THE SA
RECONCILIATION BAROMETER
-TRACKING SOCIO-POLITICAL TRENDS-

INSTITUTE FOR
JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

Report of the First Round of the
SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey

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<u>**Executive Summary**</u>

The SA Reconciliation Barometer project provides some answers to the question of how the national reconciliation process is unfolding. By conducting regular public opinion surveys, audits of tangible transformation and monitoring relevant national developments, this research intendeds, not only, to provide some quantification of the direction and distance along the path of reconciliation already traveled, but also to yield more precise information regarding the issues that advance or retard the process.

The Barometer is *by necessity* a longitudinal study, as any process obviously requires time-series data that can show short-term fluctuations and long-term changes in attitudes, perceptions and values. This round of the survey results serves the critical function of providing the baseline data against which future data can be compared and forecasts predicted. The drawback of any baseline phase of data collection is that it offers little opportunity to draw conclusions about the advancement or regression of the process. The projected 2004 and 2005 rounds of the public opinion surveys will ensure that the potential use of the 2003 data is maximized and, in fact, further developed.

In order to measure South Africa's progress, the intangible and highly ambiguous concept of reconciliation needs to be unpacked in relation to a number of critical indicators or benchmarks. The following table provides an overview:

Hypotheses	Indicators
Human Security: If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with each other and the larger system.	¬ Physical Security ¬ Economic Security ¬ Cultural Security
Legitimacy of the New Political Dispensation: If citizens view the Institutions, Leadership and Culture of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more	¬ Justifiability of Extra-legal Action ¬ Legitimacy of Leadership ¬ Legitimacy of Parliament ¬ Respect for the Rule of Law

likely to progress.	
Cross-cutting Political Relationships: If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	¬ Commitment to National Unity ¬ Commitment to multi-racial Political Parties
Dialogue: If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely to be advanced.	¬ Commitment to more dialogue
Historical Confrontation: If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	¬ Acknowledgement of Injustice of Apartheid ¬ Forgiveness ¬ Reduced levels of Vengeance
Commitment to Socio-economic Development: If citizens are able to commit themselves to transformation and redress, the national reconciliation process is more likely to progress.	¬ Willingness to Compromise
Race Relations: If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	¬ Inter-racial Contact ¬ Inter-racial Preconceptions ¬ Inter-racial Tolerance

This analysis is based on a national survey of 3 498 South Africans conducted in April and May this year.

¬ The data suggests that the new dispensation has commanded significant commitment, support and confidence, but still needs to attract higher levels of intrinsic and unconditional legitimacy if South Africans are to be considered reconciled with the system, and if the system is to serve as the normative and legislative frame-work of a 'minimally decent' reconciled nation.

¬ The data further suggests that South Africans are relatively committed to national unity that transcends racial barriers, but find it far more difficult to commit to a political party not dominated by their own race. This has ramifications, not only for the ability of South Africans to strike up creative and innovative new relationships, but potentially also for the capacity of political parties to stretch beyond racially-based interests. More positively, although some South Africans

are not committed to dialogue, on the whole, levels of support for increased dialogue are relatively high, which can only bode well for reconciliation. Agents of change need to recognize and act on this opportunity.

¬ Additionally, South Africans reveal a remarkable willingness to confront the past and embark on the future. But, a relative inability amongst many to relinquish the need to seek vengeance against those responsible for apartheid on the one hand, and an unwillingness amongst Whites to make socio-economic compromises on the other, may prove problematic for the South African process of reconciliation.

¬ The picture presented by this data is one of certain sectors of the population having made remarkable progress in reducing the extensive social distance that existed between South Africans of different races at the end of apartheid. A large portion of the population appears, however, to retain negative stereo-typical preconceptions about people of other races and show little inclination to change. Whilst class and other divisions are undoubtedly becoming an ever larger obstacle to reconciliation, the inability of significant portions of the South African public to accept racially-integrated schools and neighbourhoods show that they have a long way to go learning to live together.

¬ The data also suggest that the issue of threat, not so much to the cultural, but to the physical and economic security of citizens is something change agents need to pay close attention to. Threats to both these critical forms of security have the potential of unleashing such a spectrum of negative repercussions, that these two issues should be amongst the primary concerns of leader and citizen alike.

These situations will unlikely remain static. A retrospective glance at the last ten years reveals change of such a scale as few could have imagined. This only serves to emphasize the salience of the need to maintain and develop this instrument to show the changes from this point onwards, for South Africa is undeniably in for the long haul.

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Introduction

The process of reconciliation can begin at different points in the transition of a country from a totalitarian state to a new form of democracy. For some, it begins at the negotiation table; for others, when perpetrators are indicted and prosecuted; for others, it may be when prisoners are released; for others, when a new constitution, which guarantees fundamental freedoms, is accepted; and for some, it is when free and open elections are held in which all citizens can participate. There are many starting points, but its never a once off. The process is ongoing, especially in countries where oppression has been deep and lasting.[1]

By eloquently recognizing the various watershed moments at which national reconciliation could be described as having officially begun, this quote emphasizes that reconciliation is undeniably a process that South Africans have only recently embarked upon. Few could argue that South Africa did not embark on this journey in a most spectacular manner. Some extol the remarkable progress the nation has made. Some remain skeptical about the achievements of the past decade, whilst others are unsure how far down the path of reconciliation South Africa has traveled.

The SA Reconciliation Barometer project intends to provide some answers to the question of how the national reconciliation process is unfolding. By conducting regular public opinion surveys, audits of tangible transformation and monitoring relevant national developments, this research intendeds, not only, to provide some quantification of the direction and distance along the path of reconciliation already traveled, but also to yield more precise information regarding the issues that advance or retard the process.

Approach

From the outset, any undertaking that involves the measurement of as subjective and contested a process as reconciliation must recognize some obvious shortcomings. These range from the need to oversimplify certain dimensions of the reconciliation process for

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[1] Boraine, A. (2002) "Reconciliation". Paper presented at the ICTJ Program Staff Retreat. New York. 3 – 5 November 2002.

the sake of measurability and having to focus on only a select few facets of this complex and multi-dimensional concept, to the inherent dangers of working with public opinion data.

There is, however, a need to conduct rigorous empirical research on the progression of the national reconciliation process. But, as is the case with all exploratory research (whether of a quantitative or qualitative nature), a cautionary approach should be employed. The obvious dangers of excessive reductionism in translating such a complex process in relation to a handful of critical indicators is thus recognized, and, as such, the paper by no means asserts that reconciliation is solely composed of these critical dimension and is no bigger than the sum of its parts. On the contrary, this paper recognizes the definitional and contextual ambiguity of the process and should simply be seen as a first attempt at some necessary comparable quantification of the national progress.

The SA Reconciliation Barometer is *by necessity* a longitudinal study, as any process obviously requires time-series data that can show short-term fluctuations and long-term changes in attitudes, perceptions and values. This round of the survey results will serve the critical function of providing the baseline data against which future data can be compared and forecasts predicted. The drawback of any baseline phase of data collection is that it offers little opportunity to draw conclusions about the advancement or regression of the process. The projected 2004 and 2005 rounds of the public opinion surveys will ensure that the potential use of the 2003 data is maximized and, in fact, further developed.

Survey Design

The analysis that follows is based on a survey of adult South Africans conducted between the 29th March and the 18th May 2003. The fieldwork for the survey was undertaken by Markinor and the information was obtained by adding a substantial set of questions to Markinor's MBus (an omnibus survey conducted on a nationally representative sample

of South Africans aimed at measuring socio-political trends). The sample is representative of the entire South African population, 16 years and older. Face to face interviews were conducted with 3,498 South Africans.

The survey instrument was first prepared in English and then translated into Afrikaans, Xhosa, Zulu, North Sotho, South Sotho and Setswana. As a result, respondents were interviewed in the language of their choice. All respondents were interviewed by members of their own race. The average M-Bus interview lasted 88 minutes, whilst the median interview time was 99 minutes.

A formal pre-test of the questionnaire was conducted on a convenient sample of seventy-five South Africans. Soft quotas were utilised to create a sample that closely resembles the probable proportions of these characteristics in the population as a whole. Thirty-five of the interviews were conducted in the Western Cape, whilst forty occurred in Gauteng, with at least 10 interviews conducted in each of the 7 official survey languages. In light of the pre-test outcome and interviewer feedback, a number of questions were re-worded, others were completely omitted and the order of some questions was changed.

So as to allow for statistical analysis of interracial differences, four distinct sub-samples, one for each race group, were drawn by applying multistage stratification procedures. The numbers of completed interviews for Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Indians are 2000, 937, 391, and 170 respectively. The sample covers both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, and respondents included people residing in informal settlements, deep rural areas, and those living in multi-member households.

The black sample was created through a geographical area-probability sampling procedure. The coloured, white and indian samples were created through area-stratified sampling procedures according to region, town, suburb and community size, with randomly selected sampling points. The smaller size of the white, coloured and indian samples demanded that the samples at each sampling point be quota controlled for gender, age and working status.

The accuracy of 9.1% of all interviews was verified through a personal backcheck, whilst 18.8% of the remainder of completed interviews was checked telephonically.

Some population groups are over-sampled to allow a sufficient number of cases to allow for statistically significant results. Due to the fact that some population sub-samples are not selected proportional to their size in the greater South African population, it is necessary to weight the data after data entry to render it more representative of the population as a whole. AMPS (All Media Product Survey) data was used to do this. The table below reports the racial composition of the sample before and after weighting, as well as the estimated composition of the entire South African population.

Table 1: Racial Composition of Sample

	Racial composition of respondents interviewed (%)	Racial composition of weighted sample (%)	Racial composition of South African Population (%)[2]
Black	57	75	78
White	27	14	12
Coloured	11	9	8
Indian	5	3	3

It should be noted that in making reference to South African racial sub-groups as Black, White, Indian and Coloured, no approval of the Apartheid-era classification system or its underlying theory of race is intended. The nature of present day South African society still bears the scars of an apartheid past, and, as such, substantial differences between the conditions and orientations of the four main racial groups often persist and need to be rigorously analysed.

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[2] *Mid-year estimates 2001,* Statistical Release PO302, 2 July 2001.

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Paradigms of Reconciliation

Before extrapolating the complex concept of reconciliation to a number of measurable indicators, a brief theoretical discussion of the meaning and definition of the concept of reconciliation is necessary. Reconciliation as a concept has no neat explication, no clearly defined definition and no undisputed meanings. One of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's primary architects, MP Johnny De Lange, recently proclaimed that he has never met "two people with the same definition of reconciliation"[3]. There is undeniably a lack of conceptual clarity around the word and reconciliation remains an essentially contested concept.

The literature and academic debate on reconciliation in the South African context offers multiple definitions or paradigms of reconciliation, although many of these paradigms are not mutually exclusive, with certain dimensions common to numerous models. In attempting to create a coherent list of reconciliation models, the original research undertaken by Hamber and van Der Merwe[4] will be expanded upon. This conceptual framework of models only contain those explicitly relevant to the South African experience, and have necessitated a certain degree of oversimplification.

The two most prominent ideologies of reconciliation promoted in post-apartheid South Africa are those ascribing to the non-racial and multi-cultural schools of thought. The melting-pot-of-cultures ideology, as the multicultural model is sometimes referred to, is based on the notion that South Africa is composed of a conglomeration of different cultures and histories. As such, the reconciliation process seeks to bridge the past, whilst simultaneously bridging the divisions between different communities. The aim is to ultimately create a society where citizens and communities co-exist in a peaceful and tolerant manner, but where diversity is respected and even celebrated.

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[3] Reported in Doxtader, E. (2002) "Is it 'Reconciliation' if we Say It Is? Discerning the Rhetorical Problem in the South African Transition." An unpublished paper. Pp. 2

[4] Hamber, B and H. Van Der Merwe. (1998) "What is this thing called reconciliation?" Paper presented at the Goedgedacht Forum "After the Truth and Reconciliation Commission" at Goedgedacht Farm: Cape Town. 28 March 1998.

The non-racial ideology essentially defines reconciliation as "dissolving the racial identities arising from the policies of the past and implores the TRC [*and other such efforts*] to convert people, through confession and acknowledgment, into non-racial citizens within a harmoniously integrated social setting"[5]. Theoretically this model of reconciliation speaks to disbanding pre-apartheid identities and re-constructing non-racial ones.

The Human Rights model sets the bar far lower. A prominent proponent of this paradigm, Jakes Gerwel argues that reconciliation requires "the institutionalisation of consensus seeking. If we are a divided society with different sectors, with diversity, then institutionalisation of consensus is a very important thing"[6]. This model asserts that social interaction needs to be moderated by the rule of law, largely to prevent the atrocities of the past being repeated. It involves the creation of the so-called 'minimally decent society', where normative and legal boundaries control interaction and create the space for peaceful coexistence.

Whilst the trajectory of the reconciliation process for the human right paradigm moves from the macro to the micro, the religious model focuses on the model propagated by various churches that speaks about concentric circles of reconciliation, working from the individual to the societal- or macro- level. Notions of truth and forgiveness are unequivocally central to this model, whilst some advocate the presence of primary movers, meaningful engagement at all levels (not simply at an institutional/elite one), genuine repentance, restitution and absolution; atonement and penance; or reflection, confession, repentance and rebirth.

There is a certain degree of overlap between the religious and *ubuntu* paradigm. This paradigm, based on the African philosophy of *ubuntu*, asserts that all community members share a common humanity, and by denying the common humanity of others, the

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[5] Hamber, B. (2002) "'Ere their story die': truth, justice and reconciliation in South Africa" in *Race & Class*. Vol 44, Iss 1, Pp. 66.
[6] Gerwel, J (2000) "Anticipating a Different Kind of Future" in Villa -Vicencio (ed)(2000) *Transcending a Century of Injustice.* The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation: Cape Town. Pp. 122.

community and its members are dehumanized[7]. A great deal of emphasis is placed on the inter-connectedness of individuals, and the re-integration of perpetrators into the community is seen as an act that restores the entire community to peace.

This should not be confused with the community-building paradigm of reconciliation, which argues that micro-level relationships within communities and between the community and the larger society need to be restored to facilitate reconciliation at a macro level. This model sees the healing of relationships and a better understanding between actors as critical to the process[8]. Practitioners working within this paradigm in South Africa have argued that it requires the raising of historical awareness, the healing of painful memories, commemorative events, dialogue and reflection.

