

SA Reconciliation Barometer 2017

SA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER SURVEY: 2017 REPORT



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SA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER SURVEY 2017 REPORT

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
CAPI	Computer Aided Personal Interviews
DA	Democratic Alliance
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
LSM	living standards measure
NDP	National Development Plan
SARB	South African Reconciliation Barometer
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
WMC	white monopoly capital
StatsSA	Statistics SA



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

More than two decades since South Africa's first democratic election, the first hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and the promulgation of the country's Constitution, calls have been made – and initiatives taken – to reflect on the country's journey so far. In addition to political life, governance and economics, progress in terms of reconciliation enjoys substantial focus.

Reconciliation in South Africa's current and historical context requires a nuanced approach to overcoming and preventing social division. In the pursuit of positive peace and reconciliation in the South African context, identifying progress as well as key areas that may hamper such processes and outcomes is vital. By measuring reconciliation in South Africa through public opinion surveying since 2003, the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) captures progress and offers empirical insights in this regard. The SARB follows a rigorous methodology to measure reconciliation specific to the South African context.

South Africa's National Development Plan (NDP) envisages the country as a transformed society with an emphasis on unity in diversity – which is fostered by a shared commitment to constitutional values. Since the SARB's inception in 2003, most South Africans have indicated their preference for a united South African nation, as well as their belief that such a society is possible. A South African identity, furthermore, remains important to most South Africans. Language, however, features as a salient identity among South Africans, which offers both opportunities and challenges for the reconciliation process. The importance of race and class as primary identities, however, offers many challenges – as both of these identities form part of broader historical and contemporary societal challenges.

Since the inception of the survey, 'inequality' has remained the most prominent source of social division in the eyes of ordinary South Africans. Not surprisingly, therefore, respondents feel that on this score the country has made least progress since the political transition of 1994. Inequality is thus both the most divisive and enduring aspect of South African society. Improvement in race relations since 1994 has also been reportedly slow, with 'race'

ranking as the second-most divisive aspect of South African society in 2017. These findings, coupled with the prominence of both race and class as primary sources of identity, show that the most divisive aspects of apartheid-era laws – namely racial segregation and socioeconomic divisions – persist as divisions today.

Even though we may be finding ourselves almost a quarter of a century into a new political dispensation, many unresolved legacies of the apartheid and colonial eras remain. They continue to this day to present an obstacle in the way of achieving a truly fair and equitable society. As such, these legacies have to be confronted head-on and acknowledged. Despite some decline in the acknowledgement of the injustices of apartheid, a significant majority is still of the view that the apartheid system could be categorised as a crime against humanity. A majority of South Africans, furthermore, agree that the legacies of apartheid continue to persist to the present day, although differences between race groups are evident in this regard. Combined with perceptions of political and economic power, and related fears born out of perceptions in this regard, unaddressed legacies remain divisive and limiting to reconciliation.

Most South Africans feel that reconciliation is still needed, and that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) provided a good foundation for reconciliation in the country. However, just over half the population feel that progress in terms of reconciliation has been made, while less than half of South Africans report having experienced reconciliation themselves. Six in ten South Africans, furthermore, feel that reconciliation – most commonly associated with forgiveness, moving on and peace – cannot fully take its course while those who were oppressed under apartheid remain poor. Six in ten South Africans believe that both those who were and those who were not oppressed during apartheid need to form part of the reconciliation process, with this sentiment being reflected across all race groups. The involvement of institutions is deemed to be important by at least six in every ten South Africans, with personal involvement, and that of family and friends, regarded as more important than any other institution listed. This creates both opportunities and challenges, in particular

as families are the most trusted of all, and homes are where the least interracial interaction happens.

Progress towards reconciliation in South Africa cannot take place without opportunities for, and willingness to engage in, meaningful connection and interaction between different race groups. More than half of South Africa's population indicated an openness to greater racial integration in the latest SARB 2017 Survey. In general, the spaces where South Africans report having more interaction are also the spaces where they experience the most racism. Most South Africans, however, remain open to interracial interaction in all spaces – private and public – with the main limitations in this regard (other than none) being language and confidence barriers. The latter is of particular importance, given that 'mother tongue' is the most salient primary identity of South Africans. A starting point for further interaction can thus be to promote multilingualism more actively.

As mentioned before, inequality is regarded as the most divisive aspect of South Africa's society. Inequalities show within and between race groups when assessed with economic measures and in terms of relative standing. Perceptions of power relations in economic and political terms show great disparities between various groups, broadly showing that very few South Africans are satisfied with the political and economic power they have, and perceptions that 'other groups' have political and economic power,

rather than the group to which they belong. The lived experience of unjust and unequal economic and political power relations proves to be a hindrance in the way of meaningful reconciliation in South Africa. In the long term, such divisions also offer fertile ground for manipulation by political entrepreneurs, who use them to detract from their own misconduct. Reconciliation, therefore, also has an important governance imperative. A divided society, with unequal power relations (and perceptions of such) is much less likely to unite in keeping leadership and institutions accountable.

Trust in institutions, leadership and fellow citizens is a critical component of a vibrant democratic political culture. Its presence or absence offers a reflection of the extent to which citizens feel excluded from or included in the system, and connected to or disconnected from one another. The confidence recorded in public institutions and national leadership has been low and a comparison over time points to a process of systematic erosion. In terms of interpersonal trust, South Africans trust their relatives more than any other grouping or social formation in society. This is not surprising, but holds implications in an environment in which South Africans not only have low levels of trust in other groups, but also in public institutions that preside over society. When combined with economic volatility it poses significant challenges for reconciliation and broader social cohesion processes.

I. INTRODUCTION

So “... it is within the concepts of truth, justice and mercy that that the bridge from violence to peace can be found ... by finding a balance between these three, reconciliation can be fostered, and that is reconciliation that provides the foundation stone for building positive peace.”

More than two decades after South Africa's first democratic election (1994), the first hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (1995) and the promulgation of the country's Constitution (1996), calls have been made – and initiatives taken – to reflect on the country's journey so far. In addition to change (or the lack of change) pertaining to South Africa's politics, governance and economics, progress in terms of reconciliation enjoys substantial focus.

South Africa is often applauded for its transition, reconciliation process and Constitution internationally, yet in recent years the country's leadership, governance and political life, and the structure of its economy, have come under scrutiny. Views, as reflected in dominant discourse (in particular, in spaces such as social media and traditional media), however, seem to be polarised on various key issues in the country. And it often appears that there is little scope for dialogue, accommodation of various views, or discussion to find ways forward. Some, furthermore, are of the view that the initial optimism for a united South Africa – palpable at the advent of democracy – has crumbled with the appeal of nation-building and ‘rainbow nation’ rhetoric, whilst others attest that the current challenges are mere growing pains to be expected of a young democracy and are not unique to a postcolonial society.

Such conversations and debates highlight questions about the reconciliation process thus far – in particular, what a reconciled South Africa will look like, and what is limiting progress towards such a society. Like many other facets of social change, reconciliation is conceptually complex and inherently difficult to measure (Lefko-Everett, 2012). Various conceptualisations and definitions of reconciliation are used, with various elements said to be conducive to ensuring sustainable reconciliation processes. Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio, the founding director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), describes reconciliation as involving different processes and parameters, but always the changing of patterns of events. For Villa-Vicencio (2004: 6, 8), reconciliation involves social dialogue, healing and grieving, acknowledgement of the truth, the pursuit of justice, reparations and (sometimes) forgiveness. Former IJR executive director Fanie du Toit proposed framing reconciliation as ‘a call

of recognition of the basic and radical interdependence of comprehensive wellbeing across conflict lines, and [that] as a process should allow for both participation and creativity but also concrete agendas, fostering shared memories and more effective institutions’ (Du Toit, 2012: 10, 15, 25–27). Highlighting the importance of building relationships as part of reconciliation, Louis Kiesberg (2007) defines reconciliation as ‘the process of developing mutual conciliatory accommodation between enemies or formerly antagonistic groups. It often refers to the process of moving towards a relatively cooperative and amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in relations involving extreme injury to one or more sides in the relationship.’

Combining various elements associated with reconciliation, and building on the work of JP Lederach's work on social reconstruction, Fisher et al (2000) attest that there are three key elements that require attention when thinking about the rebuilding of a post-conflict society:

... it is within the concepts of truth, justice and mercy that that the bridge from violence to peace can be found ... by finding a balance between these three, reconciliation can be fostered, and that is reconciliation that provides the foundation stone for building positive peace.

For the authors, truth involves associated concepts such as acknowledgement, transparency, revelation and clarity, while mercy involves associated concepts such as forgiveness, support, compassion, healing and acceptance. The notion of justice alludes to concepts such as equality, restitution, rights and responsibility, while ‘positive peace’ involves harmony, unity, wellbeing, security and respect. Reconciliation is, then, the way in which these concepts are brought together as a process and goal. Social reconstruction and reconciliation requires more than the passing of legislation – it requires time as well as the active involvement of those who were affected by and through the conflict that occurred. The balance and processes involved may differ in various contexts, as each reconciliation process is unique and brings with it its own complexities. It is thus the unique ways in which various societies or communities decide to interpret and pursue reconciliation that

brings value to the process of reconciliation – makes the process and goal meaningful, and not just a vision (Fisher et al, 2000).

In the pursuit of positive peace and reconciliation in the South African context, identifying key areas that may hamper such processes and outcomes – and thus need to be addressed – is vital. By measuring reconciliation in South Africa through public opinion surveying since 2003, the SARB captures progress and offers empirical insights in this regard. This year's SARB report explores South Africans' experiences of the reconciliation process and what progress has been made in this regard. The report furthermore identifies what may be hampering the reconciliation process. Such a delicate societal process is certainly not linear, and requires the continuous support of institutions and involvement of the relevant actors to ensure its progress. It is to this end that the SARB also considers who South Africans think should be involved in ensuring a sustainable reconciliation process going forward.

The report is structured in the following way: section two provides an overview of the SARB's research methodology. Section three focuses on nation-building and identity as dominant discourse in governmental documentation coupled with the SARB's findings on sources of division in society. Section four reports on South Africans' understanding of reconciliation, improvement in this regard, as well as societal change since 1994. This section also

considers who South Africans think should be involved in and responsible for reconciliation processes. The next sections follow from findings from these chapters. Section five explores public opinion about the past, with a particular focus on apartheid legacies. Then, section six reports on racial reconciliation indicators – including attitudes towards integration, frequency and openness to interaction, experiences of racism, as well as possible barriers to interaction between groups. Section seven focuses on power relations and socioeconomic access. It examines the current economic climate, coupled with SARB data on relative deprivation, lived poverty and social mobility. It furthermore explores perceptions of power – of groups, and personal power. Finally, section eight reports on aspects of democratic political culture, including trust in institutions, interpersonal trust, political efficacy and activism. The findings from these respective sections are then consolidated as part of the conclusion.

These findings are of particular relevance at this time, given the current (seemingly) politically polarised environment in South Africa in the lead-up to the 2019 South African national elections; given the current discourse pertaining to the structure, performance, inequalities and foundations of the economy; at a time when the spread of 'fake news' is rampant (here and abroad), with concerns about the integrity of media sources rising; and given concerns about race relations in South Africa.

What counts is
that people are
truly listening to
people who are
truly speaking

"Today I am educated, not with a certificate, but through workshops and training from comrades at Community House, where you can sit with a Prof but he is your equal."





II. METHODOLOGY

The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) is a public opinion survey conducted by the IJR since 2003. It is the only survey dedicated to critical measurement of reconciliation in South Africa, and is the largest longitudinal data source of its kind globally.

Since 2003, the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) Project has been tracking national reconciliation in South Africa. Through its South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) Survey, the project collects reliable and accurate public opinion data through a nationally representative public opinion survey that gauges public sentiment towards national reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa. Increasingly prone to reliance on assumptions, rhetoric and stereotypes, the debates on reconciliation and nation-building have, in recent years, tended to divide – rather than unify – South Africans. The SARB Survey takes a different approach. Through its well-honed survey methodology, it is able to quantify public sentiment about reconciliation, thereby providing a solid point of departure that can inform qualitative debates on the content of the concept and the extent to which it finds (or struggles to find) traction within South African society. The survey instrument is, however, strongly influenced by the findings of two qualitative national focus group exercises that were conducted in 2001 and 2011. As such, the project approaches the question of reconciliation from both quantitative and qualitative vantage points. The focus of this report falls on the quantitative results of the SARB Survey.

Conceptual framework

Between 2003 and 2013,¹ the SARB Survey was conducted on an annual basis, through face-to-face interviews, using a structured questionnaire. Results were released annually by the IJR to coincide with the commemoration of the Day of Reconciliation (16 December). In 2013 and 2014, the SARB survey instrument underwent extensive review in order to improve the survey questionnaire in conceptualisation and measurement of key constructs and variables. This process concluded in early 2015 and the new survey was fielded later that year.² The new survey contains the core items from previous rounds to ensure longitudinal value, but with a stronger emphasis on questions of economic justice. Table 1 shows the conceptual framework for the South African Reconciliation Barometer since 2015.³

Sampling and fieldwork⁴

The Reconciliation Barometer survey is conducted through face-to-face interviews with South Africans eighteen years and older who are resident in all nine South African provinces. Prior to 2017, the survey was conducted using a two-stage stratified random sample design based on a sampling frame obtained from Statistics SA (StatsSA). Once fieldwork was completed, the realised samples were reweighted for race, gender and age group to ensure representivity of all adults in the country. The 2017 SARB survey (from hereon SARB 2017), employed a multi-stage stratified sampling design with province, race and geographic area as the explicit stratification variables, with the final sample weighted using 2017 mid-year population estimates from StatsSA to provide a probability sample of adults in the country.

The SARB utilises a survey questionnaire comprising closed-ended responses and measurement scales. The majority of questions are posed in the form of a five-point Likert scale. A few questions allow for 'Other' as a response category, for which respondents can provide an alternative response to those provided. The questionnaire was developed by the IJR, and includes approximately one hundred survey items. New items added into the questionnaire were subjected to cognitive testing and piloting to assess suitability for inclusion in the final survey.

Additional reporting considerations

This report provides an overview of the South African public opinion in relation to reconciliation as per the indicators provided in Table 1. All reported data has been weighted (unless stated otherwise) by race, gender, area classification (metro/non-metro) and age groups to be nationally representative of the South African population.

