

SA Reconciliation Barometer 2021

SA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER SURVEY: 2021 REPORT



SA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER SURVEY 2021 REPORT

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CONTENTS

Figures and tables	iv
Abbreviations and acronyms	v
Executive summary	vi
1 The Year 2021	1
2 Methodology.....	7
3 Reconciliation and social cohesion	11
4 Effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.....	17
5 Interpersonal trust and relations.....	25
6 Democratic political culture.....	31
7 National identity, unity and nation-building	39
8 Apartheid legacy and perceptions of change.....	45
Appendix A: Methodology	48

FIGURES AND TABLES

- Figure 1: Perceived reconciliation progress, SARB 2021
- Figure 2: Groups responsible for reconciliation, SARB 2021
- Figure 3: Importance of institutions in the reconciliation process, SARB 2021
- Figure 4: Evaluation of government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, SARB 2021
- Figure 5: Prospects for the future since the COVID-19 pandemic, SARB 2021
- Figure 6: Groups most in need of assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic, SARB 2021
- Figure 7: Feeling closer to particular groups since the pandemic, SARB 2021
- Figure 8: Experience of livelihood shocks, SARB 2021
- Figure 9: Groups that have been the most financially supportive during the pandemic, SARB 2021
- Figure 10: Interpersonal trust, SARB 2021
- Figure 11: Frequency of interracial interaction, SARB 2021
- Figure 12: Likelihood of preventing people from other African countries accessing services and activities, SARB 2021
- Figure 13: Confidence in institutions, SARB 2021
- Figure 14: High levels of confidence in institutions over time, SARB 2017–2021
- Figure 15: Political efficacy, voting efficacy and populist sentiments, SARB 2021
- Figure 16: Citizens' political participation, SARB 2021
- Figure 17: South Africans who have used, or will use, violence for a political cause, SARB 2015–2021
- Figure 18: Agreement with the rule of law, SARB 2021
- Figure 19: Perceptions of national unity and identity, SARB 2021
- Figure 20: Agreement on the desirability and possibility of unity, SARB 2003–2021
- Figure 21: Agreement on views of apartheid, SARB 2021
- Figure 22: Legacies of apartheid, SARB 2021
- Table 1: Reported meaning of reconciliation, SARB 2021
- Table 2: Biggest concerns for South Africans during the COVID-19 pandemic, SARB 2021
- Table 3: Biggest divisions in society, SARB 2021
- Table i: SARB hypotheses and indicators, 2003–2013
- Table iii: SARB hypotheses and indicators, 2015 onwards
- Table iii: Realised sample vs weighted sample, SARB 2021

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
DA	Democratic Alliance
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
GDP	gross domestic product
IEC	Electoral Commission of South Africa
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
LGEs	local-government elections
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NIDS-CRAM	National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
NPO	non-profit organisation
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SARB	South African Reconciliation Barometer
SARS	South African Revenue Service
SEM	Socio-Economic Measure
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2021 South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB), a nationally representative public-opinion survey conducted regularly by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), aims to provide a measure of several aspects of public opinion.

The first introductory section outlines the context within which the survey was conducted. This it does by reflecting on the past two years since the last survey. The COVID-19 pandemic, the unrest seen in the KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng provinces, and the outcomes of the recent local-government elections (LGEs) all show how much has changed in South African society recently. It is likely that each of these, along with broader structural and historical considerations, has influenced South Africans' opinions in the survey.

The second introductory section outlines the methodology of the survey. The SARB was conducted via face-to-face interviews in multiple languages in all nine provinces. At all times during the interviews, all relevant COVID-19 restrictions were adhered to. The sample size is just under 2 400 people and the data is broadly reflective of the adult population as a whole.

In the first thematic section, Section 3, the 2021 SARB explores the concepts of reconciliation and social cohesion. As the longest-running reconciliation barometer anywhere in the world, the SARB continually provides South Africans with an opportunity to define what reconciliation means to them. Reconciliation is a contested and nebulous concept and South Africans attach many kinds of meanings to it, most notably those of forgiveness and peace. The data also shows that most South Africans believe that reconciliation is still necessary in South Africa, and that everybody has a part to play in the process.

The second thematic section, Section 4, explores the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on South Africans. Several questions in the 2021 SARB aimed to explore South Africans' assessment of their government's performance, the livelihood shocks they experienced, and the level of social solidarity they had seen in their communities. The survey reveals that most respondents have experienced personal loss over the last six months and close to half of all respondents underwent severe financial shocks. Section 4 highlights the dire circumstances many South Africans experienced over the last year and the resilience many households had to develop.

The third theme explored in the 2021 SARB, in Section 5, is interpersonal trust. This section shows that there is a significant trust deficit in South African society, where circles of trust are small and people that fall outside these circles – those from different cultural backgrounds – are mistrusted by many South Africans. Interracial interaction is most likely to occur in public areas and mostly does not occur within the private sphere. Trust is central to building a more cohesive society and mistrust can foster feelings of enmity, such as xenophobia, or a greater propensity for conflict.

MOST SOUTH AFRICANS, DESPITE THEIR DIFFERENCES, GENERALLY AGREE ON STATEMENTS ABOUT THEIR NATIONAL IDENTITY AND EXPRESS PRIDE IN IT.

The fourth theme, explored in Section 6, focuses on democratic political culture, that is, it reflects on the state of South Africa's democracy. Similar to the findings on trust, South Africans generally have low levels of confidence in public institutions and their representatives. Moreover, most respondents would prefer to have a greater say on political issues and governance, as they do not see their representatives as acting in their best interests. Aside from voting, many respondents also engage in democracy by coming together in their communities to debate issues collectively.

The fifth thematic section, Section 7, explores the idea of national identity and nation-building. Most South Africans, despite their differences, generally agree on statements about their national identity and express pride in it. There is also clear support among most respondents for the possibility and desirability of South Africa being a united nation comprised of different groups. A shared identity is crucial in overcoming differences that may lead to conflict or mistrust. Inequality and divisions between racial groups are identified as the primary obstacles to a more cohesive society.

The final section, Section 8, explores the legacies of apartheid in South Africa. The vast majority of respondents agree that apartheid was a dark period in South African history, and that certain groups benefitted while the majority were deprived of equal rights and opportunities. South Africans also agree that apartheid's legacies continue to shape present-day South Africa and that not enough has been done to redress the inequalities, dispossession and hurt of the past.



THE YEAR 2021

Since the release of the last survey report of the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) in December 2019,¹ several major events have altered the trajectory of South African society. The 2021 SARB survey occurred during an extraordinary period in South African and global history and the findings, compared with those of previous rounds, are likely to reflect these circumstances.

The first and most prominent development has been the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, the South African government introduced one of the world's strictest national lockdowns, with severe restrictions on movement and trade being imposed on individuals and businesses to curb the spread of the virus.² During these first few weeks, the government and President Cyril Ramaphosa were commended for their proactive approach to mitigating the effects of the pandemic, compared with other countries – which were slow to realise the gravity and immediacy of the impending health crisis.³ However, the government's efforts were soon criticised for their arbitrary restrictions, the severity with which restrictions were enforced, and reports of corruption and misappropriation of emergency funds for public-health services. Despite the harsh restrictions, the number of identified COVID-19 cases rose precipitously in mid-2020.⁴ Official data from the Department of Health notes that, at the end of October 2021, South Africa had recorded close to three million positive cases of COVID-19 and 90 000 COVID-19 deaths.⁵ Of even graver concern is the number of excess deaths, a measure of above-average mortality, recorded in South Africa, with demographers estimating that there were close to 270 000 excess deaths between May 2020 and November 2021, many of which could be attributed to unconfirmed COVID-19 deaths.⁶ COVID-19 has had a devastating impact on South Africa, from reducing life

1 Potgieter, E. 2019. *SA Reconciliation Barometer: 2019 Report*. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Available online: <https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/sa-reconciliation-barometer-2019/>.

2 Wiysonge, C. S. 2020. South Africa's War on COVID-19. *Think Global Health*, 20 April. Available online: <https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/south-africas-war-covid-19>.

3 October, A. 2020. Ramaphosa's COVID-19 battleplan widely welcomed. *Daily Maverick*, 18 March. Available online: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-03-18-ramaphosas-covid-19-battleplan-widely-welcomed/>.

4 BBC. 2020. Coronavirus: South Africa COVID-19 deaths 'to soar' in coming months. 20 May. Available online: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52745235>.

5 Department of Health. 2021. Update on COVID-19 (Monday 01 November 2021)'. 1 November. Available online: <https://sacoronavirus.co.za/2021/11/01/update-on-covid-19-monday-01-november-2021/>.

6 South African Medical Research Council. 2021. Report on weekly deaths in South Africa. 3 November. Available online: <https://www.samrc.ac.za/reports/report-weekly-deaths-south-africa?bc=254>.

expectancy across the country;⁷ to exacerbating the economic recession,⁸ or altering the relationships between citizens and their state.