In some ways the developmental paradigm of transformation is diametrically opposed to the more subjective approach to reconciliation espoused by the community-building, *ubuntu* and religious models for reconciliation. The developmental paradigm advocates the remedying of historically induced inequalities, whilst simultaneously advocating a strategy of cooperation for the social and economic development of the nation. This model sees the subjective restoration or reconciliation of relationships as following naturally (or, at minimum, more easily) from a restitution process. This model requires an acknowledgment of past injustice and the willingness to redress the broad-scale injustices that continue to skew advantages in present day South Africa.

This model is quite distinct from the transformation model, potentially the most ambitious and far-reaching of all the paradigms. Advocates of this model assert that reconciliation requires structural and systemic adjustments, which include institutionalising a new post-apartheid value system, structure and political culture, as well as wide-ranging reparations. This model advocates that reconciliation cannot "develop in a sustainable way if structural injustice in the political, legal an d economic

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[7] Tutu, D. M. (1999) *No Future without Forgiveness.* Random House: New York.
[8] Hamber, B and H. Van Der Merwe. (1998) "What is this thing called reconciliation?" Paper presented at the Goedgedacht Forum "After the Truth and Reconciliation Commission" at Goedgedacht Farm: Cape Town. 28 March 1998.

domains remain"[9]. As such, this model prescribes that it is impossible to change the relationships in a post-conflict society if the material, structural and valuative conditions under which these relationships were created remain unchanged[10].

This conceptual map is an attempt to draw out and capture some of the dominant models of reconciliation that have evolved in South African theoretical deliberations around the meaning of the term. It is not an exhaustive list, and as South Africa's transition advances, new nuances of meaning will no doubt come to the fore.

Individual or Political Reconciliation?

This conceptual map points to another distinction in the conceptualisation of reconciliation that is becoming increasingly apparent. Amongst others[11] Tristan Borer cautions about the lack of conceptual clarity between differing levels of reconciliation, encouraging a conceptual separation between *interpersonal* reconciliation – between victims and perpetrators, for example- and *national* or *societal* reconciliation[12]. Jeremy Cronin makes a similar distinction within the context of the mandate of the TRC, arguing that a particular difficulty exists in understanding reconciliation on a national level. He asserts 'there is a potentially dangerous confusion between a religious, indeed Christian, understanding of reconciliation, more typically applied to *interpersonal* relationships, and a more limited, *political* notion of reconciliation applicable to a democratic society"[13].

The paradigms of reconciliation mapped out above refer to different levels at which reconciliation can occur. Whilst the religious, *ubuntu* and community-building models

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[9] Huyse, L. (2003) "The Process of Re conciliation" in Bloomfiled, D, Barnes, T and L. Huyse (eds) (2003) *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook.* International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Sweden. Pp. 21.

[10] Esterhuyse, W (2000) "Truth as a trigger for transforma tion: from apartheid injustice to transformational justice" in Villa -Vicencio, C and W. Verwoerd (eds) (2000) *Looking Back Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa.* University of Cape Town Press: Cape Town.

[11] Hayner, P. B (2001) *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity.* Routledge: New York.. Pp. 155; Villa-Vicencio, C. (2003) 'The Politics of Reconciliation." Unpublished paper. Pp. 3.

[12] Borer, T.A. (2001) 'Reconciliation in South Africa. Defi ning Success." *Kroc Institute Occasional Paper* 20:OP:1. March 2001.Pp. 9.

[13] Cronin, 1999:3, on page 108 of the *TRC Report.*

primarily fall into the gambit of the *individual* or *interpersonal*, the human rights and developmental paradigm are largely located at the level of *national* or *political* reconciliation. Whilst the transformation and multi-cultural models could be construed as highly ambitious forms of *political* reconciliation, the non-racial paradigm is less easy to place, but probably falls somewhere between the *political* and *individual* levels of analysis.

According to Charles Villa-Vicencio the critical distinction between political and individual reconciliation revolves around the fact that "political reconciliation can forego the psychological and moral challenges that many aggrieved individuals face, but often choose never to deal with in a thoroughgoing manner"[14]. Contrary to religious notions of reconciliation, political reconciliation does not require forgiveness, it does not require loving thy neighbour. Instead political reconciliation provides the process through which to address and confront the issues that continue to impede sustainable peace. David Bloomsfield, in a similar fashion to Cronin, also places this form of reconciliation at the heart of democratic politics[15].

For such engagements to transpire, an interruption in an established pattern of events is necessary. This interruption requires more than "a grim determination not to fight", but actually necessitates a kind of social contract that allows for some degree of coexistence, whilst addressing the conflict from a new perspective. This interruption is typically the beginning of the long and rarely simple process of political reconciliation. This process is generally aided by acknowledgement of past suffering and a reduced need for vengeance, but at minimum requires a social contract based on the recognition that all parties are permanent participants in the others' future. Part of this contract requires unequivocal recognition that dialogue is necessary to establish a *modus operandi* for peaceful co-existence, which may one day allow for the repairing of relations between previously conflicting parties. Ultimately political reconciliation demands a more socio-

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[14] Villa-Vicencio, C. (2003) "The Politics of Reconciliation." Unpublished paper. Pp. 3.
[15] Bloosmfield, D (2003) "Reconciliation: An Introduction" in Bloomfiled, D, Barnes, T and L. Huyse (eds) (2003) *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook.* International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Sweden. Pp. 11.

economically just and equitable society, characterized by an enduring human rights culture, respect for the rule of law and trust in political institutions. Priscilla Hayner argues that mutual agreement about the basic facts of the past is an additional mandatory precondition to political reconciliation, with "an official accounting and conclusion about the facts allow[ing] opposing parties to debate and govern together without latent conflicts and bitterness about past lies"[16].

There is general consensus that individual reconciliation is simultaneously a far more complicated and yet often far easier undertaking. Individual reconciliation concerns itself to a greater degree with the restoration of relationships, be it of a victim or perpetrator with themselves, victim and perpetrator, perpetrator and community or communities with each other. Individual reconciliation processes generally involve the milestones of confession, repentance, forgiveness and restoration.

This paper, although incorporating a limited number of facets of *individual* reconciliation, will mainly focus on examining the extent of progress the country has made with regard to political reconciliation. Additionally, the South African general public's views and understandings of the concept of reconciliation were also incorporated in the development of the critical indicators of benchmarks of reconciliation.

How do South Africans understand reconciliation?

The exploratory round of the SA Reconciliation Barometer[17] asked a representative sample of South Africans what they understood by the word reconciliation. It cannot be expected that ordinary citizens engage with the definitional ambiguity of this concept to the same extent as those in the academic sphere, nor are able to do justice to this engagement with the meaning of the term in one interview. As such there should not be

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[16] Hayner, P. B (2001) *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity.* Routledge: New York.. Pp. 155

[17] This survey of South Africans, 16 years and older, was conducted between the 18th October and the 25 November 2002. Face to face interviews were conducted with 3 491 South Africans. The survey instrument was first prepared in English and then translated into Afrikaans, Xhosa, Zulu, North Sotho, South Sotho and Setswana. As a result, respondents were interviewed in the language of their choice.

any expectation that the public opinion data flowing from these questions in the exploratory round of the SA Reconciliation Barometer survey will allow for a neat categorisation into these academic paradigms. At best, a brief description of these academic models of reconciliation will allow for a more structured analysis of the facets of reconciliation prominent in the public opinion data.

The data reveals that other than those unable to provide an answer for reconciliation (29%), the most frequently volunteered answers made reference to notions of *forgiveness*. This raises the question whether South Africans view reconciliation within a religious paradigm, inculcating theological demands for confession, repentance and, most importantly, forgiveness? Alternatively, the salience of forgiveness, as demonstrated by its prominence in respondent's answers, could stem from the emphasis of forgiveness in restoring perpetrators to the larger community as espoused by the *ubuntu* paradigm.

Table 2: Distribution of Meanings of Reconciliation (Open-ended Question)

	Percentage of Respondents (%) providing item as first answer. [18]
Forgiveness	18.5
Unification	12.2
Peace	9.8
Racial Integration	6.2
Forgetting about the Past	6.0
Dealing with difference	3.7
Cooperation	1.9
Dealing with the Past	4.0
Reducing poverty and inequality	1.8
Reconciliatory values	1.4
End of racism	1.4
Human Rights Protection	.8
Other	3.2
Refused	.1
Don't know	29.1
N = 3 377	

Question asked: "*What, if anything, do you understand by the word "reconciliation"?*

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[18] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Forgiveness unequivocally plays a central role in the understandings of reconciliation of a large portion of South Africans. The nature of the relationship between forgiveness and reconciliation, and in particular the causal order of this apparent trajectory, has been the source of heated debate. In a national survey conducted by the Institute in 2000 78% of all South Africans agreed that national reconciliation requires that people forgive one another. In conjunction, these two findings suggest that for many South Africans forgiveness is a paramount dimension of reconciliation.

Significantly, bar associations with forgiveness and forgetting, other meanings of reconciliation that are directly associated with actively confronting the past, as popularly advocated by the TRC, are infrequent. Apology, acknowledgement, redress, confession and finding out the truth do not appear to be uppermost in the minds of many South Africans when they think about reconciliation.

Whilst some practitioners and researchers in post-conflict societies have realised the mutually symbiotic relationship between socio-economic development, reconciliation and democratic consolidation, others continue to underestimate the interconnectedness of these processes. Bloomsfield argues that a functioning democracy is built on a 'dual foundation', whereby "a set of fair procedures for peacefully handling the issues that divide a society (the political and social structures of governance) and a set of working relationships between the groups involved" are required. He argues that a society cannot develop practicable working relationships if the institutional structures are not fair and just and, conversely, the structures will not function properly, however fair and just they are, if there is not the minimum degree of cooperation in the interrelationships of those involved[19]. Consequently a functioning democracy and developing economy require workable relationships, and these in turn require the distrust, hostility and disrespect with which previously divided people view each other to have been treated.

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[19] Bloosmfield, D (2003) 'Reconciliation: An Introduction" in Bloomfiled, D, Barnes, T and L. Huyse (eds) (2003) *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook.* International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Sweden. Pp. 10.

Evidence of strong conceptual links between these processes is negligible in the data with less than 2% of South Africans automatically associating reconciliation with notions of *material compensation*, *financial redress* and *socio-economic development*. This lack of immediate connection of reconciliation with the "harder" issues of socio -economic redress could be interpreted as these not featuring prominently in the minds of the majority of South Africans (approximately 78% of whom are Black). Alternatively, it could be rationalised that reconciliation may not automatically be associated with redress, but redress seen as a mandatory condition for forgiveness, unification, peace, moving on or any other of the 'softer' issues that were frequently selected. Similarly, the *human rights* paradigm of reconciliation found little resonance at grassroots level, with responses in this category comprising less than 1% of total responses.

Unpacking Reconciliation

In order to measure South Africa's progress along the path of reconciliation, this intangible, and as the exploratory data suggests, highly ambiguous concept needs to be unpacked in relation to a number of critical indicators or benchmarks. The process of attempting to reduce reconciliation to a number of key indicators, under the hypothesis that when these strengthen or improve reconciliation is likely to be advanced, was a particularly difficult undertaking. It was eventually achieved through a very consultative process, which included an analysis of the results of the previously discussed exploratory national survey, numerous critical discussions with academics, researchers, social theorists and practitioners working in the field and an extensive literature review.

The nature of some of the components of reconciliation identified by South Africans in the exploratory survey, as well as some of the criteria recognized by theorists as characterizing political reconciliation, do not lend themselves to direct translation into measurable indicators, and have therefore not been included in the survey questionnaire. The following table depicts a conceptual overview of the indicators selected.

Table 3: Conceptual Overview of Reconciliation Indicators

Hypotheses	Indicators
Human Security: If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with each other and the larger system.	¬ Physical Security ¬ Economic Security ¬ Cultural Security
Legitimacy of the New Political Dispensation: If citizens view the Institutions, Leadership and Culture of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to progress.	¬ Justifiability of Extra-legal Action ¬ Legitimacy of Leadership ¬ Legitimacy of Parliament ¬ Respect for the Rule of Law
Cross-cutting Political Relationships: If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	¬ Commitment to National Unity ¬ Commitment to multi-racial Political Parties
Dialogue: If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely to be advanced.	¬ Commitment to more dialogue
Historical Confrontation: If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	¬ Acknowledgement of Injustice of Apartheid ¬ Forgiveness ¬ Reduced levels of Vengeance
Commitment to Socio-economic Development: If citizens are able to commit themselves to transformation and redress, the national reconciliation process is more likely to progress.	¬ Willingness to Compromise
Race Relations: If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	¬ Inter-racial Contact ¬ Inter-racial Preconceptions ¬ Inter-racial Tolerance

A number of critical variables referring explicitly to inter-group relations have been incorporated in this analysis. These include measures of social distance and the extent and kind of social interactions reported by diverse groups of respondents. A number of proponents of political reconciliation challenge the importance of inter-group relations measures, asserting, for example, that 'relatively negative attitudes toward members of other groups and a reluctance to engage in intimate social relationships may not have

direct implications for national reconciliation"[20]. This paper, whilst recognizing that previously divided parties do not need to "love each other" to live together, will argue that social distance, stereo-type and social contact indicators are important for national reconciliation, not least because low levels of social trust and understanding, based largely on stereotypical views of others, infringe drastically on people's capacity to build workable relationships, that in turn are critical for rebuilding those structural social institutions that form the basis of a democratic society.

For obvious reasons stemming from the country's racially specific apartheid past, the bulk of inter-group relations measures for this round refer exclusively to inter-racial reconciliation. This decision was also, however, based on findings of the exploratory SA Reconciliation Barometer survey, which yielded evidence that for a substantial portion of South Africans reconciliation is still understood in a racial context. However, in light, for example, of a growing body of research indicating that South Africa's middle-class is becoming increasingly diversified, the need to reconcile South Africans divided by class, religion, language and a host of other division should not be underestimated.

Nature of the Division

Many long-standing divisions were overshadowed in the past by the prominent and institutionalised divide between Black and White, and may now, in the post-Apartheid era, develop and periodically flare up into various forms of overt conflict. At the same time, an entire range of new identities and struggles have emerged in the aftermath of the move towards democratic rule, and they too have the potential to create conflict. In all likelihood this potentially volatile situation will have been exacerbated by the extensive poverty and inequality that pervades South Africa. To investigate where South Africans see the biggest divisions, the survey instrument included a number of items to monitor the perceived nature of societal divisions.