For the purposes of this report, data has generally been analysed and presented using several key demographic variables, which include age, living standards measure (LSM),⁵ geographic location

Table 1: South African Reconciliation Barometer hypotheses and indicators, 2015 onwards

Hypotheses	Indicators
Power relations: Unjust/unequal power relations between different social groups (e.g. race/class) hinders progress towards reconciliation. More just and equitable power relations would create a more fertile environment for reconciliation. Limited to perceptual data, we have chosen to measure this by asking about access to economic, social, cultural and spatial resources within society. This concept is measured through these sub-indicators, each of which demonstrate differential perceptions of access to realms of power in society.	Economic access, social access, cultural access, spatial access
Democratic political culture: Reconciliation is more likely to thrive in a society where there is a growing democratic political culture. This is evident when citizens feel part of an inclusive nation, participate in the political process, feel the government is legitimately elected, respect the rule of law and support democratic political institutions.	Political community, political efficacy, rule of law, confidence in democratic institutions
Apartheid legacy: For reconciliation to take root in South Africa, it is necessary, firstly, to acknowledge and deal with the legacy of direct, structural and symbolic violence and oppression suffered under apartheid, and secondly, to support initiatives at the redress of this legacy.	Acknowledge the injustice of apartheid, acknowledge the legacy of apartheid, support for redress and transformation
Racial reconciliation: Progress towards reconciliation cannot take place without opportunities for and willingness to engage in meaningful connection between different race groups in South Africa.	Willingness to walk in someone else's shoes, willingness to tolerate, willingness to confront racism, formal opportunities to engage, spontaneous opportunities to engage
Improvement in reconciliation: For reconciliation to advance, South Africans should feel connected to the concept (they can understand and articulate the meaning of reconciliation) and feel that they have experienced it in their own lives. Reconciliation is a complex concept with different meanings. This indicator first attempts to ascertain the subjective meaning of reconciliation held by respondents and then, according to their subjective meaning, to measure perceptions of improvement.	Meaning of reconciliation, perceived improvement in reconciliation
Perceptions of change: For reconciliation to advance, it is important for citizens to perceive positive change within society for the past and for the future.	Material change, psychological change, hope for the future

and historically defined race categories.⁶ Notes have been made for each measurement, indicating the exact questions asked and the response categories available. All data presented in this report is from the SARB survey conducted in 2017, unless stated otherwise.

The IJR grants access to the Reconciliation Barometer survey datasets for purposes of secondary analysis on an application basis. Researchers, civil society organisations, academics and students are encouraged to contact the Institute for access requests. An embargo has, however, been placed on the most recent survey's data until the completion of the following survey round that will be conducted in 2019.

NOTES

1. During 2003 and 2004, the survey was conducted twice per year, and reduced to annually in 2005. For purposes of longitudinal comparison in this report, data from the first rounds in the respective years will be used, unless stated otherwise.
2. The results of the 2015 Reconciliation Barometer were released as a set of Briefing Papers, which is available on the IJR website (www.ijr.org.za).
3. Please see Appendix A for the conceptual framework of SARB surveys prior to 2015.
4. Please see Appendix B for more information.
5. The LSM is a composite measure that includes a range of survey items that assess dwelling type, telecommunications, domestic workers employed in the household, water and sanitation services on site, ownership of household consumer items (such as refrigerator, television, microwave oven), and residence in a metropolitan or rural area. More information can be found on the website of the South African Audience Research Foundation (SAARF).
6. It is not the intent of the IJR to endorse the continued use of apartheid racial categories in South Africa. The use of such categories here are for analytic purposes only. In the report, survey responses are presented according to race categories where this is analytically meaningful and deemed relevant to the tracking of public opinion.

III.

NATION-BUILDING, IDENTITY AND DIVISIONS

Since SARB's inception in 2003, most South Africans have indicated their preference for a united South African nation. In addition, optimism about the *potential* for a more unified society follows a similar trend to the *desirability* of greater unity. Furthermore, most South Africans do feel their South African identity is important for them. However, sources of division continue to pose challenges for unity and South Africa – the most pervasive of these inequality.

Identity and unity

The National Development Plan (NDP)¹ envisions a South Africa in which, by 2030, South Africans will be more conscious of what they have in common, rather than their differences. It stipulates that, by then, South Africans' lived experiences will 'progressively undermine and cut across the divisions of race, gender, disability, space and class'. The vision also holds that citizens will be more accepting of people's multiple identities.

Underlying the NDP's vision for a transformed society is an emphasis on unity in diversity, fostered by a shared commitment to constitutional values. This follows from the assertion that the Constitution aims to 'transform South Africa into a more equitable, integrated and just society', and that it provides the foundation for a South African identity (as a social identity). The plan furthermore outlines its aim to create a society in which citizens are proud to be South African and live the values of the Constitution. It does, however, also caution against 'narrow nationalism', the 'dislike of others', or the development of a superiority complex in relation to people from other countries or continents (NPC, 2012).

Social identity refers to group belonging, as well as the way in which we associate and connect with others on the basis of this belonging. Individuals may subscribe to multiple identities at any given time, based on their patterns of social, political and economic interaction (e.g. gender, race, religious affiliation, nationality), or they may single out any of these to exclude others from membership of their group. We depart from an assumption that South Africans who prefer an inclusive identity will be more receptive to the notion of reconciliation than those who hold singular, exclusive identities.

To this end, the SARB 2017 considered the primary and secondary identity associations of South Africans. In terms of primary identity association, the highest-ranked basis for group association in the 2017 survey was on the basis of *language* (mother tongue), followed by *race* and, thereafter, *economic class*. *South African* as a primary group association and identity ranks fourth. However, when primary and secondary identity associations were combined,

race ranks first, followed by *language*, *economic class* and then being *South African* (see Table 2).

Table 2: Primary identity²

	Primary	Secondary	Combined
Language	30.0	16.4	46.4
Race	23.4	28.0	51.4
Economic class	14.0	13.1	27.1
South African	11.1	7.7	18.8
Religion	7.1	13.1	20.2
None	4.5	7.7	12.1
Don't Know/Refused	7.3	3.4	10.7
Political party	2.5	10.5	13.0
Other	0.1	0.1	0.1

More than half of South Africa's population (55.1%) felt that the identity reported as their primary identity (see Table 2) is very important to them (see Table 3). Most South Africans furthermore felt that their primary identity association had some beneficial value to them as individuals, with 76.5% reporting that it made them feel good about themselves, 75.7% reporting that it makes them feel important, and 73.2% reporting that it made them feel secure (see Table 4).

Table 3: Importance of primary identity³

Not at all important	4.2
Not very important	15.6
Somewhat important	25.1
Very important	55.1

Table 4: Primary identity association and benefits⁴

	Makes you feel good about yourself	Makes you feel important	Makes you feel secure
Agree	76.5	75.7	73.2

Despite only 11.1% of South Africans reporting their South African identity as their primary identity, 79.9% of South Africans noted that being South African is an important part of how they saw themselves (see Figure 1). Eight in every ten South Africans (80.6%) wanted their children to think of themselves as South Africans, while 77.3% agreed that ‘people should realise we are South Africans first, and not think of themselves in terms of other groups they belonged to first’. Fewer than 5% of South Africans disagreed with these statements (see Figure 1).

Since the SARB’s inception in 2003, most South Africans have indicated their preference for a united South African nation (see Figure 2). In 2005, agreement on this question peaked at 77.6% and then dropped sharply over time to its lowest point of 55% in 2013. Between 2013 and 2017, however, this trend was reversed, with agreement levels rising again to 75.3% in the latest round of the survey. It is possible that this renewed emphasis on the forging of a national identity derives from a more acute appreciation of citizen interdependence during a period of considerable political and economic uncertainty and turmoil in the country.

Optimism about the *potential* for a more unified society follows a similar trend to the *desirability* of greater unity. The majority of South Africans, 68%, believed in 2017 that it is possible to create an united South Africa, which represents close to a 15% increase from the 2013 measurement of 53.6%.

What (still) divides us?

If it is the case that South Africans desire unity and believe it is possible, what is it that still divides citizens in the country? To assess this, the SARB 2017 requested respondents to provide their views on what they considered the primary source of the social division in the country. The question prompted respondents to provide a first and second mention, thereby capturing what were deemed the biggest and second biggest sources of social division amongst citizens. As seen in Table 5, *Inequality* is ranked as the biggest source of division on first mention, and then for first and second mentions combined. Race is ranked second in terms of first mention, as well as when combining second and first mentions, with political parties ranked third both as first mentioned, and when first and second mentions were combined.

The ranking of inequality as the greatest source of social division in the country has prevailed since the inception of the SARB in 2003, the only exceptions being in 2004 and 2010 when ‘Political parties’ were identified as the biggest source of division (see Figure 3). This is arguably due to the salience of political parties and electoral politics for these two years, with national elections in 2004 and local elections in 2010. Importantly, and despite some prevailing sentiment in public discourse, ‘Race’ was mostly

FIGURE 1: South African identity and unity⁵




FIGURE 2: South Africans agreeing that it is desirable and possible to create a united South Africa, 2003–2017⁶




Table 5: Sources of division⁷

	First mention	Second mention	Combined
Inequality	31.0%	27.1%	58.0%
Race	24.4%	28.9%	53.3%
Political parties	21.0%	16.7%	37.7%
Disease	8.8%	9.9%	18.7%
Language	3.7%	11.8%	15.5%

ranked second or third as a source of social division. Further, *language* also ranked quite low as a source of social division, an encouraging sign given that it was associated with primary group identity by the majority of adults. That is to say, while *language* may be pre-eminently important for South Africans in terms of how they differentiate themselves from others, it is not considered a basis for discriminating against these others.

Conclusion


The prominence of *language* as a salient identity among South Africans offers both opportunities and challenges for the reconciliation process. When narrowly appropriated by a specific cultural group to exclude others, *language* can be divisive. But, in instances where individuals from a particular cultural group make the effort to learn the language of others, it can bridge these divides (a point that we will return to in the chapter on racial relationships). The salience of *race* and *class*, however, offers many challenges – as both of these identities form part of broader historical and contemporary societal challenges. A *South African* identity, however, remains important to most South Africans, coupled with a desire and optimism for a united South Africa.

Given the country's history, the SARB Survey findings on inequality, race and political parties as sources of division are hardly surprising. Structural legacies from colonial and apartheid rule, such as economic and political marginalisation, are particular to the South African context. Debates on language, place, and identity; cooperation between historically distinctive groups in their competition for resources, land and ownership; and the role of political governance and developmental agendas are, however, amongst the shared structural legacies that post-independence and post-conflict societies in the global South⁸ frequently share (King et al, 2010). Reconciliation in South Africa's current and historical context thus requires a nuanced approach to overcoming and preventing social division.

NOTES

1. South Africa's National Development Plan, launched in 2012, is a detailed blueprint for how the country can eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by the year 2030 (Alexander, 2017).
2. The SARB asks respondents which group they associate with the most strongly. Options include: those who speak the same *language* (mother tongue) as the respondents, those who belong to the same *racial group* as the respondents, those who are in the same *economic class* as the respondents, those who practise and follow the same *religion* as the respondents, those who support the same *political party* as the respondents, those who regards themselves as primarily *South Africans*, *other* (with the option to give their response), or *none*.

FIGURE 3: Primary source of division, SARB 2003–2017⁸



3. Respondents were asked to think about the group they associate with most strongly (first mention), and then how important association with this group is for them.
4. Respondents were asked to think of the group they associate with most strongly (first mention), and then whether they 'Strongly Agree', 'Agree', are 'Neutral', 'Disagree' or 'Strongly Disagree' that this identity makes them feel good about themselves, makes them feel important and makes them feel secure. 'Agree' as indicated in Figure 1 captures 'Strongly Agree', and 'Agree' responses combined. 'Don't Know' and 'Refused' responses were not included in the data analysis.
5. The exact phrasing of the questions is indicated on the figure. Response categories include 'Strongly Agree', 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree'), 'Neutral', 'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree'). All 'Don't Know' answers were rendered missing, and were not included in the analysis.
6. Questions phrased as per Figure 1. Response categories include 'Strongly Agree', 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree'), 'Neutral', 'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree'). All 'Don't Know' answers were rendered missing, and were not included in the analysis.
7. The question reads: 'People sometimes talk about the division between people in South Africa. Sometimes these divisions cause people to be left out or discriminated against. In other instances it can lead to anger or even violence between groups. What, in your experience, is the biggest division in South Africa today?'

Response categories include: The division between supports of different political parties ('Political Parties'), the division between rich and poor ('Inequality'), the division between those living with infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, TB, etc.) and the rest of the community ('Disease'), the division between South Africans of different race groups (black, white, coloured and Indians) ('Race'), the divisions between South Africans of different language groups ('Language'), 'None' or 'Other'. DK/refused were included in the data. 'None', 'Other' and DK/refused answers not showed in the table.

8. Only first mentions used for this graph. Only the top five indicated on the graph. From 2003–2013 'Religion' was an option as a source of division. This was included as part of the data analysis for the relevant years. 'Other' and 'None' were an option for certain years, which were also included in the data analysis. DK/Refused included in data analysis.
9. The global South, as used here, refers broadly to the regions of Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania. As Dados and Connel (2012: 12) highlight, it forms part 'a family of terms, including "Third World" and "Periphery," that denote regions outside Europe and North America, mostly (though not all) low-income and often politically or culturally marginalized'. The concept's focus is on the shared 'interconnected histories of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social change through which large inequalities in living standards, life expectancy, and access to resources are maintained' in these contexts.





IV. IMPROVEMENT IN RECONCILIATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE

Most South Africans feel that reconciliation is still needed, and that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) provided a good foundation for reconciliation in the country. However, just over half the population feel that progress in terms of reconciliation has been made, while fewer than half of South Africans report having experienced reconciliation themselves.

The SARB posits that, for reconciliation to advance, South Africans should feel connected to the concept (they can understand and articulate the meaning of reconciliation) and that they should have experienced it in their own lives. As mentioned before, reconciliation is a complex concept with different meanings. In this section, we attempt to ascertain the subjective meaning of reconciliation held by respondents and then, according to their subjective meaning, to measure perceptions of improvement as well as who should be involved with and responsible for reconciliation.

Meaning of reconciliation

The SARB 2017 asked respondents to identify the connotations that they attach to the concept from a list of potential options. Respondents were given the option to mention three items,

ranking them in relevance from 1 to 3. Table 6 shows that, amongst the options provided, the most frequently mentioned item was the concept of 'Forgiveness': 17.1% of South Africans listed this as their first mention, followed by 'Moving on - moving forward from the past' (10.9%), and 'Truth - establishing the truth of the past' (10.2%) in the third place. Justice - framed as redress and creating a more equal society - ranks sixth on the list both in terms of first and combined mentions, while addressing racism ranks tenth.

