



THE SA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER

-TRACKING SOCIO-POLITICAL TRENDS-

THE 2007 SA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER SURVEY

SEVENTH ROUND REPORT

December 2007

This research was conducted with financial assistance from the Church of Sweden and the Royal Danish Embassy (Danida). The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the official view of our donors.

© Hofmeyr, J.H. (2007) "Report of the Seventh Round of the SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey". Wynberg: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.

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1. INTRODUCTION

This document contains some of the key findings of the seventh round of the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) Survey, a nationally representative survey conducted annually by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. This particular survey was conducted in March and April 2007.

As in previous years, it has enquired about the issue of race relations and interaction between South Africa's historically defined racial categories – typically those aspects that first come to mind when we hear the word “reconciliation”.ⁱ If racial interaction were indeed the only indicator that we used to measure the extent to which South Africans are starting to find each other in the wake of apartheid, the prognosis for national reconciliation in 2007 would be very positive. Although 48 per cent of respondents indicated that they never interact socially with anybody from a different racial group, this figure represents a significant year-on-year decrease of eight percentage points. This in itself is a positive finding.

Yet, it would be a mistake to interpret this result in isolation from other key indicators employed in the survey, because as consecutive rounds have shown, most South Africans today view material inequality, and not race, as the most significant line of division that runs through our society. When viewed from this perspective, our findings bear less encouraging news. This is borne out in significant year-on-year declines in positive personal evaluations for physical safety and economic wellbeing. South Africans feel less secure in their homes and have shown higher levels of economic uncertainty when compared to the same measurement period in 2006. These findings have been recorded despite empirical evidence to the contrary that overall material disposition of South Africans has improved since the turn of the millennium.¹ Regardless of whether the recorded public sentiment is based on fact or not, it is critical to address the perception of insecurity. Both on a physical and economic level it is potentially potent as it breeds suspicion, but also raises the stakes for the attainment of scarce resources. Often this occurs along the fault lines that have been ingrained in our society by apartheid social engineering.

The decline in levels of economic and physical security has coincided with substantial decreases in ratings of government performance. The survey has used a list of 23 performance items, which ordinary South Africans would typically use to evaluate those who govern them. None of these items showed increases in positive evaluation - seven recorded decreases of more than 20 per cent. Two human security issues, “Crime” and “The Cost of Living” were amongst the five worst performers, with dismal approval ratings of 33 and 37 per cent respectively.

The biggest year-on-year drop occurred in relation to the item, “Transparency and Accountability”. Here a 28 percentage point decrease from 67 per cent to 39 per cent was recorded. This finding, we believe, is related to another discouraging finding, namely marked drops in confidence for democratic institutions, such as political parties, the three spheres of government, parliament, and not least, the presidency. Our analysis further shows a strong correlation between these findings and an 8 per cent decline in the percentage of citizens who trust their leaders. As a result of the ruling party's presidential contest – first denied and now acknowledged - leadership has been a pervasive theme in our public discourse over the past year. While some have described the debate around it as a symptom of a vibrant democracy, it is undeniable that in some instances the conduct of the main protagonists has

ⁱ While this report makes use of terminology associated with racial categories that were employed under apartheid, their use should not be seen as showing approval thereof. Given the structural legacy of apartheid that continues to divide South Africans to this day, there are in many instances significant differences between the response patterns of the different groups, which need to be reported as such.

been shortsighted and not in line with what we should reasonably expect from our democratic leaders. Because prudent leadership is necessary for social stability, this issue cannot be separated from the broader imperative for national unity and reconciliation.

Approach

This research project measures national reconciliation processes by means of a quantitative survey instrument, the SARB Survey. Given the conceptual density of the concept “reconciliation”, such measurement is a daunting task and we are under no illusion about the limitations (and potential pitfalls) involved. Firstly, it requires a thorough understanding of what reconciliation should entail within our society, but there is more to it than that – we also need to distill a clear set of indicators to measure those features we associate with the concept of reconciliation.

Both aspects of the undertaking are difficult. Even in the unlikely event of a broad consensus on the exact substance of the concept of reconciliation, putting appropriate indicators into operation and agreeing on the weight they carry in the equation is bound to be contentious. Inevitably, and particularly in surveys that are constrained in length, some dimensions have to be sacrificed to achieve the maximum measurability possible. As noted in previous reports on this survey, our biggest challenge is to avoid reductionism of the kind that strips the concept “reconciliation” of its most important attributes.

To avoid such reductionism, we have chosen not to use a single definition of reconciliation in this survey. Rather, we took cognisance of the difference in emphasis that various scholars and observers employ in describing this phenomenon. We have taken note of several, among them the non-racial approach that espouses the objective disbanding pre-apartheid identities and reconstructing new, non-racial ones.² Then there is the multi-cultural approach, which argues that reconciliation requires “the institutionalisation of consensus seeking”³ by means of normative and legal boundaries that facilitate interaction and peaceful coexistence. There are also a number of religious approaches, within which the concepts of “repentance” and “forgiveness” play an important role.⁴ Tying national reconciliation to Ubuntu is another approach, which departs from the point of view that all citizens share a common humanity. The individual who denies this common humanity to others is being dehumanized him- or herself.⁵ The developmental paradigm in turn advocates that reconciliation cannot “develop in a sustainable way if structural injustice in the political, legal and economic domains remain”.⁶ In terms of this perspective, the structural imbalances created by oppression have to be eradicated before we can consider the possibility of creating a united nation.⁷

In order to measure South Africa’s progress along the path of reconciliation, we have tried to incorporate elements of each approach in proposing six hypotheses - each with its own indicators – relating to the nature of reconciliation in South Africa. For the past five years this survey has measured fluctuations in these indicators. Where necessary, items have been added to amplify their measurement.

Table 1 depicts a tabular conceptual overview of the hypotheses and their critical indicators. It is hypothesized that when the indicators strengthen or improve, reconciliation is likely to be advanced. Our choice of hypotheses has been informed by a consultative process with numerous researchers, social theorists and practitioners working in the field, as well as the conduct of focus groups and an extensive literature review and analysis of the results of a 2002 exploratory national survey. Some elements of each of the previously discussed definitions were included. We expand on the rationale for the presence of each indicator in the relevant sections of the report.

Table 1: Conceptual Overview of Reconciliation Variables, Hypothesis, and Indicators

VARIABLE	HYPOTHESES	INDICATORS
Human Security	If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with each other and the larger system.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Physical Security Expanded Economic Security Cultural Security
Political Culture	If citizens view the Institutions, Structures and Values of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to progress.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Justifiability of Extra-legal Action Legitimacy of Leadership Legitimacy of Parliament Respect for the Rule of Law
Cross-cutting Political Relationships	If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commitment to National Unity Commitment to multi-racial Political Parties
Dialogue	If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely to be advanced.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commitment to more dialogue
Historical Confrontation	If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acknowledgement Forgiveness Reduced levels of Vengeance
Race Relations	If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cross-racial Contact Cross-racial Perceptions Cross-racial Social Distance

The first two rounds of the survey in 2003 contained questions and statements that measured responses to indicators of each hypothesis, but placed particular emphasis on those that relate to race relations, historical confrontation, dialogue, and cross-cutting political partnerships. The two rounds that were conducted in April and November 2004 featured a number of new statements and questions relating to economic security, which were aimed at strengthening the measurement of the human security hypothesis.

In 2005 we decided that the survey would henceforth be conducted only once a year. This decision was based on the little degree of variation between surveys that were conducted within the same year. The 2005 round saw further additions to sharpen the analysis of human security indicators. A first step was also taken to add depth to the measurement of indicators that deal with the political culture hypothesis, particularly as it relates to legitimacy of leadership and public confidence in the country's democratic institutions. Whereas prior surveys focused exclusively on parliament as an example of a democratic institution, this survey also included questions and statements gauging public sentiment regarding the judiciary. As far as leadership legitimacy is concerned, previous surveys only measured public sentiment towards national government. The 2005 round also added provincial and local government to incorporate all spheres of governance.

In 2006, to further strengthen the measurement of indicators relating to confidence in institutions, we added 11 institutions, from the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government, that are seen to have an important role to play in the country's reconciliation process.

The most significant addition in the most recent round of the survey has been a measurement that gauges group association amongst South Africans. We regarded this as a necessary addition to supplement our investigation into the presence, or not, of cross-cutting social relationship in South Africa. The items in this measurement consist of several social groupings, including items that would typically be used to measure personal identity. It should, however, be made clear that it was not our intention to measure perceptions of identity as such.

When interpreting the findings below, it is worth remembering that although seven rounds of the survey have been completed, the data at our disposal accounts only for the public attitudes and opinion of five years (the survey was conducted twice in 2003 and 2004). Given the volume of data that has been gathered, we are reporting here only on selected findings of the 2007 round of the SARB Survey. Selected findings of previous rounds of the survey can be accessed on the IJR website (www.ijr.org.za).

2. SURVEY DESIGN

The 2007 SARB Survey was attached to the first of survey company Markinor's two annual KhayaBus Surveys⁸ (an omnibus survey conducted on a nationally representative sample of South Africans, which is primarily aimed at measuring socio-political trends). This survey was conducted in March and April 2007. Most of the questions and statements in the latest questionnaire have appeared repeatedly since the first round in April 2003, but the Institute has in recent years also supplemented the original questionnaire with new measurement items, and excluded those that might have lost their relevance in the current socio-political context. In addition we have also obtained the right from Markinor to access and use data for a number of key measurements that appear in each round of the KhayaBus Survey.

The standard sample size of this nationally representative survey is 3 500. The survey measures public opinion of South Africans aged 16 years and older, and is conducted both in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. All settlements with a population exceeding 250 000 were categorised as metro areas. Those with less than this number were divided the following sub-categories: cities, large towns, small towns, villages, and rural areas.

Multistage area-probability sampling was employed. This included South Africans living in informal housing settlements. Enumeration areas were drawn from the 2001 Population Census, and sampling points were allocated to sub-places in each of the metros. The data for the Metro KhayaBus was weighed in terms of the race, metro, gender and age variables, whilst weighting for the Non-Metro KhayaBus was done in terms of the community size, age group, gender, and province variables. Weighting of the KhayaBus Survey was based on the adjusted universe from the All Media Products Survey (AMPS) 2005 data. We can, therefore, with a substantial amount of certainty, project our findings regarding respondent attitudes and perceptions to the adult South African population.

3. HUMAN SECURITY

A focus on human security emphasises the fact that human well-being is determined by far more than the extent to which people are free from physical harm. The term gained popular currency in the wake of the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report's suggestion that "the concept of security must change – from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people's security; from security through armaments to security through human development; [and] from territorial security to food-, employment- and environmental security."⁹ The report proposed that the future conflict could only be averted by "faster economic development, greater social justice and more people's participation".¹⁰ The Commission on Human Security's 2003 *Human Security Now* Report further elaborated on the concept by noting that it involves the creation of "political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks for survival, livelihood and dignity."¹¹

Given its context of extreme developmental inequalities, the theme of human security also resonates strongly in the post-apartheid South African, particularly as it relates to the question of national reconciliation. Not only has physical security been severely compromised by one of the highest incidences of violent crime in the world, but unacceptably high levels of poverty continue to relegate millions of citizens to a desperate existence. Given that both these issues form part of the historical legacy of apartheid, insecurity on occasions tend to manifest in an overt racial character. Although such incidences may introduce themselves in the form of friction between formerly advantaged and disadvantaged communities, as is often evident in debates around affirmative action and access to jobs, it can also occur between formerly disadvantaged groups themselves in relation to access to scarce resources, as the housing question in the Western Cape has illustrated.

It is for this reason that the SARB Survey has over the past five years been measuring a number of human security indicators relating to physical safety, economic well-being, and cultural security. In the section below we report on some of the responses to these indicators the survey statements and questions posed to respondents, as well as their responses to it.


Physical Security

"Do not trust strangers who offer to help" is the message that greets customers at the ATM's of one of the country's major banking groups. Although unfortunate, these words encapsulate an internalised principle that guides our society today. Suspicion of our fellow citizens has become internalised in our national psyche and our children are being raised to be suspicious of anyone that they do not know. While the advice might be sound, given the statistical likelihood of becoming a victim of crime in South Africa, the sentiment is unfortunate as distrust, instead of ubuntu, might become the defining feature of our nationhood. South Africans will continue to erect physical, but also literal, walls between each other for as long as this climate of fear persists.