The second major shock to South African society and the economy occurred in July 2021, when parts of the two most populous provinces, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, were gripped by several days of rioting, looting and public violence.⁹ Over 300 people were killed in the mayhem that ensued across these provinces, while certain communities resorted to armed self-defence and patrolling their neighbourhoods in the absence of sufficient security enforcement.¹⁰ Damage to property and businesses totalled billions of rand and several thousand workers lost their jobs when workplaces were closed or destroyed.¹¹ National infrastructure, including sites used for telecommunications, energy provision and logistics, was caught in the crossfire of the riots, with several organisations and state officials suggesting that these were acts of coordinated sabotage.¹² President Ramaphosa, in a national address, stated that the riots were an uprising that constituted an attack on South Africa's democracy and claimed that security agencies had identified several instigators of the violence.¹³ Although several months have passed since the chaos of July, there has been relatively little official interest in highlighting the causes and reprimanding coordinators of the unrest, with opposition parties suggesting that several instigators were recalcitrant members of factions within the ruling party.¹⁴

The catalyst for the unrest was the arrest of former President Jacob Zuma for having been found in contempt of court by the Constitutional Court for failing to appear before the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture.¹⁵ Zuma's presidency was marked by high-profile corruption scandals involving allegations relating to personal enrichment and the use of state institutions to benefit his business associates. Zuma remains a polarising figure, being unpopular among most South Africans,¹⁶ but his supporters are concentrated in his home province of KwaZulu-Natal. His arrest occurred under a cloud of public interest, with news channels broadcasting live outside his home in anticipation of his arrest, which occurred in a dramatic manner close to midnight. Soon after Zuma's arrest, reports of protesting and rioting emerged from Durban, the major national port city of the country and the largest city in KwaZulu-Natal, and quickly spread to other parts of the province and to Gauteng.¹⁷ Several journalists, analysts and opposition-party members have alleged that the riots were

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- 7 Statistics South Africa. 2021. COVID-19 epidemic reduces life expectancy in 2021. 19 July. Available online: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14519>.
 - 8 Statistics South Africa. 2020. Steep slump in GDP as COVID-19 takes its toll on the economy. 8 September. Available online: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=13601>.
 - 9 Shoki, W. 2021. South Africa is falling apart. *New York Times*, 28 July. Available online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/28/opinion/south-africa-violence-anc.html>.
 - 10 Davis, R., Nicolson, G. and Simelane, B. 2021. July unrest: What really happened in Phoenix? *Daily Maverick*, 8 August. Available online: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-08-08-july-unrest-what-really-happened-in-phoenix/>.
 - 11 Mthethwa, C. 2021. #Unrest SA: Cost of damage to KZN at least R2bn – Premier Sihle Zikalala. *News24*, 3 August. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/unrest-sa-cost-of-damage-to-kzn-at-least-r2bn-premier-sihle-zikalala-20210803>.
 - 12 Hunter, Q., Singh, K. and Wicks, J. 2021. Excerpt: Eight days in July: Inside the Zuma unrest that set South Africa alight. *News24*, 8 November. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/news24/books/excerpt-eight-days-in-july-inside-the-zuma-unrest-that-set-south-africa-alight-20211108>.
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 - 15 IOL. 2021. Zuma arrest saga: A timeline of events. 7 July. Available online: <https://www.iol.co.za/mercury/news/zuma-arrest-saga-a-timeline-of-events-fa418067-8a70-42d7-a12f-207bf212d9bb>.
 - 16 Mattes, R. 2018. Survey shows Zuma and ANC's mutual dance to the bottom. *The Conversation*, 11 March. Available online: <https://theconversation.com/survey-shows-zuma-and-ancs-mutual-dance-to-the-bottom-92126>.
 - 17 Hunter, Q., Singh, K. and Wicks, J. 2021. Excerpt: Eight days in July: Inside the Zuma unrest that set South Africa alight. *News24*, 8 November. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/news24/books/excerpt-eight-days-in-july-inside-the-zuma-unrest-that-set-south-africa-alight-20211108>.

THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC HAS CERTAINLY EXACERBATED EXISTING SOCIAL PROBLEMS, BUT IT HAS ALSO LAID BARE JUST HOW VULNERABLE SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY, FROM PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS TO HOUSEHOLDS, IS TO PERIODS OF CRISIS.

orchestrated by Zuma's supporters – many of whom have links to the former armed liberation movement and organised-crime networks – as a response to the state's insistence on arresting a figure alleged to have facilitated state corruption and financial crime.¹⁸ This line of analysis suggests that the response to Zuma's arrest was a reminder of the power of his supporters and their capacity to destabilise areas of the country, sabotage public infrastructure and undermine the legitimacy of the state.¹⁹

The final major development in South African politics and society relates to the local-government elections (LGEs). For the first time in the history of democratic South Africa, the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), received less than a majority of the national vote share. Despite the proposals to postpone the LGEs due to insufficient vaccine coverage and the threat of COVID-19 infections,²⁰ the elections were held on 1 November 2021. Going into the elections, the ANC's electoral dominance was hampered by several issues, including corruption scandals within government, an economy in which high levels of unemployment have surged, scheduled electricity blackouts occurring almost daily, and a generally poor record of governance at a local level.²¹ The main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), had thus far been unable to capitalise effectively on the ANC's decline, and their prospects for growth were limited by the emergence of new parties, such as Action SA, and voters turning towards smaller, more nationalist parties, such as the Freedom Front Plus.²² South Africa's third-largest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), did not grow its share of the vote, which remained around 10% of all votes.²³

18 See, for example, Poplak, R. 2021. This is what a failed state looks like. *Daily Maverick*, 14 July. Available online: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-14-this-is-what-a-failed-state-looks-like/>; *New Frame*. 2021. Editorial: The fire this time. 16 July. <https://www.newframe.com/the-fire-this-time/>; Haffajee, F. 2021. Good Party sends explosive evidence to Hawks unit of 26 individuals directly implicated in SA's July unrest. *Daily Maverick*, 4 August. Available online: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-08-04-good-party-sends-explosive-evidence-to-hawks-unit-of-26-individuals-directly-implicated-in-sas-july-unrest/>.

19 Fogel, B. 2021. The insurrection in South Africa is about more than freeing Zuma. *Al Jazeera*, 20 July. Available online: <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/7/20/the-insurrection-in-south-africa-is-about-more-than-freeing-zuma>.

20 Masuabi, Q. 2021. IEC to decide on local elections after Moseneke recommends postponement. *City Press*, 20 July. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/iec-to-decide-on-local-elections-after-moseneke-recommends-postponement-20210720>.

21 Khoza, A. 2021. Ramaphosa intends using local government election campaign to unify the ANC. *TimesLIVE*, 9 October. Available online: <https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2021-10-09-ramaphosa-intends-using-local-government-election-campaign-to-unify-the-anc/>.

22 Resnick, D. 2021. South Africa's municipal elections: A referendum on political parties and local democracy. *Brookings Institution*, 28 October. Available online: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/10/28/south-africas-municipal-elections-a-referendum-on-political-parties-and-local-democracy/>.

23 Du Toit, P. 2021. Explainer: What happened in the 2021 municipal election: Who won, who lost and what now? *News24*, 5 November. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/news24/analysis/explainer-what-happened-in-the-2021-municipal-election-who-won-who-lost-and-what-now-20211105>.



The ANC's declining vote share has meant that almost all major cities in South Africa, except for Cape Town where the DA has a majority, will have to be governed by coalition agreements.²⁴ City councils governed via coalitions have previously been mired in partisan disagreements, to the detriment of governance and service delivery. Looking ahead, political parties which form part of local governing coalitions will have to learn how to cooperate across partisan lines, especially if they are to avoid being punished by voters in subsequent elections.²⁵ More broadly, the ANC's steep and steady decline in votes over the last decade indicates that the national elections in 2024 may result in some form of coalition government.²⁶ Power-sharing and compromise are going to become increasingly common arrangements in South African politics.

While there have been major shifts and upheavals over the last two years, there has also been significant continuity in many areas. For example, the previous SARB survey report in 2019 highlighted the importance of rising levels of unemployment, particularly for young people.²⁷ In 2021, many major economic trends have continued since 2019, with the unemployment rate rising from 23% to 32.6% in the first quarters of 2019 and 2021 respectively.²⁸ The unemployment rate is both a cause and an outcome of low levels of growth in the national economy. In 2020, South Africa registered a negative growth in gross domestic product (GDP) of 6.4%, while the recovery in 2021 has been much slower. Real GDP in the second quarter of 2021 was still 1.4% lower than the first quarter of 2020.²⁹ In other areas such as safety and security, levels of reported crimes in 2021 have increased significantly since 2020, when there were many restrictions on movement, and continued the upward incidence trend over the last few years.³⁰ Gender-based violence has also continued unabated, with some restrictions imposed by the lockdown exacerbating existing relationships of abuse while there are insufficient resources for survivors.³¹ Over the last two years, South African society has been characterised by the upheaval caused by recent local and global developments, as well as the persistence of structural and systemic issues inherited from its past.

The 2021 SARB survey occurred during a turbulent period in South Africa's recent history. Politically, it is clear that the dominant governing party is experiencing a period of decline, whereas the landscape of opposition politics is dynamic and fast-moving. Socially, it is clear that there are significant issues of mistrust along the many social fissures in society and across racial lines, coupled with high rates of crime and violence – all of which are compounded by extreme inequalities. Economically, 2021 has been an exceptionally challenging year for most people, as the country saw record levels of unemployment, a surge in applications for social assistance, as well as rising levels of inflation. The COVID-19 pandemic has certainly exacerbated existing social problems, but it has also laid bare just how vulnerable South African society, from public institutions to households, is to periods of crisis.

24 Grootes, S. 2021. Coalition haggling enters final few days with not much agreement – and a rerun election might favour the ANC. *Daily Maverick*, 16 November. Available online: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-16-coalition-haggling-enters-final-few-days-with-not-much-agreement-and-a-rerun-election-might-favour-the-anc/>.

25 Tandwa, L. & Harper, P. 2021. The future is coalitions as parties battle it out for your municipality. *Mail & Guardian*, 4 November. Available online: <https://mg.co.za/politics/2021-11-04-the-future-is-coalitions-as-parties-battle-it-out-for-your-municipality/>.

26 Qobo, M. 2021. Coalition of the disastrous with the unpalatable. *Mail & Guardian*, 25 November. Available online: <https://mg.co.za/opinion/2021-11-25-coalition-of-the-disastrous-with-the-unpalatable/>.

27 Potgieter, E. 2019. *SA Reconciliation Barometer: 2019 Report*. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Available online: <https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/sa-reconciliation-barometer-2019/>.

28 Statistics South Africa. 2021. *Quarterly Labour Force Survey – Quarter 2: 2021*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Available online: <https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2021.pdf>.