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[20] Chapman, A.R. (2002) "Approaches to Studying Reconciliation". Paper presented at the Conference on Empirical Approaches to Studying Truth Commissions. Stellenbosch, South Africa. November 2002. Pg. 9.

Table 4: Perceptions of the Nature of the Divisions

	Percentage of Respondents in Agreement (%)[21]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
The division between different political parties	22.0	23.5	21.0	19.7	18.2
The division between poor and middle income/wealthy South Africans	29.8	29.0	29.1	36.6	34.1
The division between those living with HIV/Aids and other infectious diseases and the rest of the community	14.3	16.6	9.4	9.5	8.8
The division between members of different religions	6.9	6.6	5.6	7.9	6.5
The divisions between Black, White, Coloured and Indian South Africans	20.1	17.7	27.5	21.2	24.7
The divisions between South Africans of different language groups.	6.3	6.3	5.5	5.1	7.6
Don't know	.3	.2	.8		
None	.2	.3	.3		
Refused	.1		.8		
χ^2 = 109.190, p < .000.	N=3498	N=2000	N=927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *People sometimes talk about the divisions between people in South Africa. Sometimes these division can cause people to feel left out or discriminated against. In other circumstances it can lead to anger and even violence between groups. What, in your experience, is the biggest division in South Africa today?* First mention.

From the data it is clear that class divisions are an increasingly salient (and visible) problem for South Africans. Thirty percent of the population feels that the division between poor and rich is the largest one facing the nation today. In light of the country's GINI coefficient, as measure of the country's degree of inequality, fluctuating in its ranking as one of the worst in the world, this is hardly surprising. Moreover, a growing body of research contends that the racial composition of the middleclass is rapidly diversifying[22], indicating that, contrary to past experience where race and class lines were practically overlapping, a clear differentiation between the two is developing.

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[21] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

[22] See Nattrass, N and J. Seekings (2001) 'Race and Economic Inequality in South Africa" in *Daedalus.* Winter 2001. 45-72. and Rivero, C. (2000) *The Size and Composition of the South African Middle Class:*

Surprisingly, divisions between political parties are the second most frequently mentioned rift, surpassing even divisions between South Africans of different races. It appears likely that some of this sentiment stems from the longtime conflict that periodically resurfaces between the IFP and the ANC in Kwa-Zulu Natal. A recent report asserts that, according to some sources, the violence in this province has claimed as many as 20 000 lives since 1984[23]. The severity of this division prompted Mary De Haas, University of Natal academic and violence monitor, to call for immediate government intervention, including the deployment of the SANDF in specific areas, such as Nkandla, Gingindlovu, Msinga and Mbazwana[24]. Instances of almost incomprehensible violence, such as the opening of gun fire on school children at the Amatikulu High School by Balaclava-clad men and the disappearance of Vusi Ngwenya near Esikhawini, are just some indicators of the level of barely controlled conflict in the province. De Haas warns that if the current trend of "low intensity conflict and gross human rights abuses" continues, KwaZulu-Natal could find itself in a dire situation. A breakdown of the data according to provincial boundaries reveals that KwaZulu-Natal certainly has the highest number of respondents believing political party divisions are the most prominent facing the nation today. In fact, in Kwazulu-Natal 32% of the population feel political party divisions are the most important, compared to a smaller 29% who feel class divisions are most important.

But KwaZulu-Natal is not the only province in which more people perceive political party divisions as being more important than class divisions. In Mpumalanga race (26%) is most frequently mentioned as the biggest divide, followed by political parties (23%) and then class (21%). In the Free State political parties (30%) are most frequently identified as demarcating the biggest line of divisions, followed by HIV/Aids status (25%) and finally by class (22%). These data raise the question whether the intensity of accusations, slander and very public infighting between political parties has driven a

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The Implications for a Consolidating Democracy. PhD Thesis. University of Stellenbosch and Seekings, J (2003) "Inequality, Mobility and Politics in South Africa" Paper presented at the 19th International Political Science Congress, Durban: South Africa. 30 June 2003.

[23] Taylor, R (2002) "Justice Denied: Political Violence in KwaZulu-Natal after 1994" in *Violence and Transition.* Vol. 6.

[24] *Mail & Guardian,* 12 April 2002

substantial portion of the South African population to the point at which party affiliation is a central point of conflict? A recent request for the Police to investigate the cause of a Khayelitsha fire that ravaged the home of the leader of a recently established Democratic Alliance Branch, after the DA alleged that it followed threats by African National Congress members[25], suggests this could be the case.

Although conflict surrounding the question of language is no new phenomenon in South Africa, with many protest against the compulsory learning of Afrikaans resulting in the bloodiest conflicts during apartheid, the issue of language and language divisions appear salient to a relatively small portion of South Africans. Although the reaction to threats to Afrikaans as the language of tuition at certain traditionally Afrikaans Universities, and in particular the University of Stellenbosch, suggests that language remains an issue that many people feel very strongly about, only 6% of South Africans thought that language divisions were the most important divides facing the country.

A similarly small portion of South Africans selected religious cleavages (7%). In light of recent international developments the occurrence of violent conflicts between religious and cultural groups has garnered much attention. Although the September 11th attacks are clearly a clash between some sovereign nations and terrorist groups, some commentators have framed these events as a "clash of civilizations" between Islam and Christianity [26].
The aftermath of September 11th did reveal some anti-Arab/Muslim sentiments in many parts of the world, including South Africa. Examples include the setting alight of the wooden doors of the Muslim Judicial Council in Cape Town[27], the harassment of several Muslim teenagers, as reported by the Human Rights Commission[28], and the removal of two Muslim passengers from a SAA flight bound for London, after a first class passenger alleged they looked 'suspicious'[29]. But, the SA Reconciliation Barometer data do not

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[25] *Sunday Independent*, 31 August 2003.
[26] *The Star*, 27 November 2001.
[27] *Mail & Guardian,* 19 September 2001
[28] *Sowetan,* 19 September 2001
[29] *Mail & Guardian*, 16 April 2002.

reflect any substantial portions of South Africans seeing this as one of the biggest obstacles to national reconciliation.

Somewhat unexpectedly, a far larger portion of South Africans (14%) experience a divide between those infected with HIV/Aids and the greater community. A recent incident in which an HIV-positive mother was forced to remove her baby from a Woodstock child-care facility after other parents became anxious about their children' s well being- even though the baby does not have the Aids virus[30] – is clearly just one of many discriminatory experiences occurring across the country each day. With HIV/Aids infection rates growing daily and Scientists believing it will take at least a decade before an Aids vaccine is found[31], this divide will probably become more prominent with time and will need to be constantly monitored.

Examining the data for different population sub-groups reveals some very telling similarities and one or two interesting differences. Amongst all race groups the class divide is the most prominent division, although the proportions of coloured and indian South Africans selecting this cleavage is larger than those amongst Whites and Blacks. With regard to the rifts between political parties, roughly a fifth of the members of each of the racial groups selected this option, although comparatively it appeared to be more salient for Blacks and Whites than for Indians and Coloureds. Similarly small portions of each race group identified cleavages based on religious or language differences as primary obstacles to South Africans living together. The biggest differences are revealed on the question of a racial divide, with 10% more Whites than Blacks selecting this option, with Coloureds and Indians between; and the issue of HIV/Aids, which is considered important by 17% of Blacks, but only by less than 10% of all other race groups. Disaggregation of the data by Living Standard Measure, or LSM, which ranks households in terms of incomes from LSM 1 (the poorest) to LSM 10 (the wealthy), reveals no clear patterns of class, racial or any other divide being more prominent amongst any particular Living Standard Group.

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[30] *Cape Argues*, 29 August 2003.
[31] *The Star*, 26 August 2003.

The data suggest that the dynamics of the nature of the divisions in South Africa have changed, and are likely to change further. Scientists caution that a cure for HIV/Aids is many years away and a recent Department of Health report estimated that the number of HIV-positive people in South Africa grew by 12% between 2001, when 4.74 million South Africans were infected, and 2002, at which point the count was 5.3 million[32]. Economists warned that an end to global poverty is unlikely to be witnessed by this generation and a recent report by *Global Insight*, an organisation that compiles poverty index ratings, contends that the poverty rate in South Africa rose from 41% in 1996 to 49% in 2001[33]. In light of these challenges, it is highly likely that class- and HIV/Aids-orientated divisions will increasingly challenge the nation, and the SA Reconciliation Barometer will continue monitoring public opinion in this regard.

Human Security

Regardless of the specifics of where the lines of divisions are drawn, Hayner asserts that threats of political violence and intimidation can continue well into the transition and long after formal resolution of the conflict has transpired[34]. Moreover, post-conflict societies are at great risk of falling prey to new forms of violence that also undermine and weaken efforts to stabilize society. The fact that reconciliation can only occur when "the shooting stops" is obvious, but less obvious and more complicated are the host of other threats and challenges to citizen's security that also have a bearing on reconciliation. Ron Kraybill argues that any healing or reconciliation process after some form of conflict requires a certain degree of mutual withdrawal. He then contends that this withdrawal into the safety of a community that is known and trusted is crucial to finding a *modus operandi* to move forward. However, such a withdrawal can only really occur if a certain minimal level of social and physical safety is achieved. Without such a healthy, safe

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[32] *Cape Argus*, 10 September 2003.

[33] http://www.sabcnews.com/south_africa/social/0,2172,64797,00.html

[34] Hayner, P.B. (2001) *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity: How Truth Commissions Around the World are Challenging the Past and Shaping the Future.* New York and London: Routledge. Pp. 163.

space, the opportunity for people, whether from the side of beneficiary, victim, perpetrator or otherwise, to redefine themselves and their future path may be lost[35].

Political fatalities showed a marked increase in the late 1980s from 661 deaths in 1987 to 1149 in 1988, 1403 in 1989, reaching a peak of just short of 2 500 deaths in 1994. Since then, political violence has dropped dramatically to 1044 deaths in 1995 to fewer than 500 in 1997 and only 57 in 2002[36]. Despite the fact that political violence in the South African post-conflict situation no longer presents any real threat, even a casual observation of any national Newspaper will reveal that South Africans feel threatened, some by seemingly excessive crime, others by increased unemployment, large influxes of foreign nationals from other African countries or escalating levels of domestic violence. Others still appear to feel threatened by apparent attempts to undermine the sovereignty of their minority status language or religion.

The SA Reconciliation Barometer instrument included a number of items to test this hypothesis that, despite the absence of any threat of widespread future political violence, South African citizens feel their human security threatened.

Although South Africans undeniably perceive numerous facets of their life to be under threat from a range of perils, three dimensions have been selected, the first two respectively representing concerns for economic survival (in light of increasing poverty and unemployment) and personal safety (in light of high levels of crime). The third dimension concerns perceptions of increasing threats to minority groups' cultural, linguistic and religious survival. These concerns are presumably only important to specific groups of South Africans, but the recent alleged action of the *Boeremag* (and their alleged arguments for perpetrating their crimes) is just one example that demonstrates how incredibly important this threat can be to specific groups of South

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[35] Krog, A (1998) 'South Africa: On the Tortured Road to Reconciliation" in the *Cape Argus*, 22 July 2003.
[36] South Africa Survey 2002/2003 Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations. Pp. 439..

Africans, and that these extremist groups appear to have the capacity to cause considerable damage to the national reconciliation process[37].

Physical Threat

According to the Institute's manual *Learning to Live Together,* there are at least five ways in which crime obstructs reconciliation. It "undermines public trust in nation-building, it creates more victims and more trauma, it reinforces apartheid segregation and socio-economic inequality, it entrenches racial prejudice and it undermines social stability and tolerance".[38]

Although the accuracy of crime statistics is constantly under debate, crime appears to be a growing threat to South Africans. Information supplied by the South African Police Services Crime Information Analysis Centre reveals that murders decreased by 19.2% between 1994 and 2000, whilst reported cases of rape increased by 24.6%. Over the same period motor vehicle theft decreased by 3.5%, whilst common robbery increased by a whopping 169.1%[39].

These crime statistics report a mixed bag of changes with violent crimes, like murder, on the decrease, but cases of rape and common robbery being reported far more frequently. The SA Reconciliation Barometer survey instrument provides an opportunity to compare people's perceptions of the degree to which their physical safety is under threat and likely to be under threat in the near future, with the actual situation of threat as portrayed by national crime statistics.

When asked to reflect on their *current level* of personal safety compared to a few months ago, the SA Reconciliation Barometer data report that almost half of all South Africans

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[37] Schoenteich, M and H. Boshoff (2003) "Volk, Faith and Fatherland". Institute for Security Studies Monograph No 81. March 2003. Pp 56.

[38] Du Toit, F (ed) (2003) Learning to Live Together: Practices of Social Reconciliation. Rondebosch: The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Pp 119.

[39] Crime Information Analysis Cebtre, South African Police Service (SAPS), *The Incidence of Serious Crime in South Africa: January to December 2000,* 1/2001.

(44.7%) feel that their personal safety has neither improved nor deteriorated, whilst just short of a quarter (22.7%) feel that it has in fact deteriorated. But, disaggregation of the data reveal that South Africans of various races have very different perceptions in this regard, with fully 61% of Indians and 46% of Whites, compared to 17% of Blacks, asserting that their personal safety has deteriorated.

Table 5: Perceptions of Future Physical Security [40]

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[41]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
It will get better	45.1	54.4	14.2	33.7	11.8
Stay about the same	26.7	25.6	28.5	27.9	19.4
It will get worse	28.3	20.1	57.3	38.4	68.9
$\chi^2 = 699.315$, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 937	N = 391	N = 170

A similar pattern is visible when South Africans' extent of worry for their *future* physical security is examined. Taken as a whole, a sizeable portion of South Africans (45%) appear relatively optimistic about their future safety, whilst 28% fear a deterioration and 27% expect no change.

Far fewer Indians (12%) and Whites (14%) than Coloureds (34%) and Blacks (54%) are optimistic. This data substantiates a previously made argument that although the media, in particular, often portray Whites as the primary victims of crime, particularly when it comes to white farmers, this is usually not true as 'in the vast majority of crimes of violence the victims are African and poor'[42]. Somewhat ironically thus, crime and other threats to physical survival, are perceived as a bigger problem by Indians and Whites than it is by Blacks, yet they are at a far higher risk of crime.