In order to find out how pervasive this sense of insecurity is amongst South Africans, we have asked respondents to indicate their expectations pertaining to their personal physical safety over the next two years.

Figure 1: South African perception of physical safety

How do you think the personal safety of people like you will change over the next two years? (% Expected improvement)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

South African expectations for the improvement of personal safety conditions have remained low since our first measurement in 2003, as Figure 1 illustrates. Although positive expectations showed quite a large incline from a low base between 2003 and 2004, it showed an equally large decline between 2006 and 2007. In 2007 only 39 per cent of respondents, compared to 51 per cent the year before, believed that their physical safety would improve over the next two years. This negative sentiment in 2007 was strongest amongst white South Africans who only recorded an 18 per cent confidence level. Black South Africans remain the most optimistic of the country's four constitutive groups, although their 45 per cent confidence level also marks a 10 per cent decline on the year before.

Figure 2: South African perception of Physical Safety by LSM Group

How do you think the personal safety of people like you will change over the next two years? (% Expected improvement)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

Figure 2 suggests that, seen from a social class perspective, this negative sentiment also spans across the respective living standards measurement (LSM) categories. Highest positive sentiment was

measured within LSM 5, while the lowest was recorded within the most affluent LSM 10. None of the categories registered a positive expectation that exceeds the 50 per cent mark.

These findings suggest that pessimism regarding the South African crime situation is not limited to one specific class or racial group, as intimated by certain politicians in recent years. Arguably, it therefore suggests the need for a much more comprehensive strategy by government to get ordinary citizens involved in the fight against crime. Combating this scourge does present the opportunity for South Africans to unite against a common enemy. Government, through the South African Police Service, is most favourably positioned to play the critical role of coordinating such action with the assistance of civil society organisations. Yet, the question remains whether it is able to muster the confidence of ordinary South Africans when its head remains unapologetic about his social connections with members of the country's criminal underworld.


Economic Security

The historically skewed distribution of income and resources along racial lines under apartheid has entrenched extreme inequality in present-day South Africa. Over the past thirteen years it has therefore not been a question of "if", but "how" a redistribution of the country's wealth should take place. Because this involved the shifting of resources and reprioritisation of focal areas it has become inevitable that some communities would scrutinise this process with the suspicion that racial- or ethnic patronage might be a driving force behind the consideration of resource allocations. The interrelatedness of inequality and race may create the perception amongst many South Africans that marginalisation, in whatever form, should be viewed as the result of a trade-off between the interests of two or more of the country's historically-defined racial groups. This context where race becomes superimposed on the reality of economic vulnerability is a potent cocktail for social friction. It is therefore our contention that the degree of perceived material security across group lines is an important determinant of social stability in a heterogeneous society such as ours.

The survey has measured three key indicators of economic security. It has firstly prompted respondents to evaluate the prospects for an improvement in their personal economic circumstances. Secondly, and closely related to the former, they have been asked about their views on job security. Lastly, given the dependence of millions of South Africans on government welfare and service delivery, they have been asked to rate the quality of service that they received.

Figure 3: Improvement in Personal Economic Situation

How do you think the economic situation of people like you will change during the next two years? (% Expected Improvement)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

The findings presented in Figure 3 show that during the 2007 round of the SARB Survey half of South Africans expected an improvement in their personal economic fortunes over the next two years. This figure is seven percentage points down from last year, but remains significantly higher than that of the first measurement in 2003 when only 43 per cent of respondents indicated positive sentiment. Black Africans with an optimism level of 57 per cent remained the most upbeat in 2007, followed by Indians with 44 per cent, and coloureds with 41 per cent. Only a third of white South Africans anticipated an improvement in their economic circumstances over the next two years.

Figure 4: Improvement in Personal Economic Situation by LSM Group

How do you think the economic situation of people like you will change during the next two years? (Expected Improvement)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

When viewed from a social class perspective, most optimism about personal economic prospects seems to reside within the lower middle-income categories. As Figure 4 shows, the highest levels of optimism were registered in LSMs 4-6 registered, while positive sentiment tapers down on both sides towards the most impoverished and most affluent sections on the population. Compared to our first measurement in 2003 all LSM categories, with the exception of LSM 7, showed a marked

increase in the their positive evaluations. The year on year measurement between 2006 and 2007, however, shows moderate declines for nine out of the ten categories.

Figure 5: Job Security

*Whether you currently have a job or not, how do the chances of you finding a job compare to twelve months ago?
(% Affirmative responses)*




Source: SARB Survey 2007

2007 saw the lowest positive response since our first measurement on the indicator for job security, and follows on the highest positive rating just a year ago. As a result, it therefore marks the biggest year on year decline for this measurement to date. It would nevertheless be too early to say whether this points to the beginning of a more sustained decline, given the fact that a significant decrease also occurred between the 2004 and 2005 measurements, only to recover again in 2006. The largest decline over the past year occurred amongst black African respondents. Their level of optimism went down by 8 per cent from 36 per cent to the current 28 per cent. The latter, however, remains the highest positive rating amongst the country's historically defined groups. Coloured respondents recorded 25 per cent on the same measurement, followed by Indians with 19 per cent and whites with 15 per cent.

Figure 6: Job Security by LSM Group

*Whether you currently have a job or not, how do the chances of you finding a job compare to twelve months ago?
(% Affirmative responses)*



Source: SARB Survey 2007

A glance at responses to the same question from a social class perspective clearly shows that the lowest levels of optimism reside within the lowest three and highest two LSM categories. Conversely, the highest such levels can be found between LSMs 4 and 8. A year-on-year comparison of the two most recent surveys highlights declines in optimism amongst all categories, with the exception of LSM 8.

Table 2: Government Service Delivery

How well would you say government is handling the following areas? (% Approval)

Delivery Area	2006	2007	Change
Transparency and Accountability	67%	39%	-28%
Cost of living	61%	37%	-24%
Correct Appointments	62%	38%	-23%
Implementing Affirmative Action	69%	46%	-23%
Controlling Inflation	63%	41%	-22%
Reducing the Crime Rate	54%	33%	-21%
Narrowing the Income Gap	65%	45%	-20%
Fighting corruption	63%	43%	-20%
Retaining skilled people	48%	28%	-20%
Managing the Economy	71%	52%	-19%
Encouraging Intl. investment	72%	57%	-15%
Uniting All South Africans	78%	63%	-15%
Access to land	72%	57%	-15%
Police Closer to Community	69%	56%	-13%
Educational Needs	78%	65%	-13%
Building Houses	67%	54%	-13%
Ending Political Violence	74%	62%	-12%
Improving Basic Health Services	73%	64%	-10%
Gender Equality	83%	74%	-9%
Reducing Unemployment	40%	32%	-8%
HIV/Aids	71%	63%	-8%
Delivering Basic Services	75%	68%	-7%
Welfare Payments	85%	80%	-5%

Source: SARB Survey 2007

Table 1 presents one of the most significant findings of this report – a considerable year-on-year decline in positive evaluations for a list of key government performance indicators. None of the twenty-three policy areas that have been tracked by the SARB Survey over the past two years recorded increases in their approval ratings.ⁱⁱ Within this list the item “Transparency and Accountability” recorded the single largest year-on-year decline of 28 per cent. This should probably not come as a surprise, given the concerns about this matter that has also been raised in the *2007 State of the Public Service Report* that is published annually by Public Service Commission. The report notes that while government departments have excelled at bringing out public documents over the past thirteen years, there have however been considerable shortcomings in the timely submission of annual reports to the Auditor-General, as well as their ability to interact with, and respond to the enquiries of members of the public.¹² This finding has particular significance, since the virtues of public transparency and accountability are supposed to underpin the state’s “Batho Pele” approach to service delivery.

Overall the three worst performing areas remain the “Retention of Skilled People” (28 per cent), “Reducing Unemployment” (32 per cent), and “Reducing the Crime Rate” (33 per cent). The respective

ⁱⁱ While some of these items have been tracked in years prior to 2006, this is the first time that we repeat the same combination of items in consecutive years. Hence we only present our findings for the two most recent rounds of the survey.

declines for each of these items were 20 per cent, 8 per cent and 21 per cent. Interestingly, the former two represent government's response to our other economic security indicator, "Employment Prospects", and the latter relates to its response on to the question of "Physical Security". The three top performers in 2007 were "Welfare Payments", "Gender Equality", and "Delivering Basic Services". Yet, each of these items also represent respective declines of 5 per cent, 9 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. Because these declines represent year-on-year movements, it would be incorrect to infer the start of a more prolonged downward trend in the evaluation of government performance. They are nevertheless significant and it would be interesting to see when and to what extent they will recover to their former levels.


Cultural Security

Although South Africa's cultural and religious diversity is one of the country's greatest attributes, it also demands of citizens to be tolerant, and importantly also, to value that which groups other than their own hold dear. While many have dedicated their lives towards this goal, the challenge remains immense in a country where these differences were not too long ago employed as the primary criteria for dominance of one group over others. This entrenched view that culture and race hold political and economic currency in the South African context is still held by many and may take time to eradicate. Jim Gibson and Amanda Gouws show in their book, *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in Democratic Persuasion*¹³, that cultural, and specifically language and religious identities, continue to be key determinants of how South Africans view themselves and how they relate to others outside this group. This implies that perceived threat to the customs and ways of particular groups will also have an impact on the way in which they relate to other groups.

For this reason the SARB Survey has set out to measure perceptions of religious and language security. In the latest round of the survey we have used three new measurements that relate to the question of cultural security. The first gauges opinion about the extent to which all religions enjoy equal rights in South Africa; the second asks about perceived recognition for respondents' mother tongue language; while the third tests perceptions about the extent to which particular cultural rights are being promoted at the cost of others.

Figure 7: Equal Rights for Religious Groups

In South Africa all religious groups enjoy equal rights. (% Agreement)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

Figure 7 presents responses to a statement, which purports that religious groups enjoy equal rights in South Africa.ⁱⁱⁱ The findings suggest that the vast majority of South Africans are convinced of the equality of all religions in South Africa. This assessment also holds true for each of the country's constitutive racial groups. Sixty two per cent of respondents agreed with the statement, while only 15 per cent disagreed. Almost a quarter of respondents indicated that they did not know whether this was the case. Agreement was highest amongst coloured respondents, who recorded a 72 per cent affirmative response. The highest level of disagreement, on the other hand, was recorded amongst white respondents with 24 per cent.

This finding, when read together with another SARB finding that only 7 per cent of South Africans regard religion as the most divisive aspect of social life in South Africa, appears to suggest that South Africans experience relatively little threat with regard to their religious convictions.

Figure 8: Recognition for mother tongue language

My mother tongue language gets the recognition it deserves in a democratic South Africa. (% Agreement)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

The adoption of eleven national languages in the South African Constitution serves as possibly the most visible recognition of, and affirmation for, the richness contained in this country's diversity. While it extends equal status to each of these languages in Section 6 of Chapter 1, it also points to the "historically diminished status of indigenous languages" and instructs that steps be taken to "elevate and advance the status of these languages".¹⁴ This provision flows from the privileged status that Afrikaans and English have enjoyed under the previous political dispensation, and is therefore targeted at bringing indigenous languages on an equal footing with these two. It has however been argued that English, and to a lesser degree Afrikaans, still enjoys privileged status in terms of public accessibility to key documents and services.


The results presented in Figure 8 shows that a large majority of South Africans, believe that their mother tongue receive the recognition that it deserves in post-apartheid South Africa. Sixty three per cent believe that it is the case, only 16 per cent disagrees, while 21 per cent were not able to voice an opinion on the topic. While there were majorities in agreement within each of the country's historically defined racial groups, the white section of the population was the only group that registered a level of

ⁱⁱⁱ Although it would have been preferable here to provide a breakdown of responses in terms of religious affiliation, the samples of certain important categories, such as Islam, Buddhist and Jewish, were too small to draw conclusions from.

agreement below 50 per cent. Forty six per cent within this group agreed, 40 per cent disagreed and 14 per cent responded that they don't know.