29 Statistics South Africa. 2021. The economy grows by 1,2% in Q2:2021. 7 September. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Available online: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14660>.

30 Lancaster, L. 2021. South Africa needs a murder reduction strategy. *ISS Today*, 14 June. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Available online: <https://issafrika.org/iss-today/south-africa-needs-a-murder-reduction-strategy>.

31 Human Rights Watch. 2021. *South Africa: Broken promises to aid gender-based violence survivors*. Johannesburg: Human Rights Watch. Available online: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/24/south-africa-broken-promises-aid-gender-based-violence-survivors>.



METHODOLOGY

2

The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) is a cross-sectional, iterative public-opinion survey conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa on a regular basis since 2003. It is the world's longest-running public-opinion survey on national reconciliation and provides a nationally representative measure of South Africans' attitudes to reconciliation and several other important social and political indicators.

Questionnaire development and conceptual framework³²

To date, a total of 17 rounds of the survey have been conducted. The SARB went to field twice, in 2003 and 2004, and then once annually until 2013. Subsequently, the survey has been fielded biennially, with the most recent round carried out in 2021.

From 2003 to 2013, the survey used a quantitative questionnaire with approximately 100 items, most using the five-point Likert scale response format. This set of questionnaire items was revised and adapted over time based on pilot studies and changes in public discourse. However, the core set of survey items remained consistent throughout these changes to ensure continuity of time series analysis and comparisons. The SARB questionnaire is furthermore grounded in relevant qualitative research, conducted by the IJR in the form of focus-group discussions in 2001 and 2011.

In 2013 and 2014, the SARB survey instrument underwent an extensive review in order to improve the survey questionnaire in its conceptualisation and measurement of key constructs and variables. This process was concluded in early 2015 and the new survey was fielded later that year. The new survey builds on the strengths of the previous survey by improving the robustness of measurement scales and individual items.

Other than for measurement purposes, the regular review and revision of the survey ensured that the SARB was, and continues to remain, conceptually relevant and contemporary in the context of the various social, political, economic and cultural changes experienced in the country since the SARB's inception.

Questionnaires for the 2003 to 2013 rounds followed a set of hypotheses relating to:

- Human security;
- Political culture;
- Cross-cutting political relationships;

³² See Appendix A for the detailed conceptual frameworks.

METHODOLOGY / CONTINUED

- Historical confrontation;
- Race relations;
- Dialogue; and
- Commitment to socio-economic development (2003 only).

In 2014, following extensive reliability and validity testing, the survey was updated for a new iteration. Since 2015, the SARB questionnaire has been built around specific conceptual domains, namely:

- Power relations;
- Democratic political culture;
- Apartheid legacy;
- Racial reconciliation;
- Improvement in reconciliation; and
- Perception of change.

Fieldwork and data collection

All SARB rounds were conducted by means of face-to-face interviews, with the 2003 to 2015 rounds being conducted in six languages – English, Afrikaans, isiZulu, Sesotho, isiXhosa and Setswana – according to the preference of the respondent. The 2017, 2019 and 2021 questionnaires were administered in English, isiZulu, isiXhosa, Sesotho and Afrikaans according to the preference of the respondent. Back-checks of interviews conducted by each fieldworker were done to ensure accuracy and consistency. Participation is always voluntary, based on full informed consent, and participants are free to withdraw from the survey at any time during the interview. No incentives are offered to respondents for their participation.

From 2003 to 2013, the SARB survey was conducted by Ipsos as part of its annual Khayabus survey focused on social and political trends. In each round, Ipsos selected a nationally representative sample of the South African adult population. The 2015 to 2021 rounds were conducted as stand-alone surveys by Kantar Public using a nationally representative sample of the South African adult population. Stratified random-sampling designs were employed in all SARB iterations, and all SARB datasets were returned to the IJR in SPSS files, with a weighting variable to ensure national representivity.

The sampling approach employed for the 2021 SARB survey was consistent with previous SARB data-collection rounds, that is, a stratified, multistage random-sample design was used. Province, race and geographic area (metro/non-metro) were taken as the explicit stratification variables to ensure that good coverage and the best possible precision per stratum were achieved. Variables such as district and local municipality, main place and sub-place were used as implicit stratification variables to improve the representativeness of the sample. The total sample size for the 2021 round is around 2 400 respondents. Fieldwork for the 2021 round took place during October and November 2021. All COVID-related restrictions and precautionary measures, such as mask-wearing and social distancing, were adhered to during the fieldwork.

For the 2021 dataset, sample weights were benchmarked to the Statistics South Africa's (StatsSA) 2021 mid-year population estimates. The weights were within acceptable limits, with no observed abnormal or unusual skews. The final dataset was weighted to correct any disproportions that may have occurred due to several factors: unequal inclusion probabilities; non-response; and non-coverage and skewness resulting from sample design and fieldwork. The benchmark variables used in the integrated weighting are as follows: province, race, gender and age group.³³

33 See Appendix A for realised vs weighted samples.

PARTICIPATION IS ALWAYS VOLUNTARY,
BASED ON FULL INFORMED CONSENT,
AND PARTICIPANTS ARE FREE TO WITHDRAW
FROM THE SURVEY AT ANY TIME DURING
THE INTERVIEW.

Reporting considerations

This report provides an overview of South African public opinion in relation to reconciliation as per the conceptual framework explained. All reported data has been weighted (unless stated otherwise) to be nationally representative of the adult South African population (18 years and older). Data has generally been analysed and presented using several key demographics, including age groups, geographic location, gender/sex,³⁴ (historically defined) race categories,³⁵ and Socio-Economic Measure (SEM) categories.³⁶ Notes have been made for each measurement, indicating the exact questions asked and the response categories for each question. All data presented in this report is from the SARB survey conducted in 2021, unless stated otherwise.

The IJR grants access, on an application basis, to SARB survey datasets for purposes of secondary analysis. Researchers, civil society organisations, academics and students are encouraged to contact the Institute with regard to access requests. The most recent survey's data is, however, embargoed until the completion of the following survey round.³⁷

34 Survey response categories for the 'gender' demographic variable include 'male' and 'female'. The IJR recognises that this approach is binary, and recognises the conceptual difference between sex – which refers to physical characteristics assigned by birth – and gender – which refers to identity innate to respondents.

35 It is not the intent of the IJR to endorse the continued use of apartheid or colonial racial categories in South Africa. The use of such categories here are for analytical purposes only. In the report, survey responses are presented according to race categories where this is analytically meaningful and deemed relevant to the tracking of public opinion.

36 The SEM is used to consider the socio-economic circumstances of respondents. The SEM can be regarded as the successor to the Living Standard Measure (LSM), focusing more on lifestyles than durables as with the LSM. More information on the SEM is available on the website of the Publisher Research Council of South Africa.

37 See Appendix A for a note on SARB reports and data availability.



RECONCILIATION AND SOCIAL COHESION

3

The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) measures South Africans' perceptions on a range of issues relevant to social cohesion and reconciliation. Reconciliation emerged as a popular concept during the democratic transition in the 1990s as a means to both minimise the prospect of conflict and enmity between previously segregated groups and to foster an inclusive form of democratic citizenship. In contemporary South Africa, for reconciliation to remain relevant, South Africans should feel that they understand the concept of reconciliation and be able to say whether there has been some form of reconciliation in their lives or across society. The SARB asks South Africans to articulate their subjective definition of reconciliation and, using respondents' definitions, to measure public perceptions of reconciliation.

What does reconciliation mean?

Reconciliation is a complex and contested term, especially in South Africa with its long history of segregation and domination. To better understand what South Africans infer from the term, the SARB asks respondents to identify the primary connotations associated with reconciliation from a list of options. Respondents are given three responses, which allows for a broader range of responses and a ranking of multiple responses. The survey therefore allows respondents to select their own subjective definition of reconciliation. Other questions in the SARB relate to evaluations of reconciliation should be understood through respondents' subjective definitions of reconciliation.

The 2021 SARB survey shows that the meaning of reconciliation most identified by respondents is 'forgiveness', ranking first among respondents' first (15%) and combined (39%) mentions (Table 1). The second-most common meaning attached to reconciliation is 'peace' (31%), followed by 'making amends' (25%) as the third-most chosen meaning of reconciliation.

RECONCILIATION AND SOCIAL COHESION / CONTINUED

Meaning	Combined response	First mention	Second mention	Third mention
Forgiveness	39%	15%	13%	11%
Peace	31%	9%	11%	10%
Making amends	25%	8%	8%	9%
Moving on	25%	9%	8%	8%
Respect	23%	8%	8%	7%
Improving relationships	23%	6%	8%	9%
Truth	23%	7%	8%	8%
Justice	22%	7%	7%	8%
Democracy	18%	6%	6%	7%
Addressing racism	14%	4%	5%	5%
Compromise	13%	4%	5%	4%
Retribution	13%	4%	4%	5%
Dialogue	9%	2%	4%	3%
Memorialisation	7%	2%	2%	3%
No meaning	5%	4%	0%	1%
Other	1%	0%	0%	0%
Don't know	8%	5%	1%	2%

Table 1 shows what values South Africans associate with the term 'reconciliation'. Many of these values are indicative of the influence of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), with its emphasis on truth-telling and forgiveness to overcome historical conflicts.³⁹ Although the idea of reconciliation – and the entire TRC process – in South Africa has come under renewed scrutiny, very few respondents (5%) reported that it has 'no meaning'.

Reconciliation progress?


South Africans' perceptions of reconciliation are shaped by their definition of, and the meaning attached to, the term. When evaluating whether there is still a need for reconciliation or whether South Africans have experienced reconciliation, the definitions selected by respondents will shape their responses.