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[40] Two items: *How do you think the general level of safety of South Africans will change in the next 12 months?* and *How do you think the personal safety of people like you will change during the next two years?* formed a reliable index. (Factor Loadings were .878 and .865 respectively, with Alpha coefficient of .878)

[41] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

[42] Shaw, M and P. Gastrow. (2001) 'Stealing the Show? Crime and its Impact in Post-Apartheid South Africa' in *Daedalus.* Winter 2001. Pp 236. and Rule, S (ed) (1999) *Public Opinion on National Priority Issues Election '99.* Democracy SA. Human Sciences Research Council. HSRC Publishers. Pp 25.

On the whole, crime is obviously a problem for most South Africans, and whilst the data show that around 45% of all South Africans are actually optimistic about an improvement, the rest expect the present dismal situation to be maintained or deteriorate. There are numerous potential consequences of more than half of the population being relatively pessimistic about the physical safety dimension of their human security. This fear may result in decreasing levels of confidence in the criminal justice system and, by association, the new government and the order it creates, thereby contributing to, amongst others, lower levels of public participation and higher emigration rates, which in turn have negative consequences for capital flight and the brain drain.

For the wealthy, and Whites in particular, other possible consequences include increasing isolation and withdrawal from the larger society, often through the building of higher walls, electric fences and lately even the booming-off of whole suburbs. It is possible that predominantly white residents of the suburbs may react to crime by "seeking to insulate themselves physically from the mainly black poor who are seen as its perpetrators. That would entrench a form of social distance which will impede attempts to create a common South African loyalty"[43].

Particularly amongst the poor, fears of increased levels of assault on personal security can result in increased vigilante action. This trend is characterized by citizens acting on their instinct to fulfill the role that the state cannot or will not. In January last year local residents in Khayelitsha burnt to death three suspected murderers. In the same week a mob in KwaZulu-Natal killed a 57 year-old man, alleged to have raped an 8 year old, whilst in Johannesburg a man, suspected of killing a street vendor, had to be rescued from an angry mob wanting to place a burning tyre around his neck[44].

It would appear that people who perceive their safety to be threatened are increasingly likely to resort to means outside legal boundaries to address escalating crime and

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[43] Shaw, M, (1997) "South Africa; Crime in Transition". Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper No 17. March 1997
[44] *Mail & Guardian,* 15 January 2002.

compensate for inadequate policing. The danger of this extremely volatile situation is clear, not only for individuals, but for the state. Increased vigilante action represents a growing distrust and disrespect for the rule of law and due process, as well as for a larger culture of human rights. Bronwyn Harris comments that when contextualised within South Africa's culture of violence, 'vigilantism appears as a symptom of complete disregard for the law…as well as fundamental disagreements with the human rights framework that underlies the constitution. It is, therefore, not enough merely to tackle practical failings of the formal Criminal Justice System and offer education about due process. Rather, these interventions must form part of a broader strategy that aims to delegitimise violence as the primary and pervasive social solution to problems; the human rights framework must be enacted at a societal as well as constitutional level"[45].

Whether resorting to vigilante justice, emigration or increasing isolation, the effects of high levels of fear for future personal security are numerous and largely not beneficial to the reconciliation process. Anecdotal analysis of the situation indicates that levels of fear are already an obstacle to reconciliation, but should current levels of fear for future physical security increase, the retarding effects on the reconciliation process could be disastrous.

Economic Threat

Despite the fact that the re-structuring of the country's 'economic fundamentals' has reaped considerable praise, with an unemployment rate of between 30.5% and 41.8%, depending on whether the strict or expanded definition is used, many South Africans undeniably feel economically threatened. Moreover, Economist Nicoli Nattrass reports that between 1990 and 2001, non-agricultural formal employment declined by over 20%, whilst South African agricultural employment is lower today than it was 20 years ago[46], providing some theoretical substantiation for the possibility that the fear of

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[45] Harris, B (2001) '"As for Violent Crime that's our Daily Bread": Vigilante violence during South Africa's period of transition" in *Violence and Transition* Series, Vol. 1, May 2001
[46] Nattrass, N. (2003) 'The State of the Economy: A Crisis of Employment" in Daniel, J; Habib, A and R. Southall (eds) (2003) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003 – 2004*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

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unemployment may be increasing. Additionally, a recent report by *Global Insight* contended that the poverty rate in South Africa rose from 41% in 1996 to 49% in 2001[47]

Table 6: Perceptions of Future Economic Security [48]

	Percentage of Respondents (%) in Agreement[49]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
It will get better	52.4	58.6	33.3	55.7	43.0
Stay about the same	25.8	24.0	28.3	22.8	19.4
It will get worse	21.9	17.5	38.5	21.5	37.7
χ^2 = 272.381, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 937	N = 391	N = 170

This trend of rising unemployment and poverty levels appears to invoke slightly less pessimism amongst South Africans than the apparently more ominous situation of increased fears about threats to physical security. Whereas 28% of respondents feared further deterioration in levels of personal safety, only 22% of South Africans are expecting more severe economic hardships in the future and at least 52% are optimistic about their economic future. The recent drops in interest rates and the stronger Rand could go some distance to explaining this optimism.

Disaggregation by racial backgrounds reveals that Whites are far less hopeful about an improved economic future, as only a third of Whites compared to almost 60% of Blacks expressed a positive future outlook, with Indians and Coloureds in between. According to *Statistics SA*, however, the average annual household income for urban Blacks was R28 816, whilst white households earned an average of R134 489. The differences are far greater in rural areas where the average for a black South African household was R15 269 and in the case of white households was R168 919[50]. Additionally, the February 2001 *Labour Force Survey* indicated that 39.3% of black South Africans, 27.6% of Coloureds,

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[47] http://www.sabcnews.com/south_africa/social/0,2172,64797,00.html

[48] Two items: *How do you think the economic situation in South Africa will change during the next 12 months?* and *How do you think the economic situation of people like you will change in the next 2 years?* formed a reliable index. (Factor loadings were .659 and .681 respectively, with an alpha coefficient of .82)

[49] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

[50] Statistics SA, *Income and expenditure of households*, 2000, published in November 2002.

18.0% of Indians and only 7.7% of Whites were unemployed[51]. A comparison of actual economic circumstances, which provide some indications of real levels of economic threat, and reported fears of future economic hardships as indicator of perceived levels of economic threat, presents an interesting juxtaposition. On average it appears far less likely that the economic security of Whites will be threatened, yet they appear least optimistic about their future economic standing, whilst black South Africans, on average, still face far greater levels of poverty and are likely to continue doing so, yet report far greater optimism. Widespread fear and resentment of Affirmative Action policies amongst Whites could, at least partially, account for this situation.

Interesting racial differences aside, although lower than worries about future threats to physical security, these relatively high levels of perceived threats to economic security are problematic for reconciliation. One potential consequences of this threat for the country as a whole is the fact that wealthy South Africans who fear for their future economic well being have the resources to emigrate, taking with them the skills and resources needed for economic growth and development in the country.

Less obvious, though no less important, are the levels of resentment, perceptions of unfairness and general lack of confidence in the country as a whole that these fears can elicit. If people are feeling threatened – if they perceive that others 'are doing something to us', reconciliation is problematised. Black South Africans could perceive threats to their future economic security as stemming from the situation whereby political freedoms and opportunities are now afforded to all South Africans, but economic opportunities and benefits are still reserved for Whites. Whites, on the other hand, could lay the blame for their worries about future economic survival on policies such as Affirmative Action, which they may perceive as a form of 'reverse apartheid'. Coloureds and Indians are likely to believe the by now often uttered mantra that during apartheid they were 'too Black' and in the new South Africa they are 'too White', and are therefore always going to be economically disadvantaged. These situations have the capacity to breed bitterness,

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[51] Statistics SA, *Labour Force Survey February 2001,* Statistical Release PO210, 25 September 2001, Pp. 9.

resentment and anger, all of which impede increased understanding and trust, thereby retarding the reconciliation process.

Cultural Threat

The Institute's ongoing research into the sphere of the link between identity, culture and violence[52] suggests that fears of cultural alienation have become increasingly worrying for certain South Africans, most prominently for members of minority groups. Whilst the multi-cultural paradigm of reconciliation advocates the respect and even celebration of diversity, and the protection of minority groups rights is emphasized in the Constitution[53], a certain degree of fear of government or societal action to curb the freedom of specific communities to freely practice their language or religion has surfaced.

Although the policy has now been accepted by most quarters, the original outcry that the recently released and greatly debated religion policy for schools elicited[54], bears testimony to this. Although Minister Asmal has attempted to assure the nation that the policy does not erode religious freedom and advocates "age-appropriate religious education", which will not turn learners against their own religion[55], concerns have not abated, with the Christian View Network calling on parents who objected to it to take the matter up in court. They have categorically disputed the "wide acceptance" Minister Asmal has spoken of, alleging that it "has been a reluctant acceptance, rather than full support"[56].

At the same time, the vociferous debate about certain Afrikaans centers of higher education converting to duel-medium teaching continues. Both the NNP and DA have expressed their opposition to the proposed plan and in 2002 the DA asserted that the "imposition of dual-medium tuition at all historically Afrikaans-medium universities was

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[52] For more information contact: Fanie@grove.uct.ac.za.
[53] Section 6 recognizes eleven official languages.
[54] *Cape Times*, 1 April 2003.
[55] *Saturday Star*, 6 September 2003.
[56] *Radio Voice of the Cape Report*, 10 September 2003.

the first step to oblivion".[57] Both these instances suggest that minority groups are becoming increasingly fearful of their freedoms being stifled.

Table 7: Perceptions of Future Cultural Security [58]

	Percentage of Respondents (%) in Agreement[59]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
It will get better	67.1	74.3	36.9	66.2	62.3
Stay about the same	22.3	17.5	38.1	24.8	25.3
It will get worse	10.5	8.3	25.0	8.7	12.3
$\chi^2 = 468.065$, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 937	N = 391	N = 170

Data flowing from questions inserted to test this hypothesis reveal that, as a whole, South Africans are least pessimistic about their cultural survival and most pessimistic about any improvement in their future physical safety. On average only 1 in 10 South Africans fears that the survival of their particular cultural group, whether denoted by a specific language or religion, may be threatened to a greater extent in the near future. It would appear that this threat is vastly more important amongst white South Africans than any other racial group, with one quarter of all Whites proclaiming that they think the freedom to practice the customs and ways of their culture may be increasingly threatened in the future.

Some, most notably the Group of 63 Afrikaaner think-tank, have argued that the recently exposed alleged actions of the *Boeremag* should be seen as merely a "symptom of serious alienation among Afrikaners resulting from the present political dispensation". There is little consensus on this, and some of the accused in the court cases who have since turned state witnesses, have asserted that the *Boeremag* is strongly influenced by prophecies of Siener Van Rensburg[60], and other more radical ideas that would probably not find

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[57] *SAPA*. 4 September 2002.

[58] Three items: *South Africa has many different language and religious groups. In the next 12 months do you think government support for these groups to practice their language or religion will…?* and *South Africa has many different language and religious groups. In the next 12 months do you think the situation of these groups being able to practice their religion or language without interference will…?* and *South Africa has many different language and religious groups. Over the next two years do you think other people's respect for your religious or language groups will…?* formed a reliable index. (Factor loadings were .840; .879 and .817 respectively, with an alpha coefficient of .85)

[59] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

[60] *The Star*, 19 May 2003.

resonance in the hearts of minds of most disillusioned and alienated Whites. But the Group of 63's Letter to the President does point to the not ion, that is consequently substantiated by this data, namely that about a quarter of Whites are feeling increasingly culturally alienated and threatened in the New South Africa. Further Disaggregation of the data reveal that 29% of Afrikaans speaking Whites, as opposed to 18% of English speaking Whites expressed some pessimism of the future survival of their culture.

Although certainly higher than for any other group in South Africa, this 29% of pessimists represents less than a third of all Afrikaans speaking Whites in South Africa today, indicating the level of disillusion with the current disposition may not be as high as media sources may portray it to be. Moreover, this data only reports the portion of the Afrikaaner population fearful of further attacks on their culture, which sheds no light on the extent to which these individuals would resort to extra-legal means to protect their assumed rights to cultural autonomy. In their recently released study entitled *Volk, Faith and Fatherland,* Schoenteich and Boshoff assert that the vast majority of those experiencing cultural and political impotence and alienation in the new dispensation have joined the Democratic Alliance "to find protection in an ideology based on individual rights" or have joined parties such as the Freedom Front. Some have moved to Orania, others are isolating themselves in racially homogenous and highly insulated suburbs, whilst others still are emigrating *en masse*[61].

Based on their analysis, it would appear that the majority of South Africans who fear increased threat to cultural autonomy and survival, would not resort to extra-legal means to protect their culture and hence it would seem that the vast majority pose no security threat. In general this threat is seen as problematic by a far smaller portion of the population.

If, however, the alleged actions of the *Boeremag* are indeed actions of a group of people fighting for cultural survival, it is clear that these threats have the capacity to result in

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[61] Schoenteich, M and H. Boshoff (2003) "Volk, Faith and Fatherland". Institute for Security Studies Monograph No 81. March 2003. Pp 79.

isolated instances of high-profile social destabilization. At the same time the potential for the 25% of Whites, fearful of future threats to their culture, to increase to more destabilizing levels should not be underestimated. But, cultural isolation is a problem for far fewer portions of the South Africans public, and fears for economic and physical survival are far more likely to have a long-term, destructive impact on the reconciliation process.

Legitimacy of New Dispensation

Potentially influenced by feelings of cultural alienation and political impotence, but extending far broader, is the question of the legitimacy of the new dispensation. A legitimacy crisis within the new political system can prove destructive. Such a crisis could emerge if the citizenry were unwilling to extend their confidence and unconditional support to the new dispensation, extrapolated for the purposes of this research to its agents (national leaders and public officials), its institutions (Parliament) and a general human rights culture (respect for the rule of law).

Central to the new dispensation earning a sense of legitimacy is the forging of what has sometimes been termed 'public trust'. This refers to the perception amongst the general public that the sate and its agents are committed to the well-being and interests of its people. The Institute's manual emphasizes the fact that during apartheid a great deal of trust and confidence in the state, its institutions, its agents and the values and norms it espoused was destroyed. The first democratic election in 1994 marked the imposition of a new and just political system, complete with new constitution, laws, institutions, leaders and civil servants, but 'the *subjective process* of restoring trust in government, the police and other agencies had only begun"[62].