Who needs to be involved?

South Africans' perceptions of what reconciliation means holds implications for who they think should be involved in reconciliation processes, and who is responsible for reconciliation processes. Six in ten (62.2%) South Africans agree that everyone - both

Table 6: Meaning of reconciliation¹

	First	Second	Third	Combined
Forgiveness - past victims forgiving past perpetrators	17.1	14.9	12.8	44.8
Moving on - moving forward from the past	10.9	12.2	10.6	33.6
Peace - the reduction of violence and establishment of peace	9.4	10.3	10.9	30.5
Truth - establishing the truth of the past	10.2	8.9	8.7	27.8
Respect - respecting people's humanity	7.6	8.5	9.8	25.9
Justice - redressing injustice/creating a more equal society	7.1	7.4	7.5	22.0
Relationships - improving relationships between past enemies	5.5	8.1	7.7	21.3
Democracy - building a democratic culture	5.3	6.4	6.4	18.1
Making amends - past perpetrators taking responsibility for their actions	5.6	5.6	6.4	17.6
Race relations - addressing racism	4.2	4.3	4.3	12.8
Compromise - two sides make compromises	3.2	4.3	5.2	12.7
Retribution - past perpetrators punished for their actions	3.2	3.4	3.6	10.2
Nothing - it has no meaning	5.7	1.5	2.1	9.3
Dialogue - finding ways to talk about the past	2.5	2.0	2.2	6.7
Memorialising - remembering the past	2.1	2.3	1.9	6.3
Other specify	0.2	—	0.1	0.3

the victims and perpetrators of apartheid – need to come to the table for reconciliation to work (see Figure 4). More than any race group, white respondents show the greatest understanding in this regard. Of course, who respondents think is responsible for reconciliation depends on their conceptualisation of reconciliation, and thus those who understand it as forgiveness may feel that those who were oppressed under apartheid have a greater role to play. However, given the SARB's findings in terms of historical confrontation and legacies (see section 5), as well as the fact that more than half of South Africa has not experienced reconciliation, it seems that, even though most white South Africans understand that they need to come to the table for reconciliation to work, it is not happening. This, coupled with inequalities as well as perceptions regarding political and economic power (see section 7), may very well allude to fears about what involvement in the reconciliation process may entail.

Processes of reconciliation, however, do need guidance and involvement of institutions and leadership. The SARB 2017 asked respondents whether they think the involvement of specific institutions is important for reconciliation (see Figure 5). Almost seven in ten (66.7%) respondents agreed that it is important that they themselves, their families and friends are involved in reconciliation. Relatives are the most trusted in terms of interpersonal trust (see section 8). Involvement of family, friends and individuals in reconciliation processes thus holds significant potential to start change in a trusted environment, but can also hamper reconciliation processes, should they be resistant to such. According to respondents, religious and faith-based organisations (65.7%), as well as civil society organisations (62.5%), can also play an important role in reconciliation processes. Six in ten (60.5%) South Africans furthermore believe that business has an important role to play in reconciliation. Although the role of national government and elected representatives is deemed important by 62.4% of South Africans, and such structures do have an important role to play in reconciliation, trust in these institutions has decreased (see section 8).

Reconciliation progress

South Africans' perceptions of what reconciliation means also holds implications for whether they have experienced reconciliation, whether it is still needed, and whether progress has been made in this regard. Only 56.1% of South Africans agree that South Africa has made progress in reconciliation since the end of apartheid. Fewer than half of South Africans report that their friends and family have experienced reconciliation after the end of apartheid, while 62.4% feel that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) provided a good foundation for South Africa to achieve reconciliation. Seven in ten (73.5%) South Africans feel that South Africa still needs reconciliation, while 63.4% agree

FIGURE 4: Responsibility for reconciliation²





FIGURE 5: Importance of involvement of institutions in reconciliation processes³



that reconciliation is impossible for as long as people who were disadvantaged under apartheid remain poor (see Figure 6). From the latter finding, coupled with the findings that 'Forgiveness', 'Moving on' and 'Peace' are most commonly associated with the concept of reconciliation, we can infer that many South Africans feel that forgiving, moving on and peace are difficult amid the realities of poverty and inequality. This does not mean that there is no desire for reconciliation, but that there is a certain societal context limiting the reconciliation process.

Perceptions of change

For reconciliation to advance, it is important for citizens to perceive positive change within society for the past and for the future. A first step in this regard is to understand public perceptions of what has, and has not, changed since the advent of democracy in 1994. It goes without saying that, for reconciliation processes to be evaluated in a positive light, citizens should perceive positive change to have occurred within the social, economic and political spheres and to foresee such positive change in the future.

Somewhat disconcertingly, respondents who participated in the 2017 SARB survey perceived limited change in key spheres of society. As seen in Figure 7, the greatest reported positive change since 1994 is in terms of race relations, with almost one in every three South Africans reporting improvement thereof. However, a larger proportion of South Africans (38.3%) reported that race relations had actually stayed the same since 1994, while 29.4% believe that they have worsened. The latter two results represent a somewhat damning indictment, given that the post-1994 period was, and is considered by many to have been, the most important period for improving the dismal race relations that prevailed during apartheid. Based on these results, it would appear that progress, while apparent, is remarkably muted and slow.

The picture is worse for assessment of inequality, with three in four South Africans (77.1%) reporting that inequality has either stayed the same or worsened. One reason for this lies in another result reported in the figure – for reported change in economic circumstances – in which 71.7% believe that their economic circumstances, and those of their families, have either stayed the same or deteriorated since 1994. Unsurprisingly, given the current levels of employment in the national economy, employment opportunities are also reported to have stagnated or deteriorated since 1994.

Conclusion

Forgiveness, moving on and peace are the most common concepts associated with reconciliation. Most South Africans feel that

FIGURE 6: Reconciliation progress⁴





FIGURE 7: Perceptions of change since 1994, SARB 2017⁵



reconciliation is still needed, and that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) provided a good foundation for reconciliation in the country. However, just over half the population feel that progress in terms of reconciliation has been made, while fewer than half of South Africans report having experienced reconciliation themselves. Six in ten South Africans, furthermore, feel that reconciliation – as mentioned above, most commonly associated with forgiveness, moving on and peace – cannot fully take its course while those who were oppressed under apartheid remain poor. Six in ten South Africans believe that both those oppressed and those who were not oppressed during apartheid need to form part of the reconciliation process, with this sentiment being reflected across all race groups – but the most by white South Africans. Respondents' perceptions of who should be involved, however, is influenced by their conceptualisation of reconciliation. The involvement of all of the listed institutions is deemed to be important by at least every six in ten South Africans, with personal involvement, and that of family and friends, regarded as more important than involvement of any other institution listed. This creates both opportunities and challenges, in particular as families are the most trusted of all (see section 8), and homes are where the least interracial interaction happens (see section 6).

Since the inception of the survey, inequality has remained the most prominent source of social division in the eyes of ordinary South Africans. Not surprisingly, therefore, respondents feel that, on this score, the country has made least progress since the political transition of 1994. Inequality is thus both the most divisive and enduring aspect of South African society. In addition, improvement in race relations since 1994 has been slow, with race ranking as second most divisive aspect of South African society for the first time in 2015, and again in 2017. These findings, coupled with the prominence of both race and class as primary sources of identity (Table 2), show that the most divisive aspects of apartheid-era laws – namely, racial segregation and socioeconomic divisions – persist as divisions today.

NOTES

1. Question reads: 'What, if anything, does "reconciliation" mean to you?' Response options as per Table 6, with three mentions possible.
2. Question reads: 'Who do you think should take the greatest responsibility for ensuring reconciliation in South Africa?' Response categories as indicated in Figure 4.
3. Question reads: 'How important do you think the role of the following institutions/people is in the reconciliation process in South Africa?' Statements as indicated on Figure 5. Response categories include "Very important" and "Important" (combined to form important), "Somewhat important", "Not very important" and "Not important" (combined to form not important).
4. Statements as indicated on Figure 6. Response categories include 'Strongly Agree', 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree', 'Neutral', 'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree'). 'Don't Knows' not included in data analysis.
5. Question reads: 'How would you say the following has changed since 1994, when the country became a democracy? Has it ...' Statements read: 'Your personal safety and that of your family (Safety)'; 'Economic circumstances for you and your family (Economic circumstances)'; 'Employment opportunities for you and your family (Employment)'; 'Relations between members of different race groups (Race relations)'; and 'The gap between rich and poor (Inequality)'. Response categories: 'Worsened a great deal', 'Worsened somewhat' (combined to form 'Worse'), 'Stayed the same', 'Improved somewhat' and 'Improved a great deal' (combined to form 'Better').

V. HISTORICAL CONFRONTATION AND APARTHEID LEGACIES

How we remember the violent and divisive nature of apartheid matters for the quality of reconciliation that we hope to achieve. Within the realm of reconciliation discourses, memory is not only a question of what we remember, but also of what we forget. Despite some decline in the acknowledgement of the injustices of apartheid, a significant majority is still of the view that the apartheid system could be categorised as a crime against humanity.

How we remember the violent and divisive nature of apartheid matters for the quality of reconciliation that we hope to achieve. The legacies of apartheid continue to have an economic and psychological impact on South Africans. In the absence of memory, a society is likely to repeat its costly failures. Even though we may find ourselves almost a quarter of a century into a new political dispensation, many unresolved legacies of the apartheid and colonial eras remain. They continue to present an obstacle to the achievement of a truly fair and equitable society. As such, these legacies have to be confronted head-on. This will require, amongst other things, that our society acknowledges this legacy and the structural and symbolic violence that continues to inflict on South Africans.

Seven out of every ten South Africans in the most recent round of the survey agreed about the unjust nature of the apartheid system (Figure 8), with 70% of South Africans agreeing that the majority of South Africans were oppressed by it and 77.4% agreeing that it was a crime against humanity. In this regard, however, there has been a drop in acknowledgment levels since 2003, with 87% of respondents back then agreeing that apartheid was a crime against humanity, compared to the 77% in 2015 and 2017 (see Figure 9). Agreement in this regard dropped particularly among

FIGURE 9: Agreement that apartheid was a crime against humanity, SARB 2003–2017²





FIGURE 8: Historical confrontation and apartheid injustices¹



coloured respondents from 92% in agreement in 2003 to 71% in agreement in 2017. Agreement among black African respondents similarly dropped from 89% in 2003 to 79% in 2017, while agreement among white respondents declined by 2% from 70% in 2003 to 68% in 2017. Starting off with 89% agreement in 2003, agreement among Indian/Asian respondents reached 90% and above during 2008 and 2009, but decreased slightly again to 87% in 2017.

Apartheid legacies

South Africans, nevertheless, do acknowledge legacies attributed to the policies of apartheid (see Figure 10), with seven in ten agreeing that 'Many black South Africans are still poor today because of the lasting effects of apartheid' (70%); 'Many white South Africans are still well-off today because of the lasting effects of apartheid' (70%); 'Many black South Africans do not own land/property because of the lasting effects of apartheid' (70.8%); and 'Many white South Africans today own land/property because of the lasting effects of apartheid' (70.3%). Furthermore, 66.7% of South Africans agree that residential areas in South Africa are still racially segregated as a result of the apartheid legacy.

Disaggregating the national findings by race, however, shows differences in this regard, in particular that more black African respondents agree with the statements than any of the other race groups (see Figure 10). Notably, when considering white respondents' responses, the statement with which most white respondents agreed pertains to spatial segregation. Differences in terms of perceptions regarding white South Africans still being well-off as a result of apartheid, furthermore, shows that only 39.2% of white South Africans agreed with this statement and only 42.9% agreed with the statement that many white South Africans today own land or property because of the lasting effects of apartheid.

In comparison to other race groups, white South Africans indicate higher levels of denial of past injustices and lower levels of support for redress. According to Steyn (2012), remembering and being cognisant of such injustices could have difficult psychological and material consequences for white South Africans. Ignorance and forgetting serve to shield white South Africans from being aware of such injustices and to ensure that racial privilege continues without internal questioning. These factors, coupled with perceived group political 'powerlessness' (as per section 7), creates an environment in which it is very difficult to find solutions to engage constructively in findings ways forward. However, it might be said that there is acknowledgement of the injustices of apartheid over time (despite a dip in 2013) among white South Africans (as per Figure 9), although less so in terms of the legacy of apartheid (as per Table 7).

FIGURE 10: Apartheid legacies, agreement with statements³




Table 7: Apartheid legacies, agreement by race groups

	Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	South Africa
In general, residential areas in South Africa are still racially segregated because of the lasting effects of apartheid	69.5	51.1	50.2	62.4	66.7
Many black South Africans are still poor today because of the lasting effects of apartheid	74.7	42.9	56.3	59.5	70.0
Many white South Africans are still well-off today because of the lasting effects of apartheid	74.8	39.2	59.1	62.2	70.0
Many black South Africans today do not own land/property because of the lasting effects of apartheid	76.1	40.7	56.7	57.4	70.8
Many white South Africans today own land/property because of the lasting effects of apartheid	74.9	42.9	54.9	61.2	70.3

Conclusion

Within the realm of reconciliation discourses, memory is not only a question of what we remember, but also of what we forget. Despite some decline in the acknowledgement of the injustices of apartheid, a significant majority is still of the view that the apartheid system could be categorised as a crime against humanity. A majority of South Africans, furthermore, agree that the legacies of apartheid continue to persist to the present day, although differences between race groups are evident in this regard. White South Africans in particular indicate higher levels of denial of past injustices and lower levels of support for redress, compared to other groups. Studies, such as by Steyn (2012), show that ignorance and forgetting serve as a shield to introspection and acknowledgement of privilege. Combined with perceptions of political and economic power, and related fears born out of perceptions in this regard, unaddressed legacies remain divisive and limiting to reconciliation.

NOTES

1. Question reads: 'How much do you agree with the following statements about apartheid?' [Statements as per Figure 8]. Response categories included: 'Strongly Disagree' and 'Disagree', 'Neutral', 'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (combined to form 'Agree' in Figure 8). 'Don't Know' responses not included in data analysis.
2. Question and response categories as per note 1 in this section.
3. Question reads: 'How much do you agree with the following statements about the lasting effects of apartheid in South Africa today?' [Statements as per Figure 10]. Response categories included: 'Strongly Disagree', 'Disagree', 'Neutral', 'Agree' and 'Strongly Agree' (combined to form 'Agree' in Figure 10). 'Don't Know' responses not included in data analysis.