Figure 1 shows that only a minority of South Africans (46%) have personally experienced reconciliation since the end of apartheid, while only a small majority (52%) agree that South Africans have made progress in reconciling. When asked to evaluate the efficacy of the TRC, a larger share of respondents agree (58%) that it provided a good foundation for national reconciliation. Finally, although Figure 1 suggests that many South Africans have not experienced reconciliation, it also shows that a substantial majority of respondents (72%) agree that South Africans still need reconciliation.

38 Respondents were asked: 'What, if anything, does "reconciliation" mean to you?'. The response options are as per Table 1, with three responses requested from each respondent. 'Don't know' and 'Refused' responses are excluded.

39 Burton, M. I. 2017. *The Truth and Reconciliation Commission*. Johannesburg: Jacana.

FIGURE 1: Perceived reconciliation progress, SARB 2021⁴⁰




Reconciliation role players

Building on the findings of Figure 1, where respondents state that South Africa is still in need of reconciliation, the SARB asks several questions related to the role players in the reconciliation process. If only a minority of South Africans report that they have personally experienced reconciliation, which groups of people should take the greatest responsibility in the reconciliation process?

A small majority of South Africans (51%) agree that all South Africans should bear the responsibility of ensuring reconciliation in South Africa, including the groups that were oppressed and not oppressed under apartheid (Figure 2). The second-most common response indicated that nearly one in four South Africans (23%) believe that the greatest responsibility for ensuring reconciliation should lie mostly with those who were oppressed under apartheid, while a further 9% say that only those formerly oppressed should be responsible. Only 16% of respondents believe the responsibility should mostly or exclusively be that of those who were not oppressed under apartheid.

FIGURE 2: Groups responsible for reconciliation, SARB 2021⁴¹



In addition to identifying the groups and individuals that should form part of the reconciliation process, Figure 3 highlights the importance of particular institutions. Close to half of all respondents (47%) believe that they personally, along with their loved ones, are very important to the reconciliation process, while a further 24% said this group is quite important (Figure 3). Less than 10% of respondents (8%) said that they

40 Respondents were asked: 'Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?'. The statements are as indicated in Figure 1. Response categories include 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree'), 'Neither agree nor disagree', 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree'). 'Don't know' responses were excluded.


41 Respondents were asked: 'Who do you think should take the greatest responsibility for ensuring reconciliation in South Africa?'. 'Don't know' responses were excluded.



are personally only a little important for reconciliation. This finding indicates that South Africans perceive reconciliation to be a personal process and that individuals and families are the primary role players in reconciliation.

Religious and faith-based organisations are also perceived to be either very (40%) or quite important (27%) to the reconciliation process by about two in three South Africans (67%). Most South Africans also identify the private sector as an important role player in reconciliation, with 63% of respondents reporting that business is very or quite important, and there is also a high degree of support for civil and community organisations. National government and elected representatives are considered important for reconciliation, but this institution ranks lowest on the list. South Africans' perceptions of the importance of various institutions in the reconciliation process indicates an emphasis on a 'bottom-up' approach, where the responsibility lies with individuals and families, as opposed to a 'top-down' approach led by the state.

FIGURE 3: Importance of institutions in the reconciliation process, SARB 2021⁴²




In summary

Reconciliation is a contested term, especially in the context of post-apartheid South Africa. A history of exploitation and segregation has meant that the country's diverse groups have struggled to participate as equal members of the national and political community. In democratic South Africa, with its progressive emphasis on equality of opportunity and legislative equality, reconciliation serves to further engender sentiments of overcoming the difficulties of a shared and violent past.

What does reconciliation mean to South Africans? The 2021 SARB shows that South Africans attach many different kinds of meanings to the term but that ideas of forgiveness and peace are the most common. It is likely that South Africans' perceptions of reconciliation have been shaped by the TRC and its emphasis on public truth-telling and on granting amnesty to perpetrators. The SARB also showed that most respondents have not personally experienced reconciliation and that there is strong public support for further reconciliation in South Africa. Respondents believe that the responsibility for reconciliation should lie with all South Africans, regardless of their status under apartheid, and that they personally have an important role to play in the process. The results suggest that, although reconciliation is a contested term with many different meanings attached to it, there is significant public support for greater efforts at reconciliation and that this process should be defined by a citizen-led approach.

⁴² Respondents were asked: 'How important do you think is the role of the following institutions/people in the reconciliation process in South Africa?'. Note: 'Don't know' responses are excluded from the chart.



EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC


4

The COVID-19 pandemic and the measures introduced by the government to curb the spread of the disease have had a devastating impact on South Africa's economy and society. During the 'hard lockdown' in March and April 2020, constraints on socialising were enforced in many areas and public spaces were closed, limiting social interactions. To better understand the scale of the disruption caused by the national lockdowns, the 2021 South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) asked respondents a series of questions specifically about COVID-19, ranging from evaluations of the state's response, to reflecting on their personal well-being and distress, to their attitudes towards vaccination.

How do South Africans perceive their state's response to the pandemic? The SARB asked a series of questions to evaluate public perceptions on several major issues during the pandemic, such as school closures, social assistance to the poor and recently unemployed, and health-care services.

Figure 4 shows that most South Africans agree that the government can provide adequate services relating to education, health care, social assistance and employment relief. Public agreement on the government's capacity to support schoolchildren (61%) and the provision of health care (61%) is higher than perceptions about the government's capacity to support the poor (56%) and those who lost their jobs (54%). The statement about whether the government's response indicates that it does not care about respondents garnered the lowest levels of agreement (52%).

FIGURE 4: Evaluation of government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, SARB 2021⁴³




⁴³ Respondents were asked: 'Thinking about the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?'. 'Don't know' answers are excluded.

THE PANDEMIC HAS BEEN DEVASTATING FOR HOUSEHOLDS ACROSS THE COUNTRY ... SO THE OPTIMISTIC RESPONSES OF SOUTH AFRICANS INDICATE A WILL AND DETERMINATION TO IMPROVE THEIR FAMILIAL AND NATIONAL PROSPECTS.

In addition to the positive evaluations of the government’s capacity to provide essential services, Figure 5 shows that most South Africans agree that future prospects for their families and their country are positive. To gauge whether respondents are hopeful for the prospects of the family in the next few years, a similar share of South Africans agreed that they and their families will be in a better position in the future (59%) and that South Africa will emerge from this crisis a more united nation (58%). The pandemic has been devastating for households across the country, as the section, ‘Livelihood shocks’, will demonstrate below, so the optimistic responses of South Africans indicate a will and determination to improve their familial and national prospects.

FIGURE 5: Prospects for the future since the COVID-19 pandemic, SARB 2021⁴⁴




Social solidarity

The 2021 SARB asked two questions that attempted to gauge South Africans’ perceptions of social solidarity amid the COVID-19 crisis. The first question asks: Which groups of people do South Africans, regardless of their demographic groups, identify as the most in need of assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic? Figure 6 shows that the largest share of respondents, roughly one in four South Africans (28%), believe that all South Africans, regardless of their demographic groups, are equally deserving of support. This finding suggests that assistance should not be distributed based on social or demographic categories. The second-most identified group in need of assistance are the poorest people (22%), indicating that many respondents support means-based, targeted interventions. Among the less common responses, homeless (8%), elderly (5%) and chronically ill people (5%) are identified by a small share of respondents as most in need of support.

⁴⁴ Respondents were asked: ‘Thinking about everything that has happened over the last year, how do you see the future of you and your family in the next 2–3 years? Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.’ Statements are as shown in the figure; ‘Don’t know’ answers are excluded.


FIGURE 6: Groups most in need of assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic, SARB 2021⁴⁵



The second question on social solidarity asks: Do you feel closer to the following groups of people since the start of the pandemic? The unique social conditions caused by the lockdowns, such as restrictions on movement and travel and more time spent in the home, are likely to have affected South Africans' relationships with particular groups of people, both familiar and unfamiliar.

Figure 7 shows that nearly half of South Africans (46%) now feel much closer to their families than before the pandemic, with a further 22% saying they feel somewhat closer to their family. These sentiments are similar, yet less emphatic, for respondents' relationship with their local community (54% closer than before) and South Africans from other race groups (47% closer than before). Only once asked to evaluate their relationship with foreign nationals do some respondents indicate that they feel more estranged from this group than before (26% less close than before).

FIGURE 7: Feeling closer to particular groups since the pandemic, SARB 2021⁴⁶




45 Respondents were asked: 'In these times, many people are vulnerable and struggling to make ends meet. Excluding you and your immediate family, who would you say are the people who need the most support and protection right now?'.
 46 Respondents were asked: 'The pandemic has changed many aspects of our social lives. Please tell me whether you feel closer to the following groups of people'. 'Don't know' answers are excluded.

Livelihood shocks

COVID-19 has compounded the impact of an already poorly performing economy on vulnerable citizens. This has been borne out by successive rounds of the National Income Dynamics Study – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile (NIDS-CRAM) panel survey, which has pointed to deepening poverty and growing levels of unemployment.⁴⁷ To gauge the impact of these on the lived experience of South Africans, the 2021 SARB asked three questions related to livelihood shocks caused by the pandemic.

The first question measures the scale of different kinds of disruption to respondents' livelihoods over the last six months. The SARB shows that more than half of all respondents (54%) have lost close friends or family members (Figure 8). This finding demonstrates the sheer scale of mortality caused by COVID-19 and of the economic shocks over the past six months. In addition to loss of life, Figure 8 suggests that nearly half of all respondents were unable to pay their debts (47%), and a similar share of South Africans (45%) said they had lost most of their income. As a result of the financial difficulties experienced by many households, more than a third of respondents (36%) reported that they had been unable to feed their family at some point over the last six months.

FIGURE 8: Experience of livelihood shocks, SARB 2021⁴⁸



In April 2020, President Ramaphosa announced an extensive social-relief package amounting to R500 billion to mitigate the economic shock of the pandemic on individuals, households and businesses.⁴⁹ The package related to a variety of sectors and institutions, from government departments and agencies to commercial banks and non-profit organisations (NPOs).