At the same time, the illegitimacy of the oppressive and discriminatory legislative framework, as well as the wide-ranging human rights abuses perpetrated by the state and

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[62] Du Toit, F (ed) (2003) Learning to Live Together: Practices of Social Reconciliation. Rondebosch: The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Pp 120

even sometimes by the liberation forces under apartheid, have in various ways contributed towards a culture in which violence, the violation of human rights and a general disrespect for the law is not simply tolerated, but often even considered necessary. As emphasized in the Human Rights paradigm of reconciliation, post-apartheid South Africa is challenged with the task of creating a new legislative and normative environment in which a culture that reveres the protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law and the legitimacy of its institutions prevails.

Justified Forms of Actions.

It can be hypothesized that one of the ways in which the perceived legitimacy of the present South African state can be measured is by determining whether the general public deem it justified and acceptable to resort to extra-legal means to protect their human rights. The theory asserts that if the state is perceived as being legitimate, citizens are unlikely to resort to violence or other illegal actions, even if the they believe the state is not meeting the expectations and needs of its citizens. The survey therefore included a number of questions designed to determine the perceived justifiability of various methods by which people can engage the state.

The data report that almost half of all South Africans (47%) believe that joining a demonstration as reaction to government violation to human rights is justified. Disaggregation of the data by race reveals some asymmetry, with more than half of Coloureds (65%), Indians (59%) and Blacks (51%) agreeing that it is justified, compared to only 32% of Whites. Considering the racially discriminatory actions and policies of the government under apartheid, it is no surprise that protest action in the form of a demonstration against the state is more readily acceptable to Coloureds, Indians and Blacks than to Whites, 32% of whom answered that they were uncertain as to whether it was justified or not.

Table 8: Perceptions of Strikes as Justified Actions

	Percentage in Agreement (%)[63]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Justified	41.9	45.7	22.8	61.4	54.1
Uncertain	23.1	22.9	23.0	16.6	24.1
Not justified	27.2	24.8	46.0	19.2	18.8
Don't know	7.8	6.8	8.1	2.8	2.9
Refused			.2		
χ^2 = 278.090, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *Here are some different actions people could take if government was disregarding or violating or going against their human rights. I would like you to tell me if it would be justified if some people joined strikes.*

A similar disjuncture is visible on the question whether people are justified in joining strikes when their rights have been violated in any way. Approximately 60% of coloured South Africans felt it was justified, compared to 46% of Blacks, 54% of Indians and only 23% of Whites.

Table 9: Perceptions of Using Violence or Force as Justified Actions

	Percentage in Agreement (%)[64]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Justified	13.3	16.5	4.4	11.5	2.4
Uncertain	18.5	20.4	14.3	12.3	7.6
Not justified	61.8	57.7	74.8	73.1	87.6
Don't know	6.5	5.6	6.3	3.1	2.4
Refused			.2		
χ^2 = 181.969, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *Here are some different actions people could take if government was disregarding or violating or going against their human rights. If these actions did not work, would it be justified if they used force or violent methods, such as damaging public property or taking hostages.*

Whereas the previous data reveal that between 40 and 50% of South Africans believe demonstrations and strikes are acceptable channels by which to challenge a governmental infringement on human rights, only 13% feel using violence or force is justified. The empirical fact that 13% of the South African public feel it justified to resort to violence to protest against government inaction, deliberate or otherwise, in protecting their human

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[63] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding
[64] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

rights, and a further 19% are uncertain whether it is justified or not, may prove problematic for reconciliation.

The Human Rights paradigm of reconciliation contends that in post-apartheid South Africa, as in all transitional societies, social interaction needs to be moderated by a legislative and normative framework. Such an environment would be strongly influenced by respect for the rule of law, a general cultural of reverence of human rights and an accountable and responsive leadership. If people find violence justified, it may be indicative of a situation whereby the government is not seen as being capable or willing to protect and guarantee people's rights and freedoms, and may therefore lead to a legitimacy crisis. It would appear that the advocates of the *Boeremag* case have taken to instituting this argument in defense of their clients[65]. It may also, however, point to a general disrespect for the rule of law, within a milieu in which the foundations of a human rights culture have not been securely established.

Leader Legitimacy

Another possible indicator of the perceived legitimacy of the state is the extent to which its leadership draws the trust and confidence of the general public. This is crucial because reconciliation very rarely happens without the overt efforts of change agents. Some refer to them as 'the champions of reconciliation', whilst Peter Storey calls them "prime movers"[66]. Each level of reconciliation, whether in a community, organisational or national context, requires the direction and encouragement of some form of leadership, be it political, social, religious or economic. In terms of the broad national political reconciliation process, Political Analyst Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert recently asserted that there is no "magic formula" for becoming a reconciled nation, but that there are indeed certain clear milestones on the way there that are within reach, a crucial one being

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[65] *Reuters*, 23 June 2003
[66] Storey, P. (1994) "Reconciliation and Civil Society". Paper p resented at the *Making Ends Meet: Reconciliation and Reconstruction in South Africa Conference*. World Trade Centre: Johannesburg. 18 August 1994.

'political leaders who are accessible and speak clearly and unambiguously about p olicies and projects"[67].

Without undermining the importance of other types of leaders, the salience of a visionary political leadership, generally trusted and respected by its electorate, should not be underestimated. Besides possessing the legislative and executive power to create a legal and normative environment in which reconciliation can take root, political leaders have the rare opportunity to access and mobilize the social momentum that the reconciliation process requires. Some may even argue that it is their moral obligation to fill this role.

But, corrupt or biased national leaders will not hold the confidence of the people. Leaders who appear unable to engage each other in respectful dialogue, resorting instead to attacking the personal integrity of other leaders do not set a good example. Potentially even more importantly: leaders who appear to forget the people who elected them to power and whose interest they are meant to represent, also do not inspire citizens with a vision to become a reconciled nation. A lack of confidence in- and a sense of alienation from- political leaders will have serious ramifications for popular support for the very leaders instituting the kind of reforms needed to take a society through the transition to a post-conflict society in which democracy will eventually be consolidated.

The survey instrument included two items designed to measure the perceived trustworthiness and attentiveness of political leaders. The data reveals that six out of ten South Africans (57%) felt the leaders were not particularly concerned about their electorate's life circumstances, and although the percentage of people with this viewpoint amongst Indians was higher (75%) than amongst Whites (63%), Coloureds (61%) and particularly Blacks (56%), the majority of each race group shared this view.

Although evaluations of trustworthiness were slightly more positive than evaluations of attentiveness, with a majority of all South Africans (55%) asserting that they could trust

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[67] *Financial Mail*, 8 September 2000.

the country's leaders to do what is right most of the time, a quarter of respondents were unsure whether they could or could not trust the national leadership and 18% declared the country's leaders untrustworthy. It is highly unlikely that the general public in any country in the world unconditionally trust all its leaders. Some even argue that a certain degree of distrust of national leaders is necessary, as a viable democracy requires citizens that keep a watchful eye over leaders. It is not yet clear whether this level of trust is advantageous or disadvantageous for the reconciliation process and any interpretation would probably be premature. The trends in levels of trust that the time-series data will make available should provide greater insight.

Unlike the previous question regarding leadership interest and accountability in and to ordinary citizens, the question of trust revealed remarkable racial differences. Whilst slightly more than 60% of black South Africans thought that they could trust the national leadership most of the time, only slightly more than 20% of Whites and Indians agreed.

Table 10: Trust in National Leaders

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[68]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	54.5	61.9	21.5	47.8	24.7
Uncertain	24.7	24.0	29.1	23.3	19.4
Disagree	18.2	12.2	45.1	27.1	53.5
Don't know	2.5	2.0	3.8	1.8	2.4
Refused	.1				
χ^2 = 612.445, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *Most of the time I can trust the country's national leaders to do what is right.*

Although South Africans as a whole are more confident that leaders are trustworthy than that they are interested in attending to the needs and interests of the ordinary citizens, the data suggests that a substantial portion of the South African public feels a sense of alienation from leaders. Additional data indicates that this sense of alienation may even extend beyond national leaders to public officials.

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[68] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

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Table 11: Perceived capacity to Influence Public Officials

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[69]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	53.2	51.1	56.5	66.5	67.1
Uncertain	25.0	25.8	22.7	11.8	17.1
Disagree	17.3	18.7	15.3	20.5	14.1
Don't know	4.4	4.5	5.0	1.3	1.8
Refused	.1		.5		
χ^2 = 83.604, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *If public officials are not interested in hearing what people like me think, there is really no way to make them listen*

About half of all respondents reported a sense of helplessness or powerlessness to enforce some kind of accountability from public officials. The table below reveals that 53% of South Africans felt that there was no way to make leaders listen, and despite sizeable differences between slightly more optimistic black and white South Africans on the one hand, and more pessimistic Coloureds and Indians on the other, this sense of incapacity to make leaders stand accountable appears a problem for a large portion of South Africans.. Interestingly, fully a quarter of the population was uncertain whether people like themselves have the capacity to force leaders to listen.

Institutional Legitimacy

In his recently released Monograph, Jim Gibson stresses that for reconciliation to progress it is not sufficient for citizens to view the leadership as legitimate, but requires that the institutions of the state are viewed as such. He argues that it is paramount for people to support and accept the legitimacy of the elected organisations of the post-apartheid state, because a lack of such legitimacy would be indicative of a larger unwillingness to accept the new political system, and it would consequently "be difficult to consider them reconciled with the newly implemented democratic system"[70].

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[69] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding
[70] Gibson, LJ (2003) 'Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?" Institute for Justice and Reconciliation Monograph No.2 . August 2003. Pp. 7.

One way of measuring the extent of support for organizations responsible for supporting and protecting human rights is to examine people's perceptions of Parliament. Parliament has theoretically been assigned the responsibility of creating laws that protect and guarantee citizen's human rights in its capacity as institution of majority rule[71]. The survey included items to test the extent to which the general public trusts Parliament, the extent to which Parliament is viewed as treating everyone in a fair and equitable manner and the extent of unconditional support extended to Parliament, regardless of its decisions[72].

Table 12: Perceived Fairness of Parliament

	Percentage of Respondents (%)				
	SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	48.7	57.2	19.6	41.4	26.5
Uncertain	25.1	23.8	27.7	23.3	31.2
Disagree	20.7	13.6	47.1	33.2	38.2
Don't know	5.4	5.5	5.0	2.0	4.1
Refused	.1		.5		
χ^2 = 542.059, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *The South African Parliament treats all people who come before it – Black, White, Coloured and Indian – the same.*

The table above reveals that less than half of all respondents believe the national Parliament treats all people who appear before it equally and fairly, with less than 20% of Whites agreeing. Whilst the overtly negative evaluations of the impartiality of Parliament by Whites may have been clouded by obvious feelings of vulnerability as a result of the loss of political power, the empirical fact that more than 40% of black South Africans are not sure or disagree that Parliament treats all of the citizens it is meant to represent equally, does not bode well for the legitimacy of this important institution.

On a more positive note 62% of South Africans assert that Parliament can generally be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country, and only 13% blatantly disagree,

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[71] Gibson, JL (2002) 'Empirical Indicators of Reconciliation". Un published document.
[72] These items were developed by Dr James L. Gibson.

with 25% uncertain. As in the previous case, Whites, and to a lesser extent, Indians, appear to trust Parliament much less than black and coloured South Africans.

Perhaps the most worrying finding about the views of South African citizens regarding the national Parliament is that a massive 45% believe that if Parliament makes unpopular decisions it can be done away with. Obviously this finding needs to be interpreted within a very particular context, and that is that in the past this country's national Parliament made the very decisions that formed the legislative framework of a system that has since been declared a crime against humanity.

Table 13: Unconditional Confidence in Parliament

	Percentage of Respondents (%)				
	SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	45.2	51.0	26.9	33.2	27.1
Uncertain	28.4	27.6	32.4	25.3	31.8
Disagree	18.6	15.8	30.3	34.8	30.0
Don't know	6.8	5.6	9.9	6.6	11.2
Refused	.1		.5		
$\chi^2 = 243.900$, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *If the South African Parliament started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with Parliament altogether.*

Parliament's past record will almost certainly have had an impact on the fact that just less than half the country does not appear to intrinsically and unconditionally support Parliament, even though the country has now enjoyed almost a decade of democratic rule. Despite this context which needs to be born in mind, the national reconciliation process is unlikely to benefit from this situation where the institution charged with representing majority rule is seen as being dispensable, should it make decisions the majority does not agree with.

Respect for the Rule of Law

Closely linked to the legitimacy of national leaders and important national institutions, and equally as important, is the question of South Africans' respect for the rule of law.

Taking the cue from South Africa's greatly respected Constitution, there is clearly a need for South Africans to create a culture in which the human rights of all individuals are protected and guaranteed. Apartheid did a great deal of damage, not simply in violating people's human rights, but also in creating an environment in which human rights could be violated with impunity. Rectifying this task requires far more than "a stable political, constitutional and legal framework"[73], it needs the unequivocal commitment and support of all South Africans that human rights will be respected, regardless of the cost or implications of doing so. James Gibson argues that the "first principal" of such an unconditional commitment to a human rights culture is respect for the rule of law, contending that a human rights culture cannot be created, nor maintained, if there is no "commitment to the universal application of law, and especially the unwillingness to set law aside to accomplish other objectives"[74].

Thirty five percent of respondents agreed that it is sometimes better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately, rather than waiting for a legal solution. Although this percentage may seem high, it should be interpreted within the context of a high presence of vigilante action in South Africa – a report released last year cited that every three days sees the killing of another suspected criminal by vigilantes, "seeking either to avenge a violent crime against a member of their community or a bid to halt the seemingly inexorable rise in crime"[75].

At the same time 27% of respondents assert that they do not feel any obligation to abide by the laws of a government they did not vote for. It is difficult to know how to interpret this statistic. Again the history of this country, in terms of a minority government making discriminatory and oppressive laws to the detriment of the majority, cannot be ignored. Context aside, the reconciliation process will certainly not benefit from the empirical fact that three in every ten South Africans do not reveal unconditional respect for the rule of

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[73] Gerwel, J (2000) "Anticipating a different kind of Future" in Villa -Vicencio, C. (eds) (2000) *Transcending a Century of Injustice*. Cape Town: The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Pp. 124.
[74] Gibson, JL (2002) 'Empirical Indicators of Reconciliation". Unpublished document.
[75] *Financial Mail* 1 February 2002.

law, and in fact, see acquiescence with national laws as largely dependent on whether the laws have been made by those representing their political interests or not.