VI. RACIAL RECONCILIATION

Progress towards reconciliation in South Africa cannot take place without opportunities for, and willingness to engage in, meaningful connection and interaction between different race groups. SARB 2017 shows that South Africans remain open to interracial interaction in all spaces, with the main limitations in this regard being language and confidence barriers. In addition, more than half of South Africa's population indicated an openness to greater racial integration.

Progress towards reconciliation in South Africa cannot take place without opportunities for, and willingness to engage in, meaningful connection and interaction between different race groups. Contact between different racial groups has been measured by the SARB since its inception. The measure is informed by social psychology theory related to the contact hypothesis attributed to Gordon W. Allport (1954). Allport posits that the most effective way to reduce prejudice between groups is through interpersonal contact under the correct conditions, namely: 1) equal status, 2) intergroup cooperation, 3) common goals, and 4) support provided by social and institutional authorities. Evidence has shown positive outcomes (such as peace and accord) from intergroup contact – which may apply to both minority and majority groups. In some instances, prejudice was reduced even without the four conditions framed by Allport. There is, however, also a growing awareness of a possible 'paradoxical' effect of intergroup contact – that is, increased contact may also reinforce previously held stereotypes and prejudices and thus increase, rather than decrease, ingroup-outgroup distinctions and enmity.

Racial integration

The SARB Survey asked respondents about the race group (other than their own) which they found most difficult to associate. This question is posed before asking questions in terms of openness to integration. It helps to ascertain whether South Africans are tolerant and open to integration, even though they might find it difficult to associate with a specific group of South Africans. It also provides the opportunity for respondents to report that they do not have difficulties associating with other race groups. While 38% of South Africans indicated that they do not have difficulties with any other race group, 26.9% indicated that they find it most difficult to associate with white South Africans, 20.1% with black South Africans and 12.2% with Indian/Asian South Africans. Only 2.7% of South Africans found it difficult to associate with coloured South Africans. Although 66.3% of white respondents indicated they do not have a problem associating with any other race group, for black, coloured and Indian respondents, the white category was the most frequently mentioned category. A variety of factors

Table 8: Racial group respondents find it difficult to associate with, by race groups¹

	Black	White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	South Africa
Black	22.3	15.5	6.7	10.2	20.1
White	30.8	9.3	25.7	11.4	26.9
Indian/Asian	13.7	6.8	15.7	4.5	12.2
Coloured	2.1	2.1	4.0	8.0	2.7
Don't have difficulties with other race groups	31.1	66.3	48.0	65.9	38.0

may be at play here, such as language or religious differences (transcending racial categories), not having had the opportunity for interaction with people from other race groups, and self-identification other than the formally assigned category. Most of these, nevertheless, have their origins in the country's history of social division.

Following the above question, respondents were asked whether they would approve of integration with their mentioned least-associated group in their neighbourhood; at school (among children and teachers); in work settings, working under a person from that racial category; interracial marriage; and being attended by a doctor from the group they mentioned.

The results, conveyed in Figure 11, show that, in each of the above-mentioned settings, more than half of respondents approved of more integration. These majorities are, however, in some instances not overwhelming. Approval of interracial marriage (52.3%) is the lowest, followed by approval of integration in neighbourhoods (53.4%). Approval of having to work for, or take instructions from, a person from least-associated groups reached 55.4%, while approval of respondents' children or a family member being taught by a person from least-associated with groups reached 58.3%. Integration among schoolchildren enjoyed slightly more support, at 58.5% approval. Being treated by a medical professional from respondents' respective least-associated with groups enjoyed the most approval at 63.6%. White respondents were the least approving of integration in all respects, while Indian/Asian respondents were the most approving of integration in all respects – except in terms of neighbourhood integration.

Interracial interaction

As mentioned, following Allport, prejudices – possibly prohibiting the approval of integration in the various respects mentioned above – may be alleviated through intergroup interaction under the right conditions. To understand which conditions are present or not present, it is valuable to ascertain where intergroup interaction is actually occurring or not occurring at present.

The data reveal that interracial contact differs significantly in private versus public spaces. The least interracial interaction occurs at private homes with 52% of South Africans reporting they rarely or never interact with people from other race groups in their personal living space. Interaction is also limited on public transport, at social gatherings and in public recreational spaces, with 48.2% of South Africans rarely or never interacting with people from other race groups on public transport; 46.6% rarely or never interacting at social gatherings; and 46.1% rarely or never interacting in public recreational spaces. The highest degree of interracial interaction occurs in commercial spaces, such as malls

FIGURE 11: Approval of integration²




FIGURE 12: Interaction with people from other race groups in various spaces, 'Rarely'/'Never' by race groups³





FIGURE 13: Open to more interaction⁴



or shops and work and study places, with only 36.1% of South Africans reporting that they rarely or never interact with people from other race groups in commercial spaces and 39.4% reporting the same for work and study places.

White and coloured respondents report having the most interaction with people from other race groups in the various spaces. Notably, coloured respondents report having much more interaction on public transport spaces than is the case for all other race groups.

Open to more interaction

As mentioned before, the SARB posits that reconciliation requires a willingness to engage and interact with people from other race groups.

As reported in Figure 13, six out of every ten (60.9%) South Africans indicated that they are open to more interaction with people from other race groups in public and private spaces. One in four (25%) South Africans were open to more interaction with people from other race groups in certain spaces but not in others – i.e. selective interaction – while only 14.1% are not open to any further interaction with people from other race groups. More South Africans in metro spaces indicated that they desire interaction in all spaces (65.5%) than is the case for non-metro respondents (26.4%). Respondents in higher LSM categories (6-7 and 8-10) were also more likely to desire more interaction in all spaces than respondents from lower LSM categories (1-5). Indian/Asian (69.5%) and coloured (63.9%) respondents were the population groups most likely to agree to higher levels of interaction in all spaces, although positive responses were also around the 60% mark for white (58.5%) and black (60.5%) respondents. While there seems to be an openness towards greater interaction, we need to understand what, then, prevents citizens from doing so.

Table 9: Factors preventing more interaction⁵

	Black	White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	South Africa
Nothing prevents me	27.2	47.5	44.0	33.7	30.3
Language barriers	15.6	14.8	21.5	28.1	16.9
Your confidence	17.5	7.6	6.7	7.3	15.3
Fear/Anxiety	8.8	4.7	7.0	5.1	8.0
No common ground	7.9	7.3	5.9	8.8	7.9
Opportunities to talk/engage	8.0	7.9	2.1	7.6	7.8
Negative prior experiences	8.1	4.9	7.8	4.0	7.4
Your willingness to talk/engage	6.8	5.3	4.9	5.4	6.4

Table 9 shows that almost three in ten (30.3%) South Africans attest that nothing prevents them from having more interaction with people from other race groups. For 16.9%, language barriers represent the greatest barriers, followed by confidence (15.3%). Only 8% of South Africans report that fear/anxiety was the biggest barrier for interacting with people from other race groups, followed closely by the percentage of South Africans who report having no common ground (7.9%) and no opportunities to talk and engage (7.8%). Only 7.4% of South Africans cite negative prior experiences, and only 6.4% cite their unwillingness to talk and engage, as the primary reason for not interacting with people from other race groups.

Experiences of racism and addressing racism

Although negative experiences as a barrier to further interaction was not one of the key obstacles identified by South Africans, such experiences may have a negative impact on the extent to which a person is open to further interaction with people from race groups other than their own.

The 2017 SARB round asks respondents how frequently they experience racism in their daily lives, specifically making reference to various spaces where interracial contact may occur.

Two in every ten (20.7%) South Africans reported that racism affects their daily lives 'always' or 'often' in the workplace or place of study. This is also the space where black, white and Indian respondents reported experiencing the most racism. Furthermore, 19.1% of South Africans reported experiencing racism always or often in commercial and retail spaces, 17% in public recreational spaces, 15.4% at social gatherings and events, and 14.4% on public transport. Coloured respondents reported the most racism on public transport, with 20.8% indicating that they always or often experience racism in such spaces. Public transport is also the space where coloured respondents reported having much more interaction with people from other race groups than is reported by other race groups in this particular space. Indians reported experiencing the least racism in a range of spaces, although they had the second-least interaction with people from other race groups (as per Figure 12).

As indicated above, most interaction by South Africans of different racial backgrounds occurs in commercial spaces, and those frequented for work and study. These are also the spaces where respondents have encountered most racism. This, however, does not seem to be a deterrent for being open to more interaction, as pointed out in Table 9.

Should racism occur, however, confronting racist behaviour and talk in public and private spaces might be difficult, particularly in

FIGURE 14: Frequency of racism affecting people in their daily lives, always/often⁶





FIGURE 15: Agree that it is difficult to confront racist behaviour or talk⁷



instances where language and confidence plays a big role. Respondents to the 2017 SARB were asked whether they agree about the difficulty of confronting specific people when they act in a racist manner.

The findings reported on in Figure 15 suggest that the majority of respondents (52.1%) found it more difficult to confront strangers who behaved in a racist manner than acquaintances. This sentiment cuts across all the population groups, with the exception of South Africans of Indian/Asian origin. Respondents found it least difficult to confront racist behaviour and talk from a colleague, with 39.6% agreeing that it is difficult to confront such behaviour in a colleague. However, more South Africans (41.8%) would find it difficult to confront such behaviour from a person in authority or a superior at work.

Conclusion

More than half of South Africa's population indicated an openness to greater racial integration in SARB 2017. This is in the context of neighbourhoods, schools (in terms of learners and teachers), interracial marriage, and in professional settings, such as receiving treatment from a doctor of another racial group. In general, the spaces where South Africans report having more interaction are also the spaces in which they experience the most racism. However, they find it the easier to confront racism in the workplace when a colleague behaves in a racist manner than is the case with a stranger in a public setting. This shows the importance of systems in workplaces that address these experiences and the possible role that employers and the administrations of institutions of learning can play in addressing racism and aiding the reconciliation process. Most South Africans remain open to interracial interaction in all spaces – private and public – with the main limitations in this regard (other than none) being language and confidence barriers. The latter is of particular importance, given that 'mother tongue' is the most salient primary identity of South Africans (see section 3). A starting point for further interaction can thus be promoting multilingualism more actively.

NOTES

1. Question reads: 'Excluding your own race group, which one race group do you find most difficult to associate with?' Response categories as per Table 8. 'Don't Know' and 'Refused' responses not included in the data analysis.
2. Question reads: 'Now I would like you to tell me how you feel about the following. Again, think of [group mentioned difficult to associate with] and tell me in each of the following statements whether you would strongly approve, approve, neither disapprove nor approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove of the following.' 'Strongly Approve' and 'Approve' combined to form 'Approve' for Figure 11, 'Strongly Disapprove' and 'Disapprove' combined to form 'Disapprove' for Figure 11. Statements listed: a) Living in a neighbourhood where half of your neighbours are (group mentioned) people (Neighbourhood on figure); b) Having a (mentioned group) person sit next to my child, or the child of a family member, at school (schoolchildren on figure); c) Having my child, or the child of a family member, taught by a (mentioned group) person at school (schoolteacher on figure); d) Having to work for and take instructions from a (group mentioned) person; e) Having a close relative marry a (group mentioned) person (marriage on figure); f) Being treated by a (group mentioned) doctor in an emergency situation (doctor on figure).
3. Question reads: 'Thinking about a typical day in the past month, how often do you think did you interact or talk to someone who was a different race to you?' a) At work/place of study, b) At home, c) At commercial or retail spaces, d) At social gathering and events, e) At public spaces (such as parks, stadiums and benches), f) At public transport spaces (such as trains, buses, taxis or airports).' Response categories include: 'Never', 'Rarely', 'Sometimes', 'Often' and 'Always'. 'Don't Know' responses were not included in the data analysis.
4. Question reads: 'Would you like to interact more with people from a different race than you?' List of spaces similar to that of note 3 in this section. Response categories 'Yes' or 'No'. 'Yes' responses combined to compile Figure 13. 'Don't Knows' were not included in the data analysis.
5. Question reads: 'In general, what may prevent you from talking to people of different race groups?' Statements as listed in Table 9.
6. Question reads: 'How often does racism affect your daily life in these various places?' Spaces as listed in Figure 14. Response categories include: 'Always', 'Often', 'Sometimes', 'Rarely' and 'Never'. 'Don't Know' responses were not included in the data analysis.
7. Question reads: 'Please tell me how much you agree or disagree that it is difficult to confront the following people when they behave or talk in a racist manner.' A) Someone you know well (friends or family), b) Someone you work or study with (colleague), c) Someone you don't know well or a stranger, d) Someone in a position of authority or leadership (such as a church or community leader, your manager, your lecturer or teacher).



VII.

POWER RELATIONS AND SOCIOECONOMIC ACCESS

The lived experience of unjust and unequal economic and political power relations proves to be a hindrance in the way of meaningful reconciliation in South Africa.

The SARB posits that unjust and/or unequal power relations between different social groups (e.g. race/class) hinder progress towards reconciliation, whilst more just and equitable power relations would create a more favourable and fertile environment for reconciliation. As mentioned before, inequality is regarded as the most divisive aspect of South Africa's society. It is therefore imperative that, to understand how to bridge such divides, we understand the socioeconomic realities of South Africans in the various ways in which these play out in their everyday lives.

Current economic environment

According to StatsSA's most recent release of Poverty Trends in South Africa (2017), South Africa's economic performance in the last five years has been driven by a combination of international and domestic factors, including:

'... low and weak economic growth, continuing high unemployment levels, lower commodity prices, higher consumer prices (especially for energy and food), lower investment levels, greater household dependency on credit, and policy uncertainty'.

As a result, more households and individuals have been pulled into poverty. Despite the general decline in poverty levels from 2006 to 2011, poverty measured in monetary terms increased again between 2011 and 2015. Over the period, the proportion of South Africans living below the poverty line¹ increased from 53.2% to 55.5%. This percentage translates into over 30.4 million South Africans living in poverty.

Although inequality – measured by the Gini Coefficient – has declined since 2006, from 0.72 to 0.68 (StatsSA, 2017), South Africa remains one of the most economically unequal societies in the world (Bhorat, 2015). This manifests most strongly between racial groups, but increasingly also within these groups (Leibbrandt et al, 2012). Labour market outcomes, in terms of earnings inequality and chronically high levels of unemployment, are major drivers of these perpetually high levels of inequality.

The economy's major challenge remains to grow at a sustained and high rates, that would allow a broader spectrum of South Africans to benefit from its proceeds. At the time of writing, the prospects for such growth in the short to medium term appeared to be limited. Growth remained stagnant at less than 1% and, while other emerging economies have finally picked up steam again in the wake of the global recession, political infighting within the ruling African National Congress (ANC), and the resultant political uncertainty, have scuppered South Africa's chances of benefiting from a more favourable global economic environment. As a result, global ratings agencies Fitch and Standard & Poor's have downgraded South Africa's sovereign credit rating to sub-investment grade (or 'junk' status). This followed shortly after a cabinet reshuffle during March 2017, which affected critical ministries such as the National Treasury.