Figure 9 shows which groups South Africans believe have been the most supportive of financially troubled citizens. The two main groups identified by respondents, families (23%) and the government (20%), suggest that households have had to become more resilient as regards their financial coping mechanisms and that the state has played a significant role in easing financial concerns, particularly through the use of the social-grant programmes and the Unemployment Insurance Fund. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (11%) and charitable organisations (8%) are identified by more South Africans as providing financial relief than wealthy individuals (4%) or private businesses (4%), while banks (1%) were identified by the fewest number of respondents. These findings suggest that many South Africans identify their

47 Espi, G., Leibbrandt, M. & Ranchhod, V. 2021. Age, employment and labour force participation outcomes in COVID-era South Africa, NIDS-CRAM Wave 5. National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (CRAM). Available online: <https://cramsury.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/5.-Espi-G.-Ranchhod-V.-Leibbrandt-M.-2021-Age-employment-and-labour-force-participation-outcomes-in-COVID-eraSouth-Africa.pdf>.


48 Respondents were asked: 'Thinking closer to home, how have you and your family been directly affected over the past 6 months?'. Only positive responses are shown.

49 Institute for Economic Justice. 2021. South Africa's COVID-19 rescue package scorecard. 24 June. Johannesburg: Institute for Economic Justice. Available online: <https://www.iej.org.za/south-africas-covid-19-rescue-package-scorecard/>.

MANY SOUTH AFRICANS IDENTIFY THEIR COMMUNITIES, LOCAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE STATE AS BEING THE MOST SUPPORTIVE DURING THIS PERIOD OF ECONOMIC CRISIS.

communities, local organisations and the state as being the most supportive during this period of economic crisis, while the private sector, wealthy South Africans and financial institutions are perceived to have been the least supportive, despite having perhaps the greatest capacity to provide assistance.

FIGURE 9: Groups that have been the most financially supportive during the pandemic, SARB 2021⁵⁰



When asked to identify their biggest concerns for themselves and their families, many South Africans identified the threat of their most basic needs not being met, particularly around hunger (24%) (Table 2). These results support several findings by economists on the increase in food insecurity since the beginning of the pandemic.⁵¹ Owing to the highly infectious nature of COVID-19, many South Africans are concerned about the health of their family members (24%), while concerns over their household's financial situation (21%) and prospects for employment (20%) ranked highly.

50 Respondents were asked: 'Who do you think has been most supportive of South Africans who are struggling financially as a result of COVID-19?'

51 Van der Berg, S., Patel, L. & Bridgman, G. 2021. Food insecurity in South Africa: Evidence from NIDS-CRAM Wave 5', NIDS-CRAM Wave 5. National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) – Coronavirus Rapid Mobile Survey (CRAM). Available online: <https://cramsurvey.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/13.-Van-der-Berg-S.-Patel-L-and-Bridgman-G.-2021-Food-insecurity-in-South-Africa-%E2%80%93-Evidence-from-NIDS-CRAM-Wave-5.pdf>.



Table 2: Biggest concerns for South Africans during the COVID-19 pandemic, SARB 2021⁵²

Livelihood concerns	Combined response	First mention	Second mention
Hunger and starvation	24.3%	12.6%	11.6%
Health of family members	23.8%	12.8%	10.9%
Financial situation of your family	21.1%	10.2%	11.0%
Current and future employment/income	20.0%	10.0%	10.0%
Personal health	18.8%	10.4%	8.5%
Safety and security	16.4%	8.9%	7.5%
Personal financial situation	14.4%	6.9%	7.5%
Schooling and education	13.6%	6.1%	7.5%
Gender-based violence	13.5%	6.7%	6.8%
Threat to social life	10.5%	4.8%	5.7%
Domestic violence	10.2%	5.1%	5.0%
Family tension and conflict	7.6%	2.9%	4.8%
Childcare responsibilities	5.8%	2.6%	3.2%

In summary

To evaluate the extent of COVID-19's impact on South Africans, the 2021 SARB included a range of questions related to the pandemic and respondents' experiences of its effects. South Africa's strict lockdowns to curb the spread of infections have also had severe impacts on the economy, with severe job losses compounding record levels of unemployment before the pandemic.

The SARB shows that most South Africans agree that the government is able to provide essential services, such as social protection for the poor and recently unemployed. Despite the difficult circumstances that many respondents have experienced, most South Africans are positive about their future prospects. Respondents are generally supportive of social relief being directed to all South Africans, regardless of demographic groups, and for means-based targeting of the poor. Many South Africans have also grown closer to their families during the last few months, as many households have had to increasingly rely on each other for social support.

The SARB also demonstrates the extent of the livelihood shocks that many South Africans have experienced. More than half of all respondents have lost a loved one during the last six months of the pandemic, while a similar share of South Africans have struggled to pay their debts or have lost most of their income. The primary concern among respondents is staving off hunger and starvation, while ensuring the health and well-being of their households. South Africans have had to demonstrate remarkable resilience to endure the shocks of the pandemic, and many respondents identified families and the government as the most supportive institutions.

⁵² Respondents were asked: 'Overall, what do you think are the two biggest concerns for you and your family during the pandemic?'. Respondents were given two options to respond; responses have been summed to form a 'Combined' response.



INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND RELATIONS

5

Public trust is considered to be the 'glue' that holds any particular society together, particularly in democracies.⁵³ Trust between actors is central to the processes that are needed to resolve conflicts and to create a foundation for sustainable relationships within a society.⁵⁴ It is useful to distinguish between two types of trust in society: horizontal trust (across different groups of people) and vertical trust (between groups of people and institutions). The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) aims to provide a measure of both horizontal and vertical trust so as to better understand the degree of social cohesion and the strength of democratic political culture.

Figure 10 shows that there are varying degrees of horizontal public trust in South Africa. It is possible to further distinguish between this as bonding trust (trust between people of the same group) and bridging trust (trust between different groups of people). Figure 10 shows that there is a stronger sense of bonding than bridging trust; South Africans are much more trusting of those closest to them than of other groups of people. Relatives are the most trusted group by 61% of respondents, followed by neighbours (43%). South Africans have similar levels of trust in colleagues (35%), people with a different sexual orientation (35%), and people from other language (33%) and race (31%) groups. Foreign nationals from other African countries are the least trusted group in this list, with a small majority of South Africans (52%) saying that they do not trust this group very much or not at all.


53 Dodsworth, S. & Cheeseman, N. 2020. Political trust: The glue that keeps democracies together., Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Available online: <https://www.wfd.org/2020/05/27/political-trust-the-glue-that-keeps-democracies-together/>.

54 Meiring, T. & Potgieter, E. 2017. Towards a Social Cohesion Index for South Africa using SARB data. SARB Working Paper 1, Reconciliation and Development Series. Cape Town: IJR. <https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/towards-a-social-cohesion-index-for-south-africa-using-sarbdata/>.

INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND RELATIONS / CONTINUED

THESE FINDINGS INDICATE THAT THE CIRCLES OF TRUST AMONG SOUTH AFRICANS ARE SMALL, YET STRONG.

FIGURE 10: Interpersonal trust, SARB 2021⁵⁵



These findings indicate that the circles of trust among South Africans are small, yet strong. Levels of bridging trust among South Africans are low; respondents in the SARB survey do not have a high degree of trust in groups that might differ from them, especially along lines of sexual, religious, linguistic and, particularly, national identities.


Interracial interaction

South Africa's long history of segregation and domination has produced severe inequalities, most notably along lines of racial classification. In post-apartheid South Africa, explicit racial segregation has mostly been removed from various aspects of public life, but the first few decades of democracy have yet to erase centuries of legislated inequality. Without explicit restrictions on interracial interaction, the SARB gauges the degree to which South Africans interact with people from different racial groups. Building on the findings from Figure 10, separation and a lack of interaction are factors which may lead to greater distrust among historically defined race groups.

⁵⁵ Respondents were asked: 'How much do you trust the following groups of people?'

Figure 11 shows that there is a varying degree of interracial interaction across locations. Interracial interaction is least likely to occur within the homes of respondents, with 42% of respondents never interacting with people from other race groups in this space, indicating that these interactions take place in public. Public transport is similarly limiting for interracial interaction, with only one in five respondents (19%) reporting that they interact with other race groups often or always. This finding is perhaps indicative of the close associations between class and racial identities, and the different modes of transport utilised by different groups of South Africans. Workplaces, as well as recreational and commercial spaces, are the areas where interracial interaction is most likely to occur.

FIGURE 11: Frequency of interracial interaction, SARB 2021⁵⁶



Xenophobia

South Africa is infamous for its recent history of xenophobic violence.⁵⁷ Major incidences of widespread conflict occurred in 2008 and as recently as 2020, but isolated attacks on foreign nationals remain prevalent in recent history. Drawing on findings from recent SARB and Afrobarometer surveys,⁵⁸ which found that xenophobic attitudes are prevalent among South Africans, the 2021 SARB asked respondents whether they would take part in certain actions to prevent foreign nationals from accessing services or exercising certain rights.

Figure 12 shows that there is a sizeable share of South Africans who would be likely to prevent foreign nationals from accessing jobs (35%) and government services (35%), as well as preventing them from operating a business (37%) or moving into neighbourhoods (36%). Opinion is relatively split between those who would be likely and unlikely to take these actions, and more than one in five respondents are neutral on this question. These perceptions show that xenophobia is more commonly non-violent in South Africa, with a distinct prejudice against foreign nationals from other African countries.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Respondents were asked: 'Thinking about a typical day in the past month, how often do you think you interacted or talked to someone who was of a different race to you?'. 'Don't know' responses were excluded.

⁵⁷ Landau, L. B. 2019. What's behind the deadly violence in South Africa?. *New York Times*, 16 September. Available online: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/16/opinion/south-africa-xenophobia-attacks.html>.