Table 14: Respect for the Rule of Law

Question asked:	Percentage of Respondents (%) in Agreement
Sometimes it may be better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately rather than wait for a legal solution	35.0
It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that I did not vote for.	27.6
It is all right to get around the law as long as you don't actually break it.	54.1
	N = 3498

Additionally, whilst substantial portions of citizens are unwilling to blatantly break the law, more than half of all South Africans feel there is no problem in 'getting around the law' as long as it is not broken. In all three questions, Whites respect for the rule of law is generally higher than that of the other racial groups, but this difference is almost certainly influenced by the very different experiences of apartheid laws by white South Africans in comparison to the experiences of people of other races.

Respect for the rule of law, the extension of legitimacy to Parliament and confidence in the national leadership are all measures aimed at gauging the degree to which the institutional, legislative and ethical foundations of society have gained the respect and confidence of the people. Luc Huyse reminds us that the reconciliation process must, by necessity, 'be supported by a gradual sharing of power, an honouring of each other's political commitments, the creation of a climate conducive to human rights and economic justice, and a willingness among the population at large to accept responsibility for the past and for the future – in other words, reconciliation must be backed by the recognition of the essential codes of democracy"[76]. The data suggests that the values, institutions and agents that constitute the new democratic political system have not yet been fully and

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[76] Huyse, L. (2003) 'The Process of Reconciliation' in Bloomfiled, D, Barnes, T and L. Huyse (eds) (2003) *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook.* International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Sweden. Pp. 21.

unconditionally legitimated by the entire population. As stated previously, the cross-sectional nature of this first round of the survey only provides limited insight into the degree of legitimacy this system commands. Longitudinal pubic opinion data will provide greater insights on whether levels of legitimacy are such that they prove beneficial for the national process of reconciliation.

Cross-cutting Political Relationships

Besides the need to forge a human rights culture in which leaders and institutions are viewed as legitimate, political theorists have asserted that the capacity to form political groupings that stretch across racial, religious, class and linguistic boundaries are another critical building block for the reconciliation process[77]. Variously referred to as political tolerance or political integration, this involves citizens seeking larger political groupings that transcend existing societal boundaries, as a basis for cooperation and collaboration in order to attain the minimal preconditions for political reconciliation. Only with this kind of willingness and commitment to form new political relationships, can solutions to stubborn problems be found.

Of course no study of reconciliation would be complete without an extensive research sojourn into the field of political tolerance. James Gibson and Amanda Gouws, in their latest book *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa,* contend that political tolerance, whilst being a paramount component of a democratic political culture in many countries, may be the most decisive component of South Africa's political culture as it seeks to consolidate its democracy and reconcile its nation. They go on to describe tolerance as 'the willingness to allow all groups, irrespective of their political viewpoints, to compete for political power through legal and peaceful means, and relying upon a research tradition well established within relatively democratic polities"[78].

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[77] Villa-Vicencio, C. (2003) "The Politics of Reconciliation." Unpublished paper; Chapman, A.R. (2002) "Approaches to Studying Reconciliation" . Paper presented at the Conference on Empirical Approaches to Studying Truth Commissions. Stellenbosch, South Africa. November 2002. Pg. 15.

[78] Gibson, J.L and A. Gouws (2003) *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

This research paper fully acknowledges the salience of political tolerance in any post-conflict society, and in particular, present-day South Africa. The wealth of public opinion research that has been conducted about political intolerance in the South Africans context, most notably by Gibson and Gouws[79], compared to the relative vacuum of public opinion research on other components of reconciliation, led to the decision not to duplicate existing ongoing tolerance research, but to utilize the limited resources available to examine other facets of the reconciliation process. One such facet is the capacity of members of the population to conceive of belonging to political communities that are shared or even dominated by South Africans of other racial backgrounds.

It can be hypothesized that, at minimum, there should be a certain degree of commitment to the creation of one nation out of all the population's subgroups as the broadest and most sweeping political relationship South Africans can be a part of. Seven in every ten South Africans believe it is desirable to create one united South African nation. Broken down into racial sub-groups, the data reports that eight in every ten Coloured and Indian South Africans are in support, and only six out of every ten Whites and seven out of every ten Blacks agree. Interestingly almost 13% of Whites disagree with the statement. There are probably numerous possible reasons for this unwillingness. The social distance, lack of understanding and stereotypes that prevail could be a factor in this reluctance, but further investigation is necessary.

On a more demanding level, Chapman speaks about the need to create "new forms of social institutions and political parties with a multi-community basis"[80]. More integrated political parties that bridge societal cleavages may prove useful in the South African context, but are unlikely to happen in the near future, as the data reveal that fully 40% of

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[79] For an excellent analysis see Gibson, J.L and A. Gouws (2003) *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Also see Gibson, J.L and A. Gouws (2000) "Social Identities and Poilitical Intolerance: Linkages within the South African Mass Public" in *American Journal of Political Science.* Vol. 44. No. 2. Pp 278 –292; Gouws, A (1996) "political Tolerance and Civil Society: The Case Study of South Africa" in *Politikon.* Vol. 20. Iss. 1. Pp. 15 – 31.

[80] Chapman, A.R. (2002) "Approaches to Studying Reconciliation". Paper presented at the Conference on Empirical Approaches to Studying Truth Commissions. Stellenbosch, South Africa. November 2002. Pg. 5.

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South Africans could not conceive of ever belonging to a political party in which their own race group does not dominate.

Table 15: Perceived Desirability to create one United South Africa

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[81]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	72.9	76.3	57.3	82.9	80.0
Uncertain	18.1	16.9	24.6	12.0	11.8
Disagree	5.9	4.4	12.5	3.1	5.3
Don't know	3.1	2.4	5.1	2.0	2.9
Refused	.1		.5		
$\chi^2 = 178.861$, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *It is desirable to create one united South Africa out of all the different groups who live in this country.*

The question whether South African elections represent a racial census, whereby South Africans largely vote along racial lines has stirred considerable debate[82]. Although a growing body of literature is asserting that, particularly in the 1999 elections, the outcome was certainly not simply the result of a racial or ethnic census[83], the SA Reconciliation Barometer data does imply that race could continue to have an important and potentially destructive impact on reconciliation. The consequence of the inability of a large portion of the South African population to even conceive of belonging to a political party in which their own race does not dominate requires further investigation and analysis.

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[81] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

[82] For some examples see Du Toit, P (1999) "The South Africans voter and the racial census" in *Politeia.* Vol. 18, No. 2.; Lodge, T. (1994) "The South African General Election, April 1994: results, analysis and implications" in *African Affairs.* Vol. 94.; Southall, R (1994) "The South Afri can elections of 1994: the remaking of a dominant-party state" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies.* Vol. 32. Iss. 4.; Mattes, R.; Giliomee, H and W. James. (1996) "The elections in the Western Cape" in Johnston, R.W. and L. Schlemmer (eds) (1996) *Launching Democracy in South Africa. The first Open Election, April 1994.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

[83] Mattes, R., Taylor, H. and C. Africa (1999) "Judgemet and Choice in the 1999 South Africans election" in *Politikon.* Vol. 26. No. 2.*;* Friedman, S (1999) "Who we are: voter participation, rationalisty and the 1999 elections" in *Politikon.* Vol. 26. No. 2.; Taylor, R and T. Hoeane. (1999) "Interpreting the South African election of June 1999" in *Politikon.* Vol. 26. No. 2

Table 16: Perceived Desirability to join Multi-racial Political Parties

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[84]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	40.2	44.3	33.4	17.1	21.8
Uncertain	25.8	25.1	27.1	21.5	14.1
Disagree	27.8	25.3	33.9	56.8	58.2
Don't know	6.1	5.4	5.4	4.6	5.9
Refused			.2		
$\chi^2 = 238.016$, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *I could never imagine being part of a political party made up mainly of (GROUP) people.*

Dialogue

Social Commentator Erik Doxtader argues that reconciliation requires more than a superficial willingness to belong to a diverse political constituency, it requires dialogue, or what Adam Kahane refers to as "deep conversations" [85]. Doxtader argues that it extends beyond discussion, beyond individuals and groups gathering and "expressing their views, and then leaving their respective claims to hang in the air like so much smoke"[86]. Quantifying the extent to which this kind of meaningful dialogue is occurring is virtually impossible. Instead the survey instrument included two items that allowed for an evaluation of the willingness of people to speak with people of other racial, cultural, religious or language backgrounds about reconciliation or any of the range of complex and often conflicting issues involved in the larger reconciliation process. At the same time the items make reference to two important institutions or stakeholders that have the capacity to facilitate this kind of dialogue, and consequently the questions may also provide some measure of the extent to which South Africans would like these institutions to play a more active role in encouraging this kind of debate.

Although the function and role of the media in present day South Africa has been hotly debated, besides fulfilling its responsibility of providing mass audiences with knowledge and information, the media can feasibly also play a role in bringing South Africans into

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[84] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

[85] Kahane, A (2002*) Shaping the Future: How Small Groups of People Can Change the World for the Better*. Unpublished Manuscript.

[86] Doxtader, E. (2001) "Debate about Debate will Build Democracy" in *Cape Times*. 13 May 2001.

dialogue, whether it be through current affairs programmes, live public debates or the broadcasting of pubic events. As a result, a question concerning greater efforts by the media to facilitate open debate about issues pertinent to the reconciliation process was included in the survey. The table reports that the overwhelming majority (78%) of South Africans believe the government should require both the print and broadcast media to provide citizens with more opportunities for engaging in meaningful dialogue. Although there are no guarantees that once created, people will come forward and make use of these opportunities, it still reveals a principled support for having more opportunities for public debate.

Table 17: Preferences for Increased Media-driven Public Debate

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[87]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	78.4	83.6	47.8	88.7	82.4
Uncertain	12.9	11.1	24.8	6.9	11.8
Disagree	5.4	2.9	20.9	3.3	2.9
Don't know	3.2	2.5	5.9	1.0	2.9
Refused	.1		.5		
χ^2 = 552.425,p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *The government should require Radio and TV stations to have more shows where South Africans can talk to each other about things like transformation and nation-building.*

Disaggregation of the data by race reveals that just under half of all Whites are in support, compared to almost 90% of Coloureds and just over 80% of Blacks and Indians. This reluctance of Whites to engage in more dialogue and get to know other South Africans better is also visible in the data on inter-faith services, which reveals that 41% of Whites are in support, compared to double the portion of Coloureds (84%) and Indians (83%), with Blacks in between at 70%. Disaggregating the data by race reveals that whilst approximately 40% of Whites are in support, almost double that portion of Coloureds, Indians and Blacks feel the same.

Commenting on a recent jointly attended service in the Boland Town of Paarl, where a white NG Kerk Congregation returned a Church to the St Stephen's Congregation who

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[87] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

had to leave the Church in 1981 when it was zoned a 'White Area', Political Analyst Max Du Preez remarks that government cannot make laws that make the problems of "moral decay, loss of human dignity, crime and racial and ethnic divisions" go away. He asserts that these issues should be addressed by trade unions, charity organizations, cultural societies and other clubs, "but by their nature, faith communities are best placed to address these ills in our society. They should be more proactive; and they should be cooperating much more"[88]. Speaking at a Reconciliation Conference in 1994 former Bishop of the Methodist Church Peter Storey reminded the nation "the religious component of civil society bears a great burden of responsibility for South Africa's past and needs to shoulder a significant part of the task of reconciliation for the future"[89].

Table 18: Preferences for a Religious Organisation led Inter-group Interaction

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[90]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	67.3	70.3	40.9	84.1	82.4
Uncertain	21.0	20.0	32.1	9.0	12.9
Disagree	7.7	5.9	20.2	5.6	2.9
Don't know	4.0	3.9	6.3	1.3	1.8
Refused	.1		.5		
$\chi^2 = 394.644$, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *Different churches or religious organizations should start holding some services together so that different South Africans can get to know one another better.*

On the whole South Africans reveal relatively high levels of support for both religious and media organisations to play a more proactive role in providing South Africans with the space and opportunity to get to know one another, thereby contributing towards bridging the divides between South Africans of different backgrounds. Whilst certain sectors of the greater population are less enthusiastic about the idea, the data appear to point to a clear opportunity for various stakeholders to become involved, and in doing so, advance reconciliation.

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[88] *The Star*, 1 May 2003.
[89] Storey, P. (1994) 'Reconciliation and Civil Society". Paper presented at the *Making Ends Meet: Reconciliation and Reconstruction in South Africa Conference*. World Trade Centre: Johannesburg. 18 August 1994.
[90] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Historical Confrontation

No discussion of the reconciliation process in South Africa or any other transitional society would be complete without an investigation of the degree to which the nation is able to confront its past. There is a famous political saying that proclaims "those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it". Whilst this certainly rings true, a nation in denial of its history also faces the danger of never being able to bridge the divide from the past to a new future.

A critical milestone along the path of confronting the past is acknowledgement. Charles Villa-Vicencio speaks about the need of victims to know why acts were perpetrated against themselves or their family, arguing that they want to know who was involved, but more than that, 'they want acknowledgment of this by the persons concerned' [91]. Even in a less victim-perpetrator centred model of reconciliation, acknowledgement is still important. In the South African context this refers to acknowledgement of the width and breadth of human rights violations under apartheid. Actual levels of acknowledgment of the severity of abuses committed under the rubric of apartheid was measured by asking respondents whether they agreed or disagreed that apartheid was a crime against humanity. Considering the fact that apartheid was declared such by the TRC, one could be tempted to assume that all South Africans would agree. Although as a whole the overwhelming majority of South Africans agree (86%), more than a fifth of Whites (21%) feel this is not true, revealing that portions of the South African public still do not acknowledge the criminality of apartheid.

Acknowledgment of past discrimination, oppression and human rights abuses is not the only form of acknowledgment necessary for effectively confronting the past. Particularly in the South African context where many present social ills, be they excessive violence, high levels of inequality or advanced social dislocation, are strongly rooted in the specific

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[91] Villa Vincencio, C (2003) *The Politics of Reconciliation.* Unpublished paper.

historical context of the country pre-1994, the importance of a slightly different form of acknowledging should not be underestimated.