Figure 9: Competing Cultural Interests

The promotion of the rights of other social or cultural groups is done to the detriment of the groups that I belong to. (% Agreement)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

Given the variety of cultures in South Africa and the sensitivities that their proximity to each other can still evoke, it is important that relationships across cultural borders should be characterised by respect and tolerance. Perceptions of cultural marginalization amongst particular groups might give rise to a cultural retreat, which might isolate it from the rest of the country. Because of the historical privilege given to so-called European values under apartheid, it is imperative that the playing fields be leveled in order to extend prominence to the full array of the country's cultural spectrum. The critical challenge remains how to do so in a way that is inclusive of a multiplicity of interest groups.

Figure 9 presents findings of the SARB Survey regarding perceived cultural marginalization. The results paint a mixed picture. In total 39 per cent of respondents agree that the promotion of the rights of other groups has got a detrimental effect on the interests of the group that they belong to, while 18 per cent disagrees. Agreement was highest amongst Indian respondents with 50 per cent, followed by black respondents with 42 per cent, and coloured respondents with 36 per cent. Interestingly, the lowest level of agreement with this statement was recorded amongst white respondents. Only small percentages within each of the country's historically defined groups disagree with the statement. Disagreement was lowest amongst black African respondents with 16 per cent. Majorities in the national-, black African-, white- and coloured samples indicated that they were not able to voice an opinion on the matter. A very sizable proportion, 42 per cent did not register any opinion on this issue. Such a degree of absence of opinion could be interpreted as a response in itself. It does arguably point to a middle group, or section of the population that does stand to be influenced and is not unreservedly convinced of the Constitution's ability to protect their cultural rights.

Section Summary

Physical Security:

The sense of physical security of ordinary South Africans, as measured in terms of their opinions regarding their personal safety over the next two years, has declined markedly in comparison to the previous measurement period. This drop in positive responses was found amongst all of the country's constitutive population groups. While instances of certain violent crimes, such as murder, has dropped in comparison to previous years, the statistics for such crimes remain unacceptably high. Negative sentiment may have been reinforced by continued perceptions of corruption within the police force, the controversy around its national commissioner, and alleged abuse of the state's security organs in party political struggles.

Economic Security:

The economic security indicators relating to expectations regarding the respondents' personal economic circumstances and prospects for employment have shown moderate declines from the previous round of the survey. This occurred amidst conditions of stable economic growth and a slight year-on-year improvement in national employment statistics. The most noteworthy results within the category have, however, been the significant declines in the public's approval of government service delivery. Crime, unemployment, and the retention of skilled South Africans have been the worst performing areas, each registering approval ratings of 33 per cent and less. This finding also tallies with the above-mentioned results regarding employment and crime. The biggest year-on-year decline of 28 per cent was recorded for public perception on government's commitment to transparency and accountability. This finding is at odds with the public service's commitment to the principle of "Batho Pele".

Cultural and Religious Security:

During 2007 the SARB has employed three new cultural security measurements that reflect on the issues of religion, language and perceptions pertaining to benefit of particular cultural groups to the detriment of the group that the respondent belongs to. Responses to the first two items suggest that majority of citizens are convinced about the equality of religions in South Africa, while a strong majority also feels that their mother tongue language gets the recognition that it deserves. In both instances white South Africans show the lowest levels of agreement, and particularly so on the question of language where affirmative responses of less than 50 per cent were recorded within this group. Responses to the statement relating to equal treatment of different cultural groups present more of a mixed picture and do not provide conclusive answers. A large section of respondents agreed that the promotion of the rights of other cultures may be infringing on theirs. Few disagreed, yet the vast majority of respondents were not willing to wage an opinion on the matter.

4. POLITICAL CULTURE

For a reconciliation process to bear fruit in a formerly divided state, citizens need to feel assured that the political system that guides this process provides an efficient and impartial mechanism to facilitate the route that has been embarked upon. Particularly when questions of social transformation and restorative justice are concerned, all sides of the political divide need to extend legitimacy to the underlying values of the political system and the institutions that give effect to their realisation. Without a realistic expectation of an unbiased system to facilitate transitional processes, those feeling vulnerable to partisan agendas will not participate. Under such circumstances attempts at reconciliation, both at the national and community levels are bound to fail.

It is for this reason that SARB project views an impartial and transparent *political culture* as one of the minimal requirements for a constructive and lasting reconciliation process. While there may not be a direct causal relationship between such a culture and the outcome of the reconciliation process, legitimacy of public institutions, the presence of shared principles, and the acceptance of the *bona fides* of political leaders, regardless of party affiliation, provides a much firmer foundation for meaningful deliberation.

In the case of South Africa the forging of such a culture is still in a formative stage, which require that public institutions have to execute their mandates without fear or favour. Given this country's protracted history of oppression, it would be naïve to assume that the mere existence of new democratic institutions and accompanying laws and regulations would instantaneously entrench such a political culture. If charges of interventions by state agencies in the ANC's leadership contest are accurate, it would be unfortunate as it suggests that key strategic sectors within the public service remain vulnerable to sectoral manipulation.

The creation of an open political culture is not an overnight endeavour and must ultimately be entrenched by repeated good practice over a protracted period. We believe that the behaviour of leaders, the legitimacy of institutions and the public's respect for the rule of law under a democratically elected government are key to this process. In this report we have enquired about public sentiment regarding each of these aspects.


Leadership Legitimacy

Administrative skill, legislative capacity, and commitment to democratic principles are obvious qualities that citizens require from their leaders, but in transitional societies political office also demands moral authority that supersedes historical schisms. Ideally in these contexts leadership should prioritise the national good above the entertainment of sectoral power struggles or patronage in the distribution of resources. Each citizen, regardless of political or cultural background, should feel that national leaders can be trusted to do what is right, but importantly also in contexts where large sections of the population are extremely vulnerable, that those who they trust truly cares about their plight.

The SARB survey instrument included two items designed to measure the perceived trustworthiness and attentiveness of political leaders. The first statement asserted that: "Most of the time I can trust the country's national leaders to do what is right". The second offered respondents the opportunity to indicate their level of agreement with the statement: "The people who run the country are not really concerned with what happens to people like me".

Figure 10: Trust in National Leaders

Most of the time I can trust the country's national leaders to do what is right. (% Agreement)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

The April 2007 findings, presented in Figure 10, show that 57 per cent of South Africans believe that the country's leaders can be trusted to do what is in their best interest. The level of agreement to the same statement amongst black African respondents was six percentage points higher than the national average of 63 per cent, while none of the collective responses for the three remaining groups exceeded the 50 per cent mark. Agreement amongst white respondents was particularly low at 27 per cent.

The overall national response marks a decline of 8 per cent in comparison with the same measurement a year before, when 65 per cent of respondents indicated high levels of trust in the country's leaders. The same has also been the case for responses within the different population groups. Amongst black African respondents this decrease totalled 7 per cent, amongst white respondents 9 per cent, and amongst the Indian group agreement declined by 9 per cent. The only exception here was within the coloured section of the population that registered a small increase of 3 per cent over the past year. While these decreases are significant, they remain slightly higher than those that were recorded during our first measurement in 2003.

Figure 11: Concern of National Leaders for Ordinary Citizens

The people who run the country are not really concerned with what happens to people like me. (% Agreement)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

While trust is an important contributor to the social capital that is needed for leaders to govern, equally so is the perception amongst citizens that those at the helm of national affairs are truly concerned about their plight. Figure 11 presents the SARB 2007's results relating to the statement: "The people who run the country are not really concerned with what happens to people like me". It shows that while a majority of South Africans might trust government to do the right things, it does not imply that most are convinced that national leaders care about their plight. Fifty three per cent, or more than half of respondents, in this nationally representative sample felt that the national leadership does not show enough concern with the struggles that they face on a daily basis. Responses to this measurement is also one percentage point up from last year, but remains four point lower than the first measurement in 2003.

What may lie behind these declines? The issue of leadership has indeed been on the lips of many South Africans right through 2007. As the ruling African National Congress prepares to elect its new leader at the party's national conference at the end of the year, South Africans wait in anticipation for an indication of whom President Thabo Mbeki's successor at the end of his second term in office might be. The public and private media has over the past year framed the contest for the ruling party's leadership, and probably therefore also that of the nation, as a contest between two political camps: one side favouring Mbeki and the other supporting the party's deputy president, Jacob Zuma. An unfortunate by-product of this contest has been the earlier referred to allegations that the state's security apparatus had become involved in this tussle, as well as talk about patronage and deals being offered to lure supporters into one of the camps. Such allegations, and others related to the battle for the ANC's top position over the past year, has arguably not the strengthened the cause of leadership legitimacy. Some suggest that it might even have had an alienating effect on ordinary citizens. As the old African adage goes: "When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers".

Institutional Legitimacy

When assessing the role of institutions in promoting national reconciliation in transitional democratic states, such as South Africa, there are a number of important factors to keep in mind. Firstly, institutions, but especially those that form part of a government bureaucracy, are complex. Because of their intricate networks and hierarchies, ordinary citizens, who have to entrust them with matters that affect their daily lives, tend to view them as large faceless monoliths.¹⁵ In order to relinquish self-

determination to these impersonal entities, the latter have to instill confidence in citizens through their actions and relationships with the public. This is extremely difficult when a restructured institution does not have a track record by virtue of its short existence, but nevertheless has to instill public confidence. Secondly, few public institutions, and especially those in transitional contexts where resources are scarce, can deliver on all citizen demands. To ensure stable migration from one system to another, compromises often have to be found between the fears of the old order and the aspirations of those that represent the new order. Thirdly, in such contexts of scarcity all citizens must be convinced of their leaders' commitment to realise their aspirations, even though there might be little change of doing so overnight.

In summary, these new democratic institutions therefore require credible systems and procedural frameworks that encourage fair and transparent decision-making, that will compel the 'losers' in public processes and disputes to abide by institutional decisions. Importantly also, such institutions need to be headed by leaders that imbue them with a democratic ethos that proves itself to be above the sectional interests of a society. This is especially important in a fragmented country that views almost every major piece public policy through a historically entrenched perspective.

Table 3: Confidence in Institutions

Please indicate how much confidence you have in each of the following institutions (% Confidence)

Institution	2006	2007	% Change
National Government	73	63	-10
Political Parties	48	37	-10
Provincial Government	66	57	-9
Presidency	77	68	-9
Parliament	69	62	-8
Local Government	50	43	-7
SA Human Rights Commission	67	60	-7
Print Media	64	58	-7
Broadcast Media	74	68	-6
Legal System in General	61	55	-6
Big Companies	65	60	-6
Constitutional Court	66	61	-5
Religious Institutions	70	69	-1

Source: SARB Survey 2007

During the two most recent rounds of the SARB Survey respondents have been asked to indicate the amount of confidence that they are willing to extend to a number of prominent South African institutions. Table 2 contains this list of 13 public and civil society institutions. Columns two and three indicate the percentages of South Africans who either had a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in each during the 2006 and 2007 rounds of the survey, while the third column reports the percentage change between the two surveys.

Religious Institutions replaces the Presidency as the institution which drew most confidence amongst respondents in 2007. Political parties remain at the bottom of the pile. Probably the most striking feature of Table 2, however, is that none of the measured institutions managed to improve on their 2006 confidence levels. To the contrary, twelve out of thirteen registered year-on-year declines of 5 per cent and more. The most considerable of these occurred for the *National Government*, *Political Parties*, the *Presidency*, and *Provincial Government*. Declines for the former two categories totalled 10 per cent each, while the corresponding figure for the latter two was 9 per cent each. The sharp declines of these four items are followed by that *Parliament* (-8 per cent) and *Local Government* (-7 per cent). Viewed

together they represent a category that can be termed, representative democratic institutions. These are the institutions that most citizens look towards for material deliverables, but importantly also for accountable leadership. A study in IJR's forthcoming *2007 Economic Transformation Audit* shows that the corresponding declines for confidence in representative democratic institutions, trust in leadership, and government transparency and accountability ratings, are not coincidental. According to this study, the latter two does appear to explain a considerable amount of variance in the confidence that South Africans extend to representative democratic institutions.


These are year-on-year variations and do not suggest a particular trend. It is, however, important that these public sentiments need to be reversed. Because these declines occurred at a time that government is spending more than ever before to improve the material well-being of its citizens, these findings do not seem to reflect as much an evaluation of what these institutions have delivered over the past year, as they do on how actual delivery was effected. Legitimacy hinges on more than just material benefits.