⁵⁸ See Potgieter, E. 2018. Social cohesion among South Africans, and between South Africans and foreigners: Evidence from the South African Reconciliation Barometer 2017. Reconciliation & Development Occasional Paper 4. Cape Town: IJR. Available online: <https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/social-cohesion-among-south-africans-and-between-south-africans-and-foreigners/>; Dryding, D. 2020. Half of South Africans would refuse asylum, bar foreign workers, places refugees in camps. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 360. Available online: <https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad360-half-south-africans-would-refuse-asylum-bar-foreign-workers-place-refugees-camps>.

⁵⁹ See the low levels of trust for this group in Figure 10.



THE CONTINUED ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND SLOW PACE OF RESTITUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA HAVE NOT ALLEVIATED THESE LEGACIES OF SOCIAL DISTRUST.

FIGURE 12: Likelihood of preventing people from other African countries accessing services and activities, SARB 2021⁶⁰



In summary

South Africa has a long history of segregation and enmity between particular groups. The continued economic inequality and slow pace of restitution and redistribution in post-apartheid South Africa have not alleviated these legacies of social distrust. The 2021 SARB shows that there is greater bonding trust than bridging trust among South Africans, with people from different sexual, religious and linguistic identities considered less trustworthy than respondents' relatives and neighbours. Of particular concern for horizontal trust is the lack of trust in foreign nationals, especially from other African countries. Xenophobic attitudes are not uncommon among respondents, with more than a third reporting that they would be likely to prevent foreign nationals from accessing certain services.

⁶⁰ Respondents were asked: 'Please can you tell me how likely you are to prevent people who have come here from other African countries from...'



DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE

6

One of the main conceptual assumptions of the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) is that social cohesion is more likely to occur in democratic societies. When citizens feel that they are part of an inclusive political community, participate in processes of power-sharing, and believe that institutions are legitimate, society is more likely to be cohesive.


Confidence in institutions

To gauge the legitimacy of public institutions and elected representatives, the SARB asks respondents to evaluate how much confidence they have in each institution. These results should be read alongside the findings on public trust reported in the previous section, representing both horizontal (across groups) and vertical trust (between people and the state).

South Africans' confidence in institutions is generally low (Figure 13). The only institution that most South Africans have a high degree of confidence in is the national broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) (52%), which attracts large audiences across its multilingual radio stations and television channels. The South African Revenue Service (SARS) is the institution with the second-highest degree of public confidence (45%), while 43% of South Africans have a high degree of confidence in the Hawks, the name given to the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation. These three institutions are responsible for performing oversight functions, through, respectively, media reporting, taxation, and investigating crimes in the public domain.

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE / CONTINUED

FIGURE 13: Confidence in institutions, SARB 2021⁶¹




More than two in five South Africans (42%) have quite a lot or a great deal of confidence in their President. The President is perceived as having the confidence of more in South Africa than other political or governance entities. In terms of high levels of public confidence, respondents have more negative assessments of Parliament (37%), national government (34%), provincial government (33%), local government (31%) and the Deputy President (30%) than the President (42%).

Most South Africans do not have a high degree of confidence in political parties: only 36% of respondents have a high degree of confidence in the African National Congress (ANC), with a similar share for the Democratic Alliance (DA) (31%). In both instances, there is a larger share of respondents who have not very much or no confidence at all in both the ANC (46%) and DA (46%). Public confidence in the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) is the lowest across all of the SARB's list of institutions, with only a quarter of respondents (24%) indicating a high degree of confidence in the party and a majority of respondents (57%) reporting a low degree of confidence in the EFF.

61 Respondents were asked: 'Please indicate how much confidence you have in each of the following institutions, or haven't you heard enough to say'.

How has South Africans' confidence in institutions changed over time? The SARB has asked South Africans to evaluate the same institutions over the last three rounds of surveys, enabling an analysis of changes in confidence over time. High levels of confidence in various institutions have changed over time (Figure 14). Generally, public confidence in nearly all institutions was at its lowest in 2017. However, there was a significant improvement in public confidence in 2019, while public sentiment is slightly more negative in 2021 than in 2019, but is still higher than in 2017. The 2019 SARB report highlighted the impact of former President Zuma's removal from office in 2018 and the generally positive first impressions of Ramaphosa's subsequent election as a possible cause for the increase in public confidence in institutions.⁶² As regards the slight decline in public confidence in 2021, it might be expected that the health and economic crises presented by the pandemic have affected public confidence, while instances of corruption within the state have not diminished.⁶³

FIGURE 14: High levels of confidence in institutions over time, SARB 2017-2021⁶⁴



There are four institutions where there is greater public confidence in 2021 than there was in the 2019 survey, namely: the Hawks (38% in 2019, 43% in 2021), the Public Protector (34% in 2019, 37% in 2021), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) (32% in 2019, 36% in 2021) and the DA (26% in 2019, 31% in 2021). Notably, three of these four institutions are prosecutorial or oversight bodies responsible for investigating corruption within the private and public sectors. The increase in public confidence in these institutions might be a result of their renewed authority and independence, with several high-profile political figures and their business associates currently under investigation for financial crime and corruption.⁶⁵ Regarding the DA, an increase in public confidence between 2019 and 2021 is a positive development, as the largest opposition party is likely benefitting from a significant drop in high levels of confidence in the ANC (47% in 2019, 36% in 2021). However, the DA has struggled to grow beyond roughly 20% of votes in elections. In the 2021 local government elections (LGEs), the DA received 22% of all votes nationally, compared with 21% of votes in the 2019 national government elections.⁶⁶

62 Potgieter, E. 2019. SA Reconciliation Barometer: 2019 Report. Cape Town: IJR. <https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/sa-reconciliation-barometer-2019/>.

63 Patel, J. & Govindasamy, P. 2021. South Africans see corruption as worsening during President Ramaphosa's tenure. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 476. Available online: <https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad476-south-africans-see-corruption-worsening-during-president-ramaphosas-tenure>.

64 Respondents were asked: 'Please indicate how much confidence you have in each of the following institutions, or haven't you heard enough to say'. Note: Only those responses coded 'Quite a lot' or 'A great deal' are shown.

65 See, for example: Myburgh, P-L. 2021. Released: Damning SIU report finds at least R72m fruitless and wasted, implicates Mkhize, DoH officials in Digital Vibes contract. *Daily Maverick*, 29 September. Available online: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-09-29-released-damning-siu-report-finds-at-least-r72m-fruitless-and-wasted-implicates-mkhize-doh-officials-in-digital-vibes-contract/>.


66 Vote share figures have been rounded and gathered from the Electoral Commission of South Africa's (IEC's) website.

Political efficacy and political participation

Along with the findings from Figure 13, several other surveys have shown that South Africans have relatively low levels of trust in public institutions.⁶⁷ This trust deficit may have an influence on declining levels of voter turnout and voter registration.⁶⁸ In the 2021 LGEs, voter turnout had declined from 58% to 45% between 2016 and 2021, while the share of unregistered voters grew even larger.⁶⁹ To examine the degree to which South Africans continue to see efficacy in political participation, the SARB asked respondents to agree or disagree with several statements on voting and political actions.

More than two in three South Africans agree that elected representatives always need to follow the will of the people (72%) and that ordinary South Africans can only rely on each other, rather than political elites (69%) (Figure 15). A similar share of respondents agree that the public, not politicians, should make the most important policy decisions (67%), and that the people should have the final say on important political issues by voting on decisions through referendums (66%). These responses suggest that most South Africans would prefer a more direct form of democracy where decision-making is majoritarian, instead of the current emphasis on electing representatives to make decisions on behalf of constituents. The high levels of agreement in respect of these statements also speak to the relatively low levels of confidence in public institutions and elected officials, as South Africans may feel that their concerns are not being addressed by their representatives.

FIGURE 15: Political efficacy, voting efficacy and populist sentiments, SARB 2021⁷⁰



67 Moosa, M. & Hofmeyr, J. 2021. South Africans’ trust in institutions and representatives reaches new low. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 474. Available online: <https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad474-south-africans-trust-institutions-and-representatives-reaches-new-low>.

68 Schulz-Herzenberg, C. 2019. Trends in voter participation: Registration, turnout and the disengaging electorate. In C. Schulz-Herzenberg and R. Southall (eds). *Election 2019: Change and stability in South Africa’s democracy*. Johannesburg: Jacana.


69 Du Toit, P. 2021. Explainer: What happened in the 2021 municipal election: Who won, who lost and what now?, News24, 5 November. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/news24/analysis/explainer-what-happened-in-the-2021-municipal-election-who-won-who-lost-and-what-now-20211105>.

70 Respondents were asked: ‘Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about politics and voting’. Response categories include ‘Strongly agree’ and ‘Agree’ (combined to form ‘Agree’), and ‘Neither agree nor disagree’, ‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly disagree’.

Figure 15 also shows whether South Africans believe they are qualified to participate in their democracy. A small majority of South Africans (52%) report that they do not consider themselves to be as well informed as other people about issues affecting the country. Nearly half of all respondents believe they do not have a good understanding of important issues affecting the country (47%) and they do not consider themselves well qualified to participate in these issues (46%). Taken together, Figure 15 indicates that most South Africans believe that they should have a greater and more direct input into important policy decisions, but, currently, many South Africans also feel ill-informed about important policy processes. These sentiments may provide some context to the declining levels of voter turnout in national elections over the last decade, as many people do not feel well qualified to participate and a majority believe they should have more say on political issues than the current system affords.

Low levels of confidence in voting and low levels of turnout do not necessarily equate to a politically apathetic population. Figure 16 shows that many South Africans do engage in various forms of political participation. Over the previous year, one in three respondents (34%) attended a community meeting at least once and a further 6% reported doing so often. A similar share of South Africans (30%) have got together with others to raise an issue, while around one in five respondents (19%) have contacted their local councillor or community leaders about an issue. Only a minority of South Africans have contacted media outlets to complain about an issue (10%) or have used social media to share political content (12%). The most uncommon form of political participation is the use of force or violence for a political cause, with only 7% of respondents reporting that they have used such means in the last year.