In light of these developments, finance minister Malusi Gigaba's Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBS) in October painted a bleak picture of the country's fiscal health. The country faces its biggest tax revenue shortfall – R50.8 billion – since 2009. In addition, the country's debt-to-GDP ratio has more than doubled since 2008 and currently stands at 54.2%. Gigaba's forecast is that it may reach 61% by 2022. It is within this context that the 2017 SARB investigates South African sentiment with regard to economic security, as well as the related dimensions of access to social, cultural and spatial resources.

Relative standing and socioeconomic access

Relative standing refers to 'where one fits into the distribution of economic welfare'. This can be measured by income, wealth, or – as is the measure used here – perceptions of relative financial welfare. Measures of relative standing – and relative income, more specifically – are often studied in relation to self-reported happiness or subjective well-being (Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Kingdon & Knight, 2007). The general finding from such studies is that, although absolute income levels have a role to play, how people rank themselves in relation to others has a more important impact on subjective well-being. In this regard, individuals' subjective

well-being diminishes due to the higher income of reference groups and the accompanying sense of relative deprivation or reduced status.

To gauge South Africans' self-perceived social standing and access to economic resources, the SARB 2017 asked respondents a series of questions about their subjective experience of their own living conditions and financial situation in relation to others in their community, but also the rest of South Africa. They were also asked how these circumstances compare with what they were in the past, and how they expect them to be in the future. Furthermore, it asked them a series of questions that relate to their experience of poverty, outside of the income dimension, to look at actual deprivation from basic resources.

Table 10 summarises the main findings in this regard by presenting the mean scores of scales compiled from relevant questions per respective heading. A mean score captures the average of a distribution of a scale. In this case, the scales range from 1 to 5, with 1 representing being much worse off and 5 representing

being much better off for all items – except the Lived Poverty Index. In the case of the Lived Poverty Index scale – ranging from 1 to 5 – 5 represents more lived poverty, while 1 represents less lived poverty.

Lived Poverty Index scores reveal great disparities between respondents in the LSM 1-5 group and other LSM groups – in particular, in comparison with the LSM 8-10 group. The LSM 1-5 group's mean scores are, furthermore, lower than the national scores across all indicators, showing greater lived poverty, being worse off on all accounts, and having the least access to resources to achieve personal goals.

Lived Poverty Index scores furthermore reveal great disparities between race groups, with white and Indian/Asian respondents scoring much lower in this regard (thus showing less lived poverty), while scoring higher than coloured and black African respondents on all other accounts – indicating being better off on all accounts. The white group's score for access to resources to achieve own goals is particularly high, an aspect we explore later in this section.

TABLE 10: Perceived socioeconomic and financial well-being²

	Lived Poverty Index	Household conditions of you and family compared to community and rest of SA	Household conditions of you and family compared to past and prediction for SA	Financial situation of you and family compared to community and rest of SA	Financial situation of you and family compared to past and prediction for future	Quality of life of you and family compared to community and rest of SA	Availability and access to resources to achieve personal goals
LSM groups							
LSM 1-5	2.2	2.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.8
LSM 6-7	1.7	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.2
LSM 8-10	1.2	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.6
Race groups							
Black	1.9	2.9	3.1	2.8	3.0	2.9	3.1
White	1.1	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.7
Indian/Asian	1.2	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.5	3.4	3.2
Coloured	1.4	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.1
Gender							
Male	1.7	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.1	3.0	3.2
Female	1.8	2.9	3.0	2.8	3.0	2.9	3.1
Metro vs non-metro							
Metro	1.5	2.9	3.1	2.8	3.1	3.0	3.2
Non-metro	2.0	2.9	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.9	3.1
Age groups							
18-34 years	1.8	3.0	3.1	2.9	3.2	3.0	3.2
35-54 years	1.8	2.9	3.1	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.1
55 years plus	1.6	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.0
National							
South Africa	1.8	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.0	2.9	3.1

Metro respondents' Lived Poverty Score points to much less lived poverty experienced than non-metro respondents. Non-metro scores, on all other accounts, are mostly on par with the national score – except in terms of household living conditions improving – while metro respondents' scores are mostly higher than the national, with the exception of relative financial situation. Some disparities also show between male and female respondents, with female respondents' scores being the same or worse than the national score, and male respondents' scores being the same or better than the national score. Finally, although the Lived Poverty Index score for respondents 55 years and older is lower than for other age groups, this group score less on most of the other indicators, indicating that they feel worse off on all other accounts. Scores of younger respondents, in particular those aged 18–34, are mostly on par with, or better than, the national figures.

Overall, mean scores for perceived relative deprivation (comparison to the rest of South Africa" and "community") are lower than mean scores for current circumstances compared with what they were in the past and how respondents expect them to be in the future. This indicates more optimism (or, at least, the sentiment that things will not get worse) in terms of future prospects, whilst, in comparison with others, South Africans feel worse off.

Access to resources and locus of control

In addition to relative standing, an investigation into perceptions of social mobility and access to important resources is of particular relevance to the South African context. These not only hold implications for political and social cohesion, but also allow for a better understanding of the psychological state of individuals (Stander, 2014).

Social mobility (often also seen as equality of opportunity) can be defined as the capacity of an individual to achieve a better economic and/or social position for himself or herself (and his or her family) through hard work (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). Starting points matter in the pursuit of equal outcomes; hence, access to resources, services and opportunities are important determinants of the extent to which people can fulfil their own potential (UN DESA, 2015). To this end, the 2015 and 2017 SARB surveys considered the goals that respondents have in their own lives, and whether they feel that they have access to a) the *financial resources*; b) the *groups of people*; c) the *education*, and d) the *mobility* to achieve their goals.

The 2017 SARB not only considered whether South Africans feel that they have access to the more tangible resources that they

need to reach their goals, but also the *psychological* resources. In this regard, Rotter's (1966) conceptualisation of the locus of *control of reinforcement* (hereafter just referred to as locus of control) is applied. Locus of control can be defined as '... the attitudes and behaviour people adopt in life according to their perception of what determines whether or not they receive reinforcement in life ...'. In other words it is the extent to which one believes that he or she has control over the positive and negative outcomes in life (Stander, 2014). A one-dimensional continuum – ranging from external to internal – is often used in measuring an individual's locus of control. Those who are located more on the internal spectrum believe that reinforcements are within their own control (and therefore dependent on their own actions), whilst those on the more external side of the continuum believe that reinforcements are contingent on events or persons outside of their control (therefore not dependent on their own actions). Locus of control has been applied in various fields, including in terms of an economic locus of control by Furnham (1986) – in particular, considering an individual's perceptions and attitudes towards reinforcements related to work and money-related aspects.

For the purposes of the SARB 2017, we applied this concept to understand whether South Africans believe they have the internal reinforcements to reach their goals. In this regard, respondents were asked whether they feel that they have the self-confidence and the self-determination that they need to achieve their goals.

It is important to note that the SARB's questions relating to social mobility refer to self-identified goals. This allows for individuals' own ambitions (or non-ambitions) and not only economic indicators, to determine the extent to, and reasons for, which certain resources are required. Perceived access to financial resources and groups of people (i.e. social capital), in particular, does not mean that respondents already have the resources they require, but rather that respondents believe that they can access those resources when they are required to do so. Respondents' perceptions of having the education and the ability to access physical spaces, however, captures whether respondents believe they already have (or do not have) certain advantages on the way to achieving their goals.

These barriers, reported on below, are by no means an exhaustive list of obstacles or aids to social mobility, but they do offer insights into perceived access and advantages pertaining to the main drivers or barriers of social mobility. Disaggregations other than by race groups, furthermore, reveal various important findings. However, given the notable difference in mean scores for this particular index by race groups, as shown in Table 10, the analysis here focuses on disaggregation by race groups.

Figure 16 shows that about four in ten South Africans believe that they have access to the financial resources (38.6%), social capital (38.8%), education (40.0%), and transport (38.8%) they need in order to achieve their personal goals. More than half of the population believe they have the self-confidence (55.5%) and self-determination (54.5%) that is needed to achieve their personal goals. More South Africans thus report having access to the internal resources than to the external resources required to reach their own goals.

Clear differences are evident in terms of the proportion of white respondents indicating that they have access to the external and internal resources required to reach their own goals in comparison with black African, Indian and coloured respondents. Most notably, although more than half of the respondents from all groups report having the internal resources to reach their own goals, this proportion is much higher for white respondents, with more than 3 in 4 from this group reporting that they have the internal resources required. Much work thus lies ahead in finding ways to improve access to the external resources South Africans need to reach their own goals, but also in the realm of psychology to enable and support social mobility, as well as in facilitating racial reconciliation as confidence is mentioned as a one of the greatest barriers to interaction between race groups (see section 6).

FIGURE 16: Access to external and internal social mobility resources³




Table 11: Perceptions regarding political and economic power⁴

Current	Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	South Africa
Economic power – The majority of white people	40.8	13.7	24.0	20.1	36.1
Political power – The majority of white people	11.4	0.6	15.7	3.8	9.8
Economic power – A small group of white elites	13.8	20.5	8.2	8.1	13.7
Political power – A small group of white elites	8.3	2.5	2.9	3.4	7.2
Economic power – The majority of black people	25.0	30.2	47.0	44.1	27.8
Political power – The majority of black people	48.5	54.3	66.9	66.6	51.1
Economic power – A small group of black elites	5.9	11.0	10.3	7.8	6.7
Political power – A small group of black elites	16.5	26.9	6.5	11.5	16.7
Economic power – A small group of elites from various groups	14.5	24.7	10.4	19.8	15.7
Political power – A small group of elites from various groups	15.4	15.7	8.1	14.7	15.1
Benefitted	Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	South Africa
Economic power – The majority of white people	34.9	10.6	19.0	15.3	30.5
Political power – The majority of white people	11.3	2.5	3.5	3.5	9.6
Economic power – A small group of white elites	14.6	16.5	9.2	9.6	14.2
Political power – A small group of white elites	7.2	1.6	7.6	4.7	6.5
Economic power – The majority of black people	27.9	34.7	46.4	43.9	30.5
Political power – The majority of black people	49.6	52.0	62.3	65.2	51.5
Economic power – A small group of black elites	8.6	14.7	12.5	13.1	9.7
Political power – A small group of black elites	18.5	23.8	13.9	12.5	18.4
Economic power – A small group of elites from various groups	13.9	23.5	13.0	18.1	15.2
Political power – A small group of elites from various groups	13.3	20.2	12.7	14.1	14.0

Perceptions about power: Political, economic and personal

Because unequal power relations limit the opportunities for reconciliation, respondents to the SARB 2017 Survey were asked about the groups that they think hold the most economic and political power in South African society. In addition, they were asked about the groups that they think made the most in economic and political gains since 1994. This question aims to understand the subjective experiences of power relations, but also taps into very current debates about 'white monopoly capital' (WMC) and 'economic apartheid'.

Economic power

The results represented in Table 11 show that 36.1% of South Africans feel that white people hold the most economic power, while 27.8% thought that black South Africans have the most influence. A further 15.7% thought that a small group of elites from various race groups command the most economic power. Should responses from the respective racial groups be ranked according to which group each think has the most economic power, white, Indian/Asian and coloured respondents perceive that the majority of black South Africans have the most economic power. At the same time, black African respondents (40.8%) feel that the majority of white people have the most economic power, followed by the majority of black people (25%). Conversely, 30.2% of white respondents feel that black people have the most economic power, followed by a small group of elites from various race groups (24.7%). It thus comes across as though each respective group perceives the 'other' racial group as having more economic power than them.

In terms of perceptions about the group that has benefited most from the 1994 political transition in terms of economic power, views show a similar pattern to the above, although with some nuances. The same proportion of South Africans indicated that a majority of black South Africans and the majority of white South Africans benefited in terms of economic power (30.5%). While 34.9% of black African respondents indicate that the majority of white people have benefited the most in terms of economic power since 1994, 27.9% believe the majority of black people have benefited in this regard. While 34.6% of white respondents felt that the majority of black South Africans have benefited the most since 1994 in terms of economic power, 23.5% indicated that a small group of elites from various race groups have benefited the most. Among coloured and Indian/Asian respondents, 'The majority of black people' was the most-selected option by over 40% of respondents from each group.

Political power

Nationally, more than half of South Africans (51.1%) report that black people have the most political power, followed by a small group of black elites (16.7%), and a small group of elites from a variety of race groups (15.1%). Only 9.8% of South Africans report that the majority of white South Africans have the most political power, and only 7.2% report feeling that a small group of white elites has the most political power.

Notably, only 0.6% of white respondents report feeling that the majority of white South Africans have the most political power, while only 2.5% of white respondents report that a small group of white elites has the most political power. This may reflect a feeling of powerlessness in the South African political environment among white South Africans.


More than half of South Africans (51.5%) furthermore report that they feel that the majority of black people have benefited the most in terms of political power since 1994. Should responses be ranked according to which option was chosen the most by each respective race group, all four racial categories show that this option was chosen the most, followed by the option 'A small group of black elites'.

Satisfaction with personal power

In addition to perceptions regarding groups' power, respondents were asked how satisfied they are with the economic and political power they personally have.

Nationally, 17.7% of South Africans were satisfied with the amount of economic power they have, while 19.7% were satisfied with the amount of political power that people like them have. South Africans are thus slightly more satisfied with the amount of political power they think they have. Although satisfaction with power is low across all groups, groups that show slightly more satisfaction in their economic power than the national figure include black Africans (18.4%), female respondents (18.9%), respondents from non-metro areas (18.9%), respondents between 18 and 34 and 35 and 54 years of age (18.6% and 18.4% respectively), and respondents in the LSM 6-7 group. Groups that show more satisfaction in their political power than the national figure include black African respondents (21.8%), female respondents (21%), non-metro respondents (21.4%) and respondents between 18 and 34 and 35 and 54 years of age (20.9% and 21.7% respectively).

Importantly, minority groups – in particular, coloured (10.2%) and Indian/Asian (10.4%) respondents – report less satisfaction (than the national figure) with the amount of political power they

FIGURE 17: Satisfaction with personal power⁵

experience having. Coloured respondents' satisfaction with both political and economic power was much lower than the national figure, showing a general feeling of disempowerment, while Indian/Asian respondents seem to feel more satisfied with the amount of economic power, compared to political power, that they have. A similar finding shows with regards to white respondents, although to a lesser extent.