Table 19: Acknowledgement of Injustice of Apartheid [92]

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[93]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Strong acknowledgement	67.8	73.9	34.1	81.1	65.3
Moderate acknowledgement	23.2	19.8	41.1	17.4	26.5
Moderate denial	6.6	4.9	15.6	1.3	4.1
Strong denial	2.5	1.4	9.2	.3	4.1
χ^2 =545.284, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 1986	N = 911	N = 391	N = 170

In response to the statement that South Africa has great income differences today because in the past Blacks were not given the same educational opportunities as Whites, 83% of the population deemed this true, whilst 12% deemed this untrue. A racial breakdown reveals interesting differences: whilst 87% of Blacks, fully 94% of Coloureds and 82% of Indians agree, only 60% of Whites agree. This lower level of agreement amongst Whites suggests that a substantial portion of Whites still need to realize and recognize that many problems today are the result of the past. Overall, however, most South Africans appear to acknowledge, within the context of today's income inequalities, that the past is not yet past and, in fact, continues to shape and mould the present.

Taken as a whole, about two thirds of the population strongly recognize and acknowledge the injustices of the past and the fact that they continue to impact on present day socio-economic realities. This acknowledgement is a very important first step for the citizens of any transitional society. Whilst it can bring some intrinsic value to victims in particular, it is not really an end in itself, but rather 'forms a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for outcomes such as democratization and judicial reform, reconciliation, and the growth

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[92] Three items: Apartheid was a crime against humanity; In the past the state committed horrific atrocities against those struggling against apartheid; and South Africa has great income differences today because in the past Blacks were not given the same education opportunities as Whites formed a reliable index. (Factor loadings were .798; .844 and .821 respectively, with an alpha coefficient of .76)
[93] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

of social trust… The process of acknowledgment, if it assists in overcoming the causes of conflict, has the potential to support real and lasting change[94].

Despite the fact that 6% of respondents in the Exploratory Round of the SA Reconciliation Barometer asserted that reconciliation is about people simply "forgetting about the past and just moving on", such a statement continue to elicit anger from certain quarters. For many it is seen as the exact opposite of recognition and acknowledgement, for them it is about papering over the wounds of the past. Others still argue that it can only happen once acknowledgement has taken place.

It would seem that whilst there certainly is need for acknowledgement, recognition, remembering and healing, there is certainly also a need for South Africans to channel their energies into creating a nation that is peaceful, productive and forward-looking. As Alwinus Mhlatsi, appearing before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission argued: "We have children to bring up". It would appear that, provided people have sufficiently addressed the demons of this country's past, a willingness to move forward and improve the country and their own place within it, can only be beneficial for the reconciliation process.

Table 20: Levels of self-professed willingness to forget about the past

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[95]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	76.1	74.8	76.4	90.5	90.6
Uncertain	11.9	13.8	5.1	1.3	4.1
Disagree	4.4	5.0	3.9	3.1	1.2
Don't know	7.6	6.5	14.6	5.1	4.1
Refused	.1	.1	.1		
$\chi^2 = 172.205$, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *I want to forget about the past and just get on with my life*

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[94] Quinn, J (2003) Acknowledgement: The Road to Forgiveness. Institute on Globalization and the Human Conditions Institute Working Paper Series GHC 03/1. January 2003.
[95] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

An unexpected 76% of South Africans reported wanting to move on, whilst black and white South Africans hardly appear to differ in this regard. This data suggests the presence of a considerable amount of willingness to confront the future instead of remaining confined in the past. The potentially sobering reality of this data is, however, that it simply reports on the will to move on, but it is highly likely that a substantial portion of those willing to move on, may actually feel that they are unable to do so for a variety of reasons, ranging from unhealed memories, historically-rooted structural disadvantages and suffocating levels of poverty to excessive levels of anger and frustration.

Table 21: Levels of self-professed willingness to forgive

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[96]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	54.8	61.0	19.8	77.5	66.5
Uncertain	15.8	17.5	9.2	7.2	10.0
Disagree	6.0	6.2	5.6	4.1	2.9
Not applicable	23.3	15.4	65.3	11.3	19.4
Don't know			.1		1.2
Refused					
χ^2 = 959.025, p < .000.	N = 3498	N= 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *I am trying to forgive those who hurt me during apartheid*

The survey instrument also included a question intended to provide some insight into the state of readiness of South Africans to forgive. Taking into account the fact that apartheid did not affect all South Africans in the same way, the option of 'not applicable' was also included. Overall, 55% of South Africans proclaimed they were attempting to forgive those responsible for their suffering under apartheid, whilst only 6% asserted they were not prepared or not yet ready to try.

Interestingly only 65% of Whites clamed this question was not applicable to them, meaning that 35% believed they had reason to forgive someone for what happened to them under apartheid. Although further research would be necessary, it is likely that this

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[96] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

portion is composed of a mixture of Whites who resisted the apartheid system and Whites who were negatively affected by some of the laws (some Whites, for example, were forced to move residence when their areas were declared Coloured, Indian or Black Areas). On the whole, South Africans reveal a remarkable willingness to positively confront the past and move forward.

Vengeance

A great deal of debate has emerged over the question of the necessity of forgiveness in post-conflict societies. A growing school of thought is examining this question from a completely different vantage point, which focuses on the extent to which transitional mechanism need to incorporate means of lowering levels of need for vengeance. Proponents of this view argue that vengeance or revenge represents the flipside of forgiveness, and occurs as a moral response to loss or wrongs based on the impulse to retaliate[97]. Gabriel O'Malley, commenting on eleven workshops conducted with Khulumani Support group members, speaks about vengeance as the 'pacts' people make as a response to excessive loss[98]. He argues that 'these pacts may take the form of a vow to avenge the death, or a vow that nothing else will ever replace the deceased"[99]. He argues that this seeking of revenge or vengeance will manifest itself if opportunities for venting and confronting the emotions evoked by the loss are not established. Similarly Susan Jacoby asserts "vengeful anger is at its most powerful and pervasive when there are no mechanisms for releasing it through legitimate channels" [100].

Marcia Hartwell has expanded upon this notion of vengeance as the reverse of forgiveness by adding a third dimension, which she refers to as 'passive resentment'. She describes this as "a neutral but volatile middle ground between forgiveness and revenge",

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[97] Marcia Hartwell. Interview: Cape Town, December 2002.
[98] O'Malley, G (1999) 'Respecting Revenge: The Road to Reconciliation" in *Law, Democracy and Development.* Vol. 3.
[99] Quoting Hamber, B. and R. Wilson (1999) 'Symbolic Closure through memory, reparation and revenge in post-conflict societies." Paper presented at the Traumatic Stress in South Africa Conference hosted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in association with the African Society for Traumatic Stress Studies. Johannesburg: Parktonian Hotel. 27 – 29 January 1999.
[100] Jacoby, S (1983) *Wild Justice: The Evolution of Revenge.* New York: Harper & Row. Pp. 181.

at which people feel the need for vengeance, but do not generally act upon this impulse. If any individuals act on this need for vengeance, the majority will generally not approve of these acts, as most people falling into this category are likely to wait and see whether the new system will bring them justice[101].

The dangers of high levels of vengeance are clear. If unchecked, the response of victims may lapse into acts of aggression and violence. Besides the blatantly illegal nature of such acts, there is also an inherent danger that the retaliatory acts will be disproportionate to the wrong committed, or may simply be waged against innocent 'others whom they identify with perpetrators'[102]. Moreover, when people seek to avenge the crimes perpetrated against themselves there is potential for a situation whereby 'the fantasy of revenge simply reverses the role of the perpetrator and victim, continuing to imprison the victim in horror and degradation' [103]. Even the presence of high levels of 'passive resentment', if not constantly checked, have the potential to evolve into high levels of the need for vengeance, and the result of this can be self-perpetuating circles of victor's revenge that continue the conflict indefinitely.

Table 22: Levels of Passive Resentment

	Percentage of respondents (%)[104]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	48.9	55.7	15.5	40.9	51.8
Uncertain	19.9	18.6	24.7	15.3	17.6
Disagree	25.7	21.3	50.8	38.4	27.6
Don't know	5.5	4.5	8.5	5.4	2.9
Refused	.1		.4		
$\chi^2 = 473.317$, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked*: I think it is fair that the people who discriminated against others during apartheid feel what it is like to be discriminated against.*

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[101] Interview: Cape Town, December 2002.
[102] O'Malley, G (1999) 'Respecting Revenge: The Road to Reconciliation' in *Law, Democracy and Development.* Vol. 3.
[103] Minow, M (1998) Between vengeance and forgiveness: facing history after genocide and mass violence. Boston: Beacon Press. Pp. 13.
[104] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

As a result the survey instrument contained two items designed to tap the level of need for vengeance amongst people at all levels of society. From the table it is clear that almost half of the general population is in support of some form of reciprocal discrimination for those responsible for discrimination, indicating the presence of substantial levels of passive resentment. As may have been expected, with Whites generally being beneficiaries and Blacks the victims of discriminatory practices, only 16% of Whites compared to a far larger 56% of black South Africans agree with the statement.

Somewhat surprisingly the second statement, intended to measure more overt needs for vengeance, elicited very similar results. In this instance fully 41% of South Africans agreed that those responsible for apartheid should be punished, regardless whether this decision was supported by a court of law. Such relatively high levels of support for punishment without the mandate of the law, do not bode well for reconciliation.

A great deal of debate about the need for victimised South Africans to give up their right to prosecute in the name of fostering reconciliation has emerged. Although requiring further analysis, this data could be indicative of a situation where some South Africans are not in support of those perceived as being responsible for apartheid going free, even if this is the decision of the criminal justice system. This sentiment raises some difficult questions about people's willingness to forgo any attempt at prosecution and giving perpetrators amnesty, if a substantial portion are clearly unable to relinquish their need for vengeance even if the perpetrators have technically been found not guilty.

Table 23: Levels of Vengeance

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[105]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	40.6	48.6	9.2	27.4	22.4
Uncertain	23.3	21.9	26.3	24.0	22.9
Disagree	29.8	24.6	55.0	42.7	51.2
Don't Know	6.3	5.0	9.0	5.9	3.5

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[105] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Refused	.1		.5		
χ^2= 519.122, p < .000.	N= 3 375	N= 2 000	N= 927	N= 388	N= 170

Question asked: *People who abused others during apartheid must be punished, even if it means going against the decisions of the courts.*

On the whole a sizeable portion of the South African public still reveals relatively high levels of need to satiate their desire for vengeance. This is obviously not beneficial for the reconciliation process and further raises the question whether South Africa has sufficiently provided opportunities for justice to take its course.

Commitment to Socio-Economic Development

The issue of sufficient justice extends also to the question of whether enough has been done to attain optimal socio-economic justice. The President reminds us that "a major component part of the issue of reconciliation and nation-building is defined by and derives from the material conditions in our society, which have divided our country into two nations"[106]. The *SA Reconciliation Barometer* exploratory national survey[107] conducted in 2002 included a number of questions designed to evaluate respondent's support of compensatory or redistributive measures. Respondents were questioned whether they would support or oppose government implementing the following policy decisions: "People in formerly disadvantaged racial categories must be given special consideration in education, hiring and promotion decisions, even when their credentials on paper are not as good as their competitors"; "Introducing a compulsory community service year for graduating teachers, to address the quality differences between previously disadvantaged and other schools" and "Introducing a basic yearly financial payment for all previously disadvantaged people".

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[106] Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, at the Opening of the Debate in the National Assembly on "Reconciliation and Nation-Building". Cape Town, 29 May 1998.

[107] This survey of South Africans, 16 years and older, was conducted between the 18th October and the 25 November 2002. Face to face interviews were conducted with 3 491 South Africans. The survey instrument was first prepared in English and then translated into Afrikaans, Xhosa, Zulu, North Sotho, South Sotho and Setswana. As a result, respondents were interviewed in the language of their choice.

All three questions yielded majority support, although immediate financial payment for all previously disadvantaged persons yielded the lowest level of support, at only 54.8%.

Table 24: Support for Socio-economic Compromise [108]

	Percentage of respondents (%)[109]				
	All SA	White	Black	Coloured	Indian
Supporting compromise	72.5	25.4	82.9	71.0	38.8
Uncertain	19.6	33.5	15.9	22.8	19.6
Opposing compromise	7.9	41.1	1.3	6.2	7.9
χ^2=1122.728, p < .000.	N= 3 375	N= 935	N= 1 998	N= 388	N= 170

The table reports that South Africans reveal a remarkable degree of willingness to make compromises in the present for future benefit, with almost three quarters of the population registering their support. But disagreggation of the data once again reveals distinct differences across race groups, with far larger percentages of Blacks and Coloureds than Whites willing to make the previously mentioned compromises. Whilst past privileges enjoyed by white South Africans are likely to leave them on the losing end of these kinds of sacrifices, the data belies both a lack of any thoroughgoing realisation that present sacrifices may result in future political, social and - most importantly - economic arrangements that are beneficial for all South Africans, as well as a lack of any substantial recognition that future arrangements need to be infused with *a strong consciousness of the past*[110].

Consequent research corroborates this absence of significant acknowledgment of past or continued economic benefits ascribed to Whites as a result of the colour of their skin. The 2002 survey revealed that only 22.4% of Whites agreed with the following statement: "In

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[108] Three items: *People in formerly disadvantaged racial categories must be given special consideration in education, hiring and promotion decisions, even when their credentials on paper are not as good as their competitors*; *Introducing a compulsory community service year for graduating teachers, to address the quality differences between previously disadvantaged and other schools* and *Introducing a basic yearly financial payment for all previously disadvantaged people* formed a reliable index. (Factor loadings were .829, .806 and .833 respectively, with an alpha coefficient of .76)

[109] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

[110] Taylor, H (2000) "The Future of Remembrance in South Africa's Deeply Divided Society" Paper presented at *The Future of Remembrance Conference*, Germany 6-9 September 2000.

the past, whites profited greatly from Apartheid, and most continue to profit today from the legacy of Apartheid". The percentage of black South Africans who agreed was 73.7%.

This denial of beneficiation appears to hinder, as former MP Carl Niehaus explains, 'the beginning of a more mature process of taking joint responsibility for the future of our country" [111], the beginning of a process of Whites and other 'haves' becoming actively involved in capital sharing, capacity-building, development and reconstruction drives that extend beyond those projects emphasized by government[112]. It is an absence of this kind of commitment that prevents greater socio-economic justice and consequent thoroughgoing reconciliation. The extent of denial that Whites have and continue to do so has prompted some to toy with the idea of a Truth Commission to inform South Africans of the extent to which white people benefited and enriched themselves at the cost of South Africans of colour[113].