Rule of Law

The South African Constitution of 1996 embodies one of the most profound distinctions between the old apartheid order and the democratic society that we live in today. The new dispensation differentiates itself from the one that preceded it in that all legislative, executive, and private interaction, must be tested against the values and rights espoused in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights contained in it. As such, it serves as a document that gives expression to our common aspirations as a united country and thus has the potential to unify South Africans around a common set of principles. These principles are elevated above our day-to-day political life and even demand compliance from the highest political office. Government, therefore derives its legitimacy to govern from the Constitution, which in turn requires that citizens abide to government laws that measure up to the standards of the Constitution. Such abidance is mandatory, regardless of the political party or parties that constitute government.

Figure 12: Rule of Law

It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that I did not vote for (% Agreement)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

To establish the extent to which the authority of the Constitution is valued when it comes to compliance to national laws, respondents have been asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement

that: “It is not necessary to obey the laws of a government that I did not vote for”. The findings presented in Figure 12 are encouraging. Only 17 per cent of respondents have indicated that they agree with this statement, which marks a decline of 11 per cent since the first measurement of this item in 2003. Positive responses within each of the country’s historically defined groups have also been low. Black African respondents recorded the highest level of agreement with 20 per cent, which is 12 percentage points down from 2003. The lowest level of agreement was recorded amongst Indian respondents with 9 per cent.

Section Summary

Leadership Legitimacy

Fewer respondents have indicated trust in national leaders, while there has been a slight increase in the number that believed that government does not care about people like them. Although these are not the worst scores recorded for these measurements to date, it is important that they be rectified. The contest for the presidency of the ruling party, has not contributed in this regard. Perceptions of patronage and the use of the state security machinery for political gain have been damaging.

Institutional Legitimacy

Public confidence in the 13 institutions that we have measured over the past two years has dropped significantly. Twelve out of the 13 recorded decreases in confidence of over 5 per cent. The biggest casualties were institutions that can broadly be categorised as representative democratic institutions. Because these declines occurred at a time that government is spending more than ever before to improve the material well-being of its citizens, these findings do not seem to reflect as much an evaluation of what these institutions have delivered over the past year, as they do on how actual delivery was effected. There appears to be a link between confidence levels, perceptions of leadership, and approval of government transparency and accountability.

Rule of Law

The vast majority of respondents indicated that the laws of the land should be abided to, regardless of the party in power. Responses to this measurement have strengthened significantly since first measurement four years ago. This points to growing respect for the Constitution, which confers the power to govern, provided that governance takes place within the boundaries of prescriptions.

5. CROSS-CUTTING SOCIO-POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Thus far we have paid attention to the importance of human security and an inclusive political culture in the pursuit of national reconciliation. While important, their existence can however only satisfy the contextual requirements for national reconciliation by creating an even playing field on which to engage with apartheid injustice. Complete reliance on their presence, without attempts to transcend racial and cultural boundaries, leaves a society vulnerable to fluctuations in these indicators. Cross-cutting social ties therefore need to be forged across society to limit the temptation to revert to default positions of racial solidarity in times of crisis.

Ideally these relationships ought to be premised upon shared interests, rather than membership to exclusionary categories. This does not suggest for one moment that the existence of these categories, such as cultural and religious groups, must be discouraged, but rather that they do not become the sole grounds for socio-political mobilization within a nation. By their very nature cross-cutting social relations allow for the formation of a more fluid and dynamic society that is better equipped to transcend historical racial, religious, class and linguistic boundaries. Not only does the absence of these relationships delay critical engagement with the past; it also burdens our future. In a context of unresolved differences and continued suspicion, the process through which we reach national consensus will continue to be hamstrung by constant appeasement and efforts to allay group fears. One of this project's points of departure is, therefore, that an increase in the density of cross-cutting relationships within a formerly divided society, will promote national reconciliation by exposing formerly segregated communities to the views of each other.

This survey has since its inception been investigating national unity and racially-mixed political parties as tentative indicators of the existence of cross-cutting social relationships. In 2007 we have also included an item that probes the question of group association amongst South Africans. This has been done to explore the extent to which ordinary citizens associate with groups that have memberships that transcend the exclusive categories of our past.


National Unity

While South Africa's victory in the final of the 2007 Rugby World Cup might have unified South Africans in celebration of their national team's achievement, it is arguable whether such celebrations were really indicative of a deeper, more entrenched sense of national unity. While sporting events such as this and the upcoming 2010 Soccer World Cup might become important catalysts towards this end, a clearly articulated sense of what a unified South African nation should look like still evades us.

The emphasis on what should constitute such unity has been varied. Some have proposed that the pursuit of national unity should be framed by the search for a common national culture, based on shared symbols and common purpose. Others contend that it should rely on a collective vision of the future that is premised on shared understanding of the past. Still others contend that ascription to the values espoused in the Constitution should be its centerpiece. Arguably, the unity that we seek contains elements of each, yet it may still take some time before we would be able to put our finger on the relative contribution of each. In this survey we have therefore refrained to ask respondents to speculate about the exact content of the concept, "national unity. Instead they have been requested to express the extent to which they regard national unity as a desirable objective. In 2007, we have supplemented this question with another measurement which enquired about the extent to which they believe that it is an achievable objective.

Figure 13: National Unity

It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country (% Agreement)
It is possible to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups in this country (% Agreement)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

A vast majority of South Africans (just over 70 per cent), believe in the importance of developing a sense of national unity that transcends the cultural and historic differences. Fewer, however, believe that it is possible to find the common ground to do so. As Figure 13 shows, 9 per cent divides South Africans who think that national unity is a desirable objective from those who regard it as achievable. This is also mirrored in the findings for each of the country's historically defined groups. Each registered higher scores on the "desirability" measurement than on the "possibility" measurement, with the margins of difference between the two ranging from 9 per cent amongst black African respondents to 16 per cent amongst coloured respondents. Indians recorded the highest scores on both measurements, while white respondents were the least likely to offer positive responses on both counts. Less than half of respondents in this latter group were convinced of the possibility to create a united nation.

Group Association

Closely linked to the issue of national unity is the question of a South African national identity. What makes a real South African, and would our search for an answer to this question lead us to firmer ground on the question of unity. South Africans continue to grapple with the question of national identity and, not surprisingly, the past few years have seen a proliferation of publications that interrogate this question.

Our fascination with this question is understandable. Few systems in history have attached as much political and economic currency to identity as apartheid did. And few have managed to divide their citizenry to the same extent. It was no wonder then that a fixation with race, perceived as the primary attribute of one's identity, developed amongst those who controlled the levers of power at the time. Because the system actively promoted a diffuse, hierarchical and racial nationhood that discouraged the development of cross-cutting identities, most South Africans could not relate to the state, its symbols and, needless to say, its conception of what it means to be South African.

It is against this backdrop that the creation of a new national identity, grounded in the principles of equality and inclusivity, became one of the most urgent imperatives of a newly democratic South Africa.

As the ‘two nations’ realisation dawned upon us after the brief ‘rainbow embrace’ of the nineties, it became increasingly clear that forging a new, single sense of nationhood was going to be a protracted endeavour.

The adoption of the country’s new Constitution in 1997 provided the most concrete exposition of the values that were envisaged for the ‘new’ South African nation. Its denouncement of racial ideology and endorsement of equal citizenship signified a clear break with the past. But written commitments to these ideals had to be matched by actions aimed at eradicating the terrible legacy of ‘separate development’. This has in many instances been contingent on the use of apartheid’s narrowly defined racial identities. In a country that has become so finely attuned to the language of identity, it has become inevitable that the implementation of such restorative measures creates the perception that identity will continue to be commodified in the political and economic spheres of post-apartheid South Africa. While there is little empirical proof for such assertions, anecdotal accounts suggest that such a perception is widespread.

This context is important to keep in mind when our objective is to establish quantitatively whether transcending cross-cutting relationships are developing within what used to be an acutely divided society.

The 2007 round of the IJR’s SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey included a measurement instrument with which the Institute tried to probe this question. Aware of perceptions that may exist around the political and economic utility of identity, we have tried to circumvent this obstacle in three ways. Firstly, rather than enquiring about self-perception, respondents have been asked to identify broad categories of people with whom they are able to associate. Instead of measuring identity, we have therefore opted to look at association. Secondly, by adding items such as age, profession, and gender in a balanced menu of options, we have avoided the mere juxtaposition of a series of exclusionary identities against a common national identity. And thirdly, great care has been taken in the wording of questions to depoliticise the construct that is being measured.

Table 4: Group Association

When you think of yourself and your daily interaction with others, which group do you associate with primarily? (% Association)

Category	1st Choice	2nd Choice	Ave. %
Language	20.4	12.6	16.5
Ethnic	15.1	14.6	14.85
Race	11.8	10.7	11.25
SA	11.2	10.1	10.65
Neighbourhood	8.9	11.3	10.1
Religion	6.9	7.9	7.4
Class	6.9	6.7	6.8
Gender	4.7	6.8	5.75
Age	4.9	6.5	5.7
Profession	4.1	4.5	4.3
African	3	3.9	3.45
Association	1.4	3.3	2.35
Don't know	0.5	0.7	0.6
None	0.2	0.3	0.25

Source: SARB Survey 2007

Table 1 shows that the three most preferred associational groups were “Language”, “Race” and “Ethnic” group in this order. “Ethnic” and “Language” were the two most popular second choices,

followed by “race” and “neighbourhood” together in the third place. On average “Language” and “ethnic” were either a first or second choice for the majority for respondents, while “South African” and “Race” are together in the third place.

The top three first choices are all ascriptive categories that exclude certain South Africans by virtue of birth. Together, they constitute just under 50 per cent of responses. A breakdown of these responses into those of the country’s constitutive racial groups shows that combinations of these categories featured amongst the top three choices of each group, with the exception of Indian South Africans, who only included language amongst their first three.

Association on the basis of national identity (those who regard themselves as primarily South African) features fourth on this list of primary association with 11 per cent, and third on the list of average first and second choices for association. Amongst black African and white respondents primary association with the category “South African” stands at 11 per cent; 13 per cent amongst coloureds; and 18 per cent amongst Indian South Africans. Closer inspection shows that there is a generational distinction to be made between preferences for association on the basis of national identity. South Africans younger than 35 are more likely to choose association on the basis of nationality, compared to those falling outside this age group. This distinction is particularly clear within the coloured and white groups, where 10 per cent and 7 per cent differences exist within the respective groups.

Thirty seven per cent of respondents have preferred association with a variety of groups that are not national, but potentially transcending in relation to our historically entrenched divisions. This group includes associational ties amongst those residing in the same neighbourhood; sharing the same religious beliefs; falling within the same social class; working in the same profession; belonging to the same social- or savings club; being of the same gender; and those who fall in the same age group.

The finding that only 3 per cent of respondents associate with those that regard themselves primarily as African, might at first appear unexpected, but it should be pointed out that our results do not reflect a preference for a particular identity, but for what we set out to measure, namely group association. A young black accountant in Sandton may therefore have stronger associational ties with his white South African colleague by virtue of their business interest, than with somebody of the same age in rural part of Morocco.

Viewed as a collective, these results largely support previous findings of the SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey that relate to interaction between South Africans of different backgrounds. Low levels of social interaction exist between South Africans from historically defined racial categories, and much of it can be ascribed to the associational- and settlement patterns that developed under apartheid. Yet, the fact that over 11 per cent of South Africans do primarily associate with those who regard themselves as South African, is encouraging.


Racially mixed Political Parties

Racial integration of political parties remains one of the strongest indicators of the extent to which citizens have been able to forge cross-cutting interest groups.¹⁶ In South Africa few political parties have thus far managed to attract a supporters base with a multi-racial profile, and hence a substantial body of literature also exists on the debate whether South African elections should be viewed as racial censuses or not.¹⁷ Proponents of the racial census thesis assert that South African election outcomes are no more than the product of a high level of racial allegiance. Others dismiss this argument and insist that South African voters have proved themselves mature enough to base their vote on rational choice. To measure the extent to which race still receives precedence in considerations about support

for political parties, the SARB Survey has since its inception measured South Africans' willingness to belong to political parties where their particular racial group is in a minority.