Interestingly, only 17.6% of respondents in the higher LSM category (LSM 8-10) report feeling satisfied with the amount of economic power they have. There might be a variety of factors at play here, which include subjective financial well-being in relation to those wealthier than themselves.

Conclusion

The lived experience of unjust and unequal economic and political power relations proves to be a hindrance in the way of meaningful reconciliation in South Africa. Inequalities show within and between race groups. Perceptions of power relations in economic and political terms show great disparities between various groups, showing that very few South Africans are satisfied with the political and economic power they have. Perceptions furthermore broadly shows that many South Africans feel that "other groups" have political and economic power, rather than the group to which they belong. In the long term, such divisions also offer fertile ground for manipulation by political entrepreneurs, who use it to detract from their own misconduct. Reconciliation, therefore, also has an important governance imperative. A divided society, with unequal power relations (and perceptions of such), is much less likely to unite in keeping leadership and institutions accountable.

NOTES

1. The poverty line referenced is the upper bound poverty line as used by StatsSA (2017), accounting for the poverty headcount of all South Africans living below R992 per person per month, in 2015 constant prices.
2. *Lived Poverty Index* questions: 'Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family ...?' Gone without enough food to eat; Gone without enough clean water for home use; Gone without medicines or medical treatment; Gone without enough fuel to cook your food; Gone without cash income; Gone without electricity in your home (excluding load shedding)? Responses: Never; Just once or twice; Several times; Many times; Always. *Household living conditions* questions: 'Thinking about these household living conditions (reference to Lived Poverty Index question), how would you regard your situation when compared to others?' In relation to the rest of your community where you live; In relation to the rest of South Africa; In relation to your parents, how do these household living conditions of you and your family compare to what they were like 2-3 years ago? How are these living conditions likely to change in the next 2-3 years?' Responses: Much worse; Worse; The same; Better; Much better. *Financial situation* is asked in the same manner as household living conditions – referring to family income, cash available, savings, expenses and debt. *Quality of life* – referring to the amount of time to spend with your partner, family and friends, your relationships, recreation and leisure and health – was only asked in relation to community, South Africa and parents. Questions relating to *Availability and Access* to resources for personal goals are discussed in depth in the following section.
3. Question reads as indicated in analysis. Response categories include 'Strongly Agree', 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree'), 'Neutral', 'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree').
4. Question regarding current power reads: 'In South Africa, different groups of people have different amounts of political and economic power. Thinking about these groups of people, who do you believe has the most ... [economic power/political power]?' Response categories are as listed in Table 11. 'Don't

Know' answers were not included in the data analysis. Question regarding who benefited the most reads: 'Thinking again about these groups of people and political and economic power, who do you think has benefited the most since 1994 in terms of ... [economic/political power]?' Response categories as per Table 11. 'Don't Knows' not included in data analysis. 'Black people' in our response categories refers to black African, Indian and coloured South

Africans. However, respondents may have referred to black African respondents, rather than to 'black' as broadly defined.

5. Question reads: 'How do you feel about the amount of economic and political power you have?' Response categories are: 'Very Dissatisfied' and 'Dissatisfied' (combined to form 'Dissatisfied'), 'Neutral', 'Satisfied' and 'Very Satisfied' (combined to form 'Satisfied'). 'Don't Know' responses were not included in the data analysis.



VIII. DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE

Trust in institutions, leadership and fellow citizens are critical components of a vibrant democratic political culture. The SARB 2017 shows that confidence recorded in public institutions and national leadership has been low and a comparison over time points to a process of systematic erosion.

Reconciliation is more likely to thrive in societies where democratic political culture exists. This is evident when citizens feel part of an inclusive nation, participate in political processes, feel that the government has been legitimately elected, respect the rule of law and support democratic political institutions.

Confidence in institutions

On a global level, the Edelman Trust Barometer (2017) reports a profound crisis in trust, with two-thirds of the countries surveyed now labelled as 'distrusters' by the barometer. According to Edelman (2017), various macro-trends hold important consequences for trust globally. These include the aftershocks of the Great Recession of 2008, as well as changes related to globalisation and the impact of technological advances. The implications of decreasing trust levels (in institutions in particular), according to the study, include that the 'basic assumptions of fairness, shared values and equal opportunity ... are no longer taken for granted'. Deep disillusionment with 'the system', coupled with growing despair about the future, is evident from various groups and has made many susceptible to solutions proffered by populist movements. In light of this, the Edelman Barometer suggests that trust has now become a deciding factor for whether or not a society can function.


Political theorists identify trust as a crucial element and indicator of democratic political culture (Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993). Democracy requires citizens to trust one another as well as the institutions and leaders of their country. At the same time, a democratic disposition requires that citizens keep governments accountable. According to Fakir (2009), leadership and trust are both central to democratic and participatory governance, because effective (democratic) governance derives from 'consent of citizens through the inculcation of interpersonal trust, institutional trust and trust in societal as well as political leadership'. High levels of trust – institutional, interpersonal and leadership – is, in particular, required during periods of social, economic and political crisis. In this regard, the SARB measures both interpersonal trust and confidence in institutions and leaders.

Interpersonal trust

Figure 18 reports on interpersonal trust between people belonging to different social groups or affiliations. Amongst these, 'relatives' are the most trusted, with six in ten (63.3%) South Africans indicating trust in their family members. The second most trusted group – but by a much larger margin – is 'neighbours' (35.6%), while 'colleagues' at work represent the third most trusted group (25.8%). Fewer than a quarter of South Africans trust people from 'other religions' (23.3%), 'other language groups' (23.2%) and 'people with a different sexual orientation' (22.5%). The three least-trusted categories are 'other race groups' (20.8%), 'foreigners not from African countries' (14.5%), and 'foreigners from African countries' (15.8%). While these findings are stark and report on the extremes, it is also important to report on the more nuanced responses. It is, for example, important to mention the 40% of South Africans who indicated that they 'Somewhat' trust people from other race groups. In some instances, however, there seems to be precious little middle ground, as is the case with 'Foreigners from other African countries' category. This runs counter to the vision of the National Development Plan (NDP) that calls for an inclusive approach to nation-building (as opposed to 'narrow nationalism').

The results that we report in Figure 19 suggest that confidence in key governance institutions remains low. 'Quite a lot' and 'A Great Deal' responses were combined to indicate confidence in institutions, while 'Not at all' and 'Not very much' were combined to indicate a lack of confidence in institutions, as indicated in Figure 19. Those scoring lowest in the confidence ratings were 'the president', 'main political parties', 'local government', 'provincial government' and 'national government', with fewer than three in every ten South Africans reporting sufficient confidence in these bodies to execute their respective mandates. The only institution in which more than half of the South African population had confidence was the SABC (50.7%), which also happened to be the most trusted institution during the previous round of the survey in 2015. 'Parliament' also attracted a low confidence score of 30.3 %, while legal and judicial institutions

FIGURE 18: Interpersonal trust¹



– such as the Constitutional Court and the legal system in general – attracted more confidence than elected representatives.

When we look at these responses over time, it is clear that, over the past decade, there has been a significant erosion of confidence in key public institutions. Table 12 – just indicating those who trust the respective institutions ‘a great deal’ – shows that, between 2006 and 2017, confidence in ‘Parliament’ plummeted from 29.6% to 12.6%, while the figure for ‘national government’ decreased 33% to 10.2%. ‘Provincial government’ also experienced a significant decline in confidence of 16.1% from 26% in 2006 to 9.9% in 2017. Confidence is also the lowest it has been since 2006 in Parliament, national government and provincial government.

The decrease in confidence in Parliament is of particular concern. If citizens do not trust the pre-eminent legislative body that represents their interests, it has significant implications for trust in the democratic system more broadly. In diverse and historically divided societies, such confidence in the overarching system to be transparent and accountable is critical to ensure that citizens do not feel marginalised to the extent that they start to undermine official structures.

National elections 2019

With low and decreasing levels of confidence in institutions of governance, it is important that this negative trajectory be arrested and reversed. The upcoming general elections in 2019 offer an opportunity to keep political parties accountable through voting.

Support for the incumbent (ANC) has decreased incrementally, but been sustained since the local elections of 2006 and the 2009 national elections. The 2016 local elections consolidated this trend, with ANC voters staying away and several voting for opposition parties – particularly in metro areas (Fakir & Potgieter,

FIGURE 19: Confidence in Institutions,^{2,3}




Table 12: South Africans with “A great deal” of confidence in institutions, 2006–2017⁴

	Parliament	National government	Provincial government	Local government	Legal system	Constitutional Court	Political parties
2006	29.6	33.0	26.0	18.3	20.0	24.0	14.6
2007	20.9	20.7	15.2	10.8	13.6	17.1	8.2
2008	16.6	16.4	10.7	8.1	9.3	12.2	6.5
2009	16.2	18.8	11.7	9.2	12.0	14.5	8.2
2010	21.8	23.7	17.7	12.1	15.9	19.8	10.3
2011	18.9	22.0	13.6	11.0	17.4	20.5	7.9
2012	23.5	25.2	22.7	15.9	22.0	24.5	14.3
2013	18.5	19.9	17.3	16.1	18.9	19.5	13.6
2015	14.3	18.7	–	14.8	15.7	17.3	13.0
2017	12.6	10.2	9.9	9.2	10.4	15.7	11.7

2016). The SARB 2017's data shows that confidence in the incumbent party at the time of surveying was low – with 33% of South Africans reporting that they have ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in the ANC. The main opposition parties expected to contend the 2019 national election include the DA and the EFF, in which 23.5% and 19.1% of South Africans have confidence respectively (see Figure 20).

While only 33% of South Africans report having confidence in the ANC at present, 49.8% of South Africans report they feel close to the party over a long period of time. This shows that some South Africans feel close to the ANC, but do not have confidence in the party at present. In comparison, fewer South Africans report a long-term affiliation with the DA and EFF than is the case with the ANC. Should the ANC manage to reinvent itself and possibly regain the confidence of those South Africans who report a long-term affiliation, but lack of confidence in the party at present, it may be assured of the support of its long-term supporters during the coming elections. However, should it fail to do so, supporters who lack confidence in the ANC at present may either decide still to vote for the ANC, not to vote, or to vote for an opposition party.

It is interesting to note that 25,6% of South Africans do not feel close to any political party. That means one in every four South Africans do not feel that they have a political ‘home’ at present. Should this be coupled with low voting efficacy levels (as per Figure 21), voter apathy or a sense of not being represented in political structures may very well be an outcome. It may also be, however, that this group of South Africans keeps an open mind in terms of election decisions, and may not vote according to long-term affiliation, but other considerations such as issue voting. In addition, voting is not the only form of political participation, and although voting efficacy levels are low, many South Africans are taking part in various other forms of political participation (see Figure 22). South Africans are thus not necessarily political apathetic, but some may be voting apathetic. Voting, participation

FIGURE 20: Percentage South Africans having a great deal of confidence in respective main political parties, and long-term affiliation with the same parties⁵





FIGURE 21: Political efficacy⁶

and representation matters for reconciliation, as mentioned before, as reconciliation processes are more likely to thrive in a society where there is a growing democratic political culture. It may not bode well for reconciliation should many South Africans not feel that their vote makes a difference, or do not feel represented in political spaces. On the other hand, greater competition among political parties may provide opportunities to keep them more accountable. In addition, a coalition government – such as has been the result of the recent local elections in 2016 in various municipalities including three metros (Tshwane, City of Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay) – may be possible, which poses new opportunities (and challenges) to democracy in South Africa.

Political efficacy

The presence of democratic institutions and democratically elected leaders means little if ordinary citizens feel that they have limited influence over decisions that affect their daily lives. If institutions or leaders systematically distort civic mandates, or worse, ignore them, the system's legitimacy is eroded over time. In order to gauge the extent to which South Africans feel that they are able to impact these decision-making processes, the SARB measures whether citizens feel that a) they have the relevant knowledge to participate in politics, b) political and parliamentary leaders pay attention to their plight, and c) their votes make a difference to the quality of governance that they receive.


More than half of voting-age South Africans (55.6%) surveyed by the SARB agreed with the statement that 'Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted' (see Figure 21). An equal

proportion, furthermore, agreed with the statements that 'After being elected, all parties are the same, so voting is pointless' (56.4%); 'Your vote does not make a difference' (51%), and 'People like you don't have a say about what the political leaders and politicians do' (52.9%). Close to two-thirds noted that they 'Don't think that political leaders and politicians care much what people like [them] think' (64.5%), and that 'Those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people' (67.4%). Fewer respondents regarded themselves as uninformed and unqualified to participate in politics, with only 43.1% agreeing that they do not think they are as well informed as most people about issues affecting the country, 38.8% agreeing that they do not have a good understanding of the important issues affecting our country, and only 36.5% agreeing that they do not consider themselves qualified to participate in issues affecting the country. It thus seems as though the frustration with political engagement does not lie with the experience of lacking relevant information, but rather with the perceived functioning of the formal structures and processes that facilitate political participation. That is, the primary constraint to effective political participation by citizens stems not from their own perceived inadequate capacity to understand and participate in political processes and issues, but rather from the perceived lack of responsiveness of political institutions and actors to such citizen participation.

Political activism

Although voting represents the most powerful expression of citizen voice, it is a periodic measure. Vibrant democracies allow and encourage continuous participation in decision-making between elections through a multiplicity of channels. They

FIGURE 22: Participation in various forms of activism⁷



manifest through both conventional and unconventional forms of activism.


In response to the SARB 2017, most South Africans indicated that they have participated in, or are willing to engage by attending, a community meeting (54.8% have done, 22.6% will do) and get together with others to raise an issue (41.5% have done, 33.4% will do). In terms of signing petitions, 16.3% have already done so, and a further 28.2% said that they will do so when circumstances require it of them; 15.9% said that they have distributed material with political content on social media, while 23.4% were open to the idea of doing so; 28% have contacted their local councillor or community leader, with 37% saying they will do so if and when required, 16.1% indicating that they have contacted the media to complain about an issue, and another 37.2% indicating that they will not hesitate to do so.

In terms of the more unconventional forms of legal activism, 26.7% of South Africans reported that they have attended a demonstration or protest march, while a further 25.3% indicated that they would attend such a march should they get the chance to do so. Public protest, although a less common form of activism.

The use of violence or force for a political cause, and refusal to pay tax or a fee to government, are two forms of illegal activism about which the SARB 2017 probed respondents. Three in ten South Africans (30.3%) have used, or would use, force or violence for a political cause, and an equal number have or would refuse to pay tax/fees should they get the chance to do so (see Figure 22).

