaning of reconciliation) and have experienced it in their own lives. Reconciliation is a complex concept with different meanings. This indicator attempts to ascertain the subjective meaning of reconciliation held by respondents, and, according to their subjective meaning, to measure perceptions of improvement.</p>	<p>Meaning of reconciliation; perceived improvement in reconciliation.</p>
<p><b>Perceptions of change:</b> For reconciliation to advance, it is important for citizens to perceive positive change within society with regard to the past and the future.</p>	<p>Material change; psychological change; hope for the future.</p>

## ANNEX B: SARB SAMPLE

**Table 3: SA Reconciliation Barometer unweighted sample, 2023**

Race	N (2 006)	%
Black	1 160	57.8
Coloured	358	17.8
White	359	17.9
Indian/Asian	129	6.4
Sex	N	%
Male	907	45.2
Female	1 096	54.6
Age group	N	%
18–24	226	11.3
25–34	478	23.8
35–44	503	25.1
45–54	381	19.0
55+	418	20.8
Province	N	%
Eastern Cape	276	13.8
Free State	176	8.8
Gauteng	453	22.6
KwaZulu-Natal	360	17.9
Limpopo	95	4.7
Mpumalanga	103	5.1
Northern Cape	66	3.3
North West	107	5.3
Western Cape	370	18.4
Annual household income (using NLI)	N	%
Low income (< R137 000)	951	47.4
Middle income (R137 001 to R620 000)	707	35.2
Upper income (> R620 001)	348	17.3



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# NOTES

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## **ABOUT THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION (IJR)**

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), established in 2000, is a leading pan-African organisation that works collaboratively with governments, inter-governmental and civil society actors to contribute towards building fair, democratic, inclusive and peaceful societies across the continent, through peacebuilding interventions that are informed by a transitional justice lens.

The IJR is a trusted knowledge producer on global, continental and national reconciliation and transitional justice issues. Through its pioneering South African Reconciliation Barometer It has also positioned itself as a provider of choice of reliable quantitative data on public perceptions of social cohesion and reconciliation.

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We welcome collaboration with like-minded partners and invite you to find out more about our work on our website: [www.ijr.org.za](http://www.ijr.org.za).

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