Figure 14: Membership of Political Parties

I could never imagine being part of a political party made up mainly of people from another race. (% Agreement)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

Figure 14 confirms that just less than half of South Africans regard race as a primary consideration in their choice of political party. This figure has shown only a small amount of variance since the first measurement in 2003. The lowest score of 40 per cent had been recorded in the first round, while the highest score of 45 per cent was measured in both the April 2004 and 2005 rounds of the survey. The 48 per cent agreement level recorded by black African respondents remains, as in previous rounds of the survey, the highest for the country's four constitutive population groups. White respondents, with 35 per cent, was the group second most likely to agree, followed by coloured and Indian respondents with 27 and 20 per cent respectively. Significantly, the biggest increase in levels of agreement has been amongst coloured respondents. Their latest measurement on this item represents a 10 per cent increase from that of the first round in 2003.

While the large proportion of South Africans that still use race as a primary criteria for party association represent a disappointing state of affairs, it does not come as a surprise. Numerous accounts of racial mobilisation by various parties during the 2004 general election- and 2006 local government election campaigns, suggest that much of the blame for this should be laid before the doors of our political parties. It is indeed unfortunate that historical differences continue to be perpetuated in the service of power by those that should stand at the forefront of dismantling these barriers.

Section Summary

National Unity

Most South Africans (70 per cent) believe that a sense of national unity, which transcends cultural and historic differences, should be prioritised. Fewer believe that it is possible to do so (61 per cent). This finding is also mirrored in the responses of the country's historically defined groups. More than 60 per cent in each agreed on the desirability of a united nation, while more than half, with the exception of whites, felt that it is an achievable objective. The national response for the desirability of a united South African nation has recorded the lowest measurement since the inception of the survey in 2003, and so has that for black African and coloured responses.

Group Association

The seventh round of the SARB Survey has for the first time measured South African preferences for group association. The three most preferred associational groups were "language", "race" and "ethnic" groups in this

order. "Ethnic", "language" were the two most popular second choices, followed by "race" and "neighbourhood" together in the third place. On average "Language" and "ethnic" were either a first or second choice for the majority for respondents, while "South African" and "Race" were together in the third place. The top three first choices were therefore largely exclusionary categories and together constitute just under 50 per cent of all responses. Association on the basis of national identity (those who regard themselves as primarily South African) features fourth on this list of primary association and third on the list of averages for first and second choices. Closer inspection has shown that there is a generational distinction to be made between preferences for association on the basis of national identity.

Racially-mixed Political Parties

Less than half of South Africans, but nevertheless a substantial number, use race to discern in their choice of a political party that represents their interests. This remains unfortunate and political parties should play a more active role in dispelling perceptions that they serve sectional interests of exclusive groups.

6. DIALOGUE

While segregation legislation has been removed from the country's statute books, the racial cleavages that it entrenched bequeathed a template for group interaction to post-apartheid South Africa, which continues to define social relations to this day. Although increasing attention is being paid to the development of class divides as a result of the structural changes in the South African economy, race remains one of the strongest explanatory variables for the degrees of relative vulnerability of ordinary South Africans.

Virtually no South African public policy debate takes place without direct or indirect reference to the racial dynamics at play within the particular subject area. But the questions of race and vulnerability does not only intersect at the level of relations between the formerly advantaged and disadvantaged communities, but also amongst the formerly disadvantaged groups (black Africans, coloured, and Indians) themselves. Examples of the latter has, for example, occurred in grassroots struggles between formerly disadvantaged communities for employment, housing and the delivery of municipal services.¹⁸ In the eyes of many, the question of race has therefore remained a proxy for the larger question of transitional justice. This, therefore, implies that frank and open dialogue about this country's racial legacy, is an irreplaceable determinant of, but also important indicator for, national reconciliation.

To what extent does such dialogue take place? Based purely on observation, South Africans do not engage regularly in meaningful conversations on the question of race. In the 2007 round of the SARB Survey we have tried use a quantitative measure to find out under which circumstances South Africans would be willing to speak freely about this issue. Respondents have been asked to indicate the extent to which they are willing divulge their true opinions on how racial issues affect their lives under different circumstances (See Table 4). In each context they had the option to indicate whether they would "Always" be willing to do so, "Only under certain circumstances", or whether they would "Never" agree to it. A "don't know" response category was also created for those who were not willing to wage an opinion on the matter.

Table 5: Conversations About Race

Please look at the different situations below and tell us under which circumstances would you reveal your true thoughts about how racial issues affect your life.

Context	Always	Conditional	Never	DK
Debating with own race	35	32	23	8
When phoning to radio talk show	31	26	30	12
Letter to local newspaper	30	25	32	12
When interviewed on TV	27	30	31	11
Debating with different races	25	34	30	11
Posting on Internet	22	20	35	21

Source: SARB Survey 2007

The findings presented in Table 4 show that South Africans generally remain hesitant to express their views on issues of race unconditionally, and when they do, they prefer do so amongst people belonging to their own racial group. Even when such debates are conducted with somebody from the same racial group, respondents were reluctant to engage openly with the topic. In all instances a majority of respondents have indicated that they would either "Never" do so, or "Only under certain circumstances" (conditionally). With regard to the big question on whether they would "Always" be available for open dialogue on the question of race with other racial groups, only a quarter of those who participated in this survey selected this option. Thirty per cent indicated that under no circumstances

would they do so, 34 per cent said they would do so with reservations, while another 11 per cent were not able to wage an opinion on the issue.

The results related to the item, “Posting on the Internet” are puzzling. Our expectation was that respondents would have been much more forthcoming to express themselves by means of this medium, as it does result in less personal exposure. We suspect that the high “Don’t know” score may be pointing to the relatively low levels of access to the internet in South Africa, and therefore insufficient knowledge about the medium. This item would therefore be excluded, should this measurement be replicated in future rounds of the survey.

Table 6: Unconditional Willingness to Talk About Race (by racial group)

Please look at the different situations below and tell us under which circumstances would you reveal your true thoughts about how racial issues affect your life.

Context	White	Black	Coloured	Indian
Debating with different race	23	26	28	29
Debating with own race	37	37	38	40
Letter to local newspaper	36	30	36	46
Posting on Internet	28	22	31	36
When interviewed on TV	28	28	30	28
When phoning to radio talk show	32	33	37	41

Source: SARB Survey 2007

Table 5 suggests that the race of the respondent has in this instance not been an important determinant of the willingness to engage in forthright dialogue about the broader question of race. The table, which presents the “Always” responses for each of the country’s historically categorised groups, shows only small differences between groups that have shown the highest and the lowest levels of agreement. The first item “Debating with different race” is a case in point. The lowest level of willingness to talk openly with people from another racial group about the race-related matters was recorded amongst white respondents with 23 per cent. The highest positive response for this item, on the other hand,, has been registered by Indians with 29 per cent. Both figures are low and not far apart.

Another expectation was that age might play an important role in determining these responses. In terms of such thinking, lower levels of exposure to apartheid for younger generations might have made them less sensitive to the discussion of race-related issues. Our analysis has, however, suggested no relationship and very little correlation between the age variable and each of the context items.

Section Summary

Dialogue

South Africans remain hesitant to express their views on issues of race unconditionally, and when they do, they prefer to do so amongst people belonging to their own racial group. Even when such debates are conducted with somebody from the same racial group, respondents were reluctant to engage openly with the topic. With regard to the question on whether they would “Always” be available for open dialogue on the question of race with other racial groups, only a quarter of those who participated in this survey selected this option.

7. HISTORICAL CONFRONTATION

South Africa's decision to institute a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) during the first years of democratic rule, pointed to two key assumptions regarding the country's political transition at the time. Firstly, the prognosis for lasting peace without a visible attempt to address apartheid injustice had been weak. Justice had to be administered, but it had to be achieved in a way that would not destabilise a delicately poised political settlement. Because the imperative for national unity was one of the cornerstones of the transitional arrangement, it was agreed amongst negotiators that Nuremburg style trials might have endangered what was a brittle peace, and consequently also any future expectation for reconciliation in a divided society.

This leads us to the second important assumption, which is that the transitional justice process, as led by the TRC, was intended to facilitate restorative, rather than retributive justice. Mark Amstutz notes that whereas retributive justice has "objective wrongdoing" as its primary emphasis, restorative justice hones in on "subjective factors that impair community, such as anger, resentment, and the desire for vengeance".¹⁹ He also cites Elizabeth Kiss, who has argued that although retributive- and restorative justice both focus on issues of the restoration of human dignity, accountability, and a respect for human rights, restorative justice distinguishes itself by the added focus on reconciliation.²⁰

In South Africa the objective of historical confrontation has, therefore, been twofold. It sought justice for victims, but also put a high premium on the need for a reconciled society. The SARB Survey has since its inception measured public perception about the nature of apartheid, as well as sentiments about its injustice should be addressed.

While most white South Africans may not have directly perpetrated acts of human rights abuse under the previous dispensation, they have been beneficiaries in as far as these acts entrenched their privilege. It is therefore important to understand how this group, but also others who fell victim to apartheid, think about it thirteen years after the system was abolished. The survey has also solicited opinion, specifically of those that bore the brunt of apartheid, on the prospects of forgetting and forgiving, as well as the extent to which a desire for retribution still exists. This year also saw the introduction of a new measure to establish whether respondents feel that government has done enough to punish apartheid perpetrators.

Acknowledgement

One of the most important prerequisites for restorative justice to be truly restorative, is that the disclosure of truth should be matched by an acknowledgement of its wrongfulness by the perpetrator to the victim or relatives of victim. As Charles Villa-Vicencio notes, acknowledgement of injustice and more specifically, acknowledgement of having perpetrated injustice, either actively or by default is a first essential step in any reconciliation process.²¹ Without the acknowledgement of suffering, there is very little room for forgiveness, and hence no opportunity for reconciliation. Such acknowledgement should, however, extend beyond the actual perpetrator also to the beneficiaries of his or her deeds.


Following the 1976 Soweto school protests and its brutal suppression, the United Nations resolved to declare apartheid a crime against humanity.²² At the time this condemnation represented the most stringently articulated denunciation of Pretoria's domestic policies to date. To measure the extent to which South Africans - now with the benefit of extensive evidence presented before the TRC - recognise the brutality of apartheid, we have asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with a statement that purports it was indeed a crime against humanity. In addition, they were also

asked to give their views on the proposition that the state committed horrific atrocities against those who fought against apartheid.

Figure 15: Apartheid Acknowledgement

Apartheid was a crime against humanity. (% Agreement)

In the past the state committed horrific atrocities against those struggling against apartheid. (% Agreement)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

The results reported in Figure 15 confirm that the overwhelming majority of respondents agree with the contention that inhumanity sustained apartheid. It shows that 86 per cent of all South Africans agreed with the statement that apartheid was a crime against humanity, while 78 per cent concurred with the view that “horrific atrocities” were committed by the regime. Levels of agreement on both counts went above the 80 per cent mark for those groups that were marginalised by the system. Unfortunately, the graph also highlights the divide that exist between the responses of these groups and that of white respondents. The 68 per cent agreement on the “crime against humanity” item is 18 per cent lower than the national average and 6 per down on the measurement of 2006. The 56 per cent agreement on the “atrocities” item is 22 per cent lower than that for the country as a whole, and equals the lowest score thus far, which was recorded during the first round of the SARB in 2003.

Figure 16: Apartheid Acknowledgement (White Youth and Older South Africans)

In the past the state committed horrific atrocities against those struggling against apartheid.



Source: SARB Survey 2007

Figure 16 presents a closer analysis of white South African responses in the 2007 survey to the statement that “horrific atrocities” were committed during apartheid. Responses were broken down into two age categories (respondents younger than 35, and those aged 35 and older)^{iv} to establish whether there has been a generational difference in opinion on this question. Interestingly there seems to be a marked difference in sentiment between the two groups. The survey shows that only half of those that can be categorised as youth, agreed with the statement, compared to close to 60% of white respondents from the older age group. While twenty seven per cent in the youth category disagreed, a substantial 23 per cent indicated that they do not know. This suggests that the TRC and the evidence presented before it, either passed them by, or worse still, had failed to make an impression on them. Unfortunately such opinions – or lack of any opinion at all - might inform this section of the population’s thinking about broader socio-political issues.