The high propensity for using force of violence for a political cause is concerning, and on the rise. In 2013, 19.6% of South Africans

FIGURE 23: Use of force or violence for political cause, 2013–2017^a



indicated in the Afrobarometer survey, also conducted by the IJR, that they have used, or are willing to use, force or violence for a political cause. In 2015, when measured by the SARB, this figure had risen to 24.7% and, in the most recent survey, this percentage had further increased to 30.3%.

This does not necessarily mean that South Africans show disregard for the rule of law. Most (66.3%) agree that the Constitution must be upheld and respected in all circumstances (see Figure 24), with only 10.3% disagreeing with this statement. A majority (59.2%) furthermore agreed that the police always have the right to make people obey the law, while 57.1% agreed that the courts always have the right to make decisions that people have to accept and 60.1% endorsed the statement that the South African Revenue Service (SARS) always has the right to make people pay taxes. However, only 44% of South Africans agree that democratically elected representatives (such as MPs and local councillors) always have the right to make policy and governance decisions in South Africa, with 22.2% disagreeing with this statement. This is perhaps not surprising, given the lack of confidence in elected leaders that we reported on earlier. This may also partially explain the extent to which almost a third of respondents indicated their participation or willingness to participate in illegal forms of political engagement.

Political information and news

Returning to the findings on the possession of relevant information and knowledge that are needed to participate in politics (Figure 21), the SARB considers where South Africans receive their political news and information from and whether they think such resources can be trusted.

Figure 25 shows that, according to the SARB 2017, radio and television remain South Africans' political news sources of choice, with 37.2% accessing radio for their political news on a daily basis and 49.3% using television for this purpose. These two forms of media were, furthermore, the most trusted sources for political news, followed by 'friends and family' (or word of mouth) (46.3%) and the 'Print Media' (36.7%). The least accessed of the listed categories for political news, the Internet and social media were also the least trusted. The finding with the latter is of particular interest. Even though it constitutes a source of intense political debate for a more upwardly connected and mobile portion of the population, the majority of respondents do not access it, and neither do they particularly trust it. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier (Figure 26), only 15.9 % of South Africans have used social media as a platform for activism and only 23.4% would if they had the chance to do so. These findings suggest that we have to guard against an assumption that social media provides a nuanced and representative reflection of what is happening in society. South

FIGURE 24: Rule of Law⁹





FIGURE 25: Use and trust in sources of political news¹⁰



Africans are using a multiplicity of platforms to access political information, and engage in various forms of activism to keep leaders and institutions accountable. In addition, should the discourses arising from social media start to dominate other sources of political news, it will result in the exclusion of the interests of those who do not have access, or do not use, political content on social media.

Conclusion

Trust in institutions, leadership and fellow citizens are critical components of a vibrant democratic political culture. Their presence or absence offers a reflection of the extent to which citizens feel excluded or included from the system and connected to or disconnected from one another. In terms of interpersonal trust, South Africans trust their relatives more than any other grouping or social formation in society. This is not surprising, but holds implications in an environment in which South Africans not only have low levels of trust in other groups, but also in public institutions that preside over society – in particular as it may foster the transfer of attitudes (such as prejudices) between generations. When combined with economic volatility it poses significant challenges for reconciliation and broader social cohesion processes. Family and friends, as could be predicted, also emerged as the most trusted source of political information – making family, as an institution, integral to people’s democratic engagement. Ideally, more bridging capital – trust in ‘other’ groups – would be present. The finding that many South Africans find themselves in the middle ground in this regard point to much work that still needs to be done in this regard. Furthermore, the low levels of trust in foreigners living in South Africa needs urgent attention, with more than half of the nation distrusting people who originate from outside the country’s borders.

The confidence recorded in public institutions and national leadership has been low and a comparison over time points to a process of systematic erosion. As far as access to, and trust of, news sources is concerned, the SABC continues to be the outlet of choice amongst the majority of South Africans. Judicial and legal institutions also received fair levels of trust, as opposed to political leaders, parties, and representative institutions, such as Parliament. In light of the above, levels of perceived political efficacy are also low, with more than half of respondents disagreeing with the notion that voting constitutes a meaningful political activity and 60% agreeing that elected leaders do not keep in touch with people. South Africans, nevertheless, are taking part in various other forms of activism and their political positions are being shaped mainly by television and radio news and actuality programmes. Although social media may have an important agenda-setting role, a minority of South African access it for their news, and even fewer trust it as a reliable news source.

NOTES

1. Question reads: ‘How much do you trust the following groups of people?’ Statements include: Your relatives; Your neighbours (in your immediate and local community); Your colleagues (at work, studying etc.); Other race groups; Other language groups; People who practise a different religion than your own; People with a different sexual orientation than your own; Foreigners from other African countries living in South Africa; Foreigners not from African countries living in South Africa. Response categories include: ‘Not At All’ and ‘Not Very Much’ (combined to form ‘Distrusting’), ‘Somewhat’, ‘Quite a Lot’ and ‘A Great Deal’ (combined to form ‘Trusting’).
2. Question reads: ‘Please indicate how much confidence you have in each of the following institutions, or haven’t you heard enough to say?’ Response categories are: ‘Not At All’, ‘Not Very Much’, ‘Somewhat’, ‘Quite a lot’, ‘A Great Deal’, ‘Haven’t Heard Enough to Say’.
3. Confidence in ‘Main Political Parties’ calculated from responses to ANC, DA and EFF in terms of confidence. This was also used for the percentage of confidence in political parties in 2017, as portrayed in Table 12. Other survey years referred to “political parties” broadly.
4. Response categories for 2017 as indicated in endnote 2 in this section. Response categories from 2006–2015 did not include ‘Somewhat’. This was added in 2017 to ensure a more precise measure, in particular for more ‘undecided’ respondents. ‘Not at All’ and ‘A Great Deal’ response categories can be compared over time, as the added category mainly improved on the middle response categories.
5. Confidence question asked as with institutions (see endnote 2 in this section). ‘Quite a Lot’ and ‘A Great Deal’ responses included for ‘Current Confidence’. Long-term affiliation question: ‘Many people feel close to a particular political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally vote for a different political party. Which political party do you feel close to?’ Responses included all political parties in Parliament, as well as the options ‘Other’ and ‘Don’t Feel Close to a Political Party’ (‘None’ in Figure 20).
6. Questions as per Figure 15. Response categories include: ‘Strongly Agree’, ‘Agree’ (combined for ‘Agree’ in Figure 21), ‘Neither agree or disagree’ (as per Figure 21), and ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Disagree’ (combined for ‘Disagree’ in Figure 21). ‘Don’t Knows’ were included in the data analysis.
7. Question reads: ‘Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me if you have personally done any of these during the past year. If you have, please tell me how often you have done it. If you have not, please tell me if you would if you had the opportunity or would never do it.’ Response categories include: ‘No, and would never do this’, ‘No, but I would if I had the opportunity’, ‘Yes, once or twice’, ‘Yes, several times’, ‘Yes, often’ and ‘Yes, very often’. All ‘Yes’ responses combined for Figure 22.
8. 2013 figure from Afrobarometer.
9. Question on rule of law reads: ‘The courts always have the right to make decisions that people have to accept (Courts), The police always have the right to make people obey the law (police), The South African Revenue Services (SARS)

always have the right to make people pay taxes (SARS), Democratically elected representatives – such as MPs and local councillors – always have the right to make policy and governance decisions in South Africa (elected representatives), the Constitution must be upheld/respected in all circumstances (Constitution). Responses: 'Strongly Agree', 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree' in Figure 24), 'Neutral', 'Disagree' and 'Strongly Disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree' in Figure 24). 'Don't Knows' were not included in the data analysis.

10. Question pertaining to use reads: 'How often do you get information and news about politics and political information from the following sources: Radio, Television, Print Newspapers, Internet (news and other websites, not social media), Social media such as Facebook or Twitter, From friends and family (word of mouth)'. Responses: 'Never', 'Less than once a month', 'A few times a month', 'A few times a week', 'Every day'. 'Don't Knows' not included in data analysis. Question for trust reads: 'How much do you trust the following sources of political information and news?' [list as per use in question] Responses include: 'Not at all', 'A little', 'Somewhat', 'Quite a lot', 'A great deal'. 'Don't Knows' were not included in the data analysis.

CONCLUSION

More than two decades after the advent of democracy, most South Africans feel that reconciliation is still needed. Just over half the population, however, feel that progress in terms of reconciliation has been made, while fewer than half of South Africans report having experienced reconciliation themselves. Reconciliation processes are taking place in a context of economic uncertainty, declining confidence in institutions and low political efficacy. Many opportunities to ensure a sustainable reconciliation process going forward, however, present itself in the SARB 2017 data.

South Africans indicate their preference for a united South African nation, as well as their belief that such a society is possible. Most South Africans, furthermore, feel that reconciliation is still needed. However, just over half the population feel that progress in terms of reconciliation has been made, while fewer than half of South Africans report having experienced reconciliation themselves. Six in ten South Africans, furthermore, feel that reconciliation cannot fully take its course while those who were oppressed under apartheid remain poor.

Unresolved legacies of the apartheid and colonial eras continue to present an obstacle in the way of achieving a truly fair and equitable society. Despite a decline in the levels of acknowledgement of the injustices of apartheid, a significant majority is still of the view that the apartheid system could be categorised as a crime against humanity. A majority of South Africans, furthermore, agree that the legacies of apartheid continue to persist to the present day. Differences in opinion between race groups are however evident in this regard.

The lived experience of unjust and unequal economic and political power relations proves to be a hindrance in the way of meaningful reconciliation in South Africa. Since the inception of the SARB, inequality has remained the most prominent source of social division in the eyes of ordinary South Africans. Not surprisingly, therefore, respondents feel that, on this score, the country has made least progress since the political transition of 1994. Inequality is thus both the most divisive and enduring aspect of South African society. Perceptions of power relations in economic and political terms, furthermore, show great disparities between various groups, broadly showing that very few South Africans are satisfied with the personal political and economic leverage they have. Many believe that groups other than their own have political and economic power. In the long term, such divisions also offer fertile ground for manipulation by political entrepreneurs, who use it to detract from their own misconduct. Reconciliation, therefore, also has an important governance imperative. A divided society, with unequal power relations (and perceptions of such) is much less likely to unite in keeping leadership and institutions accountable.

The confidence recorded in public institutions and national leadership – in particular, governmental structures and elected representatives – is low, and a comparison over time points to a process of systematic erosion. In terms of interpersonal trust, South Africans trust their relatives more than any other grouping or social formation in society. This is not surprising, but holds implications in an environment in which South Africans not only have low levels of trust in other groups, but also in public institutions that preside over society. Political (in particular voting) efficacy is also low, with an increase in the proportion of South Africans willing to use force or violence for a political cause. When combined with economic volatility it poses significant challenges for reconciliation and broader social cohesion processes. Most South Africans, however, do still agree with the rule of law – in particular, that the Constitution must be upheld/respected at all times.

On a more positive note, more than half of South Africa's population indicated an openness to greater racial integration in the latest SARB 2017 Survey. In general, however, the spaces where South Africans report having more interaction are also the spaces in which they experience the most racism. Most South Africans, however, remain open to interracial interaction in all spaces, with the main limitations in this regard (other than none) being language and confidence barriers.

A foundation for reconciliation can be fostered by finding a balance between truth and historical confrontation, healing and racial reconciliation, and justice and addressing inequalities. Progress in this regard, however, also requires the support and guidance of trusted institutions, as well as the involvement of all South Africans. The SARB 2017 shows what has been achieved in this regard, as well as which aspects need more work. Much work lies ahead in ensuring progress in reconciliation, which – according to South Africans – requires all South Africans and institutions to be on board.

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APPENDIX A

Table A1: South African Reconciliation Barometer hypotheses and indicators, 2003–2013

Hypotheses	Indicators
Human security: If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with one another and the larger system.	Physical security; economic security; cultural security
Political culture: ¹ If citizens view the institutions, leadership and culture of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to progress.	Justifiability of extra-legal action; legitimacy of leadership; legitimacy of Parliament; respect for the rule of law
Cross-cutting political relationships: If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	Commitment to national unity; commitment to multiracial political parties
Historical confrontation: If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	Acknowledgement of the injustice of apartheid; forgiveness; reduced levels of vengeance
Race relations: If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of one another, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	Interracial contact; interracial preconceptions; interracial tolerance
Dialogue: If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely to be advanced.	Commitment to more dialogue
ONLY 2003 ROUNDS Commitment to socioeconomic development: If citizens are able to commit themselves to transformation and redress, the national reconciliation process is more likely to progress.	Willingness to compromise

NOTES

1. Called 'Legitimacy of the new political dispensation' in the 2003 rounds.

APPENDIX B

In 2017, sampling, piloting and interviews were conducted by survey company, Kantar Public. A nationally representative sample of 2 400 adult South Africans over the age of 18 was drawn, following a stratified multi-stage random sample design, as was the case with previous SARB surveys. Province, race and geographic area (urban/rural or metro/urban or non-metro/rural) were taken as the explicit stratification variables to ensure that good coverage and the best possible precision per stratum was achieved.

Prior to the commencement of fieldwork in 2017, viewing and field pilots were conducted to test new or amended questions. A comprehensive briefing and training session with regional field managers was conducted prior to the commencement of fieldwork to ensure that the requirements of the study were fully understood. Subsequent to this, fieldworkers were briefed in smaller groups by their respective field managers.

Fieldwork was conducted from 9 June 2017 to 27 July 2017 and respondents had the option of being interviewed in one of five languages: isiZulu, isiXhosa, Sesotho, Afrikaans and English. Kantar Public used CAPI (Computer Aided Personal Interviews) interviewing as its data collection method, while in-field checks were performed by supervisors, field managers and regional field managers. Its Independent Quality Assurance Department conducted 549 (23%) successful independent back-checks to ensure accuracy and consistency.

Following fieldwork and the verification of the dataset, weights were assigned to make weighted sample records representative of the target population as closely as possible. The weights were within acceptable limits. No abnormal or unusual skews were found. Weights were developed to correct any distortions that may have occurred due to unequal inclusion probabilities, non-response, non-coverage and skewness resulting from sample design and fieldwork. The design weights are benchmarked to the 2017 mid-year population estimates of StatsSA. Tables B1 and B2 capture relevant information in this regard.