FIGURE 16: Citizens' political participation, SARB 2021⁷¹




As Figure 16 demonstrates, there is a small minority of South Africans (7%) who have used force or violence for a political cause in 2021. Figure 17 shows the change in the share of respondents who stated that they had either used violence for a political cause or would be willing to do so. The share of South Africans who have used force or violence for a political cause is at its lowest (7%) in 2021, decreasing from its peak of 12% in 2017. It is likely that COVID-19 restrictions on gatherings, combined with an increased presence of police and security personnel across the country to enforce lockdown restrictions, have played some part in this decline.

⁷¹ Respondents were asked: 'Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. Please tell me if you have personally done any of these things during the past year'.

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE / CONTINUED

FIGURE 17: South Africans who have used, or will use, violence for a political cause, SARB 2015–2021⁷²



However there is some cause for concern about the use of force, as the share of respondents who would be willing to engage in violence for a political cause is at its highest level in 2021 (20%). Figure 17 suggests that fewer South Africans have used force for a political cause in 2021, but that one in five respondents would use force if they had the opportunity. The unrest that gripped parts of the country in July 2021 has viscerally shown that there are sections of the population who would be willing to engage in illicit looting and rioting if the opportunity presented itself, and the 2021 SARB suggests that a sizeable share of South Africans would be willing to use force for a political cause.

Rule of law

The rioting and disorder that brought parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng to a standstill in July 2021 posed a profound challenge to the rule of law in South Africa. Local authorities and the police were largely unable to prevent crowds of people from ransacking businesses or attacking infrastructure or other people. A semblance of order was only restored once an extraordinary deployment of the army was authorised.⁷³


Despite the scenes of anarchy from earlier in 2021, the SARB survey shows that most South Africans agree with several principles of the rule of law, namely upholding the values of the Constitution and respecting the rights of public authorities to fulfil their duties. Two in three South Africans agree that the Constitution must be upheld in all circumstances (68%) and that the police always have the right to make people obey the law (64%) (Figure 18). There are also high levels of agreement that SARS always has the right to make people pay taxes (62%) and that courts always have the right to make decisions that people have to accept (59%). Only a small majority (53%) of South Africans agree that democratically elected representatives always have the right to make policy and governance decisions, while one in five (21%) disagree with this statement. Overall, there is generally a high level of agreement that the rule of law should be upheld by the mandated authorities, but there is much less consensus concerning elected representatives. This latter finding is supported by the results in Figure 15, which shows that most South Africans believe they should have a greater role to play in policy and governance decisions.

72 Respondents were asked: 'Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. Please tell me if you have personally done any of these things during the past year: Used force or violence for a political cause?'

73 Hunter, Q., Singh, K. & Wicks, J. 2021. *Eight days in July: Inside the Zuma unrest that set South Africa alight*. Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers.

DESPITE THE SCENES OF ANARCHY FROM EARLIER IN 2021, THE SARB SURVEY SHOWS THAT MOST SOUTH AFRICA AGREE WITH SEVERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RULE OF LAW, NAMELY UPHOLDING THE VALUES OF THE CONSTITUTION AND RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO FULFIL THEIR DUTIES.

FIGURE 18: Agreement with the rule of law, SARB 2021



In summary

South Africa's democratic political culture is shaped by a variety of influences, from its historical legacies of racial exclusion to an economy characterised by widespread poverty, unemployment and limited opportunities for upward mobility. This section has shown that South Africans generally do not have a high degree of confidence in public institutions or their elected representatives. Over the last three rounds of the survey, from 2017 to 2021, public confidence has grown and diminished, but overall it has remained low across a variety of institutions.

Low levels of public confidence have affected South Africans' perceptions of governance, with a majority of respondents agreeing that they should play a greater role in policy and governance issues. Nearly half of all respondents also believe they are not qualified to participate in their democracy, which suggests a disconnect between constituents and their representatives. Voting, however, is not the be-all and end-all of democracy. The SARB shows that many respondents have attended community meetings or have got together with others to raise an issue, despite some of the restrictions on gathering imposed by COVID-19. Only a small minority of South Africans have resorted to violence for a political cause over the past year, but the share of people who would be willing to do so if given the opportunity is more concerning. The political crisis presented by the July 2021 unrest in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng is a fundamental concern for governance in South Africa, but the SARB demonstrates that most South Africans agree that certain institutions have a responsibility to uphold the rule of law.



NATIONAL IDENTITY, UNITY AND NATION-BUILDING

A crucial component of South Africa's democratic transition in the 1990s was the state's emphasis on creating a shared national identity based on the values of non-racialism and egalitarianism. A shared sense of national identity was also an important component of de-racialising the public sphere, entrenching the values of equal citizenship, and minimising the political potency of ethnic competition. The National Development Plan (NDP), the state's guiding planning document, envisions a society where South Africans will be more conscientious of their shared identity, rather than their differences. The idea of 'unity in diversity' is perhaps the clearest expression of the desire to create a strong national identity, while maintaining and celebrating a diversity of sub-national identities.

A common form of identification across a population may lead to a greater sense of social capital.⁷⁴ Prominent theories of social cohesion and conflict resolution suggest that a diversity of sub-national identities within a society is not intrinsically a weakness of cohesion, but that a recognition of a shared identity is important for mitigating potential conflicts.⁷⁵ The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) asks South Africans what they think of certain statements on national identity.

National unity and identity

Despite a shared history of segregation along lines of race and language, most South Africans express strong agreement about ideas of a shared national identity (Figure 19). Three in four respondents agree that they would want their children to think of themselves as South African (78%), that being a South African is an important part of their identity (77%), and that people should realise there is a shared national identity among one another (77%). There is also a similar degree of agreement (76%) among South Africans that it is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups in the country. More than two-thirds of South Africans agree that there is more that unites than keeps South Africans apart (69%), and that it is possible to create one united nation out of all the different groups in the country (68%).


74 Cantle, T. 2005. *Community cohesion: A new framework for race and diversity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

75 Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K. & Demarest, L. 2015. Conceptualising and measuring social cohesion in Africa: Towards a perceptions-based index. Working Paper No. 21. Leuven: Centre for Research on Peace and Development, KU Leuven. Available online: <http://soc.kuleuven.be/crpd/files/working-papers/wp21.pdf>.

NATIONAL IDENTITY, UNITY AND NATION-BUILDING / CONTINUED

MOST SOUTH AFRICANS AGREE THAT, OVER TIME, IT IS POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE TO CREATE A UNITED NATION, BUT THERE ARE STILL CLEAR DIVISIONS IN SOCIETY THAT PREVENT THIS SHARED WILL FROM BECOMING A REALITY.

FIGURE 19: Perceptions of national unity and identity, SARB 2021⁷⁶




A strong sense of a shared national unity is an essential basis for furthering social cohesion and minimising chauvinistic conflict among narrow, sub-national identities. Equally important for the task of fostering a more cohesive society is whether there is popular support for a united South African nation.

Figure 20 shows the share of respondents who agree that it is either desirable or possible to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups in the country over time. Public agreement on the desirability of a united nation has remained high since the first round of the SARB survey in 2003 (73%), and there is slightly more agreement on this statement in 2021 (76%). Encouragingly, there has been more substantial growth in public agreement on the possibility of creating a united nation, rising from 61% in 2007 to 68% in 2021. Ultimately, Figure 20 shows that most South Africans agree that, over time, it is possible and desirable to create a united nation, but there are still clear divisions in society that prevent this shared will from becoming a reality.

⁷⁶ Respondents were asked: 'Thinking about yourself as a South African, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements'.

FIGURE 20: Agreement on the desirability and possibility of unity, SARB 2003–2021⁷⁷



Sources of division

The SARB survey consistently reveals that most South Africans agree that it is both possible and desirable to create one united nation out of all the different groups in society. So what is preventing the will of the majority from materialising?

Along with popular support for greater unity, another of the SARB’s most consistent findings relates to the obstacles to greater social cohesion. When asked to select what they believe to be the primary source of division in society, South Africans consistently identify inequality – phrased as ‘the division between the rich and the poor’ – to be the main issue (Table 3). Across two response options, a small majority of respondents identified inequality (52%) as the biggest division in society, while a similar share identified racial divisions (50%) as the primary division. Aside from divisions along lines of class or racial lines, two in five South Africans (40%) identify the division between supporters of different political parties as the biggest division in South Africa, suggesting that partisanship is detrimental to cohesion.

Table 3: Biggest divisions in society, SARB 2021⁷⁸

Responses	Combined response	First mention	Second mention
The division between the rich and the poor	52%	31%	21%
The division between South Africans of different race groups	50%	23%	26%
The division between supporters of different political parties	40%	18%	22%
The division between South Africans of different language groups	29%	12%	17%
The division between those living with infectious diseases and the rest of the community	16%	8%	9%
None (there are no divisions)	6%	3%	3%
Other	0%	0%	0%
Refused	2%	1%	1%
Don’t know	5%	4%	1%

77 Respondents were asked: ‘Thinking about yourself as a South African, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country; It is possible to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country’.

78 Respondents were asked: ‘People sometimes talk about the divisions between people in South Africa. Sometimes these divisions cause people to be left out or discriminated against. In other instances, it can lead to anger and even violence between groups. What, in your experience, is the biggest division in South Africa today?’. Note: Respondents’ first and second responses have been summed to form the combined response.



A MAJORITY OF RESPONDENTS TAKE PRIDE IN THEIR NATIONAL IDENTITY AND BELIEVE THEY SHARE A COMMON IDENTITY WITH OTHER GROUPS OF PEOPLE. THERE IS ALSO POPULAR SUPPORT FOR CREATING A UNITED SOUTH AFRICAN NATION AMONG THE COUNTRY'S DIFFERENT GROUPS.