Race Relations

The question of commitment to socio-economic justice, like so many other questions in this paper, highlights the rift in views and opinions between South Africans of different racial backgrounds. A decade is too short a time to overcome the effects of centuries of racially-based segregation, discrimination and oppression. As a result, the different race groups in South Africa today still have a long way to travel to learning to live together.

The importance of the extent of social distance between South Africans of different races for the larger national reconciliation process has been debated at length. The SA Reconciliation Barometer survey instrument included a number of questions examining the state of race relations in the country. Whilst some theoretical paradigms of reconciliation assert that the presence of adequate normative and legislative parameters,

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[111] In a newsletter to members of the *Home For All Campaign*, quoted in *Time*, 8 January 2001.
[112] Such as the mandatory 1% of payroll training levy that is now required from corporations.
[113] Suggested by Philosophy Professor Hennie Lotter in an article in *The Star*, 30 April 2003.

together with a politically tolerant and generally respectful citizenry is sufficient for national reconciliation and others contend that more far-reaching integration is necessary, this research moves from the hypothesis that the quality of race relations does provide some insight on how the reconciliation process is unfolding.

The inclusion of these measures is based on the assertion that although the nation has now enjoyed almost a decade of democracy, possesses a world-respected constitution designed as a safeguard against any discrimination and has legislation intended to redress past and prevent future injustices, for many South Africans not a great deal has changed. An article penned by two senior Gemini consultants reminds us that 'post 1994 unresolved frustration forms part of everyday life in SA and if this is not dealt with, rational solutions will be hard to implement'[114]. Political Analyst Judith February argues that the recent race row between two Springbok squad Rugby players has revealed that racism is alive and well, and that the instance has left 'South Africans divided and sometimes disillusioned'[115]. There is no doubt that whilst forgiveness and love may not be mandatory preconditions for reconciliation, a certain degree of inter-racial trust, understanding and a willingness to co-exist goes a long way towards creating a reconciled nation.

Inter-racial Contact

Although, as Political Analyst Jim Gibson notes, there is no conclusive verdict on whether interracial contact enhances racial harmony, it does seem likely 'that contact, particularly close and sustained contact, with members of different cultural groups promotes positive, tolerant attitudes. By contrast, the absence of such contact is believed to foster stereotyping, prejudice and ill will towards these groups'[116].

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[114] *Business Day*, 29 May 2003.
[115] *Sunday Argus*, 14 September 2003.
[116] Ellison, C and D.A. Powers (1994) 'The Contact Hypothesis and Racial Attitudes amongst Black Americans" in *Social Science Quarterly*. Vol 75; Iss. 2. quoted in Gibson, J (2002) 'Measuring Racial Reconciliation through Inter-racial respect and Understanding". Unpublished Papert.

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On this assumption, the survey instrument included a number of items to determine the extent and depth of inter-racial contact across racial groups, as well as the desire (or lack thereof) to increase this contact. The table below portrays the extent of inter-racial contact reported by South Africans as a whole. Twenty Six percent of respondents assert they never have contact with a member of another racial group on an average day in the week, whilst almost half of all South Africans proclaim that they never have contact with South Africans of other races in social situations. Despite having enjoyed almost a decade of no legally enshrined racial segregation, and despite many politically correct protestations about friendships across colour lines, half the country does not engage in any close, voluntary social contact with citizens from other racial backgrounds, and another fifth reports doing so only rarely.

Whilst this finding demonstrates the long path to meaningful integration that still lies ahead for the nation, one must bear in mind at what stage of social dislocation and segregation South Africa found itself in 1994. Some have reported on how difficult it is for many, especially older, South Africans to overcome the distrust and lack of understanding which characterized their interactions prior to 1994, and how many have reacted to this rapid expansion in opportunities for racial interaction by creating racially homogenous 'comfort zones' to which to retreat to at night [117].

Table 25: Frequency and Inter-racial Contact

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[118]	
	Frequency of general contact *	Frequency of voluntary equal contact **
Never	26.1	46.3
Rarely	24.1	22.5
Sometimes	22.6	18.9
Often	13.5	5.7
Always	12.0	4.8
Don't know	1.7	1.8

* Question asked: *On a typical day during the week, whether at work or otherwise, how often do you talk to people of another race?* [119]** Question asked: *When socializing in your own home or the homes of friends, how often do you talk to People of another race?* [120]

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[117] Du Toit, F (ed)(2003) Learning to Live Together: Practices of Social Reconciliation. Rondebosch: The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Pp 89.

[118] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

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The disjuncture between involuntary contact, as experienced by people in their everyday business, and the extent of voluntary, more intimate and certainly on a more equal-participant-basis contact, is clearly demonstrated by the data, with 14% of South Africans reporting frequent inter-racial contact in any given day and only 6% report cross-racial contact in social circumstances.

Breaking down the data by race reveals that Whites, Coloureds and Indians report more frequent interaction with members of other races on any given weekday than blacks South Africans, with 33% of Whites, 22% of Coloureds and 28% of Indians reporting they often have contact across racial lines. This is hardly surprising in light of the fact that the great majority of the South African population is black and that its is more likely for members of the White, Coloured and Indian minority groups to make contact with Blacks, than it is for the mass of black South Africans to make contact with the comparatively much smaller groups of Indians, Coloureds and Whites.

Additionally, many black South Africans spend their days in the country's townships, which are very rarely visited by white, coloured and indian South Africans and are therefore subject to a certain degree of involuntary racial isolation. This pattern appears replicated, although less asymmetrically so, on the question of the extent of interaction in social contexts, with 4% of Blacks reporting this occurs often compared to 13% of Whites, 13% of Coloureds and 12% of Indians.

Although about a third of respondents reveal that they would welcome more contact with people of other races, South Africans of different races also hold sharply differing views on the extent of desired social contact.

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[119] Based on the respondent's own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.
[120] Based on the respondent's own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.

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Table 26: Preferred Frequency of Inter-racial Contact

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[121]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
More often	32.3	33.8	16.0	67.0	42.4
About the same as now	39.2	35.6	66.3	27.4	52.9
Less often	18.0	20.2	11.0	2.3	3.5
Never	6.9	6.8	4.1	1.0	.6
Don't know	3.6	3.8	2.4	2.0	.6
Refused	.1		.1	.3	
χ^2 = 540.286, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *If you had a choice, would you want to talk to people of another race group …* [122]

Only 16% of Whites wish more frequent contact, compared to 67% of Coloureds, with Blacks and Indians in between. However, 20% of Blacks compared to 11% of Whites want less frequent contact. There could be a number of reasons for this. The extent of black isolation mentioned previously could be responsible for the perpetuation of negative racial stereotypes and misconceptions, which could lead to this unwillingness of Blacks to encounter Whites more frequently. Alternatively, the nature of uneven and disrespectful cross-racial contact under apartheid, could also explain this hesitance.

Inter-racial Preconceptions

It can be argued that inter-racial contact is crucial for building mutual trust and understanding. The table reports that almost 60% of South Africans agree that they find it difficult to understand South Africans of other races. A lack of understanding is problematic, both as a deterrent to meaningful interaction and as a result of a lack of interaction. It appears as if black South Africans are most affected with a difficulty in accepting the customs and ways of other racial groups. This could largely be attributed to the greater extent of social isolation experienced by black South Africans, but other possible reasons need to be explored.

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[121] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding
[122] Based on the respondent's own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.

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Table 27: Inter-racial Understanding [123]

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[124]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	58.7	64.9	39.8	42.7	35.9
Uncertain	17.4	17.3	20.4	9.2	12.9
Disagree	23.7	17.6	39.3	48.1	51.2
Don't know	.3	.3	.3		
Refused			.2		
χ^2 = 331.322, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *I find it difficult to understand the customs and ways of (GROUP) people.*

Compared to the approximately 60% of respondents claiming to have trouble understanding people of other races, substantially fewer South Africans report having trouble trusting people of other race groups. Proponents of political reconciliation regularly stress the fact that 'the absence of social interactions does not necessarily inhibit collaboration in civil society and political institutions that cut across community boundaries"[125], yet reports from practitioners on the ground constantly emphasize the importance of 'broadening the thin lines of trust' as a mandatory pre-condition to creating workable relationships.

Table 28: Inter-racial Trust[126]

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[127]				
	All SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Agree	38.3	42.7	24.2	17.4	20.0
Uncertain	29.1	30.7	31.4	15.3	13.5
Disagree	26.8	20.5	41.4	63.4	65.3
Don't know	5.7	6.2	2..8	3.8	1.2
Refused			.2		
χ^2 = 459.939, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *(GROUP) people are untrustworthy*

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[123] Based on the respondent's own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.

[124] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

[125] Chapman, A.R. (2002) "Approaches to Studying Reconciliation". Paper presented at the Conference on Empirical Approaches to Studying Truth Commissions. Stellenbosch, South Africa. November 2002. Pp. 9.

[126] Based on the respondent's own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.

[127] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Whilst it may not be important for previously conflicting parties to share close social relationships, a certain critical measure of trust is essential for the creation of any workable partnership. In the South African context, most of the relationships necessary to facilitate development, transformation and reconciliation require South Africans to trust one another. A closer examination of the data reveal higher levels of distrust amongst Blacks than amongst Whites, Indians and Coloureds, and considering the fact that under apartheid black South Africans suffered the most severe abuse and oppression, it is not completely unexpected that they reveal the highest levels of distrust.

Other than measures intended to tap into respondent's general attitudes towards members of other races, the survey instrument also used some social distance indicators that are based on existing scales used in the US and elsewhere. Three items testing the extent to which South Africans feel comfortable with various degrees of inter-racial integration were included. In response to the question whether they would approve or disapprove of living in a neighbourhood where more than half of all residents were members of other race groups, more than half (53%) of all respondents claimed they would approve, although a substantially higher percentage of Coloureds (74%) and Indians (64%) and far lower portions of Whites (38%) agreed.

Table 29: Views of direct Inter-racial contact at Schools[128]

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[129]				
	SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Disapprove	11.2	11.7	11.7	3.3	4.7
Uncertain	20.0	17.5	37.6	9.2	8.2
Approve	66.7	69.0	48.8	85.7	87.1
Don't know	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.8	
Refused			.2		
χ^2 = 285.306, p < .000.	N =3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *Would you strongly disapprove, disapprove, neither disapprove nor approve, approve or strongly approve of any of the following: Having a (GROUP) person sitting next to my child, or the child of a friend, at school.*

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[128] Based on the respondent's own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.
[129] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

South Africans appear more tolerant of racial integration in the class-room than they do in their neighbourhoods. Three quarters of respondents (67%) reported approving of a child of another race sitting next to their own child at school. A racial breakdown reveals that levels of approval amongst Whites were again lower than amongst any of the other race groups. Not unexpectedly, the question of mixed-race marriages elicits higher levels of disapproval, with 29% disapproving and a further 21% uncertain. Again disapproval amongst white South Africans is far higher than amongst any of the other racial groups.

Table 30: Views of Inter-racial Marriages[130]

	Percentage of Respondents (%)[131]				
	SA	Black	White	Coloured	Indian
Disapprove	28.6	23.8	58.6	12.3	28.8
Uncertain	21.4	20.7	25.2	19.4	17.1
Approve	47.4	53.0	13.6	66.5	52.9
Don't know	2.6	2.6	2.4	1.8	1.2
Refused			.2		
χ^2 = 590. 269, p < .000.	N = 3498	N = 2000	N = 927	N = 391	N = 170

Question asked: *Would you strongly disapprove, disapprove, neither disapprove nor approve, approve or strongly approve of any of the following: Having a close relative marry a (GROUP) person.*

The picture presented by this data is one of certain portions of the population having made remarkable progress in reducing the extensive social distance that existed between South Africans of different races at the end of apartheid. A large portion of the population appears, however, to retain negative stereo-typical preconceptions about people of other races and show little inclination to change. Whilst class and other divisions are undoubtedly becoming an ever larger obstacle to reconciliation, these data show that 30% of South Africans are not sure or openly disapprove of mixed schools, 45% are unsure or openly disapprove of mixed neighbourhoods. Whilst disapproval of mixed marriages probably present little hindrance to national political reconciliation, the inability of significant portions of the South African public to accept integrated schools and neighbourhoods show that they are certainly not ready to learn to live together.

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[130] Based on the respondent's own race, the question were asked by making reference to their overall average contact with members of all three other race groups.
[131] The percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Conclusion

South Africa has made a spectacular start to its reconciliation process. Since then a number of changes likely to advance reconciliation have occurred.

This data suggests that the new dispensation has commanded significant commitment, support and confidence, but still needs to attract higher levels of intrinsic and unconditional legitimacy if South Africans are to be considered reconciled with the system, and if the system is to serve as the normative and legislative frame-work of a 'minimally decent' reconciled nation.

South Africans are relatively committed to national unity that transcends racial barriers, but find it far more difficult to commit to a political party not dominated by their own race. This has ramifications, not only for the ability of South Africans to strike up creative and innovative new relationships, but also for the capacity of political parties to transcend racially-based interests. More positively, although not all South Africans are equally committed to dialogue, on the whole, levels of support are relatively high, which can only bode well for reconciliation. Agents of change need to recognize and act on this opportunity.

Additionally, South Africans reveal a remarkable willingness to confront the past and embark on the future. But, a relative inability amongst many to relinquish the need to seek vengeance against those responsible for apartheid on the one hand, and an unwillingness amongst Whites to make socio-economic compromises on the other, may prove problematic for the South African process of reconciliation.

The data also, however, portray a situation whereby inter-racial contact has certainly increased drastically since 1994, but contact in which South Africans interact as equals in a relaxed, social environment still appears rare. Moreover, a critical portion of the population still finds highly integrated schools and neighbourhoods unacceptable, raising

concerns about how greater integration, increased trust and improved understanding can be facilitated.

Other changes, however, are likely to prove an ever more menacing obstacle to reconciliation. The data suggest that the issue of threat, not so much to the cultural, but to the physical and economic security of citizens is something change agents need to pay close attention to. Threats to both these critical forms of security have the potential of unleashing such a spectrum of negative repercussions, that these two issues should be amongst the primary concerns of leader and citizen alike.

These situations will unlikely remain static. A retrospective glance at the last ten years reveals change of such a scale as few could have imagined. This only serves to emphasize the salience of the need to maintain and develop this instrument to show the changes from this point onwards, for South Africa is undeniably in for the long haul.