Table B1: South African Reconciliation Barometer sample, 2017

	StatsSA 2017 Mid-year estimates (full population)		SARB 2017 Weighted sample (adults only)	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Eastern Cape	6 498 700	11.5	3 960 578	10.7
Free State	2 866 700	5.1	1 866 746	5.0
Gauteng	14 278 700	25.3	10 179 693	27.5
KwaZulu-Natal	11 074 800	19.6	6 933 781	18.7
Limpopo	5 778 400	10.2	3 425 153	9.2
Mpumalanga	4 444 200	7.9	2 808 300	7.6
Northern Cape	1 214 000	2.1	796 412	2.2
North West	3 856 200	6.8	2 508 260	6.8
Western Cape	6 510 300	11.5	4 562 855	12.3
Total	56 521 900	100.0	37 041 778	100.0

Table B2: South African Reconciliation Barometer sample, 2017

	StatsSA 2017 Mid-year estimates (full population)	SARB 2017 Weighted sample (adults only)
	Number	Percentage
Black African	80.8	78.3
Coloured	8.8	9.6
Indian/Asian	2.5	2.9
White	8.0	9.0
Total	100.0	100.0

APPENDIX C

NATION-BUILDING, IDENTITY AND DIVISION

TABLE 1C: South African identity and unity

	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
It is possible to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups in this country	68.0	23.3	8.7
It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups in this country	75.3	19.6	5.1
You would want your children to think of themselves as South African	80.6	14.7	4.7
Being a South African is an important part of how you see yourself	79.9	15.4	4.7
People should realise we are South Africans first, and not think of themselves in terms of other groups they belong to first	77.3	18.0	4.7

TABLE 2C: South Africans agreeing that it is desirable and possible to create a united South Africa, 2003–2017

	Desirable	Possible
2003	72.9	—
2004	76.5	—
2005	77.6	—
2006	76.3	—
2007	69.7	60.6
2008	67.8	56.1
2009	72.0	59.9
2010	72.2	63.8
2011	66.3	59.9
2012	61.8	59.0
2013	55.0	53.6
2015	71.0	64.6
2017	75.3	68.0

TABLE 3C: Primary source of division, SARB 2003–2017

	Political parties	Inequality	Disease (HIV/AIDS)	Race	Language
2003	22.0	29.8	14.3	20.1	6.3
2004	27.9	23.8	15.9	20.4	4.8
2005	17.7	30.8	21.1	17.3	6.2
2006	19.1	30.0	17.7	19.7	5.8
2007	11.9	31.0	21.4	21.4	7.4
2008	21.7	29.3	17.2	18.6	6.3
2009	23.2	26.8	18.6	18.5	6.2
2010	25.3	25.0	15.8	20.6	5.9
2011	21.5	31.6	14.4	19.8	5.6
2012	17.4	25.4	19.3	13.2	4.0
2013	16.0	27.9	20.7	14.6	4.8
2015	19.6	30.0	6.5	22.0	5.3
2017	22.3	31.0	8.8	24.4	3.7

IMPROVEMENT IN RECONCILIATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE

TABLE 4C: Responsibility for reconciliation

	Black	White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	South Africa
Only those oppressed during apartheid	7.7	4.9	12.1	4.7	7.3
Mostly those oppressed during apartheid	18.5	8.1	29.4	15.0	17.5
Both those who were oppressed and who were not oppressed during apartheid equally	60.5	77.6	46.6	65.7	62.2
Mostly those who were not oppressed during apartheid	9.0	7.1	5.1	6.2	8.4
Only those who were not oppressed during apartheid	4.4	2.3	6.7	8.4	4.6

TABLE 5C: Importance of involvement of institutions in reconciliation processes

	Important	Somewhat important	Not important
Business	60.5	27.4	12.1
National government and elected representatives	62.4	25.3	12.3
CSOs	62.5	26.1	11.4
Religious/faith-based	65.7	25.0	9.3
You, friends and family	66.7	23.8	9.5

TABLE 6C: Reconciliation progress			
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
Reconciliation is impossible as long as people who were disadvantaged under apartheid continue to be poor	63.4	21.2	15.4
South Africans still need reconciliation	73.5	19.7	6.8
I believe the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) provided a good foundation for South Africa to achieve reconciliation	62.4	24.7	12.9
My friends and family have experienced reconciliation after the end of apartheid	49.8	29.2	21.1
South Africans have made progress in reconciliation since the end of apartheid	56.1	27.0	16.9

TABLE 7C: Perceptions of change since 1994			
	Worse	Same	Better
Race relations	29.4	38.3	32.3
Economic	37.5	34.2	28.3
Safety	37.7	32.4	29.8
Employment	41.6	31.2	31.5
Inequality	45.6	31.5	22.8

HISTORICAL CONFRONTATION AND APARTHEID LEGACIES

TABLE 8C: Historical confrontation and apartheid injustices	
	Historical confrontation, agreement with statements
The apartheid government oppressed the majority of South Africans	70.0
Under apartheid black South Africans were deprived from quality education	71.5
Under apartheid black South Africans were deprived of land and property ownership	71.8
Under apartheid black South Africans were deprived of earning proper livelihoods	71.7
The apartheid government committed terrible crimes against those struggling against apartheid	73.6
Under apartheid black South Africans suffered violence because of their race	74.0
Apartheid was a crime against humanity	77.4

TABLE 9C: Agreement that apartheid was a crime against humanity, SARB 2003-2017					
	White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	Black African	South Africa
2003	70.3	88.6	92.2	88.9	86.5
2004	67.1	82.0	93.7	87.3	84.9
2005	68.1	87.1	89.4	88.0	85.9
2006	74.8	87.6	95.0	88.9	87.8
2007	67.1	88.8	92.2	89.1	86.4
2008	58.3	90.8	89.1	86.3	83.0
2009	76.1	89.7	89.6	84.3	83.9
2010	81.9	88.1	93.3	87.6	87.4
2011	79.8	86.5	77.4	80.2	80.1
2012	73.5	89.3	78.3	85.7	83.8
2013	52.8	77.0	70.4	80.9	76.4
2015	63.4	65.1	71.8	79.4	76.6
2017	67.7	87.3	70.6	78.9	77.4

TABLE 10C: Apartheid legacies, agreement with statements	
In general, residential areas in South Africa are still racially segregated because of the lasting effects of apartheid	66.7
Many black South Africans are still poor today because of the lasting effects of apartheid	70.0
Many White South Africans are still well-off today because of the lasting effects of apartheid	70.0
Many black South Africans today do not own land / property because of the lasting effects of apartheid	70.8
Many White South Africans today own land / property because of the lasting effects of apartheid	70.3

RACIAL RECONCILIATION

TABLE 11C: Approval of integration					
	Black	White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	South Africa
Neighbourhood	53.9	52.4	42.4	50.6	53.4
School children	58.7	54.2	65.5	55.6	58.5
School teacher	58.6	47.4	64.1	61.9	58.3
Manager	55.3	48.4	66.3	59.6	55.4
Marriage	52.8	43.2	65.3	45.9	52.3
Doctor	63.6	54.3	76.7	67.1	63.6

APPENDIX C

TABLE 12C: Interaction with people from other race groups in various spaces, 'Rarely'/'Never' by race groups

	Black	White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	South Africa
Home	56.3	33.3	36.5	39.6	52.0
Social gatherings	49.2	36.5	42.3	36.2	46.6
Place of work or study	42.7	26.3	37.0	24.9	39.4
Commercial spaces (shops/malls)	40.1	22.6	26.2	18.4	36.1
Public recreational spaces	48.4	37.3	37.3	38.1	46.1
Public transport spaces	51.0	46.2	42.4	27.8	48.2

TABLE 13C: Open to more interaction

	Full interaction	Selective interaction	None at all
Black	60.5	25.9	13.5
White	58.5	19.7	21.8
Indian/Asian	69.5	22.4	8.1
Coloured	63.9	23.2	12.8
Metro	65.5	23.1	11.4
Non-metro	57.4	26.4	16.1
LSM 1-5	54.7	28.5	16.9
LSM 6-7	64.3	24.3	11.3
LSM 8-10	66.1	19.1	14.8
South Africa	60.9	25.0	14.1

TABLE 14C: Frequency of racism affecting people in their daily lives, 'Always'/'Often'

	Black	White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	South Africa
Work/place of study	22.4	14.8	9.2	16.5	20.7
Commercial and retail	20.4	14.7	6.1	17.1	19.1
Public transport	14.5	10.1	3.9	20.8	14.4
Public recreational spaces	18.3	12.6	6.2	14.3	17.0
Social gatherings and events	17.1	7.9	4.3	11.5	15.4

TABLE 15C: Agree that it is difficult to confront racist behaviour or talk

	Black	White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	South Africa
Stranger	52.3	52.9	46.9	51.6	52.1
Friends/family	42.9	34.8	48.2	32.9	41.4
Colleague	40.8	36.6	39.0	32.2	39.6
Manager/ authority	42.1	42.3	43.0	38.8	41.8

TABLE 16C: Access to external and internal social mobility resources

	Black	White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	South Africa
Financial resources	37.5	55.6	39.3	29.8	38.6
Social capital	37.0	56.6	43.2	34.6	38.8
Education	37.7	63.4	42.2	34.8	40.0
Mobility/ transport	36.5	64.7	38.5	31.7	38.8
Self-confidence	52.6	78.2	51.1	58.8	55.5
Self- determination	51.7	77.4	54.7	54.6	54.5

POWER RELATIONS AND SOCIOECONOMIC ACCESS

TABLE 17C: Satisfaction with personal power

	Economic power	Political power
Black African	18.4	21.8
White	15.6	13.6
Indian/Asian	17.5	10.4
Coloured	13.8	10.2
Male	16.3	18.3
Female	18.9	21.0
Metro	16.3	17.5
Non-metro	18.9	21.4
18-34 years	18.6	20.9
35-54 years	18.4	21.7
55 years plus	14.2	12.8
LSM 1-5	16.8	18.1
LSM 6-7	18.7	22.6
LSM 8-10	17.6	16.0
National	17.7	19.7

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE

TABLE 18C: Interpersonal trust

	Trusting	Somewhat	Distrusting	Don't Know
Relatives	63.3	27.0	7.9	1.7
Neighbours	35.6	41.9	18.8	3.7
Colleagues	25.8	37.4	19.9	16.8
Other religious	23.3	40.0	27.4	9.3
Other language groups	23.2	42.6	26.6	7.6
Different sexual orientation	22.6	38.9	28.9	9.6
Other race groups	20.8	40.6	30.4	8.3
Foreigners (not African)	14.5	27.1	50.1	8.3
Foreigners (African)	15.8	24.7	51.9	7.6

TABLE 19C: Confidence in institutions

	Quite a lot/ A great deal	Somewhat	Not at all/ Not very much	Don't Know
SABC	50.7	26.9	20.4	1.9
SARS	39.8	25.1	26.5	8.7
SAPS	35.6	28.2	34.4	1.8
Hawks	35.5	23.0	26.2	15.3
Constitutional Court	35.4	26.2	30.5	7.9
Public protector	35.2	26.0	27.9	11.0
Deputy President	31.9	25.8	37.3	5.0
Legal system	31.2	28.6	33.7	6.6
Parliament	30.3	25.1	40.3	4.3
NPA	30.2	20.9	33.4	15.6
National government	29.8	27.7	39.9	2.6
Provincial government	28.6	31.2	36.5	3.7
Local government	28.1	30.6	38.9	2.3
Main political government	25.2	18.6	52.5	3.7
President	23.9	21.3	52.7	2.1

TABLE 20C: Percentage of South Africans having a great deal of confidence in respective main political parties, and long-term affiliation with the same parties

	Long-term affiliation	Current confidence
ANC	49.8	33.0
DA	13.6	23.5
EFF	7.4	19.1
None	25.6	-
Other political parties	29.2	-

TABLE 21C: Political efficacy

	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Don't Know
Voting is meaningless because no politician can be trusted	55.6	24.2	19.4	0.8
After being elected all parties are the same, so voting is pointless	56.4	22.8	20.0	0.8
Your vote does not make a difference	51.0	23.0	25.0	0.9
You don't think that political leaders and politicians care	64.5	22.5	12.0	1.1
Generally speaking, those elected to Parliament soon lose touch with the people	67.4	22.1	12.0	1.0
People like you don't have a say about what the political leaders and politicians do	52.9	22.7	23.9	0.5
You don't think you as well informed as most people are about the voting process	43.1	26.3	30.0	0.6
You don't feel you have a good understanding of the voting process	38.8	24.0	36.7	0.5
You don't consider yourself well qualified to participate in voting	36.5	27.4	35.2	1.0

TABLE 22C: Participation in various forms of activism

	Yes	No, but I would if I had the opportunity	No, and I would never do this
Used force or violence for a political cause	12.0	18.3	69.7
Attended a demonstration or a protest march	26.7	25.3	48.0
Refused to pay a tax or a fee to government	9.6	23.3	67.1
Signed a petition	16.3	28.2	55.5
Shared political content on social media	15.9	23.4	60.8
Contacted your local councillor or other community leaders about an issue	28.0	37.3	34.7
Contacted radio, TV, or a newspaper to complain about an issue	16.1	37.2	46.7
Get together with others to raise an issue	41.5	33.4	25.1
Attended a community meeting	54.8	22.6	22.7

APPENDIX C

TABLE 23C: Use of force or violence for political cause, 2013–2017

	Have used violence	Will use violence
2013	7.8	11.8
2015	10.6	14.1
2017	12.0	18.3

TABLE 24C: Rule of law

	Disagree	Neutral	Agree
Courts	15.1	27.8	57.1
Police	16.2	24.3	59.6
SARS	12.6	27.3	60.1
Representatives	22.2	33.7	44.0
Constitution	10.3	23.4	66.3

TABLE 25C: Use of and trust in sources of political news

	Use every day	Trust
Radio	37.2	54.5
Television	49.3	61.9
Print media	12.7	36.7
Internet	6.9	19.1
Social media	6.8	14.1
Friends and family	10.3	46.3

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) is an independent, non-governmental organisation, which was established in 2000 in the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with the aim of ensuring that the lessons of South Africa's successful transition to democracy remain fundamental principles central to government and society as the country moves forward. Today, the IJR works to build fair, democratic and inclusive societies across Africa after conflict.

The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) is a public opinion survey conducted by the IJR. Since its launch in 2003, the SARB has provided a nationally representative measure of citizens' attitudes to national reconciliation, social cohesion, transformation and democratic governance. The SARB is the only survey dedicated to critical measurement of reconciliation in South Africa, and is the largest longitudinal data source of its kind globally. As one of the few dedicated social surveys on reconciliation in Africa and worldwide, the SARB has become an important resource for encouraging national debate, informing decision-makers, developing policy and provoking new analysis and theory on reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

For more information, visit the IJR website at www.ijr.org.za.