South Africa is frequently identified as among the most unequal countries in the world and much of the divisions also follow racial lines, as apartheid-era stratification has produced an inequality in economic opportunities for different groups.⁷⁹ The SARB shows that South Africans believe these vast disparities to be detrimental to social cohesion.

In summary

This section has explored the importance of a shared national identity for furthering social cohesion and conflict resolution in South Africa. Although certain forms of nationalism can also be detrimental to social cohesion and can foster chauvinistic attitudes to certain kinds of outsiders, it is important for South Africans to have some form of a shared identity if citizenship is to be meaningful. Division, segregation and enmity are present throughout South African history, much of it enforced through colonial or authoritarian forms of governance. For South Africa's democracy to be meaningful, it will need to foster a shared sense of identity along with reckoning with past injustices.

The 2021 SARB shows that, despite the demographic diversity of South Africa and its history of mistrust among different groups, most South Africans express a high level of agreement with statements on national identity. A majority of respondents take pride in their national identity and believe they share a common identity with other groups of people. There is also popular support for creating a united South African nation among the country's different groups, with many believing this vision to be both possible and desirable. However, around half of all respondents identify both the divisions between rich and poor South Africans and South Africans of different race groups to be the biggest division in society. The results from the 2021 SARB suggest that there is popular support for a united national identity, but that there are material and historical divisions to overcome before this vision can be realised.

⁷⁹ Stats SA. 2019. Inequality trends in South Africa: A multidimensional diagnostic of inequality. Pretoria: StatsSA. Available online: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-19/Report-03-10-192017.pdf>.



APARTHEID LEGACY AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE


8

One of the primary goals of the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) is to gauge the changes in South African society and the opinions of South Africans. Initiated in 2003, the SARB aims to provide a measure of what South Africans think about their country and their fellow citizens. Because the survey has been carried out regularly since then, the SARB is able to track changes in opinion over time and it is possible to gauge how much has changed since then, but also how much – or how little – South Africa has changed since the end of apartheid.

Legacies of apartheid

There are very high levels of public agreement about the impact of apartheid in South Africa (Figure 21). Roughly three in four South Africans agree that the apartheid government committed terrible crimes (76%) and that the system of apartheid was a crime against humanity. A similar share of respondents agree that black South Africans – including all those historically classified as Black African, Coloured and Indian – suffered because of their race (74%), and were deprived of their rights to land and property (72%), the opportunity to earn proper livelihoods (72%) and quality education (72%).

FIGURE 21: Agreement on views of apartheid, SARB 2021⁸⁰




80 Respondents were asked: 'How much do you agree with the following statements about apartheid?'

APARTHEID LEGACY AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE / CONTINUED

The 2021 SARB survey also reveals strong public agreement on the lasting legacies of apartheid (Figure 22). More than two-thirds of all respondents agree that many black South Africans, broadly defined, are poor today due to apartheid's legacy (72%) and that, conversely, many white South Africans are still well-off because of the lasting effects of apartheid (71%). There are similar levels of agreement when it comes to the spatial legacies of apartheid, with 69% of South Africans agreeing that residential areas are still segregated according to apartheid-era patterns and 67% agreeing that little progress has been made to return land to people evicted under the apartheid regime.

FIGURE 22: Legacies of apartheid, SARB 2021⁸¹



In summary

The era of democratic governance is only a small part of South Africa's history as a modern state. For most of the period prior to democracy, people were governed under a combination of colonial and racially authoritarian rule. The legacies of the last few decades and centuries of these political systems are long-lasting and it will take many years and sustained redress to overcome the divisions of the past.

The section has highlighted just how far South Africa still needs to progress beyond the apartheid era. Although there is widespread consensus on the evils of apartheid and the severe inequalities it engendered along lines of race, most South Africans agree that these patterns of inequality still exist today. In addition, two-thirds of respondents agree that little progress has been made regarding land restitution for those who were dispossessed under apartheid. The task of redressing South Africa's apartheid past is immense, but it is also important to highlight that many South Africans are dissatisfied with the slow pace of redress in the democratic era.

Any analysis of contemporary South African society should consider its recent history of apartheid and exclusion, but it is becoming increasingly important to emphasise how post-apartheid South Africa has insufficiently addressed the legacies of the past, whether through adequate restitution, truth-telling or progressive socio-economic development.

⁸¹ Respondents were asked: 'How much do you agree with the following statements about the lasting effects of apartheid in South Africa today?'



APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

South African Reconciliation Barometer publications and data availability

Findings from previous South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) rounds were released as part of reports, briefing papers, working papers, occasional papers and other publications of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). More information on sampling, methodology and findings are presented as part of these publications and is available on the IJR's website: www.ijr.org.za.

All data from 2003 to 2017 has also been made available on the IJR's website in the form of an online analysis tool. Data from the 2003 to 2013 rounds was furthermore used as part of a book published by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the IJR, namely *Rethinking reconciliation: Evidence from South Africa* (edited by Lefko-Everett, Govender & Foster, 2017). The book is available at: <https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/rethinking-reconciliation>. More information on the SARB's methodology, measurement of reconciliation, and findings over time is captured as part of this book, as well as on the IJR's website.

Conceptualisation

Table i: SARB hypotheses and indicators, 2003–2013	
Hypotheses	Indicators
Human security: If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with each other and the larger system.	Physical security; economic security; cultural security.
Political culture: If citizens view the institutions, leadership and culture of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	Justifiability of extra-legal action; legitimacy of leadership; legitimacy of Parliament; respect for the rule of law.
Cross-cutting political relationships: If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	Commitment to national unity; commitment to multiracial political parties.
Historical confrontation: If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	Acknowledgement of the injustice of apartheid; forgiveness; reduced levels of vengeance.
Race relations: If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	Interracial contact; interracial preconceptions; interracial tolerance.
Dialogue: If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely to be advanced.	Commitment to more dialogue.
ONLY 2003 ROUND - Commitment to socio-economic development: If citizens are able to commit themselves to transformation and redress, the national reconciliation process is more likely to progress.	Willingness to compromise.

Table ii: SARB hypotheses and indicators, 2015 onwards

Hypotheses	Indicators
<p>Power relations: Unjust/unequal power relations between social groups (e.g. race/class) hinder progress towards reconciliation. More just and equitable power relations would create a more fertile environment for reconciliation. Limited to perceptual data, we have chosen to measure this by asking about access to economic, social, cultural and spatial resources within society. This concept is measured through these sub-indicators, each of which demonstrates difference perceptions of access to realms of power in society.</p>	<p>Economic access; social access; cultural access; spatial access.</p>
<p>Democratic political culture: Reconciliation is more likely to thrive in a society where there is a growing democratic political culture. This is evident when citizens feel part of an inclusive nation, participate in the political process, feel the government is legitimately elected, respect the rule of law, and support democratic political institutions.</p>	<p>Political community; political efficacy; the rule of law; confidence in democratic institutions.</p>
<p>Apartheid legacy: In order for reconciliation to take root in South Africa, it is necessary, firstly, to acknowledge and deal with the legacy of direct, structural and symbolic violence and oppression suffered under apartheid, and, secondly, to support initiatives aimed at the redress of this legacy.</p>	<p>Acknowledging the injustice of apartheid; acknowledging the legacy of apartheid; support for redress and transformation.</p>
<p>Racial reconciliation: Progress towards reconciliation cannot take place without the opportunities and willingness to engage in meaningful connection between different race groups in South Africa.</p>	<p>Willingness to tolerate; willingness to confront racism; formal opportunities to engage; spontaneous opportunities to engage.</p>
<p>Improvement in reconciliation: For reconciliation to advance, South Africans should feel connected to the concept (i.e. they can understand and articulate the meaning of reconciliation) and have experienced it in their own lives. Reconciliation is a complex concept with different meanings. This indicator attempts to ascertain the subjective meaning of reconciliation held by respondents, and, according to their subjective meaning, to measure perceptions of improvement.</p>	<p>Meaning of reconciliation; perceived improvement in reconciliation.</p>
<p>Perceptions of change: For reconciliation to advance, it is important for citizens to perceive positive change within society with regard to the past and the future.</p>	<p>Material change; psychological change; hope for the future.</p>

Table iii: Realised sample vs weighted sample, SARB 2021		
Variable	Realised sample, n = 2 374	Weighted sample, n = 40 153 738
Race groups		
Black	64%	79%
White	14%	9%
Coloured	17%	9%
Indian	5%	3%
Sex/gender		
Male	41%	48%
Female	59%	52%
Area specification		
Metro	60%	45%
Non-metro	40%	55%
Age groups		
18 to 24 years old	15%	17%
25 to 34 years old	25%	27%
35 to 49 years old	38%	30%
50 to 59 years old	14%	12%
60+ years old	8%	14%
Provinces		
Eastern Cape	14%	10%
Free State	9%	5%
Gauteng	22%	28%
KwaZulu-Natal	18%	18%
Limpopo	5%	9%
Mpumalanga	5%	8%
North West	5%	7%
Northern Cape	3%	2%
Western Cape	18%	13%

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) is an independent, non-governmental organisation, which was established in 2000 in the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with the aim of ensuring that the lessons of South Africa's successful transition to democracy remain fundamental principles central to government and society as the country moves forward. Today, the IJR works to build fair, democratic and inclusive societies across Africa after conflict.

The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) is a public opinion survey conducted by the IJR. Since its launch in 2003, the SARB has provided a nationally representative measure of citizens' attitudes to national reconciliation, social cohesion, transformation and democratic governance. The SARB is the only survey dedicated to critical measurement of reconciliation in South Africa, and is the largest longitudinal data source of its kind globally. As one of the few dedicated social surveys on reconciliation in Africa and worldwide, the SARB has become an important resource for encouraging national debate, informing decision-makers, developing policy and provoking new analysis and theory on reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

For more information, visit the IJR website at www.ijr.org.za.