Forgiveness

According to Lynn Graybill, the idealistic expectation of the TRC was that perpetrators would repent for their sins, that victims would forgive them, and that this would lead to reconciliation between the affected parties and ultimately to the rest of the country.²³ The causation in terms of the thinking behind this was clear. Reconciliation hinged on the forgiveness of victims, but such forgiveness would rely heavily on the remorse that was evident amongst perpetrators. During the TRC process participants from both sides of the spectrum were therefore strongly encouraged to repent and to forgive. Yet, as Graybill rightly notes, the *Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995* did not make provision for the requirement of remorse in the processing of amnesty applications. Instead the minimal requirement of full disclosure was accepted as sufficient ground for indemnity from prosecution. One of the critical building blocks for the reconciliation model was therefore missing, and although the


^{iv} Section 1(iv) of the National Youth Commission Act (No. 19 of 1996) states that all South Africans between the ages of 14 and 35 falls in the category of “youth”.

Commission strongly encouraged repentance, the absence of a sanction for a lack of remorse often resulted in half-hearted gestures both by the perpetrator and the victim.

As the results that were reported above show, almost half of white South Africans are not convinced that atrocities were committed in their name under apartheid. This suggests that a considerable proportion of white South Africans may also not consider the need to have remorse. This may offer partial explanation for former Archbishop Desmond Tutu's frustration when he noted that: "So many white people in South Africa have come to see themselves as entitled to reconciliation and forgiveness without their having to lift so much as a finger to aid this very crucial and demanding process".²⁴

Figure 17: Forgiveness for Apartheid

I am trying to forgive those that hurt me during apartheid (% Agreement).



Source: SARB Survey 2007


Figure 17 presents the SARB Survey's 2007 results on a statement that measures the extent to which those who were disadvantageded under apartheid are willing to forgive the injustices that were perpetrated against them. Respondents were asked to show the extent of their agreement with the statement: "I am trying to forgive those that hurt me during apartheid". Sixty four per cent of black African respondents agreed with this statement, compared to 65 per cent for coloured respondents and 69 per cent for Indian respondents. Declines in positive responses were recorded for each of the three groups measured. The 2007 score for black Africans is the result of an 8 per cent decline from the previous year, while those for coloured and Indian respondents went down by 11 per cent each.

Retribution

As noted above, the *Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act's* provision to extend amnesty merely on the grounds of full disclosure has been controversial. To many critics this seemed like an extraordinary easy way to escape reckoning for crimes that would under normal circumstances have been met with far more stringent punishment. One of its unfortunate consequences has therefore been that a large section of the South African population had been left with the impression that no justice had been done at all. This raises the question whether vengeance has become an option for those who felt frustrated and betrayed by a process that appeared to prioritise truth above their need for dignity.

Figure 18: Retribution for Apartheid

It is fair that people who discriminated against others during apartheid feel what it is like to be discriminated against. (Agreement).



Source: SARB Survey 2007

The results that are presented in Figure 18 shows that a substantial percentage of South Africans, 42 per cent, feel that the beneficiaries of apartheid should experience what it is like to be discriminated against. Amongst the country's constitutive groups black Africans with 46 per cent have recorded the highest score on this measurement, followed by coloured respondents with 43 per cent and Indian respondents with 42 per cent. As can be expected, the lowest level of agreement was registered amongst white South Africans with 17 per cent. Both black Africans and Indians recorded their second lowest scores to date. Most notably, the current score marks a significant decline of 10 per cent since the first measurement in 2003.

Satisfaction with Government Action

In the wake of the TRC process, government has on occasions been criticised by a number of interest- and victim groups for not doing enough to pursue alleged apartheid era perpetrators who did not receive or apply for amnesty. The National Directorate for Public Prosecutions responded early last year with a new set of directives for the prosecution of apartheid era crimes. The trial of former Minister of Police, Adriaan Vlok, former Police Commissioner, Johan van der Merwe, and their co-accused was the first to have taken place under the new directives.


One of the important features of these new parameters has been a provision that due consideration should be given to the question whether a prosecution would be in the "national interest". This implies that it will be left to the discretion of the NPA to decide what impact a particular prosecution would have on broader social relations in the country. This would be a difficult and would require a fine sense of the public mood at any given time. But what do ordinary South Africans, who are not intimately involved in transitional justice debates, think about the progress that has been made with regard to prosecutions thus far? In the 2007 round of the SA Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) Survey, respondents were prompted for their opinion on this issue. The survey, which was conducted amongst a nationally representative sample in all nine provinces across South Africa, contained the following statement: "Government has done enough to prosecute the perpetrators of apartheid era crimes."

The national response to this statement ran contrary to our expectation that South Africans will have strong opinions about this issue. In the survey 35 per cent of respondents agreed that government has

indeed done enough to prosecute alleged perpetrators, while 25 per cent disagreed. Yet, 24 per cent were uncertain whether it was the case, and 15 per cent said that they “don’t know”. This means that about 39 per cent, a very significant proportion of the South African population, do not hold any particular opinion on this issue.

Figure 19: Prosecution of Apartheid Crimes

Government has done enough to prosecute the perpetrators of apartheid crimes. (Agreement)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

A closer look at the country’s four constitutive population groups (see Figure 19) suggests that none, with the exception of white South Africans with a 53 per cent agreement level, held a predominant view either in agreement or disagreement with the statement. For each of the groups that were disenfranchised under apartheid, the difference between those in agreement and those in disagreement has been small, while the remainder is made up by undecided responses. The highest level of disagreement was registered amongst coloured respondents. Uncertain responses were highest amongst Indians and black South Africans, who recorded the highest level of “don’t know” responses.

It is important to remember that this survey was conducted in March and April this year, prior to the prosecution of Vlok and Van der Merwe. The findings, therefore, reflect on responses to government’s general track record on the issue since the conclusion of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The high level of indecision on this matter is interesting. It is unlikely, however, that the absence of clear-cut responses can be contributed to a lack of interest, given the large number of apartheid-era deaths and disappearances that remain unresolved to this day. A more likely explanation would be that it reflects on the quantity and quality of information regarding the guidelines for, and progress with, prosecutions that is communicated to ordinary South Africans. Whether the outcome of these prosecutions would make a significant dent in the undecided responses in a future survey remains to be seen. Against the background of the broader national media agenda that was dominated by the ANC’s presidential contest, the trial received relatively little attention. In addition, the process, which culminated in swift trial and sentence, might have further robbed the country from an opportunity to gain a better understanding of the crimes and the context within which they were committed.

Section Summary

Acknowledgment

Most South Africans are convinced about the inhumanity that characterised life under apartheid. Large majorities agreed with the contentions that apartheid was a crime against humanity, and that “horrific atrocities” were committed in order to keep the regime intact. However, there remains a significant divide between the levels of agreement amongst white respondents and those groups that were marginalised under apartheid on both counts. Interestingly there seems to be a marked difference in sentiment between the two groups. Closer analysis of white South African responses to the question relating to the occurrence of atrocities under apartheid, shows a generational difference in perceptions of this period. Half of those aged younger than thirty five, agreed with the statement, compared to almost 60 per cent for those above this age. Worryingly, 27 per cent in the younger age group disagreed, while 23 per cent indicated that they do not know whether such atrocities indeed occurred. Unfortunately such opinions – or lack of any opinion at all - might inform this section of the population’s thinking about the developmental challenges that the country faces at present.

Forgiveness

Although significant majorities in each of the formerly disadvantaged groups agreed with a statement purporting their willingness to forgive those who benefited from their oppression under apartheid, there has been marked year on year declines for each of these groups. A distinction must, however, be made here between the willingness to forgive and actual forgiveness. It has to be kept in mind that the latter remains contingent upon the extent to which white South Africans acknowledge the accrual of benefits at the expense of others under apartheid.

Retribution

Forty two per cent of South Africans agree that the beneficiaries of apartheid should in some way feel what it is like to be discriminated against. Amongst the country’s constitutive groups black Africans were the most likely to agree, followed by coloured respondents and then Indian respondents. As can be expected, the lowest level of agreement was registered amongst white South Africans. Both black Africans and Indians recorded their second lowest scores to date.

Satisfaction with Government Action

The national response to a statement relating to satisfaction with government attempts to prosecute apartheid perpetrators rendered results that ran contrary to our expectation that strong opinions will exist about this issue. While 35 per cent agreed and 25 per cent disagreed, close to 40 per cent of respondents indicated that they either don’t know or that they do not hold a particular view on this issue. The lack of clear-cut responses should arguably be attributed to the accessibility of information regarding the prosecutions, rather than a lack of interest.

8. INTERRACIAL RECONCILIATION

The question of national reconciliation can not simply be reduced to the questions of race and racial prejudice. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that respondents have identified income inequality, above race, as the most powerful source of division in present-day South Africa.^v In the 2007 Round of the SARB Survey, 31 per cent of respondents noted that income inequality has become the major obstacle to the achievement of a unified nation. Race and the prejudice that exists around the question of HIV/AIDS, shared the second position with 21 per cent each.

Yet, given the fact that race has existed as the organising principle of apartheid, the prospect of national unity remains unimaginable without racial reconciliation. As Jim Gibson notes: "... interracial reconciliation is perhaps the bedrock without which all other forms of reconciliation is devoid of meaning."²⁵ This is borne out in the fact that vulnerability to poverty and disease in South Africa largely overlaps with the phenomenon of race. It is therefore not surprising that those who have identified income inequality as a primary obstacle, have also reported race as the second most significant obstacle, and *vice versa*.

While many have equated South Africa's peaceful political transition in 1994 with national reconciliation, this view is an oversimplification of reality. The negotiated pact at the CODESA talks can at best be described as a form of political elite reconciliation. Unlike this political elite, South Africans from the country's historically defined groups were still worlds apart from each other at the time. While discriminatory legislation has since been removed from the statute books and legal obstacles to integration have disappeared, some still doubt whether reconciliation has taken root. Jonathan Jansen recently suggested that now, more than ever, we need to bring people together to talk about the past. Jansen expressed his concern when he noted that:

"I sometimes get angry that we had an elite reconciliation, one in which our racially divided political masters resolved differences, went fishing together and negotiated freedom, without a similar process available to ordinary South Africans. There is no manual in CNA or Exclusive Books on racial reconciliation and social justice for citizens as they live and work alongside each other in the heat of day".²⁶

How far have South Africans progressed on the question racial reconciliation? This section will look at public opinion on this issue, but also reports on a number of social distance-, stereo-type-, and social contact indicators, to explain variability in attitudes towards it. It is our contention that low levels of trust and understanding, based on stereotypical views of the other, do impact on people's capacity to build meaningful social- and economic relationships. In their absence, tolerance and consensus may be more difficult to achieve.

Public Opinion on Interracial Reconciliation


In the 2001 and 2003 rounds of its South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) had asked respondents the following question: "Since 1994, do you think that that race relations in the country have improved, remained the same, or deteriorated?" In this most recent round of the SARB Survey we have asked a very similar and comparable question. As part of a measurement to establish perceived change over time on a number of important social issues, the survey has asked respondents: We want to know how you compare the South Africa of today with

^v Question in the 2007: SARB Survey People sometimes talk about the divisions between people in South Africa. Sometimes these divisions cause people to be left out or discriminated against. In other instances it can lead to anger and even violence between groups. What, in your experience, is the biggest division in South Africa today?

the country that it was in 1994, when it became a democracy. Would you say that *race relations* have improved a great deal, improved somewhat, stayed the same, worsened somewhat, or worsened a great deal?”

Figure 20: Race Relations by Race

We want to know how you compare the South Africa of today with the country that it was in 1994, when it became a democracy ("Improved somewhat and "Improved great deal combined. "Deteriorated somewhat" and "deteriorated great deal" combined)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

Figure 20 shows that in 2007 more than half of South Africans (54 per cent), who participated in the SARB Survey, believed that race relations have improved since the first democratic elections. Twenty nine per cent thought it stayed the same, and 12 per cent sensed a worsening in inter-group relations. Although the level of agreement is 12 per cent higher than the 42 per cent recorded by the HSRC in 2001, it is 3 per cent down on this organisation’s measurement that was made in 2003. During 2007 more than half of black Africans and Indians experienced an improvement in relations, while less than half of coloured and white respondents felt that this was the case. The agreement figures for black African, white, and Indian respondents have shown little variance since the 2003 SASAS. Note should, however be taken of the coloured response. While the 2007 SARB response was 15 per cent higher than 2001 SASAS, it is 12 per cent down from the 2003 SASAS. This finding points to the need for closer examination of the factors that could have contributed to this response.

Figure 21: Race Relations by Province

We want to know how you compare the South Africa of today with the country that it was in 1994, when it became a democracy ("Improved somewhat and "Improved great deal combined. "Deteriorated somewhat" and "deteriorated great deal" combined)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

Figure 21 provides a provincial breakdown of responses to the same question. It shows that in the provinces of the Western Cape, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and the Free State at least half of respondents have not experienced improvement in race relations. In this regard the Free State is worst off with one quarter noting that race relations in the province has deteriorated, while another quarter has indicated that nothing has changed. This contrasts with the results for the Eastern Cape where 60 per cent indicated an improvement, 8 per cent a decline, and 25 per cent reported no change.

Figure 22: Race Relations by Age

We want to know how you compare the South Africa of today with the country that it was in 1994, when it became a democracy ("Improved somewhat and "Improved great deal combined. "Deteriorated somewhat" and "deteriorated great deal" combined)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

The results that are presented in Figure 22 point to very little generational difference in national responses regarding race relations. The youth category (respondents between 16 and 34) is only slightly more convinced that things have improved in this regard.

Figure 23: Future Prospects for Race Relations

How confident are you of a happy future for all races in South Africa?
("Very confident and "Fairly confident" combined. "Not very confident" and "Not confident at all" combined)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

Our findings thus far in this subsection suggest that although more than half of South Africans have sensed an improvement in race relations over the past thirteen years, a large proportion is still cautious in their assessment. But how do they regard the future prospects for peaceful coexistence between the country's constitutive groups? The findings in Figure 23 show that the vast majority of respondents share a positive outlook in this regard. Most confidence resides within the black African section of the population, followed by coloured and then Indian respondents. Although white optimism comes close to the 60 per cent mark, it nevertheless remains concerning that a significant proportion of this group does have doubts about this matter.

Cross-racial Contact

Forced segregation under apartheid made the forging of cross-cutting social relationships between individuals of different backgrounds almost impossible. Because it was an ideology based on bias, prejudice became entrenched into the psyche of millions of South Africans, of whom many were introduced to their fellow South Africans through stereotypes rather than factual reality. Arguably one of the greatest challenges for this nation will be to undo these caricatures that we have created of each other. This is, however, unlikely to happen if we do not engage with it purposefully through meaningful dialogue, as Ryland Fisher in his recent publication, *Race*, notes.²⁷


The notion that increased contact and conversation will be beneficial to national reconciliation is based on what psychologists refer to as the contact hypothesis. It posits that sustained contact between antagonistic social groups can break down negative stereotypes vis-à-vis each other.²⁸ Against this background, we have used the frequency of conversations that citizens have with South Africans of racial groups other than their own as a baseline indicator of such contact. It may include any form of communication, ranging from quibbling about a price with a street vendor to conducting intense business negotiations. The objective here has merely been to establish the extent to which people from different population groups are being exposed to one another in their daily routines.

With the second measurement we tried to establish the extent to which informal communication takes place outside formal routines that occur within public and work spaces. In this instance respondents

have been asked about the frequency with which they communicate with other groups at their own homes or in the homes of friends.

Figure 24: Cross-racial Contact

On a typical day during the week, whether at work or otherwise, how often do you talk to people of other racial groups? (% Never)
When you are socialising at home or the homes of friends, how often do you talk to people of other races? (% Never)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

Figure 24 confirms something that is very apparent in the day-to-day lives of South Africans: Levels of inter-racial contact remain low. Twenty six per cent of respondents noted that they never talk to somebody from a different race on an ordinary day, while 48 per cent indicated that they never socialise with other groups. While both these measurements represent considerable improvements on the scores recorded in 2006, they have not managed improve on those that were registered during the first round in 2003. “Never” responses were highest amongst the black African majority, and significantly lower amongst the three minority groups. Amongst Indians, for example, only 3 per cent noted no conversation with other groups, while only 12 per cent indicated that they never socialise outside their group.

As mentioned in previous reports, there are three key explanations for the low levels of contact within the majority black African group and, on the other hand, high incidences of contact for the minority groups. Firstly, the likelihood for inter-group contact by black Africans is much lower, because an individual belongs to a population group that makes up 80 per cent of the population is statistically more likely to have interaction with somebody from the same group. For the same reason, their proportional representation as part of a larger population makes it more likely for individuals from minority groups to have interaction with groups other than their own. A second more structural reason is that most South Africans still tend to settle in areas where their particular population group form a numerical majority. This means that interaction, and particularly social interaction outside of the work environment, will in most instances be between individuals of the same racial group. Thirdly, successive surveys have pointed to a significant correlation between employment status and the frequency of group interaction. Employment encourages upward economic mobility and access to the more racially integrated formal South African economy. The unemployed and impoverished, however, are often stranded in areas that are typically dominated by one racial or cultural group.

Figure 25: Cross-racial Contact by LSM Group

When you are socialising at home or the homes of friends, how often do you talk to people of other races? (% Never)




Source: SARB Survey 2007

Figure 25 very graphically shows the correlation between socio-economic circumstances and cross-racial contact. Amongst the most marginalised section of the population, LSM 1, 72 per cent of respondents have indicated that they never socialise with people from other races. Conversely, the more affluent sections of the population reported higher levels of contact. Our findings therefore suggest that as material disposition improves, the higher the likelihood for inter-racial contact becomes. This pattern is not new and has also been manifest in previous rounds of the survey.

Responses to the two contact questions above reported on actual contact between South Africans of different races. While some of this might have been voluntary, it must also be assumed that in some instances contact might have been imposed by institutional contexts, such as the workplace. Whether South Africans from different racial backgrounds actually prefer to have contact with people that do not form part of their group is a separate question. Respondents have therefore also been asked about their desired frequency of contact with people from other racial groups and were offered the following response categories: "More often", "The same as now", "Less often", and "Never".

Figure 26: Desire for Cross-racial Contact

If you had a choice, would you want to talk to people of another race group (% in favour of more frequent contact).



Source: SARB Survey 2007

Figure 26 reports the responses for those South Africans that indicated the need for higher levels of communication between citizens of different racial backgrounds. Just less than a third of respondents noted a desire for more contact with other groups in this round of the survey – a figure that has shown little variance since the first round of the survey when the corresponding score was 32 per cent. White respondents, with 15 per cent were the least likely to report a preference for increased contact in 2007, while coloured respondents with 38 per cent were the most likely to do so. The positive responses of the latter group has, however, shown a significant decline since the first round of the survey when 67 per cent signaled their desire for higher levels of contact.


Cross-racial Preconceptions

The frequency of cross-racial social contact may in many instances be explained by the levels of prejudice that still exists in our society. When one accepts the underlying assumption of the contact hypothesis that distrust is likely to be reduced by increased exposure of opposing parties to each other, then the findings reported in the previous subsection suggest that racial prejudice in South Africa may still take years to eradicate. It is therefore important to get a sense of what South Africans know about the lives of people who belong to groups other than their own.

To measure the extent of perceived understanding of the “other”, the SARB Survey has asked respondents to rate their knowledge of the “customs and ways” of these groups. While the information at their disposal may in many cases not be based on fact, it does provide a useful indicator of whether respondents base their opinions of, and attitudes to, other groups on perceived knowledge, or whether it is a product of a fear of the unknown.

Figure 27: Understanding Customs and Ways of Others

I find it difficult to understand the customs and ways of groups other than my own. (% Agreement)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

Most South Africans feel that they do not have enough insight into the lives of their fellow citizens from other racial groups. As Figure 27 shows, 61 per cent of respondents in the 2007 round of the SARB Survey indicated that they do not understand the customs and ways of other groups. Should we add a further 12 per cent, who said they were uncertain, and this brings us close to three quarters of South Africans who acknowledge that they have little or no understanding of the ways in which South Africans from groups other than their own live their lives. Black respondents remained the most likely to indicate


their inability to make sense of the ways in which other groups live, while respondents from the smaller minority groups were less prone to do so. Once again, we have to note that the general response for black African respondents does not come as a surprise, given this group's numerical dominance.

An analysis of the different age cohorts in for this measurement has shown that there is very little difference between age groups within the total population, but also within each of the historically defined racial categories. Age, it appears, can therefore be excluded as an explanatory variable in as far as perceived understanding of other racial groups is concerned.

The responses that were reported in Figure 27 measured perceived knowledge of other groups. It did, however, not provide us with information about the content of that knowledge and whether it predisposes an individual towards a positive or negative attitude regarding groups other than their own. As a measurement to establish the extent to which negative perceptions of other groups exist, respondents have been asked to give their views on a statement, which purports that groups other than their own are untrustworthy.

Figure 28: Trustworthiness of other Racial Groups

People of groups other than my own are untrustworthy. (% Agreement)



Source: SARB Survey 2007

The results reported in Figure 28 show that less than half - but still a substantial percentage - of respondents feel that they cannot trust people from groups other than their own. Forty-four per cent noted that they find it difficult to trust people that do not belong to the same historically-defined racial group. Black participants in the survey were the most likely to respond in this way, while similar responses recorded amongst the three smaller groups were much lower. Interestingly the response pattern largely resembles that of the results reported in Figure 27. Closer inspection shows a strong positive correlation ($r = 0.468$) that is significant at the $p < 0.01$ level, between perceived knowledge of other groups and the extent which respondents are willing to trust other groups. Those who reported higher levels of understanding of the "customs and ways" of other groups in this survey were more likely to report trust in these groups. The opposite is also true, less knowledge implied less trust.

Cross-racial social distance

Prolonged historical segregation and the often brutal means with which it was enforced has had an impact on South African patterns of inter-racial contact and the way in which these groups view each other. These conclusions we can draw from the findings presented thus far in this section. This, inevitably, has made many South Africans prone to insecurity in as far the prospect of racial integration

is concerned. The extent to which South Africans would be willing to share their public and more intimate spaces with others that are not like them, can therefore be regarded as an important indicator of the extent to which race relations have normalized within post-apartheid South Africa.

The survey has used three statements to measure different levels of integration. The first was to gauge opinion around integrated neighbourhoods, the second about multi-racial schools, and the third to test the acceptability of inter-racial marriages. Respondents were, however, first asked to single out a racial group, other than their own, with whom they find it most difficult to associate. On the basis of this response they were requested to indicate the extent to which they would agree to integration at the three different levels with this least-associated group. We have approached the measure in this way, because the true test for successful integration arguably lies with the extent to which citizens tolerate the sharing of their private and semi-private spheres with those that they can least associated with.

Table 7: Least Associated Group

Which one of the following groups, apart from your own, do you find most difficult to associate with?

	White	Black	Coloured	Indian
White	-	45%	13%	29%
Black	54%	-	51%	42%
Coloured	9%	12%	-	16%
Indian	26%	40%	25%	-
None	11%	4%	11%	13%

Source: SARB Survey 2007

(Read Table 4 vertically. Columns represent respondent's group; rows represent level of association with other groups.)

The findings presented in Table 6 largely mirror those that were recorded during the 2006 round of the survey. It shows that black African respondents, not surprisingly, regard white South Africans as the group they find most difficult to associate with. Forty five per cent within this category responded in this way. White, coloured and Indian respondents, on the other hand, indicated that in their experience it is most difficult to relate to black African South Africans. For whites this figure was 54 per cent, for coloureds 51 per cent, and for Indians 42 per cent. This then leads us to the next question. To what extent would South Africa's historically-defined groups approve of different levels of racial integration?

Table 8: Disapproval for Integration

Please indicate the extent of your approval with each of the following: (% Disapproval)
If a child from your least-associated group sits next to your child or the child of a family member at school.
Living in a neighbourhood where half of your neighbours are from your least associated group.
The idea of a close relative marrying somebody from the least-associated group.

	Integrated Schools	Shared Neighbourhoods	Inter-racial Marriage
Black	12%	24%	27%
White	8%	23%	73%
Coloured	7%	17%	20%
Indian	7%	18%	29%

The results in Table 7 show that the more intimate the level of integration becomes, the higher the levels of disapproval becomes for each of the four racial groups. All groups showed relatively little opposition to the idea of integrated schools. They became more cautious in as far shared neighbourhoods are concerned, and even more so in relation to the question of inter-racial marriages. The black African group was the most likely to disapprove of the propositions of integrated schools and

vi "Strongly approve" and "Approve" combined.

shared neighbourhoods, albeit at very moderate levels. In as far as inter-racial marriages are concerned white South Africans, have shown the highest level of disapproval by far. Their 73 per cent disapproval of racially-mixed unions marks a 15 per cent increase on the 58 per cent that was recorded for the same measurement in 2006.

Section Summary

Public Opinion on Interracial Reconciliation

Fifty four per cent of South Africans believe that race relations have improved since the first democratic elections, 29 per cent thought it stayed the same, and 12 per cent experienced a decline in the quality of such interaction. This was the first time that the SARB Survey has prompted respondents about their evaluation of present-day race relations in relation to what it was in 1994. Comparisons with previous measurements that were conducted by the HSRC show that although there has been a 12 per cent increase in positive sentiment since 2001, the current figure represents a 3 per cent decline from the HSRC's most recent measurement in 2003. In 2007 more than half of black Africans and Indians experienced an improvement in relations, while less than half of coloured and white respondents felt that this was the case. While the positive responses amongst black African, white, and Indian respondents have shown little variance since the 2003, the same can not be said for the response of coloured respondents. When compared against the 2003 HSRC data, a significant drop of more than 10 per cent seems to have occurred. The 2007 survey show that the vast majority of South Africans are optimistic about increased levels of racial harmony in years to come.

Cross-racial Contact

Levels of inter-racial contact remain low. Although there has been a significant decline in the percentage of respondents who indicated that they never have formal or informal social contact with other groups, these figures are still higher than those that were recorded during the first round of the survey. During this most recent round of the survey 26 per cent of respondents noted that they never talk to somebody from a different race on an ordinary day, while 48 per cent indicated that they have never socialised with people from other groups.

Just less than a third of respondents noted a desire for more contact with other groups in this round of the survey – a figure that has shown little variance since the first round of the survey when the corresponding score was 32 per cent. White respondents, with 15 per cent were the least likely to report a preference for increased contact in 2007, while coloured respondents with 38 per cent were the most likely to do so. The positive responses of the latter group has, however, shown a significant decline since the first round of the survey when 67 per cent signaled their desire for higher levels of contact.

Cross-racial Preconceptions

Most South Africans feel that they do not have enough insight into the lives of their fellow citizens from other racial groups. Sixty one per cent of respondents have indicated in the 2007 round of the SARB Survey that they do not understand the customs and ways of other groups. Should we add to this the further 12 per cent, who noted that they were uncertain, it brings us close to three quarters of South Africans who acknowledge that they have little or no understanding of the ways in which South Africans from groups other than their own live their lives. Black respondents remain the most likely to indicate their inability to make sense of the ways in which other groups live, while respondents from the smaller minority groups were less prone to do so.

Cross-racial Social Distance

Black African respondents continue to regard white South Africans as the group they find most difficult to associate with. Forty five per cent within this category responded in this way. White, coloured and Indian respondents, on the other hand, indicated that in their experience black African South Africans is the group most difficult to relate to. For whites this figure was 54 per cent, for coloureds 51 per cent, and for Indians 42 per cent.

The results show that the more intimate the level of integration becomes, the higher the levels of disapproval tend to become within each of the four racial groups. All groups showed relatively little opposition to the idea of integrated schools. They became more cautious in as far as shared neighbourhoods are concerned, and even more so in relation to the question of inter-racial marriages. Nevertheless, none of the responses, with the exception of white South Africans' 73 per cent disapproval of inter-racial marriages, were exceedingly high.

9. SUMMARY FINDINGS

The 2007 SARB Survey, the seventh of its kind, was conducted in March and April of 2007 by Markinor on behalf of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, amongst a nationally representative sample of 3479 respondents.

As in previous years, the survey measured variance in selected indicators of six key variables that have been identified by the Institute as instrumental in the facilitation of national reconciliation in South Africa. It has been hypothesized that when the indicators strengthen or improve, reconciliation is likely to be advanced. The reverse is also true. Stagnation or decreases in these indicators may set the process back.

This document reported on a number of selected findings emanating from this most recent round of the survey. It set out by identifying six critical variables that ought to underpin the South African reconciliation process. It also operationalised indicators for each of these variables. Here below we recapture some of the key findings relating to each of these variables and their key findings.

Human Security

Physical Security: South Africans' sense of physical security, as measured in terms of their opinions regarding the prospects for personal safety over the next two years, has declined markedly in comparison to the previous measurement period. This drop in positive responses was evident amongst all of the country's constitutive population groups. In 2007 only 39 per cent of respondents, compared to 51 per cent the year before, believed that their physical safety would improve over the next two years.

Economic Security: The economic security indicators pertaining to expectations regarding respondents' personal economic circumstances, as well as their prospects for employment have shown moderate declines from the previous round of the survey. Evaluation of government service delivery was the greatest casualty in this category. None of the twenty-three performance areas measuring government performance showed increases. The biggest decline was for the item "Transparency and Accountability" that dropped by 28 per cent.

Cultural Security: A majority of citizens are convinced about religious equality in South Africa, while a strong majority also feels that their mother tongue language gets the recognition that it deserves. In both instances white South Africans show the lowest levels of agreement, and particularly so on the question of language where affirmative responses of less than 50 per cent were recorded.

Political Culture

Leadership Legitimacy: In a year when the issue of leadership has been on everybody's lips, fewer South Africans have indicated trust in our national leaders. In 2006, 65 per cent of respondents responded that they trust the country's leaders to do what is right. In 2007 this figure is 8 percentage points down to 57 per cent. The percentage of South Africans who feel that government does not care about people like them increased from 52 to 53 per cent.

Institutional Legitimacy: Public confidence measured for thirteen key institutions dropped significantly. Twelve out of 13 recorded decreases in confidence of over 5 per cent. The biggest casualties were institutions that can be broadly categorised as representative democratic institutions. The biggest

decreases were recorded for “National Government” and “Political Parties” (both -10 per cent), the “Presidency” and “Provincial Government” (both -9 per cent) and “Parliament” (-8 per cent). Overall, “Local Government” (43 per cent) and “Political Parties” (37 per cent) instilled the least confidence in citizens.

The Rule of Law: The vast majority of respondents indicated that the laws of the land should be abided to, regardless of the party in power. Only 17 per cent of respondents agreed with a statement purporting that they do not have to obey the laws of a party that they did not vote for. This is 11 percentage points down from the 28 per cent that was measured during the first round of this survey.

Cross-Cutting Socio-Political Relationships

National Unity: A majority of South Africans (70 per cent) believes that a sense of national unity, which transcends cultural and historic differences, should be prioritised. Indian respondents (87 per cent) were the most likely to respond in this way, followed by coloureds (74 per cent), black Africans (72 per cent), and white South Africans (62 per cent). However, fewer respondents in the total national sample (61 per cent) were optimistic about achieving a sense of national unity. This finding is also mirrored in the responses of the country’s historically defined racial groups. Indians (73 per cent) were once again most optimistic in this regard, followed by black Africans (63 per cent) and coloureds (58 per cent). The white group was the only one where less than half of respondents signaled their optimism about national unity.

Group Association: The seventh round of the SARB Survey has for the first time measured South African preferences for group association. A national identity (those who regard themselves as primarily South African) features fourth on this list of preferred primary association categories, and third on the list of average combined first and second choices. The three most preferred associational groups were “language”, “race” and “ethnic” groups in this order. “Ethnic” and “language” were the two most popular second choices, followed by “race” and “neighbourhood” together in the third place. On average “Language” and “ethnic” were either a first or second choice for the majority for respondents, while “South African” and “Race” were together in the third place. The top three first choices are therefore largely exclusionary and together constitute just under 50 per cent of all responses.

Racially-mixed Political Parties: Less than half of South Africans (44 per cent), but nevertheless a substantial number, use race as a criteria to discern in their choice of political party. Black Africans (48 per cent) and whites (35 per cent) were the most likely to respond in this way. The corresponding figures for coloured and Indian respondents were 27 and 20 per cent respectively.

Dialogue

Conversations about Race: The vast majority of respondents were hesitant to speak openly about the subject of race, particularly when people from other races were present. Even in same-race conversations a significant proportion of South Africans indicated that they are cautious to address the topic. These findings cut across racial lines.

Historical Confrontation

Acknowledgement: On a national level, significant majorities agreed with the contentions that apartheid was a “crime against humanity” (87 per cent), and that “horrific atrocities” were committed (78 per cent) in order to keep the regime intact. There remains a significant divide between the stronger levels of agreement amongst black African, coloured, and Indian respondents on the one hand, and weaker white responses on the other for both measurements. A closer analysis of white South African

responses to the question relating to the occurrence of atrocities under apartheid shows a generational difference in perceptions of this period. Half of those aged younger than thirty-five, agreed with the statement, compared to almost 60 per cent for those above this age.

Forgiveness: Most respondents in each of the historically defined groups that bore the brunt of apartheid, agreed with a statement purporting their willingness to forgive those who benefited from their oppression. For Indian respondents this figure was 69 per cent, for coloureds 65 per cent, and for black Africans 64 per cent. It has to be kept in mind that the latter remains contingent upon the extent to which white South Africans acknowledge the accrual of benefits at the expense of others under apartheid.

Retribution: Forty-two per cent of South Africans agree that the beneficiaries of apartheid should in some way feel what it is like to be discriminated against. Black Africans (44 per cent) and coloured respondents (34 per cent) were the most likely to agree, followed by Indian- (23 per cent), and white respondents (15 per cent). Both black Africans and Indians recorded their second lowest scores to date.

Satisfaction with Government Action: While 35 per cent of respondents agreed that government has performed well in prosecuting apartheid transgressors is concerned, and 25 per cent disagreed with the same statement, close to 40 per cent said that they either don't know or that they do not hold a particular view on this issue. The lack of clear-cut responses should arguably be attributed to the accessibility of information regarding prosecutions, rather than a lack of interest.

Interracial Relations

Public Opinion on Race Relations: Fifty four per cent of South Africans believe that race relations have improved since 1994, 29 per cent thought that nothing changed, and 12 per cent experienced a decline in the quality of such interaction. In 2007 more than half of black Africans (54 per cent) and Indians (66 per cent) experienced an improvement in relations, while less than half of coloured (49 per cent) and white respondents (42 per cent) felt that this was the case.

Cross-racial Contact: During this most recent round of the survey 26 per cent of respondents noted that they never talk to somebody from a different race on an ordinary day, while 48 per cent indicated that they have never socialised with people from other groups. Just less than a third of respondents noted a desire for more contact with other groups in this round of the survey. White respondents, with 15 per cent were the least likely to report a preference for increased contact in 2007, while coloured respondents with 38 per cent were the most likely to do so. The positive responses of the latter group has, however, shown a significant decline since the first round of the survey when 67 per cent signaled their desire for higher levels of contact.

Cross-racial Preconceptions: Sixty one per cent of respondents have indicated in the 2007 round of the SARB Survey that they do not understand the customs and ways of other groups. Should we add to this the further 12 per cent, who noted that they were uncertain, it brings us close to three quarters of South Africans who acknowledge that they have little or no understanding of the ways in which South Africans from groups other than their own live their lives. Black African respondents (64 per cent) were the more likely to do so. The corresponding figures for white, coloured, and Indians were 48-, 47- and 43 per cent respectively.

Cross-racial social distance: Forty five per cent of black African respondents (the single largest group) regard white South Africans as the group they find most difficult to associate with. White, coloured and Indian respondents, on the other hand, indicated that in their experience black African South Africans is

the group most difficult to relate to. For whites this figure was 54 per cent, for coloureds 51 per cent, and for Indians 42 per cent. When respondents were asked about their degree of approval for higher levels integration with their "least-associated group", the results show that the more intimate the level of integration becomes, the higher the levels of disapproval tend to become within each of the four racial groups.

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